Gender “Men-Streaming” CVE: Countering Violence

Extremism by Addressing Masculinities Issues

Abstract:

Violent extremist groups differ in many aspects - ideology, operations, and geography - but
almost all seek and recruit disillusioned young men as fighters on their front lines. The
ubiquity of this strategy means that young men are drawn to such groups less because of the
groups' specific beliefs and more out of an inherent need to fulfill their identities as men.
Policies and analysis to counter violent extremism must therefore incorporate gender analysis-
thus "men-stream" their efforts - in order to identify factors that make men vulnerable to
recruitment by extremist groups.

Keywords: violent extremism, terrorism, gender equality, gender justice, masculinity, men's
health, security, international development, gender studies

Acknowledgements: I would like to thank my mentors at George Washington University who

Contact: Jossif Ezekilov, [email protected]

The multifaceted ways violent terrorist groups come to exist, operate, and flourish are rooted
in complex geopolitical trends, which are continuously researched and debated by national
security experts, policymakers, and development practitioners alike. However, whether ISIS in
the Middle East, Boko Haram in West Africa, or hate groups in the West, one major
commonality among extremist groups is that they actively identify and recruit young,
disillusioned men as fighters on their front lines. The ubiquity of this strategy suggests there is
an inherent lure for young men to join such groups, one that goes beyond the groups’
respective ideologies.
This policy brief argues young men are more likely drawn into joining extremist groups when
they are struggling to fulfill their perceived needs and identities as men, rather than through an
inherent hatred of specific groups or radical ideologies. Countering Violence Extremism (CVE)
analyses and approaches must therefore incorporate considerations of masculinities - gender
“men-stream” their efforts - if anti-terrorism policies are to truly address the root causes of the
prevalence of violent extremism. “Men-streaming”, a term derived by scholars- most notably
popularized by Chant and Gutman (2002)- from the development and public policy concept of
gender mainstreaming, is a process of assessing and developing policy with particular attention
to, and emphasis on, its impact on men and young boys. In the context of CVE, this requires an
understanding of the role that dominant societal constructs of masculinity play in influencing
individuals’ choice of participating in violent activities.
“Men-Streaming”: Considering Men as Gendered Beings
Masculinities, that is, the study of cross-cultural social constructs that define what it means to
be a man, has traditionally received scant attention from activists and policy makers. This is
because most programs aimed at promoting gender equality have traditionally focused
primarily on promoting women’s rights. When men were included in the discourse, it was
mostly in the role of the “problematic male”: the obstacle in the way of women’s empowerment
(Cornwall, 2000). Some feminists have justified this omission on the grounds that resources
devoted to gender should be going to women to redress existing and longstanding gender
inequalities (Peretz, 2016.)
Though international agreements, such as the 1995 Beijing Declaration, have highlighted the
need to involve men in the promotion of gender equality (Ruxton, 2004), engaging with men on
gender issues has only been pursued recently. This shift in thinking came about due to the
realization that the success of gender equality efforts was limited in their focus solely on
women (Wanner & Wedham, 2015.) Development practitioners and gender equality advocates
came to see including the male side of gender as necessary for two reasons. First, achieving
transformational change on gender equality is not possible without engaging men. Second, men
also experience issues related to their gender that have a significant impact on their well-being
and life choices (Wanner & Wedham, 2015, Bannon & Correia, 2006; Chant & Gutman, 2002).
While masculinities differ across cultural, geographical, and political contexts, there is usually a
dominant and normative form of masculinity that is upheld by a society as the standard by
which all men are judged (Bannon & Correia, 2006). Known as hegemonic masculinity, it
encompasses a normative set of behaviors, actions, values, and practices that men are
conditioned to adhere to in order to be seen as proper men in their community. Certain
capabilities are valued over others, including: being able to secure work and provide for one’s
family; the ability to be sexually active, marry, and have children; and the ability to enjoy a
sense of belonging and respect among one’s peers and community. The pursuit of these

