W17228

VOLKSWAGEN EMISSION SCANDAL: REPUTATION RECOVERY AND

RECALL STRATEGY1

Rachna Shah, Gaganpreet Singh, and Sandeep Puri wrote this case solely to provide material for class discussion. The authors do
not intend to illustrate either effective or ineffective handling of a managerial situation. The authors may have disguised certain names
and other identifying information to protect confidentiality.

This publication may not be transmitted, photocopied, digitized, or otherwise reproduced in any form or by any means without the
permission of the copyright holder. Reproduction of this material is not covered under authorization by any reproduction rights
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University, London, Ontario, Canada, N6G 0N1; (t) 519.661.3208; (e) [email protected]; www.iveycases.com.

Copyright © 2017, Richard Ivey School of Business Foundation Version: 2017-04-25

We have totally screwed up.

Michael Horn, chief executive offer, Volkswagen USA2

The trust-shattering exposure of the Volkswagen Group (VW) emission scandal on September 18, 2015,
left Matthias Müller, VW’s newly appointed chief executive officer (CEO), with a daunting management
challenge—reputation recovery. Müller’s task was to draw the German multinational automotive
manufacturing company out of the abyss of one of the worst reputation crises it had faced since its inception
in 1937. The matter came to the fore when the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
slapped a legal notice on VW for violation of the Clean Air Act.3 The EPA accused VW of manipulating
nitrogen oxide emissions tests to ensure its EA 189 diesel engines, built during fiscal years 2009–2015, met
EPA standards. The EPA claimed that VW used a “defeat device,” programming its engines to control
emissions during laboratory testing and driving so that they remained within permissible limits. However,
during actual on-the-road driving, the nitrogen oxide emissions were as much as 40 times higher.4

No sooner had VW admitted to the intentional fraud charges than its stock plummeted 20 per cent5 and its
market value declined by US$26.8 billion.6 This downturn forced VW to recall 11 million affected cars
worldwide. VW also faced a penalty of approximately $18.0 billion from the EPA.7 An additional $7.3
billion was required to fix all affected cars.8 This full-blown crisis hit VW across the board, severely denting
its market share, brand image, internal/external stakeholders’ trust, and supply chain operations.

The consequences of the unethical conduct included investigations from over a dozen countries and lawsuits
from many customers. It was imperative that the company have a fresh start to overcome this bleak scenario.
Müller needed to meticulously reconceptualize the VW brand identity and devise an appropriate recall
strategy, along with its key elements. Should he break down the recall strategy into distinct phases, with
unique objectives for each phase? Should the strategy be different for different stakeholders and address
their specific concerns? Finally, could different stakeholders be more relevant during different phases, and
should the recall strategy be designed with this difference in mind?

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THE SCANDAL

In 2005, VW CEO Wolfgang Bernhard wanted to reaffirm VW’s position in the world’s most competitive
market—the United States. He believed that diesel engines were the gateway to compete with VW’s
Japanese rival, Toyota Motor Corporation, and to capture the U.S. market, which had stricter environmental
standards. Rudolf Krebs, an experienced engineer from Audi whose prototype had worked well in South
Africa, recommended the additional use of AdBlue in the planned engine, which was later named EA 189.
When Bernhard left and Krebs was transferred to another position, Martin Winterkorn became CEO in
2007. After taking office, Winterkorn instructed Ulrich Hackenberg and Wolfgang Hatz, key Audi team
members, to expedite the engine development.9

In 2007, VW introduced the diesel engine EA 189, which efficiently met tighter emissions controls and
better fuel efficiency standards. EA 189 became an effective differentiator, which increased VW’s U.S.
market share. The increased clean diesel sales volume in the United States, which rose from 43,869 in 2009
to 98,500 in 2014, reflected the high customer acknowledgment.10 VW positioned the innovation with the
“clean diesel” mantra.11 Its aggressive promotion campaign claimed the following:

This ain’t your daddy’s diesel. Stinky, smoky, and sluggish. Those old diesel realities no longer
apply. Enter TDI Clean Diesel. Ultra-low-sulfur fuel, direct injection technology, and extreme
efficiency. We’ve ushered in a new era of diesel.12

In addition, VW insisted “diesel cars are fun, quiet, efficient and, most critically, they are clean.”13
According to iSpot.tv, VW spent $77 million to endorse its clean diesel cars, which accounted for about 45
per cent of its total television advertising budget of $165 million.14 The technology was also showcased at
various car shows.

