MOLDOVA STATE UNIVERSITY

FACULTY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, POLITICAL AND

ADMINISTRATIVE SCIENCES
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS DEPARTMENT

GUREANU ANA

STRENGHTENING RESILIENCE OF THE REPUBLIC OF

MOLDOVA TO HYBRID THREATS OF NATIONAL SECURITY

Master thesis

Author: ____________
(signature)

Scientific adviser: _____________

Ejov, Cristina, PhD., Associate Professor

Approved by: Head of Department ______________

EJOV Cristina, PhD., Associate Professor

CHISINAU, 2023
 UNIVERSITATEA DE STAT DIN MOLDOVA

FACULTATEA RELAŢII INTERNAŢIONALE, ŞTIINŢE POLITICE

ŞI ADMINISTRATIVE
DEPARTAMENTUL RELAŢII INTERNAŢIONALE

GUREANU ANA

CONSOLIDAREA REZILIENŢEI REPUBLICII MOLDOVA LA

AMENINŢĂRILE HIBRIDE LA ADRESA SECURITĂŢII
NAŢIONALE

Teză de master

Autorul: ______________
(semnătura)

Conducător științific: _____________

Ejov, Cristina, dr.conf.univ.

Aprob: Șef Departament ______________

EJOV Cristina, dr., conf. univ.

CHIŞINĂU, 2023

2
 CONTENT

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS…………………………………………………….……………………...4
ANNOTATION……………………………………………………………..…………………………......5
INTRODUCTION……………………………………………………………………………...……….....7

1. HISTORIOGRAPHICAL AND THEORETICAL - CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS OF

RESILIENCE FROM THE SECURITY PERSPECTIVE……………………………………......5
1.1. Historiographical research of resilience from the security perspective……………………….14
1.2. Theoretical-conceptual bases of the analysis of resilience in the security field………..…….25
1.3. Conclusions to chapter 1………………………………………………………………….…………35

2. HYBRID SECURITY THREATS: EU AND NATO EXPERIENCE IN

STRENGTHENING RESILIENCE…………………………………………………...……………..37
2.1. Hybrid threats: concept, tools and modus-operandi………………………….………………….37
2.2. EU and NATO models of strengthening resilience to hybrid threats…………………………..47
2.3. Conclusions to chapter 2…………………………………………………………………………….57

3. STRENGHTENING RESILIENCE TO HYBRID THREATS: REFERENCES FOR

THE REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA……………………………………………………………..…….60
3.1. The Republic of Moldova as a subject to hybrid threats………………………………………...60
3.2. Building resilience of the Republic of Moldova to hybrid threats of national security by
applying EU and NATO experience…………………………………………………………………….71
3.3. Conclusions to chapter 3…………………………………………………………………………….82

GENERAL CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS………………………….………84

BIBLIOGRAPHY……………………………………………………………………..…………………88
APPENDIXES………………………………………………………………………………………….....95
Appendix no. 1. Evolution of the term resilience: from ancient times to disaster and risk
reduction management field of study…………………………………………………………………....95
Appendix no. 2. The genealogy of resilience concept…………………………………………………96
Appendix no. 3. Triangular relationship of security, resilience, and non-security politics……...97
Appendix no. 4. The list of hybrid tools by EU Commission Joint Research Centre…………...…99
Appendix no. 5. Phases of a hybrid threat by the Hybrid CoE………………………..……..…..…100

STATEMENT ON ASSUMING THE RESPONSIBILITY…………………………………....101

3
 LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

CSDP – Common Security and Defense Policy

JRC – European Commission Joint Research Centre
EEAS – European Union External Action Service
EU – European Union
EUPM Moldova – European Union Partnership Mission in the Republic of Moldova
EUGS – European Union Global Strategy of 2016
HT – Hybrid threats
HW – Hybrid war
Hybrid CoE – The European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats
NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO – Nongovernmental organization
NNS – National Security Strategy of the Republic of Moldova
OECD – The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
RM – the Republic of Moldova
SIS – Security and Intelligence Service of the Republic of Moldova
StratCom – Strategic communication
UN – United Nations
US – United States of America

4
 ANNOTATION

Gureanu Ana. Strengthening resilience of the Republic of Moldova to hybrid threats of

national security. Chisinau, 2023.
Thesis structure: introduction, 3 chapters, general conclusions, bibliography of 123
titles, 5 appendixes, 70 pages of basic text.
Keywords: resilience, hybrid threats, hybrid warfare, national security, vulnerabilities,
hostile activities, European Union, North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
Field of study: security studies.
The problem of research is strengthening resilience of the Republic of Moldova as a
measure for countering hybrid threats of national security.
The object of research consists in the analysis of resilience as a measure for countering
hybrid threats of national security, including research on hybrid threats.
The purpose and objectives of the work. The goal of this research is to analyze
resilience as a measure to hybrid threats of national security of the Republic of Moldova. In
order to achieve the proposed goal, the following objectives were formulated: to conduct
historiographical study of scientific papers on resilience, including from the security perspective;
to define and analyze the theoretical-conceptual aspects of the concept of resilience within the
security field; to analyze the concept, tools, and modus-operandi of hybrid threats from the
American and European perspective in order to reveal the main indicators of a hybrid threat; to
analyze the EU and NATO models of strengthening resilience to hybrid threats; to establish if
the Republic of Moldova is a subject to hybrid threats since 24 February 2022; to analyze current
security mechanism of the Republic of Moldova for addressing hybrid threats in order to
establish how to apply the EU and NATO experience in building resilience of the Republic of
Moldova to hybrid threats of national security.
The scientific novelty of the paper. The innovative and original character of the
research consists in the applied conceptual and analytical approach to resilience as a measure for
addressing hybrid threats of national security. Thus, the scientific novelty of the research paper
consists in: carrying out an overall analysis and synthesis of the main concepts and views on the
resilience, including from the security perspective and of hybrid threats phenomenon; carrying
out an assessment on the EU and NATO experience in strengthening resilience to hybrid threats,
including on their cooperation in this regard and identifying how to apply their experience in
building resilience of the Republic of Moldova to hybrid threats of national security.
Applicative value of the work. The results of the research, the conclusions and the
recommendations formulated can serve as reference points for completion of the conceptual
framework for carrying out interdisciplinary scientific investigations on strengthening resilience
as a measure for addressing hybrid threats; determining some benchmarks from the EU and
NATO experience in strengthening resilience to hybrid threats for building resilience of the
Republic of Moldova to hybrid threats.
Obtained results: since 24 February 2022, the Republic of Moldova is a subject to
hybrid threats perpetrated by the Russian Federation state. Thus, since the beginning of the war
in Ukraine, Russian Federation exploits the main vulnerabilities of the Republic of Moldova: - its
energy dependence on the Russian gas and the issue of territorial integrity - the unresolved
Transnistrian conflict. Taking into account that the current security mechanism for addressing
hybrid threats is at the incipient stage of development and implementation, at the present stage,
the only opportunity for applying the EU and NATO experience in building resilience of our
country to HT is by fully by exploiting the existing framework for cooperation with these
organizations at the present stage.

5
 ADNOTARE

Gureanu Ana. Consolidarea rezilienţei Republicii Moldova la ameninţările hibride la adresa

securităţii naţionale. Chişinău, 2023.
Structura tezei: introducere, 3 capitole, concluzii generale, bibliografie din 123 de
titluri, 5 anexe, 70 de pagini de text de bază.
Cuvinte-cheie: rezilienţă, amenințări hibride, război hibrid, securitate națională,
vulnerabilități, activități ostile, Uniunea Europeană, Organizația Tratatului Atlanticului de Nord.
Domeniul de studiu: studii de securitate.
Problema de cercetare este consolidarea rezilienţei Republicii Molodva ca măsură de
contracarare a ameninţărilor hibirde la adresa securităţii naţionale.
Obiectul de cercetare este reziliența ca măsură de contracarare a amenințărilor hibride la
adresa securității naționale, inclusiv cercetarea conceptului de amenințări hibride, instrumente și
modus-operandi.
Scopul și obiectivele lucrării: Scopul acestei cercetări este de a analiza reziliența ca
măsură la amenințările hibride la adresa securității naționale al Republicii Moldova. Pentru
atingerea scopului propus s-au formulat următoarele obiective: realizarea studiului istoriografic
al lucrărilor științifice privind reziliența, inclusiv din perspectiva securității; definirea și analiza
aspectelor teoretico-conceptuale ale conceptului de reziliență în domeniul securității; analiza
conceptului, instrumentelor și modus-operandi al amenințărilor hibride din perspectiva
americană și europeană pentru dezvăluirea principalilor indicatori ai unei amenințări hibride;;
analiza modelelor UE și NATO de consolidare a rezilienței la amenințările hibride; stabilirea
dacă Republica Moldova este supusă amenințărilor hibride începând cu 24 februarie 2022;
analiza mecanismului actual de securitate al Republicii Moldova pentru abordarea amenințărilor
hibride pentru a stabili modul de aplicare a experienței UE și NATO în construirea rezilienței
Republicii Moldova la amenințările hibride.
Noutatea științifică a lucrării: Caracterul inovator și original al cercetărilor constă în
abordarea conceptuală și analitică aplicată a rezilienței ca măsură de abordare a amenințărilor
hibride la adresa securității naționale. Astfel, noutatea științifică a lucrării de cercetare constă în:
realizarea unei analize și sinteze de ansamblu a principalelor concepte și puncte de vedere asupra
rezilienței, inclusiv din perspectiva securității și a fenomenului amenințărilor hibride; realizarea
unei evaluări a experienței UE și NATO în consolidarea rezistenței la amenințările hibride,
inclusiv a cooperării lor în acest sens și identificarea modului de aplicare a experienței lor în
consolidarea rezilienței Republicii Moldova la amenințările hibride la adresa securității
naționale.
Valoarea aplicativă a lucrării: Rezultatele cercetării, concluziile și recomandările
formulate pot servi drept puncte de referință pentru completarea cadrului conceptual de realizare
a investigațiilor științifice interdisciplinare privind întărirea rezilienței ca măsură de abordare a
amenințărilor hibride; determinarea unor repere din experiența UE și NATO în consolidarea
rezilienței la amenințările hibride pentru construirea rezilienței Republicii Moldova la
amenințările hibride.
Rezultatele obţinute: din 24 februarie 2022, Republica Moldova este supusă
amenințărilor hibride din partea Federației Ruse. Astfel, încă de la începutul războiului din
Ucraina, Federația Rusă exploatează principalele vulnerabilități ale Republicii Moldova: -
dependența energetică de gazul rusesc și problema integrității teritoriale - conflictul transnistrean
nerezolvat. Ținând cont de faptul că actualul mecanism de securitate pentru abordarea
amenințărilor hibride se află în stadiul incipient de dezvoltare și implementare, în stadiul actual,
singura oportunitate de aplicare a experienței UE și NATO în construirea rezilienței țării noastre
la ameninţările hibride este exploatarea pe deplin a cadrului existent de cooperare cu aceste
organizații în stadiul actual.

6
 INTRODUCTION

Relevance and importance of the researched topic. At the present stage resilience
gained ground into the security research around the world. This fact is strongly connected with
the present international security environment, the multitude of crisis-type events in Syria and
the Mediterranean basin, the illegal annexation of Crimea and of the four regions form Ukraine
by the Russian Federation, the recent military conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia in the
Nagorno-Karabakh region, the launching of new hybrid strategies such as cyberattacks,
disinformation, or hostile intelligence actions designed for the destabilization of national states,
which require nation states and international collective security organizations to reevaluate and
develop new preventive strategies and countermeasures for being able to respond to challenges
that have arisen.
Thus, increasing resilience and strengthening a national community within the state,
based on common values, principles and identities, as well as amplifying the multilateral factor
of international organizations of collective security, based on the principle of community
solidarity, become important imperatives in confronting new challenges.
In this regard, the international collective security organizations as EU and NATO,
started to reassess and develop new preventive strategies and countermeasures in order to
respond to the emerging hybrid threats and challenges. Increasing resilience also involves the
development of the security culture, which is based on the principle of inclusive security through
proactive reactions and by minimizing vulnerabilities, which can be exploited by some
unfriendly actors.
Against the background of all these developments in today’s world, taking into account
the geographical location of the Republic of Moldova, the vicinity of some conflict zones, the
war in Ukraine, the geo-strategic, historical, political and economic data that define it, the
Republic of Moldova must evaluate its vulnerabilities, internal and external threats, in order to
increase resilience in the face of potential risks and ensure national security. In these conditions,
resilience and national security must be, more than ever, an absolute priority of any government,
which calls for strategies, initiatives and synergistic actions at the level of state institutions.
The importance of the topic can also be highlighted by the fact that today it is necessary
to emphasize the ability of the Republic of Moldova to formulate strategies and ways to develop
and maintain the resilience, which must demonstrate the government’s ability to counter new
types of threats and hybrid challenges.

7
 Degree of investigation. The issue of resilience is an actual subject of several studies
among researchers around the world. Before percolating into security field, resilience has been
subject of various works of scholars from various disciplines as mechanics, psychology, social
studies, engineering, ecology, urban planning, and disaster management.
Referring strictly to research on resilience with the security field, we can outline the
special contribution of the works of Western scholars as: Ryan C1., Chandler D2., Corry. O3. and
Rogers P4. , which have put forward several sets of arguments and propositions about resilience
as applied to world politics.
A special contribution was made by a Canadian associate professor in the field of
Political Sciences, an expert in international relations, security studies and resilience, Boubreau
P., who has more remarkable works on resilience from the security perspective5.
In analyzing resilience as a countermeasure to hybrid threats, the following scholars made
important contribution to expanding research on resilience along with exploring hybrid threats
phenomenon: Milanova N6. investigated resilience measures of the NATO member states by
including the wide range of vulnerabilities, Kalniete S. and Pildegovics T.7 presented the
analysis of the EU policies of resilience building against hybrid threats, De Conning C. and Sari
A. provided an actual research of the current hybrid security threats in the framework of the
European center of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats.8
In addition to the works of Western authors, the studies of Romanian researchers are also
of major importance. In this case we can mention that the analysis of the resilience is made from
the hybrid threats perspective. A significant contribution was made by Romanian researchers as:
Frunzeti T. and Barbulescu C.9, Brigadier General and PhD, Buta V. and Colonel Vasile V.10,

1
Ryan C. Everyday resilience as resistance: Palestinian Women practicing sumud. In: International Political
Sociology, vol. 9, no. 4, 2015, p. 299-315.
2
Chandler D. Resilience and the autotelic subject: Toward a critique of the socialization of security. In: International
Political Sociology vol. 7, 2013, p. 221-228.
3
Corry. O. From defense to resilience: environmental security beyond neo-liberalism. In: International political
sociology, vol. 8, no. 3, 2014, p. 256-274.
4
Rogers P. The evolution of resilience. In: Connections: The Quarterly Journal vol. 19, no. 3, 2020, p.13-32.
5
Boubreau P. Resilience and international politics: premises, debates, agenda. In: International studies review, 2015,
no. 17, vol. 3, p. 374-395; Boubreau P., Vuori J. Security, resilience, and desecuritization: multidirectional moves
and dynamics. In: Critical studies on security, vol. 3, no. 3, 2015.
6
Milanova N. Institutional resilience and building integrity in the defense and security sector. In: The Quarterly
Journal vol. 19, no. 3, 2020, p. 67-75.
7
Kalniete S., Pildegovics T. Strengthening the EU’s resilience to hybrid threats. In: European view, vol. 20, no. 1,
2021, p. 23-33.
8
De Coning C. Strengthening the resilience and adaptive capacity of societies at risk from hybrid threats. In: Hybrid
CoE working paper no. 9, June 2021; Sari A. Hybrid threats and the law: building legal resilience. In: Hybrid CoE
working paper no.3, November 2021.
9
Frunzeti T., Barbulescu C. National resilience to hybrid threats and the security culture. In: Strategic Impact no. 1,
vol. 2, 2018, p. 60-67.

8
Potirniche M. and Petrescu D.11 , which analyzed the appearance and evolution of the resilience
phenomenon in the Romanian literature of specialty, and the authors Mihai I., Cimpean P.,
Popescu S. and Vasilescu A.12, who introduces the concept of strategic resilience.
Within the scientific system of the Republic of Moldova, an important contribution in the
field of resilience form the security perspective was made by Albu N., the author provided a
framework for conceptual understanding of resilience within national security field13.
A special contribution to the research of the resilience is made by Cibotaru V.14, doctor of
philosophical sciences, but also an expert in the security matters, researcher stress that the
Republic of Moldova needs to consolidate, develop and modernize the national security and
defense system, taking into account the evolution of the security environment.
In addition, the work of doctor of political science Ungureanu V.15, after examining the
political and military cooperation relations between our country and NATO, reveals the
opportunities provided by the Alliance to enhance the degree of institutional resilience of
Moldova’s national security and defense system.
At the same time, the work of the local author Sterpu V.16 can be mentioned due to
providing a comprehensive research of the security sector of the country in relation with the
constantly emergent hybrid threats and presented resilience as an option/ solution for
counteracting hybrid threats and hybrid war.
The authors Mârzac E., Sandu S., Negru A. contributed to the resilience research within
our country focusing on the analysis of resilience from NATO perspective and presenting
StratCom as an important tool for the Republic of Moldova to build its information resilience17.

10
Buța V., Vasile V. Creșterea rezilienței față de amenințările hibride - definiții, abordări și perspective. In: Revista
de științe militare, no. 1, 2018, p. 50-68;
11
Potirniche M., Petrescu D. Studiu de specialitate. Modalități de contracarare a amenințării hibride la adresa
securității statelor. Editura Universităţii Naţionale de Apărare „CAROL I”. București, 2019.
12
Reziliența strategică a Uniunii Europene, inclusiv în domeniile tehnologic și digital: scenarii de viitor și contribuții
ale României, 2022. http://ier.gov.ro/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/SPOS-2021.-Studiul-2.-Rezilienta-strategica-a-
Uniunii-Europene_final_site.pdf (accessed 29.12.2022).
13
Albu N. Reziliența din perspectiva securității: aspecte teoretice și practice. In: Reziliența în atenția securității.
Concepte, procese, necesități. Chişinău, 2022, p. 6-29; Albu N. Tendințe de măsurare și monitorizare a rezilienței.
In: Reziliența în atenția securității. Concepte, procese, necesități. Chişinău, 2022, p. 30-43.
14
Cibotaru V. Cartografierea sistemului de securitate și apărare a Republicii Moldova și valorificarea rezilieenței în
acest sector. In: Reziliența în atenția securității. Concepte, procese, necesități. Chişinău, 2022, p. 44-54.
15
Ungureanu V. Reziliența securității internaționale al Republicii Moldova în contextual reconfigurării mediului de
Securitate regională în perioada pandemiei COVID-19. In: Reziliența în atenția securității. Concepte, procese,
necesități. Chişinău, 2022, p. 99-122.
16
Sterpu V. Politica națională de securitate a Republicii Moldova în contextul amenințărilor și războaielor hibride.
https://soros.md/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/9_Studiu-de-politici-publ-Am-si-Razb_final_compressed.pdf
(accessed 29.12.2022).
17
Mârzac E., Sandu S.Comunicarea strategica – instrument de fortificare a rezilienței informaționale. Tendințe de
măsurare și monitorizare a rezilienței. In: Reziliența în atenția securității. Concepte, procese, necesități. Chişinău,
2022, p. 55-77; Mârzac E. Negru A. Parteneriatele NATO: oportunități și beneficiipentru consolidarea rezilienței în

9
 The problem of research is strengthening resilience of the Republic of Moldova as a
measure for countering hybrid threats of national security.
The object of research consists in the analysis of resilience as a measure for countering
hybrid threats of national security, including research on hybrid threats concept, tools and
modus-operandi.
The goal and objectives of research. The goal of this research is to analyze resilience
as a measure to hybrid threats of national security of the Republic of Moldova.
In order to achieve the proposed goal, the following objectives were formulated.
- to conduct historiographical study of scientific papers on resilience, including from the
security perspective;
- to define and analyze the theoretical-conceptual aspects of the concept of resilience
within the security field;
- to analyze the concept, tools, and modus-operandi of hybrid threats from the American
and European perspective in order to reveal the main indicators of a hybrid threat;
- to analyze the EU and NATO models of strengthening resilience to hybrid threats;
- to establish if the Republic of Moldova is a subject to hybrid threats since 24 February
2022;
- to analyze current security mechanism of the Republic of Moldova for addressing hybrid
threats in order to establish how to apply the EU and NATO experience in building
resilience of the Republic of Moldova to hybrid threats.
Research hypothesis. Hypothesis no. 1: “Is the Republic of Moldova a subject to hybrid
threats since 24 February 2022?”;
Hypothesis no. 2: “Is the EU and NATO experience in in strengthening resilience to
hybrid threats currently relevant for being applied by the Republic of Moldova in building its
own resilience to hybrid threats?”.
Research methodology and methods of the paper.
The recent works in the security field served as an orientation support for the
methodological structure of the master thesis, the authors of which presented a methodological
approach for the analysis of resilience as a measure to hybrid security threats. The theoretical
part will therefore be based on existing definitions from academic works, state and international
institutions. In the empirical part, indicators will be applied to individual cases from the
environment of the Republic of Moldova, where the work analyzes hybrid actions in the political

sectorul de securitate al Republicii Moldova. Tendințe de măsurare și monitorizare a rezilienței. In: Reziliența în
atenția securității. Concepte, procese, necesități. Chişinău, 2022, p. 78-98.

