MODULE 1

Baguio Country Club Corp. v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. L-55624,
[November 19, 1982], 204 PHIL 194-203)

FACTS: On August 18, 1978, Baguio Country Club Corporation applied for clearance to terminate the
services of Jimmy Sajonas. Grounds for termination included willful breach of trust, lying in an
investigation, taking money from customers, threatening a fellow employee, dishonesty against
guests, and four violations of club rules. Sajonas opposed the dismissal, claiming lack of justifiable
grounds and violation of his constitutional right to security of tenure. A conciliator recommended
preventive suspension, and the case was referred to Labor Arbiter Benigno Ayson. On December 11,
1978, the labor arbiter denied the application for clearance, ordering Sajonas's reinstatement with
backwages based on two grounds - First, the evidence available to the labor arbiter when he decided
this case was such that the respondent had not sufficiently shown a just cause for the complainant's
dismissal. Second, the evidence to support the application for clearance to dismiss the complainant
was submitted too late because it was submitted only on appeal. The decision was appealed to the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), which affirmed the arbiter's decision on January 17,
1980. Baguio Country Club Corporation filed a petition, alleging grave abuse of discretion by the public
respondents because it was denied due process as its evidence was not considered by both the labor
arbiter and the NLRC.

ISSUE: Whether the denial of due process, specifically the failure to consider the petitioner's evidence,
justifies the reversal of the decisions by the labor arbiter and the NLRC.

RULING: Yes. The Court criticized the labor arbiter for concluding insufficient evidence without
considering sworn statements submitted during conciliation. The NLRC's rejection of affidavits and
failure to order the elevation of ignored records were deemed a denial of elementary principles of fair
play. The court affirmed the existence of evidence supporting the termination, including instances of
misconduct and threats made by Sajonas. Loss of trust, confidence, and strained relationships justified
the termination, supported by the petitioner's statement on Sajonas's employment in another hotel.
The Supreme Court stated that the instant petition is a timely reminder to labor arbiters and all who
wield quasi-judicial power to ever bear in mind that evidence is the means, sanctioned by rules, of
ascertaining in a judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding, the truth respecting a matter of fact.
(Section 1, Rule 128) The object of evidence is to establish the truth by the use of perceptive
and reasoning faculties. (See Martin, Rules of Court, Vol. 5 on Evidence, p. 2 citing Chamberlayne
on Trial Evidence and Thayer on Prelim. Treat.) The statutory grant of power to use summary
procedures should heighten a concern for due process, for judicial perspective in administrative
decision making, and for maintaining the visions which led to the creation of the administrative office.
Bustos v. Lucero, G.R. No. L-2068, [October 20, 1948], 81 PHIL 640-658
FACTS: Dominador Bustos, an accused in a criminal case, filed a motion with the Court of First
Instance of Pampanga after he had been bound over to that court for trial, praying that the record of
the case be remanded to the justice of the peace court of Masantol, the court of origin, in order that
the petitioner herein might cross-examine the complainant and her witnesses in connection with their
testimony, on the strength of which warrant was issued for the arrest of the accused. The accused,
assisted by counsel, appeared at the preliminary investigation. In that investigation, the justice of the
peace informed him of the charges and asked him if he pleaded guilty or not guilty, upon which he
entered the plea of not guilty. Then his counsel moved that the complainant present her evidence so
that she and her witnesses could be examined and cross-examined in the manner and form provided
by law. The fiscal and the private prosecutor objected, invoking section 11 of rule 108, which provides
that “Evidence - which is the "the mode and manner of proving the competent facts and circumstances
on which a party relies to establish the fact in dispute in judicial proceedings"
The objection was still sustained denying the motion for reconsideration of the accused herein. The
motion was denied, and for that reason the present special civil action of mandamus was instituted.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Section 11 of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court infringes the constitutional
right of the accused to confront and be confronted by the witness against him.

RULING: No. While section 11 of Rule 108 denies to the defendant the right to cross-examine
witnesses in a preliminary investigation, his right to present his witnesses remains unaffected, and his
constitutional right to be informed of the charges against him both at such investigation and at the trial
is unchanged. It is fundamentally a procedural law. The Supreme Court that section 11 of Rule 108
does not curtail the sound discretion of the justice of the peace on the matter. Said section defines the
bounds of the defendant's right in the preliminary investigation.
The constitutional right of an accused to be confronted by the witnesses against him does not apply
to preliminary hearings; nor will the absence of a preliminary examination be an infringement of his
right to confront witnesses. (32 C.J.S., 456.)
The decision was rendered by a divided court. The minority went farther than the majority and denied
even any discretion on the part of the justice of the peace or judge holding the preliminary investigation
to compel the complainant and his witnesses to testify anew.
The present petition was dismissed with costs against the petitioner.
Aldeguer v. Hoskyn, G.R. No. 1164, [September 17, 1903], 2 PHIL 500-503

FACTS: Doña Petrona Inarda bought the land in question in 1855 from Don Pablo Garcia. Doña
Petrona lived on the land until her death, in 1876, when Don Miguel Aldeguer, their grandfather, was
appointed guardian of Doña Petrona's four children, the present plaintiffs. In 1884 Don Manuel sold
the land to one Martinez, who sold it to the defendant, Henry Hoskyn, in 1887. In the deed to Martinez,
Don Manuel stated that he acquired the property by purchase from Don Pablo Garcia twenty-four
years before. The court find that this declaration was the only evidence in the case that Don Manuel
had any title to the land.
The appellant defendant below assigns as error that the court found from parol evidence alone the
existence of the contract of sale between Don Pablo and Doña Petrona. It is true the court says that
no documentary evidence was received on this point, but it is also stated that the existence of a written
contract was proved, as also its record in the registry of property, its attachment to a complaint filed in
court by the plaintiffs in 1892, its subsequent destruction with other papers in the case, and the
contents thereof.
The appellant has moved for a new trial, on the ground of newly discovered evidence. This evidence
is to the effect that one Bonifacio Garcia was never the owner of the land in question and never sold
it to the mother of the plaintiffs.

ISSUE: Whether or not the judgment is supported by the findings of fact stated in the decision.

RULING: After such preliminary proof had been made, parol evidence of the contents of the document
was properly received. Such a ruling does not infringe section 795, par. 6, of the Civil Code, which
provides "that nothing in this act contained shall be so construed as to divest or injuriously affect any
property right that has already become vested under existing law," even if under article 1221 or other
provisions of the Civil Code, after the destruction of the instrument, such parol evidence of its contents
could not have been given. The general rule is that there is no vested right of property in rules of
evidence.
The recital in the document of sale by Don Manuel to Martinez proves nothing against the plaintiffs,
either according to the former law (Civil Code, art. 1218) or according to the new Code (secs. 277 et
seq.), and the claim of the appellant to the contrary cannot be sustained.
The appellant claimed that he has acquired title by prescription, but the defense of the statute of
limitations was not done. The appellant has moved for a new trial on the ground of newly discovered
evidence, such that one Bonifacio Garcia was never the owner of the land in question and never sold
it to the mother of the plaintiffs. The motion was denied on the ground that such evidence is not "of
such a character as to probably change the result." The court finds that the mother of the plaintiffs
bought the land from Don Pablo Garcia. Evidence that Bonifacio did not own it would be immaterial.
The Court finds that the introduced evidence showed that the purchase was made from Don Pablo.
We must presume that this was done without objection on the part of the defendant, for no exceptions
relating to the matter appear in the record. Ifn such objections had been made, the court had power
to allow the plaintiffs to amend their complaint by striking out the name of Bonifacio and inserting that
of Pablo.
People v. Moner y Adam, G.R. No. 202206, [March 5, 2018]

FACTS: Teng Moner was convicted by the trial court of illegal sale of dangerous drugs (3.91
grams). To establish his guilt, the prosecution presented three (3) witnesses namely:
P02 Joachim Panopio, P03 Junnifer Tuldanes, and PO3 Edwin Lirio. The prosecution's evidence
tends to establish the facts of the preparation, coordination and buy-bust operation, arrest of
Monera and taking into custody of the dangerous drugs. The Court of Appeals affirmed the
decision of the lower court.
Moner elevated the case before the Supreme Court and argued among others that the arresting
officers failed to comply with the statutorily mandated procedure for the handling and custody of
the dangerous drugs allegedly seized from him. Moner asserts that he should be acquitted of the
criminal charges levelled against him specifically because of the following serious lapses in
procedure committed by the apprehending officers: (a) the physical inventory was not conducted
at the place where the seizure was made; (b) the seized item was not photographed at the place
of seizure; and (c) there was no physical inventory and photograph of the seized item in the
presence of the accused, or his representative or counsel, with an elected public official and a
representative of the National Prosecution Service or the media who shall be required to sign the
copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof. He also maintained that the prosecution failed
to discharge its burden of proof, failed to present in court the informant who pointed him as
supplier of shabu and that the operation was conducted without proper coordination with PDEA.
He also pointed out that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses were inconsistent,
incredible, and unworthy of belief.

ISSUE: Whether or not noncomplia nce with the requirements of Section 21of Republic Act No.
9165 will render the illegal drugs seized or confiscated in a buy-bust operation inadmissible as
evidence.

RULING: No. The chain of custody rule is a matter of evidence and a rule of procedure. It is
therefore the Court who has the last say regarding the appreciation of evidence. Under
Section 3 of Rule 128 of the Rules of Court, evidence is admissible when it is relevant to the issue
and is not excluded by the law or these rules.
The court ruled that inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses that were
pointed out by Moner consist merely of minor variances that do not deviate from the main narrative
which is the fact that Moner sold illegal drugs to a poseur-buyer.
It has been held, time and again, that minor inconsistencies and contradictions in the declarations
of witnesses do not destroy the witnesses’ credibility but even enhance their truthfulness as they
erase any suspicion of a rehearsed testimony. It bears stressing, too, that the determination by
the trial court of the credibility of witnesses, when affirmed by the appellate court, is accorded full
weight and credit as well as great respect, if not conclusive effect. People vs. Moner, 857 SCRA
242, G.R. No. 202206 March 5, 2018
The court have consistently ruled that noncompliance with the requirements of Section 21 of
Republic Act No. 9165 will not necessarily render the illegal drugs seized or confiscated in a buy-
bust operation inadmissible. Strict compliance with the letter of Section 21 is not required if there
is a clear showing that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized illegal drugs have been
preserved, i.e., the illegal drugs being offered in court as evidence is, without a specter of doubt,
the very same item recovered in the buy-bust operation.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Appeals, 298 SCRA 83 (1998) G.R. 124043

FACTS: Private Respondent YMCA is a non-stock, non-profit institution, which conducts various
programs and activities that are beneficial to the public, especially the young people, pursuant to
its religious, educational and charitable objectives.
In 1980, private respondent earned, among others, an income of P676,829.80 from leasing out a
portion of its premises to small shop owners, like restaurants and canteen operators, and
P44,259.00 from parking fees collected from non-members. On July 2,
1984, the commissioner of internal revenue (CIR) issued an assessment to private respondent,
in the total amount of P415,615.01 including surcharge and interest, for deficiency income tax,
deficiency expanded withholding taxes on rentals and professional fees and deficiency
withholding tax on wages. Private respondent formally protested the assessment and, as a
supplement to its basic protest, filed a letter dated
October 8, 1985. In reply, the CIR denied the claims of YMCA.
YMCA filed a petition for review at the Court of Tax Appeals and in due course, the
CTA issued a ruling in favor of the YMCA considering their findings that YMCA was not engaged
in the business of operating or contracting a parking lot and therefore there is no legal basis for
the imposition of a deficiency fixed tax and a contractor's tax in the amounts of P353.15 and
P3,129.73, respectively.
When the CIR elevated the case to the Court of Appeals (CA), the CA initially decided in favor of
the CIR but upon finding merit in the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the YMCA, the CA
reversed itself stating that the Court cannot depart from the CTA's findings of fact, as they are
supported by evidence beyond what is considered as substantial.
The internal revenue commissioner's own Motion for Reconsideration was denied by
Respondent Court. Hence, this petition for review under Rule 45.

ISSUE: Whether or not, in its decision, the Court of Appeals departed from the findings of facts of
the Court of Tax Appeals when being supported by substantial evidence should have been final
and conclusive?

RULING: Indeed, it is a basic rule in taxation that the factual findings of the CTA, when supported
by substantial evidence, will not be disturbed on appeal unless it is shown that the said court
committed gross error in the appreciation of facts. In the present case, this Court finds that the
February 16, 1994 Decision of the CA did not deviate from this rule.
The latter merely applied the law to the facts as found by the CTA and ruled on the issue raised
by the CIR: "Whether or not the collection or earnings of rental income from the lease of certain
premises and income earned from parking fees shall fall under the last paragraph of Section 27
of the National Internal Revenue Code of 1977, as amended."
Clearly, the CA did not alter any fact or evidence. It merely resolved the aforementioned issue,
as indeed it was expected to. That it did so in a manner different from that of the CTA did not
necessarily imply a reversal of factual findings.
The distinction between a question of law and a question of fact is clear-cut. It has been held that
"[t]here is a question of law in a given case when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law
is on a certain state of facts; there is a question of fact when the doubt or difference arises as to
the truth or falsehood of alleged facts." In the present case, the CA did not doubt, much less
change, the facts narrated by the CTA. It merely applied the law to the facts. That its interpretation
or conclusion is different from that of the CTA is not irregular or abnormal.
interpretation of evidence

appreciation of evidence is a
question of law.
Villanueva v. Court of Appeals, 294 SCRA 90 (1998) GR 127997

FACTS: In a civil action for sum of money with damages filed by private respondent Almario Go
Manuel against petitioner Felix Villanueva and his wife Melchora which involved a check dated
June 30, 1991 in the amount of P167,600.00 issued by petitioner in favor of private respondent.
The Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 8 rendered a decision in favor of private
respondent, directing the petitioner to pay the private respondent P167,600.00, the dismissal of
the case with respect to his co-defendant
Melchora Villanueva, and finally with costs against the husband. Both parties appealed the
decision to the Court of Appeals. Petitioner prayed for the reversal of the trial court's decision and
contended that his principal obligation was only P23,420.00, while private respondent sought
interest of ten percent (10%) of the principal obligation; twenty-five percent (25%) as attorney's
fees, as well as moral and exemplary damages. The Court of
Appeals dismissed the appeal of petitioner and affirmed the decision of the trial court subject to
the modification that petitioner was directed to additionally pay private respondent attorney's fees
and litigation expenses in the amount of ten (10%) percent of P167,600.00, and the entire
obligation to earn interest at six (6%) percent per annum from the filing of the complaint.