Reconsidering Development 2
Ezekilov Gender “Men-Streaming” CVE

capabilities dictates many men’s actions and the way they live their lives. Men who deviate
away from these established norms often face ridicule and social exclusion by their peers and
other members of their community (Barker & Ricardo, 2005). They are also often confronted
with a divide between the role society expects of them and their own realities. Men who are
poor, socioeconomically marginalized, disabled, or affected by conflict, are least likely to be able
to fulfill the aforementioned capabilities deemed favorable by their society (Bannon & Correia,
2006).
When men are unable to fulfill these expectations, they may turn to destructive and illicit
means to do so. This happens because men do not see an alternative other than living up to the
expectations set upon them by their environment and those around them (Bannon & Correia,
2006). Men may resort to illicit behavior to achieve a sense of dominance over their
surroundings, as well as vent their frustrations with the status quo. Studies have shown that
men who uphold such hegemonic views of masculinity are more likely to engage in actions such
as criminal activity, drug use, violence against others, and unsafe sexual practices (Barker &
Ricardo, 2005; Barker, Heilman, & Harrison, 2017; Robb, Featherstone, Ruxton, & Ward,
2015).
The Role of Masculinities in Violent Extremism
Organizations involved in CVE have long supported the notion that young men fuel the rise of
extremist groups. The presence of a “youth bulge” in a population has been documented as a
predictor of societal unrest. For example, Urdal (2011) has found that the probability of armed
conflict is 150% greater when 15-24-year-olds make up 35% of a country’s population, as is the
case in many developing countries. However, the gendered nuances regarding the way men are
involved in such conflicts are not well examined. When gender is considered, it is again usually
in the context of women and the way they are targeted as instruments of war, as seen with the
example of Boko Haram’s use of rape and abduction of women in Nigeria (Zenn & Pearson,
2014). Even donor strategies on CVE without an articulated gender strategy still only see half
the story. USAID (2016) calls for gender considerations in their CVE strategy, but only in the
context of increased attention to “women’s perceptions of violence and security” (p.10), while
also engaging women as stakeholders as certainly necessary endeavors.
Given that men are more likely to choose violent action if they face challenges to fulfilling their
societal roles as men, one can expect the presence of such barriers to be indicative of a greater
vulnerability to radicalization. Mapping out these barriers in the context of “push” and “pull”
factors towards extremism would thus present a useful analysis of the conditions needed for
men to be radicalized. Hasan (2012) provides useful definitions of push and pull factors in this
context: push factors are the negative factors in one’s “societal environment” that aid in
“pushing” them toward violent extremism, while “pull” factors are the perceived positive
features of extremist groups that pull men towards joining. The following are examples of both
types of factors that may act as determinants for joining a violent extremist group.
Push Factors
Lack of economic opportunities. Poverty and unemployment are some of the biggest risk
factors for men’s radicalization. The inability to work and provide for oneself and family
represents the ultimate emasculation in many societies, and it has been shown to have a
negative impact on men’s health, self-image, and general well-being (Barker, 2005). This can be
exacerbated if men are dependent on others for support. Joining an extremist group can

