BEFORE THE HON’BLE APPELLATE TRIBUNAL

(UNDER THE PREVENTION OF MONEY LAUNDERING ACT, 2002)

NEW DELHI
APPEAL NO. 4983/CHN/2022
IN
O.C. No. 674/2017

IN THE MATTER OF:

MS. R. M. SIVAGAMI AACHI
… APPELLANT
VERSUS

DEPUTY DIRECTOR, DIRECTORATE OF ENFORCEMENT

..... RESPONDENT

MASTER INDEX
Sl. No. Particulars Page No.

1. Memo of Parties
2. Reply Filed by the Respondent Against the Appeal
Filed by the Appellant under Section 26 of the PMLA,
2002

Through

Date:
Place:

Page 1 of 39
 BEFORE THE HON’BLE APPELLATE TRIBUNAL
(UNDER THE PREVENTION OF MONEY LAUNDERING ACT, 2002)
NEW DELHI
APPEAL NO. 4983/CHN/2022
IN
O.C. No. 674/2017

MEMO OF PARTIES:
MS. R. M. SIVAGAMI AACHI
11/4, SARAVAN STREET, T. NAGAR,
CHENNAI-600002

… APPELLANT
VERSUS

DEPUTY DIRECTOR, DIRECTORATE OF ENFORCEMENT

SHASHTRI BHAVAN, CHENNAI-600006
..... RESPONDENT

Through

Date: Advocate
Place: Counsel of Enforcement
Directorate

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 BEFORE THE HON’BLE APPELLATE TRIBUNAL

(UNDER THE PREVENTION OF MONEY LAUNDERING ACT, 2002)

NEW DELHI

APPEAL NO. 4983/CHN/2022

IN

O.C. No. 674/2017

IN THE MATTER OF:

MS. R. M. SIVAGAMI AACHI

… APPELLANT

VERSUS

DEPUTY DIRECTOR, DIRECTORATE OF ENFORCEMENT

..... RESPONDENT

REPLY FILED AGAINST THE APPEAL ON BEHALF OF THE

RESPONDENT

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 MOST RESPECTFULLY SHOWETH:

I, Brijesh Beniwal, S/O- Shri. Babu Singh Beniwal, Aged about 34 years,
currently working as Assistant Director, Directorate of Enforcement,
Department of Revenue, Ministry of Finance, Govt. of India, No. 1A, P&
T Nagar Main Road, Madurai-625017 do hereby solemnly affirm and
sincerely state as follows:

1. I humbly submit that I am authorized to file this reply on behalf of the

Respondent as such I am well acquainted with the facts of the case from
perusal of the records and competent to swear and file this reply.
2. I humbly submit that I have read the above said appeal filed by the
appellant herein and deny all the allegations contained therein except
those that are specifically admitted herein and put the appellant herein to
strict proof of the same.
3. I humbly submit that the appellant herein has filed this appeal with prayer
to set aside the Order dated 09.09.2021 in MA-46/2020 in O.C. No.
674/2017 passed by Sh. Binodanand Jha, Chairperson, Adjudicating
Authority, PMLA,4th Floor, Jeevandeep Building, New Delhi, with
respect to the Appellant’s property mentioned at Serial No. 17 and Serial
No. 25 of the Provisional Attachment Order and / or to release the
Appellant’s property at Serial No. 17 and Serial No. 25 attached by the
Order dated 31.05.2017 in O.C. No, 674/2017 passed by Sh. Mukesh
Kumar, Chairperson, Adjudicating Authority and / or pass any other
order, orders or directions as this Hon’ble Appellate Tribunal deems fit in
the facts and circumstances of the case.

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4. I humbly submit that the brief facts of the case covered under the subject
appeal are as follows:-
4.1. The Inspector of Police, Keelevalavu Police Station,
Madurai District had registered an FIR No.196/2012 dated 07.09.2012 for
offences committed under Section 447,379,406,420 of IPC, 1860 read
with Section 3 of TNPPFL and Section 4(1)A, 4(2)A, 4(3) and 21(b)5 of
Mines and Minerals Development Regulation Act, 1957.

4.2. After completion of their investigation in the abovementioned

FIR, final report was filed on 19.08.2013 and 10.01.2014 before the
Hon’ble Judicial Magistrate, Melur wherein the Accused persons were
charged for committing offences under Section 120B, 147, 447, 379, 420,
430, 434, 465, 467, 468, 471, 304 r/w 114,511 of IPC, 1860 and Section
3(i), 3(ii) & 4 of TNP(PD&L) Act,1992 r/w Section 3(a) & 6 of
Explosive Substance Act,1908 and thereby violated the conditions of
lease in the said Lease order, removed the boundary marks installed by
the Government, trespassed into the adjoined Government Poramboke
Land in Survey No. 288/17& 267/1, used Explosive and Machines and
without leaving the safety area as prescribed by the Government, illegally
quarried and mined granites and sold them and thereby caused wrongful
loss of Rs. 717.20 Crores to the Government between the period from
2010 to 2012.

4.3. On the basis of the FIR No.196/2012 dated 07.09.2012 filed

by the Inspector of Police, Keelavalavu and on the basis of the Final
Report dated 19.08.2013 and 10.01.2014 before the Hon’ble Judicial

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Magistrate, Melur under Section 173(2) of Cr.P.C, 1973 and on the basis
of the aforesaid information/copies of documents and in as much as
certain offences alleged were under Section 120B, 420, 467 & 471 of
IPC, 1860 and Section 3(a) & 4 (a) of the Explosive Substance Act, 1908
are covered under the Scheduled Offences under Section 2(1)(y) of
PMLA, 2002 and in the aforesaid charge sheets the offences thus charged
were covered under the list of Scheduled Offences and prima facie, the
persons accused in the abovementioned FIR appeared to have committed
an offence of money laundering under Section 3 of PMLA, an
Enforcement Case Information Report (ECIR) was registered vide
ECIR/CEZO/13/2015 dated 31.12.2015 for conducting investigation
under the provisions of PMLA, 2002 and accordingly, investigation was
initiated.