ISSUE: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in its decision based on the presented evidence.

RULING: Time and again it has been ruled that the jurisdiction of this Court in cases brought to it
from the Court of Appeals is limited to the review and revision of errors of
law allegedly committed by the appellate court, as its findings of fact are deemed conclusive. As
such, this Court is not duty-bound to analyze and weigh all over again the evidence already
considered in the proceedings.
After a review of the case at bar, we consider petitioner to have failed to raise issues which
would constitute sufficient ground to warrant the reversal of the findings of the trial and appellate
courts.
Cruz v. People, 303 SCRA 533 (1999) GR121422

FACTS: On June 19, 1990, police officers arrested petitioner without warrant for illegal possession
of a .38 caliber revolver with six (6) rounds of ammunition while waiting outside the Manila Pavilion
Hotel along U.N. Ave., Manila.
The trial court proceeded to try the case. After the prosecution presented and formally offered its
evidence, the trial court issued an order dated January 18, 1993, admitting in evidence the gun
and ammunition seized from the accused, over his objections. After the prosecution had rested
its case, petitioner, on motion and upon leave of court, filed a demurrer to evidence. On December
20, 1993, the trial court denied the demurrer, and ordered the accused to present his evidence.
Instead, the petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which the trial court denied in an order
dated July 8, 1994.
On October 27, 1994, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari to annul the
three (3) orders, namely: the order admitting the prosecution's formal offer of evidence; the order
denying his demurrer to evidence; and the order denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration,
for being issued capriciously, arbitrarily and whimsically, in utter disregard of controlling law and
jurisprudence, and with grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
On November 7, 1994, the Court of Appeals gave due course to the petition and ordered the trial
court to temporarily refrain from further proceeding with the trial of Criminal Case No. 90-85059.
On August 8, 1995, the Court of Appeals rendered decision 9 denying the petition for lack of merit.
The Court of Appeals ruled that the assailed orders were interlocutory in nature and not
reviewable by certiorari. Petitioner should wait until the trial court has decided the case on its
merits and if aggrieved, appeal from his conviction. The Court of Appeals held that the trial court's
order admitting the allegedly inadmissible evidence involved questions of facts, which are not
reviewable in petitions for certiorari. There being no error on jurisdiction, whatever error in
judgment committed by the trial court cannot be corrected by certiorari.

ISSUE: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in upholding the trial court's order admitting in
evidence the gun and ammunition, which are allegedly inadmissible for being the fruits of an
illegal warrantless arrest and search.

RULING: Regarding the denial of the demurrer to evidence, we have likewise ruled that the
question of whether the evidence presented by the prosecution is sufficient to convince the court
that the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt rests entirely within the sound discretion of
the trial court. The error, if any, in the denial of the demurrer to evidence may be corrected only
by appeal. The appellate court will not review in such special civil action the prosecution's
evidence and decide in advance that such evidence has or has not established the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt.
The orderly procedure prescribed by the Revised Rules of Court is for the accused to present his
evidence, after which the trial court, on its own assessment of the evidence submitted, will then
properly render its judgment of acquittal or conviction. If judgment is rendered adversely against
the accused, he may appeal the judgment and raise the same defenses and objections for review
by the appellate court.
Ferrer v. Carganillo, G.R. No. 170956, [May 12, 2010], 634 PHIL 557-593)

FACTS: Regarding the denial of the demurrer to evidence, we have likewise ruled that the
question of whether the evidence presented by the prosecution is sufficient to convince the court
that the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt rests entirely within the sound discretion of
the trial court. The error, if any, in the denial of the demurrer to evidence may be corrected only
by appeal. The appellate court will not review in such special civil action the prosecution's
evidence and decide in advance that such evidence has or has not established the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt.
The orderly procedure prescribed by the Revised Rules of Court is for the accused to present his
evidence, after which the trial court, on its own assessment of the evidence submitted, will then
properly render its judgment of acquittal or conviction. If judgment is rendered adversely against
the accused, he may appeal the judgment and raise the same defenses and objections for review
by the appellate court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the DARAB erred in disregarding the Katulagan as evidence.

RULING: Yes. The Rules of Court, particularly the Revised Rules on Evidence, are specifically
applicable to judicial proceedings. The rules of evidence shall be the same in all trials and hearing
except as otherwise provided by law or these rules (Sec. 2, Rule 128).
In quasi-judicial proceedings, the said rule shall not apply except “by analogy or in a suppletory
character and whenever practicable and convenient”. The DARAB Rules of Procedure explicitly
provides that the Agrarian Reform Adjudicators are not bound by technical rules of procedure and
evidence in the Rules of Court nor shall the latter apply even in a suppletory manner. Thus, the
DARAB erred in holding the Katulagan as inadmissible since it was not formally offered and
admitted. The fundamental rule found in Sec. 34, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court does not find
any application in this agrarian case. Respondents Domingo and Sergio Carganillo were
dispossessed from the subject landholding.
suppletory only.
People v. Caparas Jr. y Temporas, G.R. Nos. 121811-12, [May 14, 1998], 352 PHIL 686-699
FACTS: Ramon Caparas Jr. and Jose Santos were convicted of rape with homicide, involving
the victim, Maricris Fernandez. Maricris' body was found in a cemetery in Cabanatuan City,
showing signs of sexual assault and blunt force trauma. Physical evidence included hair samples
and bloodtype comparisons from the crime scene, the victim, and the accused. The forensic evidence,
such as bloodtype and hair samples, was inconclusive in directly linking the accused to the crime.
Caparas and Santos both presented alibi defenses, claiming they were elsewhere at the time of the
incident.

ISSUE: Whether the circumstantial evidence presented in the case against Ramon Caparas Jr. and
Jose Santos sufficient to support their conviction for rape with homicide.

RULING: The Supreme Court upheld the conviction of Caparas Jr. and Santos. The ruling focused on
the circumstantial nature of the evidence, which, while not directly linking the accused to the crime,
created a coherent narrative that pointed to their guilt. The inconclusive forensic evidence did
not exonerate them, as the totality of circumstances, including their identification near the crime
scene and inconsistencies in their alibi defenses, built a strong case against them. The Court
emphasized that circumstantial evidence, when weighed together, can be as compelling as direct
evidence in proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court affirmed that the circumstantial
evidence presented was sufficient to uphold the convictions, demonstrating the principle that a
combination of indirect evidence can effectively establish the guilt of the accused in the absence of
direct evidence.
Guinea v. Vda. de Ramonal, G.R. No. L-38659, [February 20, 1975], 159 PHIL 426-431)

FACTS: In Civil Case No. 2766, the plaintiffs (petitioners) contested the ownership of Lot No. 2059 in
the Cagayan de Oro cadastre against Matilde S. Vda. de Ramonal. The plaintiffs claimed possession
of the lot "since their birth up to now disturbed only during the war up to February 1966." During the
trial, they presented seven witnesses to prove their possession from 1940 to 1966, interrupted only
during World War II. An eighth witness, Isabelo Ello, was presented to allegedly corroborate the same
point, but the testimony was disallowed by the judge. The judge then terminated the presentation of
the plaintiffs'evidence when their counsel was late for a hearing, and allowed the defendant to present
her evidence.

ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court abused its discretion in disallowing the eight witness to testify
on the issue of possession and in terminating the presentation of evidence.

RULING: No. Where the testimony of the eight witness for the plaintiffs be on the same point already
testified to by their preceding seven witnesses, such testimony would be merely cumulative and not
corroborative. A testimony which would be merely cumulative may be rejected by the trial court. The
trial court is invested with the prerogative of stopping "further testimony upon any particular point when
the evidence upon it is already so full
that more witnesses to the same point cannot be reasonably expected to be additionally persuasive."
(Sec. 6, Rule 133, Rules of Court). Special civil action for certiorari dismissed with costs against
petitioners.
People v. Araneta, G.R. No. 137604, [July 3, 2000], 390 PHIL 306-317

FACTS: Robert Araneta, also known as Gilbert Araneta, was convicted of murder for the shooting
death of Leo Latoja on December 21, 1995 in the municipality of Navotas, Metro Manila,
Philippines. The primary witness, Estelita Latoja, positively identified Araneta as one of the
assailants, claiming to have known him for five years. Estelita testified that she witnessed Araneta,
along with others, shoot her son Leo. Araneta’s defense was based on mistaken identity, denial,
and alibi, arguing that Estelita mistakenly identified him as the assailant. The Regional Trial Court
(RTC) found Araneta guilty beyond reasonable doubt, which he appealed.

ISSUE: Whether the positive identification of Robert Araneta by the lone prosecution witness
credible and sufficient to uphold his conviction for murder, despite his defense of mistaken identity,
denial, and alibi.

RULING: The appellant’s claim that witness was mistaken in naming him as “Gilbert Araneta” and not
“Robert Araneta” does not destroy her credibility and is not sufficient to exculpate him. For even
assuming that the accused real name is Robert, it is sufficient that she was positive as to his physical
identity as a participant in the shooting of her son from her personal knowledge for purposes of
identifying him in the present case. Given the positive identification made by the lone prosecution
witness, the appellant’s uncorroborated defense of denial and alibi must fail. However, treachery and
evident premeditation were not established, therefore, the crime committed can only be homicide, not
murder. Abuse of superiority was however established. Considering that the victim when assaulted
was unarmed, he was therefore no match to his 3 adversaries who were all armed with handguns. Our
jurisprudence is exemplified by the holding that where 3 armed persons attacked the defenseless
victim but there was no proof as to how the attack commence and treachery was not proved, the fact
that there were 3 armed assailants would constitute abuse of superior strength.
H. D. Kneedler v. Paterno, G.R. No. L-1349, [December 29, 1949], 85 PHIL 183-192

FACTS: H.D. Kneedler, as the liquidator of Kneedler Realty Co., filed a case against Simon Paterno
regarding a parcel of land sold to Paterno, who made an initial payment and agreed to pay the balance
in installments, mortgaging the property to secure the payment. The transfer certificate of title for
the land was subsequently lost. Paterno claimed he had paid the mortgage to the Japanese enemy
property custodian during the Japanese occupation, but failed to provide primary evidence of such
payment. Kneedler Realty Co. sought to foreclose the mortgage due to non-payment. The trial court
ruled in favor of Kneedler Realty Co., finding that Paterno failed to substantiate his claim of payment
and ordered him to pay the remaining balance plus interest and costs.

ISSUE: Whether the reliance on oral evidence and absence of primary evidence significant in the
court's decision to rule in favor of Kneedler Realty Co. in the dispute over the land sale and
mortgage payment between Kneedler and Paterno.

RULING: The Court's decision hinged on the application of the best evidence rule and the assessment
of oral testimony as secondary evidence. The best evidence rule necessitates the production of
the best available evidence to the court to prove a fact. In this case, Simon Paterno's failure to present
primary evidence (such as documents) to prove his claim of payment to the Japanese custodian
during the occupation significantly weakened his defense. The Court found the oral evidence
presented by Paterno insufficient to prove his claim, as it lacked the clarity, consistency, and reliability
necessary for acceptance. Consequently, the Court upheld the trial court's decision, emphasizing
the importance of primary evidence in legal proceedings and the limited value of secondary evidence,
particularly when it contradicts the primary evidence's narrative or is inconsistent and unreliable
Cometa v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 124062 (Resolution), [December 29, 1999], 378 PHIL
1187-1197

FACTS: SIHI and Cometa filed a criminal case against Guevara for falsification of Public Documents.
The basis of the aforesaid case filed by the defendants against Guevara is a supposed Affidavit of
Undertaking which had allegedly been submitted by the plaintiffs with the (HLURB) in connection with
its application of a License to Sell its townhouse units. According to the plaintiffs, the Affidavit of
Undertaking is a forgery because Cometa’s signature was forged. Office of the Makati Provincial Fiscal
dismissed the case filed by the defendants against Guevara.
The principal evidence submitted by the prosecution consists of the sworn testimony of Cometa to the
effect that Guevara had submitted the forged document. After the prosecution had rested its case,
Guevara filed a Motion to Dismiss on a Demurrer to the Evidence, contending that all the evidence
submitted by the prosecution do not suffice to show that he had committed the crime for which he has
been accused. RTC granted the motion to dismiss and ordered the dismissal of the criminal case for
falsification of public documents against him. Petitioners move for a reconsideration of the decision in
this case. They contend (1) that the complaint and its annexes show that petitioners acted with
probable cause and without malice in charging private respondent Reynaldo Guevarra with falsification
of public documents, and (2) that the non-inclusion in the civil case for malicious prosecution of the
government prosecutors who directed the filing in court of the criminal case shows the existence of
probable cause and the absence of malice.
Contending that the prosecution of private respondent Guevarra for falsification was grounded on
probable cause. On the other hand, private respondents argued that the absence of probable cause
is sufficiently alleged in their complaint that petitioners criminal action against private respondent
Guevarra had no basis in fact and in law as well as by virtue of the trial courts dismissal of the criminal
case for falsification of public documents on private respondent Guevarras demurrer to the evidence.

ISSUE: Whether the petitioners provide sufficient prima facie evidence to establish probable cause for
the accusation of falsification of public documents against Reynaldo S. Guevarra, and was their appeal
based on valid grounds.

RULING: No. The Court held that the petitioners' contention did not establish prima facie
evidence of malicious prosecution against Guevara. The mere act of charging someone with
a crime, by itself, does not establish malicious prosecution. Prima facie evidence requires
more than just the filing of a case; it must show that the case was filed without probable cause
and with malice. The non-inclusion of government prosecutors in the civil case was not
conclusive evidence of the petitioners’ innocence or of their having probable cause. Thus, the
Court affirmed the lower court’s ruling
Grace Park International vs. Eastwest, G.R. No. 210606. July 27, 2016

FACTS: Grace Park International Corporation and Woodlink Realty Corporation (petitioners) entered
into a Mortgage Trust Indenture (MTI) with EBC, Allied, Security (respondents), and Banco De Oro
Unibank (BDO), with EBC acting as trustee, in the aggregate amounts of ₱162,314,499.00 and
US$797,176.47. BDO was the majority creditor with 58.04% ownership of the credit, with EBC, Allied,
and Security having 18.33%, 12.58%, and 11.05% ownership, respectively. As collaterals, petitioners
mortgaged 8 parcels of land, as well as the improvements. Under the MTI, EBC, as trustee, cannot
commence foreclosure proceedings on any or all parts of the collaterals without the written instructions
from the majority creditors. During the pendency of the MTI, BDO's majority share in the MTI was
effectively paid for by Sherwyn Yao, Jeremy Jerome Sy, and Leveric Ng (Sherwyn, et al.). EBC refused
to honor the subrogation, causing Sherwyn, et al. to file an action for subrogation and injunction, before
the RTC-Makati. On the other hand, an
Amended Complaint for Injunction and Annulment of Foreclosure Sale was filed by petitioners against
respondents before the RTC-Malolos. In the respondents’ Answer and Motion to Dismiss, they
contended that the complaint before the RTC-Malolos should bem dismissed on the grounds of forum
shopping and litis pendentia. They claimed that the action for subrogation pending before the RTC-
Makati basically involved the same parties, reliefs, and causes of action with the action pending before
the RTC-Malolos.
RTC-Malolos dismissed the case on the ground of forum shopping. CA likewise upheld the dismissal,
hence the petition.