In 2012–2013, various environmental organizations raised concerns that diesel cars were not as clean as
claimed. In 2013, an environmental association, DUH (Deutsche Umwelthilfe), revealed audit reports
highlighting significant irregularities between the test mode and the actual driving mode in Germany. The
reason for VW’s exceptional diesel performance was unveiled when the International Council on Clean
Transportation conducted similar tests in the United States and informed the EPA and the California Air
Resources Board about several VW brands and models that failed the tests (see Exhibit 1).15

After a series of investigations, VW admitted that it used a defeat device to improve performance and
eventually change buyers’ perception regarding diesel technology. VW’s acknowledgment of manipulation
led to several countries launching investigations and many customers filing lawsuits. VW then started a
recall in January 2016, which was expected to last until the end of the year.

PAST RECALLS IN THE U.S. AUTO INDUSTRY

Car recalls were among the most common issues in the auto industry. The recalls were mostly the
consequence of design flaws and misses in the production line. Most manufacturers faced this problem,
either voluntarily or imposed, at some stage in their businesses and at staggering costs. According to the
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, in 2013–2014, the recall amount in the U.S. auto industry
was more than 30 per cent. The U.S. auto industry recalled 22 million vehicles and sold just over 15
million.16 Some of the most famous recalls in the United States related to Toyota’s out-of-control gas pedals,
2009– 2010; Ford’s failure-to-park recall, 1980; the Takata seatbelt scandal, 1995; and the Ford ignition

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problem, 1996.17 Although these were some of the most costly recalls to affect the U.S. auto industry, they
were neither the only ones nor the last ones.

The latest VW recall would also find a place on the list of biggest and most expensive recalls; however, it was
distinct. Unlike the others, this global recall was the result of intentional infringement rather than a
manufacturing defect. Generally, after a manufacturing defect, the relaunch of a car did not involve a complete
overhaul of the positioning strategy; neither were customer trust and market share dynamics greatly affected.
However, the emissions scandal made it imperative for the VW marketing team to put something new in place.

PAST USE OF DEFEAT DEVICES IN THE AUTO INDUSTRY

VW’s use of the defeat device was not the only time the device was used in the auto industry. In fact, VW
had repeatedly used the device. General Motors Company, Ford Motor Company, and American Honda
Motor Company had also paid heavy penalties for using the device.

VW: In 1974, VW paid $120,000 to resolve an objection the EPA raised. The EPA’s complaint maintained
that VW did not reveal the existence of two devices that altered the emission control on about 25,000 cars
manufactured in 1973.18

GM Cadillac: GM’s first environmental-related recall occurred in 1995 following the installation of illegal
devices in 470,000 Cadillac cars. The total penalty, including a hefty fine, recall cost, and cost of altering
the infrastructure to offset the excess emission, was $45 million.19

American Honda and Ford: In 1998, Honda and Ford were alleged to have used a defeat device called a
“misfire monitor.” The use of the emission-control mechanism led to both companies being forced to pay
millions of dollars in penalty, recall, and fixing costs.20

THE DISRUPTION

Suppliers

The VW scandal disrupted the value chain for most of its stakeholders. Limited or halted VW production
affected the sales of first-tier suppliers of wheels, engines, fenders, and so on. In turn, these suppliers
stopped the delivery from their own suppliers of spark plugs, engine blocks, and other such parts (second
tier). The subsequent chain reaction continued to increase the magnitude of the disruption.

VW used the best supply chain management practices such as lean inventory levels. However, the just-in-
time system, and its high dependence on single suppliers for each of its parts, intensified the speed and
relative harshness of the impact on suppliers. VW’s subcontracting represented about 70 per cent of the car
sticker price. If the 70 per cent figures persisted, the first-tier suppliers had $280 billion at stake. Similarly,
if 70 per cent revenue of the first-tier suppliers was generated for second-tier suppliers, the total impact
would be about $476 billion, and this could be expected to increase further while moving down the supply
chain. Thus, the consequences of one organization’s unethical practices drastically affected the related value
chains and eventually affected the entire industry.

The unexpected incident brought a sense of hesitation to the relationships among business partners and
distorted their strategic business planning. One supplier acknowledged that the VW scandal had ushered in
disruptive uncertainty.21 As VW was held accountable, it had to effectively manage the relationships with
its suppliers during the crisis.