4.4 . During the course of the investigation voluntary

statements were recorded, relevant documents/details were obtained from
other agencies and after thorough investigation Provisional Attachment
Order No. 23/2016 dated 22.12.2016 under section 5(1) of PMLA, 2002
was issued and the same was confirmed by the Adjudicating Authority in
OC No. 674 of 2017 vide its order dated 31.05.2017.

4.5 Further, during the course of investigation under PMLA prior

to the provisional attachment, a letter dated 01.11.2016 was addressed by
the Directorate of Enforcement to the Sub- Registrar, Theppakulam
requesting him to provide details of registration of any immovable
property registered in the names of the persons under investigation viz.

Page 6 of 39
 Defendants 1 to 5 in Provisional Attachment Order, either as a Claimant
or as an Executant along with the latest Encumbrance Certificate of the
said immovable property.

4.6 Further, the Sub- Registrar, Theppakulam vide letter dated

25.11.2016, enclosed 39 documents related to the persons mentioned in
the Directorate's reference. The said 39 documents included the
documents relating to the properties attached and described in Sl. No. 17
& 25 of Schedule-A of the Para 33 of PAO dated 22.12.2016 and that the
main contention of the Appellants’ herein is that they are owner of the
said lands and have transferred the possession of the said lands in the
status of a cultivating tenancy and have only lease cultivating tenancy
rights on the said lands are given to the named Accused persons of
scheduled offences under PMLA namely, P.K.M. Selvam and S.
Shankara Narayanan.

REPLY TO THE GROUNDS

5. I humbly submit with regard to the averments made by the Appellant in

Paragraph No. 1 of the Grounds of Appeal that, Section 2(u) of
PMLA,2002 defines "Proceeds of Crime" as any property derived or
obtained, directly or indirectly, by any person as a result of criminal
activity relating to a scheduled offence or the value of any such property,
or where such property is taken or held outside the country, then the
property equivalent in value held within the country or abroad. It further
means that the, "Proceeds of Crime" include property not only derived or

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obtained from a scheduled offence but also any property which may
directly or indirectly be derived or obtained as a result of any criminal
activity relatable to the scheduled offence. The method of obtaining the
property can be different including the cultivation rights. The Directorate
as stated above issued a letter dated 01.11.2016 to the Sub- Registrar,
Theppakulam requesting him to provide details of registration of any
immovable property registered in the names of the persons under
investigation in the said Provisional Attachment Order, either as a
Claimant or as an Executant along with the latest Encumbrance
Certificate of the said immovable property. Afterwards, the Sub-
Registrar, Theppakulam vide letter dated 25.11.2016, enclosed 39
documents related to the persons mentioned in the Directorate's reference.
The said 39 documents included the documents relating to the properties
attached and described in Sl. No. 17 & 25 of Schedule-A of the Para 33
of PAO dated 22.12.2016 in the names of Shri. P.K.M. Selvam and Shri.
S. Shankara Narayanan- the named accused in the case under
investigation by the Directorate. It is an accepted fact on behalf of the
Appellants that the payments made in consideration of the cultivation
tenancy was from the funds of the SARE (Shri Aishwarya Rock Exports)
which is also under the investigation in the present case. The PAO was
passed on 22.12.2016 and as per the averment made in Paragraph No. 1
of the Grounds of Appeal the Appellants came to know about the case
only in 2016 when they went to the Tehsildar’s office for a MoU of their
family. It means that for the past few decades since 1970s, the property
was not concerning the Appellants in any way but since its attachment
itself progress and interest of the Appellants began in the property. This is

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 too much of a coincidence and too much of coincidence is always a
conspiracy. There are ample chances that the Thevar family was working
just on behalf of the Appellants and did everything including passage of
the cultivation tenancy to the accused persons on their instructions.
6. I humbly submit with regard to the averments made by the Appellant in
Paragraph No. 2 of the Grounds of Appeal that, the Appellant has referred
to an ongoing case vide W.P. No. 16841/2014, K.R. Ramaswamy @
Traffic Ramaswamy Vs. The Central Vigilance Officer, Chennai and
Others pending before the Hon’ble Madras High Court. In any
circumstance, it is not legally feasible to comment upon any sub-judice
case save and except the present appeal which is under reply thereto at
the moment. So far as the claim of the Appellant with regard to the two
FIRs vide FIR No.(s)- 196/2012 and 12/2015 that the Law Enforcement
Agencies have failed to submit final report or the concerned Learned
Court has failed to take cognizance upon them is concerned, it is humbly
submitted that the 2019 Amendment to PMLA added an explanation to
S.44 which is as follows:

“Explanation: For the removal of doubts, it is clarified that,—(i)

the jurisdiction of the Special Court while dealing with the offence
under this Act, during investigation, enquiry or trial under this
Act, shall not be dependent upon any orders passed in respect of
the scheduled offence, and the trial of both sets of offences by the
same court shall not be construed as joint trial;”

This amendment is self-explanatory and further, it is submitted that in the

instant case, the Directorate of Enforcement before issuance of the

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Provisional Attachment Order communicated with the SRO regarding the
properties including those mentioned at Sl. No. 17 and 25. It can thus, be
said that the Directorate pursued the attachment in due care and diligence.
As far as the appellant’s claim pertaining to the ascertainment of the
period of crime and the period in which proceeds of crime where
generated is concerned, the same is under the investigation by the
Directorate. Very recently, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of
Tarun Kumar Vs. The Assistant Director, Directorate of Enforcement ,
SLP (Crl.) No. 9431 of 2023, observed that,

“…the economic offences having deep-rooted conspiracies and

involving huge loss of public funds need to be viewed seriously and
considered as grave offences affecting the economy of the country
as a whole and thereby posing serious threat to the financial
health of the country. Undoubtedly, economic offences have
serious repercussions on the development of the country as a
whole.”