ISSUE: Whether the elements of forum shopping were evident, focusing on the identity of the evidence
presented (factum probans) and the similarity of the factual issues or claims (factumprobandum) in
both cases.

RULING: The Supreme Court ruled that there was no forum shopping. It highlighted that the evidence
presented in both cases (factum probans) served different purposes: in Civil Case No. 10-323, the
evidence was directed towards establishing the right to subrogation, while in Civil Case No. 543-
M-2010, it was aimed at asserting debtor rights under the MTI. Therefore, the factum probans in each
case were distinct. Additionally, the Court observed that the factum probandum in each case – the
factual issues or claims to be proved – were substantially different. One case focused on the right to
subrogation due to an alleged unjust refusal, while the other dealt with a purported breach of
foreclosure provisions. The ruling emphasized that despite superficial similarities in parties and
context, the distinct factum probans and factumprobandum in the two cases negated the presence of
forum shopping, as they essentially involved different factual and legal issues.
Tantuico Jr. v. Republic of the Philippines, G.R. No. 89114, December 2, 1991
FACTS: In Tantuico Jr. v. Republic of the Philippines, Francisco S. Tantuico, Jr., the petitioner,
sought to annul and set aside resolutions of the Sandiganbayan, which denied his motion for a
bill of particulars in Civil Case No. 0035. The case involved allegations against Tantuico, primarily that
he acted in unlawful concert with Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos and others, contributing to the
misappropriation and theft of public funds. Tantuico argued that the allegations in the Second
Amended Complaint were mere conclusions of fact and law, lacking the ultimate facts required by the
Rules of Court. He contended that the complaint should be either more definite or that he should be
excluded as a defendant if a sufficient bill of particulars was not provided.

ISSUE: Whether the respondent Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion in denying
Tantuico's motion for a bill of particulars, based on the argument that the complaint's allegations
were insufficiently detailed and consisted of conclusions rather than ultimate facts.

RULING: The Supreme Court clarified the difference between "ultimate facts" and "evidentiary
facts" in legal pleadings. Ultimate facts are the essential facts constituting the plaintiff's cause of action,
which directly form the basis of the primary right and duty or make up the wrongful acts or omissions
of the defendant. Evidentiary facts are those necessary for determining the ultimate facts. The
Court examined the allegations against Tantuico to determine if they were stated with sufficient
definiteness to enable him to prepare his responsive pleading or for trial. If the allegations were found
to be vague, indefinite, or in the form of conclusions, Tantuico would be entitled to a bill of particulars.
The decision revolved around whether the complaint against Tantuico in Civil Case No. 0035
adhered to the required standard of pleading ultimate facts and not mere legal conclusions or
inferences
Far East Marble (Phils.) Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 94093, August 10, 1993

FACTS: The Bank of the Philippines Islands (BPI) filed a complaint for foreclosure of chattel mortgage
with replevin against petitioner Far East Marble (Phils.), Inc. (Far East), Ramon A. Tabuena and Luis
R. Tabuena, Jr. with Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region. Far East received
from BPI several loans evidenced by promissory note executed by Far East and credit facilities in the
form of Trust Receipts. The said promissory notes and trust receipts have long matured but despite
repeated requests and demands for payment, Far East has failed and refused to pay. Far East also
executed, in favor of BPI, a Chattel Mortgage. Far East filed an answer with compulsory counterclaim
admitting the genuineness and due execution of the promissory notes, alleging further that said notes
became due and demandable. On the basis of the maturity dates of the notes, Far East raised the
affirmative defenses of prescription and lack of cause of action as it denied the allegation of the
complaint that BPI had made previous repeated requests and demands for payment. BPI maintained,
the ten-years prescriptive period to enforce its written contract had not only been interrupted, but was
renewed. BPI then filed a motion for summary judgment on the ground that since Far East had
admitted the genuineness and due execution of the promissory notes and the deed of chattel
mortgage, there was no genuine issue as to any material fact, thus entitling BPI to a favorable
judgment as a matter of law in regard to its causes of action and on its right to foreclose the chattel
mortgage.

ISSUE: Whether the claims against Far East had become prescribed and whether there was a valid
cause of action, examining the factum probans presented by both parties to establish the
factumprobandum (the fact to be proved) - the existence and enforceability of the debt obligations.

RULING: The Supreme Court's decision focused on the jurisdictional question, determining that the
Court of Appeals had properly assumed jurisdiction over the appeal. In the context of factum probans
versus factumprobandum, the Court differentiated between questions of law and questions of fact.
The case hinged on the conflicting factum probans presented by Far East and BPI regarding
the existence of demands for payment and acknowledgments of debt. The Court of Appeals had
earlier set aside the trial court's ruling, which had found in favor of Far East, and remanded the case
for further proceedings to resolve these factual disputes. This ruling highlighted the need for a
thorough examination of the factum probans presented by both parties to establish the actual situation
concerning the alleged debts and their enforcement
Salita v. Magtolis, G.R. No. 106429, June 13, 1994

FACTS: Petitioner and Private Respondent Espinosa were married on 1986 and separated 2 years
after. Espinosa sued for annulment on the ground of Salita’s psychological Incapacity. The RTC of
Quezon City granted for Salita’s motion for a Bill of Particulars.
Espinosa specified in the Bill of Particulars the incapacity of Salita in being “unable to understand and
accept the demands by his profession’ whose intervention caused Espinosa to lose his Job as a Doctor
of Medicine. RTC and the Appellate Court found that the Bill of Particulars adequate and issued an
order upholding its sufficiency. Salita was not contented and filed for certiorari regarding the
insufficiency of the Bill of Particulars arguing that the assertion (in the Bill of Particulars) is a statement
of legal conclusion made by petitioner's counsel and not an averment of 'ultimate facts,' as required
by the Rules of Court, from which such a conclusion may properly be inferred.

ISSUE: Whether the Bill of Particulars provided by the private respondent was of sufficient definiteness
or particularity to enable the petitioner to properly prepare for her defense or for trial.

RULING: The Supreme Court upheld the view of the respondent Court of Appeals that the Bill of
Particulars filed by the private respondent was sufficient to state a cause of action. The Court
clarified that a complaint only needs to state the "ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff’s cause
or causes of action," which are those facts that the expected evidence will support. In this case, the
allegations in the Bill of Particulars, such as the petitioner's inability to understand and accept the
demands made by her husband’s profession, were deemed sufficient for the petitioner to
prepare her responsive pleading or for trial. The Court distinguished between ultimate facts and
evidentiary facts, noting that the additional details sought by the petitioner regarding her specific acts
or omissions would be evidentiary in nature. The Court concluded that the annulment proceedings,
which had already been delayed, should resume immediately to determine whether the petitioner was
psychologically incapacitated, as allege
Balitaan v. Court of First Instance of Batangas, 201 Phil. 311, July 30, 1982 GR L-38544

FACTS: Petitioner, Balitaan, filed for Estafa against Rita De Los Reyes. Balitaan was the owner of a
dress shop in which the accused, De Los Reyes was an employee of. The dress shop mended and
made dresses for a business establishment in Makati. De Los Reyes collected a sum of 127.58 pesos
for the payment of the dresses made by Balitaan and to deliver the amount to the latter. Despite
repeated demands, De Los Reyes, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate, misapply, and
convert the sum to her own use and benefit to the damage and prejudice of Balitaan. In a testimony
during a direct examination of Balitaan, in the MTC, the counsel for the accused moved to strike out
the petitioner’s testimonies but the trial court denied the motion. The CFI nullified the MTC decision
and ordered the testimonies to be stricken out. Hence, this petition for certiorari.

ISSUE: Whether or not the testimonial evidence corresponded with the allegations in the Information
which did not state the three checks.
RULING: The Court reversed and set aside the decision of the respondent Court and held that the
existence of the three checks need not be alleged in the Information. They are evidentiary matters
which is not required therein.
It is fundamental that every element of which the offense is composed must be alleged in the complaint
or information. It is true that estafa under paragraph 1(b) is essentially a different offense from estafa
under paragraph 2(a). To sustain a conviction for estafa under paragraph 2(a), on the other hand,
deceit or false representation to defraud and the damage caused thereby must be proved. This does
not mean, however, that presentation of proof of deceit in a prosecution for estafa under paragraph
1(b) is not allowed. Abuse of confidence and deceit may co- exist. The presence of deceit would not
change the whole theory of the prosecution that estafa with abuse of confidence was committed.
Besides, in estafa by means of deceit, it is essential that the false statement or fraudulent
representation constitutes the very cause or the only motivem which induces the complainant to part
with the thing. MTC properly denied, CA decision reversed and set aside.
(Rules 7 and 11) Parties to a case are now required to attach to their opening pleading (i.e., the
complaint for the plaintiff or the answer for the defendant) copies of all the pieces of evidence
supporting their claims and defenses. They must also indicate the names of intended witnesses and
the summaries of their testimonies.
Paranaque Kings Enterprises, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, February 26, 1997 GR 111538

FACTS: Paranaque Kings Enterprises, Inc. filed a complaint against Catalina L. Santos and David A.
Raymundo, alleging a breach of contract. The plaintiff claimed that Santos, the owner of leased
property, sold the property to Raymundo without offering the plaintiff the first option to buy, as
stipulated in their lease agreement. The plaintiff had made significant investments in the property,
believing it would eventually be sold to them. The sale was allegedly in collusion between Santos and
Raymundo to mislead the plaintiff and inflate the property's price. The plaintiff sought the annulment
of the deed of sale and compensation for damages.

ISSUE: Whether the complaint alleging breach of the contractual right of "first option or priority to buy"
stated a valid cause of action, focusing on whether the factum probans (evidence proving a fact)
presented in the complaint corresponded with the factumprobandum (fact to be proved) - the alleged
breach of the right of first refusal.

RULING: The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the petitioner, Paranaque Kings Enterprises, Inc.,
affirming that the allegations in the complaint constituted a valid cause of action. The Court recognized
the enforceability of the right of first refusal as stipulated in the lease agreement. The complaint
sufficiently detailed the contractual obligations, the alleged breach, and the resulting damages,
aligning the factum probans with the factum probandum. The Court held that the plaintiff was entitled
to be offered the same terms and conditions as those given to Raymundo, who eventually bought
the property. Therefore, the right of first refusal was enforceable by an action for specific performance,
and the complaint validly stated a cause of action for breach of contract and damages.
De Gala v. De Gala, 42 Phil. 771 G.R. No. 15756, [February 15, 1922],]

FACTS: This case is to compel the defendant pedro De Gala to recognize the plaintiff as his natural
son. Complaint alleged that the plaintiff had been in uninterrupted possession of the status of a natural
child of defendant which latter denied. the defendant objected on admitting an evidence from a
stenographic notes from another case. upon the ground that it was "impertinent." The lower court
sustained the objection. The lower court sustained the objection. RTC Dismissed Plaintiff’s complaint
and absolved defendant from all liability. Plaintiff appealed but defendant died, hence the substitution
by the spouse and only legitimate son as defendants.

ISSUE: Whether or not Exhibit C (stenographic notes) was admissible as evidence.

RULING: While it is true that such admission of the defendant's only legitimate son would not, of itself,
be sufficient to entitle the plaintiff to a compulsory recognition by the defendant as his natural child,
yet it should have been admitted in evidence as a factum probans, which would help to establish the
factum probandum — the uninterrupted possession of the status of a natural child. For that purpose
Exhibit C was perhaps admissible. In the present case there are no indications that the defendant
Pedro de Gala did not intend to recognize the plaintiff as his natural son. On the contrary, it clearly
appears that he had always treated the plaintiff as a son; and his only legitimate son, Generoso, had
also treated the plaintiff as a brother. We are fully persuaded that the facts proven in the present case
clearly establish the uninterrupted possession by the plaintiff of the status of a natural son of the
defendant Pedro de Gala. the judgment of the lower court is hereby revoked, with the costs of this
instance against the appellees, and it is hereby ordered and decreed that a judgment be entered,
requiring the appellees, Josefa Alabastro and Generoso de Gala, to recognize and acknowledge the
appellant, Sinforoso de Gala, as the natural son of the deceased Pedro de Gala.
Blas v. Angeles-Hutalla, G.R. No. 155594, [September 27, 2004], 482 PHIL 485-508)

FACTS: The case involves Rhodora Blas and Linda Angeles-Hutalla. Angeles-Hutalla, a naturalized
U.S. citizen, owned a property in the Philippines, which Blas, a Filipino citizen, was interested in
purchasing. Initially, the property was not registered in Angeles-Hutalla's name. They agreed on the
sale and executed an unnotarized deed of sale. Subsequently, a notarized deed of sale and a real
estate purchase contract and receipt for deposit
(REPCRD) were executed in the United States. Blas took possession of the property and allowed
tenants to occupy it. Later, a dispute arose when Angeles-Hutalla demanded that the tenants vacate
the property. Blas filed a complaint for specific performance and delivery of title, while Angeles-Hutalla
filed a counterclaim for rescission of the contract. The trial court ruled in favor of Angeles-Hutalla, and
the Court of Appeals affirmed this decision.

ISSUE: Whether the REPCRD executed in the United States was the real and binding contract
between the parties and whether it was admissible in evidence.

