PHILOS 1E03 Exam Review

Does God Exist?

St. Anselm of Canterbury: Proslogion

 Anselm is often credited with being the first major thinker in the medieval Christian tradition to place great
importance on the rational justification of theology. Accumulating facts about God would bring for a better
personal acquaintance with God.
 Creator of the Ontological Argument, an argument that sets out to logically prove that God exists as well as that
he has a set nature (benevolent, omnipotent, and omniscient). The argument is an ‘a priori’ argument – that is it
sets out to prove the existence of God through the
basis of reason alone, independently of sense experience.

 Proslogion Chapters 2 – 5:
 Two types of existence: existence in the mind and existence in actual reality. One can exist only in the mind,
exist in both the mind and actual reality, or only exist in actual reality.
 Anselm uses the example of an artist to prove that the idea of the artist, the image of the painting, sculpture,
etc., that what he has in mind "belong[s] to the very nature of the mind itself" whereas other sorts of things are
distinct from "the understanding that grasps" them. He is saying that the artwork exists simply because it exists
in the mind.
 The Ontological Argument
1. God exists in the understanding but not in reality.
2. Existence in reality is greater than existence in the understanding alone.
3. A being having all of God’s properties plus existence in reality can be conceived.
4. A being having all of God’s properties plus existence in reality is greater than God.
5. A being greater than God can be conceived.
6. It is false that a being than God can be conceived (that than which nothing greater can be conceived).
7. Hence, it is false that God exists in the understanding but in reality.
8. God exists in the understanding.
9. Hence, God exists in reality.
 Pro Insipiente (On Behalf of the Fool) by Gaunilo of Marmoutiers
1. Gaunilo criticizes Anselm’s example of the artist and his work of art. Gaunilo's point is that art is
inextricably tied to the mind that creates it; intent to create is a necessary condition for art. In contrast,
other things exist independently of the mind; the mind is not necessary for them to exist at all. Thus,
while there is a sense in which an object of art exists in the mind and a sense in which that same work of
art exists in the mind of the artist, there is no parallel for things that exist independently of the mind.
Where the existence of something is independent of mind, Gaunilo argues, the understanding of that
thing is a distinct entity from that thing itself. Thus, there are not two ways in which something-than-
which-no-greater-can-be-thought exists. Rather, there really are two distinct things: the idea of
something-than-which-no-greater-can-be-thought and that thing itself.
2. A different criticism concerns Anselm's claim that we have an understanding of something-than-which-
no-greater-can-be-thought. Gaunilo distinguishes two ways in which one might have a conception of
something that one has never encountered. First, one might have a conception of something never
encountered on the basis of having encountered other things like it. In this sense one can have an idea
 of a person never encountered because one has encountered other persons and understands general
human characteristics. Second, one might have a conception of something encountered by "the verbal
formula. In this sense one has some notion of the meanings of words describing the unknown, but
merely "tries to imagine what the words he has heard might mean. Since the something-than-which-no-
greater-can-be-thought is unlike anything we have encountered, one cannot have a conception of it in
the first sense. Thus, if one has a conception at all, it must be in the second sense. But if one only
understands something-than-which-no-greater-can-be-thought in this sense, it doesn't really seem that
the conception is in one's mind at all.
3. Lastly, Gaunilo argues that one might apply Anselm's reasoning of the Ontological Argument to other
objects in order to "prove" that they exist. Gaunilo argues that we can imagine an island than which no
greater island is possible. If we suppose that this island does not exist outside the mind, and since such
an island would be greater were it to exist, we can think of an island greater than the island than which
none greater can be thought. Thus, the claim that the island does not exist outside the mind must be
false. Clearly there is no such island, Gaunilo argues, and the Ontological Proof must therefore be
defective.
 Anselm’s Reply to Gaunilo
1. In Anselm’s reply to Gaunilo, he reasserts that anything than which nothing greater can be conceived
must exist in reality, but explains that this reasoning can only work for God alone, as God is the only
being than which no greater can be conceived. “Now I promise confidently that if any man shall devise
anything existing either in reality or in concept alone (except that than which a greater cannot be
conceived) to which he can adapt the
sequence of my reasoning, I will discover that thing, and will give him lost island, not to be lost again”
(68). Simply put, we can always conceive of a lost island more perfect than a lost island we have already
conceived, but we cannot conceive of anything greater than a being than which no greater can be
conceived. This being is God, and by its very essence of anything greater being inconceivable, it must
exist.

St. Thomas Aquinas

 His great achievement was that he brought together Christian theology with the insights of Greek philosophy
and created a formidable systematic and powerful body of thought.
 Summa Theologiae: Part 1, Question 2, The Existence of God
This piece of work is about God’s essence and in particular about whether God exists. He breaks down this
question into three parts, and in each part – called an ‘Article’ – Aquinas first considers objections to his
position, then lays out his view, and then answers the objections.
1. The First Article considers whether God’s existence is self-evident: that is, whether it is simply obvious to
everyone who considers the matter that God must exist. Aquinas claims that it is not self-evident (except to
be learned), and so some kind of argument will be needed to convince the unbeliever. In this section
Aquinas argues against the Ontological Argument for the existence of God.
2. The Second Article discusses whether God’s existence can be rationally demonstrated at all, or whether it is
something that must be merely accepted on faith: Aquinas argues that God’s existence can be proven.
3. Finally, the Third Article proceeds to lay out this proof; in fact, Aquinas thinks there are no fewer than five
good arguments for the existence of God (his famous “five ways”).

The First Way: Argument from Motion

1. Our senses prove that some things are in motion.

2. Things move when potential motion becomes actual motion.
 3. Only an actual motion can convert a potential motion into an actual motion.
4. Nothing can be at once in both actuality and potentiality in the same respect (i.e., if both
actual and potential, it is actual in one respect and potential in another).
5. Therefore nothing can move itself.
6. Therefore each thing in motion is moved by something else.
7. The sequence of motion cannot extend ad infinitum.
8. Therefore it is necessary to arrive at a first mover, put in motion by no other; and this
everyone understands to be God.

The Second Way: Argument from Efficient Causes

1. We perceive a series of efficient causes of things in the world.

2. Nothing exists prior to itself.
3. Therefore nothing is the efficient cause of itself.
4. If a previous efficient cause does not exist, neither does the thing that results.
5. Therefore if the first thing in a series does not exist, nothing in the series exists.
6. The series of efficient causes cannot extend ad infinitum into the past, for then there would
be no things existing now.
7. Therefore it is necessary to admit a first efficient cause, to which everyone gives the name of
God.

The Third Way: Argument from Possibility and Necessity (Reductio argument)

1. We find in nature things that are possible to be and not to be, that come into being and go
out of being i.e., contingent beings.
2. Assume that every being is a contingent being.
3. For each contingent being, there is a time it does not exist.
4. Therefore it is impossible for these always to exist.
5. Therefore there could have been a time when no things existed.
6. Therefore at that time there would have been nothing to bring the currently existing
contingent beings into existence.
7. Therefore, nothing would be in existence now.
8. We have reached an absurd result from assuming that every being is a contingent being.
9. Therefore not every being is a contingent being.
10. Therefore some being exists of its own necessity, and does not receive its existence from
another being, but rather causes them. This all men speak of as God.

The Fourth Way: Argument from Gradation of Being

1. There is a gradation to be found in things: some are better or worse than others.
2. Predications of degree require reference to the “uttermost” case (e.g., a thing is said to be
hotter according as it more nearly resembles that which is hottest).
3. The maximum in any genus is the cause of all in that genus.
4. Therefore there must also be something which is to all beings the cause of their being,
goodness, and every other perfection; and this we call God.

The Fifth Way: Argument from Design

1. We see that natural bodies work toward some goal, and do not do so by chance.
2. Most natural things lack knowledge.
3. But as an arrow reaches its target because it is directed by an archer, what lacks intelligence
 achieves goals by being directed by something intelligence.
4. Therefore some intelligent being exists by whom all natural things are directed to their end;
and this being we call God.

David Hume
 Hume can be called the first ‘post-skeptical’ modern philosopher. He was wholly convinced that no knowledge
that goes beyond the mere data of our minds has anything like secure and reliable foundations: that is, he
believed, we have no certain knowledge of the inner workings of the physical world and its laws, or of God, or of
absolute moral ‘truth’, or even of our own ‘real selves.’ All we have secure knowledge of is our own mental
states and their relations: our sensory impressions, our ideas, our emotions, and so on.
 Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion
There are three speakers in this dialogue: Cleanthes, who advocates the argument from design; Demea, who
defends both mysticism and, occasionally, a kind of cosmological argument; and Philo, who plays the role of a
skeptical critic of both of the others. The dialogue contains twelve sections: the first, sixth, and twelfth have
been omitted here.
1. The three players lay out their basic positions with regard to religion. Demea notes that he would
not teach theology at all until late in a child's upbringing until after an instinctive devotion had been
ingrained (a modern skeptic would call this brainwashing). Philo sarcastically endorses this position
because he feels that, once we leave the realm of common experience, so many philosophical
positions become defensible that it is impossible to choose between them (In other words, it does
no harm to delay because it's all worthless anyhow). Cleanthes notes that extreme skeptics
nevertheless do not live up to their own statements because they continually behave is if some
position or other were really more valid. Philo notes that theologians at various times have
embraced or opposed reason as it suits their purposes, to which Cleanthes replies, so what?
Everyone makes use of the ideas that best supports his position.