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The VW scandal originated from manipulated engine production and emission control technology, parts of which
were supplied by some of the world’s most renowned suppliers such as Bosch. Bosch built key components of
the diesel engines. It provided the engine control module known as EDC 17 and a basic software to control its
operations. The system adjusted the vehicle’s mechanism of cleaning burned-up fuel before it was expelled as
exhaust. The U.S. authorities investigated the role Bosch may have played in this scandal. An inquiry was
initiated to determine if Bosch knew that its technology was used to control the emissions. Bosch rejected the
basis of investigation, stating that it had simply supplied the engine management systems to VW, and the onus
to integrate the components into cars lay with the carmaker.22 Bosch had cautioned VW about its intent to
commercialize the engine management software, which was initially supplied for vehicle testing, for production.
According to German newspaper Bild am Sonntag, in 2007, Bosch warned VW of the illegality of using the
emissions-controlling software in vehicles for sale.23 The authorities prosecuted Bosch on the basis that “if you
know that a crime is being committed and you actively facilitate part of the crime you are on the hook.”24

Customers

The impact of the scandal extended to VW’s customers through the anticipated lost resale value, customer
loyalty, and repurchase behaviour. Diesel technology had a fuel-economy advantage over petrol engines
via a trade-off with the emissions discharge. It emitted 500 parts per million of sulphur. VW’s clean diesel
was positioned to balance the trade-off by reducing emissions by 97 per cent and improving fuel economy
by 30 per cent. This encouraged buyers to pay a premium price for acquiring both a green image and fuel
efficiency. The unveiling of the VW scandal caused customers to tighten their belts; the resale value of the
affected cars was expected to go down by $5,000.25
At the onset, to regain consumer trust, VW initiated the “TDI Goodwill Program.” It offered compensation
to affected customers in the form of gift cards as a way of saying, “We’re sorry and we hope you’ll let us
back into your lives.”26 One of the gift cards was a $500 prepaid card that could be used anywhere, and the
other was a $500 card only redeemable at VW dealerships. It also assured 24-hour road assistance to the
affected cars for three years.27 However, a joint statement by U.S. senators Richard Blumenthal of
Connecticut and Edward Markey of Massachusetts termed the $1,000 gift “insultingly inadequate” and an
attempt to conceal VW’s deception.28 In the statement, the senators said,

[Volkswagen] should offer every owner who wants to keep her car full compensation for the loss
of resale value, fuel economy, and other damage caused by its purposeful deception. Volkswagen
should cooperate fully with federal criminal and civil investigations that will provide redress for
taxpayers as well as car owners—the company needs to get serious.29

VW also floated loyalty discounts on the current range of VW models. All individuals with any VW model
(emissions scandal affected or otherwise) with ownership of no less than 90 days were eligible for money
off the price of the car or deposit contributions to the finance agreements.30 It was highly likely that VW’s
tarnished reputation would affect customers’ repurchase behaviour. Earlier recalls in the auto industry had
been caused by unintentional engineering defects; a comeback after an intentional act would require a
complete transformation of positioning strategy.

Dealers

For many years, U.S. dealers had been cautioning VW about its flawed segmentation, targeting, and
positioning (STP) strategy. They believed that VW was offering cars unfit for the domestic market and with
a price tag much higher than its competitors. About dealership challenges, Alan Brown, chairman of the
Volkswagen National Dealer Advisory Council, said that dealers were struggling because of an obsolete

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product cycle, overpriced product, and worsening tensions between the council and VW over the years.31
This recent manipulation by VW had further dented the relationship. VW dealers placed it among the
biggest scams in the world. After holding a VW dealership for over two decades, New Jersey dealer Steve
Kalafer thought the VW scandal was so big, considering the overwhelming sales of these products in Europe
($300 billion) and the United States ($15 billion), that it was worse than the scams run by Ponzi and Madoff.
As a VW dealer, Kalafer felt conned. He was particularly worried about his employees, who had for years
worked on VW cars and represented them proudly. Now they were subjected to questions about whether
they knew about the cheating and fraud.32

Dealers faced the first and maximum wrath of buyers, who harangued them by phone, email, and on social
media, even as they demanded that the business partners buy back their cars or offer refunds. Dealers were
upset to be on the receiving end of this wrath for investing millions of dollars in the falsely advertised clean
diesel technology. Concerns increased after VW sales were banned until the company submitted a plan to
bring the leftover inventory into compliance with state emission laws. The dealers considered the scandal
their “Titanic.”33 Managing inventory was a major challenge in the car industry, with dealers generally
financing cars rather than owning them outright. The implication was that dealers paid hefty interest
amounts to operate their businesses.

Generally, dealers benefited from safety recalls. When a customer approached a dealer to repair an
engineering error, there was an opportunity for engineers to identify unrelated concerns and make more
sales. The trade of parts and services often brought more profit than the original car sale. As a result of the
scandal, the trust between the company and dealers was compromised. The situation pushed VW to
establish some pricing floor and incentive programs to retain relationships with its dealers.