RULING: The Supreme Court held that the REPCRD executed in the United States was the real and
binding contract between Blas and Angeles-Hutalla. The Court ruled that the REPCRD was admissible
in evidence despite being notarized abroad, as the genuineness and due execution of the document
were admitted by the respondent. The Court also rejected the application of the Maceda Law, which
grants certain rights to buyers of real estate on installment payments, because Blas failed to invoke it
in the trial court and did so for the first time only in the appellate court. Consequently, the Court
affirmed the decision of the trial court and the Court of Appeals, recognizing the REPCRD as the
governing contract between the parties and dismissing Blas'complaint for specific performance and
delivery of title.
Waterous Drug Corp. v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 113271, [October 16,
1997], 345 PHIL 983-997

FACTS: Antonia Melodia Catolico was employed as a pharmacist by Waterous Drug

Corporation. She was accused of engaging in an inappropriate transaction with a supplier, YSP
Philippines, by allegedly receiving a check as a commission. The check was discovered by
her employer when a co-employee opened an envelope addressed to Catolico. Based on this,
she was dismissed from her job. The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of Catolico, ordering her
reinstatement and awarding monetary damages. The National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC)
affirmed this decision, declaring the check inadmissible as evidence due to a violation of the
constitutional right to privacy of communication.

ISSUE: Whether the evidence presented against Catolico, particularly the check, was admissible in
proving the alleged misconduct and justifying her dismissal.

RULING: The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Catolico, upholding the NLRC's decision. The Court
found that Catolico was unjustly dismissed and denied due process. The evidence against her,
primarily the check purported to be a commission, was deemed inadmissible. The Court held that the
check's discovery violated the constitutional provision on the right to privacy of communication, making
it inadmissible in evidence. Furthermore, the Court noted that the evidence presented by Waterous
Drug Corporation was insufficient to establish that there was an overcharge or that Catolico pocketed
any amount in collusion with the supplier. It was also noted that no hearing was conducted after the
issues were joined through letters, and Catolico's dismissal was based on hearsay information. The
Court concluded that Waterous Drug Corporation failed to prove just and valid cause for dismissing
Catolico, resulting in a finding that the dismissal was unjustified.
People v. Marti, G.R. No. 81561, [January 18, 1991], 271 PHIL 51-65

FACTS: Andre Marti was charged with violating the Dangerous Drugs Act (R.A. No. 6425). He and
his common-law wife went to Manila Packing and Export Forwarders to send packages allegedly
containing books, cigars, and gloves to a friend in Switzerland. However, the proprietor, Job
Reyes, upon inspecting the parcels as part of standard operating procedure, discovered dried leaves
suspected to be marijuana. Reyes reported this to the NBI, which then conducted further investigation
and confirmed the presence of marijuana in the packages. Marti was subsequently convicted by the
trial court for the offense.

ISSUE: Whether the evidence obtained by a private individual, and not by a government authority,
violated Marti's constitutional rights against unreasonable search and seizure and privacy of
communication, thus rendering the evidence inadmissible.

RULING: The Supreme Court ruled that the Bill of Rights, specifically the protection against
unreasonable search and seizure, is a restriction on the government and not on private individuals.
The Court held that in the absence of governmental interference, the constitutional rights against
unreasonable search and seizure cannot be invoked against the State. In Marti's case, the initial
search and discovery of the contraband were done by a private individual (the proprietor of the
forwarding company), without government intervention. Therefore, the evidence was admissible,
and Marti's constitutional rights were not violated. The Court emphasized that the constitutional
safeguards against unreasonable search and seizure are intended as a restraint on government
activities and not as a limitation on private individuals. Consequently, the evidence obtained by Reyes
was deemed admissible in prosecuting Marti for the offense charged
Pollo v. Constantino-David, G.R. No. 181881, [October 18, 2011], 675 PHIL 225-300

FACTS: Briccio Pollo, a former Supervising Personnel Specialist of the Civil Service Commission
(CSC) Regional Office No. IV, was charged with dishonesty, grave misconduct, conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service, and violation of R.A. No. 6713 (Code of Conduct and
Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees). This case arose from an anonymous letter
addressed to the CSC Chairperson, Karina Constantino-David, alleging misconduct by Pollo. The
CSC conducted a fact-finding investigation and found a prima facie case against Pollo. Files in his
computer indicated that he aided people with pending cases at the CSC. Pollo contended that the files
were not his but belonged to his friends whom he had allowed to use his computer. The CSC, in its
ruling, referred to U.S. jurisprudence, notably O'Connor v. Ortega and United States v. Mark L. Simons,
to determine the admissibility of evidence obtained from the search of Pollo's office computer.

ISSUE: Whether the search of Pollo's computer and the subsequent use of the discovered files as
evidence in his administrative case violated his constitutional rights and were admissible under the
rules of evidence.

RULING: The CSC, and later the Court of Appeals, held that Pollo had no reasonable
expectation of privacy with regard to the computer he used in his office, based on the CSC’s computer
use policy. The policy stated that employees could not assert any privacy right to a computer assigned
to them. The CSC considered the search reasonable in its inception and scope, as it was conducted
in connection with an investigation of work-related misconduct. The Supreme Court, in its decision,
upheld the view that the search was reasonable and did not violate Pollo's constitutional rights. The
Court ruled that the search was an administrative search, not a judicial one, and the files found in
Pollo’s computer were admissible. The Court highlighted that government agencies, as employers,
could conduct reasonable searches in the workplace without violating the constitutional safeguard
against unreasonable searches and seizure.
Trans-Pacific Industrial Supplies, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 109172, [August 19, 1994]

FACTS: Trans-Pacific Industrial Supplies, Inc. was granted several financial

accommodations by Associated Bank, secured by promissory notes and a real estate mortgage. The
documents evidencing the indebtedness were stamped "PAID" and returned to Trans-Pacific,
which claimed full payment of its obligations. However, the Court of Appeals held that the
documents possessed by Trans-Pacific were mere duplicates and could not be the basis for
claiming that the obligation had been fully paid. The appellate court’s ruling was based on the
interpretation of Article 1271 of the Civil Code, which provides that the delivery of a private document
evidencing a credit implies the renunciation of the action by the creditor against the debtor.

ISSUE: Whether the duplicate copies of the promissory notes marked "PAID" and presented by Trans-
Pacific were sufficient to prove the full payment of its obligations to Associated Bank.

RULING: The Supreme Court ruled that the duplicate originals of the documents were admissible
as evidence. It emphasized that duplicate originals are considered equally as valid as the original
documents for evidentiary purposes. The Court clarified that when carbon sheets are used between
two or more sheets of writing paper, the resulting copies are treated as duplicate originals. In this case,
the fact that Associated Bank did not challenge the authenticity of the duplicates supported their
admissibility. Furthermore, the Court noted that the presumption created by Article 1271 of the
Civil Code is not conclusive but merely prima facie. The Court found that sufficient justification existed
to overthrow the presumption of payment generated by the delivery of the documents evidencing
the debt. Therefore, the Supreme Court did not find any reversible error in the appellate court’s
decision, although it clarified the admissibility and the weight of duplicate originals in evidence.
People v. Sood y Amatondin, G.R. No. 227394 , [June 6, 2018]

FACTS: Norjana Sood y Amatondin was accused of violating Section 5, Article II of Republic
Act No. 9165 (Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002). The case revolved around the alleged
illegal sale of dangerous drugs on January 28, 2009. The prosecution’s case was primarily based on
a buy-bust operation conducted by law enforcement officers, during which the accused was
apprehended, and illegal drugs were allegedly recovered from her. The accused contested the
validity of the buy-bust operation and the admissibility of the seized drugs, citing non-compliance
with Section 21 of RA 9165 regarding the custody and disposition of confiscated drugs.

ISSUE: Whether the non-compliance with the prescribed procedures under Section 21 of RA 9165
affected the admissibility of the seized drugs as evidence and the legality of the accused's arrest.

RULING: The Supreme Court ruled that while there was non-compliance with certain procedural
requirements under Section 21 of RA 9165, there was substantial compliance with the law, and the
integrity and evidentiary value of the drugs seized were preserved. The Court found that the chain of
custody of the drugs was established and not broken, as testified by the police officers involved in the
operation. Despite conflicting testimonies regarding where the inventory of seized items was
conducted, the Court held that these minor inconsistencies did not impair the credibility of the
witnesses. The Court underscored that non-compliance with Section 21 is not automatically
fatal to the prosecution's case as long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are
preserved. The Court concluded that the accused’s arrest was valid, and the items seized were
admissible as evidence of her guilt.
People v. Toledo, G.R. No. 28655, [August 6, 1928], 51 PHIL 825-839)

FACTS: Sisenando Holgado and Filomeno Morales were involved in a dispute over land occupation
in Mindoro. This disagreement led to a bolo duel, resulting in the death of Morales and serious injuries
to Holgado. Before dying from his wounds,Holgado made a sworn statement to the municipal
president, claiming there was no one present during their fight. Eugenio Toledo, a worker of Holgado,
was later charged with the homicide of Morales and convicted in the lower court. The case's complexity
revolved around the admissibility of Holgado's statement, which was made before his death.

ISSUE: Whether Holgado's sworn statement, made before his death, was admissible as evidence
under the rules of evidence, specifically considering the concepts of hearsay and declaration against
interest.

RULING: The Supreme Court ruled that Holgado's statement was admissible as evidence under the
exception to the hearsay rule, known as the Declaration Against Interest. This rule allows statements
made by a deceased or unable to testify person to be admitted in court if they were against the
declarant's interest at the time they were made. The Court found that Holgado's statement met the
requisites for this exception:

The declarant (Holgado) was deceased.

The statement was against Holgado’s interest, as it exonerated Toledo. Holgado was aware that his
statement was against his interest.

There was no motive for Holgado to falsify the statement, and it was made under oath.
The Court concluded that Holgado's statement should be considered alongside other facts of the case.
Given the circumstances, the Court ruled that Toledo should be acquitted due to reasonable doubt,
as Holgado's statement was deemed credible and consistent with other evidence.
People v. Yatco, G.R. No. L-9181, [November 28, 1955], 97 PHIL 940-947)

FACTS: Juan Consunji, Alfonso Panganiban, and an unidentified individual were charged with the
murder ofJose Ramos. During the trial, an issue arose regarding the admissibility of an extrajudicial
confession made by Consunji. The defense objected to the confession on the grounds of hearsay. The
trial court excluded the evidence, not on the basis of the objection raised but because it believed that
conspiracy had to be proven first through definite acts, conditions, and circumstances.

ISSUE: Whether the extrajudicial confession of an accused could be admitted as evidence against
him without prior proof of a conspiracy.

RULING: The Supreme Court held that the trial court committed a grave abuse of discretion by
completely excluding the evidence of the confession. It clarified that under the rule of multiple
admissibility of evidence, even if a confession may not be competent against a co-accused or to prove
conspiracy, it is admissible as evidence of the declarant's own guilt. The Court emphasized the
importance of allowing such evidence to be presented, at least against the party making it, to enable
the prosecution to present all relevant evidence. The final determination of the admissibility of such
evidence would be based on its relevance and materialityin the context of the entire case
Gonzales v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-37453, [May 25, 1979], 179 PHIL 149-177)
FACTS: On June 24, 1961, Lutgarda Santiago filed a petition for the probate of the will of Isabel
Andres Gabriel. The will was written in Tagalog and appeared to have been executed in Manila.

Petitioner Rizalina Gabriel Gonzales (Isabel’s niece), opposed the petition mainly alleging that the
witnesses to the will were not credible. She contended that to be a credible witness, there must be
evidence on record that the witness has a good standing in his community, or that he is honest and
upright, or reputed to be trustworthy and reliable. She further argued that the term “credible” should
have the same meaning under the Naturalization Law.

ISSUE: Whether there is a need to introduce independent proof of the credibility of the witnesses.

RULING: No. Article 820 of the Civil Code provides for the qualifications of a witness to the execution
of wills, while Article 821 sets forth the disqualifications from being a witness.

Art. 820. Any person of sound mind and of the age of eighteen years or more, and not blind, deaf or
dumb, and able to read and write, may be a witness to the execution of a will mentioned in article 806
of this Code.

Art. 820. The following are disqualified from being witnesses to a will:

(1) Any person not domiciled in the Philippines,

(2) Those who have been convicted of falsification of a document, perjury or false testimony.

Under the law, there is no mandatory requirement that the witness testify as to his good standing in
the community, his reputation for trustworthythiness and reliableness, his honesty, and uprightness in
order that his testimony may be believed and accepted by the trial court. It is enough that the
qualifications enumerated in Article 820 are complied with and that he has none of the disqualifications
under Article 821. Such attributes are presumed of the witness unless the contrary is proved otherwise.

“Credible Witness” under Naturalization Law

Under the Naturalization Law, it is mandatory that the petition for naturalization must be supported by
two character witnesses who must prove their good standing in the community, reputation for
trustworthiness and reliableness, their honesty and uprightness. The two witnesses in a petition for
naturalization are character witnesses. In probate proceedings, the instrumental witnesses are not
character witnesses for they merely attest the execution of a will or testament and affirm the formalities
attendant to said execution.

In the case at bar, the finding that each and everyone of the three instrumental witnesses, namely,
Matilde Orobia, Celso Gimpaya and Maria Gimpaya, are competent and credible is satisfactorily
supported by the evidence. Moreover, petitioner has not pointed to any disqualification of any of the
said witnesses, much less has it been shown that anyone of them is below 18 years of age, of unsound
mind, deaf or dumb, or cannot read or write.
Bautista v. Sarmiento, G.R. No. L-45137, [September 23, 1985], 223 PHIL 181-187)

FACTS: Petitioners were charged before CFI Pampanga of the crime of Estafa. In the information
filed against the accused, it was alleged that accused received jewelries from Dr. Leticia C.
Yap on April 19, 1975 on consignment, and that these pieces of jewelries should be sold by the
accused on commission basis and to pay or to deliver the proceeds thereof to Yap if sold, and if not
sold to return said jewelries. In spite of represented demands made on the said accused, said
accused failed and refused and still fails and refuses to return the jewelries or deliver the proceeds
thereof to the damage of Yap in the total amount of P77,300.Prosecution presented during the trial the
private complainant, Dr. Leticia C. Yap, as its only witness. Yap testified that the accused acted as her
agents for the sale of the jewelries. Petitioners in a criminal case for Estafa argued for dismissal
through a demurrer to evidence, asserting that the prosecution failed to prove guilt beyond reasonable
doubt. Petitioners challenge the court's jurisdiction, contending that, based on the denial of their
motion, the court acknowledged a prima facie case of Estafa. They assert that a mere prima facie
case is insufficient for conviction in a criminal trial, emphasizing the requirement of proof beyond
reasonable doubt. The petition seeks certiorari and prohibition with a preliminary injunction against the
trial's continuation.

