LABOR LAW & LEGISLATION (HR 192) - 7TH SATURDAY

1. Article 2, Section 14 (Philippine 1987 Constitution)

SECTION 14. The State recognizes the role of women in nation-building, and shall ensure the
fundamental equality before the law of women and men.

2. Article 13, Section 3 (Philippine 1987 Constitution)

SECTION 3. The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and
unorganized, and promote full employment and equality of employment opportunities for all.

It shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective bargaining and negotiations,
and peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in accordance with law. They shall be
entitled to security of tenure, humane conditions of work, and a living wage. They shall also
participate in policy and decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be
provided by law.

The State shall promote the principle of shared responsibility between workers and employers and
the preferential use of voluntary modes in settling disputes, including conciliation, and shall enforce
their mutual compliance therewith to foster industrial peace.

The State shall regulate the relations between workers and employers, recognizing the right of labor
to its just share in the fruits of production and the right of enterprises to reasonable returns on
investments, and to expansion and growth.

3. Article 13, Section 14 (Philippine 1987 Constitution)

SECTION 14. The State shall protect working women by providing safe and healthful working
conditions, taking into account their maternal functions, and such facilities and opportunities that
will enhance their welfare and enable them to realize their full potential in the service of the nation.

4. RA 10151

REPUBLIC ACT NO. 10151

AN ACT ALLOWING THE EMPLOYMENT OF NIGHT WORKERS, THEREBY

REPEALING ARTICLES 130 AND 131 OF PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NUMBER FOUR
HUNDRED FORTY-TWO, AS AMENDED, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE LABOR CODE
OF THE PHILIPPINES

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled:

SECTION 1. Article 130 of the Labor Code is hereby repealed.

SEC. 2. Article 131 of the Labor Code is hereby repealed.

SEC. 3. The subsequent articles in Boot Three, Title III, Chapter I to Chapter IV of Presidential
Decree No. 442 are hereby renumbered accordingly.

SEC. 4. A new chapter is hereby inserted after Book Three, Title III of Presidential Decree No. 442,
to read as follows:
 “Chapter V

“Employment of Night Workers

“Art. 154. Coverage.— This chapter shall apply to all persons, who shall be employed or permitted
or suffered to work at night, except those employed in agriculture, stock raising, fishing, maritime
transport and inland navigation, during a period of not less than seven (7) consecutive hours,
including the interval from midnight to five o’clock in the morning, to be determined by the
Secretary of Labor and Employment, after consulting the workers’ representatives/labor
organizations and employers.

‘”Night worker’ means any employed person whose work requires performance of a substantial
number of hours of night work which exceeds a specified limit. This limit shall be fixed by the
Secretary of Labor after consulting the workers’ representatives/labor organizations and employers.”

“Art. 155. Health Assessment, – At their request, workers shall have the right to undergo a health
assessment without charge and to receive advice on how to reduce or avoid health problems
associated with their work:

“(a) Before taking up an assignment as a night worker;

“(b) At regular intervals during such an assignment; and

“(c) If they experience health problems during such an assignment which are not caused by factors
other than the performance of night work.

“With the exception of a finding of unfitness for night work, the findings of such assessments shall
not be transmitted to others without the workers’ consent and shall not be used to their detriment.”

“Art. 156. Mandatory Facilities.— Suitable first-aid facilities shall be made available for workers
performing night work, including arrangements where such workers, where necessary, can be taken
immediately to a place for appropriate treatment. The employers are likewise required to provide
safe and healthful working conditions and adequate or reasonable facilities such as sleeping or
resting quarters in the establishment and transportation from the work premises to the nearest point
of their residence subject to exceptions and guidelines to be provided by the DOLE.”

“Art. 157. Transfer.— Night workers who are certified as unfit for night work, due to health reasons,
shall be transferred, whenever practicable, to a similar job for which they are fit to work.

“If such transfer to a similar job is not practicable, these workers shall be granted the same benefits
as other workers who are unable to work, or to secure employment during such period.

“A night worker certified as temporarily unfit for night work shall be given the same protection
against dismissal or notice of dismissal as other workers who are prevented from working for reasons
of health.”

“Art. 158. Women Night Workers.— Measures shall be taken to ensure that an alternative to night
work is available to women workers who would otherwise be called upon to perform such work:
“(a) Before and after childbirth, for a period of at least sixteen (16) weeks, which shall be divided
between the time before and after childbirth;

“(b) For additional periods, in respect of which a medical certificate is produced stating that said
additional periods are necessary for the health of the mother or child:

“(1) During pregnancy;

“(2) During a specified time beyond the period, after childbirth is fixed pursuant to subparagraph (a)
above, the length of which shall be determined by the DOLE after consulting the labor organizations
and employers.

“During the periods referred to in this article:

“(i) A woman worker shall not be dismissed or given notice of dismissal, except for just or
authorised causes provided for in this Code that are not connected with pregnancy, childbirth and
childcare responsibilities.

“(ii) A woman worker shall not lose the benefits regarding her status, seniority, and access to
promotion which may attach to her regular night work position.

‘Pregnant women and nursing mothers may he allowed to work at night only if a competent
physician, other than the company physician, shall certify their fitness to render night work, and
specify, in the ease of pregnant employees, the period of the pregnancy that they can safely work.

“The measures referred to in this article may include transfer to day work where this is possible, the
provision of social security benefits or an extension of maternity leave.

“The provisions of this article shall not have the effect of reducing the protection and benefits
connected with maternity leave under existing laws.”

“Art. 159. Compensation.— The compensation for night workers in the form of working time, pay or
similar benefits shall recognize the exceptional nature of night work.”

“Art. 160. Social Services.—Appropriate social services shall be provided for night workers and,
where necessary, for workers performing night work.”

“Art. 161. Night Work Schedules.— Before introducing work schedules requiring the services of
night workers, the employer shall consult the workers’ representatives/labor

organizations concerned on the details of such schedules and the forms of organization of night work
that are best adapted to the establishment and its personnel, as well as on the occupational health
measures and social services which are required. In establishments employing night workers,
consultation shall take place regularly.”

SEC. 5. The subsequent articles starting from Book Four, Title I, Chapter I of Presidential Decree No.
442 are hereby renumbered accordingly.

SEC. 6. Application.— The measures referred to in this chapter shall be applied not later than six (G)
months from the effectivity of this Act.
SEC. 7. Guidelines.— The DOLE shah promulgate appropriate regulations in addition to existing
ones to ensure protection, safety and welfare of night workers.

SEC. 8. Penalties.— Any violation of this Act, and the rules and regulations issued pursuant hereof
shall be punished with a fine of not less than Thirty thousand pesos (P30,000.00) nor more than Fifty
thousand pesos (P50,000.00) or imprisonment of not less than six (6) months, or both, at the
discretion of the court. If the offense is committed by a corporation, trust, firm, partnership or
association, or other entity, the penalty shall be imposed upon the guilty officer or officers of such
corporation, trust, firm, partnership or association, or entity.

SEC. 9. Separability Clause.— If any portion of this Act is declared unconstitutional, the same shall
not affect the validity and effectivity of the other provisions not affected thereby.

SEC. 10. Repealing Clause.— All laws, acts, decrees, executive orders, rules and regulations or other
issuances or parts thereof, which are inconsistent with this Act, are hereby modified and repealed.

SEC. 11 Effectivity Clause.— This Act shall take effect after fifteen (15) days following its
publication in two (2) national newspapers of general circulation.

5. Articles 130 - 140 (Labor Code)

Title III
WORKING CONDITIONS FOR
SPECIAL GROUPS OF EMPLOYEES

Chapter I
EMPLOYMENT OF WOMEN

Art. 130. Nightwork prohibition. No woman, regardless of age, shall be employed or permitted or
suffered to work, with or without compensation:

1. In any industrial undertaking or branch thereof between ten o’clock at night and six o’clock
in the morning of the following day; or

2. In any commercial or non-industrial undertaking or branch thereof, other than agricultural,

between midnight and six o’clock in the morning of the following day; or

3. In any agricultural undertaking at nighttime unless she is given a period of rest of not less
than nine (9) consecutive hours.

Art. 131. Exceptions. The prohibitions prescribed by the preceding Article shall not apply in any of
the following cases:

1. In cases of actual or impending emergencies caused by serious accident, fire, flood, typhoon,
earthquake, epidemic or other disasters or calamity, to prevent loss of life or property, or in
cases of force majeure or imminent danger to public safety;

2. In case of urgent work to be performed on machineries, equipment or installation, to avoid

serious loss which the employer would otherwise suffer;
 3. Where the work is necessary to prevent serious loss of perishable goods;

4. Where the woman employee holds a responsible position of managerial or technical nature,
or where the woman employee has been engaged to provide health and welfare services;

5. Where the nature of the work requires the manual skill and dexterity of women workers and
the same cannot be performed with equal efficiency by male workers;

6. Where the women employees are immediate members of the family operating the
establishment or undertaking; and

7. Under other analogous cases exempted by the Secretary of Labor and Employment in
appropriate regulations.

Art. 132. Facilities for women. The Secretary of Labor and Employment shall establish standards
that will ensure the safety and health of women employees. In appropriate cases, he shall, by
regulations, require any employer to:

1. Provide seats proper for women and permit them to use such seats when they are free from
work and during working hours, provided they can perform their duties in this position
without detriment to efficiency;

2. To establish separate toilet rooms and lavatories for men and women and provide at least a
dressing room for women;

3. To establish a nursery in a workplace for the benefit of the women employees therein; and

4. To determine appropriate minimum age and other standards for retirement or termination in
special occupations such as those of flight attendants and the like.

Art. 133. Maternity leave benefits.

1. Every employer shall grant to any pregnant woman employee who has rendered an aggregate
service of at least six (6) months for the last twelve (12) months, maternity leave of at least
two (2) weeks prior to the expected date of delivery and another four (4) weeks after normal
delivery or abortion with full pay based on her regular or average weekly wages. The
employer may require from any woman employee applying for maternity leave the
production of a medical certificate stating that delivery will probably take place within two
weeks.

2. The maternity leave shall be extended without pay on account of illness medically certified to
arise out of the pregnancy, delivery, abortion or miscarriage, which renders the woman unfit
for work, unless she has earned unused leave credits from which such extended leave may be
charged.

3. The maternity leave provided in this Article shall be paid by the employer only for the first
four (4) deliveries by a woman employee after the effectivity of this Code.

Art. 134. Family planning services; incentives for family planning.

 1. Establishments which are required by law to maintain a clinic or infirmary shall provide free
family planning services to their employees which shall include, but not be limited to, the
application or use of contraceptive pills and intrauterine devices.

2. In coordination with other agencies of the government engaged in the promotion of family
planning, the Department of Labor and Employment shall develop and prescribe incentive
bonus schemes to encourage family planning among female workers in any establishment or
enterprise.

Art. 135. Discrimination prohibited. It shall be unlawful for any employer to discriminate against
any woman employee with respect to terms and conditions of employment solely on account of her
sex.

The following are acts of discrimination:

1. Payment of a lesser compensation, including wage, salary or other form of remuneration and
fringe benefits, to a female employees as against a male employee, for work of equal value;
and

2. Favoring a male employee over a female employee with respect to promotion, training
opportunities, study and scholarship grants solely on account of their sexes.

Criminal liability for the willful commission of any unlawful act as provided in this Article or any
violation of the rules and regulations issued pursuant to Section 2 hereof shall be penalized as
provided in Articles 288 and 289 of this Code: Provided, That the institution of any criminal action
under this provision shall not bar the aggrieved employee from filing an entirely separate and distinct
action for money claims, which may include claims for damages and other affirmative reliefs. The
actions hereby authorized shall proceed independently of each other. (As amended by Republic Act
No. 6725, May 12, 1989)

Art. 136. Stipulation against marriage. It shall be unlawful for an employer to require as a
condition of employment or continuation of employment that a woman employee shall not get
married, or to stipulate expressly or tacitly that upon getting married, a woman employee shall be
deemed resigned or separated, or to actually dismiss, discharge, discriminate or otherwise prejudice a
woman employee merely by reason of her marriage.

Art. 137. Prohibited acts.

1. It shall be unlawful for any employer:

1. To deny any woman employee the benefits provided for in this Chapter or to
discharge any woman employed by him for the purpose of preventing her from
enjoying any of the benefits provided under this Code.

2. To discharge such woman on account of her pregnancy, or while on leave or in

confinement due to her pregnancy;

3. To discharge or refuse the admission of such woman upon returning to her work for
fear that she may again be pregnant.
Art. 138. Classification of certain women workers. Any woman who is permitted or suffered to
work, with or without compensation, in any night club, cocktail lounge, massage clinic, bar or
similar establishments under the effective control or supervision of the employer for a substantial
period of time as determined by the Secretary of Labor and Employment, shall be considered as an
employee of such establishment for purposes of labor and social legislation.