Culture

Müller believed that this scam was convoluted by the involvement of few employees that had hammered
the company’s stock and done severe damage to its reputation. This scam forced VW to take an
introspective look at its culture and corporate policies. Müller agreed that this reputation crisis offered a
chance to do some organizational restructuring at VW. He felt there was a need to make the company leaner
and more decentralized and to give the brands more responsibility. He believed VW needed an “evolution”
and not a “revolution” to recover from the crisis. He was confident that if the company stuck to the plan, it
could flourish again in “two to three years.”34

By April 2016, VW’s structural changes hastened the decision-making process, reduced complexity, and
increased efficiency. The board of management could now begin to focus more on the future, safeguard
cross-brand synergies, and proceed to develop an overall strategy.35

VOLKSWAGEN PORTFOLIO

The VW Group owned a list of successful brands such as sports car maker Lamborghini; luxury brands Bentley,
Porsche, and Audi; and mass-market brands VW (passenger cars), ŠKODA, and SEAT (see Exhibit 2). The
range included brands that fell into the “nice to have” category such as Bugatti and Ducati. The product variety
and production for fiscal years 2014 and 2015 indicated the market demand (see Exhibit 3). VW had 120
production facilities spread across Americas, Asia, Europe, and Africa36 (see Exhibit 4).

After the scandal, VW was slammed for promoting expensive projects such as the Bugatti Veyron, with
many calling it “among the most superfluous things in the Volkswagen Group.” Dubbing the car an image

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enhancer unsuited for the bad times the company was going through, many wondered what VW was trying
to achieve by still backing the brand.37

VW had been carrying underperforming brands as liabilities on its balance sheet (see Exhibit 2) for a long
time. Now, the emissions scandal, which led to one of the most expensive recalls in the company’s history,
made it imperative to prioritize and overhaul the VW portfolio. Müller was busy drafting Strategy 2025 to
focus on reviewing the current portfolio. He said the company intended to make an in-depth review of its
current portfolio of over 300 models and assess how much each contributed to earnings. The immediate
focus was on “cross-brand strategies, leveraging synergies and ensuring that group resources are used
effectively.” He also said that management would be decentralized and brands and regions would be
empowered with more responsibility and independence.38

This new strategic plan was a departure from Strategy 2018, which sought to make VW the world’s biggest
carmaker by sales volume, ahead of Toyota. Müller noted that, across the board, VW had misunderstood
Strategy 2018 to be all about boosting unit sales, which meant that “a lot of things were subordinated to the
desire to be ‘faster, higher, and larger,’ especially return on sales.” He said the key was qualitative growth,
not selling a few thousand more cars than the competitor.39

The public explosion of the scandal had a ripple effect, which caused a major curve in VW’s future direction.
It would take time for Müller’s leadership and a reformed plan to help VW reconcile with consumers,
suppliers, and the giants of the auto industry. Considering VW’s vast portfolio, what corrective measures,
from an operational context, could be recommended in the new strategic plan to prevent product recalls?

THE WAY FORWARD

The scam not only put VW’s reputation at stake, but it also put the entire diesel industry under scrutiny.
Mike Hawes, CEO of the Society of Motor Manufacturers and Traders, agreed that the emissions scandal
had damaged the reputation of the entire industry and that it was now on the industry to rebuild customer
faith.40 Andy Palmer, chief executive officer of Aston Martin, said that this scandal would make customers
not only wary of all new VW cars, but that they would also doubt other car makers for some time. He
predicted that the diesel engine would die a slow death. The only way the auto industry could recover was
to phase out diesel engines.41

Suppliers, too, felt diesel technology had taken a big hit. According to Akshay Anand, a senior analyst at
Kelley Blue Book, suppliers would do better to seek out and adopt other technologies until customer trust
in diesel was regained, which could take a long time. He felt that it would depend on suppliers and how
much of their production was diesel.42 Despite the scandal, the global auto industry’s dilemma remained
the same: providing greater mileage with lesser emissions—but ethically, without manipulation.

Rachna Shah is a professor at the Carlson School of Management at the University of

Minnesota; Gaganpreet Singh is an assistant professor at NMIMS, Hyderabad; and
Sandeep Puri is a professor at the Institute of Management and Technology, Ghaziabad.