ISSUE: Whether the petitioners are guilty of the crime charged.

RULING: Yes. Since the denial of the motion to dismiss was anchored on a finding of a prima facie
case, a clear understanding of the term and its implications is in order. “A prima facie case is that
amount of evidence which would be sufficient to counterbalance the general presumption of
innocence, and warrant a conviction, if not encountered and controlled by evidence tending to
contradict it, and render it improbable, or to prove other facts inconsistent with it, and the establishment
of a prima facie case does not take away the presumption of innocence which may in the opinion of
the jury be such as to rebut and control it. There is no denying that in a criminal case, unless the guilt
of the accused is established by proof beyond reasonable doubt, he is entitled to an acquittal. But
when the trial court denies petitioners’ motion to dismiss by way of demurrer to evidence on the ground
that the prosecution had established a prima facie case against them, they assume a definite burden.
It becomes incumbent upon petitioners to adduce evidence to meet and nullify, if not overthrow, the
prima facie case against them. This is due to the shift in the burden of evidence, and not of the burden
of proof as petitioners would seem to believe. When a prima facie case is established by the
prosecution, the burden of proof does not shift to the defense; Burden of evidence shifts from party to
party depending upon the exigencies of the case in the course of the trial. A prima facie case need not
be countered by a preponderance of evidence nor by evidence of greater weight. Defendant’s
evidence which equalizes the weight of plaintiff’s evidence or puts the case in equipoise is sufficient.
As a result, plaintiff will have to go forward with the proof. Should it happen that at the trial the weight
of evidence is equally balanced or at equilibrium and presumptions operate against plaintiff who has
the burden of proof, he cannot prevail. Further, refusal of petitioners to present evidence after denial
of their motion to dismiss justifies an inference of their guilt.
People v. Dereco y Hayag, G.R. No. 243625, [December 2, 2020]

FACTS: Jeffrey Dereco was charged with rape under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code. The
victim, referred to as AAA, testified that on the night of the incident, she was walking alone along
Quirino Highway when Dereco and his companion, Biboy, approached her. They forcibly dragged her
to a dark area, where they proceeded to remove her pants and underwear. Biboy inserted his penis
into her vagina while Dereco held a knife and pressed her mouth open. After Biboy, Dereco also
inserted his penis into her vagina. AAA fought back but was overpowered. She eventually managed
to escape when the accused left the scene. AAA underwent a medico-legal examination, which
revealed the presence of spermatozoa in her vagina.
In seeking the reversal of the assailed CA’s decision, accused-appellant asserts that the prosecution
failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. He claims that AAA’s testimony was riddled with
inconsistencies and improbabilities. Thus, accused-appellant asserts that the courts a quo erred in
giving credence to AAA’s testimony as her credibility was questionable.17 People vs. Dereco<br/>,
965 SCRA 207, G.R. No. 243625 December 2, 2020

ISSUE: Whether the accused-appellant, Jeffrey Dereco, is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of rape.

RULING: Yes. It is settled that the Regional Trial Court’s (RTC’s) findings on the credibility of
witnesses and their testimonies are entitled great weight and respect and the same should not be
overturned on appeal in the absence of any clear showing that the trial court overlooked,
misunderstood, or misapplied some facts or circumstances which would have affected the case. It is
settled in this jurisdiction that as long as the testimony of the witness is coherent and intrinsically
believable as a whole, discrepancies of minor details and collateral matters do not affect the veracity,
or detract from the essential credibility of the witnesses’ declarations. In fact, the accused may be
convicted solely on the basis of the testimony of the victim that is credible, convincing, and consistent
with human nature and the normal course of things. Further, no ill motive on the part of AAA to falsely
accuse accused-appellant was ever brought up by the defense during trial. This only serves to further
strengthen AAA’s case since we have consistently held that a rape vic­tim’s testimony as to who
abused her is credible where she has absolutely no motive to incriminate and testify against the
accused. A few discrepancies and inconsistencies in the testimonies of witnesses referring to minor
details and not in actuality touching upon the central fact of the crime do not impair the credibility of
the witnesses because they discount the possibility of their being rehearsed testimony. The court also
rejected the accused-appellant's defense of denial and alibi, stating that alibi is an inherently weak
defense that is easy to fabricate and highly unreliable. To merit approbation, he must adduce clear
and convincing evidence that he was in a place other than the situs criminis at the time when the crime
was committed, such that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime
when it was committed.
People v. Solar y Dumbrique, G.R. No. 225595, [August 6, 2019]

FACTS: An Information was filed against Rolando and Mark Solar for the murder of
Joseph Capinig. During the arraignment, Rolando pleaded not guilty while Mark Kenneth remained
at large and was not brought to the RTC's jurisdiction. RTC convicted Rolando of the crime murder.
The qualifying circumstance of treachery was present in the killing of Joseph, and hence, the crime
committed by Rolando was Murder. Rolando appealed to the CA and prayed for his acquittal, stating
that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt by failing to prove his identity as
the perpetrator. He argued that since the eyewitness testified that it was Mark Kenneth who incited
the fatal blow on the victim and there were no facts available to support finding of conspiracy. CA
downgraded the offense from Murder to Homicide, holding that the Information did not sufficiently set
the particular facts establishing the existence of the qualifying circumstance of treachery

ISSUE: Whether Rolando may still question the defect in the Information?

RULING: No. Rolando has waived his right to question the defects in the Information filed against him.
The right to question the defects in an Information is not absolute. Rolando did not question the
supposed insufficiency of the Information filed against him through either a motion to quash or motion
for bill of particulars. He voluntarily entered his plea during the arraignment and proceeded with the
trial. Thus, he is deemed to have waived any of the waivable defects in the Information, including the
supposed lack of particularity in the description of the attendant circumstances. Rolando is also
deemed to have understood the acts imputed against him by the Information. Again, he is deemed to
have waived any of the waivable defects in the Information filed against him. Court affirmed the
conviction of Rolando for Murder, as held by the RTC. The testimony of the eyewitness deserves full
faith and credit. It is thus sufficient to establish the guilt of Rolando beyond reasonable doubt.
Tayao v. Republic and , G.R. No. 235682 (Notice), [January 22, 2018])

FACTS: Tayao has been buying flour from BRW Import Distribution (BRW) since 1997. As payment
for the flour delivered from January 2007 to May 2007, Tayao issued ten (10) checks with a total value
of P1,139,975.00. However, when the checks were presented for payment, the same were dishonored
by the drawee banks for the reason "Drawn Against Insufficient Funds" or "Account Closed." A demand
letter was sent to Tayao, but she failed to make good the face value of the checks or to pay her
obligation to BRW. As a result, ten (10) separate informations for violation of B.P. 22 were filed before
the Makati Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) by Beatriz White (White), BRW's proprietor, against Tayao.
Defense filed a case for demurrer to evidence granted by MetC and affirmed by RTC. The civil aspect
was then tried. The Court ruled that the prosecution was able to prove by preponderance of evidence
that Tayao failed to pay the face value of the checks she issued. On appeal, Tayao argued that she
cannot be held liable for her obligation because demand of the same was not proven. The prosecution,
according to her, should have presented the messenger of the demand letters sent to her as a witness
to prove that there was really a demand of the obligation. The CA, however, ruled that although the
messenger of the demand letter was not presented, the demand letter itself may be used as evidence
to prove that demand was made on her so as to make her civilly liable. The court made clear that while
the demand letters sent to Tayao may not be sufficient to prove notice as far as the criminal aspect of
the case is concerned, the same does not hold true with respect to the civil aspect. This is so because
unlike in criminal cases where the quantum of proof required is proof beyond reasonable doubt, mere
preponderance of evidence is sufficient to prove notice in civil cases.

ISSUE: Whether or not the demand letters sent to Tayao were sufficient to prove her civil liability.

RULING: Yes. A civil aspect which is proven by another quantum of evidence, a mere preponderance
of evidence. A person acquitted of a criminal charge is not necessarily civilly free because the quantum
of proof required in criminal prosecution (proof beyond reasonable doubt) is greater than that required
for civil liability (mere preponderance of evidence). In order to be completely free from civil liability, a
person's acquittal must be based on the fact that he did not commit the offense. If the acquittal is
based merely on reasonable doubt, the accused may still be held civilly liable since this does not mean
he did not commit the act complained of. It may only be that the facts proved did not constitute the
offense charged.

Here, the lower court granted the demurrer to evidence filed by Tayao on the ground that the
prosecution failed to prove her receipt of the notice of dishonor, the same being one of the elements
of the crime of violation of B.P. 22. 10 This only means that the facts proved do not constitute the
illegal act of issuing worthless checks, but does not mean that she is not indebted to BRW. As correctly
ruled by the CA, the demand letter was validly appreciated and was sufficient to prove her monetary
obligation to BRW. Notably, she recognized her liability, only that she claimed to have partially paid
the same. This contention, however, cannot stand as it is a mere allegation, and not proof. One who
pleads payment has the burden of proving it. Such burden rests on the defendant to prove payment,
rather than on the plaintiff to prove non-payment. Indeed, once the existence of an indebtedness is
duly established by evidence, the burden of showing with legal certainty that the obligation has been
discharged by payment rests on the debtor.
Spouses Manalo v. Roldan-Confesor, G.R. No. 102358, [November 19, 1992], 290 PHIL 311-
326)

FACTS: Petitioners Vicente and Gloria Manalo responded to a newspaper advertisement for a job
opportunity as a driver and tutor/babysitter. They applied through Career Planners Specialists
International, Inc. (CPSI), owned by private respondents spouses Fernandez. The Manalos were hired
for a job in Saudi Arabia with a monthly salary of US$350 each, and they claimed to have paid a
placement fee of P40,000, with P30,000 paid upfront and the remaining balance covered by a
promissory note. The couple was not issued a receipt despite their request. Before boarding, Gloria
noticed that her position was changed to domestic help, but CPSI assured her that it was a temporary
change. The Manalos were given Travel Exit Passes (TEP) from Filipino Manpower Services
(FILMAN), a licensed recruitment agency affiliated with CPSI. However, upon arrival, they discovered
that Gloria was assigned to work as a maid, and Vicente faced unbearable working conditions. Before
leaving Saudi Arabia, Vicente had to sign a promissory note for his plane fare and a quitclaim in favor
of CPSI and his employer. The Manalos filed a complaint with the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration (POEA) alleging illegal exaction, false advertisement, and other violations, seeking a
refund of the amount paid and moral damages. POEA initially ruled in favor of the Manalos, but private
respondents filed a motion for reconsideration, which was granted. POEA's resolution stated that the
sole basis for holding the respondents liable for illegal exaction was the uncorroborated testimony of
the complainants. The Secretary of Labor sustained the reconsideration of POEA.

ISSUE: Whether public respondents gravely abused their discretion when they violated petitioners’
right to administrative due process by requiring clear and convincing evidence to establish the charge
of illegal exaction.

RULING: Yes. In the administrative proceedings for cancellation, revocation or suspension of

Authority or License, no rule requires that testimonies of complainants be corroborated by
documentary evidence, if the charge of unlawful exaction is substantially proven. All administrative
determinations require only substantial proof and not clear and convincing evidence as erroneously
contended by public respondents.

Clear and convincing proof is more than mere preponderance but not to extent of such certainty as is
required beyond reasonable doubt as in criminal cases while substantial evidence consists of more
than a mere scintilla of evidence but may be somewhat less than a preponderance. Consequently, in
the hierarchy of evidentiary values, We find proof beyond reasonable doubt at the highest level,
followed by clear and convincing evidence, preponderance of evidence, and substantial evidence, in
that order.

The administrative determination of facts and the consequent imposition of suspension/ revocation of
Authority/License does not make the proceedings criminal. Hence, it does not require a higher degree
of proof. Moreover, the sanctions are administrative and, accordingly, their infliction does not give rise
to double jeopardy when a criminal action is instituted for the same act.
MODULE 2

Spouses Latip v. Chua, G.R. No. 177809, [October 16, 2009], 619 PHIL 155-170)

FACTS: Rosalie Chua (Rosalie) is the owner of Roferxane Building, a commercial building, located at
No. 158 Quirino Avenue corner Redemptorist Road, Barangay Baclaran, Parañaque City. On July 6,
2001, Rosalie filed a complaint for unlawful detainer plus damages against petitioners, Spouses Omar
and Moshiera Latip (Spouses Latip). Rosalie attached to the complaint a contract of lease over two
cubicles in Roferxane Bldg., signed by Rosalie, as lessor, and by Spouses Latip, as lessees thereof.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court may take judicial notice of practice of payment of goodwill money in
the Baclaran area.

RULING: No. The doctrine of judicial notice rests on the wisdom and discretion of the courts. The
power to take judicial notice is to be exercised by courts with caution; care must be taken that the
requisite notoriety exists; and every reasonable doubt on the subject should be promptly resolved in
the negative.

To say that a court will take judicial notice of a fact is merely another way of saying that the usual form
of evidence will be dispensed with if knowledge of the fact can be otherwise acquired. This is because
the court assumes that the matter is so notorious that it will not be disputed. But judicial notice is not
judicial knowledge. The mere personal knowledge of the judge is not the judicial knowledge of the
court, and he is not authorized to make his individual knowledge of a fact, not generally or
professionally known, the basis of his action. Judicial cognizance is taken only of those matters which
are "commonly" known. Things of "common knowledge," of which courts take judicial notice, may be
matters coming to the knowledge of men generally in the course of the ordinary experiences of life, or
they may be matters which are generally accepted by mankind as true and are capable of ready and
unquestioned demonstration.
Estrada v. Desierto, G.R. Nos. 146710-15 & 146738, [March 2, 2001], 406 PHIL 1-142)

FACTS: The case at bar stemmed from the events that transpired during EDSA II. President
Joseph Estrada pursuant to the calls for resignation, left Malacanang, and pursuant to this, Gloria
Macapagal. Arroyo, then the Vice President under Estrada’s reign took his place. Estrada now
goes to the court to contest the legitimacy of Macapagal. Arroyo’s presidency, arguing that he
never resigned as President, and hence, claims to still be the lawful President of the Philippines.
Among the pieces of evidence offered to prove that Estrada had indeed resigned from the
presidency is the Angara Diary, chronicling the last moments of Estrada in Malacanang.

ISSUE: Whether or not admissions of an agent are binding on the principal.