Chapter II
EMPLOYMENT OF MINORS

Art. 139. Minimum employable age.

1. No child below fifteen (15) years of age shall be employed, except when he works directly
under the sole responsibility of his parents or guardian, and his employment does not in any
way interfere with his schooling.

2. Any person between fifteen (15) and eighteen (18) years of age may be employed for such
number of hours and such periods of the day as determined by the Secretary of Labor and
Employment in appropriate regulations.

3. The foregoing provisions shall in no case allow the employment of a person below eighteen
(18) years of age in an undertaking which is hazardous or deleterious in nature as determined
by the Secretary of Labor and Employment.

Art. 140. Prohibition against child discrimination. No employer shall discriminate against any
person in respect to terms and conditions of employment on account of his age.

6. RA 6725
[REPUBLIC ACT 6725]
AN ACT STRENGTHENING THE PROHIBITION ON DISCRIMINATION
AGAINST WOMEN WITH RESPECT TO TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF
EMPLOYMENT, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE ARTICLE ONE HUNDRED
THIRTY-FIVE OF THE LABOR CODE, AS AMENDED

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress

assembled:

SECTION 1. Article One hundred thirty-five of the Labor Code, as amended, is hereby
further amended to read as follows:

“Art. 135. Discrimination Prohibited. -- It shall be unlawful for any employer to discriminate
against any woman employee with respect to terms and conditions of employment solely on account
of her sex.

“The following are acts of discrimination:

“(a) Payment of a lesser compensation, including wage, salary or other form of remuneration
and fringe benefits, to a female employee as against a male employee, for work of equal value; and

“(b) Favoring a male employee over a female employee with respect to promotion, training
opportunities, study and scholarship grants solely on account of their sexes.
 “Criminal liability for the willful commission of any unlawful act as provided in this article
or any violation of the rules and regulations issued pursuant to Section 2 hereof shall be penalized as
provided in Articles 288 and 289 of this Code: Provided, That the institution of any criminal action
under this provision shall not bar the aggrieved employee from filing an entirely separate and distinct
action for money claims, which may include claims for damages and other affirmative reliefs. The
actions hereby authorized shall proceed independently of each other.”

SEC. 2. The Secretary of Labor and Employment is hereby authorized to promulgate the
necessary guidelines to implement this Article in accordance with the generally accepted practices
and standards here and abroad.

SEC. 3. This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days from the date of its publication in at least
two (2) national newspapers of general circulation.

7. RA 6955

REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6955

AN ACT TO DECLARE UNLAWFUL THE PRACTICE OF MATCHING FILIPINO WOMEN

FOR MARRIAGE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS ON A MAIL-ORDER BASIS AND OTHER
SIMILAR PRACTICES, INCLUDING THE ADVERTISEMENT, PUBLICATION, PRINTING
OR DISTRIBUTION OF BROCHURES, FLIERS AND OTHER PROPAGANDA MATERIALS
IN FURTHERANCE THEREOF AND PROVIDING PENALTY THEREFOR

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled:

SECTION 1. It is the policy of the State to ensure and guarantee the enjoyment of the people of a
decent standard of living. Towards this end, the State shall take measures to protect Filipino women
from being exploited in utter disregard of human dignity in their pursuit of economic upliftment.

SEC. 2. Pursuant thereto, it is hereby declared unlawful:

(a) For a person, natural or juridical, association, club or any other entity to commit, directly or
indirectly, any of the following acts:

(1) To establish or carry on a business which has for its purpose the matching of Filipino women for
marriage to foreign nationals either on a mail-order basis or through personal introduction;

(2) To advertise, publish, print or distribute or cause the advertisement, publication, printing or
distribution of any brochure, flier, or any propaganda material calculated to promote the prohibited
acts in the preceding subparagraph;

(3) To solicit, enlist or in any manner attract or induce any Filipino woman to become a member in
any club or association whose objective is to match women for marriage to foreign nationals either
on a mail-order basis or through personal introduction for a fee;

(4) To use the postal service to promote the prohibited acts in subparagraph 1 hereof.
(b) For the manager or officer-in-charge or advertising manager of any newspaper, magazine,
television or radio station, or other media, or of an advertising agency, printing company or other
similar entities, to knowingly allow, or consent to, the acts prohibited in the preceding paragraph.

SEC. 3. In case of violation of this Act by an association, club, partnership, corporation, or any other
entity, the incumbent officers thereof who have knowingly participated in the violation of this Act
shall be held liable.

SEC. 4. Any person found guilty by the court to have violated any of the acts herein prohibited shall
suffer an imprisonment of not less than six (6) years and one (1) day but not more than eight (8)
years, and a fine of not less than Eight thousand pesos (P8,000) but not more than Twenty thousand
pesos (P20,000): Provided, That if the offender is a foreigner, he shall be immediately deported and
barred forever from entering the country after serving his sentence and payment of fine.

SEC. 5. Nothing in this Act shall be interpreted as a restriction on the freedom of speech and of
association for purposes not contrary to law as guaranteed by the Constitution.

SEC. 6. All laws, decrees, orders, instructions, rules and regulations, or parts thereof inconsistent
with this Act are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.

SEC. 7. This Act shall take effect upon its publication for two (2) consecutive weeks in a newspaper
of general circulation.

Approved, June 13, 1990.

8. RA 7192

REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7192

AN ACT PROMOTING THE INTEGRATION OF WOMEN AS FULL AND EQUAL PARTNERS

OF MEN IN DEVELOPMENT AND NATION BUILDING AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled:

SECTION 1. Title. — This Act shall be cited as the “Women in Development and Nation Building
Act.”

SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. — The State recognizes the role of women in nation building and
shall ensure the fundamental equality before the law of women and men. The State shall provide
women rights and opportunities equal to that of men.

To attain the foregoing policy:

(1) A substantial portion of official development assistance funds received from foreign governments
and multilateral agencies and organizations shall be set aside and utilized by the agencies concerned
to support programs and activities for women;

(2) All government departments shall ensure that women benefit equally and participate directly in
the development programs and projects of said department, specifically those funded under official
foreign development assistance, to ensure the full participation and involvement of women in the
development process; and

(3) All government departments and agencies shall review and revise all their regulations, circulars,
issuances and procedures to remove gender bias therein.

SEC. 3. Responsible Agency. — The National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA) shall
primarily be responsible for ensuring the participation of women as recipients in foreign aid, grants
and loans. It shall determine and recommend the amount to be allocated for the development activity
involving women.

SEC. 4. Mandate. — The NEDA, with the assistance of the National Commission on the Role of
Filipino Women, shall ensure that the different government departments, including its agencies and
instrumentalities which, directly or indirectly, affect the participation of women in national
development and their integration therein:

(1) Formulate and prioritize rural or countryside development programs or projects, provide income
and employment opportunities to women in the rural areas and thus, prevent their heavy migration
from rural to urban or foreign countries;

(2) Include an assessment of the extent to which their programs and/or projects integrate women in
the development process and of the impact of said programs or projects on women, including their
implications in enhancing the self-reliance of women in improving their income;

(3) Ensure the active participation of women and women’s organizations in the development
programs and/or projects including their involvement in the planning, design, implementation,
management, monitoring and evaluation thereof;

(4) Collect sex-disaggregated data and include such data in its program/project paper, proposal or
strategy;

(5) Ensure that programs and/or projects are designed so that the percentage of women who receive
assistance is approximately proportionate to either their traditional participation in the targeted
activities or their proportion of the population, whichever is higher. Otherwise, the following should
be stated in the program/project paper, proposal or strategy:

(a) The obstacles in achieving the goal;

(b) The steps being taken to overcome those obstacles; and

(c) To the extent that steps are not being taken to overcome those obstacles, why they are not being
taken.

(6) Assist women in activities that are of critical significance to their self-reliance and development.

SEC. 5. Equality in Capacity to Act. — Women of legal age, regardless of civil status, shall have the
capacity to act and enter into contracts which shall in every respect be equal to that of men under
similar circumstances.
In all contractual situations where married men have the capacity to act, married women shall have
equal rights.

To this end:

(1) Women shall have the capacity to borrow and obtain loans and execute security and credit
arrangements under the same conditions as men;

(2) Women shall have equal access to all government and private sector programs granting
agricultural credit, loans and nonmaterial resources and shall enjoy equal treatment in agrarian
reform and land resettlement programs;

(3) Women shall have equal rights to act as incorporators and enter into insurance contracts; and

(4) Married women shall have the rights equal to those of married men in applying for passports,
secure visas and other travel documents, without need to secure the consent of their spouses.

In all other similar contractual relations, women shall enjoy equal rights and shall have the capacity
to act which shall in every respect be equal to those of men under similar circumstances.

SEC. 6. Equal Membership in Clubs. — Women shall enjoy equal access to membership in all social,
civic and recreational clubs, committees, associations and similar other organizations devoted to
public purpose. They shall be entitled to the same rights and privileges accorded to their spouses if
they belong to the same organization.

SEC. 7. Admission to Military Schools. — Any provision of the law to the contrary notwithstanding,
consistent with the needs of the services, women shall be accorded equal opportunities for
appointment, admission, training, graduation and commissioning in all military or similar schools of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police not later than the fourth
academic year following the approval of this Act in accordance with the standards required for men
except for those minimum essential adjustments required by physiological differences between sexes.

SEC. 8. Voluntary Pag-IBIG, GSIS and SSS Coverage. — Married persons who devote full time to
managing the household and family affairs shall, upon the working spouse’s consent, be entitled to
voluntary Pag-IBIG (Pagtutulungan — Ikaw, Bangko, Industriya at Gobyerno), Government Service
Insurance System (GSIS) or Social Security System (SSS) coverage to the extent of one-half (1/2) of
the salary and compensation of the working spouse. The contributions due thereon shall be deducted
from the salary of the working spouse.

The GSIS or the SSS, as the case may be, shall issue rules and regulations necessary to effectively
implement the provisions of this section.

SEC. 9. Implementing Rules. — The NEDA in consultation with the different government agencies
concerned shall issue rules and regulations as may be necessary for the effective implementation of
Sections 2, 3 and 4, of this Act within six (6) months from its effectivity.

SEC. 10. Compliance Report. — Within six (6) months from the effectivity of this Act and every six
(6) months thereafter, all government departments, including its agencies and instrumentalities, shall
submit a report to Congress on their compliance with this Act.
SEC. 11. Separability Clause. — If for any reason any section or provision of this Act is declared
unconstitutional or invalid, the other sections or provisions hereof which are not affected thereby
shall continue to be in full force and effect.

SEC. 12. Repealing Clause. — The provisions of Republic Act No. 386, otherwise known as the
Civil Code of the Philippines, as amended, and of Executive Order No. 209, otherwise known as the
Family Code of the Philippines, and all laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations, rules and
regulations, or parts thereof, inconsistent herewith are hereby repealed.

SEC. 13. Effectivity Clause. — The rights of women and all the provisions of this Act shall take
effect immediately upon its publication in the Official Gazette or in at least two (2) newspapers of
general circulation.

Approved, February 12, 1992.

9. RA 7877

[REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7877]

AN ACT DECLARING SEXUAL HARASSMENT UNLAWFUL IN THE EMPLOYMENT,

EDUCATION OR TRAINING ENVIRONMENT, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled:

SECTION 1. Title. – This Act shall be known as the “Anti-Sexual Harassment Act of 1995.”

SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. – The State shall value the dignity of every individual, enhance the
development of its human resources guarantee fell respect for human rights, and uphold the dignity
of work rs, employees, applicants for employment, students or those undergoing training, instruction
or education. Towards this end, all forms of sexual harassment in the employment, education or
training environment are hereby declared unlawful.

SEC. 3. Work, Education or Training-related Sexual Harassment Defined. – Work, education or

training-related sexual harassment is committed by an employer, employee, manager, supervisor,
agent of the employer, teacher, instructor, professor, coach, trainor, or any other person who, having
authority, influence or moral ascendancy over another in a work or training or education
environment, demands, requests or otherwise requires any sexual favor from the other, regardless of
whether the demand, request or requirement for submission is accepted by the object of said Act.