To cite a few judgments in this regard are Y.S. Jagan Mohan

Reddy vs. Central Bureau of Investigation (2013) 7 SCC 439 ,
Nimmagadda Prasad vs. Central Bureau of Investigation (2013)
7 SCC 466 , Gautam Kundu vs. Directorate of Enforcement
(2015) 16 SCC 1,State of Bihar and Another vs. Amit Kumar
alias Bachcha Rai (2017) 13 SCC 751 . This court taking a serious
note with regard to the economic offences had observed as back as
in 1987 in case of State of Gujarat vs. Mohanlal Jitamalji Porwal
and Another (1987) 2 SCC 364, as under: -

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 “5… The entire community is aggrieved if the economic offenders
who ruin the economy of the State are not brought to books. A
murder may be committed in the heat of moment upon passions
being aroused. An economic offence is committed with cool
calculation and deliberate design with an eye on personal profit
regardless of the consequence to the community. A disregard for
the interest of the community can be manifested only at the cost of
forfeiting the trust and faith of the community in the system to
administer justice in an even-handed manner without fear of
criticism from the quarters which view white collar crimes with a
permissive eye unmindful of the damage done to the National
Economy and National Interest…”

Further, it is humbly submitted that Section 5 of the PMLA, 2002 states,

“Where the Director or any other officer not below the rank of
Deputy Director authorised by the Director for the purposes of this
section, has reason to believe (the reason for such belief to be
recorded in writing), on the basis of material in his possession,
that--

(a) any person is in possession of any proceeds of crime; and

(b) such proceeds of crime are likely to be concealed, transferred

or dealt with in any manner which may result in frustrating any
proceedings relating to confiscation of such proceeds of crime
under this Chapter,

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he may, by order in writing, provisionally attach such property for
a period not exceeding one hundred and eighty days from the date
of the order, in such manner as may be prescribed:

Provided that no such order of attachment shall be made unless, in

relation to the scheduled offence, a report has been forwarded to a
Magistrate under section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
1973 (2 of 1974), or a complaint has been filed by a person
authorised to investigate the offence mentioned in that Schedule,
before a Magistrate or court for taking cognizance of the
scheduled offence, as the case may be, or a similar report or
complaint has been made or filed under the corresponding law of
any other country:

Provided further that, notwithstanding anything contained

in 2[first proviso], any property of any person may be attached
under this section if the Director or any other officer not below the
rank of Deputy Director authorised by him for the purposes of this
section has reason to believe (the reasons for such belief to be
recorded in writing), on the basis of material in his possession,
that if such property involved in money-laundering is not attached
immediately under this Chapter, the non-attachment of the
property is likely to frustrate any proceeding under this Act.]

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Provided also that for the purposes of computing the period of one
hundred and eighty days, the period during which the proceedings
under this section is stayed by the High Court, shall be excluded
and a further period not exceeding thirty days from the date of
order of vacation of such stay order shall be counted.];

(2) The Director, or any other officer not below the rank of Deputy
Director, shall, immediately after attachment under sub-
section (1), forward a copy of the order, along with the material in
his possession, referred to in that sub-section, to the Adjudicating
Authority, in a sealed envelope, in the manner as may be
prescribed and such Adjudicating Authority shall keep such order
and material for such period as may be prescribed.

(3) Every order of attachment made under sub-section (1) shall

cease to have effect after the expiry of the period specified in that
sub-section or on the date of an order made under 4[sub-
section (3)] of section 8, whichever is earlier.

(4) Nothing in this section shall prevent the person interested in

the enjoyment of the immovable property attached under sub-
section (1) from such enjoyment.

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 Explanation--For the purposes of this sub-section, "person
interested", in relation to any immovable property, includes all
persons claiming or entitled to claim any interest in the property.

(5) The Director or any other officer who provisionally attaches

any property under sub-section (1) shall, within a period of thirty
days from such attachment, file a complaint stating the facts of
such attachment before the Adjudicating Authority.”
At this instance, it is humbly submitted that the Directorate acted upon
the information rendered by the SRO with regard to the properties. The
Respondent at no point acted in a haste and negligent manner so as to
harm the Appellants in any way. The question should not only be raised
with regard to the approach of the Directorate but also, with regard to the
duty cast upon owner of the land.

7. I humbly submit with regard to the averments made by the Appellant in

Paragraph No. 3 of the Grounds of Appeal that, the Appellant has raised
contention that the offences mentioned in the ECIR and FIR were not a
part of the Schedule of PMLA, 2002 till the year 2008 and were only
included after the amendment of the year 2009 is not sustainable and
irrelevant to the present case. Arguendo, it is humbly submitted that the it
is humbly submitted that the Constitution of India has envisaged a
detailed architecture of legislative mechanisms delineating the powers
and functions of different legislative authorities besides determining the
scope of legislative competence between the Centre and the States. There
are a set of rules that has to be followed by the legislators in both the
House at the time of introduction of a Bill; reference to and examination

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 of the Bill by the Select Committee of the House/Joint Committee of the
Houses or the concerned Department-related Standing Committee; and
final consideration and passage of the Bill by each House. During various
stages of legislative process, the Bills are discussed thoroughly and, if
necessary, suitably amended before they are passed. The same procedure
was also followed at the time of amendment of 2009 in the PMLA,2002.
No law is static, it is meant be amended and changed on timely basis. For
example, when PMLA was firstly passed in 2002, there was very less
technological advancement in India but right now with the growing use of
technology in financial transactions, it may be amended further, but that
does not mean that the pending cases under the Act will end and will not
be seen with a technological view.
8. I humbly submit with regard to the averments made by the Appellant in
Paragraph No. 4 of the Grounds of Appeal that, main contention of the
Appellant herein is that they are possessing the said lands in the status of
a cultivating tenancy and have only lease cultivating tenancy rights on the
said lands. It is humbly submitted that although the document may
evidence that the Defendants (Shri. P.K.M. Selvam and Shri. S. Shankara
Narayanan) have only a cultivating tenancy rights, it is per se, an
ownership and the following substantiate the contentions:
Property at Serial No. 17
Respect of Document No. 3331/2006 with regard to 1 Acre of land at
UDR Survey No.91/2A1 and RS No.207/2A1 it is indicated that the said
agricultural land made-over agreement for cultivation is executed by one
M.Veerana Thevar, resident of Door No.3/92-149 Seeman Nagar,
Karupayurani, Madurai North, Madurai 625 020 on 24.11.2006 in favour