Reconsidering Development 3
Ezekilov Gender “Men-Streaming” CVE

therefore be a primarily financial endeavor. For example, former al-Shabab fighters in Somalia
cited the ability to provide for themselves and not be reliant on relatives as a key motivator for
joining (Hassan, 2012).
Social marginalization. Men who face sociocultural barriers within their communities are
more likely to be disengaged from them, and so are more vulnerable to radicalization (Jasko,
LaFree, & Kruglanski, 2017). Such barriers can relate to race, age, religion, ethnicity, or any
other social identity. Men can feel marginalized, even in contexts where the opportunities to
fulfill their roles as men are present, if they do not enjoy equal access to those opportunities
based on their social identities. Extremists who were born in the West provide an ideal
example of this. It was long believed that societies with fairly robust human rights and
freedoms, like those of many Western countries, would make an unlikely breeding ground for
potential terrorists (Gelfand, LaFee, Fahey, & Feinberg, 2013). This theory was contradicted
by terrorist events in the West, and the fact that many of the perpetrators were citizens or
residents of the same countries they attacked. However, just because those freedoms were
present does not mean the individuals in question had real access to them, as the
aforementioned barriers are still present for many individuals, even in many Western countries.
This discrimination furthers social disengagement, which in turn makes individuals more
vulnerable to radicalization (OSCE, 2014).
Lack of marriage prospects. In many societies, one is not fully a man until he is a husband
and father. Unmarried men are often relegated to a lower status in many societies, and often
have lower rates of employment (Moffitt, 2012), income (Pollman-Schult, 2011; Ashwin &
Isupova, 2014), educational attainment (Fry et al., 2010), and land ownership (Koopman, 2009).
They may even be perceived as being homosexual, causing further tensions (Bannon and
Correia, 2006). At the same time, men also face increasing difficulties in finding spouses. The
phenomenon of “missing females” due to offspring selection in many parts of the world has led
to a dearth of potential brides (“The worldwide war,” 2010.) Migration and increased education
and employment opportunities for women are other contributing factors that exacerbate the
marriage disparity. The resulting imbalance in the marriage market has been shown to create a
surplus of males that are more prone to violent actions (Hudson & Den Boer, 2002). Extremist
groups have keyed in on this phenomenon and use marriage as a recruitment tool. Groups like
IS and Boko Haram actively recruit and/or kidnap women and girls to be married off to their
fighters.
Pull Factors
A sense of belonging. Being a part of a group and forming interpersonal relationships are
essential human interactions. These experiences may not be made available to men who are
ostracized by their community for their inability to fulfill their roles as men, and/or are socially
marginalized based on their social identities. This may cause men to seek acceptance and social
connection from groups elsewhere. There is psychological evidence to suggest that the need for
belonging is strong enough for individuals to accept the goals of others as their own (Khader et
al.). Groups like IS have exploited this in their messaging, calling for the unison of all Muslims,
regardless of race or ethnicity (Khader et al.). In doing so, they appeal to men who do not
experience such acceptance in their own communities.
Defense of one’s identity. All extremist groups call for war as a means of defense against the
destruction of shared values, calling on men to be defenders of religion, country, ethnicity, or
way of life. Global terrorism is thus not so much a traditional contest of territory and

Reconsidering Development 4
Ezekilov Gender “Men-Streaming” CVE

resources, but rather a radical defense of one’s identity (Bannon & Correia, 2006). It has even
been argued that the call to jihad is borne less out of orthodox religiosity, and more as a means
of redressing the past wrongs enacted on Muslims by the West (Aslam, 2012).
The search for respect. A soldier is generally seen as a being in a position of power and honor
in many societies. Joining an extremist group can therefore be a way to achieve elevated
prominence in one’s society. Former fighters of al-Shabab cited honor as the biggest draw to
joining the group, as membership ensured fear, respect, and attention from women (Hassan,
2012). Being a fighter therefore allowed these men to bypass the traditional limitations of age
and wealth in achieving a swift fulfillment of the hegemonic male status.
Recommendations
Curbing the appeal of violent extremist groups will require addressing the discussed “push” and
“pull” factors at all levels. More research is needed on the application of men’s gender
perspectives in conflict and post-conflict settings. Such analysis is difficult, not least because
most men have never been engaged in discussion about their experiences as men (Barker,
2005). There are three general approaches that can be undertaken to “men stream” CVE
policies:
Learning from existing men’s programs. Methodologies from men’s programs addressing
violence against women may provide valuable tools and lessons to crafting effective CVE
policies. Some successful examples include the White Ribbon Campaign (Kaufman, 2001) and
men’s clubs against violence (Tu-Anh, Trang, & Tam, 2013). Such efforts are effective because
they provide a sense of belonging, a space for men to deconstruct their preconceptions of
masculinity, and/or an opportunity for men to evaluate their harmful behaviors without
judgement, all of which are needed to foster true behavior change. Social media campaigns
should also be pursued to promote positive masculinity, gender equality, and expressions of
one’s identity (Helmus, York, & Chalk, 2013).
Engagement of local stakeholders. Countering CVE requires the inclusion of local actors
such as NGOs, religious groups, community youth organizations, women’s groups, recreation
and sports clubs, and other civil society groups, working at the grassroots level, as well as
young people themselves. Previous policies on CVE have too often created stigma and further
resentment, as evidenced by “counter radicalization” interventions in Europe (Chin, Gharaibeh,
Woodham, & Deeb, 2016). Incorporating community actors into the design and
implementation of CVE efforts will go a long way to correcting this, as well as ensuring such
efforts will be effective, sustainable, and embraced at the local level. An inclusive and
participatory planning process will also help to identify specific factors that contribute to the
marginalization of young men and to develop the best means for addressing them.
Addressing structural barriers. On the national level, structural barriers that lead to social
marginalization must be eradicated, particularly in developing countries with large youth
populations. The most effective ways to pursue this goal is to expand education and
employment programs. Providing school and vocational programs that support young people
to develop employable skills, while at the same time expanding employment opportunities for
youth as they graduate, will reduce socioeconomic incentives for joining an extremist group.
Investing in youth entrepreneurship in both the formal and informal sector has been identified
as an area of importance, especially for CVE efforts in East Africa (ACSS, 2012). Such efforts