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 Page 7 9B17M052

EXHIBIT 1: LIST OF AFFECTED VW BRANDS AND MODELS

2009–2015 Volkswagen Jetta 2.0L TDI

2009–2015 Audi Q7 3.0L V-6 TDI
2009–2016 Volkswagen Touareg 3.0L V-6 TDI
2010–2015 Volkswagen Golf 2.0L TDI
2010–2015 Audi A3 2.0L TDI
2012–2015 Volkswagen Beetle 2.0L TDI
2012–2015 Volkswagen Passat 2.0L TDI
2013–2016 Porsche Cayenne Diesel 3.0L V-6
2014–2016 Audi A6 3.0L V-6 TDI
2014–2016 Audi A7 3.0L V-6 TDI
2014–2016 Audi A8/A8L 3.0L V-6 TDI
2014–2016 Audi Q5 3.0L V-6 TDI
Source: Clifford Atiyeh, “Everything You Need to Know about the VW Diesel-Emissions Scandal,” Car and Driver, January 11,
2017, accessed February 23, 2017, http://blog.caranddriver.com/everything-you-need-to-know-about-the-vw-diesel-
emissions-scandal/.

EXHIBIT 2: OPERATING AND BUSINESS PERFORMANCE FIGURES

FOR MAJOR VW CAR BRANDS

Vehicles Sales to
Sales Revenue Operating Result
Sales Third Parties
(in € Million) (in € Million)
(in 000s) (in 000s)
2015 2014 2015 2014 2015 2014 2015 2014
VW Passenger Cars 4,424 4,583 106,240 99,764 70,939 68,396 2,102 2,476
Audi 1,529 1,444 58,420 53,787 37,605 36,105 5,134 5,150
ŠKODA 800 796 12,486 11,758 6,128 6,144 915 817
SEAT 544 501 8,572 7,699 3,570 3,412 –10 –127
Bentley 11 11 1,936 1,746 1,379 1,175 110 170
Porsche 219 187 21,533 17,205 19,633 15,727 3,404 2,718

Source: Adapted from Volkswagen Annual Report 2015, accessed October 11, 2016,
http://annualreport2015.volkswagenag.com/.

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EXHIBIT 3: VARIETY AND PRODUCTION OF VW CAR BRANDS

Brand Production (Years) Brand Production (Years)

VW Passenger Cars 2015 2014 Audi 2015 2014
Golf 1,095,553 1,011,124 A3 370,144 351,526
Jetta/Sagitar 844,907 926,277 A4 318,788 328,465
Polo 754,546 753,754 A6 293,960 307,693
Passat/Magotan 724,018 747,583 Q5 267,861 260,853
Tiguan 501,712 515,349 Q3 205,445 200,097
Lavida 462,748 481,740 A1 116,250 115,377
Santana 279,583 295,485 Q7 82,340 61,012
Bora 202,964 226,006 A5 79,133 88,545
Gol 192,841 300,629 TT 35,510 17,621
up! 172,345 217,278 A7 29,158 27,709
Touran 120,507 126,567 A8 27,065 39,557
Lamando 103,573 3,080 R8 2,074 2,169
Fox 85,161 106,991 Q2 67 –
Saveiro 75,397 96,420 Total 1,827,795 1,800,624
Beetle 64,035 91,464
Touareg 59,190 63,741 Lamborghini 2015 2014
CC 56,796 85,591 Huracán Coupé 2,559 1,540
Sharan 53,423 49,498 Aventador Coupé 666 456
Suran 24,691 23,332 Aventador Roadster 413 654
Scirocco 16,251 23,573 Huracan Roadster 69 –
Eos 4,559 6,567 3,707 2,650
Phaeton 2,924 4,061
XL1 59 106
Total 5,897,783 6,156,216 Total Audi Brand 1,831,502 1,803,274

Brand Years Brand Years Brand Years Brand Years

ŠKODA 2015 2014 SEAT 2015 2014 Bentley 2015 2014 Porsche 2015 2014
Continental
Octavia 425,629 397,433 Leon 169,455 157,087 3,997 3,442 Macan 86,016 59,363
GT Coupé
Fabia 195,349 162,954 Ibiza 160,451 153,633 Flying Spur 3,660 4,556 Cayenne 79,700 66,005
Altea/ Continental 911 Coupé/
Rapid 189,187 228,175 32,729 35,683 2,216 2,151 31,373 31,590
Toledo GT Cabriolet Cabriolet
Boxster/
Yeti 89,890 107,084 Alhambra 27,925 22,612 Mulsanne 919 884 21,978 23,211
Cayman
Superb 84,550 82,079 Mii 24,516 25,845 Bentayga 96 – Panamera 15,055 22,383

Citigo 41,280 41,974 Total 415,076 394,860 Total 10,888 11,033 Spyder 375 545

Roomster 11,166 29,983 Total 2,34,497 203,097

Total 1,037,051 1,049,682

Source: Adapted from Volkswagen Annual Report 2015, accessed October 8, 2016, http://annualreport2015.volkswagenag.com/.