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of PKM Selvam and S. Sankaranarayanan (the Defendants 4 & 2 herein),
wherein the executant declares that one Mrs. R.M. Sivagami Aachi is the
owner of the scheduled property; was cultivated by the executant's father
Shri. Muthiah Thevar and he paid all the lease rentals without default;
that the executant's father died on 13.1.1989; that subsequently since the
executants is the legal heir of Shri. Muthiah Thevar, he acquired the
cultivating rights from his deceased father; that from that date has been
cultivating in the said land and has been paying the lease rentals to the
landowner without default; that the executant is unable to continue further
cultivation and also unable to pay the lease rent and hence transferring the
cultivation rights through this made-over agreement to the claimants viz.,
the Defendant 4 & 2 and has received a consideration of Rs.81000/- on
that date in cash for making over the said right in favour of the claimant;
that since the rights have been transferred through the made-over
agreement, henceforth the claimants shall pay the lease rental to the
owners. It could be seen herein that Market value of the said property as
per the agreement is also Rs.81000/-. Thus it is evident that the
Defendants have paid the market value to the executant M. Veerana
Thevar. These kinds of disguised sale in the form of cultivable tenancy
made-over agreements are common where the actual owner is not
available and the person in the possession of land for many years doing
cultivation, instead of making a sale deed (since he is prohibited as he is
not the legal owner) would normally while selling make only a made-
over Deed only. In the instant case, the lacuna in the documents is evident
from the fact with regard to the legality of M. Veerana Thevar giving the
cultivation lease rights to the Defendants. Normally any right of lease,

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would specify a period. In the instant case, since the property has been
actually sold, there is no mention about the lease period. Further, no
evidence has been submitted to prove that the periodic lease rents are paid
to the original owner Mrs. R.M. Sivagami Aachi. Further even if
considering that Mrs. R.M. Sivagami Achi is still existing as the legal
owner, subsequent to the death of Shri. Muthiah Thevar, the cultivation
rights cease and even if Shri.M. Veerana Thevar is the legal heir he has to
enter into a fresh agreement with the original owner, which is not found
in the records of the SRO as evident from the EC for the period from
1.1.1987 onwards (Shri. Muthiah Thevar died on 13.1.1989). Without
prejudice to the above, a common sense would always prevail that a
lessor shall not pay the actual value of the land in case it is only on lease.
In the instant case, as evident from the agreement, the market value of the
land is Rs.81000/-, which is reportedly paid in cash by Defendant 2 & 4
to Shri.M. Veerana Thevar.

Property at Serial No. 25

In respect of Document No. 2971/2008 with regard to 2.74 Acre of land
at UDR Survey No.91/2A1 and RS No. 207/2A it is indicated that the
said agricultural land made-over agreement for cultivation is executed by
one K. Asokan, S/o K. Karupannan, resident of Door No.200,
Chellathamman Koil Street, Madural North Taluk, Madurai District on
24.6.2008 in favour of PKM Selvam and S. Sankaranarayanan (the
Defendants 4 & 2 herein), wherein the executant declares that one
Azhagar was doing cultivation on the basis of the cultivation rights
obtained by him on 19.10.71 for doing cultivation in the lands belonging
to R Sivakami Achi, W/o Ramanathan Chettiar to an extent of 5.74 Acres

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in Survey No.207/2 of Kalikappan 2nd Bit and also lands belonging to
Mrs. Meenachi Achi, & Shri Muthuveerapan, S/o Palaniappa Chettiar to
an extent of 5.74 acres in Survey No 207/2 of Kalikappan 2d Bit Village
and was paying the lease rentals regularly; that after the said Alagar died,
his first wife Smt. Veerayi, Second wife Karuppi @ Karuppayi and their
only legal heir Smt.Karupayi were carrying out the cultivation in the said
lands; that subsequently, the first wife and the legal heir also died; that
later the second wife Karuppi @ Karuppayi along with the assistance of
her relatives viz., Pandi, Chokkan, etc., were doing the cultivation and
that lease rental receipts were obtained in the name of Karupi @
Karuppayi; that since Karuppayi has become aged and since her relatives
also could not continue the cultivation, the said three persons transferred
the leasing rights through document number 543/2003 to the executant
upon receipt of Rs.50000/-; that since then the executant has been
cultivating in the said land and paying lease rent to the owners on an
yearly basis; that since the executant could not continue the cultivation, is
transferring the cultivation rights to the claimant viz., the Defendants 4 &
2 upon receipt of consideration of Rs.50000/- and that henceforth the
claimants can do the cultivation in the said lands and pay the lease rents
on an yearly basis to the land owners and as an executant his rights in the
land ceases. It could be seen herein that Market value of the said property
as is also Rs.50000/-. Thus, it is evident that the Defendants have paid the
market value to the executant Ashokan. It is once again reiterated that
these kinds of disguised sale in the form of cultivable tenancy made-over
agreements are common where the actual owner is not available and the
person In the possession of land for many years doing cultivation, instead

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of making a sale deed (since he is prohibited as he is not the legal owner)
would normally while selling make only a made-over Deed only. In the
instant case, the lacuna in the documents is evident from the fact with
regard to the legality of Ashokan giving the cultivation lease rights to the
Defendants. Normally any right of lease, would specify a period. In the
instant case, since the property has been actually sold, there is no mention
about the lease period. Further, no evidence has been submitted to prove
that the periodic lease rents are paid to the original owners viz., Sivakami
Aachi and Meenatchi Aachi. Further even if considering that Sivakami
Aachi and Meenatchi Aachi are still existing as the legal owners,
subsequent to the death of Azhagar, the cultivation rights cease and even
if his two wives are the legal heirs, they have to enter into a fresh
agreement with the original owner, which is not found in the records of
the SRO. Without prejudice to the above, a common sense would always
prevail that a lessor shall not pay the actual value of the land in case it is
only on lease. In the instant case, as evident from the agreement, the
market value of the land is Rs.81000/-, which is reportedly paid in cash
by Defendant 2 & 4 to Shri.M. Veerana Thevar. Thus, it is evident that
the Defendants are the legal owners of the said properties. Assuming for
an argument, if the said properties are not attached, the Defendants,
through another made over agreement would transfer the property and
would derive the market value from the said claimants. In as much as the
said properties have actually been acquired in the form of made over
agreements and the payments to the executant were made out of proceeds
of crime, the attachment holds good in law.