Reconsidering Development 5
Ezekilov Gender “Men-Streaming” CVE

will also unlock a vital source of growth and poverty reduction for many countries, further
reducing the draw extremist groups have for young men.
References
Africa Center for Strategic Studies. (2012). Preventing youth radicalization in East Africa. Program summary of
preventing youth radicalization in East Africa work shop, Kigali, Rwanda. Retrieved from
http://africacenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Preventing-Youth-Radicalization-in-East-Africa-
Program-Summary-ACSS.pdf
Ashwin, S., & Isupova, O. (2014). "Behind every great man . . . ": The male marriage wage premium examined
qualitatively. Journal of Marriage and Family, 76(1), 37-55. Retrieved from
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/jomf.12082/full Aslam, M. (2012). Gender-based explosions: The
nexus between Muslim masculinities, jihadist Islamism, and terrorism. Tokyo: United Nations University Press.
Bannon, I., & Correia, M. (2006). The other half of gender: Men's issues in development. Washington, DC: World
Bank, 2006.
Barker, G. [Gary Thomas]. (2005). Dying to be men: Youth, masculinity and social exclusion. New York; London:
Routledge.
Barker, G. and Ricardo, C. (2005). Young men and the construction of masculinity in Sub-Saharan Africa. Social
Development Papers, Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction. Washington, DC: World Bank. Retrieved from
wds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2005/06/23/000012009_20050623134235/Rend
ered/PDF/327120rev0PAPER0AFR0young0men0WP26.pdf
Barker, G., Heilman, B., & Harrison, A. (2017). The man box: A study on being a young man in the US, UK, and
Mexico. Washington, DC and London: Promundo-US and Unilever. Retrieved from
http://promundoglobal.org/resources/man-box-study-young-man-us-uk-mexico/
Chant, S., & Gutmann, M. C. (2002). ‘Men-streaming’ gender? questions for gender and development policy in the
twenty-first century. Progress in Development Studies, 2(4), 269-282. doi:10.1191/1464993402ps041ra
Cancel
Chin, M., Gharaibeh, S., Woodham, J. & Deeb, G. (2016). A national strategic framework for countering violent
extremism in Jordan. Journal of International Affairs, 69(2, Spring), 115-XIII. Retrieved from
https://jia.sipa.columbia.edu/national-strategic-framework-countering-violent-extremism-jordan
Cornwall, A. (2000). Missing men? Reflections on men, masculinities and gender in GAD. Institute for Development
Studies Bulletin 31(2), 18–27. Retrieved from http://sro.sussex.ac.uk/10629/
Fry, R., & Cohn, D. (2010). Women, men, and the new economics of marriage. Pew Research Center Social
Demographics Trend Report. Retrieved from http://assets.pewresearch.org/wp-
content/uploads/sites/3/2010/11/new-economics-of-marriage.pdf
Gelfand, M. J., LaFee, G., Fahey, S., & Feinberg, E. (2013). Culture and extremism. Journal of Social Issues, 69(3),
495-517. Retrieved from http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/josi.12026/epdf.
Hassan, M. (2012). Understanding drivers of violent extremism: The case of Al-Shabab and Somali youth. CTC
Sentinel, 5(8). West Point: Combating Terrorism Center. Retrieved from https://www.ctc.usma.edu/v2/wp-
content/uploads/2012/08/CTCSentinel-Vol5Iss84.pdf
Helmus, T., York, E., and Chalk, P. (2013). Promoting online voices for countering violent extremism. Santa
Monica, CA: RAND Corporation. Retrieved from https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR130.html.
Hudson, V. M., and Den Boer, A. (2002). A surplus of men, a deficit of peace: Security and sex ratios in Asia's
largest states. International Security, 26(4), 5-38. Retrieved from
http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/016228802753696753
Jasko, K., LaFree, G. and Kruglanski, A. (2017), Quest for Significance and Violent Extremism: The Case of
Domestic Radicalization. Political Psychology, 38: 815–831. doi:10.1111/pops.12376
Kaufman, M. (2001). Strategic planning to end men's violence: The White Ribbon Campaign. Aggressive Behavior,
27(3), 158-158.
Khader, M., Neo, L. S., Ong, G., Mingyi, E. T., & Chin, J. (2016). Combating violent extremism and radicalization
in the digital era. Hershey, PA: Information Science Reference.
Koopman, J. (2009). Globalization, gender, and poverty in the Senegal River Valley. Feminist Economics, 15(3) 253-
285, Inequality, Development, and Growth. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13545700902920370
Moffitt, R. A. (2012). The Reversal of the employment-population ratio in the 2000s: Facts and explanations.
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 201-264. Retrieved from https://www.brookings.edu/bpea-articles/the-
reversal-of-the-employment-population-ratio-in-the-2000s-facts-and-explanations/ Organization for Security
and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). (2014). Youth engagement to counter violent extremism and radicalization
that lead to terrorism. Vienna, Austria: Report on the findings and recommendations stemming from the Expert