2. Philo and Demea both assert that any real understanding of God is unattainable, Demea because
God is so inscrutable, Philo because none of our conclusions can be trusted. Cleanthes basically lays
out the Argument from Design. Demea is mortified at the comparison of God to a human artisan.
Philo argues that we cannot validly argue by comparing what we observe in a small part of the
universe to the universe as a whole. [In Hume's day, even the existence of the planet Uranus was
unknown. Galaxies were visible in telescopes as fuzzy patches but were not known to be distant
star systems. Spectroscopy, with its incredible power to probe the nature of stars, was a century in
the future. The only laws of nature that were really known in rigorous quantitative terms were
Newton's laws of motion and gravitation. It never occurred to Hume or anyone else that we might
one day have ways of testing whether the laws of nature on Earth applied through the cosmos. In
modern terms, Philo is dead wrong.]

3. Cleanthes continues to argue for Design. He points out that if we were to hear a voice coming from
the clouds, we would not hesitate to ascribe to it intelligence, and if books grew on trees like fruit,
we would certainly deduce from their contents that there was an intelligence behind their design.
Although these are rather weird and contrived arguments, Cleanthes points out that what is
actually observed in nature could hardly be more surprising, or more clearly indicative of
intelligence. Demea continues to flog the dead horse of being unable to ascribe humanly
comprehensible attributes to God.
4. Cleanthes demolishes Demea by pointing out that a mind which has no thought is not a mind, and a
view of God that makes him utterly unknowable is not very different from atheism. Philo,
meanwhile, has caught his breath and wades back in. He attacks the idea of reasoning from earthly
particulars to the universe as a whole, and pretty well lays out the modern skeptical opposition to
the Argument from Design, asking why, if ideas in God's mind organize themselves without cause,
why matter couldn't do the same thing. Cleanthes retorts that, regardless of Philo's "abstruse
doubts, cavils and objections," the chain of inference from order to designer is too clear and
straightforward to doubt.

5. Philo fires a broadside against Cleanthes. He points out that the then-new discoveries in astronomy
and under the microscope undermine Cleanthes by making the universe less and less like human
design. He points out that humans are in no better position to judge whether the universe is well
designed than an illiterate peasant is to evaluate the Aeneid. He argues that we have no way of
knowing whether the universe might not be the work of a team of deities, or perhaps a discarded
trial run [positions that run counter to orthodox Christianity, of course, but not to the idea of
intelligent design]. Cleanthes replies that not one of these arguments successfully refutes the fact
of design itself.

6. Philo presses on, urged on by Demea, who sees all these contradictory views of God as further
proof of his own position. He argues that, if we are going to argue by analogy, then the universe is
much more like an organism than a machine, with God as its soul, so that Cleanthes' design is
tantamount to anthropomorphism (or perhaps pantheism). Cleanthes retorts that Philo's view
suggests that the universe is infinitely old, a claim that he refutes. [Since this all happens before
there is any real understanding of the age of the universe or the earth, the arguments are pretty
much irrelevant to modern ears.]

7. Philo continues, arguing that if the universe resembles an organism, it is much more likely to have
originated by generation from matter itself. "Wait," says Demea, "I'm lost. Explain." Philo
speculates that perhaps comets are seeds of solar systems, to which Demea asks what data there is
to support such a view. Philo replies, "my point exactly. There are no data to allow any theories of
cosmogony." [Again, this argument is hopelessly dated] Philo cites the examples of plants creating
order from seeds, and rather cavalierly dismisses the possibility that the entire process might be
proof of design. [One wonders how Philo would deal with DNA and the genetic code.] Cleanthes is
not impressed and says "such whimsies as you have delivered, may puzzle, but can never convince
us."

8. Philo argues that the appearance of order in nature could simply derive from the nature of matter
itself. Cleanthes argues that the features of nature that are advantageous to humans proves the
existence of a benevolent intelligence. [This is obviously a pre-Darwinian outlook, and atheists
pounced with glee on natural selection as an answer to this argument.] Philo points out "thought
has no influence upon matter except where that matter is so conjoined with it, as to have an equal
reciprocal influence upon it. No animal can move immediately any thing but the members of its
own body." to argue that pure intelligence could not manipulate matter.

9. Demea argues that since arguments a posteriori are inconclusive, the only way to go is an a priori
declaration of faith. Cleanthes points out that the usefulness of an approach doesn't make it valid,
then, to anticipate Philo's arguments, attempts to show that one cannot demonstrate the existence
of God a priori. Nothing is demonstrable, unless the contrary implies a contradiction. Nothing, that
is distinctly conceivable, implies a contradiction. Whatever we conceive as existent, we can also
 conceive as non-existent. There is no Being, therefore, whose non-existence implies a
contradiction. Consequently there is no Being, whose existence is demonstrable. Philo adds that
some patterns in mathematics that appear like wonderful design can be shown to arise from the
nature of numbers themselves; maybe the order in nature is similarly merely a result of the nature
of matter.

10. Demea argues the instinctive nature of religious belief, the wretched state of humanity and the
universal hope of a better world. Philo counters by asking why the world is so wretched if it is
controlled by a benevolent intelligence. Demea argues that the pains of this life might be balanced
by rewards somewhere else, a position that Cleanthes rejects as unprovable. He states "the only
method of supporting divine benevolence is to deny absolutely the wickedness and misery of man."
Philo shreds this argument, noting that pains are far more intense than pleasures and that the
natural state of man offers no grounds whatever for deriving moral principles.

11. Cleanthes explores the idea that perhaps evil is the price of achieving some greater good. Philo asks
if the world is the sort of thing a rational, impartial observer would picture as the work of a
benevolent Being. [C.S. Lewis makes very similar arguments in Mere Christianity with quite
different ends in mind.] Philo ascribes the misery in the world to four causes:

 The existence of pain as well as pleasure. Why does pain exist at all as a motivator?
 The rigidity of the laws of nature. He notes that a few judicious divine interventions could have spared
history the agony of Caligula's reign without appearing to upset the course of nature [As Tevye would
put it, "Would it spoil some vast eternal plan / If I were a wealthy man?" The obvious counter is that
we don't know how many even worse disasters might have been averted by interventions we do not
detect as such.]
 The economy of nature which limits the ability of creatures to resist or avoid harm. [He asserts that
nature is so economical that no creature is known to have become extinct, a claim that to present day
readers needs no further comment.]
 The imperfections in nature. Rain is essential for life, but why is it sometimes too little and other times
too much? [Updated versions of this argument are standards of modern critics of the Argument from
Design.]

Philo goes on to argue that we can frame four hypotheses about the first causes of the Universe: it was all
good, it was all evil, it was both good and evil, or it is neither good nor evil. We can dismiss the first two
outright since we see both good and evil in the Universe. The third is essentially Manichaeanism, and seems
hard to reconcile with the uniformity of general laws of nature [a fairly dubious line of reasoning] so he opts
for the fourth. Demea realizes to his horror where Philo is going with all this and leaves.

12. Philo and Cleanthes conclude on a more cordial note, with Philo admitting that his hatred of
superstition and corrupted religion sometimes carries him to extremes, while Cleanthes argues that
even corrupted religion is better than none. At the end of the book, Pamphilus observes:

I cannot but think that Philo's principles are more probable than Demea's, but those of Cleanthes approach
still nearer the truth.
The Problem of Evil; Religious Beliefs
Gottfried Leibniz
 Leibniz sets up his work through a breakdown of “objections”. An objection is set up with a certain structure:
Major Premise (a universal claim)
Minor Premise (a statement of fact)
Conclusion
 "Theodicy" is a term that Leibniz coined from the Greek words theos (God) and dike (righteous). A theodicy is an
attempt to justify or defend God in the face of evil by answering the following problem, which in its most basic
form involves these assumptions:

1. God is all good and all powerful (and, therefore, all knowing).
2. The universe/creation was made by God and/or exists in a contingent relationship to God.
3. Evil exists in the world. Why?

 Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz’s Theodicy was published six years before his death and has the distinction of being his
only book-length philosophical work published during his lifetime. Leibniz coined the term “theodicy,” which
means “vindication of the justice of God.” For Leibniz, a product of the French Enlightenment, the proper way of
vindicating the justice and goodness of God in the face of evil was through reason, not faith. The overarching
theme of the Theodicy is that at least some religious doctrines can be rationally demonstrated and need not be
taken as articles of faith.
 The problem of evil involves the apparent inconsistency of the existence of a morally perfect and omnipotent
God and the existence of evil. If God were morally perfect, it seems that God would want to eliminate all evil,
and if God were omnipotent, then it would be within God’s power to eliminate evil. Thus it seems that evil could
not exist if God does. However, since evil obviously does exist, it appears that God either does not exist or is not
both morally perfect and omnipotent. Leibniz, who wanted to retain the orthodox conception of God as a
morally perfect and omnipotent being, thus needed to explain why God allows evil. In the context of Leibniz’s
philosophy and his fundamental theological principle that God always chooses the best, the challenge thus
became one of explaining how the actual world, with all of its evil, is nevertheless the “best of all possible
worlds,” to use Leibniz’s phrase.
 Leibniz begins by distinguishing three types of evil: metaphysical evil (the evil involved in the existence of any
finite and imperfect thing), physical evil (pain and suffering), and moral evil (sin resulting from human free will).
Metaphysical evil is a problem for theism because it may seem that a perfect God would create a perfect world,
and so the fact that this world is not perfect shows that such a perfect being does not exist. Leibniz’s response is
that while God can do anything that is logically possible, it is not logically possible for God to create a perfect
world because such a world would be indistinguishable from God.
 TO BE FAMILIAR WITH ALL OF LEIBNIZ’S OBJECTIONS AND ANSWERS TO THE PROBLEM OF EVIL, PLEASE READ
PGS. 88 – 95!!!

J.L. Mackie

 The modern formulation of this problem by John Mackie is also very similar to David Hume’s eighteenth-century
version. Mackie’s formulation of the problem looks like this:

1. God exists, is all good, all knowing, and all powerful.

2. Such a being has no limits to its ability.
3. A good being will always eliminate all the evil that it can.
4. Evil exists, so God must not.
Theists will agree with the first two claims but call into question the third by qualifying it: "A good being will always
eliminate all the evil that it can unless it has good reason to allow that evil."

Therefore, a modified version of Mackie’s argument looks like this:

1. "If God exists, then there is no evil, unless there is a reason that would justify Him in permitting it."
2. Evil exists.
3. "There is no reason that would justify God to permit evil."
4. So, God does not exist.

The crux of the theistic response is to show that indeed God is indeed justified in permitting evil.

Alvin Plantinga
 Many philosophers in the foundationalist and evidentialist tradition argue that belief in God is only rational
insofar as it has enough evidence to support it. Properly basic beliefs are rational, but belief in God cannot be
properly basic. Plantinga argues that belief in God is properly basic, so it is rational to hold even without being
supported by further beliefs, and that arguments against its basicality fail. Philosophers who object to belief in
God based on lack of evidence espouse a normative view that we have an obligation or a duty to follow the
evidence where it leads and belief truth. The argument seems to be

1) If belief in God is rational, then it is either because it has adequate evidence or because it is properly basic

2) Belief in God is not properly basic.

3) Therefore, if belief in God is rational, then it is because it has adequate evidence.

4) Belief in God does not have adequate evidence.

5) Therefore, belief in God is not rational.

Plantinga rejects (2). His general argument is

6) If belief in God is properly basic, then it is rational to believe even without evidence.

7) Belief in God is properly basic.

8) Therefore, belief in God is rational to believe even without evidence.

 Plantinga mainly defends (7). Properly basic beliefs are not inferred from other beliefs that we have, but are
formed or occasioned by a justifying circumstance. For Christians, belief in God is formed by certain
circumstances such as knowing that one is guilty and needs forgiveness, a disposition to think that God made
the world or that he is to be thanked and praised. In these circumstances, Christians can belief God in a basic
way properly, so are rational in believing he exists.
 One objection to belief in God being properly basic is that the belief would be groundless or arbitrary if it is not
supported by evidence. However, basic beliefs are not groundless. Beliefs like “I see a tree” or “I feel pain on
my knee” are based on certain experiences, occasions, states of affairs, etc., so they are not groundless even if
they are not accepted because of other beliefs. The same can be said of God. Maybe there are certain
circumstances that occasion belief in God in a properly functioning mind, such as the feeling of guilt before a
holy God and his forgiveness of your wrongdoing, or a sense of gratitude to some being when you see a sunset,
etc. If so, it is not a groundless belief.
  Perhaps one will say that it is not strictly belief in God that is properly basic, but beliefs like “God is angry at me,”
or “God forgives me” or “God made these things,” but it follows logically from these beliefs that God exists. One
may speak loosely about belief in God itself being properly basic, but it is not groundless.
 If belief in God is properly basic, can just any belief be basic? Some have argued that, but there does not seem
to be any reason to think so. If someone argued against the verifiability criterion, according to which
propositions are not meaningful unless they can be empirically verified, that does not mean that he must think
just any proposition is meaningful. In the same way, thinking that belief in God is properly basic does not
commit one to thinking that just any belief is properly basic.
 Perhaps the problem is that the reformed epistemologist rejects a certain criterion for proper basicality, since he
believes that God is properly basic, but he does not argue for a certain criteria. But one does not need to argue
for a certain criterion in order to be justified in rejecting another. A person needs to start where he is at when
taking the beliefs he has and coming up with a criteria for proper basicality. For Christians, this will include
God’s being properly basic, but it will not include the Great Pumpkin or some other belief that does not seem
basic to the Christian.

Epistemology - How do we know what we know?

Renee Descartes
 Descartes great inspiration for his work Meditations came from three vivid dreams that he had one night.
 Descartes became obsessed by the thought that no lasting scientific progress was possible without a systematic
method for sifting through our preconceived assumptions and distinguishing between those that are reliable
and those that are false. Descartes’ central intellectual goal was to develop just such as reliable scientific
method, and then to construct a coherent and unified theory of the world and of humankinds place within it.
This theory, he hoped, would replace the deeply flawed medieval system of thought (based on the science of
Aristotle and Christian theology) called scholasticism.
 A key feature of Descartes’ system is that all knowledge should be based on utterly reliable foundations,
discovered through the systematic rejection of any assumptions that can possibly be called into doubt.
 For Descartes, all human knowledge of the world around us essentially relies upon our prior knowledge that a
non-deceiving God exists. Science, properly understood, not only does not conflict with religion but actually
depends on religion, he believed.
 One of the best-known results of Descartes metaphysical reflections is : “Cartesian dualism”. This doctrine states
that mind and body are two completely different substances – that the mind is non-physical self in which all the
operations of thought take place, and which can be wholly separated from the body after death.
 Meditations on First Philosophy
- Read pages 142 – 144 for the textbook synopsis of the six meditations

Meditation I

1. A firm foundation for the sciences requires a truth that is absolutely certain; for this purpose, I will reject
all my beliefs for which there is even a possibility of doubt, and whatever truths are left will be
absolutely certain.

2. To this end it is not necessary to go through all my beliefs individually, since they are all based on a
more fundamental belief. If there is any reason to doubt this foundation belief, then all the beliefs based
on it are equally doubtful.
3. All my beliefs about the world are based on the fundamental belief that the senses tell me the truth.
But this belief is not absolutely certain. It is at least possible that everything my senses tell me is an
illusion created by a powerful being. Therefore, there is some reason to doubt my foundation belief, and
thus all my beliefs about the world are doubtful; none of them can serve as the foundation for science.

Meditation II

1. If all my beliefs about the world are doubtful, is there any truth which can be absolutely certain? Yes.
Even if all of my experience is an illusion, it cannot be doubted that the experience is taking place. And
this means that I, the experiencer, must exist.

2. Since the only evidence I have that I exist is that I am thinking (experiencing), then it is also absolutely
certain that I am a thing that thinks (experiences), that is, a mind.

3. Since I am not certain (yet) that the physical world (including my body) exists, but I am certain that I
exist, it follows that I am not my body. Therefore, I know with certainty that I am only a mind.

4. I am much more certain of my mind's existence than my body's. It might seem that in fact we know
physical things through the senses with greater certainty than we know something intangible like the
mind. But the wax experiment demonstrates that the senses themselves know nothing, and that only
the intellect truly knows physical things. It follows that the mind itself is known with greater certainty
than anything that we know through the senses.

Meditation III

1. Every idea must be caused, and the cause must be as real as the idea. If I have any idea of which I
cannot be the cause, then something besides me must exist.

2. All ideas of material reality could have their origin within me. But the idea of God, an infinite and
perfect being, could not have originated from within me, since I am finite and imperfect.

3. I have an idea of God, and it can only have been caused by God. Therefore God exists.

Meditation IV

1. Only an imperfect (less than perfectly good) being could practice deliberate deception. Therefore,
God is no deceiver.

2. Since my faculty of judgment comes from God, I can make no mistake as long as I use it properly. But
it is not an infinite faculty; I make mistakes when I judge things that I don't really know.

3. God also gave me free will, which is infinite and therefore extends beyond my finite intellect. This is
why it is possible to deceive myself: I am free to jump to conclusions or to proclaim as knowledge things
that I don't know with absolute certainty.

4. I therefore know now that if I know something with absolute certainty (clearly and distinctly), then I
cannot be mistaken, because God is no deceiver. The correct way to proceed is to avoid mistakes and
limit my claims to knowledge to those things I know clearly and distinctly.

Meditation V

1. Now I want to find what can be known for certain about material objects. Before deciding whether
they exist outside me, I know that my ideas of them consist of shape, size, motion, etc. I also know that
by thinking about these attributes I can discover certain facts that are necessarily true about them (the
truths of geometry, for example).