10
and non-political sphere. The basis for the empirical part will be works from the academic
environment of the Republic of Moldova, analyses, media reports informing about the given
events or think tanks dedicated to hybrid warfare. Due to the analysis of this information, the
work will be able to answer research questions and possibly serve as a basis for further research.
During the research of the resilience as a measure for addressing hybrid threats of
national security a set of research methods were used and combined, including realistic-
empirical, historical, comparative, analytical, systemic, deduction and induction method, analogy
method.
Historical method was used for establishing the evolution of the concept of resilience and
its percolation within the security filled, but also for revealing the most recent approaches to
resilience that emerged under the hybrid threats study. For revealing the historical transformation
of the concept of hybrid threats, tools and modus-operandi, the combination of historical and
comparative methods was used. For the comprehension of the EU and NATO models of
strengthening resilience to hybrid threats, the structural-functional and institutional methods
were used. In order to analyze current security mechanism of the Republic of Moldova for
addressing hybrid threats, the systemic method was used. In identifying how to apply the EU and
NATO experience in building resilience of the Republic of Moldova to hybrid threats of national
security, the deduction and analytical method was used. For determining if the Republic of
Moldova is a subject to hybrid threats, the qualitative method was used, more specifically case
study. As a part of research, a large amount of data was collected within the limited boundaries
of time, with the aim of capturing the complexity of the case and describing the relationships in
their entirety. This paragraph was written in the form of an interpretive case study. Its goal, given
the complex nature of the researched topic, is to describe, explain, interpret, and understand a
single case as an end in itself rather than as a vehicle for developing broader theoretical
generalizations. The theory will serve as a guide for identifying the main process variables. It
will use an existing theory that has not been applied to the given phenomenon in this way18.
According to the objectives of the case study described by Levy, this case study will be
idiographic: it will aim to describe, explain or interpret a particular case, without claims to
generalization19

18
Levy J. Case Studies: Types, Designs, and Logics of Inference. In: Routledge, Conflict Management and Peace
Science, 25:1–18, 2008, p. 3.
19
Ibidem, p. 4.

11
 The scientific novelty of the research. The innovative and original character of the
researches consists in the applied conceptual and analytical approach to resilience as a measure
for addressing hybrid threats of national security. Thus, the scientific novelty of the research
paper consists in: carrying out an overall analysis and synthesis of the main concepts and views
on the resilience, including from the security perspective and of hybrid threats phenomenon;
carrying out an assessment on the EU and NATO experience in strengthening resilience to
hybrid threats, including on their cooperation in this regard and identifying how to apply their
experience in building resilience of the Republic of Moldova to hybrid threats of national
security.
Applicative value of the work. The results of the research, the conclusions and the
recommendations formulated can serve as reference points for completion of the conceptual
framework for carrying out interdisciplinary scientific investigations on strengthening resilience
as a measure for addressing hybrid threats; determining some benchmarks from the EU and
NATO experience in strengthening resilience to hybrid threats for building resilience of the
Republic of Moldova to hybrid threats.
The volume, structure and summary of the thesis compartments. The thesis includes
annotations in two languages (English and Romanian), the list of abbreviations, introduction, and
3 chapters of 3 paragraphs each, general conclusions and recommendations, bibliography and
annexes.
In the Introduction of the paper is presented the relevance and importance of the topic,
the degree of investigation, the problem and object of research, the purpose and objectives of the
thesis, research hypothesis, research methodology and methods of the paper, the scientific
novelty of the research, but also the applicative value of the work.
In the first chapter of the thesis – Historiographical and theoretical - conceptual
analysis of resilience from the security perspective the historiographical research of resilience
from the security perspective is provided, starting from research of multidisciplinary journey
through which resilience has percolated into security field and taking into account the most
recent approaches, especially those that emerged under the research of hybrid threats. Also, in
this chapter, in the second paragraph are outlined the theoretical-conceptual bases of the analysis
of resilience in the theory of International Relations and Security Studies, including the last 21 st
century shifts in understanding of the concept of resilience, due to increasing engagement into
the hybrid threats research. The first chapter ends with conclusions.
In the second chapter of the thesis – Hybrid security threats: EU and NATO
experience in strengthening resilience is realized a research on the hybrid threats phenomenon:

12
concept, tools and modus-operandi, from the American and European perspective, in order to
reveal the main characteristics of a hybrid threat phenomenon. In the second paragraph of the
thesis the main EU and NATO strategic documents which emphases resilience as a key measure
for counteracting hybrid threats are analyzed, including the common initiatives of these
organizations in this regard. This chapter ends with conclusions.
In the third chapter – Strengthening resilience to hybrid threats: references for the
Republic of Moldova two selected cases are analyzed in order to reveal whether the Republic of
Moldova is a subject to hybrid threats since 24 February 2022. In the second paragraph, the
analysis of the current security mechanism of the Republic of Moldova designed for addressing
HT will be provided, in order to reveal how to apply the EU and NATO experience in building
resilience of our country to HT. This chapter ends with conclusions.
In the section General Conclusions and Recommendations are presented research
results, the main ideas and visions, but also further recommendations for scientific research.

13
 1. HISTORIOGRAPHICAL AND THEORETICAL - CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS
OF RESILIENCE FROM THE SECURITY PERSPECTIVE.

This chapter will present the historiographical research of resilience from the security
perspective, starting from research of multidisciplinary journey through which resilience has
percolated into security field and taking into account the most recent approaches, especially
those that emerged under the research of hybrid threats, which have risen to the top of the
western security agenda, particularly after 2014 shifts in the global security landscape. The
theoretical-conceptual bases of the analysis of resilience in the theory of International Relations
and Security Studies in general, will be outlined, including the last 21st century shifts in
understanding of the concept of resilience, due to increasing engagement into the hybrid threats
research. Conclusions to the chapter will be provided.

1.1. Historiographical research of resilience from the security perspective.

Although resilience ranks among the key concepts of the twenty-first century20,
International Relations and Security Studies are latecomers to resilience research. Therefore, in
order to comprehensively design the historiographical research of resilience from the security
perspective, we stress that it is important to briefly outline the multiple and multidisciplinary
journey through which resilience percolated into security field of research. Moreover, this need
is generated by misunderstanding among the scholars; some of them argue that the concept of
resilience derives from the ecology field21. Therefore, we will briefly present the resilience
origins in order to better understand how the concept migrated to security field of research.
The etymology of resilire, resilio is unknown, which indicates that it was probably a part
of standard Latin and was thus a word used occasionally in Classical times, in the works of
accomplished men of letters22.
The first known scientific use in English of the word resilience can be observed in the
work of an English philosopher and statesman, Francis Bacon’s philosophical treatise on the
nature of sound, Sylva Sylvarum23, published in 1626, in which he uses the term resilience to

20
Caruso A., Metzger B. More than fashionable concepts: risk, security and resilience in modern history. In:
International journal for history, culture and modernity, 2019, vol. 7, p. 310.
21
Walker B., Salt D. Resilience thinking: sustaining ecosystems and people in a changing world. London: Island
Press, 2006, p.1.; Walker J., Cooper M. Genealogies of resilience: from systems ecology to the political economy of
crisis adaptation. In: Security dialogue, vol.42, no. 2, 2011, p. 143.
22
Alexander D. Resilience and disaster risk reduction: an etymological journey. In: Hazards and earth systems
sciences, vol. 13, 2013, p. 2708-2716. University College London, UK. https://d-nb.info/1143033132/34, (accessed
17.12.2022).
23
Bacon F. Sylva Sylvarum: or a natural history in ten centuries. London: Printed by Lee W., 1625, p. 1-414.
https://www.loc.gov/resource/rbc0001.2010fabyan43307/?r=-0.69,0.298,2.38,1.025,0, (accessed 17.12.2022).

14
show the capacity of an echo to bounce back and to describe conditions of the reflexion of
sounds.
In 1656, Blount T., an English lexicographer of the 17th century, included resilience in
his dictionary Glossographia, defining it as “a leaping or a skipping back, a rebounding”24.
Later, in 1818, an English engineer and author, Tredgold T. uses resilience to describe a
property of timber25. After that, resilience started to be researched in the works of 19th century
mechanics, the 20th century ecology and psychology.
The first research on resilience in mechanics appeared in 1858, when the famous Scottish
engineer Rankine W.26 employed it to describe the strength and ductility of steel beams. In the
sequel, the concept of resilience was found in the works of Irish civil engineer Mallet R., who
developed a measure - the modulus of resilience - as a means of assessing the ability of materials
to withstand severe conditions27. After, the modulus was introduced in the Manual of Civil
Engineering in 1867, and the technical definition of resilience appeared: the ability of a material
to absorb and release energy within a certain range of elasticity28.
Later, the concept was taken up in the field of psychology and psychiatry in the 1940.
One of the first works from the field is of American psychologists Werner E. and Smith R. In
their work, resilience is defined as the ability of individuals to restore their emotional balance,
overcome adversity, adapt, live and develop personally despite adverse circumstances and
stress29.
The modern, widespread and multidisciplinary use of the concept of resilience begins
with theoretical work of Crawford Stanley Holling, the US-Canadian ecologist. Considered by
some scholars the father of the modern resilience theory, he described resilience in the context of
evolution of ecosystems30. He distinguished two ways of understanding resilient system. First
one is from the engineering perspective, where he defined resilience as the ability of a system to

24
Blount T. Glossographia: or, a dictionary interpreting the hard words of whatsoever language, now used in our
refined English tongue. London: The Newcomb, 1656.
https://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/eebo/A28464.0001.001/1:7.17?rgn=div2;view=fulltext, (accessed 18.12.2022).
25
Tredgold T. On the transverse strength and resilience of timber. In: Philosophical magazine series 1, vol. 51, no.
239, 1818, p. 214-216. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14786441808637536, (accessed 18.12.2022).
26
Rankine W. A manual of applied mechanics. London: Charles Griffin and Co., 1870, p. 1-708.
https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=mdp.39015002017245&view=1up&seq=11, (accessed 18.12.2022).
27
Mallet M. On the physical conditions involved in the construction of artillery, London: Longman, Brown, 1856, p.
1-334. https://ordnancesociety.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/1856-mallet-construction-artillery.pdf, (accessed
18.12.2022).
28
McAslan A. The concept of resilience. Understanding its origins, meaning and utility. Australia: Torrens
Resilience Institute, Adelaide, 2010, p. 2.
29
Werner E., Smith, R. Vulnerable but invincible: a longitudinal study of resilient children and youth. New York:
McGraw Hill, 1982, p. 1-229.
30
McAslan A. The concept of resilience. Understanding its origins, meaning and utility. Australia: Torrens
Resilience Institute, Adelaide, 2010, p. 2.

15
return to an equilibrium or steady state after a disturbance. Second one is from the ecological
perspective, where he defined resilience of an ecosystem as the measure of its ability to absorb
changes and still exist31.
Analyzing thoroughly Holling’s famous works on resilience, we also consider that he
made an important contribution to the ecology field of research in particular, but also his works
are an important precursor for the further resilience usage within the security field. The
principles that he formulated to describe the resilient ecosystem, can be also applied to various
field of research nowadays, especially within the security field.
Moving further, the concept of resilience migrated to the disaster management and risk
reduction field of research. In this regard, the work of English PhD in Risk and Disaster
Reduction, Alexander D. “Resilience and disaster risk reduction: an etymological journey32” is
of particular importance, outlining the evolution of the term resilience since its usage in antic
times until its proliferation to the disaster and risk reduction management field of study
(Appendix no.1)33.
Following 9/11 2001, when many cities examined anti-terrorist measures arising from
defensive urban planning to militarization of urban public space and surveillance, urban
resilience became a major topic of critical security literature34.
According to critical thinking on resilience, sustained by some famous scholars as:
Lentzos F. and Rose N.35, Walker J. and Cooper M., Reid J.36, Jonathan J., resilience is a
neoliberal by-product. Therefore, in their article, Australian scholars Walker J. and Cooper M.37
argued for a critique analysis on resilience emergence in various discourses and contemporary
neoliberal doctrines. They claim that resilience evolved from the complex systems theory from
critique to functionalism. In his work, Jonathan J., an English researcher in International
Relations examined resilience as a form of governmentality38. He demonstrated that resilience

31
Holling S. Engineering resileince versus ecological resilience. Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1966,
31-43.
32
Ibidem, p. 31-43.
33
Alexander D. Resilience and disaster risk reduction: an etymological journey. In: Hazards and earth systems
sciences, vol. 13, 2013, p. 2708-2716. University College London, UK. https://d-nb.info/1143033132/34, (accessed
20.12.2022).
34
Svitkova K. Resilience in the national security discourse. In: Obrana a strategie, no. 1, 2017, p. 25.
35
Lentzos F. Rose. N. Governing insecurity: contingency planning, protection, resilience. In: Economy and society,
vol. 38, no. 2, 2009, p. 230-254.
36
Reid J. The disastrous and politically debased subject of resilience. In: Development Dialogue, vol. 58, 2012, p.
67-79.
37
Walker J., Cooper M. Genealogies of resilience: from systems ecology to the political economy of crisis
adaptation. In: Security dialogue, vol. 42, no. 2, 2011, p. 143-160.
38
Jonathan J. Resilience as embedded neoliberalism: a governmentality approach. In: Resilience: International
policies, practices and discourses, vol. 1, no. 1, 2013, p. 38-52.

16
despite the claims to be about the operation of system, in practice, it is likely to be a form of
governance that emphasizes individual responsibility.
On this part, it can be outlined that before proliferating into the security field, the concept
of resilience has the multiple origins within a broad range of disciplines as mechanics,
psychology, social studies, engineering, ecology, disaster management and risk reductions
studies etc.
Later, a processual perspective on resilience appeared, that paved the suitable path for the
proliferation of the resilience into security field.
A Holland PhD in philosophy, Ryan C. has demonstrated the importance of thinking
about how communities and groups engage in their own resilience building, because resilience
itself may be a tactic of resistance employed collectively and strategically to adapt to protracted
conflicts and chronic adversity39. From the processual perspective on resilience, some English
scholars of International Politics as Chandler D. and Aradau C. have put forward several sets of
arguments and propositions about resilience as applied to world politics40.
In-depth engagement of security studies with the concept of resilience begins after 2014.
Western researchers started to explore one particular angle of the relationship between security
and resilience. In addition, we mention that the shifts that occurred at the global security
landscape influenced the resilience research in the framework of hybrid threats research.
In this regard, a special contribution was made by a Canadian associate professor in the
field of Political Sciences, an expert in the international relations, security studies and resilience,
Boubreau P., who has more remarkable works on resilience from the security perspective 41. He
illustrated the genealogy of resilience concept (Appendix no.2) and suggested that understanding
the multiple and multidisciplinary path through which the concept of resilience has percolated
into security field is an essential first step to conducting an analysis of the application of
resilience in international politics and security matters42. Together with Finish Professor of
International Politics, Vuori J., the author introduced the triangular relationship of security,

39
Ryan C. Everyday resilience as resistance: Palestinian Women practicing sumud. In: International Political
Sociology, vol. 9, no. 4, 2015, p. 299-315.
40
Chandler D. Resilience and the autotelic subject: Toward a critique of the socialization of security. In:
International Political Sociology vol. 7, 2013, p. 221; Aradau C. The promise of security: resilience, surprise and
epistemic politics. In: Resilience: International Policies, Practices and Discourses, vol. 2, no. 2, 2014, p. 73-87.
41
Boubreau P. Resiliencism: Premises and promises in securitization research. In: International policies, practices
and discourses, vol. 1, 2013, p. 3-17; Boubreau P. Resilience and international politics: premises, debates, agenda.
In: International studies review, 2015, no. 17, vol. 3, p. 374-395.
42
Boubreau P. On resilience: genealogy, logics, and world politics. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press,
2018, p. 1-21. http://www.philippebourbeau.net/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/Bourbeau_Genealogy_Resilience_IPS-
2.pdf, (accessed 24.12.2022).

17
resilience, and non-security politics43 that provides more complexity for the investigation of
political dynamics in respect to security and resilience. We agree that the works of security and
resilience expert, Boubreau P., reshaped the resilience research within the security field. His
triangular model is a good argument to prove our claims.
An important contribution to study of resilience within the security field can be
considered the article of the Finish scholars Juntunen T. and Hyvonen A., in which authors have
traced the emergence of resilience discourse from ecology and complexity thinking to politics,
and the area of security and policy governance in particular44. Also, they moved to the analysis
of the consequence of resilience thinking as a security discourse, stressing that a practical
political approach on resilience is required.
Corry. O., Denmark PhD in International Studies, in his valuable work, provides an
analysis of resilience in comparison with the concept of defense, outlining it inherently neo-
liberal origins, arguing that resilience is directed towards risks rather than threats 45.
English scholars of International Politics, Chandler D. offered a coherent and
philosophically sophisticated analysis of resilience in international relations field 46. In early
2017, “Routledge Handbook of International Resilience”47 was published, edited by D. Chandler
and J. Coaffee. The book presents the comprehensive researches on resilience from very
different perspectives.
Australian researcher Rogers P. traced the diverse and many origins of the concept of
resilience. His work is of special contribution, because he concluded that the desire to both
reduce and totalize resilience leads to a misunderstanding of the different points of emergence
and the dynamics of the concept48.
The work of Israeli scholars, Padan C. and Gal R. introduces the two-dimensional matrix
with the multiple definitions of resilience, divided into four content categories: social, economic,
political, military; and three levels: individual, community and state49. This matrix generates

43
Boubreau P., Vuori J. Security, resilience, and desecuritization: multidirectional moves and dynamics. In: Critical
studies on security, vol. 3, no. 3, 2015, p. 253-268.
44
Juntunen T., Hyvonen A. Resilience, security and the politics of processes. In: International policies, practices and
discourses, vol. 2, 2014, p. 195-209.
45
Corry. O. From defense to resilience: environmental security beyond neo-liberalism. In: International political
sociology, vol. 8, no. 3, 2014, p. 256-274.
46
Chandler D. Resilience: The governance of complexity. New York: Routledge, 2014, p. 258; Chandler D.
Resilience and the everyday: beyond the paradox of liberal peace. In: Review of International Studies, 2015, vol. 41,
no. 1, p. 27-48.
47
Chandler D., Coaffee J. The Routledge handbook of international resilience. London: Routledge, 2017, p. 1-420.
48
Rogers P. The evolution of resilience. In: Connections: The Quarterly Journal vol. 19, no. 3, 2020, p.13-32.
49
Padan C., Gal R. A multi-dimensional matrix for better defining and conceptualizing resilience. In: Connections:
The Quarterly Journal vol. 19, no. 3, 2020, p. 33-46.

18
twelve sub-types of resilience and can subsequently be used for a comprehensive definition of
resilience and its sub-aspects, as well as in the security field.
Bulgarian PhD in Politics, Milanova N., outlined how the concept of resilience in defense
and security is evolving towards the inclusion of a wide-ranging and multidimensional set of
vulnerabilities and across the spectrum of associated military and nonmilitary mitigation
strategies50. She argued that while corruption and poor governance are now recognized as
security threats, the strengthening of defense and related security institutions remains to be
further embedded as an integral part of the resilience concept51.
The work of Kalniete S. and Pildegovics T., PhDs in International Relations, examines
the EU’s resilience to hybrid warfare from institutional, regulatory and societal perspectives,
with a particular focus on the information space52. Also, the article focuses on disinformation
and incorporates case studies from various EU member states, particularly the Baltic states of
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, which have historically been at the forefront of resisting and
countering Russian disinformation campaigns.
A comprehensive research and analysis is made by De Conning C., Norwegian research
professor at Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, entitled “Strengthening the resilience
and adaptive capacity of societies at risk from hybrid threats”, which presents different response
scenarios and actions to be done in order to strengthen the resilience and adaptive capacities of a
civilian population, and its social institutions53.
Another research paper entitled “Hybrid threats and the law: Building legal resilience” by
Sari A., an Associate Professor of Public International Law, presents the relationship between
law and hybrid threats, in order to develop a set of recommendations for putting legal resilience
into practice, organized around seven headings54.
Estonian associate researcher of Political Sciences Makarychev A., and postdoctoral
researcher for the Austrian Institute for International Affairs Kurnyshova Y., in their article,
explored the Ukrainian hybrid resilience which merged as they argued, in the six factors

50
Milanova N. Institutional resilience and building integrity in the defense and security sector. In: The Quarterly
Journal vol. 19, no. 3, 2020, p. 67-75. https://connections-qj.org/article/institutional-resilience-and-building-
integrity-defence-and-security-sector, (accessed 26.12.2022).
51
Ibidem, 67-75.
52
Kalniete S., Pildegovics T. Strengthening the EU’s resilience to hybrid threats. In: European view, vol. 20, no. 1,
2021, p. 23-33. https://www.martenscentre.eu/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/EUV_20_1_REV1.pdf, (accessed
26.12.2022).
53
De Coning C. Strengthening the resilience and adaptive capacity of societies at risk from hybrid threats.
In: Hybrid CoE working paper no. 9, 2021, 1-24. https://www.hybridcoe.fi/wp-
content/uploads/2021/05/20210601_Hybrid_CoE_Working_Paper_9_Strengthening_the_resilience_and_adaptive_c
apacity_of_societies_WEB.pdf, (accessed 29.12.2022).
54
Sari A. Hybrid threats and the law: building legal resilience. In: Hybrid CoE working paper no.3, November 2021,
p.1-48.

19
contributing to Ukraine’s hybrid resilience after the war restarted in February 2022 55. In addition,
they analyzed the crucial role played by the EU`s in all the six mentioned factors.
The article of Spanish researcher, Colom Piella G. provides an overview on the NATO`s
strategies for responding to hybrid war, tracing the organization`s concern to enhance resilience
building against hybrid threats that emerged in 2006 Israel–Hezbollah war56.
Analyzing the contribution of Western authors to research of resilience from the security
perspective, we can observe that after 2014 appeared a lot of works dedicated to study of
resilience through the security lens, especially linked with hybrid threats research. Therefore,
more Western scholars started to study resilience as a countering measure to hybrid threats
phenomenon.
Apart from the works of the Western authors, some recent studies on resilience from
Russia can be mentioned.
An important contribution to resilience field of research is made by Fluri F. and Tagarev
T., through the article “The concept of resilience: security implications and implementation
issues”57. This article provides a brief overview of the concept, examples of definitions used in
policy documents, and the types of problems they seek to address.
The article of Bazarkina D. entitled “Evolution of approaches to countering hybrid threats
in EU strategic planning”58 identifies the main components of the EU approach to countering
hybrid threats, mentioning resilience. The author came to the conclusion that the open
architecture of the theory of hybrid warfare, the broad possibilities of interpreting the definition
of hybrid threats makes it possible to improve practical measures and a theoretical approach to
security problems. The article “Resilience of the law enforcement system in the face of hybrid
threats”59 by Sharanov I. and Ivanitsky A. presents the concept and content of hybrid threats,
providing a resilience law-enforcement approach to the hybrid threats.
Here, we can observe that at the present stage, the Russian research on resilience is also
made within the framework of hybrid threats research.