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9. I humbly submit with regard to the averments made by the Appellant in
Paragraph No. 5 of the Grounds of Appeal that, the Appellant has relied
upon a judgment of the Hon’ble Delhi High Court in the matter of The
Joint Director, Directorate of Enforcement, Lucknow & Ors. Vs. Naresh
Grover and Anr. 2019 (12) TMI 1094 but the same is not identical to the
case of the Appellant in the present case as that case relates to the
SARFAESI Act and rights of the banking institution with respect to the
mortgaged property under the attachment. There is no facts or
circumstance in the present appeal which can be said to be matching with
the said case referred by the Appellant. Therefore, it is humbly submitted
that the Directorate has exercised due care and diligence while passing
the order for the provisional attachment and the same was free from any
ill-will or malice.
10.I humbly submit with regard to the averments made by the Appellant in
Paragraph No. 6 of the Grounds of Appeal that, it is true that there is no
prosecution complaint pending against the Appellants and at the same
time they are neither charge sheeted nor there is any kind of direct
evidence against them, but this Appeal is not regarding the involvement
of the Appellants in the alleged crime but about the property attached by
the Directorate, which they claim to be theirs’. Though, the Appellants
have tried to deviate this Hon’ble Tribunal by brining certain irrelevant
facts before the same, it is humbly submitted that PMLA, 2002 has a
hybrid touch to it, meaning, it partakes both civil and criminal colour to
it. As far as civil proceedings are concerned, the burden of proof, is
‘preponderance of probability’, which in turn means a particular set of
evidences which may not be sufficient to pass the test of ‘beyond

Page 20 of 39
 reasonable doubt’ may satisfy the condition of preponderance of
probabilities.

It is further submitted that the Appellants have time and again claimed
that the properties owned by them were misappropriated and wrongly
sub-leased by Shri. M. Veerana Thevar and Shri. K. Ashokan. It may also
be noted that the said properties were attached in the month of December,
2016 and the Appellants went to the office of Tehsildar regarding a MoU
in 2016 itself from where they came to know that the said properties are
under attachment and since then, a series of litigation has been contested
by the Appellant for the release of the same but notably, no case has been
filed or brought on record by the Appellant which they may have filed
against the said Shri. M. Veerana Thevar and Shri. K. Ashokan for
alleged misappropriation of the properties claimed to be owned by the
Appellants. Test of reasonability cannot be said to be done only on the
decision of the Directorate to attach the property but also, the same is
casted upon the Appellants as well because undoubtedly their properties
are obtained from the money laundered by the accused- Shri. P.K.M.
Selvam and Shri. S. Shankara Narayanan. This solely makes the property
in question tainted and thus, imposes a compulsion upon the Directorate
to attach the same.

11.I humbly submit with regard to the averments made by the Appellant in
Paragraph No. 7 of the Grounds of Appeal that, the above contentions
have already been brought to the notice of this Hon'ble Tribunal in
respect of the Appeal No. FPA-PMLA-1814/CHN/2017 filed by Shri S.
Sankaranarayanan, and it is in the circumstance the Appellants herein,
viz., RM Sivagami Achi and PL. Muthuveerappan, in their instant Appeal

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have averred to the effect that they came to know about attachment of
their aforesaid properties by the Enforcement Directorate and about the
legal transfer of tenancy rights by one Shri Muthiah Thevar and Alagar in
favour of Shri Shankaranarayanan and PKM Selvam. However,
apparently the Appellants should have been aware about the FIRs,
interalia, registered against M/s MS Granites, Shri Shankaranarayanan,
M/s. SARE and Shri PKM Selvam, under various sections of IPC,
TNPPDI, ESA and MMDRA, by the Tamil Nadu State Police
Department, with regard to illicit quarrying of granites. The very
submission of the Appellants that they were not aware of the illegal
transfer of the impugned properties and the same are under the possession
of the aforesaid Shri Shankaranarayanan and PKM Selvam, are devoid of
merits. Even assuming that the appellants herein as the real owners of the
Impugned properties as on the date and has let out the impugned
properties under tenancy rights for cultivation to some persons but not the
said Shri Shankaranarayanan and PKM Selvam, it is humbly submitted
that normally any right of lease, would specify a period. In the instant
case, since the property has been on perpetual lease, which creates an
interest over the property and the same is also transferable, it could
clearly be construed that the property has actually been sold. Further,
no evidence has been submitted to prove that the periodic lease rents were
received by the original owners, the Appellants herein. Further, even if
considering that the Appellants herein are still existing as the legal owner,
subsequent to the death of de-facto lessors, the cultivation rights cease
immediately and even if subsequent lessee were the legal heirs or
otherwise, they have to enter into a fresh agreement with the original

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 owner, which is not found in the records of the SRO as evident from the
EC for the period from 1.1.1987 onwards. Without prejudice to the
above, a common sense would always prevail that a lessor shall not pay
the actual value of the land in case it is only on lease. In the instant case,
as evident from the agreement, the market value of the lands, which were
reportedly paid in cash by the said S/Shri Shankaranarayanan and PKM
Selvam to their immediately preceding land owners. Had the appellants
been real owners, immediately upon expiry of Lease Agreement period,
they would have either renewed the lease or revoked. Furthermore, no
prudent person claiming ownership of a land would remain silent for such
a long hiatus oblivious of the happenings in his properties which were let
out for cultivation under tenancy rights, taking no steps on renewing the
lease agreement or revoking the same. In consideration of the above, and
that the appellants herein are not being the real owners of the impugned
properties, it is very obvious that the Appellants with a mala-fide
intention to obfuscate Law Enforcing Agency, have filed the instant
appeal stating of illegal transfer of their owned properties mere to take
advantage of the circumstances by misleading the Hon'ble Tribunal
without any logical and legal backing and thus to be get benefitted.
12.I humbly submit with regard to the averments made by the Appellant in
Paragraph No. 8 of the Grounds of Appeal that, the Directorate as stated
above issued a letter dated 01.11.2016 to the Sub- Registrar,
Theppakulam requesting him to provide details of registration of any
immovable property registered in the names of the persons under
investigation in the said Provisional Attachment Order, either as a
Claimant or as an Executant along with the latest Encumbrance

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 Certificate of the said immovable property. Afterwards, the Sub-
Registrar, Theppakulam vide letter dated 25.11.2016, enclosed 39
documents related to the persons mentioned in the Directorate's reference.
The said 39 documents included the documents relating to the properties
attached and described in Sl. No. 17 & 25 of Schedule-A of the Para 33
of PAO dated 22.12.2016 in the names of Shri. P.K.M. Selvam and Shri.
S. Shankara Narayanan- the named accused in the case under
investigation by the Directorate. As far as the guideline value is
concerned, the definition of value is provided under Section 2(zb) of the
Act that,
“(zb) “value” means the fair market value of any property on the
date of its acquisition by any person, or if such date cannot be
determined, the date on which such property is possessed by such
person.”