2. I do not invent ideas such as geometrical shapes, nor do I get them from sensory experience. Proof of
this is the fact that I can discover geometrical truths about figures which I cannot imagine.

3. Just as, by thinking about my ideas of geometrical shapes, I can discover truths that necessarily belong
to them, I can do the same with God. I have a clear and distinct idea of a perfect being. Perfect = lacking
nothing. I cannot conceive of a being that is perfect but lacks existence. Therefore, existence necessarily
belongs to God.

4. This doesn't mean that my thinking of something makes it exist. If I conceive of a triangle, I must
conceive of a figure whose angles equal two right angles. But it doesn't follow that the triangle must
exist. But God is different. God, being perfect, is the one being to whom existence must belong. Thus,
when I conceive of God, I must conceive of a being that exists.

5. Because God, being perfect, is not a deceiver, I know that once I have perceived something clearly
and distinctly to be true, it will remain true, even if later I forget the reasoning that led me to that
conclusion. I could not have this certainty about anything if I did not know God.

Meditation VI

1. All that is left is to determine whether material objects exist with certainty. I know that the abstract
shapes representing them are real, since I perceive them clearly and distinctly in geometry.

2. Furthermore, I have a faculty of imagination, by which I can conceive of material objects, and which is
different from my intellect. That it is different is proven by my ability to do geometry with unimaginable
figures. Only intellect is necessary for my existence.

3. The most likely explanation for the existence of my faculty of imagination is that my mind is joined
with a body that has sense organs. This is even more likely in the case of the faculty of sensation.

4. It formerly seemed that all my knowledge of objects came through the senses, that their ideas
originated from and corresponded to objects outside me. It also seemed that my body belonged
 especially to me, although I did not understand the apparent connection between mind and body.

5. Then I found it possible to doubt everything. Now I am in the process of systematically removing
doubts where certainty exists.

6. Now that I know God can create anything just as I apprehend it, the distinctness of two things in my
mind is sufficient to conclude that they really are distinct. Thus I know I exist, I am a thinking thing, and
although I may possess a body, "it is certain that this I is entirely and absolutely distinct from my body,
and can exist without it."

7. My faculty of sensing is passive and thus presupposes a faculty of causing sensation, which cannot be
within me, since some ideas come to me without my cooperation and even against my will; it therefore
belongs to something else. This is either a body or God. But since God is not a deceiver, he doesn't plant
these ideas directly in me (doesn't make me believe in a nonexistent world). Therefore corporeal things
exist. My senses might mislead me about the details, but I know at least that the ideas that I clearly and
distinctly understand--geometrical properties--belong to these bodies.

8. Nature is God's order; thus it has truth to teach me. For example, that I am present to my body in a
more intimate way than a pilot in a ship. And that there are other bodies around me that affect me in
various ways, that should be pursued or avoided; the senses thus act to preserve and maintain the body.

9. But I also make some judgments on my own that are not justified by nature's teachings, particularly in
assuming objects and their qualities to be exactly as my senses report them, that sense qualities reside
in them, etc. It is the fault of my judgment that I use sense perception as a direct apprehension of the
essences of external bodies; there is nothing inherently deceptive about sensation.

10. Another problem is the misleading signals I sometimes get from my own body, which induce me to
commit errors. A body with edema, for example, will have an inclination to drink, when in fact this is
something it ought to avoid. How can God permit this?

11. The body is divisible, the mind is not. Further, the mind gets impressions from the parts of the body
not immediately, but via the brain. Therefore the nerves running from the parts to the brain might be
stimulated (pulled) somewhere in between, registering motion in the brain just as if the body part were
affected. When everything functions normally, the sensations in the mind are the best and most
appropriate for the purpose of maintaining health. So the exceptions prove the goodness of God in
making us this way.

12. By using more than one sense, and memory, I can avoid errors of the senses of this kind. So I should
get rid of the excessive doubts I started with, especially those premised on dreaming, since I can easily
distinguish dreaming from waking by the continuity of the latter. I can trust the truth of my ideas as long
as my senses, memory, and understanding are all consistent with one another.

John Locke
 Locke is the leading proponent of a school of philosophy now often called “British empiricism”. Some of the
central platforms of this doctrine are as follows: First, human beings are born like a blank, white sheet of paper –
 a tabula rasa – without any innate knowledge but with certain natural powers, and we use these powers to
adapt ourselves to the social and physical environment into which we are born. Two especially important
natural powers are the capacity for conscious sense experience and for feeling pleasure and pain, and it is from
the interaction of these capacities with the environment that we acquire all of our ideas, knowledge, and habits
of mind.
 from An Essay Concerning Human Understanding

Book XXIII, Chapter VIII: Of Our Complex Ideas of Substances

In asking where we get our idea of substances, Locke finds himself in one of the stickier sections of the Essay. He gives us
the following picture of the origin of our ideas of substances: As we go through the world we carve up the dense sensory
array into discrete objects, noticing which qualities regularly seem to cluster together. For instance, we see softness,
blackness, a certain small size, a certain catlike shape moving all together throughout our experience, and we assume
that all of these qualities make up a single object. However, he claims, this cluster of our ideas of observable qualities
cannot in itself form the idea of a substance. We must also add to this an idea of whatever it is that these properties
belong to; we do not simply believe that these properties exist out in the world, but rather that they are properties of
something. That something, he argues, corresponds to our idea of substance in general or substratum. It is helpful to
think of a substratum as an invisible pincushion, with all of the observable qualities that belong to it being the pins. The
substratum itself is unobservable (and, hence, because of Locke's empiricism, unknowable) because it cannot itself have
observable qualities; it is the thing in which observable qualities inhere. Anything we can observe or describe is a
property rather than the substratum itself. Our idea of the substratum, therefore, is necessarily very obscure and
confused. All we really know about the substratum is that it is supposed to support the observable properties of a
substance. Beyond that, we have no hint and no hope of getting a hint. Locke is very eager to point out that the case is
equally bleak for both mental and physical substances. Contrary to what most people believe, he argues, we do not
know bodies any better than we know the mind. In both cases, we can only know the observable qualities. When it
comes to what the properties belong to, we are completely in the dark in both cases. When he is being particularly
careful. he remembers to point out that, really, since all we know are observable properties, there is no basis for even
claiming that there are two different types of substance in the world. For the most part, however, he talks as if dualism
were true (that is, as if mind and body were two distinct kinds of substances). In addition to treating the logico-linguistic
problem of substances (i.e. What is metaphysically responsible for supporting properties? How can we make sense of
the way we speak about them?), Locke also briefly touches on the scientific problem of substances: What is causally
responsible for properties? The cause of properties, he claims, is the constitution of objects, their hidden
microstructures. He treats this idea in greater depth in Book III.

Analysis
Locke's discussion of substratum is probably one of the most confusing sections of the Essay, in large part because he
himself is so obviously torn on the topic. In several instances, Locke uses language that would suggest he does not really
believe substrata exist, that our idea of substratum refers to nothing and thus is meaningless. For instance, at I.iv.18 he
says that we "signify nothing by the word "substance," but only an uncertain supposition of we know not what." At
II.xxiii.18 he calls it a "promiscuous use of a doubtful term." Perhaps most provocatively, at II.xxiii.2 he compares the
idea of a substratum to the explanatory tool of an Indian philosopher who, "saying that the world was supported by a
great elephant, was asked what the elephant rested on, to which his answer was a great tortoise. Being again pressed to
know what gave support to the broad-backed tortoise, he replied, something he knew not what." This mocking analogy
seems to suggest that Locke considers "substratum" an entirely empty word, referring to nothing but our own limit of
understanding. At the same time, Locke retains the idea in his picture. Given that one of his primary aims in the Essay is
to encourage us to banish terms with no real meaning--terms that are supposed to refer to something in the world but
do not or that have no clear ideas associated with them--his retention of this term is puzzling. Clearly, as suspicious as he
was of the idea, he felt that it was necessary, though whether it is necessary only as a conceptual tool to make sense of
our experience (as it would seem from the quotes above) or as something that must exist to make sense of the natural
world itself (which he seems to suggest throughout the rest of the discussion) is really not clear. There are at least four
reasons why Locke felt that it was crucial to include the notion of substratum in his account. First, he felt that the idea
was needed in order to make sense of our language. If someone asks what a ladybug is, the answer would take the
following form: "It is a thing that is black and red, with such and such a size and shape, that eats such and such..." There
are qualities out in the world that correspond to the predicates in this sentence (even if the correspondence is not one
of resemblance), so, Locke feels, there must also be something corresponding to the subject, the "thing." Not everyone
in the history of philosophy felt this way. Some people, such as David Hume, felt that "thing" was just a peculiarity of
how language works, a linguistic hanger on which we can hang qualities. In the world, however, there are only the
qualities. When we say a thing that "is..." we do not really mean there is a thing that has these qualities, but simply that
these qualities are the identity of the substance in question. This view is called the "bundle theory" of substances,
because it regards substances as mere collections of observable properties. There are good reasons, though, why Locke
did not want to go in this direction. This theory raises tremendous problems for itself. The biggest problem is the
question of persistence through change. If a school bus just is a collection of yellow color, an oblong shape, powers of
motion etc., what happens if I paint the school bus green, or if it breaks down and loses its powers of motion? If we have
a new bundle of qualities, does that mean we have a new substance? The bundle theorist needs to come up with a good
explanation of how the substance remains the same when the bundle changes. Persistence through change on Locke's
view, however, is easy to account for, which is the second reason why he felt he needed to keep the notion of
substratum. The substratum persists through any change. The substance, therefore, remains the same substance
through changes in properties. A third reason Locke felt compelled to accept the notion of substratum was to explain
what unifies co-occurring ideas, making them into a single thing, distinct from any other thing. The substratum, Locke
claims at II.xxiii.1 and 37, helps elucidate this unity. It is not entirely clear, though, how the substratum is supposed to do
this. Lastly, the substratum provides Locke with a way to account for the notion of support. The very idea of a quality
involves dependence, being a quality of something. So what are qualities dependant on, what do they exist in? The
answer, of course, is the substratum.