(a) In a work-related or employment environment, sexual

harassment is committed when:

(1) The sexual favor is made as a condition in the hiring or in the employment, re-employment or
continued employment of said individual, or in granting said individual favorable compensation,
terms, conditions, promotions, or privileges; or the refusal to grant the sexual favor results in limiting,
segregating or classifying the employee which in any way would discriminate, deprive or diminish
employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect said employee;

(2) The above acts would impair the employee’s rights or privileges under existing labor laws; or
(3) The above acts would result in an intimidating, hostile, or offensive environment for the
employee.

(b) In an education or training environment, sexual harassment is committed:

(1) Against one who is under the care, custody or supervision of the offender;

(2) Against one whose education, training, apprenticeship or tutorship is entrusted to the offender;

(3) When the sexual favor is made a condition to the giving of a passing grade, or the granting of
honors and scholarships, or the payment of a stipend, allowance or other benefits, privileges, or
considerations; or

(4) When the sexual advances result in an intimidating, hostile or offensive environment for the
student, trainee or apprentice.

Any person who directs or induces another to commit any act of sexual harassment as herein defined,
or who cooperates in the commission thereof by another without which it would not have been
committed, shall also be held liable under this Act.

SEC. 4. Duty of the Employer or Head of Office in a Work-related, Education or Training

Environment. – It shall be the duty of the employer or the head of the work-related, educational or
training environment or institution, to prevent or deter the commission of acts of sexual harassment
and to provide the procedures for the resolution, settlement or prosecution of acts of sexual
harassment. Towards this end, the employer or head of office shall:

(a) Promulgate appropriate rules and regulations in consultation with and jointly approved by the
employees or students or trainees, through their duly designated representatives, prescribing the
procedure for the investigation of sexual harassment cases and the administrative sanctions therefor.

Administrative sanctions shall not be a bar to prosecution in the proper courts for unlawful acts of
sexual harassment.

The said rules and regulations issued pursuant to this subsection (a) shall include, among others,
guidelines on proper decorum in the workplace and educational or training institutions.

(b) Create a committee on decorum and investigation of cases on sexual harassment. The committee
shall conduct meetings, as the case may be, with officers and employees, teachers, instructors,
professors, coaches, trainors and students or trainees to increase understanding and prevent incidents
of sexual harassment. It shall also conduct the investigation of alleged cases constituting sexual
harassment.

In the case of a work-related environment, the committee shall be composed of at least one (1)
representative each from the management, the union, if any, the employees from the supervisory
rank, and from the rank and file employees.

In the case of the educational or training institution, the committee shall be composed of at least one
(1) representative from the administration, the trainors, teachers, instructors, professors or coaches
and students or trainees, as the case may be.
The employer or head of office, educational or training institution shall disseminate or post . copy of
this Act for the information of all concerned.

SEC. 5. Liability of the Employer, Head of Office, Educational or Training Institution. – The
employer or head of office, educational or training institution shall be solidarily liable for damages
arising from the acts of sexual harassment committed in the employment, education or training
environment if the employer or head of office, educational or training institution is informed of such
acts by the offended party and no immediate action is taken thereon.

SEC. 6. Independent Action for Damages. – Nothing in this Act shall preclude the victim of work,
education or training-related sexual harassment from instituting a separate and independent action for
damages and other affirmative relief.

SEC 7. Penalties. – Any person who violates the provisions of this Act shall, upon conviction, be
penalized by imprisonment of not less than one (1) month nor more than six (6) months, or a fine of
not less than Ten thousand pesos (P 10,000) nor more than Twenty thousand pesos (P 20,000), or
both such fine and imprisonment at the discretion of the court.

Any action arising from the violation of the provisions of this Act shall prescribe in three (3) years.

SEC. 8. Separability Clause. – If any portion or provision of this Act is declared void or
unconstitutional, the remaining portions or provisions hereof shall not be affected by such
declaration.

SEC. 9. Repealing Clause. – All laws, decrees, orders, rules and regulations, other issuances, or parts
thereof inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.

SEC. 10. Effectivity Clause. – This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days after its complete
publication in at least two (2) national newspapers of general circulation.

Approved: FEB 14 1995

10. RA 8282, Section 14-A

“SEC. 14-A. Maternity Leave Benefit. - A female member who has paid at least three (3) monthly
contributions in the twelve-month period immediately preceding the semester of her childbirth or
miscarriage shall be paid a daily maternity benefit equivalent to one hundred percent (100%) of her
average daily salary credit for sixty (60) days or seventy-eight (78) days in case of caesarean delivery,
subject to the following conditions:

“(a) That the employee shall have notified her employer of her pregnancy and the probable
date of her childbirth, which notice shall be transmitted to the SSS in accordance with the
rules and regulations it may provide;

“(b) The full payment shall be advanced by the employer within thirty (30) days from the
filing of the maternity leave application;

“(c) That payment of daily maternity benefits shall be a bar to the recovery of sickness
benefits provided by this Act for the same period for which daily maternity benefits have
been received;
 “(d) That the maternity benefits provided under this section shall be paid only for the first
four (4) deliveries or miscarriages;

“(e) That the SSS shall immediately reimburse the employer of one hundred percent (100%)
of the amount of maternity benefits advanced to the employee by the employer upon receipt
of satisfactory proof of such payment and legality thereof; and

“(f) That if an employee member should give birth or suffer miscarriage without the required
contributions having been remitted for her by her employer to the SSS, or without the latter
having been previously notified by the employer of the time of the pregnancy, the employer
shall pay to the SSS damages equivalent to the benefits which said employee member would
otherwise have been entitled to.

11. RA 9710, Section 18

SECTION 18. Special Leave Benefits for Women. — A woman employee having rendered
continuous aggregate employment service of at least six (6) months for the last twelve (12) months
shall be entitled to a special leave benefit of two (2) months with full pay based on her gross monthly
compensation following surgery caused by gynecological disorders.

12. GR No. 164774

[ G.R. NO. 164774. April 12, 2006 ]
STAR PAPER CORPORATION, JOSEPHINE ONGSITCO & SEBASTIAN CHUA,
PETITIONERS, VS. RONALDO D. SIMBOL, WILFREDA N. COMIA & LORNA E.
ESTRELLA, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION
PUNO, J.:
We are called to decide an issue of first impression: whether the policy of the employer banning
spouses from working in the same company violates the rights of the employee under the
Constitution and the Labor Code or is a valid exercise of management prerogative.

At bar is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated August 3,
2004 in CA-G.R. SP No. 73477 reversing the decision of the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC) which affirmed the ruling of the Labor Arbiter.

Petitioner Star Paper Corporation (the company) is a corporation engaged in trading - principally of
paper products. Josephine Ongsitco is its Manager of the Personnel and Administration Department
while Sebastian Chua is its Managing Director.

The evidence for the petitioners show that respondents Ronaldo D. Simbol (Simbol), Wilfreda N.
Comia (Comia) and Lorna E. Estrella (Estrella) were all regular employees of the company.[1]

Simbol was employed by the company on October 27, 1993. He met Alma Dayrit, also an employee
of the company, whom he married on June 27, 1998. Prior to the marriage, Ongsitco advised the
couple that should they decide to get married, one of them should resign pursuant to a company
policy promulgated in 1995,[2] viz.:
1. New applicants will not be allowed to be hired if in case he/she has [a] relative, up
to [the] 3rd degree of relationship, already employed by the company.
 2. In case of two of our employees (both singles [sic], one male and another female)
developed a friendly relationship during the course of their employment and then
decided to get married, one of them should resign to preserve the policy stated
above.[3]
Simbol resigned on June 20, 1998 pursuant to the company policy.[4]

Comia was hired by the company on February 5, 1997. She met Howard Comia, a co-employee,
whom she married on June 1, 2000. Ongsitco likewise reminded them that pursuant to company
policy, one must resign should they decide to get married. Comia resigned on June 30, 2000.[5]

Estrella was hired on July 29, 1994. She met Luisito Zuñiga (Zuñiga), also a co-worker. Petitioners
stated that Zuñiga, a married man, got Estrella pregnant. The company allegedly could have
terminated her services due to immorality but she opted to resign on December 21, 1999.[6]

The respondents each signed a Release and Confirmation Agreement. They stated therein that they
have no money and property accountabilities in the company and that they release the latter of any
claim or demand of whatever nature.[7]

Respondents offer a different version of their dismissal. Simbol and Comia allege that they did not
resign voluntarily; they were compelled to resign in view of an illegal company policy. As to
respondent Estrella, she alleges that she had a relationship with co-worker Zuñiga who
misrepresented himself as a married but separated man. After he got her pregnant, she discovered
that he was not separated. Thus, she severed her relationship with him to avoid dismissal due to the
company policy. On November 30, 1999, she met an accident and was advised by the doctor at the
Orthopedic Hospital to recuperate for twenty-one (21) days. She returned to work on December 21,
1999 but she found out that her name was on-hold at the gate. She was denied entry. She was
directed to proceed to the personnel office where one of the staff handed her a memorandum. The
memorandum stated that she was being dismissed for immoral conduct. She refused to sign the
memorandum because she was on leave for twenty-one (21) days and has not been given a chance to
explain. The management asked her to write an explanation. However, after submission of the
explanation, she was nonetheless dismissed by the company. Due to her urgent need for money, she
later submitted a letter of resignation in exchange for her thirteenth month pay.[8]

Respondents later filed a complaint for unfair labor practice, constructive dismissal, separation pay
and attorney's fees. They averred that the aforementioned company policy is illegal and contravenes
Article 136 of the Labor Code. They also contended that they were dismissed due to their union
membership.

On May 31, 2001, Labor Arbiter Melquiades Sol del Rosario dismissed the complaint for lack of
merit, viz.:
[T]his company policy was decreed pursuant to what the respondent corporation
perceived as management prerogative. This management prerogative is quite broad
and encompassing for it covers hiring, work assignment, working method, time, place
and manner of work, tools to be used, processes to be followed, supervision of
workers, working regulations, transfer of employees, work supervision, lay-off of
workers and the discipline, dismissal and recall of workers. Except as provided for or
limited by special law, an employer is free to regulate, according to his own discretion
and judgment all the aspects of employment.[9] (Citations omitted.)
On appeal to the NLRC, the Commission affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter on January 11,
2002. [10]
Respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration but was denied by the NLRC in a
Resolution[11] dated August 8, 2002. They appealed to respondent court via Petition for Certiorari.

In its assailed Decision dated August 3, 2004, the Court of Appeals reversed the NLRC decision, viz.:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the May 31, 2002 (sic)[12] Decision of the
National Labor Relations Commission is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a
new one is entered as follows:
(1) Declaring illegal, the petitioners' dismissal from employment and
ordering private respondents to reinstate petitioners to their former
positions without loss of seniority rights with full backwages from the
time of their dismissal until actual reinstatement; and

(2) Ordering private respondents to pay petitioners attorney's fees

amounting to 10% of the award and the cost of this suit.[13]
On appeal to this Court, petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that:
1. X X X THE SUBJECT 1995 POLICY/REGULATION IS VIOLATIVE OF THE
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS TOWARDS MARRIAGE AND THE FAMILY OF
EMPLOYEES AND OF ARTICLE 136 OF THE LABOR CODE; AND

2. X X X RESPONDENTS' RESIGNATIONS WERE FAR FROM

VOLUNTARY.[14]
We affirm.

The 1987 Constitution[15] states our policy towards the protection of labor under the following
provisions, viz.:
Article II, Section 18. The State affirms labor as a primary social economic force. It
shall protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare.

xxx

Article XIII, Sec. 3. The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas,
organized and unorganized, and promote full employment and equality of
employment opportunities for all.

It shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective bargaining

and negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in
accordance with law. They shall be entitled to security of tenure, humane conditions
of work, and a living wage. They shall also participate in policy and decision-making
processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by law.

The State shall promote the principle of shared responsibility between workers and
employers, recognizing the right of labor to its just share in the fruits of production
and the right of enterprises to reasonable returns on investments, and to expansion and
growth.
The Civil Code likewise protects labor with the following provisions:
Art. 1700. The relation between capital and labor are not merely contractual. They are
so impressed with public interest that labor contracts must yield to the common good.
Therefore, such contracts are subject to the special laws on labor unions, collective
bargaining, strikes and lockouts, closed shop, wages, working conditions, hours of
 labor and similar subjects.