55
Makarychev A., Kurnyshova Y. Hybrid resilience in insecure times: Russia’s war and Ukrainian society. In:
Hybrid Threats, vulnerabilities, order. CIDOB Report, Barcelona, September 2022, p. 41-46.
56
Colom Piella G. NATO’s strategies for responding to hybrid conflicts. In: Hybrid Threats, vulnerabilities, order.
CIDOB Report, Barcelona, September 2022, p. 47-52.
57
Флури Ф., Тагарев Т. Концепция устойчивости: последствия для безопасности и проблемы реализации. В.
Connections QJ 19, но. 3, 2020, с. 5-14.
https://connections-qj.org/ru/system/files/19.3.00_fluri_tagarev_editorial_rus.pdf, (accessed 29.12.2022).
58
Базаркина Д. Эволюция подходов к противодействию гибридным угрозам в стратегическом планировании
ЕС. В: Современная Европа, проблемы безопасности, но. 6, 2021, с. 133-143.
59
Шаранов Ю., Иваницкий А. Устойчивость правоохранительной системы в условиях гибридных угроз. В:
Психология и право, том 12, но. 4, 2022, с. 96-109. doi:10.17759/psylaw.2022120408, (accessed 29.12.2022).

20
 In addition to works of Western and Russian authors, Romanian researchers are also
concerned with the resilience research. Referring particularly to the security perspective on
resilience, we can outline the following contributions.
The Romanian scholars Frunzeti T. and Barbulescu C. in the work entitled “National
resilience to hybrid threats and the security culture” presented a valorous analytical framework
of the hybrid threats as a new challenge to the national security, stressing that enhancing national
resilience is the only strategic option for managing hybrid threats60.
Another significant work on resilience from Romania is made by the Brigadier General
and PhD, Buta V. and Colonel Vasile V. It is entitled “Enhancing resilience against hybrid
threats - definitions, approaches and perspectives”61. The work outlines the link between
resilience and hybrid threats, providing the assessment of resilience use in the official documents
of NATO and EU.
Romanian scholars, Potirniche M. and Petrescu D. issued a specialized book entitled
“Methods of countering hybrid threats to the security of states”62. This book is relevant, because
it is based on the analysis of specialized literature, strategic and official documents, official
declarations, statistics and case studies that regards resilience against hybrid threats, which
should be developed by state as a whole government type system, implemented as a coherent
strategy in order to achieve all security objectives set at national level.
The research made by Romanian experts from the security field in the framework of
Euro-Atlantic Resilience Center, “Autumn of Resilience: From Global Crises to Anticipatory
Countermeasures”63 is a guide designed for strengthening resilience at all levels within the
Romania. It presents the impact of the Russian intervention in Ukraine, energy crises, food
resilience, economic challenges and attempts made by the country to enhance resilience to
currently emerged crises.
The book “The strategic resilience of the European Union, including in the technological
and digital fields: future scenarios and Romania's contributions”, written by the Romanian

60
Frunzeti T., Barbulescu C. National resilience to hybrid threats and the security culture. In: Strategic Impact no. 1,
vol. 2, 2018, p. 60-67.Carol I. National Defense University Centre for Defense and security strategic studies.
https://cssas.unap.ro/ro/pdf_publicatii/is66-67.pdf, (accessed 30.12.2022).
61
Buța V., Vasile V. Creșterea rezilienței față de amenințările hibride - definiții, abordări și perspective. In: Revista
de științe militare, no. 1, 2018, p. 50-68. https://cssas.unap.ro/ro/pdf_publicatii/is64-65.pdf, (accessed 30.12.2022).
62
Potirniche M., Petrescu D. Studiu de specialitate. Modalități de contracarare a amenințării hibride la adresa
securității statelor. Editura Universităţii Naţionale de Apărare „CAROL I”. București, 2019, p. 1-130.
https://cssas.unap.ro/ro/pdf_studii/modalitati_de_contracarare_a_amenintarii_hibride.pdf, (accessed 30.12.2022).
63
Toamna rezilienței: de la crize globale la măsuri anticipative de contracarare. E-ARC Centrul Euroatlantic pentru
Rezilienţă. https://e-arc.ro/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/Toamna-Rezilientei_2022_Sumar-1.pdf, (accessed
30.12.2022).

21
experts from the security field: Mihai I., Cimpean P., Popescu S. and Vasilescu A. 64, introduces
the concept of strategic resilience. In addition, the concept of strategic resilience is explored and
its direct applicability both at the European Union and national levels, for Romania as a member
state.
In addition, we consider important to mention that Romania incorporated resilience in its
National defense strategy for the period 2020-2024, stressing the aspiration of Romania to
become a resilient state in the face of current security challenges65.
We can observe that Romanian researches are mostly focused on analysis of resilience
within hybrid threats research.
Referring to resilience research, particularly in the security field of the Republic of
Moldova, we mention that until 2020, it cannot be assessed the specific engagement on the
resilience from the security perspective.
Starting from 2020, we mention the scientific works of Albu N., Moldavian PhD in
Political Sciences, which made significant contribution to the research of resilience on national
scale. The article “Resilience from the security perspective: theoretical and practical aspects”66
provides a clear overview on the evolution of the term and some conceptual clarification of its
application, including from the multinational perspective. Another work of the abovementioned
scholar is entitled “Trends to measure and monitor resilience”67, it views resilience as a
strengths-based construct, focusing on active capacity and skills, and on how these can be
mobilized proactively to reduce vulnerability and risk.
We consider the works of Albu N. being one of the first comprehensive researches on
resilience within the security field of the Republic of Moldova.
Another Moldovan scholar, Cibotaru V., PhD in Philosophical Sciences, but also an
expert in the security matters, wrote the article named “Mapping of the security and defense
system of the Republic of Moldova and valuation of resilience in this sector”68. His work
outlined the geographical positioning of the Republic of Moldova which is an area of interest for

64
Reziliența strategică a Uniunii Europene, inclusiv în domeniile tehnologic și digital: scenarii de viitor și contribuții
ale României, 2022. http://ier.gov.ro/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/SPOS-2021.-Studiul-2.-Rezilienta-strategica-a-
Uniunii-Europene_final_site.pdf, (accessed 04.01.2023).
65
Strategia naţională de apărare a ţării pentru perioada 2020-2024.
https://www.presidency.ro/files/userfiles/Documente/Strategia_Nationala_de_Aparare_a_Tarii_2020_2024.pdf,
(accessed 04.01.2023).
66
Albu N. Reziliența din perspectiva securității: aspecte teoretice și practice. In: Reziliența în atenția securității.
Concepte, procese, necesități. Chişinău, 2022, p. 6-29.
67
Albu N. Tendințe de măsurare și monitorizare a rezilienței. In: Reziliența în atenția securității. Concepte, procese,
necesități. Chişinău, 2022, p. 30-43.
68
Cibotaru V. Cartografierea sistemului de securitate și apărare a Republicii Moldova și valorificarea rezilieenței în
acest sector. In: Reziliența în atenția securității. Concepte, procese, necesități. Chişinău, 2022, p. 44-54.

22
a number of powerful regional and international actors. The researcher stress that the Republic of
Moldova needs to consolidate, develop and modernize the national security and defense system,
taking into account the evolution of the security environment.
Ungureanu V., local PhD of Political Sciences, presented the research concerning the
“National security resilience of the Republic of Moldova in the context of reconfiguration of
regional security environment during covid-19 pandemic”69. The article is valorous, because
after examining the political and military cooperation relations between our country and NATO,
it reveals the opportunities provided by the Alliance to enhance the degree of institutional
resilience of Moldova’s national security and defense system.
Another Moldovan researcher, Sterpu V., PhD in Political Sciences, has published a
study entitled “National security policy of the Republic of Moldova in threat context and hybrid
wars”70. The study presents a comprehensive research of the security sector of the country in
relation with the constantly emergent hybrid threats and presented resilience as an option/
solution for counteracting hybrid threats and hybrid war.
Issued in 2021, the study of the local Institute for European Policies and Reforms, a non-
partisan, non-profit organization and an independent research and analysis center founded by a
team of national and international experts, former government officials, civil servants and career
diplomats, issued the “Analysis and strategy to increase resilience to disinformation in the
Republic of Moldova71”, which contributes to researching resilience particularly through the
leans of disinformation concerns. The study outlines strengthening resilience as a
countermeasure to disinformation in the Republic of Moldova.
In 2022, a series of articles that contributed to enriching the resilience research within the
Republic of Moldova were issued, entitled “Resilience into security attention; Concepts,
processes and necessities”72. The research, presented the most recent scientific works of the local
scholars focused on the comprehensive approach of resilience to the national security.
In the framework of the above mentioned series of articles, local author, executive
director of the Information and Documentation Center on NATO in Moldova, Marzac E., and

69
Ungureanu V. Reziliența securității internaționale a RM în contextual reconfigurării mediului de Securitate
regională în perioada pandemiei COVID-19. .In: Reziliența în atenția securității. Concepte, procese, necesități.
Chişinău, 2022, p. 99-122.
70
Sterpu V. Politica națională de securitate a Republicii Moldova în contextul amenințărilor și războaielor hibride,
2021, p. 1-41. https://soros.md/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/9_Studiu-de-politici-publ-Am-si-
Razb_final_compressed.pdf, (accessed 06.01.2023).
71
Aanaliza și strategia de sporire a rezilientei la dezinformare în Republica Molodva. Institutului pentru Politici şi
Reforme Europene, 2021, p. 1-42. https://www.ipis.md/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/ANALIZA-SI-
STRATEGIA_compressed.pdf, (accessed 07.01.2023).
72
Reziliența în atenția securității. Concepte, procese, necesități. Chişinău, 2022, p. 1-124. https://infocenter.md/wp-
content/uploads/2021/12/Studiu_Securitatea-si-Rezilienta.pdf, (accessed 07.01.2023).

23
security expert Sandu S., contributed to resilience research within our country, by presenting the
article “Strategic communication - an information resilience building tool”73. In general, the
article focuses on the analysis of resilience from NATO perspective, presenting StratCom as an
important tool for the Republic of Moldova to build its informational resilience.
In addition, Mârzac E. wrote another relevant work, along with another expert Negru A.
„NATO partnerships: opportunities and benefits for building the resilience in the security sector
of the Republic of Moldova”74. The article emphasizes resilience building in the area of security
in Georgia and Ukraine, also the benefits of the Republic of Moldova cooperation with NATO in
matters of security resilience.
Based on the analysis of historiographical research of resilience from the security
perspective, it can be concluded that before percolated in to the security field, resilience has been
subject of various works of scholars from various disciplines as mechanics, psychology, social
studies, engineering, ecology, urban planning, and disaster management. The understanding of
resilience is contextual and its meaning depends on the field in which resilience is applied. Later,
resilience research emerged within critical security studies and world politics.
Beginning with 2014, due to significant shifts within the global security landscape, we
assess an in-depth engagement of the Western security studies with the concept of resilience. In
addition, our analysis revealed that resilience within the security field started to be studied along
with hybrid threats phenomenon. Therefore, the research on resilience was expanded, and it is
currently studied as a counter measure to hybrid threats.
If we conclude on the Russian studies on resilience, we observe that at the present stage
there are some works that also explores resilience in connection to hybrid threats. Following the
hybrid threats approach to resilience, in the Romanian literature we can find various works
dedicated to the issue of resilience to hybrid threats.
Within the Republic of Moldova, resilience issue is a recent phenomenon studied within
the security literature. Even though, the awareness over the newly emerging hybrid threats raised
the engagement of the local scholar with the resilience study.

73
Mârzac E., Sandu S.Comunicarea strategica – instrument de fortificare a rezilienței informaționale. Tendințe de
măsurare și monitorizare a rezilienței. In: Reziliența în atenția securității. Concepte, procese, necesități. Chişinău,
2022, p. 55-77.
74
Mârzac E. Negru A. Parteneriatele NATO: oportunități și beneficiipentru consolidarea rezilienței în sectorul de
securitate al Republicii Moldova. Tendințe de măsurare și monitorizare a rezilienței. In: Reziliența în atenția
securității. Concepte, procese, necesități. Chişinău, 2022, p. 78-98.

24
1.2. Theoretical-conceptual bases of the analysis of resilience in the security field.

In the last decade, the concept of resilience is more and more into attention of the security
research. This fact is closely related with recent security developments at international level, but
also due to continuously emerging threats and challenges to the security of states. Therefore, this
paragraph will present a theoretical-conceptual analysis on the concept of resilience, in order to
establish why the concept became appropriate for being applied within the security field, even
currently being seen as a countermeasure to hybrid threats.
As revealed the conducted research from the first paragraph, the concept of resilience has
roots in many disciplines. Therefore, its meaning and understanding is contextual and vary
according to the approach, discipline, or subject matter. This led us to a conclusion that there is
no generally accepted definition on resilience.
Some scholars stress75 that all definitions of resilience are somehow related to the original
one provide by C. S. Holling. We agree with this fact, and sustain that Holing’s definitions of a
resilient system, provided in the first paragraph, can be considered a precursor for many scholars
in establishing the meaning of resilience. Even so, over time the concept has considerably
changed and infiltrated within the security research acquiring more nuances.
In order to understand the meaning of resilience within the security field, we have to
establish first of all, what resilience is.
Bruneau M., asserted that resilience “can be understood as the ability of the system to
reduce the chances of a shock, to absorb a shock and if it occurs, to recover quickly after a
shock, re-establishing normal performance”76. More precisely, in his view a resilient system is
one that illustrates:
- reduced failure probabilities;
- reduced consequences from failures, in terms of lives lost, damage, and negative
economic and social consequences;
- reduced time to recovery77.
Allenby and Fink stated that “resiliency is the capability of a system to maintain its
functions and structure in the face of internal and external change and to degrade gracefully
when it must78.

75
Brand F., Jax K. Focusing the meaning (s) of resilience: resilience as a descriptive concept and a boundary object.
In: Ecology and society, vol. 12, article 23, 2007, p. 98.
76
Bruneau M. A framework to quantitatively assess and enhance seismic resilience of communities. In: Earthquake
Spectra, vol. 19, article 736, 2003, p. 550.
77
Ibidem, p.551.
78
Allenby B. Fink J. Toward inherently secure and resilient societies. In: Science, vol. 309, 2005, p. 1034.

25
 Fiksel defined it as “the capacity of a system to survive, adapt and grow in the face of
change and uncertainty79”.
In the view of Walker B. resilience is” the ability to anticipate and deal with the impacts
of natural hazards; to adapt to change; to be proactive and self-determining, rather than just
reactive and outside-determined”80.
An analyst specialized in a multidisciplinary analysis of the concept of resilience,
Longstaff P., defined resilience as the “capacity of a system to absorb disturbance, undergo
change, and still retain essentially the same function, structure, identity and feedbacks”81.
McAslan A., the director of the Torrens Resilience Institute, after looking at several
approaches to the concept of resilience within various fields of research, revealed seven
characteristics of the concept of resilience:
1) Resilience always refers to threats or dramatic events, which have a potentially
overthrowing impact on a system;
2) Resilient systems strive for a positive outcome, be it either the restoration of the status
quo or change and improvement. These two outcomes are commonly known as ‘bounce back’ or
adaptation;
3) Resilient systems need to be prepared either by standards, operational procedures, human
or social capital, etc. Meanwhile, preparedness is but one important aspect of resilient systems,
as they need to be willing and able to adapt to a constantly changing environment;
4) Adaptability hence is the fourth characteristic of resilience;
5) Willingness to learn and gain experience;
6) Coordination and interdependency, meaning resilient systems and nations tend to be
those which are well coordinated and share common values and beliefs;
7) The seventh characteristic of resilience is the desire to survive. These characteristics
make the concept of resilience “a powerful and useful concept”82, McAslan concludes.
Other scholars stressed that “in a general sense, resilience has been used as a metaphor
that seeks to describe how systems absorb threats and maintain their inherent structure and

79
Fiksel J. Sustainability and resilience: toward a systems approach. In: Sustainability: Science, practice, and policy,
fall, 2006.
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/266855367_Resilience_thinking_a_renewed_system_approach_for_sustai
nability_science, (accessed 15.01.2023).
80
Walker B., Gunderson L, Kinzig A. A handful of heuristics and some propositions for understanding resilience in
social-ecological systems. In: Ecology and society, vol. 1, no. 11, 2006, p.13.
81
Longstaff P. Armstrong N., Perrin K., Parker W., Hidek M. Building resilient communities: a preliminary
framework for assessment. In: Homeland Security Affairs, vol. VI, no.3, 2010, p. 23.
82
McAslan A. The concept of resilience. Understanding its origins, meaning and utility. Australia: Torrens
Resilience Institute, Adelaide, 2010, p. 1

26
behavior. More specifically, resilience is used as a global state of preparedness, where targeted
systems can absorb unexpected and potentially high consequence shocks and stresses”83.
According to Manca A. „the concept of resilience goes hand in hand with the notion of a
system being hit by shocks or being subject to disturbances. If disturbances did not exist the
concept of resilience would be meaningless, while if the system was able to eliminate
disturbances or at least completely insulate itself from them, resilience would be infinite”84.
Dunnay P. and Rollof R. defied resilience as the ability of states and societies to deter,
resist and overcome the impact of external interference, particularly in terms of demonstrating
institutional capacity, good governance and societal cohesion85.
Padan C. and Gal R. defined resilience as the capacity of a system/ an individual/
community/ state to behave, during a crisis or following a disruption, in an adaptive way, in
order to return to a previous or even improved level of functioning86. They revealed three
characteristics of resilience:
“The first one refers to resilience as an ability/ capacity/ capability of a person, a group, a
community, or a society;
Second one entails a dynamic change or transformation of behavior;
Third one stand that resilience is characterized by a dynamic adaptive capacity of system
to adjust to an evolving situation”87.
Romanian researcher in security studies, Bogzeanu C., proposed another definition of
resilience: „the ability of people, of societies or states to survive major shocks and crises, to
maintain their vital functions, to limit the impact on their own functioning and to improve
themselves following this experience88”.
Bourbeau P. and Vuori V., experts from security field defined resilience as maintenance,
characterized by an adaptation in which resources and energy are expended to maintain the status

83
Larkin S., Fox-Lent C. Benchmarking agency and organizational practices in resilience decision making. In:
Environment systems and decisions, vol. 35, no. 2, 2016, p.189.
84
Manca A, Benczur P., Giovannin E. Building a scientific narrative towards a more resilient EU Society. EU
Commission, JRC science for policy report, 2017, p. 7.
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/316543983_Building_a_Scientific_Narrative_Towards_a_More_Resilient
_EU_Society_Part_1_a_Conceptual_Framework, (accessed 15.01.2023).
85
Dunay P., Roloff R. Hybrid threats and strengthening resilience on Europe’s eastern flank. George C. Marshall
European Center for Security Studies, 2017. https://www.marshallcenter.org/en/publications/security-
insights/hybrid-threats-and-strengthening-resilience-europes-eastern-flank-0, (accessed 15.01.2023).
Padan C., Gal R. A multi-dimensional matrix for better defining and conceptualizing resilience. In: Connections:
The Quarterly Journal vol. 19, no. 3, 2020, p. 38.
87
Ibidem, p. 42.
88
Bogzeanu C. Resilience: concept, approaches and implications. Bucharest: Carol I National Defence University
Publishing House. Strategic Impact no. 3-4, 2017, p. 51.

27
quo in the face of an exogenous shock89. They defined resilience as a process leading to and
inducing security. In their view, resilience is a precursor to security.
To support their idea they introduced the triangular relationship of security, resilience,
and non-security politics (Appendix no.3). The third and fourth arrows illustrated the security-
resilience nexus. Point (3) here, illustrates that from the security perspective, resilience can be
applied in order to respond, and adjust to a securitized situation. They claim that the move here is
not to transform security, or to desecuritize the issue, but rather to enhance practices that build
social and community resilience in the face of an increasingly securitized world. Point (4)
suggests that resilience can drive and induce security. Therefore, the central idea of their
triangular relationship is that resilience as maintenance speaks to the idea of protecting a
society’s “way of life” and this objective is made possible by the enactment of security policies
and practices90.
Later, Bourbeau P. and Ryan C. argued that resilience is not only about maintaining the
status quo, but it is also about transforming and remodeling an individual, a group, or a social
structure. The transformational aspect of resilience implies the introduction of novel vectors of
response that will change existing policies and set new directions for governance in this field91.
On the basis of the literature review, we can define resilience as the ability of a system to
anticipate, resist, absorb, respond to, adapt to, and recover from a disturbance and by learning
experience to emerge stronger.
Originally used to describe the ability of a system to return to equilibrium after a
disturbance, the concept was enriched in time with new nuances and meanings, coming to
include no not only returning to a particular state, but also adapting to change and transforming
the system. In addition, we can observe that resilience is a property of a system, but also a
process, which could be revealed during or following exposure to potentially disruptive external
action. Taking into consideration that resilience leads to security, there is no surprise that such “a
powerful and useful concept” started to be studied and applied within the security field of
research.
Going further, we attempt to present how the concept of resilience infiltrated within the
security field and how it started to be research along with hybrid threats phenomenon.

89
Boubreau P., J. Vuori. Security, resilience, and desecuritization: multidirectional moves and dynamics. In: Critical
studies on security, vol. 3, no. 3, 2015, p. 7-10
90
Ibidem, p. 7-10.
91
Bourbeau P., Ryan C. Resilience, resistance, ifrapolitics and enmeshments. In: Eropean Journal of international
relations, 2017, p.16.