RULING: Yes. To begin with, the Angara Diary is not an out of court statement. The Angara Diary
is part of the pleadings in the cases at bar. Under our rules of evidence, admissions of an agent
(Secretary Angara) are binding on the principal (petitioner). Jones very well explains the reasons
for the rule, viz.: “What is done, by agent, is done by the principal through him, as through a mere
instrument. So, whatever is said by an agent, either in making a contract for his principal, or at
the time and accompanying the performance of any act within the scope of his authority, having
relation to, and connected with, and in the course of the particular contract or transaction in which
he is then engaged, or in the language of the old writers, dum fervet opus is, in legal effect, said
by his principal and admissible in evidence against such principal.”
Expertravel & Tours, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 152392, 26 May 2005, 459 SCRA 147,
162

FACTS: Yes. To begin with, the Angara Diary is not an out of court statement. The Angara Diary
is part of the pleadings in the cases at bar. Under our rules of evidence, admissions of an agent
(Secretary Angara) are binding on the principal (petitioner). Jones very well explains the reasons
for the rule, viz.: “What is done, by agent, is done by the principal through him, as through a mere
instrument. So, whatever is said by an agent, either in making a contract for his principal, or at
the time and accompanying the performance of any act within the scope of his authority, having
relation to, and connected with, and in the course of the particular contract or transaction in which
he is then engaged, or in the language of the old writers, dum fervet opus is, in legal effect, said
by his principal and admissible in evidence against such principal.”

ISSUE: Whether or not it is proper for the court to take judicial notice of the said teleconference.

RULING: Yes. The Supreme Court held that in this age of modern technology, the courts may
take judicial notice that business transactions may be made by individuals through
teleconferencing. Teleconferencing is interactive group communication (three or more people in
two or more locations) through an electronic medium. In general terms, teleconferencing can bring
people together under one roof even though they are separated by hundreds of miles.
Teleconferencing and videoconferencing of members of board of directors of private corporations
is commonly used in the Philippines to conduct business transactions or corporate governance.
Estrada v. Badoy, Jr., A.M. Nos. 01-12-01-SC & SB-02-10-J, [January 16, 2003], 443 PHIL 296-
322

FACTS: Subsequent to the descent of former President Estrada from power, the Office of the
Ombudsman filed several criminal cases against him, his family, and friends. One of them is
Criminal Case No. 26558 wherein he, his son Jose "Jinggoy" and Atty. Edward Serapio stand
accused for violation of Republic Act No. 7080, the Anti-Plunder Law. The case was raffled to the
Third Division of the Sandiganbayan composed of Justice Badoy, as Chairman, and Justices
Teresita Leonardo-De Castro and Ricardo M. Ilarde, now retired, as members.

After the termination of a series of pre-trial conference between the parties, the Sandiganbayan
furnished them and their counsel with a copy of the Pre-trial Order for their signatures. The
defense panel composed of Atty. Rene A.V. Saguisag (lead counsel), Justice Serafin R. Cuevas,
Attys. Jose B. Flaminiano, Felix D. Carao, Jr., Cleofe V. Verzola, and Delia H. Hermoso, refused
to sign it on the grounds that: 1) there is no provision in the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
requiring them to sign a Pre-trial Order; 2) they were not given ample time to read it; and 3) it
incorporates a statement that they admitted the existence of certain exhibits although there was
no such admission.

ISSUE: Whether or not the refusal was valid.

RULING: Yes. Considering that the Pre-trial Order contains the recital of the actions taken by the
parties, agreements and admissions, the facts stipulated, and the evidence marked, the parties
must sign it. A party who participates in the pre-trial conference and who signs the Joint Stipulation
of Facts is expected to sign the Pre-trial Order. If a party believes that the Pre-trial Order is not
an honest representation of what transpired in the pre-trial conference, then he must specify his
objections thereto and the court may modify it to prevent injustice. This was what respondents
exactly did when complainants pointed out the assailed statement in the Pre-trial Order.
Victor Ting and Emily Chan-Azajar vs. Court of Appeals and People of the Philippines
GR No. 140665, November 13, 2000

FACTS: Petitioner is charged for violation of BP 22. Petitioner issued several checks but was
dishonored for being drawn against insufficient funds. Tagle, the supposed payee, sent demand
letter to petitioner via registered mail. Petitioners deny receipt of such demand letters. Tagle
presented registry return receipt as proof of receipt.

ISSUE: Whether or not proof beyond reasonable doubt exists to satisfy the elements of violation
under BP 22.

RULING: No. There was no proof beyond reasonable doubt. The first and third elements for the
violation of BP 22 was satisfied. However, the prosecution failed to establish the second element.
The second element requires that there is knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the
time of issue there are no sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of
such check in full upon its presentment. Since the second element involves a state of mind which
is difficult to verify, BP 22 provides that such knowledge of the insufficiency of funds is brought
into existence only after it is proved that the issuer had received a notice of dishonor and that,
within five days from receipt thereof, he failed to pay the amount of the check or to make
arrangement for its payment. In this case, to prove mailing, the prosecution seems to have
presumed that the registry return receipt was proof enough that the demand letter was sent
through registered mail and that the same was actually received by petitioners or their agents.
However, it is necessary in cases for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, that the prosecution
prove that the issuer had received a notice of dishonor. It is a general rule that when service of
notice is an issue, the person alleging that the notice was served must prove the fact of service.
There being insufficient proof that petitioners received notice that their checks had been
dishonored, the presumption that they knew of the insufficiency of the funds therefor cannot arise.
Estrada v. Desierto, G.R. Nos. 146710-15 & 146738 (Resolution), [April 3, 2001], 408 PHIL 194-
255
Adoptive Admission - Where it appears that a party clearly and unambiguously assented to or adopted
the statements of another, evidence of those statements is admissible against him. This is the essence
of the principle of adoptive admission

FACTS: In the 1998 elections, Joseph Ejercito Estrada was elected President and Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo as Vice-President. Estrada's presidency faced challenges, starting with accusations of
corruption by Governor Luis "Chavit" Singson in 2000. The allegations led to investigations by the
Senate and House of Representatives, as well as calls for Estrada's resignation from religious leaders
and politicians. As the impeachment trial unfolded in November 2000, key figures resigned, and on
January 20, 2001, facing widespread protests and defections, Estrada left Malacañang Palace, and
Arroyo was sworn in as President, leading to a legal dispute over whether Estrada had resigned or
suffered a permanent disability.

ISSUE: Whether or not the act and statement of Former President Estrada constituted an adoptive
admission as evidence of his resignation?

RULING: Yes, it was an adoptive admission of Estrada. In the absence of a formal resignation letter,
the determination of whether the petitioner, Joseph Estrada, resigned on January 20, 2001, is based
on his actions and omissions. The sequence of events leading to his departure includes the Senate
Blue Ribbon Committee's investigation into allegations against him, public pressure, and key
defections, notably General Angelo Reyes. On January 19, the Angara Diary reflects concerns among
Estrada's advisers about the growing crowd at EDSA, leading to discussions of a snap election
proposal without Estrada as a candidate. The negotiations for a peaceful transfer of power on January
20 focused on a transition period, safety guarantees, and the opening of a second envelope, implying
that the resignation of the petitioner was not a disputed point. The petitioner's own words, "Ayoko na
masyado nang masakit," are considered clear evidence of his intent to resign.

In sum, we hold that the resignation of the petitioner cannot be doubted. It was confirmed by
his leaving Malacañang. In the press release containing his final statement, (1) he acknowledged the
oath-taking of the respondent as President of the Republic albeit with reservation about its legality; (2)
he emphasized he was leaving the Palace, the seat of the presidency, for the sake of peace and in
order to begin the healing process of our nation. He did not say he was leaving the Palace due to any
kind inability and that he was going to re-assume the presidency as soon as the disability disappears:
(3) he expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve them. Without doubt, he was
referring to the past opportunity given him to serve the people as President (4) he assured that he will
not shirk from any future challenge that may come ahead in the same service of our country.
Petitioner's reference is to a future challenge after occupying the office of the president which he has
given up; and (5) he called on his supporters to join him in the promotion of a constructive national
spirit of reconciliation and solidarity. Certainly, the national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity could
not be attained if he did not give up the presidency. The press release was petitioner's valedictory, his
final act of farewell. His presidency is now in the part tense.
Gonzales-Saldana v. Spouses Niamatali, G.R. No. 226587, [November 21, 2018]

FACTS: Spouses Niamatali then residing at United States of America made known to petitioner
Gonzales-Saldana(Saldana)their intention to acquire real properties in Metro Manila. They asked
Saldana to participate in the public auction on their behalf for a certain property in Las Pinas City. They
remitted US Dollars 60,000.00 or 3,000,000.00Php to Saldana's bank account. Saldana transmitted
TCTs covering properties located in Manila and Paranaque contrary to the directive to purchase the
Las Pinas property. Saldana explained that the public auction for the Las Pinas property did not push
through due to a third party claim.
On July 2002 when Spouses Niamatali's return to PH they informed Saldana that they were no longer
interested in acquiring the Las Pinas property and asked for the return of the 3,000,000.00Php which
Saldana aceeded.
Saldana even issued an acknowledgement receipt of 3,000,000.00Php and promised to return the
said amount on or before September 2002. Despite several demands Saldana never returned the
subject amount thus Spouses Niamatali filed a case for collection of sum of money,moral damages
and attorney's fees against Saldana.
Petitioner argues that the allegations in her Answer are not admissions,but are actually defenses to
show that the complaint states no cause of action.

ISSUE: Whether or not the statements of petitioner constitutes judicial admissions which binds
petitioner.

RULING: Petition is denied. The CA decision is affirmed with modification as to interest to instead
start earn at the rate of 6%per annum from the date of filing of the complaint until the decision becomes
final.
A judicial admission is an admission,verbal or written,made by a party in the course of the proceedings
in the same case,which dispenses with the need for proof with respect to the matter or fact admitted.It
may be contradicted only by showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that no such
admission was made.
A party who judicially admits a fact cannot later challenge [the] fact as judicial admissions are a waiver
of proof; production of evidence is dispensed with. A judicial admission also removes an admitted fact
from the field of controversy. Consequently, an admission made in the pleadings cannot be
controverted by the party making such admission and is cannot be controverted by the party making
such admission and is conclusive as to such party, and all proofs to the contrary or inconsistent
therewith should be ignored, whether objection is interposed by the party or not. The allegations,
statements or admissions contained in a pleading are conclusive as against the pleader. A party
cannot subsequently take a position contrary to or inconsistent with what was pleaded.

Here, Saldana does not even deny that she received P3,000,000.00 from respondent-spouses. To
resolve the controversy between the parties, the issue simply boils down to whether Saldana received
P3,000,000.00 from respondent-spouses and as can be gleaned from her Answer. Saldana admitted
such fact. She failed to prove that the admission was made through palpable mistake or that no such
admission was made. Her arguments, therefore, are mere desperate attempts to escape liability.
Atillo III v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 119053 (Resolution), [January 23, 1997], 334 PHIL 546-
555)

FACTS: On August 15, 1985, respondent Amancor, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as AMANCOR for
brevity), a corporation then owned and controlled by petitioner Florentino L. Atillo III , contracted a loan
in the amount of P1,000,000.00 with Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company, secured by real estate
properties owned by the petitioner. 1 Before the said loan could be paid, petitioner entered into a
Memorandum of Agreement dated June 14, 1988 (Annex "A" of the Complaint) with respondent
Michell Lhuillier (hereinafter referred to as LHUILLIER for brevity) whereby the latter bought shares of
stock in AMANCOR. As a consequence of the foregoing transaction, petitioner and LHUILLIER each
became owner of 47% of the outstanding shares of stock of AMANCOR while the officers of the
corporation owned the remaining 6%. In view of the urgent and immediate need for fresh capital to
support the business operations of AMANCOR, petitioner and LHUILLLER executed another
Memorandum of Agreement on February 13, 1989 (Annex "B" of the Complaint) by virtue of which
LHUILLIER undertook to invest additional capital in AMANCOR. As an addendum to the foregoing, a
Supplemental Memorandum of Agreement was entered into by the petitioner and LHUILLIER on
March 11, 1989. Petitioner contends that the decision of the respondent court absolving LHUILLIER
of personal liability is manifest error for being contrary to law, particularly Section 4 of Rule 129 of the
Rules of Court
ISSUE: Whether or not a court can rule against an admission despite clear indications that it was not
affected by mistakes palpable or otherwise.
RULING: We find petitioner's contention to be without merit and the reliance on the general rule
regarding judicial admissions enunciated by the abovementioned provision of law and jurisprudence
misplaced. As provided for in Section 4 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court, the general rule that a
judicial admission is conclusive upon the party making it and does not require proof admits of two
exceptions: 1) when it is shown that the admission was made through palpable mistake, and 2) when
it is shown that no such admission was in fact made. The latter exception allows one to contradict an
admission by denying that he made such an admission. Petitioner is seemingly misleading this Court
by isolating paragraph 3.11 of the said Answer from the preceding paragraphs. A careful scrutiny of
the Answer in its entirety will show that paragraph 3.11 is part of the affirmative allegations recounting
how LHUILLIER was persuaded to invest in AMANCOR which was previously owned and managed
by petitioner. Paragraph 3.11 has reference to the fact that in all investments made with AMANCOR
through stock purchases, only petitioner and LHUILLIER dealt with each other. It is more than obvious
that paragraph 3.11 has nothing to do with the obligation of AMANCOR to petitioner which is the
subject of the present case. Contrary to petitioner's allegations, LHUILLIER had categorically denied
personal liability for AMANCOR's corporate debts if petitioner really believed that the liability was
incurred by LHULLLIER in his personal capacity, then he should not have offset his accounts with
those of AMANCOR's. It is clear that in spite of the presence of judicial admissions in a party's
pleading, the trial court is still given leeway to consider other evidence presented. This rule should
apply with more reason when the parties had agreed to submit an issue for resolution of the trial court
on the basis of the evidence presented. As distinctly stated in the stipulation of facts entered into
during the pre-trial conference, the parties agreed that the determination of LHUILLIER's liability shall
be based on the Memoranda of Agreement designated as ANNEXES "A", "B" and "C" of the
Complaint. Thus, the trial court correctly relied on the provisions contained in the said Memoranda of
Agreement when it absolved LHUILLIER of personal liability for the obligation of AMANCOR to
petitioner.
Bitong v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 123553, CA-G.R. Nos. 33291 & 33873, [July 13, 1998],
354 PHIL 516-546

FACTS: Nora A. Bitong filed a derivative suit before the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
on behalf of Mr. & Ms. Publishing Co., Inc., alleging fraud, misrepresentation, and mismanagement by
respondents Eugenia D. Apostol and Jose A. Apostol, among others. Bitong, who claimed to be the
Treasurer and a Member of the Board of Directors of Mr. & Ms., accused Eugenia D. Apostol of
irregularities, including unauthorized cash advances to Philippine Daily Inquirer (PDI) and the lack of
proper authorization for transactions between Mr. & Ms. and PDI. The petition sought to enjoin the
Apostol spouses from acting as directors of Mr. & Ms., compel them to account for profits, and hold
them liable for damages. It also aimed to appoint a management committee for Mr. & Ms. and take
action against PDI and other third parties.
The inconsistency in the testimonies revolves around the ownership and registration of the shares of
stock in Mr. & Ms. Publishing Co., Inc. Specifically, petitioner Nora A. Bitong claims to be the registered
owner of 1,000 shares of stock out of the 4,088 total outstanding shares, as stated in her Amended
Petition before the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). On the other hand, private
respondents, particularly Eugenia D. Apostol, refute this claim by asserting that the signature on
Certificate of Stock No. 008, which supposedly proves petitioner's ownership, was signed on 17 March
1989, not on 25 July 1983, as asserted by Bitong.