Art. 1702. In case of doubt, all labor legislation and all labor contracts shall be
construed in favor of the safety and decent living for the laborer.
The Labor Code is the most comprehensive piece of legislation protecting labor. The case at bar
involves Article 136 of the Labor Code which provides:
Art. 136. It shall be unlawful for an employer to require as a condition of employment
or continuation of employment that a woman employee shall not get married, or to
stipulate expressly or tacitly that upon getting married a woman employee shall be
deemed resigned or separated, or to actually dismiss, discharge, discriminate or
otherwise prejudice a woman employee merely by reason of her marriage.
Respondents submit that their dismissal violates the above provision. Petitioners allege that its policy
"may appear to be contrary to Article 136 of the Labor Code" but it assumes a new meaning if read
together with the first paragraph of the rule. The rule does not require the woman employee to resign.
The employee spouses have the right to choose who between them should resign. Further, they are
free to marry persons other than co-employees. Hence, it is not the marital status of the
employee, per se, that is being discriminated. It is only intended to carry out its no-employment-for-
relatives-within-the-third-degree-policy which is within the ambit of the prerogatives of
management.[16]

It is true that the policy of petitioners prohibiting close relatives from working in the same company
takes the nature of an anti-nepotism employment policy. Companies adopt these policies to prevent
the hiring of unqualified persons based on their status as a relative, rather than upon their
ability.[17] These policies focus upon the potential employment problems arising from the perception
of favoritism exhibited towards relatives.

With more women entering the workforce, employers are also enacting employment policies
specifically prohibiting spouses from working for the same company. We note that two types of
employment policies involve spouses: policies banning only spouses from working in the same
company (no-spouse employment policies), and those banning all immediate family members,
including spouses, from working in the same company (anti-nepotism employment policies).[18]

Unlike in our jurisdiction where there is no express prohibition on marital discrimination,[19] there are
twenty state statutes[20] in the United States prohibiting marital discrimination. Some state
courts[21] have been confronted with the issue of whether no-spouse policies violate their laws
prohibiting both marital status and sex discrimination.

In challenging the anti-nepotism employment policies in the United States, complainants utilize two
theories of employment discrimination: the disparate treatment and the disparate impact. Under
the disparate treatment analysis, the plaintiff must prove that an employment policy is
discriminatory on its face. No-spouse employment policies requiring an employee of a particular
sex to either quit, transfer, or be fired are facially discriminatory. For example, an employment
policy prohibiting the employer from hiring wives of male employees, but not husbands of female
employees, is discriminatory on its face.[22]

On the other hand, to establish disparate impact, the complainants must prove that a facially neutral
policy has a disproportionate effect on a particular class. For example, although most employment
policies do not expressly indicate which spouse will be required to transfer or leave the company, the
policy often disproportionately affects one sex.[23]
The state courts' rulings on the issue depend on their interpretation of the scope of marital status
discrimination within the meaning of their respective civil rights acts. Though they agree that the
term "marital status" encompasses discrimination based on a person's status as either married, single,
divorced, or widowed, they are divided on whether the term has a broader meaning. Thus, their
decisions vary.[24]

The courts narrowly[25] interpreting marital status to refer only to a person's status as married, single,
divorced, or widowed reason that if the legislature intended a broader definition it would have either
chosen different language or specified its intent. They hold that the relevant inquiry is if one is
married rather than to whom one is married. They construe marital status discrimination to include
only whether a person is single, married, divorced, or widowed and not the "identity, occupation, and
place of employment of one's spouse." These courts have upheld the questioned policies and ruled
that they did not violate the marital status discrimination provision of their respective state statutes.

The courts that have broadly[26] construed the term "marital status" rule that it encompassed the
identity, occupation and employment of one's spouse. They strike down the no-spouse employment
policies based on the broad legislative intent of the state statute. They reason that the no-spouse
employment policy violate the marital status provision because it arbitrarily discriminates against all
spouses of present employees without regard to the actual effect on the individual's qualifications or
work performance.[27] These courts also find the no-spouse employment policy invalid for failure of
the employer to present any evidence of business necessity other than the general perception that
spouses in the same workplace might adversely affect the business.[28] They hold that the absence of
such a bona fide occupational qualification[29] invalidates a rule denying employment to one
spouse due to the current employment of the other spouse in the same office.[30] Thus, they rule that
unless the employer can prove that the reasonable demands of the business require a distinction
based on marital status and there is no better available or acceptable policy which would better
accomplish the business purpose, an employer may not discriminate against an employee based on
the identity of the employee's spouse.[31] This is known as the bona fide occupational qualification
exception.

We note that since the finding of a bona fide occupational qualification justifies an employer's no-
spouse rule, the exception is interpreted strictly and narrowly by these state courts. There must be a
compelling business necessity for which no alternative exists other than the discriminatory
practice.[32] To justify a bona fide occupational qualification, the employer must prove two factors: (1)
that the employment qualification is reasonably related to the essential operation of the job involved;
and, (2) that there is a factual basis for believing that all or substantially all persons meeting the
qualification would be unable to properly perform the duties of the job.[33]

The concept of a bona fide occupational qualification is not foreign in our jurisdiction. We employ
the standard of reasonableness of the company policy which is parallel to the bona fide occupational
qualification requirement. In the recent case of Duncan Association of Detailman-PTGWO and
Pedro Tecson v. Glaxo Wellcome Philippines, Inc.,[34] we passed on the validity of the policy of a
pharmaceutical company prohibiting its employees from marrying employees of any competitor
company. We held that Glaxo has a right to guard its trade secrets, manufacturing formulas,
marketing strategies and other confidential programs and information from competitors. We
considered the prohibition against personal or marital relationships with employees of competitor
companies upon Glaxo's employees reasonable under the circumstances because relationships of
that nature might compromise the interests of Glaxo. In laying down the assailed company policy,
we recognized that Glaxo only aims to protect its interests against the possibility that a competitor
company will gain access to its secrets and procedures.[35]
The requirement that a company policy must be reasonable under the circumstances to qualify as a
valid exercise of management prerogative was also at issue in the 1997 case of Philippine
Telegraph and Telephone Company v. NLRC.[36] In said case, the employee was dismissed in
violation of petitioner's policy of disqualifying from work any woman worker who contracts
marriage. We held that the company policy violates the right against discrimination afforded all
women workers under Article 136 of the Labor Code, but established a permissible exception, viz.:
[A] requirement that a woman employee must remain unmarried could be justified as
a "bona fide occupational qualification," or BFOQ, where the particular
requirements of the job would justify the same, but not on the ground of a general
principle, such as the desirability of spreading work in the workplace. A requirement
of that nature would be valid provided it reflects an inherent quality reasonably
necessary for satisfactory job performance.[37] (Emphases supplied.)
The cases of Duncan and PT&T instruct us that the requirement of reasonableness must
be clearly established to uphold the questioned employment policy. The employer has the burden to
prove the existence of a reasonable business necessity. The burden was successfully discharged in
Duncan but not in PT&T.

We do not find a reasonable business necessity in the case at bar.

Petitioners' sole contention that "the company did not just want to have two (2) or more of its
employees related between the third degree by affinity and/or consanguinity"[38] is lame. That the
second paragraph was meant to give teeth to the first paragraph of the questioned rule[39] is evidently
not the valid reasonable business necessity required by the law.

It is significant to note that in the case at bar, respondents were hired after they were found fit for the
job, but were asked to resign when they married a co-employee. Petitioners failed to show how the
marriage of Simbol, then a Sheeting Machine Operator, to Alma Dayrit, then an employee of the
Repacking Section, could be detrimental to its business operations. Neither did petitioners explain
how this detriment will happen in the case of Wilfreda Comia, then a Production Helper in the
Selecting Department, who married Howard Comia, then a helper in the cutter-machine. The policy
is premised on the mere fear that employees married to each other will be less efficient. If we uphold
the questioned rule without valid justification, the employer can create policies based on an unproven
presumption of a perceived danger at the expense of an employee's right to security of tenure.

Petitioners contend that their policy will apply only when one employee marries a co-employee, but
they are free to marry persons other than co-employees. The questioned policy may not facially
violate Article 136 of the Labor Code but it creates a disproportionate effect and under the disparate
impact theory, the only way it could pass judicial scrutiny is a showing that it is reasonable despite
the discriminatory, albeit disproportionate, effect. The failure of petitioners to prove a legitimate
business concern in imposing the questioned policy cannot prejudice the employee's right to be free
from arbitrary discrimination based upon stereotypes of married persons working together in one
company.[40]

Lastly, the absence of a statute expressly prohibiting marital discrimination in our jurisdiction cannot
benefit the petitioners. The protection given to labor in our jurisdiction is vast and extensive that we
cannot prudently draw inferences from the legislature's silence[41] that married persons are not
protected under our Constitution and declare valid a policy based on a prejudice or stereotype. Thus,
for failure of petitioners to present undisputed proof of a reasonable business necessity, we rule that
the questioned policy is an invalid exercise of management prerogative. Corollarily, the issue as to
whether respondents Simbol and Comia resigned voluntarily has become moot and academic.

As to respondent Estrella, the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC based their ruling on the singular fact that
her resignation letter was written in her own handwriting. Both ruled that her resignation was
voluntary and thus valid. The respondent court failed to categorically rule whether Estrella
voluntarily resigned but ordered that she be reinstated along with Simbol and Comia.

Estrella claims that she was pressured to submit a resignation letter because she was in dire need of
money. We examined the records of the case and find Estrella's contention to be more in accord with
the evidence. While findings of fact by administrative tribunals like the NLRC are generally given
not only respect but, at times, finality, this rule admits of exceptions,[42] as in the case at bar.

Estrella avers that she went back to work on December 21, 1999 but was dismissed due to her
alleged immoral conduct. At first, she did not want to sign the termination papers but she was forced
to tender her resignation letter in exchange for her thirteenth month pay.

The contention of petitioners that Estrella was pressured to resign because she got impregnated by a
married man and she could not stand being looked upon or talked about as immoral[43] is incredulous.
If she really wanted to avoid embarrassment and humiliation, she would not have gone back to work
at all. Nor would she have filed a suit for illegal dismissal and pleaded for reinstatement. We have
held that in voluntary resignation, the employee is compelled by personal reason(s) to dissociate
himself from employment. It is done with the intention of relinquishing an office, accompanied by
the act of abandonment. [44] Thus, it is illogical for Estrella to resign and then file a complaint for
illegal dismissal. Given the lack of sufficient evidence on the part of petitioners that the resignation
was voluntary, Estrella's dismissal is declared illegal.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 73477 dated
August 3, 2004 is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona, Azcuna, and Garcia., JJ., concur

13. Case No. RO4-3-3-3498-76

ZIALCITA V. PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC. (Case No. RO4-3-3398-76; February 20, 1977)

FACTS: Zialcita is a stewardess of PAL. She was fired from work because she had gotten married.
PAL argued and cited its policy that stewardesses must be single. The policy also states that
subsequent marriage of a stewardess shall automatically terminate employment.

Zialcita anchored on Article 136 of the Labor Code. PAL sought refuge from Article 132.

Article 132 provides, "Article 132. Facilities for women. The Secretary of Labor and Employment
shall establish standards that will ensure the safety and health of women employees. In appropriate
cases, he shall, by regulations, require any employer to: To determine appropriate minimum age and
other standards for retirement or termination in special occupations such as those of flight attendants
and the like."

Article 136 provides, "Article 136. Stipulation against marriage. It shall be unlawful for an employer
to require as a condition of employment or continuation of employment that a woman employee shall
not get married, or to stipulate expressly or tacitly that upon getting married, a woman employee
shall be deemed resigned or separated, or to actually dismiss, discharge, discriminate or otherwise
prejudice a woman employee merely by reason of her marriage."

ISSUE: Was Zialcita's termination proper?

HELD: The termination was improper. First of all, during the time Zialcita was terminated, no
regulation had yet been issued by the Secretary of Labor to implement Article 132. Second, even
assuming that the Secretary of Labor had already issued such a regulation and to the effect that
stewardesses should remain single, such would be in violation of Article 136 of the Labor Code.

Article 136's protection of women is broader and more powerful than the regulation provided under
Article 132.

14. GR No. 118978

[G.R. No. 118978. May 23, 1997]
PHILIPPINE TELEGRAPH AND TELEPHONE COMPANY,* petitioner, vs. NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and GRACE DE GUZMAN, respondents.