28
 The roots of the resilience thinking within the security field can be traced to the United
States, United Kingdom, Canada or Netherlands national security strategies, being linked to the
security of their own territory. About the same period, Australia also began to specifically
mention resilience when describing its goals for national security92.
In 2010, the US National Security Strategy embraced resilience as a central concept. The
concept was mentioned 26 times in the 51 pages of the document. It was defined as “the ability
to adapt to changing conditions and to prepare for, withstand, and rapidly recover from
disruptions93”. The strategy approaches resilience along with topics as international terrorism,
cyberattacks, pandemics, natural hazards, while 2017 vision approaches also deliberate attacks,
accidents, unconventional stresses, shocks, threats to the economy and the democratic system94.
As regards the United Kingdom, it adopted resilience within its security strategy in the
context of emergency management with the goal to “predict, prevent, and mitigate the risks to
(Britain’s) security and develop resilience to reduce their impact 95”. The main risks and threats
of issue include terrorism, hostile cyberattacks, major accidents and natural hazards.
In Australian national security strategy from 2013 entitled “Strong and secure: A strategy
for Australia’s national security96”, resilience is designed as one pillar of county`s national
security “Strengthening the resilience of Australia’s people, assets, infrastructure and
institutions”, along with another eight. Important resilience-related implications for Australia’s
national security are also highlighted in the strategy.
When it comes to security and defense, this fairly new concept of resilience is generating
a lot of interest throughout the scientific community. Referring to resilience on national security
dimension, but also on international dimension, these strategies offered a good ground for further
usage of the concept of resilience within the security context.
Later, some international organizations started to be concerned with the concept of
resilience.

92
Fjader C. The nation-state, national security and resilience in the age of globalization. In: Resilience: International
policies, practices and discourses, vol. 2, no. 2, p. 118.
93
National Security Strategy, May 2010, Washington D.C. p. 18.
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf, (accessed
15.01.2023).
94
National Security Strategy of the United States of America, December 2017, p. 14.
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf, (accessed 15.01.2023).
95
Her Majesty’s government. A Strong Britain in an age of uncertainty: The National Security Strategy, 2010, p. 25.
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/61936/national-
security-strategy.pdf, (accessed 15.01.2023).
96
Strong and Secure: A Strategy for Australia’s National Security 2013, p. 21.
https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/167267/Australia%20A%20Strategy%20for%20National%20Securit.pdf, (accessed
15.01.2023).

29
 The EU first definition of resilience appeared in 2012, in the context of development and
humanitarian affairs. The concept was defined “the ability of an individual, a household, a
community, a country or a region to withstand, cope, adapt, and quickly recover from stresses
and shocks such as violence, conflict, drought and other natural disasters without compromising
long-term development”97. It outlines two aspects of resilience. First one refers to the strength of
an entity to resist stress and shock and the capacity to recover rapidly from the impact. Second
one refers to increasing resilience by reducing vulnerability, which can be obtained by improving
entity`s strength, by reducing the intensity impact.
A widely used definition was introduced by Mitchell A. in 2013 within the study „Risk
and Resilience: From Good Idea to Good Practice” within OECD framework. In this regard,
resilience is defined as “the ability of households, communities, and nations to absorb and
recover from shocks, whilst positively adapting and transforming their structures and means for
living in the face of long-term stresses, change and uncertainty98”. Mitchell A. argued that
resilience can modify or change the basic structure and the way in which system functions: if
risk management offers a set of options for managing the events with major impact, with low
impacts and the vulnerabilities effects, resilience offers a set of options for managing changes
and uncertainties within the system, associated with the long-term trends that drive these events
and vulnerabilities.
The OECD approach to resilience introduced the resilience systems analysis, which
explores the connections between various risks and vulnerabilities. Later, the OECD definition
of resilience has been adopted, with minor variations, by most international actors.
After looking at several approaches to the concept of resilience, we can conclude that,
regardless of the field in which it is used, it assumes certain elements that are constantly found in
all approaches to this concept, namely: the existence of certain vulnerabilities of a certain
system; the existence of external factors/ threats that may affect the normal functioning of the
system; a high level of knowledge of vulnerabilities and possible external factors that can affect
the normal state of the system; the ability of the system to survive and preserve its essential
functions, even under shock or crisis conditions; the ability to adapt to the situation and recover

97
European Commission. Building resilience: The EU’s approach, p. 35.
https://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/aid/countries/factsheets/thematic/EU_building_resilience_en.pdf, (accessed
15.01.2023).
98
Mitchell A. Risk and resilience: from good idea to good practice. OECD Development CoOperation Working
Paper, 2013, p. 4-5.
https://www.oecd.org/naec/averting-systemic-collapse/SG-NAEC(2019)5_Resilience_strategies.pdf, (accessed
15.01.2023).

30
afterwards; the adaptability of a social system through which it copes with change, while
preserving its essential functions.
According to PhD Milanova N., the concept of resilience in defense and security is
evolving towards the inclusion of a wide-ranging and multidimensional set of vulnerabilities and
associated mitigation strategies across the spectrum of military and non-military mechanisms of
response99. Another constant aspect is related to the existence of at least one vulnerability within
the reference system, simultaneously with the existence of a risk or threats, which may involve
exploiting that vulnerability. Therefore, we can define resilience by referring to vulnerability.
Starting with 2014 international crisis generated by the annexation of Crimea by the
Russian Federation and the expansion of the conflict in the secessionist regions of Donetsk and
Lugansk, self-declared people's republics, resilience gained prominence in the EU and NATO
discourse as a countermeasure against hybrid threats.
Therefore, within the EU and NATO strategic documents, resilience started to be viewed
as a method to counter threats of any type, including hybrid ones. The most important strategic
documents that linked resilience with hybrid threats are:
 The Joint Framework on countering hybrid threats - a EU response of 2016100, offered an
important frame for stepping up the cooperation between the EU and NATO in common efforts
to counter hybrid threats, providing for the creation of synergies between all relevant
instruments, including resilience building. In order to develop resilience in the face of hybrid
threats, the Declaration emphasizes the need for NATO and the EU to cooperate in analysis,
prevention, detection and early warning, as well as in the exchange of information.
 The EU Global Strategy of 2016 (EUGS), provided an expansive approach on the concept
of resilience incorporating the concept in one of the five priorities in its external action,
alongside the other four priorities, namely the EU security, an integrated approach to conflicts,
cooperative regional orders, and global governance101 . The strategy thus defines “a broader
concept, encompassing all individuals and the whole society”, which is based on “democracy,
trust in institutions and sustainable development, as well as the ability to reform, resisting
internal and external crises and recovering after them”. The EU Global Strategy states that: at the

99
Milanova N. Institutional resilience and building integrity in the defense and security sector. In: The Quarterly
Journal vol. 19, no. 3, 2020, p. 67. https://connections-qj.org/article/institutional-resilience-and-building-integrity-
defence-and-security-sector, (accessed 17.01.2023).
100
Joint Framework on countering hybrid threats a EU response. European Commission, Brussels, 2016. https://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52016JC0018, (accessed 17.01.2023).
101
A global strategy for the European Union’s foreign and security policy. EU Council, 28.06. 2016, p. 9-10.
https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/eugs_review_web_0.pdf, (accessed 17.01.2023).

31
 center of a resilient state is a resilient society based on democracy, trust in institutions and
sustainable development.
 The EUGS’s Implementation Plan released later, stipulates implementation suggestions
in the area of security and defense. Therefore, the plan proposes resilience as a method to
counter hybrid threats102. An important point of this strategy regards the establishment of
European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats (Hybrid CoE), which currently
offers the most relevant research on the resilience from the hybrid threats perspective.
 The Joint Warsaw Summit communiqué of 2016 stresses the NATO ally’s commitment to
enhance resilience, especially civil preparedness by achieving the Baseline Requirements for
National Resilience103. NATO refers to resilience as maintaining and developing their individual
and collective defense capacity, in its founding treaty of 1949 and, in particular, in Article 3: the
Parties, separately or jointly, through continued self-help and mutual support will maintain and
develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attacks104. Since then, the
concept has evolved into one of national resilience through civil preparedness that enhances the
Alliance’s capacity to prevent, protect, adapt, and transform.
 The Joint Communication on increasing resilience and bolstering capabilities to address
hybrid threats of 2018, introduced relevant points on building resilience and deterrence in the
cybersecurity sector, resilience building to hostile intelligence activity, as well as strategic
communication as a tool of resilience building to hybrid threats105.
 NATO 2030 Expert Group’s Report “United for a New Era” from 2020, refers
extensively to the concept of resilience106.
 The Strategic Concept approved at the Madrid Summit in 2022, describes the new
security reality facing the Alliance, reaffirms NATO’s values, and spells out NATO’s key
purpose of ensuring Allies’ collective defense, including resilience measures107.
The above listed strategic documents expanded the meaning of the concept of resilience
within the security field, offering an important framework for analyzing resilience as a

102
European Commission, Implementation Plan on Security and Defence. Brussels: European Union, 2016,
https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/eugs_implementation_plan_st14392.en16_0.pdf, (accessed 17.01.2023).
103
NATO Warsaw Summit Communiqué, 2016. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_133169.htm
(accessed 10.01.2023).
104
The North Atlantic Treaty, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/- natohq/official_texts_17120.htm, (accessed 10.01.2023).
105
EU-NATO Joint Declaration, June 2018, p.1-2.
https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/36096/nato_eu_final_eng.pdf, (accessed 17.01.2023).
106
NATO 2030: United for a New Era.
.https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2020/12/pdf/201201-Reflection-Group-Final-Report-Uni.pdf,
(accessed 17.01.2023).
107
The 2022 NATO Strategic Concept.
https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2022/6/pdf/290622-strategic-concept.pdf, (accessed 17.01.2023).

32
countermeasure to hybrid threats. In addition, we can outline that non-state actors, such as EU and
NATO, in mitigating threats to security, especially those of a hybrid nature, use resilience in their
discourse from the perspective of strengthening the defense of member states.
At the present stage, due to the fact that the concept of resilience pursues a
multidimensional approach to defense against a multidimensional threat, although not yet fully
defined within the security field, it is examined as a countermeasure to hybrid threats.
Scholars argue that “the application of the concept of resilience emerges as a critical
measure against hybrid threats. If hybrid strategies seek to undermine societies’ security and
stability while applying pressure from within, then identifying existing vulnerabilities and
potential fault lines to build resilience against risks and threats would be a prudent
undertaking”108.
Starting with the assumption that hybrid strategies seek to find and exploit vulnerabilities
in the target nation and the international organization, therefore at the national level, resilience
would include a coherent and up to date national crisis organization, developed security and
defense structures, and capabilities and civil preparedness109.
The same view is supported by other scholars, which claims that hybrid strategies
typically focus on previously identified societal vulnerabilities (e.g., economic collapse, internal
conflict, divided society, lack of political consensus on the future of society, corruption,
ineffective law enforcement, lack of natural resources and dependence on foreign states, lack of
societal resilience etc110. Therefore, resilience emerges as framework to identify and monitor
society strengths, weaknesses or vulnerabilities, opportunities for response or even proactive
measures and potential threats long before the crisis escalates111. Also, the claim that in order to
recognize the most appropriate way to counter emerging security threats, it is important to
develop and implement robust mechanisms and measures to evaluate societal resilience112.
Romanian scholar, Chifu I. also examined the concept of social resilience in the
framework of hybrid threats research. He states that societal resilience involves closing the

108
Atkinson A., Grandi M.,Vaklinova G. Resilience, human security, and the protection of civilians: a critical
approach for future urban conflict, 2022, p. 6.
https://ec.europa.eu/research/participants/documents/downloadPublic?documentIds=080166e5b60c6c19&appId=PP
GMS, (accessed 17.01.2023).
109
The Institute for Security Governance, 2021, p.1.
https://nps.edu/documents/113018911/125185574/ISG+Resilience.pdf/bbbe0227-207d-873a-3864-
c4d19d7bdc14?t=1622747034982, (accessed 17.01.2023).
110
Apostol A, Cristache N. Nastase M. Societal resilience, a key factor in combating hybrid threats. In: International
Conference knowledge-based organization, vol. XXVIII, no. 2, 2022, p. 114.
111
Ibidem,p. 108.
112
Apostol A, Cristache N. Nastase M. Societal resilience, a key factor in combating hybrid threats. In: International
Conference knowledge-based organization, vol. XXVIII, no. 2, 2022, p. 109.

33
vulnerabilities of society, which are seen as windows of opportunity used by the hybrid enemy,
but also an increase in the capacity for reconstruction and rehabilitation after a hybrid stroke,
respectively the ability to replace elements under attack113.
Therefore, we can outline that due to the fact that resilience can identify vulnerabilities
before disruptions occurs, it could hypothetically be seen as a countermeasure to hybrid threats.
Even so, our further research will reveal the issue in a more comprehensive way.
Yet, before presenting the conclusion to the paragraph, we agree with the following
statement: “from theoretical approaches and empirical realities, to its concrete applicability in
policies, strategies, plans, programs or political and administrative decisions, resilience becomes
more than a concept, being a framework for thinking that opens an integrative, dynamic
perspective and that creates a favorable basis for analysis”114.
Based on the research of theoretical-conceptual bases of resilience, it can be concluded
that the concept has roots in many disciplines and its meaning is contextual varying according to
approach. Even though, there are some characteristics which we can find in more definitions,
which helped us to establish our own definition.
In our view, resilience is the ability of a system to anticipate, resist, absorb, respond to,
adapt to, and recover from a disturbance and by learning experience to emerge stronger. In
addition, our research revealed that resilience leads to security, therefore is no surprise that such
“a powerful and useful concept” started to be applied within the security field of research.
Referring particularly to the meaning of resilience within the security field, it can be observed
that there is no a common definition in this regard.
Starting form OECD approach to resilience by identifying the connections between
various risks and vulnerabilities, resilience can be defined by referring to vulnerabilities. If in a
reference system exists at least one vulnerability simultaneously with the existence of a risk or
threat, which may involve exploiting that vulnerability, then resilience is a useful concept for
anticipating, resisting, absorbing, responding, adapting and recovering from the disturbance by
learning experience. Taking into consideration that hybrid threats seeks to exploit the
vulnerability of a system, therefore building resilience against hybrid threats seems to be an
effective countermeasure.

113
Chifu I. Războiul hibrid şi rezilienţa societală. Planificarea apărării hibride. In: Infosfera: Revistă de studii de
securitate și informații pentru apărare, vol. 10, nr.1, 2018, p. 28.
114
Bănică, A. Muntele, I. Rezilienţă și teritoriu: operaţionalizare conceptuală și perspective metodologice,
https://www.researchgate.net/profile/AlexandruBanica/publication/321973568_REZILIENTA_si_TERITORIU/link
s/5a4f42e5a6fdc c7b3cdb44a1/REZILIENTA-si-TERITORIU.pdf, (accessed on 17.01.2023).

34
1.3. Conclusions to chapter 1.

The conducted research on historiographical and theoretical-conceptual aspects of the

resilience from the security perspective, allowed us to delve deeper into understanding the
essence of topic within the security field, as well its particular importance to hybrid threats
research.
Historiographical research on scientific publications of Western, Russian, Romanian and
Moldovan scholars helped us to reveal that before percolating within the International Relations
and Security Studies research, resilience has a multiple and multidisciplinary journey within
various works of scholars from various disciplines as mechanics, psychology, social studies,
engineering, ecology, urban planning, disaster management, etc. Therefore, the meaning and
understanding of resilience is contextual and varies according to the discipline, approach, or
subject matter. In addition, we established that the concept itself does not derive from the
ecology field, nevertheless the works of the US-Canadian ecologist Crawford Stanley Holling,
brought resilience to prominence.
In addition, we established that in-depth engagement of security studies with the concept
of resilience begins after 2014, in close connection with the security developments at
international level, as well with continuously emergence of risk and threats to the security of
states. Therefore, the Western researchers studied resilience using a more comprehensive
approach. Beginning with the research of one particular angle of relationship between security
and resilience, the research was expanded to examining resilience as countermeasure to hybrid
threats. The constantly increasing works of the experts from the field, which explores resilience
as a countermeasure to hybrid threats can be observed especially throughout the last years.
If we regard the Russian research on resilience, we can outline that currently the topic is
also examined along with hybrid threats phenomenon.
Romanian scholars, started to approach resilience earlier within the security filed,
particularly after 2014, focusing on studding resilience as a measure for counteracting hybrid
enemy. At the present stage, the works in this direction are constantly increasing.
Referring to resilience research within the security field of the Republic of Moldova, we
can outline that the concept is relatively-new. It started to be research after 2020, once with the
publication of some scientific works which explores resilience as a measure to hybrid threats
phenomenon, especially along with disinformation. Beginning with 2022, some local scholars
started to research resilience more thoroughly, offering an important ground for expanding
research of the resilience within the security field.

35
 The research on theoretical-conceptual bases of resilience in the security field, allowed us
to reveal that there is no generally accepted definition of resilience. Therefore, all provided
definitions are somehow related to the original one provide by C. S. Holling. Originally used to
describe the ability of a system to return to equilibrium after a disturbance, the concepts was
enriched in time with new nuances and meanings, coming to include no not only returning to a
particular state, but also adapting to change and transforming the system.
Analyzing more definitions of resilience we established that there are some
characteristics which are constantly present in all approaches to resilience. The identified
characteristics helped us to develop our own definition of the concept of resilience within the
security field: the ability of a state and its institutions, but also of society as a whole to withstand
crises of various types, as for example armed attacks, to recover from them by using state`s
power resources (economics, diplomatic, informational, military) with the joint efforts of the
state institutions.
At the same time, the conducted research revealed that resilience leads to security,
therefore is no surprise that such “a powerful and useful concept” started to be applied within the
security field of research.
Referring particularly to the meaning of resilience within the security field, we can
outline that the roots of resilience thinking can be traced to the United States, United Kingdom,
Canada, Netherlands or Australia national security strategies, which are linked with ensuring
security of their own territory.
Later, the concept started to be adopted by some important international organization as
EU, OECD or NATO in their security policies. We identified that OECD approach on resilience
offered a more integrative, dynamic perspective on conceptualizing resilience within the security
field by introducing resilience system analysis, which seeks to explore the connections between
various risks and vulnerabilities. Therefore, resilience can be defined by referring to
vulnerability. If within a reference system can be identified at least one vulnerability,
simultaneously with the existence of a risk or threat, which may involve exploiting that
vulnerability, therefore resilience ca be seen as a countermeasure to identify vulnerabilities
before disruptions occurs (to anticipate). And even if it occurs, to resist, absorb, respond to,
adapt to, and recover from a disturbance and by learning experience to emerge stronger.
Taking into consideration that hybrid threats seeks to exploit the vulnerability of a
system, therefore building resilience against hybrid threats seems to be an effective
countermeasure. Therefore, the further research will explore the issue of hybrid threats and help
us to reveals why resilience is put together along with hybrid threats within the security research.

36
 2. HYBRID SECURITY THREATS: EU AND NATO EXPERIENCE IN
STRENGTHENING RESILIENCE.

The ambiguity of contemporary security environment, the broad range of hybrid threats
to national security, generated the need to analyze, develop and adjust the concept of resilience
within the security documents of the international organizations such as EU and NATO, as a
mechanism of response to this type of threats. In line with this, this chapter will present the
research on the hybrid threats phenomenon: concept, tools and modus-operandi, in order to
reveal what exactly is a hybrid security threat. The second paragraph will provide the analysis of
the main EU and NATO strategic documents which emphases resilience as a key measure for
counteracting hybrid threats, including cooperation of these organizations in this regard. The
conducted research will help us to reveal the main individual signs of a hybrid threat, which will
become the starting point for the practical part. At the same time, the EU and NATO experience
in strengthening resilience to HT will serve as references for building resilience of the Republic
of Moldova to hybrid threats of national security. Conclusions to the chapter will be provided.

2.1. Hybrid threats: concept, tools and modus-operandi.

Hybrid threats, as phenomenon and concept, have rapidly placed themselves at the center
of security policy discourse since the Russian aggression against Ukraine in 2014, for good
reasons115. The nature of antagonistic threats to open, democratic societies and political decision-
making processes has broadened, and the intensity and potential damage of this kind of
antagonistic behavior has increased116.
Disinformation, cyberattacks and election interference are only a few frequently cited
examples of these threats. Consequently, it is important to establish and clarify what exactly is a
hybrid threat in order to be able to detect and identify it, to build resilience against it and finally
to counter it.
Therefore, this paragraph will attempt to establish what a hybrid security threat is. For
being able to do this thing we will look at the historical transformation of the concept of HT,
especially on the American and European perspectives. For understandable reasons (gaining by
the Republic of Moldova a candidate status to EU accession), the largest part of this chapter will
be focused on the EU institution`s approach to HT.

115
Weissmann M., Nilsson N., Palmertz B., Thunholm P. Hybrid warfare: security and asymmetric conflict in
international relations, p. 8. London: I.B. Tauris Bloomsbury Publishing Plc, https://www.diva-
portal.org/smash/get/diva2:1547060/FULLTEXT03, (accessed 01.02.23).
116
Ibidem, p. 8.

37
 Before starting the research itself, it is worth been mentioning that term HT lacks a
comprehensive and universal definition. In addition, within the security field we can find plenty
other concepts that describe new forms of conflict/ warfare which are trying to describe very
similar actions as involves the concept of HT: “grey zone activity”, “new generation warfare”,
„hybrid intervention” „non-linear warfare”, “active measures” “asymmetric warfare”,
“compound warfare” “ambiguous warfare”, “political warfare”, “information warfare”, “cyber
warfare”, “surrogate warfare”, “unrestricted warfare” etc.117.
In this regard, one way to conceptualize HT and HW is to understand them as being two
sides of the same coin, constituting two viewpoints, or phases, of the same phenomenon118.
Therefore, examining the historical evolution of the concept of HT will help us to
broaden and deepen our understanding on the HT phenomenon in order to be able to reveal the
individual signs of a hybrid threat or hybrid indicators at the end of this paragraph.
Colonel Frank Hoffmann, well-known American military theorist is considered one of the
pioneers of the term hybrid threats in the American environment. He used the term hybrid threats
in reference to his own concept of hybrid warfare119.
He defined hybrid warfare as a fusion of war forms that blurs regular and irregular
warfare120. It involves the mixing of different methods and means and combined regular,
irregular, and criminal elements with terrorism and new technologies (that later he defined as
hybrid threats). This variety of means and ways was expected to lead to positive synergy effects
for those waging war121. In addition, converging modes of war and increasing complexity would
result in an increased threat to those targeted.
Therefore, he introduced the concept of hybrid threats to define this “entire spectrum of
different ways of fighting, including conventional capabilities, irregular tactics and unit
formations, terrorist acts, up to unlimited forms of violence and intimidation and social
disruption caused by crime - while the individual elements complement each other, intermingle

117
Giannopoulos G., Smith H., Theocharidou M. The Landscape of hybrid threats: A conceptual model. European
Commission, Ispra, 2020, PUBSY No. 123305, p. 9.
118
Weissmann M. Conceptualizing and countering hybrid threats and hybrid warfare. The role of the military in the
grey zone. In: Hybrid Warfare: Security and Asymmetric Conflict in International Relations. London: I.B. Tauris,
2021, p.63.
119
Mattis J., Hoffman F. Future warfare: the rise of hybrid wars. U.S. In: Naval Institute Proceedings, November
2005, p. 31. https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2005/november/future-warfare-rise-hybrid-wars,
(accessed 03.02.23).
120
Hoffman F. Hybrid warfare and challenges. In: JFQ, issue 52, 1st quarter 2009, p. 35.
https://smallwarsjournal.com/documents/jfqhoffman.pdf, (accessed 03.02.23).
121
Ibidem, p. 36.