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EXHIBIT 4: VW PRODUCTION FACILITIES

Africa Product Europe Product
Volkswagen Polo, Polo Vivo, Volkswagen Touareg, Up!, and E-Up!
Uitenhage and Polo Vivo Sedan Bratislava ŠKODA Citigo
Audi Q7
Bentley Mulsanne, Flying Spur,
Asia Product Crewe Continental GT Coupe, Continental GT
Cabriolet, Bentayga
Volkswagen Jetta Volkswagen Phaeton
ŠKODA Octavia, Superb, Bentley Flying Spur
Aurangabad and Yeti Dresden
Audi A3, A4, A6, Q3, Q5, and
Q7
Volkswagen New Lavida and Volkswagen Passat and CC
Changsha Emden
Touran
Volkswagen Bora, CC, and Audi A3 Cabriolet, A3 Sedan, TT Coupe,
Changchun Magotan Győr TT Roadster
Audi A4, A6, Q3, and Q5
Volkswagen Jetta and Audi A3, A3 Sportback, A4, A4 Avant, A4
Chengdu Ingolstadt
Sagitar Allroad, AA5, A5 Sportback, and Q5
Volkswagen Golf and Golf Volkswagen Polo Vivo Sedan and Tiguan
Sportsvan ŠKODA Rapid
Foshan Kaluga
Audi A3 Sedan and A3
Sportback
Volkswagen New Lavida and ŠKODA Yeti, Superb, and Superb Combi
Nanjing Passat Kvasiny
ŠKODA Superb
Volkswagen Lamando Porsche Cayenne, Panamera, and Macan
Ningbo Leipzig
ŠKODA Superb and Octavia
Volkswagen Polo SEAT Ibiza, Ibiza SC, Ibiza ST, Leon SC,
Pune ŠKODA Rapid Martorell Leon 5TDR, Leon ST, Altea, and Altea XL
Audi Q3 and A1
Volkswagen Polo, New Audi A4, A5 Cabriolet, A6, A6 Avant, A6
Lavida, Gran Lavida, Tiguan Allroad, A7, A8, R8 Coupe, R8 Spyder
Shanghai
and Touran Neckarsulm
(Anting)
ŠKODA Fabia, Octavia, and
Yeti
Volkswagen Santana Volkswagen XL1 and Golf Cabriolet
Urumqi Osnabrück
Porsche Cayenne and Cayman
Volkswagen Scirocco and Sharan
North America Product Palmela
SEAT Alhambra
Chattanooga Volkswagen Passat NAR Pamplona Volkswagen Polo
Volkswagen Jetta, Beetle, Lamborghini Huracan Coupe, Huracan
Sant’Agata
Puebla Beetle Cabriolet, Golf, and Roadster, Aventador Coupe, Aventador
Bolognese
Gol Roadster
Stuttgart- Porsche 911, 911 Cabriolet, Boxster, and
South America Product
Zuffenhausen Spyder
Volkswagen Gol Volkswagen Golf, Golf Sportsvan, E-Golf,
Anchieta Wolfsburg
Touran, and Tiguan
Volkswagen Fox, Suran, and Volkswagen Golf, Golf Estate, and Passat
Sao Jose dos
Golf Zwickau Estate
Pinhais
Audi A3 Limousine
Pacheco Volkswagen Suran
Taubaté Volkswagen Up! And Gol,

Note: Only facilities that manufactured cars are included in the exhibit.
Source: Compiled from “Portrait & Production Plants,” Volkswagen, October 4, 2016, accessed November 14, 2016,
www.volkswagenag.com/content/vwcorp/content/en/the_group/production_plants.html.