DECISION
REGALADO, J.:

Seeking relief through the extraordinary writ of certiorari, petitioner Philippine Telegraph and
Telephone Company (hereafter, PT&T) invokes the alleged concealment of civil status and
defalcation of company funds as grounds to terminate the services of an employee. That employee,
herein private respondent Grace de Guzman, contrarily argues that what really motivated PT&T to
terminate her services was her having contracted marriage during her employment, which is
prohibited by petitioner in its company policies. She thus claims that she was discriminated against
in gross violation of law, such a proscription by an employer being outlawed by Article 136 of the
Labor Code.
Grace de Guzman was initially hired by petitioner as a reliever, specifically as a
“Supernumerary Project Worker,” for a fixed period from November 21, 1990 until April 20, 1991
vice one C.F. Tenorio who went on maternity leave.[1] Under the Reliever Agreement which she
signed with petitioner company, her employment was to be immediately terminated upon expiration
of the agreed period. Thereafter, from June 10, 1991 to July 1, 1991, and from July 19, 1991 to
August 8, 1991, private respondent’s services as reliever were again engaged by petitioner, this time
in replacement of one Erlinda F. Dizon who went on leave during both periods.[2] After August 8,
1991, and pursuant to their Reliever Agreement, her services were terminated.
On September 2, 1991, private respondent was once more asked to join petitioner company as a
probationary employee, the probationary period to cover 150 days. In the job application form that
was furnished her to be filled up for the purpose, she indicated in the portion for civil status therein
that she was single although she had contracted marriage a few months earlier, that is, on May 26,
1991.[3]
It now appears that private respondent had made the same representation in the two successive
reliever agreements which she signed on June 10, 1991 and July 8, 1991. When petitioner
supposedly learned about the same later, its branch supervisor in Baguio City, Delia M. Oficial, sent
to private respondent a memorandum dated January 15, 1992 requiring her to explain the
discrepancy. In that memorandum, she was reminded about the company’s policy of not accepting
married women for employment.[4]
In her reply letter dated January 17, 1992, private respondent stated that she was not aware of
PT&T’s policy regarding married women at the time, and that all along she had not deliberately
hidden her true civil status.[5] Petitioner nonetheless remained unconvinced by her
explanations. Private respondent was dismissed from the company effective January 29,
1992,[6] which she readily contested by initiating a complaint for illegal dismissal, coupled with a
claim for non-payment of cost of living allowances (COLA), before the Regional Arbitration Branch
of the National Labor Relations Commission in Baguio City.
At the preliminary conference conducted in connection therewith, private respondent
volunteered the information, and this was incorporated in the stipulation of facts between the parties,
that she had failed to remit the amount of P2,380.75 of her collections. She then executed a
promissory note for that amount in favor of petitioner.[7] All of these took place in a formal
proceeding and with the agreement of the parties and/or their counsel.
On November 23, 1993, Labor Arbiter Irenarco R. Rimando handed down a decision declaring
that private respondent, who had already gained the status of a regular employee, was illegally
dismissed by petitioner. Her reinstatement, plus payment of the corresponding back wages and
COLA, was correspondingly ordered, the labor arbiter being of the firmly expressed view that the
ground relied upon by petitioner in dismissing private respondent was clearly insufficient, and that it
was apparent that she had been discriminated against on account of her having contracted marriage
in violation of company rules.
On appeal to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), said public respondent upheld
the labor arbiter and, in its decision dated April 29, 1994, it ruled that private respondent had indeed
been the subject of an unjust and unlawful discrimination by her employer, PT&T. However, the
decision of the labor arbiter was modified with the qualification that Grace de Guzman deserved to
be suspended for three months in view of the dishonest nature of her acts which should not be
condoned. In all other respects, the NLRC affirmed the decision of the labor arbiter, including the
order for the reinstatement of private respondent in her employment with PT&T.
The subsequent motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner was rebuffed by respondent
NLRC in its resolution of November 9, 1994, hence this special civil action assailing the aforestated
decisions of the labor arbiter and respondent NLRC, as well as the denial resolution of the latter.
1. Decreed in the Bible itself is the universal norm that women should be regarded with love
and respect but, through the ages, men have responded to that injunction with indifference, on the
hubristic conceit that women constitute the inferior sex. Nowhere has that prejudice against
womankind been so pervasive as in the field of labor, especially on the matter of equal employment
opportunities and standards. In the Philippine setting, women have traditionally been considered as
falling within the vulnerable groups or types of workers who must be safeguarded with preventive
and remedial social legislation against discriminatory and exploitative practices in hiring, training,
benefits, promotion and retention.
The Constitution, cognizant of the disparity in rights between men and women in almost all
phases of social and political life, provides a gamut of protective provisions. To cite a few of the
primordial ones, Section 14, Article II[8] on the Declaration of Principles and State Policies, expressly
recognizes the role of women in nation-building and commands the State to ensure, at all times, the
fundamental equality before the law of women and men. Corollary thereto, Section 3 of Article
XIII[9] (the progenitor whereof dates back to both the 1935 and 1973 Constitution) pointedly requires
the State to afford full protection to labor and to promote full employment and equality of
employment opportunities for all, including an assurance of entitlement to tenurial security of all
workers. Similarly, Section 14 of Article XIII[10] mandates that the State shall protect working
women through provisions for opportunities that would enable them to reach their full potential.
2. Corrective labor and social laws on gender inequality have emerged with more frequency in
the years since the Labor Code was enacted on May 1, 1974 as Presidential Decree No. 442, largely
due to our country’s commitment as a signatory to the United Nations Convention on the Elimination
of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW).[11]
Principal among these laws are Republic Act No. 6727[12] which explicitly prohibits
discrimination against women with respect to terms and conditions of employment, promotion, and
training opportunities; Republic Act No. 6955[13] which bans the “mail-order-bride” practice for a fee
and the export of female labor to countries that cannot guarantee protection to the rights of women
workers; Republic Act No. 7192,[14] also known as the “Women in Development and Nation
Building Act,” which affords women equal opportunities with men to act and to enter into contracts,
and for appointment, admission, training, graduation, and commissioning in all military or similar
schools of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police; Republic Act No.
7322[15] increasing the maternity benefits granted to women in the private sector; Republic Act No.
7877[16] which outlaws and punishes sexual harassment in the workplace and in the education and
training environment; and Republic Act No. 8042,[17] or the “Migrant Workers and Overseas
Filipinos Act of 1995,” which prescribes as a matter of policy, inter alia, the deployment of migrant
workers, with emphasis on women, only in countries where their rights are secure. Likewise, it
would not be amiss to point out that in the Family Code,[18] women’s rights in the field of civil law
have been greatly enhanced and expanded.
In the Labor Code, provisions governing the rights of women workers are found in Articles 130
to 138 thereof. Article 130 involves the right against particular kinds of night work while Article
132 ensures the right of women to be provided with facilities and standards which the Secretary of
Labor may establish to ensure their health and safety. For purposes of labor and social legislation, a
woman working in a nightclub, cocktail lounge, massage clinic, bar or other similar establishments
shall be considered as an employee under Article 138. Article 135, on the other hand, recognizes a
woman’s right against discrimination with respect to terms and conditions of employment on account
simply of sex. Finally, and this brings us to the issue at hand, Article 136 explicitly prohibits
discrimination merely by reason of the marriage of a female employee.
3. Acknowledged as paramount in the due process scheme is the constitutional guarantee of
protection to labor and security of tenure. Thus, an employer is required, as a condition sine qua
non prior to severance of the employment ties of an individual under his employ, to convincingly
establish, through substantial evidence, the existence of a valid and just cause in dispensing with the
services of such employee, one’s labor being regarded as constitutionally protected property.
On the other hand, it is recognized that regulation of manpower by the company falls within the
so-called management prerogatives, which prescriptions encompass the matter of hiring, supervision
of workers, work assignments, working methods and assignments, as well as regulations on the
transfer of employees, lay-off of workers, and the discipline, dismissal, and recall of
employees.[19] As put in a case, an employer is free to regulate, according to his discretion and best
business judgment, all aspects of employment, “from hiring to firing,” except in cases of unlawful
discrimination or those which may be provided by law.[20]
In the case at bar, petitioner’s policy of not accepting or considering as disqualified from work
any woman worker who contracts marriage runs afoul of the test of, and the right against,
discrimination, afforded all women workers by our labor laws and by no less than the
Constitution. Contrary to petitioner’s assertion that it dismissed private respondent from
employment on account of her dishonesty, the record discloses clearly that her ties with the company
were dissolved principally because of the company’s policy that married women are not qualified for
employment in PT&T, and not merely because of her supposed acts of dishonesty.
That it was so can easily be seen from the memorandum sent to private respondent by Delia M.
Oficial, the branch supervisor of the company, with the reminder, in the words of the latter, that
“you’re fully aware that the company is not accepting married women employee (sic), as it was
verbally instructed to you.”[21] Again, in the termination notice sent to her by the same branch
supervisor, private respondent was made to understand that her severance from the service was not
only by reason of her concealment of her married status but, over and on top of that, was her
violation of the company’s policy against marriage (“and even told you that married women
employees are not applicable [sic] or accepted in our company.”)[22] Parenthetically, this seems to be
the curious reason why it was made to appear in the initiatory pleadings that petitioner was
represented in this case only by its said supervisor and not by its highest ranking officers who would
otherwise be solidarily liable with the corporation.[23]
Verily, private respondent’s act of concealing the true nature of her status from PT&T could not
be properly characterized as willful or in bad faith as she was moved to act the way she did mainly
because she wanted to retain a permanent job in a stable company. In other words, she was
practically forced by that very same illegal company policy into misrepresenting her civil status for
fear of being disqualified from work. While loss of confidence is a just cause for termination of
employment, it should not be simulated.[24] It must rest on an actual breach of duty committed by the
employee and not on the employer’s caprices.[25] Furthermore, it should never be used as a
subterfuge for causes which are improper, illegal, or unjustified.[26]
In the present controversy, petitioner’s expostulations that it dismissed private respondent, not
because the latter got married but because she concealed that fact, does have a hollow ring. Her
concealment, so it is claimed, bespeaks dishonesty hence the consequent loss of confidence in her
which justified her dismissal. Petitioner would asseverate, therefore, that while it has nothing against
marriage, it nonetheless takes umbrage over the concealment of that fact. This improbable reasoning,
with interstitial distinctions, perturbs the Court since private respondent may well be minded to claim
that the imputation of dishonesty should be the other way around.
Petitioner would have the Court believe that although private respondent defied its policy
against its female employees contracting marriage, what could be an act of insubordination was
inconsequential. What it submits as unforgivable is her concealment of that marriage yet, at the
same time, declaring that marriage as a trivial matter to which it supposedly has no objection. In
other words, PT&T says it gives its blessings to its female employees contracting marriage, despite
the maternity leaves and other benefits it would consequently respond for and which obviously it
would have wanted to avoid. If that employee confesses such fact of marriage, there will be no
sanction; but if such employee conceals the same instead of proceeding to the confessional, she will
be dismissed. This line of reasoning does not impress us as reflecting its true management policy or
that we are being regaled with responsible advocacy.
This Court should be spared the ennui of strained reasoning and the tedium of propositions
which confuse through less than candid arguments. Indeed, petitioner glosses over the fact that it
was its unlawful policy against married women, both on the aspects of qualification and retention,
which compelled private respondent to conceal her supervenient marriage. It was, however, that
very policy alone which was the cause of private respondent’s secretive conduct now complained
of. It is then apropos to recall the familiar saying that he who is the cause of the cause is the cause of
the evil caused.
 Finally, petitioner’s collateral insistence on the admission of private respondent that she
supposedly misappropriated company funds, as an additional ground to dismiss her from
employment, is somewhat insincere and self-serving. Concededly, private respondent admitted in
the course of the proceedings that she failed to remit some of her collections, but that is an altogether
different story. The fact is that she was dismissed solely because of her concealment of her marital
status, and not on the basis of that supposed defalcation of company funds. That the labor arbiter
would thus consider petitioner’s submissions on this supposed dishonesty as a mere afterthought, just
to bolster its case for dismissal, is a perceptive conclusion born of experience in labor cases. For,
there was no showing that private respondent deliberately misappropriated the amount or whether
her failure to remit the same was through negligence and, if so, whether the negligence was in nature
simple or grave. In fact, it was merely agreed that private respondent execute a promissory note to
refund the same, which she did, and the matter was deemed settled as a peripheral issue in the labor
case.
Private respondent, it must be observed, had gained regular status at the time of her
dismissal. When she was served her walking papers on January 29, 1992, she was about to complete
the probationary period of 150 days as she was contracted as a probationary employee on September
2, 1991. That her dismissal would be effected just when her probationary period was winding down
clearly raises the plausible conclusion that it was done in order to prevent her from earning security
of tenure.[27] On the other hand, her earlier stints with the company as reliever were undoubtedly
those of a regular employee, even if the same were for fixed periods, as she performed activities
which were essential or necessary in the usual trade and business of PT&T.[28] The primary standard
of determining regular employment is the reasonable connection between the activity performed by
the employee in relation to the business or trade of the employer.[29]
As an employee who had therefore gained regular status, and as she had been dismissed without
just cause, she is entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to
full back wages, inclusive of allowances and other benefits or their monetary equivalent.[30] However,
as she had undeniably committed an act of dishonesty in concealing her status, albeit under the
compulsion of an unlawful imposition of petitioner, the three-month suspension imposed by
respondent NLRC must be upheld to obviate the impression or inference that such act should be
condoned. It would be unfair to the employer if she were to return to its fold without any sanction
whatsoever for her act which was not totally justified. Thus, her entitlement to back wages, which
shall be computed from the time her compensation was withheld up to the time of her actual
reinstatement, shall be reduced by deducting therefrom the amount corresponding to her three
months suspension.
4. The government, to repeat, abhors any stipulation or policy in the nature of that adopted by
petitioner PT&T. The Labor Code states, in no uncertain terms, as follows:

“ART. 136. Stipulation against marriage. - It shall be unlawful for an employer to require as a
condition of employment or continuation of employment that a woman shall not get married, or to
stipulate expressly or tacitly that upon getting married, a woman employee shall be deemed resigned
or separated, or to actually dismiss, discharge, discriminate or otherwise prejudice a woman
employee merely by reason of marriage.”