38
or merge122”. Hoffman believes that there is a very close connection between actions of an
asymmetric nature such as terrorism, organized crime, drug and human trafficking and actions
undertaken with the aim of undermining the legitimacy of the government or local authorities
and generating or amplifying the crisis.
Hoffman`s analysis is based on the US National Defense Strategy from 2005. He claimed
that according to the strategy „the character of the security environment is changing due to the
presence of actors who do not rely on conventional military power in the confrontation with the
US, in which the United States has a clear advantage, but they seek to use inventive tools to
which traditional military power cannot adequately respond. Therefore, the strategy outlined the
relative probability of these threats and acknowledged America’s increased vulnerability to less
conventional methods of conflict”123.
For F. Hoffman, who is considered the initiator of this approach, hybrid therefore meant
the simultaneous use of forces, on the same battlefield, in different actions, against an opponent.
An important feature of hybrid threats outlined by the Western author is the fact that hybrid
threats targets vulnerabilities of a specific country.
Another definition of HT is presented by Major Russell W. Glenn, who also talks about
the combination of several ways of fighting, and defines hybrid threats as „any adversary that
simultaneously and adaptively employs some combination of (1) political, military, economic,
social, and information means, and (2) conventional, irregular, catastrophic, terrorism, and
disruptive/ criminal warfare methods. It may include a combination of state and non-state
actors”124.
The United States Joint Forces Command defined a hybrid threat as, “any adversary that
simultaneously and adaptively employs a tailored mix of conventional, irregular, terrorism and
criminal means or activities in the operational battle space. Rather than a single entity, a hybrid
threat or challenger may be a combination of state and non-state actors”125. In 2011 the U.S.
Army defined a hybrid threat as “the diverse and dynamic combination of regular forces,

122
Hoffman F. Conflict in the 21st Century: the rise of hybrid wars. Arlington, VA: Potomac Institute for Policy
Studies, 2007, p.14. https://www.potomacinstitute.org/images/stories/publications/potomac_hybridwar_0108.pdf,
(accessed 03.02.23).
123
Ibidem, p.13.
124
Glenn Russell W. Thoughts on hybrid conflict, p. 2. https://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/188-
glenn.pdf, (accessed 04.02.23).
125
Ibidem, p. 2.

39
irregular forces, criminal elements, or a combination of these forces and elements all unified to
achieve mutually benefiting effects”126.
On this part we can outline that according to Hoffmann, hybrid war represents a war in
which state and non-state actors operate, using methods that represent hybrid threats when
conducting combat activities. Thanks to Hoffman, we can distinguish the difference right from
the start between hybrid warfare and hybrid threats. In short, hybrid threats are methods by
which hybrid warfare occurs. So, it does not appear logical to distinguish hybrid threats from
hybrid warfare as discrete subcategories at the same level of abstraction. It would appear strange
to disregard hybrid warfare as a hybrid threat when it is typically seen as one.
In addition, we can highlight that according to American perspective, the actors of a
hybrid war can therefore be both state and non-state actors. The primary goal of these HT is
mainly to gain internal and external support using other than conventional means by exploiting
the vulnerabilities of a specific country. From this perspective, this model of warfare is used by
actors with less conventional power.
The concept of hybrid threats experienced its renaissance, to speak so, together with the
beginning of the Russian aggression against Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea in 2014.
After these events, the concept began to reappear in a big way in the works of security theorists,
security experts, political representatives or analysts, or the media.
The starting point in this regard, was the publishing on February 27, 2013 by the Russian
Federation Deputy Minister of Defense, General Gerasimov V. of the article on the new concept
of “non-linear or hybrid wars” in the magazine “Military-industrial courier”. The main idea of
the article is the fact that the boundaries between peace and war are blurring and it is not clear at
first glance whether there is a war going on127.
In order to understand the Russian perspective on HW, and why it reshaped the research
on HT, we will outline the main points of his doctrine:
- The author outlines that experience from the conflicts connected with the so-called
color revolutions in North Africa and the Middle East, shows that a prosperous state can become
in a few months, or even days, an arena of military struggle, a victim of foreign intervention, and
reach a state of humanitarian disaster, chaos and civil war;

126
Fleming B. Hybrid threat concept: contemporary war, military planning and the advent of unrestricted operational
art. In: United States Army Command and General Staff College, 2011, p. 37.
https://indianstrategicknowledgeonline.com/web/2753.pdf, (accessed 04.02.23).
127
Gerasimov V. Speech at the annual meeting of the Russian Academy of Military Science. In: Military-Industrial
Courier, Moscow, 2013. https://web.archive.org/web/20170820160806/http://www.vpk-news.ru/articles/14632,
(accessed 06.02.23).

40
 - To achieve political and strategic goals, weapons are no longer needed, or there are more
effective tools. To achieve the set goals, it is often more appropriate to use political, economic,
informational, humanitarian and other non-military measures, including the protest potential of
the population of the targeted country;
- Gerasimov, and de facto the entire Russian leadership, “accuses” the leading countries of
the whole world, especially the United States, of permanently conducting hybrid wars. In his
article, Gerasimov also writes that Russia allegedly fell asleep in this field and that it is necessary
to work on its correction. He also calls for Russia to prepare for this new type of “war”, in order
to know how to face it and use it to its advantage128.
Later, Gerasimov`s work became a part of the new military doctrine of the Russian
Federation129. The theory of deep operations130 greatly influenced the military reform in Russia,
the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation from 2014 imposing a closer coordination of the
state`s resources to fulfill its ultimate goals. In a paragraph describing the operational
environment, it is stated that “...the integrated use of military, political, economic, informational
and other non-military forces” and “...the effect on the enemy along the entire depth of its
territory in the global information space, air, land and sea” are characteristics of modern war131.
The Russian Federation actions in Ukraine have generated a big amount of researches on
HT phenomenon around the world. In 2014 Berzins J., has published an important publication
entitled “Russia's New Generation Warfare in Ukraine: Implications for Latvian Defense
Policy”132, which described how the hybrid war affects the events and the situation in Ukraine.
Berzins claims that Russia`s new military thinking emphasizes the tendency towards
“undeclared war” and the non-linear way of fighting. He presents an idea that claims that the
modern war in the Russian concept aims primarily at people's thinking, and thanks to this,
informational and psychological warfare comes to the fore. With the help of information and
psychological warfare, superiority in the control of units and weapons is ensured. At the same
time, these steps are intended to undermine the morale and psyche of enemy soldiers and

128
Gerasimov V. Speech at the annual meeting of the Russian Academy of Military Science. In: Military-Industrial
Courier, Moscow, 2013. https://web.archive.org/web/20170820160806/http://www.vpk-news.ru/articles/14632,
(accessed 06.02.23).
129
Военная доктрина Российской Федерации, параграфы 2014, параграф 15, 43-44.
https://docs.cntd.ru/document/420246589, (accessed 08.02.23).
130
Gerasimov V.Speech at the annual meeting of the Russian Academy of Military Science. In: Military-Industrial
Courier, Moscow, 2013. https://web.archive.org/web/20170820160806/http://www.vpk-news.ru/articles/14632,
(accessed 08.02.23).
131
Военная доктрина Российской Федерации, параграфы 2014, параграф 48-51.
https://docs.cntd.ru/document/420246589, (accessed 08.02.23).
132
Berzins J. Russia new generation warfare in Ukraine: implications for Latvian defene forces. In: National Defence
Academy of Latvia Center for Security and Strategic Research, 2014, p. 4.

41
civilians, who are then not completely loyal to their own government. The purpose is to reduce
the deployment of own (that is, Russian) military capacities to an absolute minimum133.
On this part, we can outline that the events of 2014 generated by the Russian Federation
contributed to the expansion of the research on HT phenomenon around the world.
After the 2014 events, the concept of hybrid threats evolved by being included into the
EU security institution`s agenda. Therefore, our research will start from highlighting the most
important definitions of the HT phenomenon provided by the EU institutions, in order to reveal
the HT modus-operandi in the European view. In addition, we will try to establish the HT tools.
At the level of EU member states, the operationalization processes of the concept of HT
started once with the EU’s Joint Framework on Countering Hybrid Threats, drafted by the
European Commission in 2016.
The Framework, states that “while definitions of hybrid threats vary and need to remain
flexible to respond to their evolving nature”, the concept is described as “the mixture of coercive
and subversive activity, conventional and unconventional methods (i.e. diplomatic, military,
economic, technological), which can be used in a coordinated manner by state or non-state actors
to achieve specific objectives while remaining below the threshold of formally declared warfare.
There is usually an emphasis on exploiting the vulnerabilities of the target and on generating
ambiguity to hinder decision-making processes. Massive disinformation campaigns, using social
media to control the political narrative or to radicalize, recruit and direct proxy actors can be
vehicles for hybrid threats”.134
The EU External Action Service (EEAS) offered the following description of HT:
“Hybrid threats combine conventional and unconventional, military and non-military activities
that can be used in a coordinated manner by state or non-state actors to achieve specific political
objectives. Hybrid campaigns are multidimensional, combining coercive and subversive
measures, using both conventional and unconventional tools and tactics. They are designed to be
difficult to detect or attribute. These threats target critical vulnerabilities and seek to create
confusion to hinder swift and effective decision-making135”.
The European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats or Hybrid CoE is the
main EU network-based organization in Helsinki that serves as a hub between EU and NATO in
analyzing HT. It characterized HT as:

133
Berzins J. Russia new generation warfare in Ukraine: implications for Latvian defene forces. In: National Defence
Academy of Latvia Center for Security and Strategic Research, 2014, p. 4.
134
EU Council. Joint Framework on countering hybrid threats a European Union response, 2016, inroduction.
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52016JC0018, (accessed 13.02.23).
135
The EEAS, Countering hybrid threats. p. 1.https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/documents/2022-03-28-
countering-Hybrid-Threats_NewLayout.pdf, (accessed 13.02.23).

42
(1) “Coordinated and synchronized action that deliberately targets democratic states’ and
institutions’ systemic vulnerabilities through a wide range of means;
(2) Activities that exploit the thresholds of detection and attribution, as well as the different
interfaces (war-peace, internal-external security, local-state, and national-international);
(3) Activities aimed at influencing different forms of decision-making at the local (regional),
state, or institutional level, and designed to further and/or fulfil the agent’s strategic goals while
undermining and/or hurting the target”136.
In an EU Commission Joint Research Centre Technical Report, the European Centre of
Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats (Hybrid CoE) established what exactly turns an action
into HT: “it is when a hostile actor deliberately combines and synchronizes action, specifically
targeting the systemic vulnerabilities in democratic societies in ways that have roots in tactics
with which authoritarian states, revisionist powers, rogue states and non-state networks that are
seeking to undermine democratic state system have been trying to maintain their power, exert
control and weaken opponents”137.
In addition they established that, „there is a malign intent behind the action, characterized
by the following:
 Using multiple synchronized tools (in principle, non-military) to create linear and non-
linear effects;
 Creating ambiguity (covert and plausible deniability) and hiding the real intent;
 Exhibiting deliberate threshold manipulation when it comes to detection and response;
 Exploiting the seams of democratic society as well as between different jurisdictions;
 Often including a distraction element, such as action in one place, and a target
somewhere else”.
Scholars from The Hague’s Center for Strategic Studies explained that “hybrid threats (or
hybrid warfare, hybrid conflict, hybrid tactics, hybrid confrontations, hybrid operations and other
hybrid ‘things’) involve the orchestrated use of a wide range of instruments of power to coerce
an opponent, falling within the entire spectrum from peace to war”, or put more simply:
“multidomain coercion”138.
Yet we can observe that there is no commonly agreed definition on HT phenomenon
between the EU institutions, and the understanding of the HT phenomenon is very wide. It

136
Hybrid CoE official site. Hybrid CoE research: Hybrid threats as a concept. https://www.hybridcoe.fi/hybrid-
threats-as-a-phenomenon/, (accessed 15.02.23).
137
EU Commision, Hybrid CoE. The Landscape of Hybrid Threats: A Conceptual Model Public Version, p. 36.
https://publications.jrc.ec.europa.eu/repository/handle/JRC123305, (accessed 15.02.23).
138
Bekkers F., Meessen R., Lassche D. Hybrid conflicts: the new normal? The Hagues Center for strategic studies,
2019, p.7. https://www.tno.nl/publish/pages/7427/tno-2019-hybride.pdf, (accessed 17.02.23).

43
involves a combination of multiple means including military, political, economic, legal, cultural,
social, infrastructure, cyber and information field. In addition, a hostile actor aims to avoid
detection and tries to confuse the situational awareness. The above-mentioned hostile actors can
be state or non-state actors. The goal is to influence decision making process of a specific county
by targeting and exploiting vulnerabilities. Therefore, in the European perspective hybrid threats
refer to the instruments, methods and means used by a potential aggressor - who might be both a
state and/ or a non-state actor - used to promote its own interests, strategies and objectives in
relation to his opponent.
In addition to HT modus-operandi, it can be outlined that:
The EU Commission Joint Research Centre Technical Report outlines that “to understand
hybrid threats one needs to understand the actors, tools, the domains that are targeted and the
phases of attack139. Hybrid warfare falls within this spectrum of activity as the “hard end” of
hybrid threat activity”140.
Referring particularly to tools, Treverton et al. provided a research which illustrates the
wide range of hybrid tools based on the analysis of two case studies on Ukraine and the
operations in the 2016 U.S. elections. Therefore he outlines the following HT tools: propaganda,
fake news, strategic leaks, funding organizations, political parties, organized protest movements,
cyber tools (espionage, attack, and manipulation), economic leverage, proxies and unknown war,
paramiliatry organizations141. However, he claim that what defines twenty-first century hybrid
threats is the simultaneous and complementary use of many of these instruments to achieve a
common objective. Combined, hybrid warfare seeks to overlay the means and employ them as
complements in order to maximize their impact142.
The range of methods and activities associated with hybrid threats is much wider, unlike
other types of threats, conventional and/or asymmetric, we are familiar with. Thus, if connected
on the same strategic objective, hybrid actions may include activities of influence through
propaganda and disinformation, economic pressures by exploiting the vulnerabilities of a
particular actor (e.g.: energy dependence), law fare actions and even military activities (e.g.:

139
EU Commision, Hybrid CoE. The Landscape of Hybrid Threats: A Conceptual Model Public Version, p. 11.
https://publications.jrc.ec.europa.eu/repository/handle/JRC123305, (accessed 15.02.23).
140
Ibidem, p. 9.
141
Treverton G., Thvedt A., Chen A. Lee K., McCue, M. Addressing Hybrid Threats, 2018, p.3.
https://www.hybridcoe.fi/publications/addressing-hybrid-threats/, (accessed 17.02.23).
142
Ibidem, p. 45.

44
demonstrations of force, border security incidents like violations of national airspace and waters
etc.) conducted to influence the decision making processes and population of the target143.
The EU Commission Joint Research Centre Technical Report provided a table which
presents an indicative list of tools used by a hostile actor to achieve its objective within the
potentially affected domains (Appendix no.4). The listed tools includes: „creating or exploiting
economic dependencies, cyber operations, undermining the opponent’s national economy, armed
forces conventional/sub-conventional operations, military exercises, exploitation of sociocultural
cleavages (ethnic, religion and culture), promoting social unrest, intelligence preparation,
clandestine operation, discrediting leadership and/or candidates, support of political actors,
media control and interference, disinformation campaigns and propaganda144”. The listed
domains includes: „political, culture, social, legal, military/ defense, infrastructure, economy
information, cyber, intelligence, space, etc.145”
As we can see, the variety of tools used by the hostile actors is very wide, being applied
in various domains. Thus, the HT activities employ a combination of techniques or tools to target
a state across several domains. By generating or exploiting vulnerability or seizing an
opportunity, each technique targets one or more domains. Because they are so closely related to
national security, it is crucial to identify the areas of importance or crucial functions that a state
should make resilient against hybrid threat activity.
Referring particularly to phases of the attack, the Hybrid CoE has divided hybrid threats
into two phases, (Appendix no. 5) illustrates hybrid influencing and hybrid threats: In the priming
phase, the influencer makes preparations for hybrid influencing by creating or identifying
channels for exerting influence. In practice, this means observing and creating various
vulnerabilities, practicing their use, testing their impacts or using them as a diversion. In the
operational phase, the influencer seeks to achieve its objective by combining various methods. If
the selection of methods extends to the use of military force, we can talk about hybrid warfare146.
Yet we can observe that in the European perspective, the HT phenomenon is the incipient
phase of the HW. The same view is shared by the American perspective. In addition, both
analyzed perspectives, agrees on the fact that HT seeks to exploit vulnerabilities of a specific
country. Even so, the European perspective highlights that the main goal of the hybrid activities

143
EU Commision, Hybrid CoE. The Landscape of Hybrid Threats: A Conceptual Model Public Version, p. 28.
https://publications.jrc.ec.europa.eu/repository/handle/JRC123305, (accessed 18.02.23).
144
EU Commision, Hybrid CoE. The Landscape of Hybrid Threats: A Conceptual Model Public Version, p. 41.
https://publications.jrc.ec.europa.eu/repository/handle/JRC123305, (accessed 18.02.23).
145
Ibidem, p. 33.
146
Hybrid CoE research: Helsinki in the era of hybrid threats – Hybrid influencing and the city, p. 5.
https://www.hel.fi/static/kanslia/Julkaisut/2018/hybridiraportti_eng_020818_netti.pdf, (accessed 18.02.23).

45
is to exploit vulnerabilities in order to influence the decision making process of the specific
democratic country. Another important aspect outlined by the European perspective is the fact
that HT seeks to create ambiguity. Generalizing, we can state that the European perspective
provides more compressive analysis of the wide range of tools used by the hostile enemies with
the malign intention in the diverse domains, which helps to better understand the HT
phenomenon.
After analyzing historical evolution of the concept of HT, especially the American, and
European perspective we can outline the common features/ characteristics or hybrid indicators of
HT phenomenon:
1. Actors. The first aspect is the actors. Although state and non-state actors can be the
originators of HT, the main role will still be played by the state. In this case, non-state actors
mainly serve as support for the state in activities for which it does not have its own capacity.
2. Goals. Next, we need to establish the HT target. Authors across the entire spectrum more
or less agree that HT, in order to achieve a goal, mainly aim at the opponent's vulnerabilities,
through which they can force him to engage in activities inconsistent with his traditional
direction or traditional policy in order to influence the decision making process of a country. The
second feature of the hybrid way of fighting is: as part of the activity of an external actor, there is
a polarization of society and subsequent destabilization of the state and its institutions.
3. Resources. First of all, we must mention that most authors understand the term hybrid
war as the use of a combination of military and non-military means. These are often defined as a
set of political, economic, social and informational means, or as the activity of intelligence
services, together with cyber and information operations, or the use of the protest potential of the
population. Thus, the third feature of the hybrid way of fighting is: combination of the military
and non-military means.
4. Unclear situation. In the Joint Framework for Countering HT, the European Commission
also says so, „hybrid threats that can be used by various state and non-state entities in a
coordinated manner to achieve specific goals without formally declaring war”147. The fourth
sign of HT is: the situation is unclear, which reduces the victim's ability to respond adequately.
In the Chapter 3, we will analyze the specific cases from the Republic of Moldova
environment based on these four hybrid indicators. In the presence of all of them, we will be able
to define the case as a hybrid threat to the national security of the Republic of Moldova.

147
EU Council. Joint Framework on countering hybrid threats a European Union response, 2016, introduction.
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52016JC0018, (accessed 22.02.23).

46
2.2. EU and NATO models of strengthening resilience to hybrid threats.

Starting with 2014 international crisis generated by the annexation of Crimea by the
Russian Federation and the expansion of the conflict in the secessionist regions of Donetsk and
Lugansk, self-declared people's republics, resilience gained prominence in the EU and NATO
strategic documents as a key measure against hybrid threats.
Even if according to the EU and, indeed, NATO, countering hybrid threats is a national
responsibility, without effective cooperation neither of them can address hybrid threats by
itself148. This is especially true in light of the complex and evolving nature of hybrid threats,
which addressing requires a comprehensive approach in developing counter-mechanisms and
building resilience149. Hence, only international cooperation, particularly through the EU and
NATO, using regional and multilateral initiatives, can enable states to unite their separate,
scattered national resources to strengthen their resilience against hybrid threats150.
In order to reveal the EU and NATO models of strengthening resilience to hybrid threats,
this paragraph will analyze the most important EU and NATO strategic documents, especially
their common initiatives, which regard resilience as a key measure against HT.
EU model of strengthening resilience to HT. Neither the European Security Strategy of
2003 nor its Implementation Report from 2008, did not refer to resilience as a measure for
countering HT151. Nevertheless, the significant shift was made after 2014, once with the effective
implementation of hybrid tactics applied by Russian Federation in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine.
Since then, many EU national governments, as well as international organizations, have started
to seriously consider the HT phenomenon.
In May of 2015, the EU Foreign Affairs Council called for “actionable proposals to help
countering hybrid threats and foster the resilience of the EU and its Member States as well as
partners”152. It marks the beginning of the operationalization process of resilience as central
measure in addressing HT.

