The Jallianwala (also spelled Jallianwalla) Bagh massacre, also known as the Amritsar

massacre, took place on 13 April 1919. A large, peaceful crowd had gathered at the Jallianwala
Bagh in Amritsar, Punjab, British India, during annual Baishakhi fair, to protest against the Rowlatt
Act and the arrest of pro-independence activists Dr. Saifuddin Kitchlew and Dr. Satya Pal. In
response to the public gathering, the temporary brigadier general R. E. H. Dyer, surrounded the
people with his Gurkha and Sikh infantry regiments of the British Indian Army.[7] The Jallianwala
Bagh could only be exited on one side, as its other three sides were enclosed by buildings. After
blocking the exit with his troops, he ordered them to shoot at the crowd, continuing to fire even as
the protestors tried to flee. The troops kept on firing until their ammunition was exhausted.
[8]
Estimates of those killed vary from 379 to 1,500 or more people[1] and over 1,200 other people
were injured of whom 192 were seriously injured.[9][10] Britain has never formally apologised for the
massacre but expressed "deep regret" in 2019.

The massacre caused a re-evaluation by the British Army of its military role against civilians to
"minimal force whenever possible", although later British actions during the Mau Mau rebellion in
the Kenya Colony have led historian Huw Bennett to comment that the new policy could sometimes
be put aside.[11] The army was retrained and developed less violent tactics for crowd control.[12] The
level of casual brutality, and lack of any accountability, stunned the entire nation,[13] resulting in a
wrenching loss of faith of the general Indian public in the intentions of the United Kingdom.[14] The
attack was condemned by the Secretary of State for War, Winston Churchill, as "unutterably
monstrous", and in the UK House of Commons debate on 8 July 1920 Members of Parliament voted
247 to 37 against Dyer. The ineffective inquiry, together with the initial accolades for Dyer, fuelled
great widespread anger against the British among the Indian populace, leading to the non-
cooperation movement of 1920–22.[15] Some historians consider the episode a decisive step towards
the end of British rule in India.[16][17]

Background[edit]
Defence of India Act[edit]
Main article: Defence of India Act 1915
See also: Ghadar Mutiny
During World War I, British India contributed to the British war effort by providing men and
resources. Millions of Indian soldiers and labourers served in Europe, Africa, and the Middle East,
while both the Indian administration and the princes sent large supplies of food, money, and
ammunition. Bengal and Punjab remained sources of anti-colonial activities. Revolutionary attacks in
Bengal, associated increasingly with disturbances in Punjab, were enough to nearly paralyse the
regional administration.[18][19] Of these, a pan-Indian mutiny in the British Indian Army planned for
February 1915 was the most prominent amongst a number of plots formulated between 1914 and
1917 by Indian nationalists in India, the United States and Germany.

The planned February mutiny was ultimately thwarted when British intelligence infiltrated the Ghadar
Movement, arresting key figures. Mutinies in smaller units and garrisons within India were also
crushed. In the context of the British war effort and the threat from the separatist movement in India,
the Defence of India Act 1915 was passed, limiting civil and political liberties. Michael O'Dwyer, then
the Lieutenant Governor of Punjab, was one of the strongest proponents of the act, in no small part
due to the Ghadarite threat in the province.[20]

The Rowlatt Act[edit]

See also: Rowlatt Committee and Rowlatt Act
The costs of the protracted war in money and manpower were great. High casualty rates in the war,
increasing inflation after the end, compounded by heavy taxation, the deadly 1918 flu pandemic, and
the disruption of trade during the war escalated human suffering in India. The pre-war Indian
nationalist sentiment was revived as moderate and extremist groups of the Indian National
Congress ended their differences to unify. In 1916, the Congress was successful in establishing
the Lucknow Pact, a temporary alliance with the All-India Muslim League. British political
concessions and Whitehall's India Policy after World War I began to change, with the passage
of Montagu–Chelmsford Reforms, which initiated the first round of political reform in the Indian
subcontinent in 1917.[21][22][23] However, this was deemed insufficient in reforms by the Indian political
movement. Mahatma Gandhi, recently returned to India, began emerging as an increasingly
charismatic leader under whose leadership civil disobedience movements grew rapidly as an
expression of political unrest.[24]