ISSUE: Whether or not the inconsistencies affects the admissibility of the evidence

RULING: A party whose pleading is admitted as an admission against interest is entitled to overcome
by evidence the apparent inconsistency, and it is competent for the party against whom the pleading
is offered to show that the statements were inadvertently made or were made under a mistake of fact.
In addition, a party against whom a single clause or paragraph of a pleading is offered may have the
right to introduce other paragraphs which tend to destroy the admission in the paragraph offered by
the adversary.

The court ruled against the petitioner, Nora A. Bitong. The court found that there were substantial
inconsistencies and doubts regarding Bitong's ownership of the shares in Mr. & Ms. Publishing Co.,
Inc. The court emphasized that Bitong failed to provide clear and convincing evidence of how she
allegedly acquired the shares of JAKA. There were inconsistencies in her testimony, and the court
found her failure to submit rebuttal evidence as fatal to her case. It concluded that Bitong was not a
bona fide stockholder of the company and lacked the legal personality to initiate a derivative suit on
behalf of the corporation.
U.S. v. Blanco, G.R. No. L-12435, [November 9, 1917], 37 PHIL 126-132)

FACTS: The defendant and appellant was convicted originally in the court of the justice of peace of
themunicipality of Castillejos, Province of Zambales, and fined P25 on a charge of violation of an
ordinance of that municipality prohibiting and penalizing the obstruction of the public highways. On
appeal to the Court of First Instance of the Province of Zambales, the accused was again convicted
and fined P25.
Defendant argues that a doubt arises as to whether the ordinance in question was in force at the date
of itsalleged violation. Counsel contends that since no affirmative proof was offered in the court below
as to the date of approval of the ordinance, the court had no evidence before it on which to base a
finding that the ordinance was in force at the date of its alleged violation.
ISSUE: Whether or not judicial notice is applicable to the said ordinance.
RULING: Yes, judicial notice by courts regarding municipal ordinances may be applied. While state
courts generally do not take judicial notice of ordinances, municipal or city courts, including police
courts, do take notice of ordinances and resolutions within their jurisdiction without the need for
pleading or proof.
Municipal courts, and the circuit courts on trials de novo on appeal from them, will take judicial notice
not only of the ordinances of a city, but of such journals and records of the commoncouncil as affect
their validity, meaning, and construction, just as state courts take official noticeof the public statutes
of the State and the journals of the legislature. (Portland vs. Yick, 44 Ore.,439.) When the case was
taken on appeal from the police court to the district court, it was not onlywithin the power, but it was
the duty of the district court to try the case in the same manner thatit should be tried before the police
court. The district court was in fact substituted for the policecourt have taken judicial notice of while
the case was in that court, the district court could andshould have taken judicial notice of after the
removal of the case to the district court. (Smith vs.City of Emporia, 27 Kan, 528, 530.
)Where an action for the violation of a city ordinance is commenced and prosecuted to convictionand
sentence before the police judge of such city, and the case is then taken by the defendanton appeal
to the district court the district court should, with reference to such case, takeexistence and substance
of its ordinances. (City of Solomon vs. Hughes, 24 Kan., 154.)As shedding some light upon the
contentions raised by counsel in this connection, we inserthere a citation from Dillon on Municipal
Corporations, which, read together with the citations inthe noted appended by the author, indicates
quite clearly the line of reasoning upon which thecourts in the United States have proceeded in cases
of this kind:Mode of pleading ordinances. The courts, unless they are the courts of the municipality,
donot judicially notice the ordinances of a municipal corporation, unless directed by charter orstatute
to do so. Therefore, such ordinances, when sought to be enforced by action, or when setup by the
defendant as a protection, should be set out or stated in substance in the pleading. Ithas been
sometimes decided that it is not sufficient that they be referred to generally by the titleor section. It is,
however, believed to be sufficient, in the absence of special legislativeprovisions prescribing the
manner of pleading, to set forth the legal substance of that part of theordinance alleged to have been
violated, it being advisable, for the purposes of identification, torefer also to the tile, date and section.
The liberal rules of pleading and practice whichcharacterize modern judicial proceedings should
extend to, and doubtless would be held toembrace, suits and prosecutions to enforce the by-laws or
ordinances of municipal corporations.(Dillon on Corporations, sec. 413 (346).
Hizon v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 119619, [December 13, 1996], 333 PHIL 358-382
FACTS: On September 1992 in Puerto Princesa City, Palawan, when Task Force Bantay Dagat was
organized to address reports of illegal fishing. The task force, accompanied by police, responded to a
report of illegal fishing using the "muro ami" method as prohibited by PD 704. Upon inspection of a
fishing boat named F/B Robinson, the police found two foreigners with photocopy passports and a
large aquarium of live fish. The police inspected the boat's license and fishermen, finding no violations,
but still brought them for further investigation. Subsequently, samples of the fish were taken for
laboratory examination, revealing the presence of sodium cyanide. The PNP Maritime Command filed
charges against the boat owner, operator, captain, crew, and others for various violations related to
illegal fishing. The accused claimed to be legitimate fishermen using the hook and line method and
asserted that the samples were taken without their consent or knowledge.
ISSUE: Whether or not the presence of sodium cyanide on the fish sample an admissible evidence of
the offense.

RULING: No, the presence of sodium cynanide is a disputable presumption. The third paragraph of
section 33 of P.D. 704 creates a presumption of guilt based on facts proved and hence is not
constitutionally impermissible. The ultimate fact presumed is that the owner and operator of the boat
or the fisherman were engaged in illegal fishing and this presumption was made to arise from the
discovery of the substances and the contaminated fish in the possession of the fisherman in the fishing
boat. The court stresses, however, that the statutory presumption is merely primafacie. It can not,
under the guise of regulating the presentation of evidence, operate to preclude the accused from
presenting his defense to rebut the main fact presumed. At no instance can the accused be denied
the right to rebut the presumption.
It was from this fish cage that the four dead specimens examined on October 7, 1992 and the five
specimens examined on November 23, 1992 were taken. Though all the specimens came from the
same source allegedly tainted with sodium cyanide, the two tests resulted in conflicting findings.The
prosecution failed to explain the contradictory findings on the fish samples and this omission raises a
reasonable doubt that the one ton of fishes in the cage were caught with the use of sodium cyanide.
The absence of cyanide in the second set of fish specimens supports petitioners' claim that they did
not use the poison in fishing. According to them, they caught the fishes by the ordinary and legal way,
i.e., by hook and line on board their sampans. This claim is buttressed by the prosecution evidence
itself. The apprehending officers saw petitioners fishing by hook and line when they came upon them
in the waters of Barangay San RafaelThe apprehending officers who boarded and searched the boat
did not find any sodium cyanide nor any poisonous or obnoxious substance. Neither did they find any
trace of the poison in the possession of the fishermen or in the fish cage itself.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is granted and the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR
No. 15417 is reversed and set aside. Petitioners are acquitted of the crime of illegal fishing with the
use of poisonous substances defined under Section 33 of Republic Act No. 704, the Fisheries Decree
of 1975. No costs.
In Re: Elbanbuena y Marfil, G.R. No. 237721, [July 31, 2018]

FACTS: Rolando M. Elbanbuena, a Disbursing Officer of Alingilan National High School, Bacolod,
was charged with malversation of public funds through falsification of documents. He was found guilty
in Criminal Cases, and the decision became final and executory on August 10, 2000. Elbanbuena
commenced serving his sentence on January 9, 2003, at the New Bilibid Prison in Muntinlupa City.
On August 29, 2017, Republic Act (RA) No. 10951 was enacted, amending penalties for certain
crimes, including malversation.

ISSUE:
1. Whether the petitioner, Rolando M. Elbanbuena, is entitled to the benefits of the amended
penalties under RA No. 10951.
2. Whether Elbanbuena should be immediately released from confinement based on the
modified sentence.

RULING: In December 5, 2017, the Supreme Court, in Hernan v. Sandiganbayan, acknowledged the
exceptional circumstance brought about by the passage of RA No. 10951, allowing the reopening of
cases to modify penalties. The Court emphasized the need to correct penalties, not guilt findings, in
light of the amended law.
Elbanbuena sought the modification of his sentence and immediate release under RA No. 10951. The
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) agreed that petitioners could invoke RA No. 10951 but argued
that the determination of reduced penalties and release entitlement should be decided by a court of
competent jurisdiction.
The Supreme Court, in its decision dated July 31, 2018, granted the petition. It remanded the case to
the Regional Trial Court in Muntinlupa City for the determination of the proper penalties under RA No.
10951 and the entitlement of Elbanbuena to immediate release based on the modified sentences. The
Court also issued guidelines for similar cases, emphasizing the role of the trial court in assessing both
legal and factual aspects.
In summary, the Supreme Court acknowledged the impact of RA No. 10951 on reducing penalties,
allowing for the reopening of cases to correct sentences. The decision emphasized the need for a trial
court to determine the modified penalties and assess the entitlement to immediate release.
Gabrillo v. Heirs of Pastor, G.R. No. 234255, [October 2, 2019]

FACTS: Genoveva G. Gabrillo, represented by her attorney-in-fact Medardo G. Cadiente, Jr., filed a
petition against the heirs of Olimpio Pastor, represented by Cresenciana Manguiran Vda. de Pastor.
The dispute involved a parcel of land in Davao City, originally owned by Olimpio and Cresenciana
Pastor. A Transfer of Rights and Sale of Improvements was executed in 1967, resulting in a
compromise agreement reducing the land to 9,000 square meters. In 1991, Ernesto A. Cadiente, Sr.,
transferred the entire property to Genoveva G. Gabrillo. The respondents filed for a free patent in
1997, leading to the issuance of Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-14876 in their favor. Gabrillo
claimed the creation of an implied trust, justifying reconveyance and annulment of the OCT.
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) dismissed the case due to a lack of jurisdiction, as the complaint failed
to state the assessed value of the property. The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed this decision.

ISSUE: Whether the RTC acquired jurisdiction over Gabrillo's action based on the mere allegation of
the market value or estimated value of the subject property in the complaint.

RULING: The Supreme Court denied the petition, affirming the decisions of the RTC and the CA. It
emphasized that jurisdiction over real property actions is determined by the assessed value of the
property as alleged in the complaint, not the market value. Since Gabrillo's complaint failed to state
the assessed value, the RTC correctly dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. The Court rejected
Gabrillo's argument that the payment of docket fees based on the market value conferred jurisdiction,
emphasizing the importance of alleging the assessed value in the complaint. The Court also did not
consider the respondents estopped from questioning jurisdiction, and it upheld the dismissal on
procedural grounds.

Relevant Laws:
• B.P. Blg. 129 (The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended by R.A. No. 7691):
Specifies that the assessed value of the property determines the jurisdiction of the court over actions
involving title to, or possession of, real property.

• Sections 19(2) and 33(3) of B.P. Blg. 129: Provide the jurisdictional requirements for Regional
Trial Courts and lower courts in civil cases involving real property.
Juego-Sakai v. Republic, G.R. No. 224015, [July 23, 2018]

FACTS: Petitioner Stephen I. Juego-Sakai and Toshiharu Sakai got married on August 11, 2000 in
Japan pursuant to the wedding rites therein. After two (2) years, the parties, by agreement, obtained
a divorce decree in said country dissolving their marriage.2 Thereafter, on April 5, 2013, petitioner filed
a Petition for Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
40, Camarines Norte. In its Decision dated October 9, 2014, the RTC granted the petition and
recognized the divorce between the parties as valid and effective under Philippine Laws.3 On
November 25, 2015, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.
In an Amended Decision4 dated March 3, 2016, however, the CA revisited its findings and recalled
and set aside its previous decision. According to the appellate court, the second of the following
requisites under Article 26 of the Family Code is missing: (a) there is a valid marriage that has been
celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and (b) a divorce is obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.5 This is because the divorce herein was consensual in
nature, obtained by agreement of the parties, and not by Sakai alone. Thus, since petitioner, a Filipino
citizen, also obtained the divorce herein, said divorce cannot be recognized in the Philippines. In
addition, the CA ruled that petitioner's failure to present authenticated copies of the Civil Code of Japan
was fatal to her cause.
ISSUE/S:
i.Whether or not the honorable [court of appeals] gravely erred under law when it held that the
second requisite for the application of the second paragraph of article 26 of the family code is not
present because the petitioner gave consent to the divorce obtained by her Japanese husband.
ii.Whether or not the honorable [court of appeals] gravely erred under law when it held that there
is no substantial compliance with requirement on the submission of authenticated copies of [the]
civil code of japan relative to divorce as required by the rules.
RULING: The issue before Us has already been resolved in the landmark ruling of Republic v.
Manalo,11 the facts of which fall squarely on point with the facts herein. In Manalo, respondent Marelyn
Manalo, a Filipino, was married to a Japanese national named Yoshino Minoro. She, however, filed a
case for divorce before a Japanese Court, which granted the same and consequently issued a divorce
decree dissolving their marriage. Thereafter, she sought to have said decree recognized in the
Philippines and to have the entry of her marriage to Minoro in the Civil Registry in San Juan, Metro
Manila, cancelled, so that said entry shall not become a hindrance if and when she decides to remarry.
The trial court, however, denied Manalo's petition and ruled that Philippine law does not afford Filipinos
the right to file for a divorce, whether they are in the country or abroad, if they are married to Filipinos
or to foreigners, or if they celebrated their marriage in the Philippines or in another country. Applying
the foregoing pronouncement to the case at hand, the Court similarly rules that despite the fact that
petitioner participated in the divorce proceedings in Japan, and even if it is assumed that she initiated
the same, she must still be allowed to benefit from the exception provided under Paragraph 2 of Article
26. Consequently, since her marriage to Toshiharu Sakai had already been dissolved by virtue of the
divorce decree they obtained in Japan, thereby capacitating Toshiharu to remarry, petitioner shall
likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed Amended
Decision dated March 3, 2016 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 104253 is REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. The case is REMANDED to the court of origin for further proceedings and reception of
evidence as to the relevant Japanese law on divorce. SO ORDERED.
Datalift Movers, Inc. v. Belgravia Realty & Development Corp., G.R. No. 144268, [August 30,
2006], 531 PHIL 554-563)