148
Clingendael Report. Countering hybrid threats steps for improving EU-NATO cooperation, 2021, p. 30.
https://www.clingendael.org/sites/default/files/2021-10/countering-hybrid-threats.pdf, (acessed 25.02.2023).
149
Ibidem, p.30.
150
Bajarunas E. Addressing hybrid threats: priorities for the EU in 2020 and beyond. Wilfried Martens Centre for
European Studies. In: European View, vol. 19, no. 1, 2020, p. 63.
151
European Security Strategy, p.1-16. EU Council, Brussels, 08.12.2003.
https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-15895-2003-INIT/en/pdf, (accessed 25.02.2023); Report on the;
Implementation of the European Security Strategy, p. 1-12. EU Council, Brussels, 11.12.2008.
https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/reports/104630.pdf, (accessed 27.02.2023).
152
Conclusions on CSDP. EU Council, 18.05.2015, p. 3, art. 5.
https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/24520/st08971en15.pdf, (accessed 27.02.2023).

47
 Subsequently in April 2016, the European Commission and the High Representative of
the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy approved the Communication: Joint Framework
on Countering Hybrid Threats: A EU Response, which contained 22 operational actions in order
to „counter hybrid threats and foster resilience of the EU and Member States, as well as
partners”153. The implementation of these operational actions is grouped in 4 elements of
response. Accordingly, we will outline the most important aspects contained in the above
mentioned mechanism of response.
1. The first element of response is improving awareness and provides for: launching hybrid
risk survey for identifying key vulnerabilities, including specific hybrid related indicators, which
potentially may target EU vulnerabilities; improving information exchange and relevant
intelligence-sharing between EU, its MS and partners by establishing an EU Hybrid Fusion Cell
within the EU INTCEN of the EEAS with a single focus on HT analysis (by providing special
trainings for its staff in order to recognize early signs of HT); developing of coordinated strategic
communication mechanisms for countering disinformation; establishment of a Centre of
Excellence for countering HT (Hybrid CoE) , focused on researching how hybrid strategies are
applied in order to align EU and national policies to the current complexity of HT (such a center
could work closely with existing EU and NATO centers of excellence in order to benefit from
their insights on HT)154.
2. The second element of response is building resilience and refers to several measures for
reducing the vulnerabilities of the MS and partners, but also of human communities and
societies. The operational actions include measures for the protection and resilience of critical
infrastructures; increasing defense capabilities to HT; cybersecurity increasing within the
industry, energy; targeting HT financing; building resilience against radicalization and violent
extremism, etc. Another important measure provides for increasing cooperation with third
countries by providing external financing, with the goal of building accountable institutions
prepared for responding effectively to security threats, supporting their security sector reform
and launching a hybrid risk survey in neighborhood regions155.
3. The third element of response to HT is preventing, responding and recovering. The
operational actions in this regards aims to define and practice the procedures used in the event
that a member state faces a serious crisis (natural disaster, ecological catastrophe, terrorist

153
Joint Framework on countering hybrid threats a EU response. European Commission, Brussels, 2016. https://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52016JC0018, (accessed 28.02.2023).
154
Joint Framework on countering hybrid threats a EU response. European Commission, 06.04.2016, p. 4.
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52016JC0018, (accessed 28.02.2023).
155
Ibidem, p. 5-14.

48
attack), which requires the application of the solidarity clause (according to art. 222 of the Treaty
on the Functioning of the European Union - TFEU) or is the victim of a military attack, which
implies the application of the mutual defense clause (based on art. 42 paragraph 7 of the Treaty
of the European Union - TEU)156.
4. The last one regards increasing cooperation with NATO. The document recognizes the
importance this cooperation for strengthening the EU's resilience, and wished the development of
joint NATO-EU responses based on the exchange of information, expertise and best practices for
countering hybrid and cyber threats, through direct liaison between the EU Hybrid Fusion Cell
and NATO’s hybrid cell. In addition, it provides for collaboration in strategic communication
and cyber defense, joint exercises both at political and technical levels, training activities, etc157.
These actionable proposals, for the first time since 2014, provided the EU and its member
states with the necessary tools to counter HT, primarily by strengthening resilience in many
fields. Thus, the EU member states recognized that no state or organization can address hybrid
threats by itself, due to its complex and continuously evolving nature. Consequently, the EU
proposed a coordinated and comprehensive approach, those of resilience building, which
strongly requires cooperation with NATO, in order to develop more efficient mechanism of
counteracting HT phenomenon. In general lines, it is a fundamental document in terms of
structuring EU efforts in addressing HT by enhancing resilience of its member states.
A couple of months after, on 28 of June 2016, the EU replaced the European Security
Strategy of 2003 with the Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy
(EUGS), which provided more wide approach to resilience by making it one of the five priories
of the EU`s external action, alongside the other four priorities, namely the EU security, an
integrated approach to conflicts, cooperative regional orders, and global governance. 158
Thus, the EUGS approach to resilience is a departure from the earlier usage of this
concept by the EU, which had its primary focus on development and humanitarian affairs. It
provides a more expansive approach, due to incorporation of resilience in the EU`s external,
strategic priority, including of addressing HT phenomenon.
In general lines, the strategy defines a broader concept of resilience, encompassing all
individuals and the whole society, which is based on “democracy, trust in institutions and

156
Joint Framework on countering hybrid threats a EU response. European Commission, 2016, p. 15-16. https://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52016JC0018, (accessed 01.03.2023).
157
Ibidem, p. 17-18.
158
A global strategy for the European Union’s foreign and security policy. EU Council, 28.06. 2016, p. 9-10.
https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/eugs_review_web_0.pdf, (accessed 01.03.2023).

49
sustainable development, as well as the ability to reform, resisting internal and external crises
and recovering after them”159.
Another relevant aspect of the strategy is reflected in the section titled “State and Societal
Resilience to our East and South”, where the EU take as a strategic priority the development of
the resilience of states and societies beyond its immediate vicinity, located in a vast geographical
area, from Central Asia in the east to Central Africa in the south, as a policy objective it’s
common - external, security and defense160. Therefore, resilience is prioritized strategically
across the east and south of the EU.
The document also emphasizes the importance of increasing resilience of MS and
partners as the optimal way to counter HT, by adopting a wide set of measures. These include
measures to protect critical infrastructures, financial systems and those intended to ensure the
health of the population, food safety, cyber security, the protection of industrial capacities and
economic resources, but also the environment161.
In addition, the EUGS outlines that “the EU will deepen its partnership with NATO by
coordinating the defense capability development process, through parallel and synchronized
exercises, through mutual support actions to build the capacities of our partners, to counter
hybrid threats and cyber ones, respectively for ensuring maritime security”162.
Therefore, we can observe that both the EU’s Joint Communication on Countering
Hybrid Threats and the EUGS already emphasized the need for a strengthened partnership with
NATO. Eventually, this need for further cooperation led to signing a joint declaration that
defines seven specific areas of cooperation, including the fight against HT.
Next practical steps in addressing HT included the adoption in November 2017, of the
Strategic Approach to Resilience in the EU’s External Action, which contains Ten Guiding
Considerations of a Strategic Approach to Resilience and of the Eastern Partnership Summit
Declaration of 2017, which outlines resilience in a variety of contexts163. Along with societal
and economic definitions of resilience, both documents goes into detail about resilience in the
security field, such as cooperation and EU support for security sector reform, the implementation

159
A global strategy for the European Union’s foreign and security policy. EU Council, 28.06. 2016, p. 16.
https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/eugs_review_web_0.pdf, (accessed 01.03.2023).
160
Ibidem, p.23.
161
A global strategy for the European Union’s foreign and security policy. EU Council, 28.06. 2016, p. 18-39.
https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/eugs_review_web_0.pdf, (accessed 01.03.2023).
162
Ibidem, p.20.
163
Strategic Approach to Resilience in the EU’s External Action. EEAS, 2017, p. 1-24.
https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/join_2017_21_f1_communication_from_commission_to_inst_en_v7_
p1_916039.pdf (accessed 23.03.2023); Joint Declaration of the Eastern Partnership Summit. EU Council,
24.11.2017, p. 1-22. https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-14821-2017-INIT/en/pdf, (accessed
03.03.2023).

50
of integrated border management, the disruption of organized crime, and dealing with HT and
disinformation.
In December 2018, the European Council agreed on an EU Action Plan for
disinformation, in addition, the EU’s new strategic agenda for 2019–2024, agreed in June 2019,
also mentions resilience, HT and disinformation for the first time and considers them to provide
a strong mandate for the EU’s future work. According to the agenda, the EU's top priority in the
area of safeguarding individuals and freedoms include strengthening the EU's resilience to both
natural and man-made disasters and protecting our society from hostile cyber activities, HT, and
disinformation164.
On 10 July 2019, the Horizontal Working Party on Enhancing Resilience and Countering
HT was established, with the focus on: combating HT; strengthening the resilience of member
states and society; improving strategic communication and combating disinformation. The
above-mentioned Working Party presents a horizontal overview of challenges connected to HT.
It examines possibilities and identifies measures to improve the EU's and its member states'
preparedness and resilience against HT165.
Moving further, in December 2019, the European Council Conclusions on
complementary efforts to enhance resilience and counter hybrid threats were adopted166. The
Conclusions explicitly stated the importance of strengthening the role of and support for Hybrid
Fusion Cell of the EU Intelligence Centre. The Conclusions also emphases the need of
continuing to support partners in terms of increasing resilience and combating HT. This decision
by EU member states will put extra pressure on EU institutions to help to Georgia, Ukraine, and
Moldova's resilience. Furthermore, the Conclusions emphasize EU-NATO cooperation, with the
significance of the Hybrid CoE and NATO Centers of Excellence underlined in this regard.
The adoption by the EU in 2020 of the new Security Strategy for the period 2020 to 2025
provided additional tools for HT defeating, along with the already established elements of
response in the 2016 Joint Framework. It calls for the creation by the EEAS of a restricted online
platform for MS`s reference on counter hybrid tools and measures at EU level. Also, it calls for a
particular focus to mainstream hybrid considerations into policy making, in order to keep up to

164
EU action plan against disinformation, 2008. p. 8.
https://www.eca.europa.eu/lists/ecadocuments/ap20_04/ap_disinformation_en.pdf (accessed 04.03.2023); EU’s
strategic agenda for 2019–2024. EU Council, 20.06.2019,p. 3-6. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/39914/a-
new-strategic-agenda-2019-2024.pdf, (accessed 04.03.2023).
165
Horizontal Working Party on Enhancing Resilience and Countering Hybrid Threats, EU Council, 2020, p. 1-10.
https://mvep.gov.hr/UserDocsImages/files/file/2020/200311-end-2-2020-gip2-interinstitutional-relations-letterpr-
annexen-new-extension.pdf, (accessed 04.03.2023).
166
Conclusions on Complementary efforts to enhance resilience and counter hybrid threats. EU Council, 10.12.2019,
p. 1-11. https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-14972-2019-INIT/en/pdf, (accessed 04.03.2023).

51
speed with dynamic security developments167. The strategy also emphasis the need for
cooperation with NATO, as the only way of coordinated response to HT.
These are main EU key practical steps took since 2014 in addressing HT by enhancing
resilience. Even analyzed briefly, they provide us the relevant picture of the EU model of
resilience building against HT.
Before exploring the areas of EU-NATO cooperation in addressing HT, it is important to
outline the NATO approach to resilience, as a central element of the Alliance`s response to HT.
NATO model of strengthening resilience to HT. The Alliance`s founding treaty of 1949
and, in particular, Article 3, directly outlines the resilience of NATO member states through
maintaining and developing their individual and collective defense capacity. It stipulates that:
„the Parties, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual
aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack”168.
From NATO's standpoint, increasing the partner states' resilience capacity gives them a range of
options for fending off various security challenges, including the HT, increasingly theorized in
recent years.
The operationalization process of resilience in the Alliance security documents started
with the adoption of the NATO Strategic Concept in 2010, at the NATO Lisbon Summit. It
specified that „increasing international efforts are needed to ensure resilience against attacks or
acts of disruption” of the communication systems, transportation, international trade and energy
security169. It worth been outlined that resilience is barely mentioned in the document, but as
well as in case of the EU, it gained more prominence in the Alliance security documents after
2014.
The importance of recognizing and defeating HT, as well as improving the resilience of
states faced with such threats, are expressed in the Final Declarations of the NATO Summits in
Wales (2014) and Warsaw (2016).
The annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation and the expansion of the conflict in
Donetsk and Lugansk, pushed the allies to declare their determination to show “resistance and

167
EU Security Union Strategy for 2020-2024. EU Commision, 24.07.2020, p14. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52020DC0605, (accessed 04.03.2023).
168
NATO founding treaty, 1949, art.3. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_17120.htm, (accessed
05.03.2023).
169
NATO Strategic Concept of 2010, 2010, p.12, art. 13.
https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_publications/20120214_strategic-concept-2010-eng.pdf,
(accessed 05.03.2023).

52
resilience” at the Wales Summit, in September 2014170.The way of applying the measures
decided by the allies, in order to increase the collective defense capacity and strengthen the
resilience of allied and partner states, was assessed by the heads of state and government
participating in the Warsaw Summit in 2016.
At the 2016 Warsaw Summit, NATO leaders committed to strengthen Alliance's
resilience against a broad range of challenges and agreed on seven basic benchmarks for national
resilience on which member states must evaluate their level of preparedness. The seven baseline
requirements were: “assured continuity of government and critical government services;
resilient energy supplies; ability to deal effectively with uncontrolled movement of people;
resilient food and water resources; ability to deal with mass casualties; resilient civil
communications systems and resilient civil transportation systems”171.
The guidelines listed above, were reiterated during the work of the NATO Summit in
Warsaw, being also included in a separate public document, adopted on July 8, 2016 by the
heads of state and government participating in the allied meeting, being entitled Commitment to
Enhance Resilience. As one of the most clearly stated resilience-centered documents on such
high political level, it stipulates that “resilience is an essential basis for credible deterrence and
defense and effective fulfilment of the Alliance’s core tasks172”.
It underlines the determination of allied states to maintain and further develop their
individual and collective capacity to resist any form of armed attack: “In this context, we commit
ourselves today to persevere in strengthening our resilience to meet the full spectrum of threats,
including hybrid ones, from any direction. Resilience is the essential foundation of defense and
credible deterrence for the effective delivery of the Alliance's core missions” 173. In addition, the
document links military and non-military security issues and underlines the need to effectively
interact with a range of actors, including governments, the corporate sector, and international
organizations like the EU.
Both documents, the Warsaw Summit Communiqué and the Commitment to Enhance
Resilience, state that the preparation of the civil sector is, above all, a national responsibility. In
this sense, NATO members are requested to fulfill their commitments to strengthen national
resilience by ensuring the functionality and security of critical infrastructures – communications

170
NATO Walles Summit Declaration, 2014, p. 1-5.
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_112964.htm?selectedLocale=en, (accessed 07.03.2023).
171
NATO Warsaw Summit Communiqué, 2016, art.73.
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_133169.htm, (accessed 07.03.2023).
172
NATO Warsaw Summit Communiqué, 09.08.2016, art.73.
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_133169.htm, (accessed 08.03.2023).
173
Ibidem, art. 73.

53
and transport, energy, cyber and financial systems, protecting access to vital resources, food and
water, investing in development the military industry, the defense capabilities and the
interoperability of the armies of the allied states, etc.
At the NATO summit in Brussels in July 2018, it was agreed to establish Counter Hybrid
Support Teams174. In terms of NATO's reaction to HT and disinformation, two significant
decisions have been made: to build strategic communication capabilities at NATO headquarters
and to commence the establishment of the NATO Strategic Communications Centre of
Excellence in Riga.
At the NATO Leaders’ Meeting on 3-4 December 2019, was issued the London
Declaration175, which increased the conceptual scope of resilience by embracing, for the first
time, NATO nations' societies alongside vital infrastructure and energy security, as well as safe
and resilient systems to assure NATO countries' communications security. Aside from the
expressly articulated resilience of societies, the other areas have already been part of NATO's
resilience agenda. The core of NATO's resilience agenda is civil preparedness, which stems from
the rapidly changing security environment and the Alliance's strengthened defense and
deterrence posture in light of increased terrorist and hybrid threats targeting civil populations and
critical infrastructure on Euro-Atlantic territory.
Based on the reflection report “NATO 2030: United for a New Era”, “building resilience
across Allied populations is the primary responsibility of Allies themselves” and NATO pays a
supportive role and “ could offer a surge capacity to individual countries whose capabilities may
be overwhelmed by e.g. a terrorist attack involving non -conventional means including chemical,
biological, or radiological substances”176. NATO Allies maintain civilian preparedness as a
model for collective defense.
The document outlines that Nations are continually enhancing civil-military
collaboration, which is critical for dealing with any crisis, and adjusting their deterrent and
defensive postures to maintain readiness and response to security issues. Within NATO's three
fundamental duties of collective defense, crisis management, and cooperative security, resilience
is an underlying requirement for a robust defensive posture. Before any crisis happens, resilience

174
NATO Brussels Summit Declaration, 11.07.2018, art. 21.
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_156624.htm, (accessed 08.03.2023).
175
NATO London Declaration, 04.12.2019. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_171584.htm,
(accessed 08.03.2023).
176
NATO 2030: United for a New Era, 25.11.2020, p.50.
https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2020/12/pdf/201201-Reflection-Group-Final-Report-Uni.pdf,
(accessed 08.03.2023).

54
is an enabler for an appropriate engagement of multiple challenges (crisis management) and a
support development of partners' resilience (cooperative security)177.
The revealed UE and NATO models of strengthening resilience to HT will help us to
better understand their common initiatives in this regard.
EU - NATO cooperation in addressing HT. Moving further to the EU-NATO cooperation
in countering HT, it worth been mentioning that the first official document in this regard is the
EU-NATO Joint Declaration adopted at the NATO Summit in Warsaw on 8 July 2016, more
precisely Joint Warsaw Summit communiqué. The document stresses the importance of
identifying and countering HT, by developing resilience mechanisms of the states that faces HT.
It provides seven specific areas of cooperation between EU and NATO, including the fight
against hybrid threats178. These areas are: „countering hybrid threats, including by bolstering
resilience, working together on analysis, prevention, early detection, through timely information
sharing ... and cooperating on strategic communication and response; broadening and adapting
operational cooperation; expanding coordination on cyber security and defense; developing
coherent, complementary and interoperable defense capabilities; facilitating a stronger defense
industry; stepping up coordination on exercises; and building defense and security capacity and
fostering the resilience of partners”179.
After the adoption of the above-mentioned document, the EU and NATO drafted the
2016 and 2017 common sets of proposals, resulting in a total of 74 concrete actions. The 74
recommendations were intended to carry out the goals outlined in the 2016 Joint Declaration. To
assess the effectiveness of these recommendations, the EU and NATO have published six
progress reports since 2016. Countering hybrid threats is one of the main areas of cooperation
between the EU and NATO: at least 20 out of the 74 proposals are related to countering hybrid
threats.
On July 2018, the EU and NATO signed the second Joint Declaration in June 2018 - the
Joint Communication Increasing Resilience and Bolstering Capabilities to Address Hybrid
Threats, focusing their cooperation four key areas: military mobility, cyber security, HT,

177
NATO 2030: United for a New Era, 25.11.2020, p.50.
https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2020/12/pdf/201201-Reflection-Group-Final-Report-Uni.pdf,
(accessed 08.03.2023).
178
EU-NATO Joint Declaration at the NATO Summit in Warsaw, July 2016, p.1-2.
https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/24293/signed-copy-nato-eu-declaration-8-july-en.pdf, (accessed
09.03.2023).
179
EU-NATO Joint Declaration at the NATO Summit in Warsaw, July 2016, p.1-2.
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/cmsdata/121580/20160708_160708-joint-NATO-EU-declaration.pdf accessed
10.03.2023, (accessed 09.03.2023).

55
counter-terrorism, women and security180. Therefore, member states of the two institutions
endorsed the cooperative process at the institutional level, emphasizing the necessity to
strengthen political dialogue between the two institutions. In parallel, no less than 74 action
points were identified as sub-themes for cooperation, while seven progress reports were issued
regularly to highlight achievements.
In addition, elaborating on the EU and NATO cooperation against HT, we can mention
that the above mentioned EU Security Union Strategy adopted in July 2020 and the NATO
reflection report NATO 2030: United for a New Era, published in November 2020, both
recognize the destabilizing nature of by HT as well as their evolving nature. The EU and NATO
also recognize the importance of cooperation between member states and partners in combating
HT, a fact underlined in the above listed documents by the need to strengthen the ties between
the two organizations and their partners to develop sets of common political tools against hybrid
threats.
At the same time, both the 2022 NATO Strategic Concept (that outlines the Alliance’s
strategy, defense and deterrence posture and core tasks) and the 2022 EU Strategic Compass (a
concrete plan of action for the EU’s security and defense until 2030) highlight the importance of
the partnership between EU and NATO, especially in combating HT181. Thus, the above listed
documents outlines that cooperation must be enhanced further on issues of common interest such
as military mobility, emerging disruptive technologies, and hybrid and cyber threats.
The most recent EU-NATO Joint Declaration was signed on 10 January 2023 in
Brussels, as a response to Russia`s invasion of Ukraine. It condemns in the strongest possible
terms Russia’s aggression against Ukraine and reiterated their unwavering support to the
country. In addition, the document stipulates that EU and NATO will expand and deepen their
cooperation on areas such as: the growing geostrategic competition; resilience and the protection
of critical infrastructure; emerging and disruptive technologies; space; the security implications
of climate change; foreign information manipulation and interference182.
On this part, we can outline that at the ground of the EU and NATO models of
strengthening resilience to HT lies the fact that countering HT, is first of all, a national
responsibility of each member state. Starting from this, since 2014, the EU and NATO
180
EU-NATO Joint Declaration, June 2018, p.1-2.
https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/36096/nato_eu_final_eng.pdf, (accessed 10.03.2023).
181
The 2022 NATO Strategic Concept. https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2022/6/pdf/290622-
strategic-concept.pdf, (accessed 10.04.2023); The 2022 EU Strategic Compass.
https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-7371-2022-INIT/en/pdf, (accessed 10.03.2023).
182
Joint Delcaration on EU-NATO Cooperation. Press release, 10.01.2023.
https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2023/01/10/eu-nato-joint-declaration-10-january-2023/,
(accessed 11.03.2023).