Book II, Chapter VII: Some Further Considerations Concerning Our Simple Ideas

Under the unassuming heading "Other Considerations Concerning Simple Ideas," Locke next introduces one of the most
important topics in the entire Essay: the distinction between primary and secondary qualities. Locke tells us that there is
a crucial difference between two kinds of simple ideas we receive from sensation. Some of the ideas we receive
resemble their causes out in the world, while others do not. The ideas which resemble their causes are the ideas of
primary qualities: texture, number, size, shape, motion. The ideas which do not resemble their causes are the ideas of
secondary qualities: color, sound, taste, and odor.
The best way to understand the distinction between primary and secondary qualities is in terms of explanation.
Whenever you have the sensation of a square book the cause of that sensation is some sort of shape out in the world
(though not necessarily squareness, since there may be some optical illusion, because distance, for instance, forcing you
to perceive the shape incorrectly), so the explanation for sensation of shape is shape in the external world. Whenever
you have a sensation of blue, on the other hand, the cause is not blueness out in the world. The cause is some specific
arrangement of the insensible parts of matter. Explanations for secondary qualities refer only to primary qualities.
Locke's argument for this claim is based on his estimation of the "best science available", which he believes is Boyle's
Corpuscular Hypothesis. According to the best scientific picture we have of the natural world, Locke argues, all that is
out there are colorless, tasteless, soundless, odorless corpuscles of matter. Using only these indivisible bits of matter and
their motions, we can explain not only our sensations of primary qualities, but our sensations of secondary qualities as
well. Sensations of color, odor, taste, and sound are caused by the primary qualities of arrangements of matter. (Locke
refers to these arrangements as the "powers" of objects to cause sensations.) Given that we are able to explain
everything we need to explain by positing the existence only of primary qualities, he reasons, we have no reason to think
that secondary qualities have any real basis in the world. An argument of this form is often called an "argument from
parsimony" and rests on the premise that it is best not to posit the existence of explanatorily superfluous entities.
The rest of Locke's discussion of the primary/secondary quality distinction focuses on making the conclusion seem more
plausible. He presents a number of thought experiments designed to bring our intuitions into line with his. First, he
describes breaking a piece of wheat up into smaller and smaller pieces. He points out that as small as the wheat
becomes we cannot conceive of it without its primary qualities (presumably since the very idea of a body without shape
or size is incoherent) whereas we can conceive of the wheat without color (presumably because there is nothing literally
incoherent about a body without color, even if it is difficult to imagine one in actuality).
He next considers an almond that is being pounded with a pestle. As it gets broken up into smaller and smaller pieces,
the color changes from a pure white to a dirtier hue, and the taste goes from sweet to oily. Yet all that was altered was
the texture of the nut. Clearly, he concludes, the secondary qualities depend on the primary qualities.
Finally, he takes the example of a flame. If we put our hand in the flame we have a sensation of pain. If we look at the
flame we have a sensation of color. No one would claim that pain is in the flame itself, he points out, so why do we
suppose that the color is?

Analysis
Locke's argument for the claim that secondary qualities do not exist out in the world as we perceive them is obviously
only as strong as the science it rests on. He knew that if that science turned out to be false, his entire argument would
crumble. One might wonder why he would be willing to risk such an important point on an uncertain theory.
At least part of the answer to this question lies in the fact that the entire reason that the distinction between primary
and secondary qualities was important to Locke was because of his belief in the *new mechanistic science*. Locke was
intent on giving a philosophical clarification of the distinction specifically because he wanted to clear the way for the
new science to take hold. He suspected that a general reluctance to believe in a colorless, odorless, tasteless world
would prove to be a major obstacle to the acceptance of theories like Boyle's. He, therefore, wanted to make this stark
view of the world more palatable, at least on a purely intellectual level (on a visceral, emotional level it remains hard to
stomach even for modern physics students). If the science turned out to be wrong enough to leave his argument
unsupported, then he would not have had much interest left in supporting his argument anyway.
Turning from the argument to the theory itself, it is difficult to conceive of how the motion of colorless, odorless
particles is supposed to cause sensations like blueness and sweetness in us. Given that even today, with science as
advanced as it is, we still cannot solve this mystery (it remains one of the most hotly debated problems in both
philosophy of mind and in the cognitive sciences), it might seem unfair to hold Locke accountable for leaving us without
a satisfactory answer. To his credit, Locke himself recognized the explanatory gap and tried to smooth over it by offering
yet another thought experiment. This time he asks us to consider a knife. When a knife cuts flesh, it causes pain. We
cannot imagine what it is about steel that leads to the sensation of pain, but yet no one doubts that it is the steel, and
not any pain inside the knife, that causes the pain in us. Though this thought experiment does not clear up the mystery
at all, it shows that even Locke realized the most puzzling consequence of the theory he espoused. In fact, he recognized
it so fully that it plays a large role in the theory of knowledge presented in Book IV.
Another puzzling aspect of Locke's theory of primary/secondary qualities is the ontological status of secondary qualities.
In what sense are these qualities supposed to exist independent of observers? If there were no observers around, would
they continue to exist as powers in the objects, or would they simply cease to be? There seems to be a certain ambiguity
in the way Locke uses the word "powers." Either a power could be an intrinsic property of the object in the world, or
else a power could be a relational property that exists between the object and the observer.
If Locke means a power to be an intrinsic property of objects, then secondary qualities do have an entirely mind-
independent existence, even if they do not exist as we perceive them. It seems likelier, however, that Locke conceives of
powers as relational properties. The ability of an object to cause certain sensations depends on the way in which the
insensible constituents of matter interact with our own sense organs. For an object to have a power, then, should
involve a certain relation between the object and the perceiver--powers should have as much to do with the laws of
neurophysiology as with the laws of physics. If this is the case, then secondary qualities cannot be said to exist entirely
independently of all observers. There needs to be at least the potential for their being observed (such as their being on a
planet with creatures capable of perceiving them) in order for them to exist.
Locke's analogy between sweetness and pain provides further support for this reading. In the analogy, Locke claims that
sweetness is in food exactly as pain or sickness is in food. Both are powers in the food to cause certain sensations in us.
If sweetness really is in food in precisely the same way that pain is, then sweetness is certainly mind-dependent. No one
would claim that pain still existed in a world devoid of creatures with pain receptors. Presumably, then, on Locke's
picture, in a world devoid of creatures with color, sound, taste, and odor receptors, color, sound, taste, and odor would
not exist.

- Book IV, Chapter XI: Of Our Knowledge of the Existence of Other Things
Locke is much more optimistic about our capacity to know of the existence of things than he is about our capacity to
know of their nature. He presents his discussion of the knowledge of the existence of things into three parts. The first is
about our knowledge of the existence of ourselves, which we know by intuition. The second is about our knowledge of
the existence of God, which we know by demonstration. The third is about our knowledge of the existence of an
external world, roughly resembling the world as we think it is. We know this last category of existence by that third,
pseudo-grade of knowledge: sensitive knowledge. Locke's discussion of our knowledge of the existence of ourselves and
of God is almost identical to Descartes' treatment of these topics. His discussion of sensitive knowledge, however, is
extremely original. Locke's mediated theory of perception raises the standard skeptical worry: If all we have access to is
our ideas, how do we know there is a world out there? Locke has three strategies for dealing with this concern, and he
employs all of them in chapter xi. Locke's first strategy, and the one he seems most viscerally drawn to, is to simply
refuse to take the skeptic seriously. Can anyone really doubt, he asks, that there is an external world out there? Next, he
takes a pragmatist tack. If you want to doubt that there is an external world, he says, that is just fine. All that matters is
that we know enough to enable us to get around in the world. His third line of attack, however, is his most interesting.
Throughout the chapter, Locke formulates a long and detailed argument based on inference to the best explanation. He
presents a number of puzzling facts about our experience that can all best be explained by positing that there is an
external world that is causing our ideas. Taken singly each one makes it a little more likely that there is an external world
out there, but taken as a whole, Locke feels, they provide overwhelming evidence--so overwhelming that the inference
is almost strong enough to be called knowledge. Locke brings up seven marks of our experience that can best be
explained by positing an external world. The first is brought up in Chapter III, section 14. There is a certain vivacity to
veridical perception that cannot be found, say, in memories or products of the imagination. In chapter XI, Locke offers
six more empirical marks that distinguish this same set of ideas. In section four, he points out that we cannot get these
ideas without the organ appropriate to them. No one born without the ability to hear, for example, can possibly have
the idea of the sound of a French horn. Next, Locke notes that we are able to receive ideas of this sort only in certain
situations. Though the organs remain constant, the possibility of experiences changes. It cannot, therefore, be the
organs themselves that are responsible for producing these ideas. In section five, Locke discusses the passive nature of
these ideas. The next empirical mark Locke brings forth involves pleasure and pain. Some ideas, Locke claims, cannot
help but be followed by pleasure of pain. When we call up the memory of these ideas, however, there is no experience
of pain or pleasure accompanying them. In section seven Locke points out yet another empirical feature: a certain
subset of our ideas fit into a coherent pattern so that if we have one idea, we can, with great reliability, predict another
one. Finally, not only is there a predictable correlation between the ideas of taste, vision, touch, sound, etc., but there is
also a correlation between the ideas belonging to different experiencing subjects (that is, between different people).