The recently crushed Ghadar conspiracy, the presence of Raja Mahendra Pratap's Kabul mission in
Afghanistan (with possible links to Bolshevik Russia), and a still-active revolutionary movement
especially in Punjab and Bengal (as well as worsening civil unrest throughout India) led to the
appointment of a sedition committee in 1918 chaired by Sidney Rowlatt, an Anglo-Egyptian judge. It
was tasked to evaluate German and Bolshevik links to the militant movement in India, especially in
Punjab and Bengal. On the recommendations of the committee, the Rowlatt Act, an extension of the
Defence of India Act 1915 to limit civil liberties, was enacted.[20][25][26][27][28]

The passage of the Rowlatt Act in 1919 precipitated large-scale political unrest throughout India.
Ominously, in 1919, the Third Anglo-Afghan War began in the wake of Amir Habibullah's
assassination and institution of Amanullah in a system strongly influenced by the political figures
courted by the Kabul mission during the world war. As a reaction to the Rowlatt Act, Muhammad Ali
Jinnah resigned from his Bombay seat, writing in a letter to the Viceroy, "I, therefore, as a protest
against the passing of the Bill and the manner in which it was passed tender my resignation ... a
Government that passes or sanctions such a law in times of peace forfeits its claim to be called a
civilised government".[29] Gandhi's call for protest against the Rowlatt Act achieved an unprecedented
response of furious unrest and protests.

Before the massacre[edit]

The Jallianwalla Bagh in 1919, months after the massacre

Especially in Punjab, the situation was deteriorating rapidly, with disruptions of rail, telegraph, and
communication systems. The movement was at its peak before the end of the first week of April, with
some recording that "practically the whole of Lahore was on the streets, the immense crowd that
passed through Anarkali Bazaar was estimated to be around 20,000".[30] Many officers in the Indian
army believed revolt was possible, and they prepared for the worst. The British Lieutenant-Governor
of Punjab, Michael O'Dwyer, is said to have believed that these were the early and ill-concealed
signs of a conspiracy for a coordinated revolt planned around May, on the lines of the 1857 revolt, at
a time when British troops would have withdrawn to the hills for the summer.[31]

The Amritsar massacre, and other events at about the same time, have been described by some
historians as the result of a concerted plan by the Punjab administration to suppress such a
conspiracy.[32] James Houssemayne Du Boulay is said to have posited a direct causal relationship
between the fear of a Ghadarite uprising in the midst of an increasingly tense situation in Punjab,
and the British response that ended in the massacre.[33]

On 10 April 1919, there was a protest at the residence of Miles Irving, the Deputy
Commissioner of Amritsar. The demonstration was to demand the release of two popular leaders of
the Indian Independence Movement, Satya Pal and Saifuddin Kitchlew, who had been earlier
arrested by the government and moved to a secret location. Both were proponents of
the Satyagraha movement led by Gandhi. A military picket shot at the crowd, killing several
protesters and setting off a series of violent events. Riotous crowds carried out arson attacks on
British banks, killed several British people and assaulted two British women.[34]

All native men were forced to crawl the Kucha Kurrichhan on

their hands and knees as punishment, 1919
On 11 April, Marcella Sherwood, an elderly English missionary, fearing for the safety of the
approximately 600 Indian children under her care, was on her way to shut the schools and send the
children home.[35][36] While travelling through a narrow street called the Kucha Kurrichhan, she was
caught by a mob who violently attacked her. She was rescued by some local Indians, including the
father of one of her pupils, who hid her from the mob and then smuggled her to the safety
of Gobindgarh Fort.[36][37] After visiting Sherwood on 19 April, the local commander of Indian Army
forces, Brigadier General Dyer, enraged at the assault, issued an order requiring every Indian man
using that street to crawl its length on his hands and knees as a punishment.[35][38] Dyer later
explained to a British inspector: "Some Indians crawl face downwards in front of their gods. I wanted
them to know that a British woman is as sacred as a Hindu god and therefore they have to crawl in
front of her, too."[39] He also authorised the indiscriminate public whipping of locals who came
within lathi length of a police officer. Marcella Sherwood later defended Colonel Dyer, describing him
as "the saviour of the Punjab".[38]