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ENDNOTES

1
This case has been written on the basis of published sources only. Consequently, the interpretation and perspectives
presented in the case are not necessarily those of Volkswagen or any of its employees.
2
Benjamin Zhang, “VW USA Boss: ‘We Have Totally Screwed Up,’” Business Insider (India), September 22, 2015, accessed
October 26, 2015, www.businessinsider.in/VW-USA-boss-We-have-totally-screwed-up/articleshow/49064930.cms.
3
The Clean Air Act is a U.S. federal law drafted to protect human health and the environment from air pollution.
4
“Emissions Testing Is Broken, and Other Lessons from the VW Scandal,” Environmental and Energy Study Institute,
October 2, 2015, accessed October 26, 2015, www.eesi.org/articles/view/emissions-testing-is-broken-and-other-lessons-
from-the-vw-scandal.
5
WIAT staff, “VW Shares Fall 20 Percent after EPA Scandal,” WIAT.com, September 22, 2015, accessed October 22, 2015,
http://wiat.com/2015/09/22/vw-shares-fall-20-percent-after-epa-scandal/.
6
Rupert Neate, “Meet John German: the Man Who Helped Expose Volkswagen's Emissions Scandal,” Guardian,
September 26, 2015, accessed October 17, 2015, www.theguardian.com/business/2015/sep/26/volkswagen-scandal-
emissions-tests-john-german-research; All currency amounts are in US$ unless otherwise specified.
7
Timothy Gardner and Bernie Woodall, “Volkswagen Could Face $18 Billion Penalties from EPA,” Reuters Business News,
September 18, 2015, accessed October 12, 2015, www.reuters.com/article/2015/09/18/us-usa-volkswagen-
idUSKCN0RI1VK20150918.
8
Mark Thompson and Ivana Kottasova, “Volkswagen Scandal Widens,” CNN Money, September 22, 2015, accessed
November 11, 2015, http://money.cnn.com/2015/09/22/news/vw-recall-diesel/.
9
Staff report, “Bosch Warned VW about Illegal Software Use in Diesel Cars, Report Says,” Automotive News Europe,
September 27, 2015, accessed December 16, 2015, http://europe.autonews.com/article/20150927/ANE/150929837/bosch-
warned-vw-about-illegal-software-use-in-diesel-cars-report-says.
10
Volkswagen, TDI: U.S. Market Success, March 2015, accessed December 16, 2015,
http://cleandieseldelivers.com/media/Douglas-Skorupski-VWoA_DTF_March2015.pdf.
11
Jeff S. Bartlett, “Making Sense of the Volkswagen Diesel Mess,” Consumer Reports, September 28, 2015, accessed
December 16 2015, www.consumerreports.org/cro/cars/making-sense-of-the-volkswagen-diesel-mess.
12
Matthew Debord, “If VW Deceived Consumers about Its Diesel Cars, Then It Has a Huge Problem,” Business Insider (India),
September 19, 2015, accessed December 26, 2015, www.businessinsider.in/If-VW-deceived-consumers-about-its-diesel-
cars-then-it-has-a-huge-problem/articleshow/49027651.cms.
13
Jad Mouawad and Sydney Ember, “Emissions Scam: How Volkswagen’s Diesel Pitch in US Relied on Fun and Fantasy,”
The Economic Times, September 28, 2015, accessed December 16, 2015,
http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2015-09-28/news/66957753_1_diesel-car-vw-passat-tdi-new-car.
14
Ibid.
15
Tyler Durden, “Volkswagen: A Decade of Deception—Full Chronology,” Zero Hedge, October 2, 2015, accessed
December 28, 2015, www.zerohedge.com/news/2015-10-02/volkswagen-decade-deception-full-chronology.
16
Jim Gorzelany, “Automakers with the Lowest (and Highest) Recall Rates,” Forbes, March 26, 2014, accessed January 16,
2016, www.forbes.com/sites/jimgorzelany/2014/03/26/automakers-with-the-lowest-and-highest-recall-rates/.
17
“5 of the Largest Car Recalls in History,” Investopedia, accessed November 14, 2016, www.investopedia.com/slide-
show/car-recalls/.
18
Ryan Beene, “VW Emissions ‘Defeat Device’ Isn’t the First,” MarketWatch, September 25, 2015, accessed January 16,
2016, www.marketwatch.com/story/vw-emissions-defeat-device-isnt-the-first-2015-09-25.
19
Ibid.
20
Ibid.
21
Agence France-Presse, “As VW Seeks Savings, Component Suppliers Brace for Cuts,” IndustryWeek, October 14, 2015,
accessed January 25, 2016, www.industryweek.com/supplier-relationships/vw-seeks-savings-component-suppliers-brace-
cuts.
22
Joel Schectman, “Exclusive: U.S. Probes Bosch in VW Cheating Scandal—Sources,” Reuters Business News,
November 19, 2015, accessed March 22, 2016, www.reuters.com/article/us-volkswagen-emissions-probe-exclusive-
idUSKCN0T82Q320151119#sXb5gRFxgpiPbJwx.97s.
23
Bob Sorokanich, “Report: Bosch Warned VW about Diesel Emissions Cheating in 2007,” Car and Driver, September 28,
2015, accessed March 22, 2016, http://blog.caranddriver.com/report-bosch-warned-vw-about-diesel-emissions-cheating-in-
2007/.
24
Reuters, “US Probes Bosch in VW Cheating Scandal: Sources,” CNBC, November 20, 2015, accessed March 26, 2016,
www.cnbc.com/2015/11/20/us-probes-bosch-in-vw-cheating-scandal-sources.html.
25
W. Rocky Newman, “The VW Scandal Could Cost Car Owners $5,000,” Fortune, September 29, 2015, accessed March 22,
2016, http://fortune.com/2015/09/28/volkswagen-emissions-scandal-consumer-costs/.
26
Paulo Acoba, “VW’s ‘TDI Goodwill Program’ Will Regain Customers Trust with Free Money,” Fansided, November 5, 2015,
accessed March 28, 2016, http://artofgears.com/2015/11/06/vws-tdi-goodwill-program-will-regain-customers-trust-with-free-
money/.
27
Aaron Cole and Mark Stevenson, “UPDATE: Volkswagen Posts ‘Goodwill Program’ Details, Catch-All Causes Confusion,”
The Truth about Cars, November 9, 2015, accessed April 11, 2016, www.thetruthaboutcars.com/2015/11/volkswagen-posts-
goodwill-program-details-wont-preclude-owners-from-suing/.