56
established their own distinct organizational models for countering HT by enhancing resilience
as a mechanism of response. This common EU-NATO approach requires preparation,
prevention, protection, promotion and transformation policies as well as an involvement of
institutions and citizens. From EU-NATO perspective, achieving common, shared, resilience is
a first line of defense against HT. It requires identification of key vulnerabilities and a common
risk assessment in order to gain common understanding of security threats, a synchronization of
efforts between partners, member states, the sector civil and private and EU-NATO institutions.
This joint EU-NATO desire in the strategy to combat HT by strengthening resilience is
understood to be achievable only in cooperation with the partner states of the two organizations
and only if it also includes other geographical regions than those covered by the two
organizations.
In addition, the common strategic values and interests of the EU and NATO are
confirmed by the membership of the majority of member states to both organizations, which are
solid prerequisites for the success of the partnership between them in addressing HT by
strengthening resilience.

2.3. Conclusion to Chapter 2.

The conducted research on the concept of HT, tools and modus-operandi, allowed us to
reveal that despite being excessively discussed since 2014, at the present stage, the concept of
HT lacks a comprehensive and universal definition. In addition, we established that HT and HW
are two viewpoints, or phases, of the same phenomenon.
The analysis of the historical evolution of the concept of HT helped us to reveal that the
origins of the concept within the security field can be traced to the works of well-known
American military theorist, Colonel Frank Hoffmann, who used the term HT in reference to his
own concept of hybrid warfare. He defined HW as a fusion of war forms that blurs regular and
irregular warfare, which involves mixing of different methods and means and combined regular,
irregular, and criminal elements with terrorism and new technologies, (methods that later he
defined as HT). Later, the meaning of concept was expanded by including the simultaneous
usage of the combination of political, military, economic, social, and information means, and
conventional, irregular, catastrophic, terrorism, and disruptive/ criminal warfare methods.
In addition, we established that according to American perspective, the actors of a HT
can be both state and non-state actors. The primary goal of these HT is mainly to gain internal
and external support using other than conventional means by exploiting the vulnerabilities of a

57
specific country. From this perspective, this model of warfare is used by actors with less
conventional power.
A key moment in the journey of the term HT was the annexation of Crimea by the
Russian Federation in 2014. The publishing by the Russian Federation Deputy Minister of
Defense, General Gerasimov V. of the article on the new concept of non-linear or hybrid wars, in
the eve of the Russian military aggression in Ukraine, has been a turning point which revived the
concept of HT in the works of security theorists, security experts, political representatives or
analysts, or the media. Therefore, as a mechanism of response, the EU member states started to
operationalize the concept of HT in their security documents.
After the research on the EU institution`s approach to HT, it can be stated that in the
European view the concept of hybrid threats must remain flexible in order to be able to respond
to HT evolving nature. In general lines, there is no commonly agreed definition on HT
phenomenon between the EU institutions, and the understanding of the HT phenomenon is very
wide. Nevertheless, the European view describes HT as a combination of conventional and
unconventional, military and non-military activities that can be used in a coordinated manner by
state or non-state actors to achieve specific political objectives. It claims that hybrid campaigns
are multidimensional, combining coercive and subversive measures, using both conventional and
unconventional tools and tactics. They are designed to be difficult to detect or attribute. These
threats target critical vulnerabilities and seek to create confusion to hinder swift and effective
decision-making.
In addition, the EU perspective outlined a set of various tools used by hostile actors in
employing HT, such as: „creating or exploiting economic dependencies, cyber operations,
undermining the opponent’s national economy, armed forces conventional/sub-conventional
operations, military exercises, exploitation of sociocultural cleavages (ethnic, religion and
culture), promoting social unrest, intelligence preparation, clandestine operation, discrediting
leadership and/or candidates, support of political actors, media control and interference,
disinformation campaigns and propaganda183”. At the same time, it provided the phases of
hybrid influencing and hybrid threats which could be used as important ground for further
research on HT phenomenon. Generalizing, we can state that the European perspective provides
more compressive analysis of the wide range of tools used by the hostile enemies with the
malign intention in the diverse domains (political, culture, social, legal, military/ defense,

183
EU Commision, Hybrid CoE. The Landscape of Hybrid Threats: A Conceptual Model Public Version, p. 41.
https://publications.jrc.ec.europa.eu/repository/handle/JRC123305, (accessed 18.02.23).

58
infrastructure, economy information, cyber, intelligence, space), which helps to better understand
the HT phenomenon.
After the research on the American and European perspectives of HT, we can outline the
following features/ characteristics or hybrid indicators of HT phenomenon: The originator of the
activity is the state, or a non-state actor cooperating with the state power; in order to achieve its
strategic goal, HT exploits the opponent's vulnerabilities through the usage of the combination of
the military and non-military means; the HT activities seeks to achieve specific objectives while
remaining below the threshold of formally declared warfare
After the analysis of the main EU and NATO strategic documents which regard resilience
as a key measure for counteracting HT, it was possible to reveal the EU and NATO models or
mechanisms established by both organizations in order to deal with the HT phenomenon,
including their common initiatives in this regard. Therefore, it can be outlined that at the ground
of the EU and NATO models of strengthening resilience to HT lies the fact that countering HT,
is first of all, a national responsibility of each member state. Also, in both cases, the process of
operationalization of resilience in the main security strategic documents, started after 2014 as a
response to the international crisis generated by the annexation of Crimea by the Russian
Federation and the expansion of the Ukrainian conflict.
The established EU model provided the EU member states the necessary tools to counter
HT, primarily by strengthening resilience in many fields. Thus, the EU member states
recognized that no state or organization can address hybrid threats by itself, due to its complex
and continuously evolving nature. Consequently, the EU proposed a coordinated and
comprehensive approach, those of resilience building, which strongly requires cooperation with
NATO, in order to develop more efficient mechanism of counteracting HT phenomenon.
The NATO model directly outlines the resilience of NATO member states through
maintaining and developing their individual and collective defense capacity. Within NATO's
three fundamental duties of collective defense, crisis management, and cooperative security,
resilience is an underlying requirement for a robust defensive posture. In addition, the core of
NATO's resilience agenda is civil preparedness, which stems from the rapidly changing security
environment. The EU-NATO cooperation for addressing HT requires preparation, prevention,
protection, promotion and transformation policies as well as an involvement of institutions and
citizens. From EU-NATO perspective, achieving common, shared, resilience is a first line of
defense against HT. It requires identification of key vulnerabilities and a common risk
assessment in order to gain a common understanding of security threats, a synchronization of
efforts between partners, member states, the sector civil and private and EU-NATO institutions.

59
 3. STRENGTHENING RESILIENCE TO HYBRID THREATS: REFERENCES FOR
THE REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA.

Based on the conducted research in the previous chapters, this part will present the
analysis of the selected cases from the Republic of Moldova environment in order to establish
whether the county is a subject of hybrid threats since 24 February 2022, date which marks the
launching of the full scale war in Ukraine by the Russian Federation. At the same time, the
analysis of the current security mechanism of the Republic of Moldova designed for addressing
HT will be provided, in order to reveal how to apply the EU and NATO experience in building
resilience of our country to HT, especially by exploiting the existing cooperation with these
organizations at the present stage.

3.1. The Republic of Moldova as a subject to hybrid threats.

In this paragraph we will attempt to establish whether the Republic of Moldova is a

subject to hybrid threats since 24 February 2022. For being able to reveal this, we will apply the
already established in the second chapter hybrid indicators, to the two individual cases from the
Republic of Moldova environment. In the presence of all of them we will define the case as a
hybrid threat to the national security of the Republic of Moldova. (Details on the applied
methodology are described in the Introduction of the present paper).
Case no. 1: Energy sector of the Republic of Moldova, natural gas and electricity.
Case description. The Republic of Moldova does not have its own energy sources.
Annually, more than 70 percent of energy sources are imported from abroad, which determines
the state`s dependence on the policies of foreign suppliers184.
Natural gas. Russia’s Gazprom is the main supplier of gas to the Republic of Moldova.
Until November/ December 2022, it was a monopolist, responsible for covering 100% of the
country’s needs. In October of that year, Gazprom reduced supplies to the Republic of Moldova
to volumes equivalent to 70% and 50% of the volumes contracted for October and November
respectively. At the same time, the company announced that it would maintain the reduced
deliveries in December as well (to just 43.5% of the contracted volumes). Gazprom also
threatened to withhold supplies completely at any time, due to Moldova’s failure to meet its
contractual obligations. Under the existing contract, Chisinau has committed to audit
Moldovagaz for its debt (Gazprom claims that the Moldovan operator owes it around 700 million

184
Sterpu V. Politica națională de securitate a Republicii Moldova în contextul amenințărilor și războaielor hibride,
2021, p. 22. https://soros.md/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/9_Studiu-de-politici-publ-Am-si-
Razb_final_compressed.pdf, (accessed 29.04.2023).

60
US dollars) and to sign an agreement to settle it (which was to happen by 1 May 2022).
Moreover, the corporation hinted that it might also break the contract due to Moldova’s regular
delays in meeting its current payment obligations185.
To limit the potential for Russian pressure, in December 2022 the Republic of Moldova
abandoned its reliance on Russian gas for the right-bank. Currently, gas for this part of the
country is supplied by Moldovan state-owned company Energocom. In early 2023 – using a 300
million euro loan from the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development – the company
managed to accumulate around 300 million m3 of gas in underground reservoirs in Romania and
Ukraine (Moldova has no storage facilities of its own). This quantity is sufficient for the winter
period186.
Moreover, the gas that the Republic of Moldova buys from traders (on exchanges) is
expensive. In December 2022 and January 2023, Energocom was selling it to distributors for
around USD 1,100 /1,000 m3. At the same time, access to cheaper Russian gas is virtually out of
the question, not only because of the reduction in supplies, but also because the contract that
Moldova signed with Gazprom in October 2021 provides for a less favorable price formula than
before. Both factors make it impossible for the Republic of Moldova to reduce household tariffs,
which increased more than six fold between October 2021 and November 2022. This is
particularly painful during the cold season when consumption is highest. It is estimated that in
winter 2022–2023, Moldovans will fork out on average around 65% of their income on energy
bills 187.
Electricity. Moldavskaya GRES power plant, located in Transnistria and owned by the
Russian state-owned business Inter RAO, is the country's principal energy supplier. The power
plant is powered by gas imported from Russian federation under the previously specified
arrangement with Moldova. It produces roughly 70-80% of the power required by the right bank.
Any reduction or interruption in the region's electricity supply poses a severe challenge for right-
bank Moldova, which is therefore forced to make up the difference by importing power from

185
Kamil Całus. The Russian hybrid threat toolbox in Moldova: economic, political and social dimensions. Hybrid
CoE Working Paper no. 23, 2023, p. 7. https://www.hybridcoe.fi/publications/hybrid-coe-working-paper-23-the-
russian-hybrid-threat-toolbox-in-moldova-economic-political-and-social-dimensions/, (accessed 29.04.2023).
186
Scutaru G., Solomon M., Dadiverina E., Baroian D. Russian Hybrid war in the Republic of Moldova. New
Strategy Center, Bucharest 2023, p. 24. https://newstrategycenter.ro/wp-content/uploads/2023/04/Razboiul-hibrid-
al-Rusiei-in-Republica-Moldova-1.pdf, (accessed 29.04.2023).
187
Kamil Całus. The Russian hybrid threat toolbox in Moldova: economic, political and social dimensions. Hybrid
CoE Working Paper 23, 2023, p. 7. https://www.hybridcoe.fi/publications/hybrid-coe-working-paper-23-the-
russian-hybrid-threat-toolbox-in-moldova-economic-political-and-social-dimensions/,(accessed 29.04.2023).

61
Romania at substantially higher prices. The electricity crisis that Moldova had in 2022 illustrates
this188.
On 24 October, due to the reduction in gas supplies to Moldova, the Transnistrian power
plant reduced its production of electricity and cut its supply to the right-bank by more than 60%,
stopping it completely on 1 November. As a result, Moldova has faced a continuous electricity
shortage since the beginning of November. Although energy imports from Romania were
helping Moldova avoid a complete collapse of its electricity system, as with gas, costs were an
issue. Part of the energy was imported on the basis of bilateral contracts, at a regulated, lower
than market price of approximately 90 euros/MWh, but the rest was purchased on the Romanian
power exchange OPCOM, where the average price in November 2022 was approximately 231
euros/MWh. These prices were clearly higher than the cost of energy delivered from Transnistria
(around 60 euros/MWh). At the same time, imports from Ukraine (which previously offered
energy at a slightly higher price than that from Transnistria) were not possible after October due
to Russian missile strikes on the country’s energy infrastructure189.
An additional vulnerability for the Republic of Moldova is also the legacy from the
Soviet era of the interconnection with the electricity transmission network in Ukraine, which
means that the risk of automatic disconnection, in failure mode, is currently maintained, a fact
that has happened several times, when the Ukrainian energy infrastructure in the Odesa region
was bombed by the Russians in November-December 2022190.
In December 2022, Transnistria resumed energy supplies to Moldova (at approx. 70
euros/ MWh). In November 2022, due to grid destabilization caused by Russian attacks, two
massive blackouts lasted from several minutes to several hours and affected much of Moldova. It
should be emphasized that Russia still has one important lever at its disposal, the use of which
could seriously restrict access to Romania’s electricity imports. This entails its control over the
electricity hub located in Transnistria, near the Moldavskaya GRES power station. Energy
imported from Romania is first supplied to this hub and only then transmitted onwards to the
Moldovan network. There is therefore a risk that Russia – wishing to aggravate the energy crisis
in Moldova – may decide to block the energy transport. Russia may frame this as a “terrorist

188
Ibidem, p. 8.
189
Kamil Całus. The Russian hybrid threat toolbox in Moldova: economic, political and social dimensions. Hybrid
CoE Working Paper 23, 2023, p. 7. https://www.hybridcoe.fi/publications/hybrid-coe-working-paper-23-the-
russian-hybrid-threat-toolbox-in-moldova-economic-political-and-social-dimensions/, (accessed 29.04.2023).
190
Scutaru G., Solomon M., Dadiverina E., Baroian D. Russian Hybrid war in the Republic of Moldova. New
Strategy Center, Bucharest 2023, p. 24. https://newstrategycenter.ro/wp-content/uploads/2023/04/Razboiul-hibrid-
al-Rusiei-in-Republica-Moldova-1.pdf, (accessed 29.04.2023).

62
attack” (similar to those allegedly carried out in Transnistria in April 2022) and accuse Ukraine
of carrying it out191.
Application of the hybrid indicators to the case no. 1:
Indicator no.1: The originator of the activity is the state, or a non-state actor cooperating
with the state authority. The Russian Federation plays the main role in cooperation with
Gazprom and Russian state owned company Inter RAO.
Indicator no. 2: The originator of a HT targets and exploits the opponents’
vulnerabilities in order to achieve its strategic goals and Indicator no. 3: Combination of the
military and non-military means. The Russian Federation exploited one of the main vulnerability
of the Republic of Moldova - its energy dependence on the Russian gas, since Russia’s Gazprom
was the main supplier of gas to Republic of Moldova, covering 100% of the country’s needs
until November/ December 2022. Russia`s hostile activities in this sector started to be observed
in the fourth quarter of 2022 when in the eve of winter, Gazprom reduced supplies to Moldova to
volumes equivalent to 70% and 50% of the volumes contracted for October and November. In
addition, the company announced that it would maintain the reduced deliveries in December as
well. In this regard, Russian Federation used Gazprom as a leverage of influence within the
Republic of Moldova economy, in the county`s energetic sector and had started to heavily
exploit Moldova’s dependence on the Russian gas. In addition, by threatening the Republic of
Moldova to stop supplies completely at any time, due to Moldova’s failure to meet its
contractual obligations, Russian Federation putted the pressure on the Republic of Moldova
Western oriented authorities, generating not only economic instability, but also social tensions
within the local population.
Thus, constant pressure exercised by Russia Federation on the Republic of Moldova
authorities, influenced the country`s decision making, thus the Republic of Moldova cased its
reliance on Russian gas, the fact that generated the significant raising in pries, which in turn
increased the unpleasant state within the society which started to protests against the pro-
European government amid the energy crisis. In addition, the Russian Federation also used the
pro-Russian politicians and their controlled television stations to instigate population to protests
against the Republic of Moldova authorities. We can see how energy is used by Russia as a
political weapon and tool to generate not only economic instability, but also social tensions.

191
I Scutaru G., Solomon M., Dadiverina E., Baroian D. Russian Hybrid war in the Republic of Moldova. New
Strategy Center, Bucharest 2023, p. 10. https://newstrategycenter.ro/wp-content/uploads/2023/04/Razboiul-hibrid-
al-Rusiei-in-Republica-Moldova-1.pdf, (accessed 29.04.2023).

63
 The issue of Russian gas imports is also inextricably tied to the Republic of Moldova`s
electricity supply. In this regard, we can see that Russian reduction in gas supplies to Moldova
provoked the reduction of electricity produced by Transnistrian power plant. As a result, since
the beginning of November 2022, Republic of Moldova has been experiencing an ongoing
electrical crisis facing a cut in the supply to the right-bank by more than 60%, stopping it
completely on 1 November. Even if the Republic of Moldova managed to prevent the collapse of
its electricity system by importing gas from Romania, the price was very high, this also
generated social tensions and unpleasant state within the society, putting additional pressure on
the Republic of Moldova constitutional authorities. Regardless of the source of energy,
Moldova's electricity security is also jeopardized by Russian bombardment of Ukraine's power
grid, as the two nations are infrastructural linked.
In addition, through the leverages of influence in energy sector, the Russian Federation
can easily exploit another vulnerability of the Republic of Moldova – unresolved Transnistrian
conflict. One problem is that the Republic of Moldova main energy supplier is Moldavskaya
GRES power plant, located in the Republic of Moldova separatist region Transnistria, which
officially is uncontrolled by the constitutional Republic of Moldova authorities. The second issue
is that Moldavskaya GRES power plant is owned by the Russian state owned company Inter
RAO. Due to the fact that gas sourced from Gazprom goes entirely to Transnistria and Gazprom
can still reduce or stop gas supplies, this could lead to collapse of electricity supplies from
Transnistria and an economic and humanitarian crisis in this separatist region. This fact would be
used to destabilize the entirely internal situation of the Republic of Moldova, which is very
fragile in the context of the Ukrainian war.
Therefore, we can see the wide range of tools used in the coordinated and synchronized
manner by the Russian Federation within its energy sector intended to deliberately target the
Republic of Moldova and its institutions in order to destabilize the internal situation of the
country.
Indicator no. 4: The situation is unclear, which reduces the victim's ability to respond
adequately. Due to the action on vulnerable sector of the Republic of Moldova – energy sector,
the possibility of reaction is limited. One the one side, the Republic of Moldova is not engaged in
war with the Russian Federation, on the other side the Russian Federation creates ambiguity
claiming that its intervention in Ukraine is a “special operation”, which shows covert and
plausible deniability and hides its real intent. Even though, the Russian war in Ukraine generates
serious repercussions on the Republic of Moldova national security.

64
 Conclusions on the case no. 1. Based on the analyzed data, the Russian influence within
the Republic of Moldova energy sector meets all the characteristics of a hybrid way of fighting
and can therefore be considered a hybrid threat to the national security of the Republic of
Moldova. In this regard, the originator of HT is the Russian Federation state. The Russian
Federation plays the main role in orchestrating HT against the Republic of Moldova by
cooperating with Gazprom and Russian state owned company Inter RAO.
In order to achieve its strategic goal, the Russian Federation uses coordinated and
synchronized actions that deliberately targets the Republic of Moldova vulnerabilities, in our
case particularly energetic sector by thus fully exploiting the Republic of Moldova energy
dependence through wide range of means, in principle, non-military one as: uses economic
leverage for exercising economic pressure; applies energetic blackmail (by threatening the
Republic of Moldova to stop gas supplies due to delays in payments); by using pro-Russian
politicians and their controlled television stations (promotes social unrest in order to organize
protest movements, taking advantage of the unpleasant state generated within the Moldovan
society, due to increasing in prices for gas and electricity and influences population`s thinking on
leadership by discrediting them, thus undermining the trust of the Moldovan society into the state
authorities), which ultimately aims at undermining the Republic of Moldova national economy
influencing the country’s the decision making process and destabilize the internal situation
within the Republic of Moldova. In addition, due to the fact that the Russian Federation hostile
actions target the vulnerable sector of the Republic of Moldova – energy sector, the possibility of
reaction is limited. Therefore, it is not clear at first glance whether there is a war going on.
As we can see, the variety of tools used by the Russian Federation just within one
analyzed case is very wide. Thus, by only targeting the energy sector of the Republic of
Moldova, the Russian Federation by applying a combination of techniques or tools, manages
exercise influence across several domains. Because they are so closely related to national
security, it is crucial for the Republic of Moldova to identify the areas of importance or crucial
functions that the state should make resilient against hybrid threat activity.
Case no. 2: Transnistrian conflict.
Case description. Transnistria is an obstacle in the development of closer ties between the
Republic of Moldova and the European Union192. According to the Republic of Moldova
constitution, Transnistrian region is part of the territory of the Republic of Moldova. De facto,

192
Sterpu V. Politica națională de securitate a Republicii Moldova în contextul amenințărilor și războaielor hibride,
2021, p. 18. https://soros.md/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/9_Studiu-de-politici-publ-Am-si-
Razb_final_compressed.pdf, (accessed 29.04.2023).