For the next two days, the city of Amritsar was quiet, but violence continued in other parts of
Punjab. Railway lines were cut, telegraph posts destroyed, government buildings burnt, and three
Europeans murdered. By 13 April, the British government had decided to put most of Punjab
under martial law. The legislation restricted a number of civil liberties, including freedom of
assembly; gatherings of more than four people were banned.[40]

On the evening of 12 April, the leaders of the hartal in Amritsar held a meeting at the Hindu College
– Dhab Khatikan. At the meeting, Hans Raj, an aide to Kitchlew, announced a public protest meeting
would be held at 16:30 the following day in the Jallianwala Bagh, to be organised by Muhammad
Bashir and chaired by a senior and respected Congress Party leader, Lal Kanhyalal Bhatia. A series
of resolutions protesting against the Rowlatt Act, the recent actions of the British authorities and the
detention of Satyapal and Kitchlew was drawn up and approved, after which the meeting adjourned.
[41]

The massacre[edit]

The Martyrs' Well, at Jallianwala Bagh. 120 bodies were

recovered from this well as per inscription on it. [42]

On Sunday, 13 April 1919, Dyer, convinced a major insurrection could take place, banned all
meetings. This notice was not widely disseminated, and many villagers gathered in the Bagh to
celebrate the Baisakhi festival, and peacefully protest against the arrest and deportation of two
national leaders, Satyapal and Saifuddin Kitchlew.[43]

At 09:00 on the morning of 13 April 1919, the traditional festival of Baisakhi, Reginald Dyer, the
acting military commander for Amritsar and its environs, proceeded through the city with several city
officials, announcing the implementation of a pass system to enter or leave Amritsar, a curfew
beginning at 20:00 that night and a ban on all processions and public meetings of four or more
persons. The proclamation was read and explained in English, Urdu, Hindi, and Punjabi, but many
either paid it no heed, or learned of it only later.[44] Meanwhile, local police had received intelligence
of the planned meeting in the Jallianwala Bagh through word of mouth and plainclothes detectives in
the crowds. Dyer was informed of the meeting at 12:40, and returned to his base at around 13:30 to
decide how to handle it.[45]

By mid-afternoon, thousands of Indians had gathered in the Jallianwala Bagh (garden) near
the Harmandir Sahib in Amritsar. Many who were present had been worshipping earlier at
the Golden Temple and were merely passing through the Bagh on their way home. The Bagh was
(and remains today) an open area of six to seven acres, roughly 200 yards by 200 yards in size, and
surrounded on all sides by walls roughly 10 feet in height. Balconies of houses three to four stories
tall overlooked the Bagh, and five narrow entrances opened onto it, several with lockable gates.
Although it was planted with crops during the rainy season, for much of the rest of the year it served
as a local meeting place and recreation area.[46] In the centre of the Bagh was a samadhi (cremation
site) and a large well partly filled with water which measured about 20 feet in diameter.[46]
Apart from the pilgrims passing through, Amritsar had filled up over the preceding days with farmers,
traders, and merchants who were attending the annual Baisakhi horse and cattle fair. Because the
city police closed the fair at 14:00 that afternoon, many of those who had been attending it drifted
into the Jallianwala Bagh, further increasing the number of people who happened to be there when
the massacre began.

Dyer arranged for an aeroplane to overfly the Bagh and estimate the size of the crowd, which he
reported was about 6,000; however, the Hunter Commission estimates that a crowd of between
10,000 and 20,000 had assembled by the time Dyer arrived.[46][9] Colonel Dyer and Deputy
Commissioner Irving, the senior civil authority for Amritsar, took no actions to prevent the crowds
from assembling, or to peacefully disperse them. This would later be a serious criticism levelled at
both Dyer and Irving.

Mural depicting 1919 Amritsar massacre

An hour after the meeting began as scheduled at 17:30, Colonel Dyer arrived at the Bagh with a
group of 50 troops. All fifty were armed with .303 Lee–Enfield bolt-action rifles. Dyer may have
specifically chosen troops from those ethnic groups due to their proven loyalty to the British. He had
also brought two armoured cars armed with machine guns; however, the vehicles could not enter the
compound through the narrow entrances. The Jallianwala Bagh was surrounded on all sides by
houses and buildings and had only five narrow entrances, most of which were kept permanently
locked. The main entrance was relatively wide, but was guarded heavily by the troops backed by the
armoured vehicles so as to prevent anyone from getting out.