Analysis
An argument based on inference to the best explanation does not add up to conclusive proof, something of which Locke
is well aware. In fact, Locke seems to recognize that given his empiricism, together with his mediated theory of ideas, he
can only hope to establish a strong likelihood for the existence of the external world. A certainty that precludes all
skeptical doubt is, in principle, beyond his grasp.
To see why this sub-certainty is all Locke could posit based on his other theories, it is necessary to ask how certain
knowledge concerning the existence of the external world could ever be attained. There are only two ways for this to be
done, neither of which is available to Locke. One method would be to attempt to prove the existence of the external
world a priori, through reason and innate concepts. As an empiricist, however, this argument is unavailable to Locke.
Locke's epistemology is founded on the idea that all of our knowledge of the (natural) world comes to us through our
experiences (the one exception he makes is for the existence of God). If one is to know, with certainty, of the existence
of the external world, it must be through one's experiences. There are two ways in which empirical knowledge comes to
us. There is that which is immediately given to us through our experiences, and there is that which we infer as
explanations for what is immediately given to us. The first sort of empirical knowledge, which is intuitive knowledge, can
get us much closer to certainty than the second. However, since Locke has already told us that only ideas are ever
presented to the mind, it is only through the second empirical means that he can arrive at any knowledge of the external
world. However, arguing for an ontological claim by showing that the truth of this claim provides the best explanation
for the available evidence ("the best" being always, at best, a provisional qualification) does not demonstrate the
certainty of that claim, but rather its probability.
One last issue which deserves mention is Locke's pragmatic response to the skeptic. It is tempting to read this response
as supporting a pragmatist understanding of truth, which says that what it means for some proposition to be true is for it
to be useful and to be believed. There is some good textual evidence for this reading. At IV.ii.13 Locke remarks, "this
certainty is as great as our happiness, or misery, beyond which, we have no concernment to know or to be." Later, at
IV.xi.8, he says that our faculties, "serve us well enough, if they will but give us certain notice of those things which are
convenient or inconvenient to us."
A pragmatic understanding of truth, however, runs contrary to what, elsewhere in the Essay, is well-entrenched realism,
grounded in a vigorous correspondence notion of truth (a proposition is true if and only if it corresponds to reality). It
would be odd, perhaps even incomprehensible, if Locke were here abandoning his strict realist line just to give a last
response to the skeptic. It seems, therefore, far more likely that, rather than making the substantive claim that truth lies
in efficacy, he is merely showing his lack of interest in skeptical concerns, or even his inability to take them seriously. He
does not suggest that there may be no such a thing as the external world, but only that whether or not we can
conclusively prove that there is such a world does not particularly concern him. In other words, he is stating his own
unshakeable faith in realism regardless of rational proof, and adding the observation that, for all practical purposes, how
we settle this issue is of no real concern.
In some sense, his claim is that the issue is strictly philosophical; it will never change the way we behave or regard the
world. We will never cease to act as if there is an external world of material bodies. Even the very fact that we do not act
as if we take the skeptical doubts seriously is yet another sign of how overwhelmingly probable we feel the existence of
the external world to be. Despite the alleged lack of interest with which Locke regards the problem of skepticism, it
seems that on the basis of what he says in the Essay, a very compelling anti-skeptical stance can be constructed. Even
the lack of interest to which he attests can be seen as adding one more gloss to the anti- skeptical argument.

Bertrand Russell

 Russell’s project was to place all of pure mathematics on a sound footing by showing that it is reducible to a
demonstrably sound logical system. This program was called ‘logicism’.
 Russell thought, good philosophy starts by examining a particular feature or type of language – such as
mathematics – and looking for its underlying logic.
 Russell’s second important contribution to philosophy: a theory called “logical atomism.” This is a metaphysical
doctrine which is simultaneously about the nature of language, knowledge, and the world. Its central claim is
that reality is ultimatly composed of atomic facts and these facts are connected by certain fundamental relations
which can be pictured in formal logic.
 After 1938, Russell switched the main focus of his philosophical research to epistemology, the study of the
nature of human knowledge. He began by searching for a method that would guarantee the certainty of our
beliefs, but he was forced gradually to the conclusion that “all human knowledge is uncertain, inexact and
partial. To this doctrine we have not found any limitations whatever.”

 The Problems of Philosophy: Chapters 1 – 3

Appearance and Reality

In seeking certainty, we discover vagueness and confusion in many common ideas. The search for certainty
launches us into the study of philosophy.

One area that seems to grant us certainty is our immediate experience. Russell describes his immediate experience as he
sits in a sunny room at his desk. He focuses on the sensations he experiences of the table before him. In a precise
description of its visual appearance Russell notes that although he believes the table to be all one color, that part of the
table appears almost white due to the reflected light. He knows that if he moves that the apparent whiteness of the part
of the table will move, too. Although this difference in appearance is unimportant for most practical purposes, the artist
must learn to see and portray things as they appear, rather than as they "really" are. Philosophy too, guides us to
examine closely what we experience.

Examining the color of the table, we are lead to the conclusion that there is no color which is preeminently the color of
the table. The color depends on the presence and kind of artificial light, the time of day and the condition of the viewers
eyes, among many other factors.

The texture of the table presents a similar result. Although to the unaided eye the table appears smooth, with a
magnifying glass, ridges and rough spots become evident. More powerful magnification would reveal an even more
elaborate texture. Which is the true texture? There is no reason to pick one over the other.

The sense of touch does not give us any more certainty about the real nature of the table. Examining the sensations we
experience about the table we must conclude that we only know about its appearance. "The real table, if there is one, is
not immediately known to us at all, but must be an inference from what is immediately known."

Russell then introduces us to Bishop Berkley, who showed that matter can be denied without absurdity. He concludes
the chapter by pointing out that philosophy guides us to from the common place to the amazing in quick order. Our
inquiry into the certainty provided by our immediate experience leads us to realize that the appearance of matter can
not be the same as its reality. The next question Russell addresses is does matter exist?

The Existence of Matter

Since our immediate experience gives us no certainty about the existence of matter and since it is possible to deny the
existence of matter without logical fallacy, should we assume that matter does not exist? Russell answers no. The
existence of matter is the simplest explanation of our experience.

Russell asks us to consider a cat. He asks to imagine that he sees a cat at one moment in one part of the room and in
another somewhere else. Our simplest assumption is that the cat has moved. But if there is no matter and nothing but
Russell's sensations, then the cat can not have been anywhere he did not see it. It must have ceased to exist when it
passed out of his view and reappeared when he saw it in its new location. Now imagine that his cat is acting hungry.
How could this be accounted for? No hunger can exist except his own sensation of hunger. Any explanation of this
behavior that does not suppose the existence of a real cat is bound to be more complicated than assuming that the cat
does exist outside the sensations Russell is experiencing.

But the problem of the cat is minor compared to the problem of explaining other people. When some one speaks and
we hear sounds we associated with ideas and we see the persons face, it is difficult to imagine that they are not
expressing a thought, as we would be if we were to make similar sounds.

We are certain of our sensations regarding matter and those sensations seem to have agreement with each other about
objects of our experience. Common sense tells us that there is a source of these sensation external to us. We would
never have doubted that matter existed if we had not begun an analysis of appearance and reality. Although this
argument is not convincing, taken with the argument for the existence of matter as the simplest explanation, it does
urge us to accept we previously naturally believed.