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28
Jim Zarroli, “Volkswagen Makes ‘Goodwill’ Gesture to Defrauded Diesel Owners,” Two-Way, November 9, 2015, accessed
May 7, 2016, www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2015/11/09/455328807/volkswagen-makes-goodwill-gesture-to-defrauded-
diesel-owners.
29
Ibid.
30
Hugo Griffiths and William Morris, “UK Volkswagen Owners Mount Dieselgate Lawsuit,” CarBuyer, January 9, 2017,
accessed February 7, 2017, www.carbuyer.co.uk/news/150583/vw-emissions-scandal-golf-recall-announced.
31
Jad Mouawad, “The Other Victims of the Volkswagen Scandal: Dealers,” New York Times, September 30, 2015, accessed
April 17, 2016, www.nytimes.com/2015/10/01/business/the-other-victims-of-the-volkswagen-scandal-dealers.html?_r=1.
32
Phil LeBeau, “Volkswagen Dealer: Biggest Fraud I Have Ever Seen,” CNBC, October 7, 2015, accessed April 25, 2016,
www.cnbc.com/2015/10/07/vw-dealers-customers-feel-betrayed-by-emissions-cheating-scandal.html.
33
Ibid.
34
Reuters, “Volkswagen CEO Matthias Mueller Says Recall to Start in January, Be Completed End-2016,” The Economic
Times, October 7, 2015, accessed August 2, 2016,
http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/international/business/volkswagen-ceo-matthias-mueller-says-recall-to-start-in-
january-be-completed-end-2016/articleshow/49251198.cms.
35
Graham Ruddick, “VW Makes Management Changes Following Emissions Scandal,” The Guardian, December 17, 2015,
accessed February 7, 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/business/2015/dec/17/vv-management-changes-emissions-
scandal-german-carmaker.
36
Only plants that manufactured cars are included in these statistics.
37
Elisabeth Behrmann, Christoph Rauwald, and Charles Penty, “Will the Scandal Force VW to Sacrifice Its Iconic Brands?”
Bloomberg, October 20, 2015, accessed August 16, 2016, www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-10-19/vw-s-12-brand-
behemoth-under-scrutiny-as-costs-of-scandal-mount.
38
“VW’s Strategy 2025 Will Focus on Profitability,” Automotive News Europe, October 29, 2015, accessed September 5, 2016,
http://europe.autonews.com/article/20151029/ANE/151029816/vws-strategy-2025-will-focus-on-profitability.
39
Ibid.
40
Andy Sharman, “UK Car Industry Warned of Battle to Regain Trust after VW scandal,” Financial Times, October 6, 2015,
accessed February 7, 2017, https://www.ft.com/content/11739a32-6c06-11e5-8171-ba1968cf791a.
41
Dan Hyde, “Time Is up for Diesel after VW Scandal, Says Aston Martin Boss,” Telegraph, October 15, 2015, accessed
October 8, 2016, www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/road-and-rail-transport/11931648/Time-is-up-for-diesel-after-VW-
scandal-says-Aston-Martin-boss.html.
42
Kris Turner, “Automotive Suppliers Likely to See Impact of VW Emissions Scandal,” IndyStar, September 30, 2015,
accessed October 8, 2016, www.indystar.com/story/money/2015/09/30/automotive-suppliers-likely-see-impact-vw-emissions-
scandal/73090456/.

This document is authorized for use only by Monika Szumilo ([email protected]). Copying or posting is an infringement of copyright. Please contact
[email protected] or 800-988-0886 for additional copies.