FACTS: The premises involved in this case is a warehouse (bodega) used by petitioner Datalift
Movers, Inc. (Datalift for short) for its cargoes in connection with its brokerage business. The
warehouse stands on a 3,967.70 squaremeter lot owned by the Philippine National Railways (PNR)
and located at No. 883 Santibañez Street corner Cristobal Street, Pandacan, Manila.
Sometime in 1987, PNR leased out the lot to Sampaguita Brokerage, Inc. (Sampaguita, hereafter),
pursuant to a written contract commencing on July 1, 1987 and terminating on June 30, 1990 for a
monthly rental of P6,282.49, subject to a ten (10%) percent increase every year. Sampaguita
thereafter entered into a special arrangement with its sister company, Belgravia Realty & Development
Corporation (Belgravia for short) whereby the latter would put up on the lot a warehouse for its own
use. True enough, Belgravia did put up a warehouse occupying an area of about 3,000 squaremeters
of the lot. However, instead of using the said warehouse for itself, Belgravia sublet it to petitioner
Datalift, represented by its president Jaime B. Aquino, pursuant to a 1-year written contract of lease
dated October 2, 1990, commencing on October 5, 1990 and ending on October 5, 1991, subject to
extension upon mutual agreement by the parties. By the terms of lease, Datalift shall pay Belgravia a
monthly rental of P40,000.00 payable on or before the 15th day of each month, provided an advance
rental for two (2) months is paid upon execution of the contract. After the one year contract period
expired, lessee Datalift continued in possession and enjoyment of the leased warehouse, evidently by
acquiesance of lessor Belgravia or by verbal understanding of the parties. Subsequently, Belgravia
unilaterally increased the monthly rental to P60,000.00 starting June 1994 to October 1994. Monthly
rental was again increased from P60,000.00 to P130,000.00 beginning November 1994 onwards,
allegedly in view of the increased rental demanded by PNR on Sampaguita for the latter’s lease of the
former’s lot whereon the warehouse in question stands. Because of the rental increase made by
Belgravia, Datalift stopped paying its monthly rental for the warehouse. Thereafter, Sampaguita
addressed demand letters to Datalift asking the latter to pay its rental in arrears in the amount of
P4,120,000.00 and to vacate and surrender the warehouse in dispute. The demands having proved
futile, Belgravia and/or Sampaguita filed with the MeTC of Manila their complaint for ejectment against
Datalift and/or its controlling stockholder, Jaime B. Aquino.

ISSUE: Whether or not CA erred in holding that an implied new lease was created between PNR and
Respondents when the former did not take positive action to eject the latter from the premises.

RULING: There is no definite showing that the lease contract between PNR and Sampaguita
Brokerage, Inc. had been effectively terminated. As held by the court a quo: “(B)y PNR not taking a
positive action to eject Sampaguita from the leased premises up to the present, again, there is a tacit
renewal of the lease contract between PNR and Sampaguita. The Rules of Court already sufficiently
shields respondent Belgravia, as lessor, from being questioned by the petitioners as lessees,
regarding its title or better right of possession as lessor because having admitted the existence of a
lessor-lessee relationship, the petitioners are barred from assailing Belgravia’s title of better right of
possession as their lessor.
Section 2, Rule 131, of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 2. Conclusive presumptions. — The following are instances of conclusive presumptions:
(a) Whenever a party has, by his own declaration, act, or omission, intentionally and deliberately led
another to believe a particular thing true, and to act upon such belief, he cannot, in any litigation arising
out of such declaration, act or omission, be permitted to falsify it;
(b) The tenant is not permitted to deny the title of his landlord at the time of the commencement of the
relation of landlord and tenant between them. (Underscoring ours.)
Conclusive presumptions have been defined as “inferences which the law makes so peremptory that
it will not allow them to be overturned by any contrary proof however strong.” 7 As long as the lessor-
lessee relationship between the petitioners and Belgravia exists as in this case, the former, as lessees,
cannot by any proof, however strong, overturn the conclusive presumption that Belgravia has valid
title to or better right of possession to the subject leased premises than they have.
Alicbusan v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 113905, [March 7, 1997], 336 PHIL 321-328)

FACTS: Cesar Cordero and Leopoldo Alicbusan were partners in operating Baby's Canteen at the
Philtranco terminal in Pasay City.The partnership, initially set to last until July 1984, continued beyond
that period based on their mutual agreement. Cordero filed a complaint against Alicbusan for
collection, alleging that Alicbusan, as Philtranco's president, instigated the withholding of remittances
to Baby's Canteen. Alicbusan claimed that he transferred his rights over Baby's Canteen to Cordero
through a Deed of Sale and Transfer of Right on April 5, 1989, for P250,000. Disagreement arose
regarding the terms of the sale, particularly the downpayment and subsequent installment payments.

ISSUE:
1. Whether there is still a partnership between Alicbusan and Cordero.
2. Whether the Deed of Sale and Transfer of Right between Alicbusan and Cordero is valid.
3. Whether Alicbusan is liable for moral damages and attorney's fees.

RULING:
1. The Supreme Court emphasized that the issue of the partnership's existence is a factual
matter, and it cannot reevaluate evidence presented by the parties.
2. The Court rejected Alicbusan's reliance on legal presumptions favoring the validity of the deed
of sale, stating that these are disputable presumptions that can be rebutted by evidence to the
contrary.
3. The Court affirmed the lower courts' findings that the deed of sale was fictitious and not
complied with, and Alicbusan acted in bad faith in withholding remittances. Moral damages and
attorney's fees were deemed appropriate due to Alicbusan's alleged gross and evident bad faith.

The Supreme Court denied Alicbusan's petition, affirming the decision of the Court of Appeals. The
court underscored the importance of presenting evidence to rebut disputable presumptions and
emphasized its limited role in reevaluating factual matters already assessed by lower courts.
Ting v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 140665, [November 13, 2000], 398 PHIL 481-496)

FACTS:
ISSUE:
RULING:
Hizon v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 119619, [December 13, 1996], 333 PHIL 358-382
Private Hospitals Association of the Philippines, Inc. v. Medialdea, G.R. No. 234448,
[November 6, 2018]

FACTS: Private Hospitals Association of the Philippines, Inc., (PHAPi) - an organization of privately-
owned clinics, hospitals, and other health facilities - seeks to declare as unconstitutional and void the
duty imposed upon hospitals, medical practitioners and employees to prevent actual death or injury
under Section 1; the penal provisions under Section 4; the presumption of liability clause under Section
5; and the reimbursement and tax deduction clause under Sections 7 and 8, all of Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 10932[1] otherwise known as an Act Strengthening the Anti-Hospital Deposit Law.

On August 25, 1997, BP 702 was amended by R.A. No. 8344.[5] R.A. No. 8344 makes it unlawful not
only to demand, but also to request, solicit, and accept any deposit or advance payment as a
prerequisite for confinement or medical treatment in emergency or serious cases.

R.A. No. 8344 also increased the penalties prescribed under BP 702 to imprisonment of not less than
six months and one day but not more than two years and four months, or a fine of not less than twenty
thousand pesos, but not more than one hundred thousand pesos, or both at the discretion of the court.

R.A. No. 10932 makes it unlawful to request, solicit, demand or accept deposit or advance payment
as a prerequisite not only for confinement or medical treatment but also for administering basic
emergency care.[12] It expands the scope of "basic emergency care" to include medical procedures
and treatment administered to a woman in active labor.

R.A. No. 10932 also introduces the creation of a Health Facilities Oversight Board (Board) where
complaints against health facilities for violations of the law shall be initially filed.

In addition, R.A. No. 10932 introduces the three-strike rule, or when upon 3 repeated violations
committed pursuant .to an established policy or upon instruction of the management, the health
facility's license to operate shall be revoked by the Department of Health (DOH).

Petitioner claims locus standi to file the present Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition as it stands to
be directly injured by the implementation of R.A. No. 10932 insofar as the law regulates the conduct
of its members and places the latter's management and staff at the risk of administrative, civil, and
criminal sanctions.

Petitioner argues that "basic emergency care" and "emergency treatment and support" as defined
under R.A. No. 10932 imposes upon the physician, the hospital, its management and staff the
untenable duties to actually prevent death, permanent disability, permanent injury to or loss of an
unborn baby or its non-institutional delivery and to sufficiently address an emergency situation and in
case of a woman in active labor, to ensure the safe delivery of the baby.

Further, petitioner aims to strike down the fines imposed under Section 4 for being unjust, excessive,
and oppressive as they are not commensurate to the act or omission that is being penalized.

Finally, petitioner seeks to strike down as unconstitutional the exclusion of the basic emergency care
of patients not classified as poor, indigent or marginalized from PhilHealth reimbursement, PCSO
assistance and tax deductibility under Sections 7 and 8 of R.A. No. 10932 for being violative of the
equal protection clause.

Respondents Hon. Salvador Medialdea, Executive Secretary, and the Acting Secretary of Department
of Health, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), seek to dismiss the instant petition for
being procedurally infirm on the ground that certiorari and prohibition are proper only against judicial,
quasi-judicial, or ministerial act.

Respondents likewise defend the validity of the presumption of liability clause on the argument that
the liability therein mentioned pertains to the liability for the death, permanent disability, serious
impairment, injury or loss of the unborn child and that such presumption arises only upon prior proof
that there was denial of admission to the health facility and that such denial was made pursuant to a
policy of demanding deposits for confinement or treatment.

ISSUE/S:
(a) are petitions for certiorari and prohibition proper to assail the constitutionality of R.A. No.
10932; (b) is direct resort to the Court proper; (c) has petitioner, as an association of privately-
owned hospitals, clinics and other health facilities, the requisite legal standing; and (c) is the
petition ripe for adjudication.

RULING: We dismiss the petition. While the remedies of certiorari and prohibition are proper legal
vehicles to assail the constitutionality of a law, the requirements for the exercise of the Court's judicial
review even under its expanded jurisdiction must nevertheless first be satisfied.

Principles:

The rule is settled that the allegations in the complaint and the character of the relief sought determine
the nature of the action and the court that has jurisdiction over it.

As expressly granted by the Constitution, the Court's expanded jurisdiction when invoked permits a
review of acts not only by a tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial
functions, but also by any branch or instrumentality of the Government. "Any branch or instrumentality
of the Government" necessarily includes the legislative and the executive, even if they are not
exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions.

etitions for certiorari and prohibition are appropriate remedies to raise constitutional issues and to
review and/or prohibit or nullify the acts of legislative and executive officials.

Arguing the absence of the first and second requisites, respondents seek an outright dismissal of the
instant petition.
In re: Szatraw v. Sors, G.R. No. L-1780, [August 31, 1948], 81 PHIL 461-464)

FACTS: Consuelo, the petitioner, is the lawful wife of Nicolas Szatraw, a Polish citizen, to whom
she was married in Manila in November 1936, whom she bore a child named Alexis Szatraw born
on September 8 1937. Consuelo and Nicolas lived together until February 1940 when Nicolas
left, taking their child with him, and never returned. She made inquiries and learned that her
husband went to Shanghai however, to information obtained from Polish citizens who had arrived
from that place, he and the child had not been seen and could not be found. Despite her efforts,
Consuelo was unable to ascertain their whereabouts and, believing her husband to be dead after
more than seven years of absence without any communication, she sought a judicial declaration
to that effect. She filed a petition seeking a declaration that her husband be presumed dead and
preservation of her parental authority over her child if he is alive. Based on the evidence, they did
not acquire any property during their marriage and that his life was not insured. The trial court
dismissed the petition on the ground that it is not for the settlement of the estate of the absentee,
and because the rule of evidence establishing the presumption that a person unheard from in
seven years is dead, does not create a right upon which a judicial pronouncement or a decree
may be predicated. The petitioner has appealed.

ISSUE: Whether the court should grant Consuelo's request for a declaration that her husband be
presumed dead.

RULING: No. The presumption of death after seven years is already established by law and does
not require a judicial declaration. Additionally, a judicial declaration based solely on this
presumption cannot reach finality as it is still disputable and subject to contrary proof.

The disputable presumption established by the rule of evidence that a person not heard from in
seven years is dead, may arise and be invoked and made in a case, either in an action or in a
special proceeding, which is tried or heard by, and submitted for decision to, a competent court.
Independently of such an action or special proceeding, the presumption of death cannot be
invoked, nor can it be made the subject of an action or special proceeding.

In this case, there is no right to be enforced nor is there a remedy prayed for by the petitioner
against her absent husband. Neither is there a prayer for the final determination of his right or
status or for the ascertainment of a particular fact (Hagans vs. Wislizenus, 42 Phil. 880), for the
petition does not pray for a declaration that the petitioner’s husband is dead, but merely asks for
a declaration that he be presumed dead because he had been unheard from in seven years. If
there is any pretense at securing a declaration that the petitioner’s husband is dead, such a
pretension cannot be granted because it is unauthorized. The petition is for a declaration that the
petitioner’s husband is presumptively dead. But this declaration, even if judicially made, would
not improve the petitioner’s situation, because such a presumption is already established by law.
A judicial pronouncement to that effect, even if final and executory, would still be a prima facie
presumption only. It is still disputable. It is for that reason that it cannot be the subject of a judicial
pronouncement or declaration, if it is the only question or matter involved in a case, or upon which
a competent court has to pass.

It is, therefore, clear that a judicial declaration that a person is presumptively dead, because he
had been unheard from in seven years, being a presumption juris tantum only, subject to contrary
proof, cannot reach the stage of finality or become final. The court expressed concerns that such
a declaration might be misused for purposes such as obtaining a divorce indirectly, which is not
allowed under the existing divorce law.