The argument for the existence of matter is not decisive. There is room for doubt. This is the nature of philosophical
knowledge. Such knowledge is built up from instinctive beliefs that we hold most strongly. "...each as much
isolated and as free from irrelevant additions as possible. It should take care to show that, in the form in which
they are finally set forth, our instinctive beliefs do not clash, but form a harmonious system." Such a
harmonious system, though it may contain error, is less likely to be incorrect, because of the interrelationship of
the parts and the scrutiny given to each part.
The Nature of Matter

Having established, at least to some degree of certainty, that matter exists, what can we know of its nature? The
physical sciences tells us that matter is wave-motion in space. This wave-motion is not identical to our
experience but corresponds to it. For example, if we see a red object and a blue object we know that there is
some corresponding difference between the two objects that give rise to the different sensations. Likewise, if we
see two blue objects we may assume that there is some common property in the two objects that gives us the
sensation of blueness.

We experience space through our sense of touch and our sense of sight. We learn in infancy how to associate
these two sensations to create an internal sense of the space we perceive. Science and common sense assume
that there is a public space in which objects exist. "It is this physical space which is dealt with in geometry and
assumed in physics and astronomy." As with our experience of matter, our experience of space is one of
correspondence. We do not experience the intrinsic nature of space.

Some philosophers contend that we can know something of the intrinsic nature of matter. They make this claim
because although our sensations do point to something that exists independently of us, that something is mental.
These philosophers are called idealists.

What constitutes scientific knowledge?

David Hume
 Hume can be called the first ‘post-skeptical’ modern philosopher. He was wholly convinced that no knowledge
that goes beyond the mere data of our own minds has anything like secure and reliable foundations: that is, he
believed, we have no certain knowledge of the inner working of the physical world and its laws, or of God, or of
absolute moral ‘truth’, or even of our own ‘real’ selves. All we have secure knowledge of is our own mental
states and their relations: our sensory impressions, our ideas, our emotions, and so on.
 Despite all this, Hume’s philosophical project was a positive one: he wanted to develop a new, constructive
science of human nature that would provide defensible foundations for all the sciences, including ethics, physics
and politics.
 Hume’s science of human nature is based firmly on the experimental methods of the natural sciences, which
emphasize the data of experience and observation, sometimes combined with mathematical or logical
reasoning. As Hume put it:

“If we take in our hand any volume; of divinity or school metaphysics, for instance; let us ask, Does it contain any
abstract reasoning concerning quantity or number? No. Does it contain any experimental reasoning concerning matter
of fact and existence? No. Commit it then to the flames: for it can contain nothing but sophistry and illusion.”

This assumption that all human knowledge is either a “matter of fact” or a “matter of relations” – the product of
experience or of reason – is often known as ‘Hume’s Fork’.

 An Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding

Section IV: Skeptical Doubts Concerning the Operations of the Understanding

OVERVIEW

In Part 1, David Hume discusses the distinction between relations of ideas and matters of fact. Relations of ideas are
indestructible bonds created between ideas and all logically true statements such as "the sky is blue" is a relation of
ideas. Relations of ideas are known and can be proven certain, and a denial of such a statement demonstrates
contradiction. Matters of fact are concerned with experience and we are certain of matters of fact through cause and
effect. For example, you know that gray clouds will "cause" rain because you have experienced the "effect" previously.

In Part 2, Hume explains one of the core tenets of his skeptical philosophy, the problem of induction. This problem
holds, in essence that reason is incapable of predicting that the future will resemble the past. If we try to uncover the
connections between induction, experience, uniformity and cause and effect we will go around and around in circles
(see image). Hume concludes that there must be something besides reason which allows us to solve this problem and
that is the subject of the next chapter.

SECTION BREAKDOWN

PART 1

 §1:In this section Hume suggests that human reason can be divided into two kinds, relations of ideas and
matters of fact. According to Hume relations of ideas are intuitively or demonstratively certain. These
propositions can be discovered through thought and don't depend on anything existing in the universe.
 §2: Matters of fact are not determined in the same way as relations of ideas. The contrary of every matter of fact
is possible and just as logical because it cannot imply a contradiction. If a falsehood could be demonstrated this
would imply a contradiction and could never be conceived by the mind.
 §3:The nature of the evidence of real existence and matter of fact is a curious subject. Besides trusting our
senses and memory, we should follow doubts and errors to discover defects in common philosophy that can be
proposed to the public. Hume believes that these propositions will be an incitement rather than a
discouragement.
 §4: All matter of fact reasoning are related to cause and effect. These realizations are from the same nature and
cause and effect makes the connection between one fact and another fact inferred from the original.
 §5:To determine the nature of the evidence of matter of fact reasoning, it needs to be determined how we
come to knowledge of cause and effect.
 §6:Knowledge of the relation of cause and effect comes from experience, therefore conclusions concerning
matter of fact and real existence cannot be made without experiences.
 §7:Hume proposes that causes and effects are understood based on experience, not reason.
 §8: We do not know any knowledge or reason without experience. We cannot reason that a billiard ball will
move when hit by another without having experienced the effect.
  §9: The mind cannot reason the cause and effect of an object by "scrutiny and examination" (Hume 21).
Movement of the second billiard ball is distinct from the movement of the first and the movement of the first
cannot suggest the movement of the second. Through observation of the affect, we will discover what happens.
 §10: The concept of cause and effect is the only way to explain a result. The mind may ponder why the billiard
ball moves in a straight line and not in a thousand other ways. The ability to reason cannot explain that action;
only the "cause" of moving the ball and observing the "effect" of it moving in a straight line can explain that
specific event.
 §11:Every event is distinct from its cause. The cause arbitrarily happens and then the effect follows this cause
with an arbitrary effect. The effect cannot be determined ahead of time.
 §12:Human reason is reduced to certain principles which simplifies many specific effects by using reasoning skills
from analogy, experience , and observation.
 §13: Geometry along with other mathematics cannot explain the ultimate causes for phenomenon, which are
called laws. They help apply these laws but only experience can discover the laws. Hume states that" all the
abstract reasonings in the world could never lead us one step towards the knowledge or it[the ultimate cause]"
(Hume 23).

PART 2

 §14: The foundation of our reasoning and conclusions is experience but what is the foundation of experience?
Hume will investigate and discuss the issue in this part of the chapter.
 §15: Hume gives a negative answer to that question and states that "even after we have experience of the
operations of cause and effect, our conclusions from that experience are not founded on reasoning, or any
process of the understanding" (Hume 23). Hume will go on to "explain and defend" this statement (Hume 23).
 §16: Our senses tell us the characteristics of bread but they fail to reason why it will give us nourishment when
we eat it. Only through experience can we discover the bread's qualities. Because we have conducted this
experiment in the past, we know that future repetitions will provide us with the same result. However, because
the bread provided nourishment yesterday does not mean that it will provide nourishment in the future.
Through past experience of events we predict what will happen in the future, but there is no certainty that those
events will occur in the future.
 §17: Hume states that his argument must be strong and convincing enough that other philosophers will not
question it but in fact turn to what he has to say for guidance. However, he knows that his argument is not
convincing enough at this in the book but he will work hard to convey his argument through the course of his
book.
 §18: All reasonings may be characterized as demonstrative or that concerning relations of ideas.
 §19: Hume's argument concerning cause and effect and experience and that knowledge of the future is based on
past events is a question that he will investigate. He knows the individuals take such form of reasoning for
granted and he wants to answer that question.
 §20: Similarities in the nature of objects are the basis for all arguments from experience
 §21: We use past experience to predict future events, but how do we know that the past is a good guide for
future predictions? There is no guarantee that future will resemble the past but we use our probability of the
certain past events and extrapolate predictions from the past knowledge concerning what may occur in the
future.
 §22: Men are arrogant because they think that since they have not thought of a certain argument, that they
think that the argument does not exist.
 §23: Hume believes that he may have simply failed to identify an argument that could reason ultimate causes,
but he challenges any other individuals to identify it. He says that a child knows from past experience that a
flame will burn and if this knowledge comes from some form of reasoning, then it must be a form of reasoning
that even a child may understand. Hume suggests that the child does not learn through reasoning but
specifically custom, which he will dwell on in the next chapter.
Section V: Skeptical Solution of the Doubts

OVERVIEW

Hume recognizes the skepticism used in the previous section concerning understanding and knows that it could never
undermine our reasoning from experiences in life. He affirms that nature always wins out against abstract forms of
reasoning. However, he believes that there is a step that motivates us to learn from experience and that step is not very
well understood; there is no ultimate causation for why we reason according to "cause and effect," but we continue to
do so. Hume investigates this problem in this section.

SECTION BREAKDOWN

PART 1

 §1:Academic (or skeptical) philosophy—meaning the prevalence of doubt and suspense of judgement—is the
only cure to the supine indolence of the mind.
 §2: This view should not, however, prevent one from attempting to discover new knowledge but rather inspire it
for the sake of truth .
 §3: It is unreasonable to perform science simply through observation. Simple observation--or the use of sensory
stimulation to draw conclusions--leads to confusing correlation and causation
 §4: Even if experience entails a relationship between two occurrences there is a principal which leads man to
draw facts from the relationship despite the lack of a scientifically accurate basis for the facts.
 §5:The principle is referred to as Custom or Habit--or the use of experience and repeated observation to draw
factual relationships. Of custom Hume states that "all inferences from experience, therefore, are effects of
custom, not of reasoning."
 §6: "Custom, then, is the great guide of human life." Hume declares that custom is what propels all action and
inquiry because it is the most basic means of determining factual relationships.
 §7: Hume continues that it should be remembered that custom is based on observation, and states that if one is
asked to support a fact, that they cannot provide evidence in infinitum without at some point employing an
observational or sensory basis for the fact.
 §8: "All belief of matter of fact or real existence is derived merely from some object, present to the memory or
senses and a customary conjunction between that and some other object." Hume elaborates that habit is a
product of "natural instincts, which no reasoning or process of the thought and understanding is able, either to
produce, or to prevent."
 §9: Hume suggests that philosophy is not a means to an end but rather a means to a sensory observation which
cannot be proved, however the attempt to uncover the mechanisms upon which a fact is based--despite an
inherent scientific skepticism--is commendable.