Without warning the crowd to disperse, Dyer ordered his troops to block the main exits and begin
shooting toward the densest sections of the crowd in front of the available narrow exits, where
panicked crowds were trying to leave the Bagh. Firing continued for approximately ten minutes.
Unarmed civilians, including men, women, elderly people and children were killed. This incident
came to be known as the Amritsar massacre. A cease-fire was ordered after the troops fired about
one third of their ammunition.[47][48] He stated later that the purpose of this action "was not to disperse
the meeting but to punish the Indians for disobedience."[49]

The following day Dyer stated in a report, "I have heard that between 200 and 300 of the crowd were
killed. My party fired 1,650 rounds".[50][47] Apart from the many deaths that resulted directly from the
shooting, a number of people died by being crushed in the stampedes at the narrow gates or by
jumping into the solitary well on the compound to escape the shooting. A plaque, placed at the site
after independence, states that 120 bodies were removed from the well. Dyer imposed a curfew time
that was earlier than the usual time; as a result, the wounded could not be moved from where they
had fallen, and many of them therefore died of their wounds during the night.[51]

Casualties[edit]
The number of total casualties is disputed. The following morning's newspapers quoted an
erroneous initial figure of 200 casualties, offered by the Associated Press, e.g.,

"News has been received from the Punjab that the Amritsar mob has again broken out in a violent
attack against the authorities. The rebels were repulsed by the military and they suffered 200
casualties."

— The Times of India, 14 April 1919[52]

The Government of Punjab, criticised by the Hunter Commission for not gathering accurate figures,
only offered the same approximate figure of 200. When interviewed by the members of the
committee a senior civil servant in Punjab admitted that the actual figure could be higher.[9] The Sewa
Samiti society independently carried out an investigation and reported 379 deaths, and 192 seriously
wounded. The Hunter Commission based their figures of 379 deaths, and approximately 3 times that
number injured, suggesting 1500 casualties.[9] At the meeting of the Imperial Legislative Council held
on 12 September 1919, the investigation led by Pandit Madan Mohan Malviya concluded that there
were 42 boys among the dead, the youngest of them only 7 months old.[53] The Hunter commission
confirmed the deaths of 337 men, 41 boys and a six-week-old baby.[9]

In July 1919, three months after the massacre, officials were tasked with finding who had been killed
by inviting inhabitants of the city to volunteer information about those who had died.[9] This
information was incomplete due to fear that those who participated would be identified as having
been present at the meeting, and some of the dead may not have had close relations in the area.[54]

Winston Churchill reported nearly 400 slaughtered, and three or four times the number wounded to
the Westminster Parliament, on 8 July 1920.[55]

Since the official figures were obviously flawed regarding the size of the crowd (6,000–20,000[9]), the
number of rounds fired and the period of shooting, the Indian National Congress instituted a
separate inquiry of its own, with conclusions that differed considerably from the British Government's
inquiry. The casualty number quoted by the Congress was more than 1,500, with approximately
1,000 being killed.[2]

Indian nationalist Swami Shraddhanand wrote to Gandhi of 1500 deaths in the incident.[56]

The British Government tried to suppress information of the massacre,[57] but news spread in India
and widespread outrage ensued; details of the massacre did not become known in Britain until
December 1919.[58][59][60]

Aftermath[edit]
This event caused many moderate Indians to abandon their previous loyalty to the British and
become nationalists distrustful of British rule.[61]

Colonel Dyer reported to his superiors that he had been "confronted by a revolutionary army", to
which Major General William Beynon replied: "Your action was correct and Lieutenant Governor
approves."[62] O'Dwyer requested that martial law should be imposed upon Amritsar and other areas,
and this was granted by Viceroy Lord Chelmsford.[63][64] Thousands were detained in the subsequent
days, some being sentenced to penal transportation. According to historian Harish Puri, at at least
115 people were killed by security forces in the days after 13 April.[65]