Reconsidering Development 6
Ezekilov Gender “Men-Streaming” CVE

Roundtable on "Youth Engagement to Counter Violent Extremism and Radicalization that Lead to Terrorism”.
Retrieved from https://www.counterextremism.org/resources/details/id/668/youth-engagement-to-counter-
violent-extremism-and-radicalization-that-lead-to-terrorism.
Peretz, T. (2016). Why study men and masculinities? A theorized research review. Men, Masculinities, and Violence,
12(3), 32-33. Retrieved from: http://gjss.org/sites/default/files/issues/full/GJSS%20Vol%2012-3.pdf
Pollmann-Schult, M. (2011). Marriage and earnings: Why do married men earn more than single men? European
Sociological Review, 27(2), 147-163. DOI: http://doi:10.1093/esr/jcp065
Robb, M., Featherstone, B., Ruxton, S., & Ward, M. (2015). Beyond male role models: Gender identities and work
with young men. Open University. Retrieved from http://www.open.ac.uk/health-and-social-
care/research/beyond-male-role-models/sites/www.open.ac.uk.health-and-social-care.research.beyond-male-
role-models/files/files/BMRM_report.pdf
Ruxton, S. (Ed.). (2004). Gender equality and men: Learning from practice. Oxford: Oxfam GB. Retrieved from
http://www.xyonline.net/sites/default/files/Ruxton,%20Gender%20equality%20and%20men.pdf
The worldwide war on baby girls. (2010, March 6th). The Economist. Retrieved from
http://www.economist.com/node/15636231
Tu-Anh H., Trang T. Q. & Tam T. T. (2013). “Because I am a Man, I should be more gentle to my wife and
children”: Positive masculinity to stop gender-based violence in a coastal district in Vietnam. Gender &
Development, 21(1), 81-96.
United States Department of State. (2016). Department of State & USAID joint strategy on countering violent
extremism. Retrieved from https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1866/FINAL%20--
%20State%20and%20USAID%20Joint%20Strategy%20on%20Countering%20Violent%20Extremism%20%28M
ay%202016%29.pdf
Urdal, H. (2011). A clash of generations? Youth bulges and political violence. New York, NY: UN Expert Group
Meeting on Adolescents, Youth, and Development. Retrieved from
http://www.un.org/esa/population/meetings/egm-adolescents/p10_urdal.pdf
Wanner, T. and Wadham, B. (2015), Men and Masculinities in International Development: ‘Men-streaming’
Gender and Development?. Development Policy Review, 33: 15–32. doi:10.1111/dpr.12090
Zenn, J. & Pearson, E., (2014). Women, gender and the evolving tactics of Boko Haram. Journal of Terrorism
Research, 5(1). DOI: http://doi.org/10.15664/jtr.828

Reconsidering Development 7