This provision had a studied history for its origin can be traced to Section 8 of Presidential
Decree No. 148,[31] better known as the “Women and Child Labor Law,” which amended paragraph
(c), Section 12 of Republic Act No. 679,[32] entitled “An Act to Regulate the Employment of Women
and Children, to Provide Penalties for Violations Thereof, and for Other Purposes.” The forerunner
to Republic Act No. 679, on the other hand, was Act No. 3071 which became law on March 16, 1923
and which regulated the employment of women and children in shops, factories, industrial,
agricultural, and mercantile establishments and other places of labor in the then Philippine Islands.
It would be worthwhile to reflect upon and adopt here the rationalization in Zialcita, et al. vs.
Philippine Air Lines,[33] a decision that emanated from the Office of the President. There, a policy of
Philippine Air Lines requiring that prospective flight attendants must be single and that they will be
automatically separated from the service once they marry was declared void, it being violative of the
clear mandate in Article 136 of the Labor Code with regard to discrimination against married
women. Thus:

“Of first impression is the incompatibility of the respondent’s policy or regulation with the codal
provision of law. Respondent is resolute in its contention that Article 136 of the Labor Code applies
only to women employed in ordinary occupations and that the prohibition against marriage of
women engaged in extraordinary occupations, like flight attendants, is fair and reasonable,
considering the pecularities of their chosen profession.

We cannot subscribe to the line of reasoning pursued by respondent. All along, it knew that the
controverted policy has already met its doom as early as March 13, 1973 when Presidential Decree
No. 148, otherwise known as the Women and Child Labor Law, was promulgated. But for the
timidity of those affected or their labor unions in challenging the validity of the policy, the same was
able to obtain a momentary reprieve. A close look at Section 8 of said decree, which amended
paragraph (c) of Section 12 of Republic Act No. 679, reveals that it is exactly the same provision
reproduced verbatim in Article 136 of the Labor Code, which was promulgated on May 1, 1974 to
take effect six (6) months later, or on November 1, 1974.

It cannot be gainsaid that, with the reiteration of the same provision in the new Labor Code, all
policies and acts against it are deemed illegal and therefore abrogated. True, Article 132 enjoins the
Secretary of Labor to establish standards that will ensure the safety and health of women employees
and in appropriate cases shall by regulation require employers to determine appropriate minimum
standards for termination in special occupations, such as those of flight attendants, but that is
precisely the factor that militates against the policy of respondent. The standards have not yet been
established as set forth in the first paragraph, nor has the Secretary of Labor issued any regulation
affecting flight attendants.

It is logical to presume that, in the absence of said standards or regulations which are as yet to be
established, the policy of respondent against marriage is patently illegal. This finds support in
Section 9 of the New Constitution, which provides:

“Sec. 9. The State shall afford protection to labor, promote full employment and equality in
employment, ensure equal work opportunities regardless of sex, race, or creed, and regulate the
relations between workers and employees. The State shall assure the rights of workers to self-
organization, collective bargaining, security of tenure, and just and humane conditions of work x x x.”

Moreover, we cannot agree to the respondent’s proposition that termination from employment of
flight attendants on account of marriage is a fair and reasonable standard designed for their own
health, safety, protection and welfare, as no basis has been laid therefor. Actually, respondent claims
that its concern is not so much against the continued employment of the flight attendant merely by
reason of marriage as observed by the Secretary of Labor, but rather on the consequence of
marriage-pregnancy. Respondent discussed at length in the instant appeal the supposed ill effects of
pregnancy on flight attendants in the course of their employment. We feel that this needs no further
discussion as it had been adequately explained by the Secretary of Labor in his decision of May 2,
1976.

In a vain attempt to give meaning to its position, respondent went as far as invoking the provisions of
Articles 52 and 216 of the New Civil Code on the preservation of marriage as an inviolable social
institution and the family as a basic social institution, respectively, as bases for its policy of non-
marriage. In both instances, respondent predicates absence of a flight attendant from her home for
long periods of time as contributory to an unhappy married life. This is pure conjecture not based on
actual conditions, considering that, in this modern world, sophisticated technology has narrowed the
distance from one place to another. Moreover, respondent overlooked the fact that married flight
attendants can program their lives to adapt to prevailing circumstances and events.

Article 136 is not intended to apply only to women employed in ordinary occupations, or it should
have categorically expressed so. The sweeping intendment of the law, be it on special or ordinary
occupations, is reflected in the whole text and supported by Article 135 that speaks of non-
discrimination on the employment of women.

The judgment of the Court of Appeals in Gualberto, et al. vs. Marinduque Mining & Industrial
Corporation[34] considered as void a policy of the same nature. In said case, respondent, in
dismissing from the service the complainant, invoked a policy of the firm to consider female
employees in the project it was undertaking as separated the moment they get married due to lack of
facilities for married women. Respondent further claimed that complainant was employed in the
project with an oral understanding that her services would be terminated when she gets
married. Branding the policy of the employer as an example of “discriminatory chauvinism”
tantamount to denying equal employment opportunities to women simply on account of their sex, the
appellate court struck down said employer policy as unlawful in view of its repugnance to the Civil
Code, Presidential Decree No. 148 and the Constitution.
Under American jurisprudence, job requirements which establish employer preference or
conditions relating to the marital status of an employee are categorized as a “sex-plus” discrimination
where it is imposed on one sex and not on the other. Further, the same should be evenly applied and
must not inflict adverse effects on a racial or sexual group which is protected by federal job
discrimination laws. Employment rules that forbid or restrict the employment of married women,
but do not apply to married men, have been held to violate Title VII of the United States Civil Rights
Act of 1964, the main federal statute prohibiting job discrimination against employees and applicants
on the basis of, among other things, sex.[35]
Further, it is not relevant that the rule is not directed against all women but just against married
women. And, where the employer discriminates against married women, but not against married
men, the variable is sex and the discrimination is unlawful.[36] Upon the other hand, a requirement
that a woman employee must remain unmarried could be justified as a “bona fide occupational
qualification,” or BFOQ, where the particular requirements of the job would justify the same, but not
on the ground of a general principle, such as the desirability of spreading work in the workplace. A
requirement of that nature would be valid provided it reflects an inherent quality reasonably
necessary for satisfactory job performance. Thus, in one case, a no-marriage rule applicable to both
male and female flight attendants, was regarded as unlawful since the restriction was not related to
the job performance of the flight attendants.[37]
5. Petitioner’s policy is not only in derogation of the provisions of Article 136 of the Labor Code
on the right of a woman to be free from any kind of stipulation against marriage in connection with
her employment, but it likewise assaults good morals and public policy, tending as it does to deprive
a woman of the freedom to choose her status, a privilege that by all accounts inheres in the individual
as an intangible and inalienable right.[38] Hence, while it is true that the parties to a contract may
establish any agreements, terms, and conditions that they may deem convenient, the same should not
be contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy.[39] Carried to its logical
consequences, it may even be said that petitioner’s policy against legitimate marital bonds would
encourage illicit or common-law relations and subvert the sacrament of marriage.
Parenthetically, the Civil Code provisions on the contract of labor state that the relations
between the parties, that is, of capital and labor, are not merely contractual, impressed as they are
with so much public interest that the same should yield to the common good.[40] It goes on to intone
that neither capital nor labor should visit acts of oppression against the other, nor impair the interest
or convenience of the public.[41] In the final reckoning, the danger of just such a policy against
marriage followed by petitioner PT&T is that it strikes at the very essence, ideals and purpose of
marriage as an inviolable social institution and, ultimately, of the family as the foundation of the
nation.[42] That it must be effectively interdicted here in all its indirect, disguised or dissembled forms
as discriminatory conduct derogatory of the laws of the land is not only in order but imperatively
required.
ON THE FOREGOING PREMISES, the petition of Philippine Telegraph and Telephone
Company is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit, with double costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Romero, Puno, Mendoza, and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.

15. GR No. 52753-R

OLYMPIA GUALBERTO, petitioner vs MARINDUQUE MINING & INDUSTRIAL CORP.,
respondent

23 CAR 528
June 28, 1978

FACTS:
The company employed plaintiff Olympia Gualberto as a dentist in 1971 while she was still single.
She married Roberto, another employee (electrical engineer) of the company, in 1972. The company
informed her that she was regarded to have resigned her office, invoking the firm’s policy that
stipulated that female employees were regarded to automatically terminate their employment the
moment they got married. Olympia filed a claim for compensation.

The Court of Appeals not only upheld her claim for damages but also awarded exemplary damages,
and held, inter alia: ‘No employer may require female applicants for jobs to enter into pre-
employment arrangements that they would be dismissed once they get married and afterwards expect
the Courts to sustain such an agreement.’

ISSUE:
WON an employer may terminate an employee by reason of marriage.

HELD:
No.
The Court made references to the Civil Code, the Woman and Child Labor Act and the 1935
Constitution of the Philippines. In light of this the Court further stated: ‘The agreement which the
appellants want this Court to sustain on appeal is an example of discriminatory chauvinism. Acts
which deny equal employment opportunities to women because of their sex are inherently odious and
must be struck down.

16. GR No. 106341

[ G.R. No. 106341. September 02, 1994 ]

DELFIN G. VILLARAMA, PETITIONER, VS. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS

COMMISSION AND GOLDEN DONUTS, INC., RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

PUNO, J.:

Sexual harassment abounds in all sick societies. It is reprehensible enough but more so when
inflicted by those with moral ascendancy over their victims. We rule that it is a valid cause for
separation from service.

First, the facts. On November 16, 1987, petitioner DELFIN VILLARAMA was employed by private
respondent GOLDEN DONUTS, INC., as its Materials Manager. His starting salary was P6,500.00
per month, later increased to P8,500.00.