This clearly means that while making the attachment, the Directorate has
not acted in malice but only in accordance with law enforced. The
PMLA,2002 was enacted by the legislature to give effect to international
guidelines set by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), a global
money laundering and terrorist financing watchdog. India, being a
member of the FATF, is bound by its guidelines in the form of the
PMLA. The present case is a case of appeal, review of the factual part
cannot be expected to be discussed at this stage, when Prosecution
complaint is already filed in the Special Court, PMLA, Madurai vide C.C.
No. 12/2018.

13.I humbly submit with regard to the averments made by the Appellant in
Paragraph No. 9 of the Grounds of Appeal that, the Registrar has not

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 misunderstood that the scheduled properties are owned by the Accused
persons. He has acted only on the basis of the documentational records
available in the office with regard to the said properties. The same has
been mentioned above as well that the attachment orders were
provisionally issued only after due confirmation from the office of Sub-
Registrar, Thallakulam.
14.I humbly submit with regard to the averments made by the Appellant in
Paragraph No. 10 of the Grounds of Appeal that, the Directorate is not the
appropriate authority to decide upon the distinction between the
cultivation tenancy and transfer of property. Moreover, the Appellants
have failed to bring anything on record so as to establish that they
actually took steps for the eviction of the tenancy rights of the Accused
persons from the scheduled property. The allegations made in Paragraph
No. 10 of the Grounds of Appeal relate to the transactions between Shri.
M. Veerana Thevar and Shri. K. Ashokan and the Appellant on one hand
and the said, Shri. M. Veerana Thevar and Shri. K. Ashokan and Shri.
P.K.M. Selvam and Shri. S. Shankara Narayanan on the other. There is no
interference of the Directorate so as to their personal transactions with
regard to the cultivation rights and sub-leasing of the same is concerned.
The Directorate is concerned solely about the use of laundered money in
obtaining rights upon the same by the accused persons.
15.I humbly submit with regard to the averments made by the Appellant in
Paragraph No. 11 of the Grounds of Appeal that, the Appellants are
beating behind the bush. It has not been clarified any where that what
steps have been taken by them to get the cultivation rights evicted from
the said properties. The Hon’ble Appellate Tribunal is not a body to

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 resolve the dispute between the tenant and the land owner neither it is a
body to examine the illegality committed as alleged by the Appellants in
sub-leasing the properties claimed by them to the accused persons. The
Hon’ble Appellate Tribunal is a body which can decide upto an extent
that whether the attachment was done as per the laws enforceable at the
time of doing so or not and whether the Provisional Attachment Order
was issued in accordance with law prevailing or not. If such practice is
allowed anyone will approach this Hon’ble Tribunal and start
complaining about their tenants and so on. This practice of the Appellants
must be discouraged.
16.I humbly submit with regard to the averments made by the Appellant in
Paragraph No. 12 of the Grounds of Appeal that, the Directorate is not the
appropriate forum to adjudge the ownership of the land and since, the
same is to be done by the Civil Courts of the local jurisdiction. However,
at this stage it is humbly submitted that the Directorate has done the
provisional attachment as per the information rendered by the Sub
Registrar, Thallakulam. As stated above, if there exists any grievance of
the Appellants with respect to the ownership of the land, the same may
kindly be contested in the Civil Court and not this Hon’ble Appellate
Tribunal.
17.I humbly submit with regard to the averments made by the Appellant in
Paragraph No. 13 of the Grounds of Appeal that, the Appellant has made
an attempt to get a valuable interpretation of the law existing at the
moment in their own favour, however, entering into such process of
statutory interpretation, when language of the Statute is clear,
unambiguous and admits of only one meaning, would be tantamount to

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 legislation and encroachment upon the sphere, which the constitution has
earmarked for the legislature. Thus, it is humbly submitted that the
contention raised by the Appellant in the Paragraph No. 13 of the
Grounds is devoid any merits and hence, liable to be dismissed.
18.I humbly submit with regard to the averments made by the Appellant in
Paragraph No. 14,15,16,17 and 18 of the Grounds of Appeal that, they are
in respect to the Adjudicating Authority and hence, no comments are
warranted thereupon them.
19.I humbly submit with regard to the averments made by the Appellant in
Paragraph No. 19 of the Grounds of Appeal that, it is regarding the
dispute in between the Appellants and the said Shri. M. Veerana Thevar
and Shri. K. Ashokan and the Directorate has nothing to intervene in
between their issues pertaining to the rights upon the said properties. The
same has already been stated in the abovementioned paragraphs of this
reply also.
20.I humbly submit with regard to the averments made by the Appellant in
Paragraph No. 20,21 and 22 of the Grounds of Appeal that, they are in
respect to the Adjudicating Authority and hence, no comments are
warranted thereupon them.
21.I humbly submit that an attempt has been made by the Appellant to get a
favourable order from this Hon’ble Tribunal by placing various irrelevant
facts and circumstances, which are not covered under the domain of the
functional aspect of the Directorate of Enforcement. The Directorate
carried out the provisional attachment proceeding in accordance with law.
Time and again, the Appellants have mentioned irrelevant details
pertaining to the tenancy and sub-leasing of the scheduled properties and

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have attempted to waste the precious time of the court. They have also
included an emotional angle of the Appellant being an old woman of 93
years in the appeal, which is again against the principle of equality before
the law. The entire appeal is a pandora box of paradoxical arguments. In
this regard, it is further submitted that, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
paragraph No.8 of the judgment in the case of Pritipal Singh Bedi v.
Union of India, (1982) 3 SCC 140 has held as under:-
“8.The dominant purpose in construing a statute is to ascertain the
intention of the Parliament. One of the well-recognised canons of
construction is that the legislature speaks its mind by use of
correct expression and unless there is any ambiguity in the
language of the provision the Court should adopt literal
construction if it does not lead to an absurdity. The first question
to be posed is whether there is any ambiguity in the language used
in Rule 40. If there is none, it would mean the language used,
speaks the mind of Parliament and there is no need to look
somewhere leers discover the intention or meaning. If the literal
construction leads to an absurdity, external aids to construction
can be resorted to. To ascertain the literal meaning it is equally
necessary first to ascertain the juxtaposition in which the rule is
placed, the purpose for which it is enacted and the object which it
is required to subserve and the authority by which the rule is
framed. This necessitates examination of the broad features of the
Act.”