PART 2

 §10: Although the imagination is free, it is unable to exceed the original ideas by man. The mind has authority
over all of its ideas. Hume uses the example that in our conception, we can join the head of a man and the body
of a horse, but it is not in our power to believe that such an animal has ever existed.
 §11: Belief and fiction differ because of feeling. When an object is presented in our memory, because of custom,
we carry on our imagination of the object and whatever is usually joined with it. Hume uses the example of two
billiard balls hitting each other with a force. Our mind conceives the image of the balls stopping on contact.
 §12: It is very difficult to define something that we have never personally experienced. Belief is something
everyone is aware of, even if it varies between people. This expresses the act of the mind and its realities.
 §13: The sentiment of belief is a steady flow of the imagination. This manner of conception is present because of
the object and its relationship it has to the memory or senses.
 §14: The principles of connexion or association can be reduced to three: resemblance, contiguity, and causation.
These are the only bonds that unite our thoughts and reflections.
  §15: Hume uses the example of looking at a photograph of an absent friend. Our idea of the person is risen
because of resemblance and the ideas and emotions behind it. We take pleasure in viewing the picture of the
friend, but when it is removed, we chose seeing the friend directly instead of the reflection of the image. This is
equally distant and obscure.
 §16: Hume extends the above principles to the ceremonies of the Catholic Church. He suggests that the reason
the Catholic Church takes part in so many religious ceremonies and practices is because its constituents need a
reminder of their faith on Earth, just as we sometimes need a photograph to remind us of an absent friend. God,
however, is not someone that we may go see in person as we may a friend. All we have is the "photograph" of
God, so the practices of the Catholic Church are an attempt to become closer to God.
 §17: Hume explains that the power of ideas fades as we get farther from them/their source. He reiterates the
example with home- how he has a clearer and more powerful idea of it when he is closer to it and the opposite
effect when he is far away. Perhaps religious practice attempts to give more immediate and thus stronger ideas
by using images and rituals to feel closer and have a stronger idea of faith.
 §18: "Superstitious" people, or those with a lot of "blind" faith, treasure relics of religious figures because of this
and seek images and artifacts to give a stronger connection and idea of faith.
 §19: If a long absent person were presented to us, this object would immediately revive all the data from
previous time. We would be able to recall our familiarities as lively as possible. This is an example to prove the
previous principle.
 §20: Ideas of distant things, like pictures or ideas of home, only work if we believe in them or that the real things
exist; our minds try to find "analogies" or relationships between ideas, things, and phenomenon. Also, objects
we are confronted with have a strong impact on us and can trigger these ideas forcefully due to our
expectations and preconceived ideas of relationships from experience.
 §21: "Custom " is the driving force of people: we act according to our expectations and the ideas and feelings
evoked when confronted with things. Hume says that our "knowledge must have been limited to the narrow
sphere of our memory and senses" otherwise.
 §22: People have the instinct to form and perceive relationships between things and thus form custom. This is a
large part of our logic

Immanuel Kant

 A large part of Kant’s work addresses the question “What can we know?” The answer, if it can be stated
simply, is that our knowledge is constrained to mathematics and the science of the natural, empirical
world. It is impossible, Kant argues, to extend knowledge to the supersensible realm of speculative
metaphysics. The reason that knowledge has these constraints, Kant argues, is that the mind plays an
active role in constituting the features of experience and limiting the mind’s access only to the empirical
realm of space and time.
 Kant responded to his predecessors by arguing against the Empiricists that the mind is not a blank slate
that is written upon by the empirical world, and by rejecting the Rationalists’ notion that pure, a priori
knowledge of a mind-independent world was possible. Reason itself is structured with forms of
experience and categories that give a phenomenal and logical structure to any possible object of
empirical experience. These categories cannot be circumvented to get at a mind-independent world, but
they are necessary for experience of spatio-temporal objects with their causal behavior and logical
properties. These two theses constitute Kant’s famous transcendental idealism and empirical realism.

 Critique of Pure Reason

- Kant’s primary aim is to determine the limits and scope of pure reason. That is, he wants to know what
reason alone can determine without the help of the senses or any other faculties. Metaphysicians make
grand claims about the nature of reality based on pure reason alone, but these claims often conflict with
one another. Furthermore, Kant is prompted by Hume’s skepticism to doubt the very possibility of
metaphysics.
- Kant draws two important distinctions: between a priori and a posteriori knowledge and between
analytic and synthetic judgments. A posteriori knowledge is the particular knowledge we gain from
experience, and a priori knowledge is the necessary and universal knowledge we have independent of
experience, such as our knowledge of mathematics. In an analytic judgment, the concept in the
predicate is contained in the concept in the subject, as, for instance, in the judgment, “a bachelor is an
unmarried man.” (In this context, predicate refers to whatever is being said about the subject of the
sentence—for instance, “is an unmarried man.”) In a synthetic judgment, the predicate concept contains
information not contained in the subject concept, and so a synthetic judgment is informative rather than
just definitional. Typically, we associate a posteriori knowledge with synthetic judgments and a priori
knowledge with analytic judgments. For instance, the judgment “all swans are white” is synthetic
because whiteness is not a part of the concept of “swan” (a black swan would still be a swan even
though it isn’t white), but it is also a posteriori because we can only find out if all swans are white from
experience.

- Kant argues that mathematics and the principles of science contain synthetic a priori knowledge. For
example, “7 + 5 = 12” is a priori because it is a necessary and universal truth we know independent of
experience, and it is synthetic because the concept of “12” is not contained in the concept of “7 + 5.”
Kant argues that the same is true for scientific principles such as, “for every action there is an equal an
opposite reaction”: because it is universally applicable, it must be a priori knowledge, since a posteriori
knowledge only tells us about particular experiences.

- The fact that we are capable of synthetic a priori knowledge suggests that pure reason is capable of
knowing important truths. However, Kant does not follow rationalist metaphysics in asserting that pure
reason has the power to grasp the mysteries of the universe. Instead, he suggests that much of what we
consider to be reality is shaped by the perceiving mind. The mind, according to Kant, does not passively
receive information provided by the senses. Rather, it actively shapes and makes sense of that
information. If all the events in our experience take place in time, that is because our mind arranges
sensory experience in a temporal progression, and if we perceive that some events cause other events,
that is because our mind makes sense of events in terms of cause and effect. Kant’s argument has a
certain parallel to the fact that a person wearing blue-tinted sunglasses sees everything in a bluish light:
according to Kant, the mind wears unremovable time-tinted and causation-tinted sunglasses, so that all
our experience necessarily takes place in time and obeys the laws of causation.

- Time and space, Kant argues, are pure intuitions of our faculty of sensibility, and concepts of physics
such as causation and inertia are pure intuitions of our faculty of understanding. Sensory experience
only makes sense because our faculty of sensibility processes it, organizing it according to our intuitions
of time and space. These intuitions are the source of mathematics: our number sense comes from our
intuition of successive moments in time, and geometry comes from our intuition of space. Events that
take place in space and time would still be a meaningless jumble if it were not for our faculty of
understanding, which organizes experience according to the concepts, like causation, which form the
principles of natural science.

- If time and space, among other things, are constructs of the mind, we might wonder what is actually
“out there,” independent of our minds. Kant answers that we cannot know for certain. Our senses react
to stimuli that come from outside the mind, but we only have knowledge of how they appear to us once
they have been processed by our faculties of sensibility and understanding. Kant calls the stimuli
“things-in-themselves” and says we can have no certain knowledge about their nature. He distinguishes
sharply between the world of noumena, which is the world of things-in-themselves, and the world of
phenomena, which is the world as it appears to our minds.
- After giving what he considers a satisfactory account of how synthetic a priori knowledge makes
mathematics and science possible, Kant turns to metaphysics. Metaphysics relies on the faculty of
reason, which does not shape our experience in the way that our faculties of sensibility and
understanding do, but rather it helps us reason independent of experience. The mistake metaphysicians
 typically make is to apply reason to things in themselves and try to understand matters beyond reason’s
grasp. Such attempts tend to lead reason into contradiction and confusion. Kant redefines the role of
metaphysics as a critique of pure reason. That is, the role of reason is to understand itself, to explore the
powers and the limits of reason. We are incapable of knowing anything certain about things-in-
themselves, but we can develop a clearer sense of what and how we can know by examining intensively
the various faculties and activities of the mind.

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