Both Secretary of State for War Winston Churchill and former Prime Minister H. H. Asquith, however,
openly condemned the attack, Churchill referring to it as "unutterably monstrous", and Asquith called
it "one of the worst, most dreadful, outrages in the whole of our history".[66] Churchill, in the House of
Commons debate of 8 July 1920, said "The crowd was unarmed, except with bludgeons. It was not
attacking anybody or anything ... When fire had been opened upon it to disperse it, it tried to run
away. Pinned up in a narrow place considerably smaller than Trafalgar Square, with hardly any exits,
and packed together so that one bullet would drive through three or four bodies, the people ran
madly this way and the other. When the fire was directed upon the centre, they ran to the sides. The
fire was then directed to the sides. Many threw themselves down on the ground, the fire was then
directed down on the ground. This was continued to 8 to 10 minutes, and it stopped only when the
ammunition had reached the point of exhaustion."[67]
After Churchill's speech in the House of Commons debate, MPs voted 247 to 37 against Dyer and in
support of the Government.[68] Cloake reports that despite the official rebuke, many Britons still
"thought him a hero for saving the rule of British law in India."[69]

Rabindranath Tagore received the news of the massacre by 22 May 1919. He tried to arrange a
protest meeting in Calcutta and finally decided to renounce his British knighthood as "a symbolic act
of protest".[70] In the repudiation letter, dated 31 May 1919 and addressed to the Viceroy of
India, Lord Chelmsford, he wrote "I ... wish to stand, shorn, of all special distinctions, by the side of
those of my countrymen who, for their so called insignificance, are liable to suffer degradation not fit
for human beings."[71]

Gupta describes the letter written by Tagore as "historic". He writes that Tagore "renounced his
knighthood in protest against the inhuman cruelty of the British Army to the people of Punjab". Gupta
quotes from Tagore's letter to the Viceroy, stating "The enormity of the measures taken by the
Government in Punjab for quelling some local disturbances has, with a rude shock, revealed to our
minds the helplessness of our position as British subjects in India ... [T]he very least that I can do for
my country is to take all consequences upon myself in giving voice to the protest of the millions of
my countrymen, surprised into dumb anguish of terror. The time has come when badges of honour
make our shame glaring in the incongruous context of humiliation ..."[72] English Writings of
Rabindranath Tagore Miscellaneous Writings Vol # 8 carries a facsimile of this hand written letter.[73]

Disorders Inquiry Committee 1919–1920 (report) Calcutta- Superintendent Government

Printing, India 1920
Hunter Commission[edit]
On 14 October 1919, after orders issued by the Secretary of State for India Edwin Montagu, the
Government of India announced the formation of a committee of inquiry into the events in Punjab.
Referred to as the Disorders Inquiry Committee, it was later more widely known as the Hunter
Commission. It was named after the chairman, William, Lord Hunter, former Solicitor-General for
Scotland and Senator of the College of Justice in Scotland. The stated purpose of the commission
was to "investigate the recent disturbances in Bombay, Delhi and Punjab, about their causes, and
the measures taken to cope with them".[74][75] The members of the commission were:

 Lord Hunter, Chairman of the Commission

 Mr Justice George C. Rankin of Calcutta
 Sir Chimanlal Harilal Setalvad, Vice-Chancellor of Bombay University and advocate of the
Bombay High Court
 W.F. Rice, member of the Home Department
 Major-General George Barrow, KCB, KCMG, GOC Peshawar Division
 Pandit Jagat Narayan, lawyer and Member of the Legislative Council of the United Provinces
 Thomas Smith, Member of the Legislative Council of the United Provinces
 Sardar Sahibzada Sultan Ahmad Khan, lawyer from Gwalior State
 H.C. Stokes, Secretary of the Commission and member of the Home Department[75]
After meeting in New Delhi on 29 October, the commission took statements from witnesses over the
following weeks.[76] Witnesses were called in Delhi, Ahmedabad, Bombay, and Lahore. Although the
commission as such was not a formally constituted court of law, meaning witnesses were not subject
to questioning under oath, its members managed to elicit detailed accounts and statements from
witnesses by rigorous cross-questioning. In general, it was felt the commission had been very
thorough in its enquiries.[75] After reaching Lahore in November, the commission wound up its initial
inquiries by examining the principal witnesses to the events in Amritsar. The commission held its
official sittings at the Lahore Town Hall near Anarkali Bazaar.
On 19 November, Dyer was ordered to appear before the commission. Although his military
superiors had suggested he be represented by legal counsel at the inquiry, Dyer refused this
suggestion and appeared alone.[75] Initially questioned by Lord Hunter, Dyer stated he had come to
know about the meeting at the Jallianwala Bagh at 12:40 hours that day but did not attempt to
prevent it. He stated that he had gone to the Bagh with the deliberate intention of opening fire if he
found a crowd assembled there. Patterson says Dyer explained his sense of honour to the Hunter
Commission by saying, "I think it quite possible that I could have dispersed the crowd without firing,
but they would have come back again and laughed, and I would have made, what I consider, a fool
of myself."[77] Dyer further reiterated his belief that the crowd in the Bagh was one of "rebels who
were trying to isolate my forces and cut me off from other supplies. Therefore, I considered it my
duty to fire on them and to fire well".[75]