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Furthermore, In Nathi Devi v. Radha Devi Gupta, (2005) 2 SCC
271, Hon’ble the Supreme Court in paragraph Nos. 13, 14, 15, 16,
17 and 18 held thus:-
“13. The interpretative function of the Court is to discover the true
legislative intent. It is trite that in interpreting a statute the Court
must, if the words are clear, plain, unambiguous and reasonably
susceptible to only one meaning, give to the words that meaning,
irrespective of the consequences. Those words must be expounded
in their natural and ordinary sense. When a language is plain and
unambiguous and admits of only one meaning no question of
construction of statute arises, for the Act speaks for itself. Courts
are not concerned with the policy involved or that the results are
injurious or otherwise, which may follow from giving effect to the
language used. If the words used are capable of one construction
only then it would not be open to the Courts to adopt any other
hypothetical construction on the ground that such construction is
more consistent with the alleged object and policy of the Act. In
considering whether there is ambiguity, the Court must look at the
statute as a whole and consider the appropriateness of the
meaning in a particular context avoiding absurdity and
inconsistencies or unreasonableness which may render the statute
unconstitutional.
14. It is equally well settled that in interpreting a statute, effort
should be made to give effect to each and every word used by the
Legislature. The Courts always presume that the Legislature
inserted every part thereof for a purpose and the legislative

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intention is that every part of the statute should have effect. A
construction which attributes redundancy to the legislature will
not be accepted except for compelling reasons such as obvious
drafting errors. (See State of U.P. and others vs. Vijay Anand
Maharaj : AIR 1963 SC 946 ; Rananjaya Singh vs. Baijnath Singh
and others : AIR 1954 SC 749 ; Kanai Lal Sur vs. Paramnidhi
Sadhukhan : AIR 1957 SC 907; Nyadar Singh vs. Union of India
and others : AIR 1988 SC 1979 ; J.K. Cotton Spinning and
Weaving Mills Co. Ltd. vs. State of U.P. : AIR 1961 S.C. 1170 and
Ghanshyam Das vs. Regional Assistant Commissioner, Sales Tax :
AIR 1964 S.C. 766).
15. It is well settled that literal interpretation should be given to a
statute if the same does not lead to an absurdity.
16. In Nasiruddin and others vs. Sita Ram Agarwal : (2003) 2 SCC
577 this Court stated the law in the following terms :- "37. The
court's jurisdiction to interpret a statute can be invoked when the
same is ambiguous. It is well known that in a given case the court
can iron out the fabric but it cannot change the texture of the
fabric. It cannot enlarge the scope of legislation or intention when
the language of provision is plain and unambiguous. It cannot add
or subtract words to a statute or read something into it which is
not there. It cannot re-write or recast legislation. It is also
necessary to determine that there exists a presumption that the
legislature has not used any superfluous words. It is well settled
that the real intention of the legislation must be gathered from the
language used. It may be true that use of the expression "shall or

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may" is not decisive for arriving at a finding as to whether statute
is directory or mandatory. But the intention of the legislature must
be found out from the scheme of the Act. It is also equally well
settled that when negative words are used the courts will presume
that the intention of the legislature was that the provisions should
be mandatory in character."
17. Even if there exists some ambiguity in the language or the
same is capable of two interpretations, it is trite the interpretation
which serves the object and purport of the Act must be given effect
to. In such a case the doctrine of purposive construction should be
adopted. (See : : Swedish Match AB and another vs. Securities &
Exchange Board, India and another : 2004 (7) Scale 158.)
18. In High Court of Gujarat and another vs. Gujarat Kishan
Mazdoor Panchayat and others : (2003) 4 SCC 712 this Court held
:-
"35. The Court while interpreting the provision of a statute,
although, is not entitled to rewrite the statute itself, is not debarred
from "ironing out the creases". The court should always make an
attempt to uphold the rules and interpret the same in such a
manner which would make it workable.
36. It is also a well-settled principle of law that an attempt should
be made to give effect to each and every word employed in a
statute and such interpretation which would render a particular
provision redundant or otiose should be avoided."

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Further, in Satheedevi Vs. Prasanna and another (2010) 5 SCC
622, the Apex Court in paragraph Nos. 12 and 13 of the judgment
held thus:-
“12. Before proceeding further, we may notice two well recognized
rules of interpretation of statutes. The first and primary rule of
construction is that the intention of the legislature must be found in
the words used by the legislature itself. If the words used are
capable of one construction, only then it would not be open to the
courts to adopt any other hypothetical construction on the ground
that such hypothetical construction is more consistent with the
alleged object and policy of the Act. The words used in the
material provisions of the statute must be interpreted in their plain
grammatical meaning and it is only when such words are capable
of two constructions that the question of giving effect to the policy
or object of the Act can legitimately arise Kanai Lal Sur v.
Paramnidhi Sadhukhan: 1958 SCR 360.
13. The other important rule of interpretation is that the Court
cannot rewrite, recast or reframe the legislation because it has no
power to do so. The Court cannot add words to a statute or read
words which are not therein it. Even if there is a defect or an
omission in the statute, the Court cannot correct the defect or
supply the omission. Union of India v. Deoki Nandan Aggarwal:
1992 Supp (1) SCC 323, Shyam Kishori Devi v. Patna Municipal
Corporation: IR 1966SC 1678.” [underlined to lay emphasis]
From the above, it is, thus, trite that principle of statutory
interpretation that legislature is presume to be careful in choice of