On July 15 1989, petitioner Villarama was charged with sexual harassment by Divina Gonzaga, a
clerk-typist assigned in his department. The humiliating experience compelled her to resign from
work. Her letter-resignation, dated July 15, 1989, reads:

"MR. LEOPOLDO H. PRIETO

President
Golden Donuts, Inc.
Dear Sir:
I would like to tender my resignation from my post as Clerk Typist of Materials
Department effective immediately.
It is really my regret to leave this company which has given me all the opportunity I
long desired. My five (5) months stay in the company have been very gratifying
professionally and financially and I would not entertain the idea of resigning except
for the most shocking experience I have had in my whole life.
Last Friday, July 7, 1989, Mr. Delfin Villarama and Mr. Jess de Jesus invited all the
girls of Materials Department for a dinner when in (sic) the last minute the other three
(3) girls decided not to join the group anymore. I do (sic) not have second thought(s)
in accepting their invitation for they are my colle(a)gues and I had nothing in mind
that would in any manner prompt me to refuse to what appeared to me as a simple and
cordial invitation. We went to a restaurant along Makati Avenue where we ate our
dinner. Mr. Villarama, Mr. Olaybar and Mr. Jess de Jesus were drinking while we
were eating and (they) even offered me a few drinks and when we were finished, they
decided to bring me home. While on my way, I found out that Mr.
Villarama was not driving the way to my house. I was wondering why we were
taking the wrong way until I found out that we were entering a motel. I was
really shock(ed). I did not expect that a somewhat reputable person like Mr.
 Villarama could do such a thing to any of his subordinates. I should have left the
company without any word but I feel that I would be unfair to those who might
be similarly situated. I hope that you would find time to investigate the veracity
of my allegations and make each (sic) responsible for his own deed. (emphasis ours)
Thank you very much and more power.
Very respectfully yours,
DIVINA GONZAGA"

The letter prompted Mr. Leopoldo Prieto, President of Golden Donuts, Inc., to call petitioner to a
meeting on August 4, 1989. Petitioner was then required to explain the letter against him. It appears
that petitioner agreed to tender his resignation. Private respondent moved swiftly to separate
petitioner. Thus, private respondent approved petitioner's application for leave of absence with pay
from August 5-28, 1989. It also issued an inter-office memorandum, dated August 4, 1989, advising
"all concerned" that petitioner was no longer connected with the company effective August 5,
1989.[1] Two (2) days later, or on August 7, 1989, Mr. Prieto sent a letter to petitioner confirming
their agreement that petitioner would be officially separated from the private respondent. The letter
reads:

"Dear Mr. Villarama:

This is to officially confirm our discussion last Friday, August 4, 1989, regarding your
employment with us. As per our agreement, you will be officially separated from the
company effective August 23, 1989.
May I, therefore, request you to please submit or send us your resignation letter on or
before the close of business hours of August 22, 1989.
Please see the Personnel & Industrial Relations Office for your clearance.
Very truly yours,
(SGD). LEOPOLDO H. PRIETO, JR.
President"

In the interim, petitioner had a change of mind. In a letter dated August 16, 1989, petitioner sought
reconsideration of the management's decision to terminate him, viz:

"DEAR SIR:
MAY I REQUEST FOR A RECONSIDERATION ON THE DECISION HANDED
DURING OUR MEETING OF AUGUST 4, 1989, TERMINATING MY SERVICES
WITH THE COMPANY EFFECTIVE AUGUST 5, 1989.
THE SIGNIFICANT CONTRIBUTION OF THE MATERIALS DEPARTMENT,
WHICH I HAD BEEN HEADING FOR THE PAST 21 MONTHS, TO THE
PERFORMANCE OF THE COMPANY FAR OUTWEIGHS THE ERROR THAT I
HAD COMMITTED. AN ERROR THAT MUST NOT BE A BASIS FOR SUCH A
DRASTIC DECISION.
AS I AM STILL OFFICIALLY ON LEAVE UNTIL THE 29th, OF THIS MONTH,
MAY I EXPECT THAT I WILL RESUME MY REGULAR DUTY ON THE 29th?
ANTICIPATING YOUR FAVORABLE REPLY.
VERY TRULY YOURS,
(SGD.) DELFIN G. VILLARAMA"

For his failure to tender his resignation, petitioner was dismissed by private respondent on August 23,
1989. Feeling aggrieved, petitioner filed an illegal dismissal case[2] against private respondent.
In a decision dated January 23, 1991, Labor Arbiter Salimar V. Nambi held that due process was not
observed in the dismissal of petitioner and there was no valid cause for dismissal. Private respondent
GOLDEN DONUTS, INC. was ordered to: (1) reinstate petitioner DELFIN G. VILLARAMA to his
former position, without loss of seniority rights, and pay his backwages at the rate of P8,500.00 per
month from August 1989, until actual reinstatement; (2) pay petitioner the amount of P24,866.66,
representing his unused vacation leave and proportionate 13th month pay; (3) pay petitioner
P100,000.00, as moral damages, and P20,000.00, as exemplary damages; and (3) pay the attorney's
fees equivalent to ten percent of the entire monetary award.

Private respondent appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission. On July 16, 1992, public
respondent reversed the decision of the labor arbiter. The dispositive portion of its Resolution reads:

"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision appealed from is hereby set aside
and a new one entered declaring the cause of dismissal of complainant as valid;
however, for the procedural lapses, respondent (Golden Donuts, Inc.) is hereby
ordered to indemnify complainant (petitioner) in the form of separation pay
equivalent to two month's (sic) pay (for his two years of service, as appears
(sic) in the records), or the amount of P17,000.00.
"SO ORDERED."

Hence, this petition where the following arguments are raised:

THE ALLEGED IMMORALITY CHARGED AGAINST PETITIONER IS NOT

SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE ON RECORD.
THE MERE ADMISSION OF THE VIOLATION OF DUE PROCESS ENTITLES
PETITIONER TO REINSTATEMENT.
IN ANY EVENT, PETITIONER IS ENTITLED TO HIS SALARIES FROM
RECEIPT BY PRIVATE RESPONDENT OF THE DECISION OF THE LABOR
ARBITER ON 4 FEBRUARY 1991 TO (sic) AT LEAST THE PROMULGATION
OF THE ASSAILED RESOLUTION ON (sic) 16 JULY 1992.
IN ANY EVENT, PETITIONER IS ALSO ENTITLED TO HIS UNUSED
VACATION LEAVE AND PROPORTIONATE 13TH MONTH PAY IN THE
TOTAL AMOUNT OF P24,866.66, ADJUDGED BY THE LABOR ARBITER.
THE AWARD OF MORAL AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES AND ATTORNEY'S
FEES BY THE LABOR ARBITER IS JUSTIFIED.

We affirm with modification the impugned Resolution.

At the outset, we note that the Petition was not accompanied by a certified true copy of the assailed
July 16, 1992 NLRC Resolution,[3] in violation of Revised Circular No. 1-88. Neither was there any
certification under oath that "petitioner has not commenced any other action or proceeding involving
the same issues in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals or different Divisions thereof, or any
other tribunal or agency, and that to the best of his knowledge, no such action or proceeding is
pending in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or different Divisions thereof or any other
tribunal or agency," as required under Circular No. 28-91. It is settled, that non-compliance with the
provisions of Revised Circular No. 1-88 and Circular No. 28-91, would result in the outright
dismissal of the petition.[4]

In addition, under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court, the special civil action for certiorari is
available in cases where the concerned "tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial functions had
acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion and there is no appeal,
nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law." In Antonio v.
National Labor Relations Commission,[5] we held that the plain and adequate remedy expressly
provided by law is a motion for reconsideration of the assailed decision, and the resolution thereof,
which is not only expected to be but would actually have provided adequate and more speedy
remedy than a petition for certiorari. The rationale for this requirement is to enable the court or
agency concerned to pass upon and correct its mistakes without the intervention of a higher
court.[6] In this case, the assailed July 16, 1992 Resolution of the National Labor Relations
Commission was received by petitioner's counsel on July 23, 1992.[7] Petitioner did not file a motion
for reconsideration, instead, he commenced this special civil action for certiorari. Be that as it may,
we allowed the petition to enable us to rule on the significant issues raised before us, viz: (1) whether
or not petitioner's right to procedural due process was violated, and (2) whether or not he was
dismissed for a valid or just cause.

The procedure for terminating an employee is found in Article 277 (b) of the Labor Code, viz:

"x x x
"(b) Subject to the constitutional right of workers to security of tenure and their right
to be protected against dismissal except for a just and authorized cause and without
prejudice to the requirement of notice under Article 283 of this Code the employer
shall furnish the worker whose employment is sought to be terminated a written
notice containing a statement of the causes for termination and shall afford the
latter ample opportunity to be heard and to defend himself with the assistance of
his counsel if he so desires in accordance with company rules and regulations
promulgated pursuant to guidelines set by the Department of Labor and Employment.
Any decision taken by the employer shall be without prejudice to the right of the
worker to contest the validity or legality of his dismissal by filing a complaint with
the regional branch of the National Labor Relations Commission. The burden of
proving that the termination was for a valid or authorized cause shall rest on the
employer. xxx" (emphasis supplied)

This procedure protects not only rank-and-file employees but also managerial employees. Both have
the right to security of tenure as provided for in Section 3, Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution. In
the case at bench, petitioner decided to seek reconsideration of the termination of his service thru his
August 16, 1989 letter. While admitting his error, he felt that its gravity did not justify his dismissal.
Considering this stance, and in conformity with the aforequoted Article 277 (b) of the Labor Code,
petitioner should have been formally charged and given an opportunity to refute the charges. Under
the facts in field, we hold that petitioner was denied procedural due process.

We now come to the more important issue of whether there was valid cause to terminate petitioner.

Petitioner claims that his alleged immoral act was unsubstantiated, hence, he could not be dismissed.
We hold otherwise. The records show that petitioner was confronted with the charge against him.
Initially, he voluntarily agreed to be separated from the company. He took a leave of absence
preparatory to his separation. This agreement was confirmed by the letter to him by Mr. Prieto dated
August 7, 1989. A few days after, petitioner reneged on the agreement. He refused to be terminated
on the ground that the seriousness of his offense would not warrant his separation from service. So
he alleged in his letter to Mr. Prieto dated August 16, 1989. But even in this letter, petitioner
admitted his "error" vis-a-vis Miss Gonzaga. As a manager, petitioner should know the evidentiary
value of his admissions. Needless to stress, he cannot complain there was no valid cause for his
separation.

Moreover, loss of trust and confidence is a good ground for dismissing a managerial employee. It can
be proved by substantial evidence which is present in the case at bench. As further observed by the
Solicitor General:

"x x x assuming arguendo that De Jesus and Gonzaga were sweethearts and that
petitioner merely acceded to the request of the former to drop them in the motel,
petitioner acted in collusion with the immoral designs of De Jesus and did not give
due regard to Gonzaga's feeling on the matter and acted in chauvinistic disdain of her
honor, thereby justifying public respondent's finding of sexual harassment. Thus,
petitioner not only failed to act accordingly as a good father of the family because he
was not able to maintain his moral ascendancy and authority over the group in the
matter of morality and discipline of his subordinates, but he actively facilitated the
commission of immoral conduct of his subordinates by driving his car into the motel."
(Comment, April 29, 1993, p. 9)

As a managerial employee, petitioner is bound by a more exacting work ethics. He failed to live up
to this higher standard of responsibility when he succumbed to his moral perversity. And when such
moral perversity is perpetrated against his subordinate, he provides a justifiable ground for his
dismissal for lack of trust and confidence. It is the right, nay, the duty of every employer to protect
its employees from over sexed superiors.

To be sure, employers are given wider latitude of discretion in terminating the employment of
managerial employees on the ground of lack of trust and confidence.[8]

We next rule on the monetary awards due to petitioner. The public respondent erred in awarding
separation pay of P17,000.00 as indemnity for his dismissal without due process of law. The award
of separation pay is proper in the cases enumerated under Articles 283 and 284 of the Labor
Code,[9] and in cases where there is illegal dismissal (for lack of valid cause) and reinstatement is no
longer feasible. But this is not to state that an employer cannot be penalized for failure to give formal
notice and conduct the necessary investigation before dismissing an employee.[10] Thus, in Wenphil
vs. NLRC[11] and Pacific Mills, Inc. vs. Alonzo,[12] this Court awarded P1,000.00 as penalty for non-
observance of due process.

Petitioner is not also entitled to moral and exemplary damages. There was no bad faith or malice on
the part of private respondent in terminating the services of petitioner.[13]

Petitioner is entitled, however, to his unused vacation/sick leave and proportionate 13th month pay,
as held by the labor arbiter. These are monies already earned by petitioner and should be unaffected
by his separation from the service.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed resolution of public respondent is hereby

AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION that the award of separation pay is DELETED. Private
respondent is ordered to pay petitioner the amount of P1,000.00 for non-observance of due process,
and the equivalent amount of his unused vacation/sick leave and proportionate 13th month pay. No
pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), Padilla, Regalado, and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

[CASE DIGEST] DELFIN G. VILLARAMA vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS

COMMISSION AND GOLDEN DONUTS, INC.
G. No. 106341 September 2, 1994
PUNO, J.
Moreover, loss of trust and confidence is a good ground for dismissing a managerial employee. It can
be proved by substantial evidence which is present in the case at bench.
As a managerial employee, petitioner is bound by a more exacting work ethics. He failed to live up
to this higher standard of responsibility when he succumbed to his moral perversity. And when such
moral perversity is perpetrated against his subordinate, he provides justifiable ground for his
dismissal for lack of trust and confidence. It is the right, nay, the duty of every employer to protect
its employees from over sexed superiors.
FACTS:
Petitioner DELFIN VILLARAMA was employed by private respondent GOLDEN DONUTS,
INC.,as its Materials Manager.
On July 15, 1989, petitioner Villarama was charged with sexual harassment by Divina Gonzaga, a
clerk-typist assigned in his department. The humiliating experience compelled her to resign from
work. The resignation letter by Gonzaga addressed to Mr. Prieto, President of Golden Donuts, Inc.,
prompted the latter to call petitioner to a meeting.
Petitioner was then required to explain the letter against him. It appears that petitioner agreed to
tender his resignation. Private respondent moved swiftly to separate petitioner. Thus, private
respondent approved petitioner's application for leave of absence with pay. It also issued an
interoffice memorandum advising "all concerned" that petitioner was no longer connected with the
company effective August 5, 1989. Two (2) days later, or on August 7, 1989, Mr. Prieto sent a letter
to petitioner confirming their agreement that petitioner would be officially separated from the private
respondent.
In the interim, petitioner had a change of mind. In a letter dated August 16, 1989, petitioner sought
reconsideration of the management's decision to terminate him.
For his failure to tender his resignation, petitioner was dismissed by private respondent on August 23,
1989.
Feeling aggrieved, petitioner filed an illegal dismissal case against private respondent.
LA held that due process was not observed in the dismissal of petitioner and there was no valid cause
for dismissal. Private respondent appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission.
NLRC reversed the decision of the labor arbiter. The dispositive portion of its Resolution reads.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was a valid cause to terminate Villarama – Yes.
RULING:
Petitioner claims that his alleged immoral act was unsubstantiated, hence, he could not be dismissed.
We hold otherwise. The records show that petitioner was confronted with the charge against him.
Initially, he voluntarily agreed to be separated from the company. He took a leave of absence
preparatory to his separation. This agreement was confirmed by the letter to him by Mr. Prieto dated
August 7, 1989. A few days after, petitioner reneged on the agreement. He refused to be terminated
on the ground that the seriousness of his offense would not warrant his separation from service. So
he alleged in his letter to Mr. Prieto dated August 16, 1989. But even in this letter, petitioner
admitted his "error" vis-a-vis Miss Gonzaga. As a manager, petitioner should know the evidentiary
value of his admissions. Needless to stress, he cannot complain there was no valid cause for his
separation.
Moreover, loss of trust and confidence is a good ground for dismissing a managerial employee. It can
be proved by substantial evidence which is present in the case at bench. x x x
As a managerial employee, petitioner is bound by a more exacting work ethics. He failed to live up
to this higher standard of responsibility when he succumbed to his moral perversity. And when such
moral perversity is perpetrated against his subordinate, he provides a justifiable ground for his
dismissal for lack of trust and confidence. It is the right, nay, the duty of every employer to protect
its employees from over sexed superiors.
To be sure, employers are given wider latitude of discretion in terminating the employment of
managerial employees on the ground of lack of trust and confidence.
We next rule on the monetary awards due to petitioner. The public respondent erred in awarding
separation pay of P17,000 as indemnity for his dismissal without due process of law. The award of
separation pay is proper in the cases enumerated under Articles 283 and 284 of the Labor Code, and
in cases where there is illegal dismissal (for lack of valid cause) and reinstatement is no longer
feasible. But this is not to state that an employer cannot be penalized for failure to give formal notice
and conduct the necessary investigation before dismissing an employee. Thus, in Wenphil vs. NLRC
nd Pacific Mills, Inc. vs. Alonzo, this Court awarded P1,000 as penalty for non- observance of due
process.
Petitioner is not also entitled to moral and exemplary damages. There was no bad faith or malice on
the part of private respondent in terminating the services of petitioner.

17. GR No. 123737

[ G.R. No. 123737. May 28, 1999 ]

CARLOS G. LIBRES, PETITIONER, VS. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS

COMMISSION, NATIONAL STEEL CORPORATION, OSMUNDO G. WAGA, JR.,
ANTOINE D. SEVA, PETER J. LOQUILLANO, SATURNINO P. MEJORADA AND
ISIDRO F. HYNSON, JR., RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

BELLOSILLO, J.:

This petition for certiorari seeks to annul the decision of public respondent National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) sustaining the Labor Arbiter's finding that petitioner was validly suspended by
private respondents, as well as the NLRC resolution denying petitioner's motion to reconsider its
decision.

Petitioner Carlos G. Libres, an electrical engineer, was holding a managerial position with National
Steel Corporation (NSC) as Assistant Manager. On 3 August 1993 he received a Notice of
Investigation from Assistant Vice President Isidro F. Hynson Jr., his immediate superior, requesting
him to submit a written explanation relative to the charge of sexual harassment made by Susan D.
Capiral, Hynson's secretary, allegedly committed by Libres sometime in May 1992, and
subsequently to answer clarificatory questions on the matter. The notice also warned him that failure
to file his written explanation would be construed as a waiver of his right to be heard. On 14 August
1993 petitioner submitted his written explanation denying the accusation against him and offering to
submit himself for clarificatory interrogation.

Subsequently, Hynson Jr. conducted an internal investigation to which Libres and Capiral were
invited to ventilate their respective sides of the issue. They readily responded. Thereafter, Hynson Jr.
submitted his report to the Management Evaluation Committee (MEC).

The MEC, after deliberation, concluded that the charges against petitioner constituted a violation of
Item 2, Table V, of the Plant's Rules and Regulations.[1] It opined that "touching a female
subordinate's hand and shoulder, caressing her nape and telling other people that Capiral was the one
who hugged and kissed or that she responded to the sexual advances are unauthorized acts that
damaged her honor."[2] Referring to the Manual of the Philippine Daily Inquirer in defining sexual
harassment,[3] the MEC finally concluded that petitioner's acts clearly constituted sexual harassment
as charged and recommended petitioner's suspension for thirty (30) days without pay.

On 5 January 1994 petitioner wrote Melchor Q. Villamor, Vice President for Manufacturing,
requesting reconsideration of his suspension, but the same was denied. On 12 February 1994 the
suspension order was finally implemented.

Seeking to reverse his misfortune, Libres filed a complaint for illegal suspension and unjust
discrimination against respondent NSC and its officers, private respondents herein, before the Labor
Arbiter. Citing the failure of the MEC to grant him audience despite his offer to answer clarificatory
questions, petitioner claimed denial of due process. Labor Arbiter Nicodemus G. Palangan however
ruled that due process was properly observed and that there was a positive finding of sexual
harassment to justify petitioner's suspension. He pointed out that there was no substantial
inconsistency between the narration of complainant Capiral and petitioner regarding the incident in
the evening of May 1992. The Labor Arbiter found that aside from a few facts which were
controverted by Capiral in her complaint-affidavit, petitioner's admissions approximated the truth;
consequently, he ruled that the MEC was correct in including that sexual harassment had indeed
transpired. The Labor Arbiter observed that petitioner should welcome that his penalty was only for
suspension of thirty (30) days as opposed to termination imposed in Villarama v. NLRC and Golden
Donuts.[4] In this recourse petitioner maintains that public respondent grievously erred amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction in finding that he committed sexual harassment justifying his
suspension, and in concluding that he was afforded due process.

Petitioner argues that the issue of sexual harassment was not adequately considered as he noted that
the finding of the NLRC was made without proper basis in fact and in law. He maintains that the
NLRC merely adopted the conclusions of the Labor Arbiter which in turn were simply derived from
the report of the MEC. Petitioner primarily disputes the failure of the NLRC to apply RA No.
7877, "An Act Declaring Sexual Harassment Unlawful in the Employment, Education or Training
Environment and for Other Purposes," in determining whether he actually committed sexual
harassment. He asserts that his acts did not fall within the definition and criteria of sexual harassment
as laid down in Sec. 3 of the law.[5] Specifically, he cites public respondent's failure to show that his
acts of fondling the hand and massaging the shoulders of Capiral "discriminated against her
continued employment," "impaired her rights and privileges under the Labor Code," or "created a
hostile, intimidating or offensive environment."[6]

Petitioner also contends that public respondent's reliance on Villarama v. NLRC and Golden
Donuts[7] was misplaced. He draws attention to victim Divina Gonzaga's immediate filing of her
letter of resignation in the Villarama case as opposed to the one year delay of Capiral in filing her
complaint against him. He now surmises that the filing of the case against him was merely an
afterthought and not borne out of a valid complaint, hence, the Villarama case should have no
bearing on the instant case.

As regards his assertion that he was not afforded due process, petitioner would point to his demand
for personal confrontation which was brushed aside by the MEC. He argues strongly that in rejecting
his plea, the MEC clearly denied him an opportunity to be heard and present his side.

The issues raised in this petition require this Court to delve into the findings of fact by the public
respondent. We have ruled in a litany of cases that resort to judicial review of the decisions of the
NLRC under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is confined only to issues of want or excess of
jurisdiction and grave abuse of discretion on the part of the tribunal rendering them. It does not
include an inquiry on the correctness of the evaluation of evidence, which served as basis for the
labor official in determining his conclusion. Findings of fact of administrative officers are generally
given finality.[8] Nonetheless, the Court shall discuss the matter if only to emphasize that the
contentions of petitioner are definitely without merit.

Petitioner assails the failure of the NLRC to strictly apply RA No. 7877 to the instant case. We note
however, that petitioner never raised the applicability of the law in his appeal to the NLRC nor in his
motion for reconsideration. Issues or arguments must chiefly be raised before the court or agency
concerned so as to allow it to pass upon and correct its mistakes without the intervention of a higher
court. Having failed to indicate his effort along this line, petitioner cannot now belatedly raise its
application in this petition.

Republic Act No. 7877 was not yet in effect at the time of the occurrence of the act complained of. It
was still being deliberated upon in Congress when petitioner's case was decided by the Labor Arbiter.
As a rule, laws shall have no retroactive effect unless otherwise provided, or except in a criminal
case when their application will favor the accused.[9] Hence, the Labor Arbiter have to rely on the
MEC report and the common connotation of sexual harassment as it is generally understood by the
public. Faced with the same predicament, the NLRC had to agree with the Labor Arbiter. In so doing,
the NLRC did not commit any abuse of discretion in affirming the decision of the Labor Arbiter.

Petitioner next trains his gun on the reliance by the NLRC on Villarama and claims it was erroneous.
We rule otherwise and hold that it was both fitting and appropriate since it singularly addressed the
issue of a managerial employee committing sexual harassment on a subordinate. The disparity in the
periods of filing the complaints in the two (2) cases did not in any way reduce this case into
insignificance. On the contrary, it even invited the attention of the Court to focus on sexual
harassment as a just and valid cause for termination. Whereas petitioner Libres was only meted a 30-
day suspension by the NLRC, Villarama, in the other case was penalized with termination. As Mr.
Justice Puno elucidated, "As a managerial employee, petitioner is bound by more exacting work
ethics. He failed to live up to his higher standard of responsibility when he succumbed to his moral
perversity. And when such moral perversity is perpetrated against his subordinate, he provides a
justifiable ground for his dismissal for lack of trust and confidence. It is the right, nay, the duty of
every employer to protect its employees from oversexed superiors."[10] Public respondent therefore is
correct in its observation that the Labor Arbiter was in fact lenient in his application of the law and
jurisprudence for which petitioner must be grateful and not gripe against.

Petitioner further claims that the delay in instituting the complaint shows that it was only an
afterthought. We disagree. As pointed out by the Solicitor General, it could be expected since Libres
was Capiral's immediate superior. Fear of retaliation and backlash, not to forget the social
humiliation and embarrassment that victims of this human frailty usually suffer, are all realities that
Capiral had to contend with. Moreover, the delay did not detract from the truth derived from the facts.
Petitioner Libres never questioned the veracity of Capiral's allegations. In fact his narration even
corroborated the latter's assertion in several material points. He only raised issue on the complaint's
protracted filing.

On the question of due process, we find that the requirements thereof were sufficiently complied
with. Due process as a constitutional precept does not always and in all situations require a trial type
proceeding. Due process is satisfied when a person is notified of the charge against him and given an
opportunity to explain or defend himself. The essence of due process is simply to be heard, or as
applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side, or an opportunity to seek
a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.[11] It is undeniable that petitioner was given a
Notice of Investigation informing him of the charge of sexual harassment as well as advising him to
submit a written explanation regarding the matter; that he submitted his written explanation to his
superior, Isidro F. Hynson Jr.; that Hynson Jr. further allowed him to air his grievance in a private
session; and, that upon release of the suspension order made by the MEC petitioner requested its
reconsideration but was denied. From the foregoing it can be gleaned that petitioner was given more
than adequate opportunity to explain his side and air his grievances.

The personal confrontation with the MEC officers, which he requested, was not necessary. The
parties had already exhaustively presented their claims and defenses in different fora. As stated
in Homeowners Savings and Loan Association v. NLRC, litigants may be heard through pleadings,
written explanations, position papers, memoranda or oral arguments.[12] Petitioner has been afforded
all of the above means to air his side. Due process was therefore properly observed.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED, no grave abuse of discretion having been committed
by public respondent National Labor Relations Commission in upholding the suspension of
petitioner Carlos G. Libres as justified and in accordance with due process. Consequently, its
decision of 28 August 1995 as well as its resolution of 31 October 1995 is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, Mendoza, Quisumbing, and Buena, JJ., concur.