After Mr. Justice Rankin had questioned Dyer, Sir Chimanlal Setalvad enquired:

Sir Chimanlal: Supposing the passage was sufficient to allow the armoured cars to go in, would you
have opened fire with the machine guns?

Dyer: I think probably, yes.

Sir Chimanlal: In that case, the casualties would have been much higher?

Dyer: Yes.[75]
Dyer further stated that his intentions had been to strike terror throughout Punjab and in doing so,
reduce the moral stature of the "rebels". He said he did not stop the shooting when the crowd began
to disperse because he thought it was his duty to keep shooting until the crowd dispersed, and that
minimal shooting would not prove effective. In fact, he continued the shooting until the ammunition
was almost exhausted.[78] He stated that he did not make any effort to tend to the wounded after the
shooting: "Certainly not. It was not my job. Hospitals were open and they could have gone there."[79]

Exhausted from the rigorous cross-examination questioning and unwell, Dyer was then released.
Over the next several months, while the commission wrote its final report, the British press, as well
as many MPs, turned increasingly hostile towards Dyer as the full extent of the massacre and his
statements at the inquiry became widely known.[75] Lord Chelmsford refused to comment until the
Commission had been wound up. In the meanwhile, Dyer became seriously ill with jaundice and
arteriosclerosis, and he was hospitalised.[75]

Although the members of the commission had been divided by racial tensions following Dyer's
statement, and though the Indian members had written a separate, minority report, the final report,
comprising six volumes of evidence and released on 8 March 1920, unanimously condemned Dyer's
actions.[75] In "continuing firing as long as he did, it appears to us that General Dyer committed a
grave error."[80] Dissenting members argued that the martial law regime's use of force was wholly
unjustified. "General Dyer thought he had crushed the rebellion and Sir Michael O'Dwyer was of the
same view", they wrote, "(but) there was no rebellion which required to be crushed." The report
concluded that:

 Lack of notice to disperse from the Bagh, in the beginning, was an error.
 The length of firing showed a grave error.
 Dyer's motive of producing a sufficient moral effect was to be condemned.
 Dyer had overstepped the bounds of his authority.
 There had been no conspiracy to overthrow British rule in the Punjab.
The minority report of the Indian members further added that:
 Proclamations banning public meetings were insufficiently distributed.
 Innocent people were in the crowd, and there had been no violence in the Bagh beforehand.
 Dyer should have either ordered his troops to help the wounded or instructed the civil authorities
to do so.
 Dyer's actions had been "inhuman and un-British" and had greatly injured the image of British
rule in India.
The Hunter Commission did not impose any penal or disciplinary action because Dyer's actions were
condoned by various superiors (later upheld by the Army Council).[81] The Legal and Home Members
on the Viceroy's Executive Council ultimately decided that, though Dyer had acted in a callous and
brutal way, military or legal prosecution would not be possible due to political reasons. However, he
was finally found guilty of a mistaken notion of duty and relieved of his command on 23 March. He
had been recommended for a CBE as a result of his service in the Third Afghan War; this
recommendation was cancelled on 29 March 1920.

Reginald Dyer was disciplined by removal from his appointment, was passed over for promotion and
was prohibited from employment in India. He died in 1927.[82]