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 language is well founded. First and primary Rule of construction,
which is also known as literal rule of interpretation, is that the
intention of the legislature must be found in the words used by the
legislature itself. If the words used in the Statute are plain, clear,
unambiguous and capable of only one construction then it would
not be open to the Courts to adopt any other hypothetical
construction on the ground that such construction would make the
Statute more consistent with its object and policy. The words used
in the Statute must be interpreted in their plain grammatical
meaning and it is only when there is two possible meaning of such
construction then question of giving effect to the legislative intent
would legitimately arise. Let us not forget that the Courts having
their delineated functions under the Constitution cannot add words
to a Statute or read words which are not there in it. Even if there is
a defect or omission in the Statute the Court cannot correct the
defect or supply the omission.
22.I humbly submit and reiterate that the Money Laundering poses a serious
threat not only to the financial system of our country, but also to our
integrity and sovereignty. To obviate such threats, the MLA was
promulgated in 2002. for preventing Money-Laundering and to provide
for attachment and confiscation of property derived from, or Involved in,
Money-Laundering and for matters connected therewith or incidental
thereto.

In the case of Sri..G.Srinivasan Vs The Chairperson, Adjudicating

Authority under PMLA, New Delhi and three others, the Hon'ble

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High Court of Judicature at Madras in W.P. No. 530 of 2011 dated
05.04.2011 has held in para 18 which is as follows:

18. Before parting with the case, it is necessary to refer to the

observations made by the Supreme Court in K.K. Baskaran's case
(cited supra), where the Supreme Court emphasized the necessity
to have laws to protect the people from money laundering and
swindlers. In paragraph 41 of the said judgment, the Supreme
Court had observed as follows: 41 The State being the custodian of
the welfare of the citizens as parenspatrise cannot be a silent
spectator without finding as solution for this malady. The financial
swindlers, who are nothing but cheats and charlatans having no
social responsibility, but only a lust for easy money by making
false promise of attractive returns for the gullible investors, had to
be dealt with strongly."

8. I humbly submit that in the case of Smt. Shobana & 02 others

Vs. the Asst. Director of Enforcement, Chennai in W.P.Nos. 14083
to 14085 of 2013, the Hon'ble High Court of Madras has held the
Impact of Money Laundering as follows:

"Impact of Money Laundering:

49. The Evil act of money-laundering may create a parallel

economic system in a particular country controlled by few persons.
Undoubtedly, this will result in destabilization and also affect the

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prevailing economy. The act of 'money-laundering has three
ingredients. (a)i+-n placement, it concerns the division of proceeds
into smurfing so as to make movements thereof less suspectable.
(b)In layering, the funds introduced in the financial system are
rotated, transferred, remixed, retransferred in a repeated fashion.
The purpose of laying' is to distance the fund from the origin so as
to make it difficult to trace the origin difference. (c) in integration
stage, the money-laundering is concerned itself with successful
merging into the legitimate finance stream.

50.It is not out of place for this Court to make a significant mention
that money-laundering offence primarily springs from Proceeds of
Crime'. There is a predicate offence under each activity of money-
laundering. Further, the Act speaks of the reporting authority to
furnish information of such provided transactions to the Director
within the prescribed time. Added further, the Prevention of
Money-Laundering Act imposes an obligation on the reporting
entity which term covers Banking, Country Financial Institutions,
Intermediary and individual carrying on Designated Business or
Profession to maintain re of transactions prescribed under the Act.
The aforementioned measures are preventive in character with a
view to get hold of the Proceeds of Crime etc.

51. Money laundering is global phenomena that affects all

countries in various degrees. The presumption can be employed in
adjudication proceedings mentioned in Section 8 of the Prevention

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 of Money Laundering Act as well for the trial of the money
laundering offences. As such, the presumption is attracted in regard
to the trial proceedings before the Special Court for an offence
under Section 3 of the Act. The Adjudicating Authority or the
Court will have to first come to the conclusion that atleast one of
the inter-connected transactions is proved by the investigating
agency to be involved in money laundering".

PRAYER

Considering the above facts, the Hon'ble Tribunal may, therefore,

graciously be pleased to dismiss the above said Appeal and pass such
further orders as this Hon'ble Tribunal may deem fit and proper in the
circumstances of the case and thus render justice, please.

Sworn and Signed before Me on this the Deponent

__________ day of January, 2024 at

:Attesting Officer:

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 VERIFICATION:-

I, Brijesh Beniwal, S/o Babu Singh Beniwal, aged 34 years, presently

working as Assistant Director, Department of Revenue, Ministry of
Finance, Govt. of India, No. 1A, P& T Nagar Main Road, Madurai-
625017 do hereby solemnly affirm and affirm and declare that the above
paragraphs nos. 1 to 8 are true and correct based on record and best of my
knowledge on this ___________ day of January, 2024.

Counsel for the Respondent DEPONENT

BEFORE THE HON’BLE APPELLATE TRIBUNAL

(UNDER THE PREVENTION OF MONEY LAUNDERING ACT, 2002)
NEW DELHI
APPEAL NO. 4983/CHN/2022
IN
O.C. No. 674/2017

IN THE MATTER OF:

MS. R. M. SIVAGAMI AACHI
… APPELLANT
VERSUS

DEPUTY DIRECTOR, DIRECTORATE OF ENFORCEMENT

..... RESPONDENT

AFFIDAVIT

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I, Brijesh Beniwal, S/o Babu Singh Beniwal, aged 34 years, presently
working as Assistant Director, Department of Revenue, Ministry of Finance,
Govt. of India, No. 1A, P& T Nagar Main Road, Madurai-625017 do hereby
solemnly affirm and affirm and declare as under:

1. That I am authorized to file this affidavit on behalf of the Respondent as

such I am well acquainted with the facts of the case from perusal of the
records and competent to swear and file this affidavit.
2. That the contents of the accompanying Reply have been drafted by
Counsel of the Directorate of Enforcement under my instructions.
3. That I affirm that the same is true and correct to the best of my
knowledge.
4. That the contents of the said reply may kindly be read as part and parcel
of this affidavit as the same are not repeated here for the sake of brevity.

Verified at____________ on this _________ day of January, 2024, that

the contents of this affidavit are true and correct to the best of my
knowledge, belief and nothing material has been concealed therefrom.

DEPONENT

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