65
Moldovan authorities have no control over the region which functions as separatist, self-
proclaimed Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic since 1990, a quasi-state not recognized by any
UN member state. On 2 March 1992, when the Republic of Moldova was formally recognized as
an independent state at the UN, the armed conflict erupted between central Moldovan forces and
Transnistrian separatist forces, due to political disagreement on the future of the Republic of
Moldova. The armed conflict escalated into a civil war. With the support of the former 14th
Soviet Army stationed in Moldova, the Transnistrian forces defeated the Republic of Moldova
Army. The ceasefire reached by the parties on 21st July 1992 in Moscow put an end to the
conflict193. Russian troops were becoming „peacekeepers” and a buffer zone was being
established between the belligerents. Thus, the first frozen conflict generated by Russia in the
Black Sea region appeared194.
Russian Armed Forces units have been stationed in Transnistria since the 1990s. They are
formally part of two structures. The first comprises the so-called peacekeeping forces, deployed
in the region under the 1992 agreement between Chisinau and Moscow that ended the war in
Transnistria. They are estimated to number around 500 soldiers. The second component is the
so-called Operational Group of Russian Forces (OGRF), a remnant of the 14th Soviet (and later
Russian) Army stationed in the region (and actively participating in the Transnistrian war on the
separatist side). It is estimated to amount to around 1,000–1,500 soldiers. Moldova considers the
presence of these forces illegal. Neither the Russian “peacekeepers” nor the OGRF have any
significant combat potential. Russia also has full control over a huge arms and ammunition depot
located near the Ukrainian border (in Cobasna). It is estimated that it holds about 22,000 tons of
ammunition. Units of the so-called Transnistrian Army are also considered to be de facto
controlled by Russia and subordinate to Russian command195.
At the end of January 2023, the Tiraspol authorities announced the mobilization of men
up to the age of 55 in the so-called peacekeeping contingent. They were given food, clothing and
remuneration from 2800 Transnistrian rubles ($175)196.

193
Baban I. The Transnistrian conflict in the context of the Ukrainian crisis. In: Research division-NATO defense
college, Rome, no.122, 2015, p. 206. https://www.ndc.nato.int/news/news.php?icode=881, (accessed 29.04.2023).
194
Scutaru G., Solomon M., Dadiverina E., Baroian D. Russian Hybrid war in the Republic of Moldova. New
Strategy Center, Bucharest 2023, p. 25. https://newstrategycenter.ro/wp-content/uploads/2023/04/Razboiul-hibrid-
al-Rusiei-in-Republica-Moldova-1.pdf, (accessed 29.04.2023).
195
Kamil Całus. The Russian hybrid threat toolbox in Moldova: economic, political and social dimensions. Hybrid
CoE Working Paper 23, 2023, p. 7. https://www.hybridcoe.fi/publications/hybrid-coe-working-paper-23-the-
russian-hybrid-threat-toolbox-in-moldova-economic-political-and-social-dimensions/, (accessed 29.04.2023).
196
Scutaru G., Solomon M., Dadiverina E., Baroian D. Russian Hybrid war in the Republic of Moldova. New
Strategy Center, Bucharest 2023, p. 26. https://newstrategycenter.ro/wp-content/uploads/2023/04/Razboiul-hibrid-
al-Rusiei-in-Republica-Moldova-1.pdf, (accessed 29.04.2023).

66
 Form 2005, the negotiations for the settlement of the Transnistrian conflict took place in
the 5+2 format (Republic of Moldova, so called Transnistria, as mediators Russia, Ukraine,
OSCE, the EU and USA observers). The negotiations did not have remarkable results, they are
currently blocked as a result of the invasion of Ukraine by Russia197.
Russia provided military, political and economic support to the separatist regime, thus
enabling it to survive by strengthening itself and by acquiring a certain amount of autonomy vis-
à vis Moldova. Moscow officially refers to the assistance it provides to Transnistria as
“humanitarian aid.” It essentially consists of a substantial financial contribution to the monthly
pensions and salaries of Transnistria’s inhabitants. In addition, Moscow subsidizes Transnistria’s
law enforcement agencies, notably the army and the so called Ministry of State Security198.
Russia plays a key role in maintaining the stability and competitiveness of the
Transnistrian economy. Transnistria has been receiving free gas from Russia for years. This
commodity is supplied under a contract signed with Gazprom by Moldova, but Russia has
consistently not claimed payment from Transnistria for its supply. This has led to a gas debt,
currently amounting to around 7–8 billion US dollars, which Russia attributes to Moldova. The
gas thus obtained supports Transnistria in three ways. Firstly, the money from its sale on the
“internal” market generates huge profits, which are used to balance the local budget deficit.
Secondly, free gas makes it possible to maintain very low (up to 25 times lower) energy tariffs
for the population, which is important for ensuring calm, and support for the authorities in the
separatist region, and which has sometimes been used as an element of pro-Russian propaganda
against Moldova (cooperation with Russia means cheap gas). Thirdly, free gas is sold to
Transnistrian companies at non-market prices, which, combined with cheap labor, underpins the
competitiveness of the local economy. Surprisingly, Russia is not an important export partner for
Transnistria (less than 10% of the total exports in 2021). The economic model of this
unrecognized republic is based on the use of cheap Russian gas for production, which is then
sold primarily to EU countries (35%) and to right-bank Moldova (32% of total exports)199.
The local political and economic elites (represented by the Sheriff Company, which
controls the entire local political scene and the “state” apparatus) are fully dependent on
Moscow’s decisions. Transnistrian society (about 25% are ethnic Russians) is unequivocally pro-
197
Scutaru G., Solomon M., Dadiverina E., Baroian D. Russian Hybrid war in the Republic of Moldova. New
Strategy Center, Bucharest 2023, p. 28. https://newstrategycenter.ro/wp-content/uploads/2023/04/Razboiul-hibrid-
al-Rusiei-in-Republica-Moldova-1.pdf, (accessed 29.04.2023).
198
Baban I. The Transnistrian conflict in the context of the Ukrainian crisis. In: Research division-NATO defense
college, Rome, no.122, 2015, p. 206. https://www.ndc.nato.int/news/news.php?icode=881, (accessed 29.04.2023).
199
Kamil Całus. The Russian hybrid threat toolbox in Moldova: economic, political and social dimensions. Hybrid
CoE Working Paper 23, 2023, p. 8. https://www.hybridcoe.fi/publications/hybrid-coe-working-paper-23-the-
russian-hybrid-threat-toolbox-in-moldova-economic-political-and-social-dimensions/, (accessed 29.04.2023).

67
Russian. Russian media are also very popular in the region, and the Moldovan Orthodox Church
is the dominant one200.
Officially Russia’s support to Transnistria is related to the protection of Russians living in
the breakaway region of Moldova. According to current estimates, 30.4% of Transnistria’s
populations are ethnic Russians and about 150,000-200,000 residents hold Russian passports.
Many of them also have Moldovan, Ukrainian or other citizenship. It is worth noting that
Moldovan citizens from Transnistria can vote in Moldovan parliamentary and presidential
elections. Russia has been employing this argument since the 1990s, when Moscow first used it
for justifying its implication in the Transnistrian conflict and unofficially backing the separatist
forces against Chisinau. At that time, Russia’s narrative consisted of the necessity to stop “the
civil war” in Moldova and to “protect Russian population” in Transnistria201.
Since 22 February 2023, it can also be seen in Russia's increasingly aggressive rhetoric
towards Republic of Moldova, regarding Transnistria. In February 2023, the Kremlin announced
the abrogation of a 2012 decree that referred to the guidelines of Russia's foreign policy, in the
logic of the escalation and cold war between Russia and the West, this measure canceling the
provision by which Moscow assumed the obligation “to continue active participation in the
search for solutions to the Transnistrian problem based on respect for the sovereignty, territorial
integrity and neutral status of the Republic of Moldova in establishing the special status of
Transnistria”.
Nevertheless, in recent months, Russia has consistently sought to stir up tension in
Transnistria. This is facilitated by the alleged “terrorist attacks” and “subversion actions” taking
place in the region, most likely conducted with Russia’s knowledge or directly under its
command. For example, on 25 April 2022, a building of the so-called “Ministry of State
Security” in Tiraspol was fired upon with hand grenade launchers. A day later, a series of
explosions destroyed two relay masts in the village of Maiac, both of which were used to
broadcast Russian radio stations. At the end of July, local media reported that Transnistrian
services had detained a Ukrainian citizen, who was alleged to have purchased and smuggled into
his homeland the uniforms of so-called Transnistrian border guards in order to “organize

200
Kamil Całus. The Russian hybrid threat toolbox in Moldova: economic, political and social dimensions. Hybrid
CoE Working Paper 23, 2023, p. 8. https://www.hybridcoe.fi/publications/hybrid-coe-working-paper-23-the-
russian-hybrid-threat-toolbox-in-moldova-economic-political-and-social-dimensions/, (accessed 29.04.2023).
201
Scutaru G., Solomon M., Dadiverina E., Baroian D. Russian Hybrid war in the Republic of Moldova. New
Strategy Center, Bucharest 2023, p. 26. https://newstrategycenter.ro/wp-content/uploads/2023/04/Razboiul-hibrid-
al-Rusiei-in-Republica-Moldova-1.pdf, (accessed 29.04.2023).

68
provocation and to discredit them”. Both Chisinau and Kyiv reject allegations emanating from
Tiraspol of involvement in organizing attacks on Transnistrian institutions202.
Application of the hybrid indicators to the case no. 2:
Indicator no.1: The originator of the activity is the state, or a non-state actor cooperating
with the state authority. We observe that events after 24 February 2022, took to prominence
Russian interference into the internal policy of the Republic of Moldova, particularly in the
course of the Transnitrian conflict settlement. Nevertheless, the Russian interference in
Transnistria is not new it is present since the Republic of Moldova gained its independence. In
this case, the Russian Federation provides military, political and economic support to the
separatist regime, thus enabling it to survive by acquiring a certain amount of autonomy in
relation to Moldova. Therefore, the local political and economic elites are fully dependent on
Moscow’s decisions.
Indicator no. 2: The originator of a HT targets and exploits the opponent’s
vulnerabilities in order to achieve its strategic goals. Russian Federation exploits one of the
main vulnerability of the Republic of Moldova – the issue of territorial integrity, with the main
strategic goal to place/ maintain the Republic of Moldova in its sphere of geopolitical influence,
thus blocking the process of the Republic of Moldova integration in EU and/ or accession to
NATO. Our argument in this regard is that Russia, as the key member of the “5+2” negotiating
format has a lever of influence over the domestic and more importantly, foreign policy of the
Republic of Moldova. The Republic of Moldova will not be able to integrate into EU until the
Transnistrian conflict will not be settled.
Indicator no. 3: Combination of the military and non-military means. To achieve its
strategic goal, since 24 February 2022, the Russian Federation uses the nonmilitary means in
order to put the pressure on the Republic of Moldova pro-Western authorities. By using
diplomatic and media means, Russia promoted increasingly aggressive rhetoric towards RM,
regarding Transnistria. By announcing in February 2023 the abrogation of a 2012 decree that
referred to the guidelines of Russia's foreign policy (where the Russian Federation is no more
obliged to continue active participation in the search for solutions to the Transnistrian problem
based on respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and neutral status of the Republic of
Moldova in establishing the special status of Transnistria), Russian Federation maintains

202
Kamil Całus. The Russian hybrid threat toolbox in Moldova: economic, political and social dimensions. Hybrid
CoE Working Paper 23, 2023, p. 8. https://www.hybridcoe.fi/publications/hybrid-coe-working-paper-23-the-
russian-hybrid-threat-toolbox-in-moldova-economic-political-and-social-dimensions/, (accessed 29.04.2023).

69
constant pressure on the Republic of Moldova authorities and generates fears within the
Moldovan society.
This unsecure state within the Moldovan population is aggravated first of all, due to
presence of the Russian Federation troops in Transnistria and the announcing at the end of
January 2023 by the Tiraspol regime the mobilization of men up to the age of 55 in the so-called
peacekeeping contingent. Secondly, the facts that around 200,000 inhabitants of the
Transnistrian region hold Russian passports also generate fear within the Moldovan society, in
case if Russia will advance in Transnistria under the pretext of “protecting Russian population”
in Transnistria. Therefore, within current regional context, the Republic of Moldova population
does not fully sustain the actions in relation to Russian done by the Republic of Moldova
authorities, claiming that is better not to damage relations with Russia.
In addition to this, Transnistria is also a platform for Russian propaganda in the region.
The alleged “terrorist attacks” and “subversion actions” taking place in the region are too
obviously promoted by the Russian Federation media in Transnistria order to influence the
people thinking. The alleged attacks, on the other hand, serve Russia's interests by instilling fear
and insecurity in Moldova and reminding Transnistrians that Moscow is the only guarantee of
their security.
Indicator no. 4: The situation is unclear, which reduces the victim's ability to respond
adequately. First of all it is not clear whether the Republic of Moldova has a conflict with the
Transnistrian regime or with the Russian Federation. During almost 30 years with the help of the
Russian Federation this conflict is presented as a conflict between the Republic of Moldova and
Transnistrian population. In reality, we have a 30 year conflict with the Russian Federation
which does not want to withdraw its military troops from the Republic of Moldova. This fact
prevents the Republic of Moldova authorities form taking radical decisions in the conflict
settlement.
Conclusions on the case no. 2. Based on the analyzed data, the Russian interference in
Transnistrian conflict since 24 February 2022 meets all the characteristics of a hybrid way of
fighting, and can therefore be considered a hybrid threat to the national security of the Republic
of Moldova. In this regard, the originator of HT is the Russian Federation state. He plays the
main role in supporting the Tiraspol`s separatist regime by providing military, political and
economic support, thus contributing to its strengthening and acquiring a certain amount of
autonomy in relation to Republic of Moldova.
In order to achieve its strategic goal, (we argue those of placing/ maintaining the
Republic of Moldova in its sphere of geopolitical influence, thus blocking the process of the

70
Republic of Moldova integration in EU and/ or accession to NATO), the Russian Federation
exploits one of the main vulnerability of the Republic of Moldova – the issue of territorial
integrity. In this regard, the varieties of nonmilitary means are applied in a coordinated and
synchronized way as: diplomatic and media means (for promoting and fueling Russian
propaganda on the Transnistrian territory, for maintaining constant pressure on the Republic of
Moldova authorities and generating fears within the Moldovan society), thus undermining the
population trust in the Republic of Moldova constitutional authorities. In addition, due to the
fact that during almost 30 years the conflict is presented to the Transdnistrian population as a
conflict between the Republic of Moldova and Transnistria, it is not clear at the first glance that
the Republic of Moldova is in conflict with Russian Federation almost 30 years. The Russian
troop’s presence on the Republic of Moldova territory prevents the Republic of Moldova
authorities form taking radical decisions in the Conflict settlement.
After analyzing two selected cases from the Republic of Moldova environment, our
research revealed that since launching of the full scale war in Ukraine by the Russian Federation,
on 24 February 2022, our country is a subject to Russian hybrid threats. Thus, Russian
Federation used a combination of tools to achieve its strategic objectives in relation to the
Republic of Moldova. Each tool targets one or multiple domains or the interface between them.
Tools exploit, or even create vulnerability in one or more domains, or take advantage of an
opportunity. The objective is achieved either by the direct effect of the tool on the domain or due
to cascade effects. Activity in one domain may be aimed at affecting a completely different
domain from the one where the activity was detected.

3.2. Building resilience of the Republic of Moldova to hybrid threats of national security by
applying EU and NATO experience.

For establishing how to apply EU and NATO experience in building resilience of the
Republic of Moldova to hybrid threats, we need first of all to identify and analyze the current
security mechanism of our county designed for addressing HT. Therefore, the obtained
assessments after the analysis will help us to reveal how to apply the EU and NATO experience
in building resilience of our country to HT, especially by exploiting the existing cooperation with
these organizations at the present stage.
The fundamental document which presents “the general assessment of the national and
international security environment in which the Republic of Moldova operates and which defines
the purpose of national security, the basic guidelines for national security, the general values
and principles to be protected by the state and by the Moldovan society” is the Concept of
71
national security of the Republic of Moldova from 2008203. Taking into account that the
document does not reflect an updated assessment of the current national and international
security environment, especially the regional security situation which changed dramatically since
2008, it can be considered outdated. Moreover, it does not contain any references to hybrid
threats, which are at the present days the most eminent to the national security of our state, in the
light of Russian military aggression in Ukraine, which started on 24 February 2022.
On the ground of the above mentioned document was elaborated and approved in 2011,
the National Security Strategy of the Republic of Moldova. Even if the document is still in force,
it does not currently “respond to threats and risks with an impact on national security”, as it is
stipulated in its introduction204. In general lines, the document determines national interests; the
main threats, risks and vulnerabilities to national security; the main benchmarks of foreign policy
and defense policy related to ensuring national security; ways to ensure national security; the
guidelines of the reform of the national security sector, without any references to hybrid threats
or activities. Therefore, “at the present stage, the Republic of Moldova is the only country in the
region without a revised national security strategy205”, the fact that makes our country extremely
vulnerable, especially in the actual regional security environment, to constantly evolving hybrid
threats.
The first references to HT phenomenon in the official security documents of the Republic
of Moldova, were made in the Draft of National Security Strategy of the Republic of Moldova
from 2016. The article 1.2 entitled “The strategic security environment”, more specifically,
article 1.2.1, which regards the “The international and regional security context”, outlined the
concept of hybrid risks, hybrid threats, hybrid battles and hybrid wars 206. Taking into account
that the document was elaborated after 2014 illegal annexation of the Crimea by the Russian
Federation, and probability of emergence and of maintaining hybrid threats was recognized as
high at the international arena, the Republic of Moldova strived to update one of its main
security documents which regulate its national security system. Nevertheless in 2017, this

203
Law no. 112 from 22.05.2008, on the Concept of national security of the Republic of Moldova.
https://www.legis.md/cautare/getResults?doc_id=24400&lang=ro, (accessed 16.03.23).
204
Parliament Decision no. 153 from 15.07.2011, on the aprovement of the National Security Strategy of the
Republic of Moldova, art. 1.https://www.legis.md/cautare/getResults?doc_id=136241&lang=ro#, (accessed
16.03.23).
205
Sterpu V. Politica națională de securitate a Republicii Moldova în contextul amenințărilor și războaielor hibride,
2021, p. 15. https://soros.md/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/9_Studiu-de-politici-publ-Am-si-
Razb_final_compressed.pdf, (accessed 17.03.23).
206
Draft of National Security Straty of the Republic of Moldova, 2016.
https://www.presedinte.md/app/webroot/proiecte/SSN16.pdf, (accessed 17.03.23).

72
attempt failed when the Republic of Moldova President Igor Dodon, withdrawn the project of
NSS and its implementation plan.
We can highlight that at the current stage, the fundamental security documents which
regulates the national security policy of the Republic of Moldova, do not provide any references
to the HT. Accordingly, it is necessary to revise the NNS of the Republic of Moldova in order to
regulate, first of all, HT phenomenon into the national security framework. One step in this
direction was made on 29 November 2022, when the Republic of Moldova President, Maia
Sandu has signed a decree on the establishment of the Commission for the elaboration of the
National Security Strategy of the Republic of Moldova. The role of this Commission is to
analyze the security sector and to draft the National Security Strategy of the Republic of
Moldova in accordance with the current security environment on national, regional and
international level207.
Moving further to identifying the current Republic of Moldova security mechanism for
addressing HT, we will mention that another attempt to regulate the HT into the national security
system of the Republic of Moldova was made in the framework of the Law on the Concept of
informational security of the Republic of Moldova form 2018. It provided for the first time the
definition of hybrid security threat into a national security official document: „a subversive
and/or information operation, conducted or placed under the command of states, non-state
entities, organizations, individuals, which specifically targets the weaknesses and vulnerabilities
of a sovereign, independent and intact government”208.
By defining HT in the context of the informational security of the Republic of Moldova,
the law offers the description of the main threats to the informational security as: „subversive
actions in order to influence the internal and external policy of the state; HT in order to
undermine national security; external information dominance on the territory not controlled by
the constitutional authorities of the RM; the elaboration and application, by other states and
entities, of the concept of information warfare; informational undermining of electoral
campaigns; altering the content of information circulated in the public space (manipulation,
disinformation or falsification) with the aim of generating panic, tensions or social conflicts; the
illegal activity of political, economic, military structures; the espionage activity of foreign
special services, of some groups or individuals, aimed at obtaining unauthorized access to

207
Decree nr. 721-IX from 29.11.2022 on the the establishment of the Commission for the elaboration of the
National Security Strategy of the RM. https://presedinte.md/app/webroot/Decrete/721.pdf, (accessed 18.03.23).
208
Law no. 299 from 21.12.2017 on the Concept of informational security of the Republic of Moldova.
https://www.legis.md/cautare/getResults?lang=ro&doc_id=105660, (accessed 18.03.23).

73
 209
information resources or obtaining control over the functioning of the resources, etc. ”, which
could also be circumscribed to threats of a hybrid nature posed to the entire national security
system of the Republic of Moldova.
A significant step for establishing a mechanism for dealing with HT, were made by the
national authorities in the documents circumscribed to the above mentioned law, more precisely
in the Information security strategy of the Republic of Moldova for 2019–2024, adopted in 2019,
along with its Action Plan. It extended the approach to hybrid security threats, by providing
some details on the main hybrid tools used within the media space at all stages of designing a
hybrid security threat “cybercrimes, espionage, propaganda, diversion and excessive
exploitation of personal data through electronic communications networks”210.
Thus, the document reveals that informational arm is an essential component of HT, used
by subversive external centers (special services, NGOs guided by state and non-state actors,
controllable media institutions, etc.) in the role of information operations or cyber-attacks
subsumed to a certain strategic goal. It also mentions that in these activities of an informative-
propagandistic nature are involved, on the segment of the media space, associative structures,
informative-analytical centers, press agencies, as well as separate groups of citizens financed by
subversive centers and special services of foreign countries, which through information
technologies use tools hybrids of subtle power (soft power)211. Domestic actors that develop and
distribute propaganda, misinformation, and false information are not considered.
Another important tool of hybrid influence outlined in the document, is the
disinformation campaigns, which are described as oriented towards accentuation of mistrust,
confusion and destabilization of the socio-political situation of the state, which ultimately could
lead to the control, by various actors, of the behavior of a part of society, as well as to
influencing the internal and external policies of the state. At the same time, it is mentioned that
the intensification of propaganda and disinformation takes place especially during events of
national interest, in order to influence the political decision of both the state and the citizen.
Depending on certain internal/external developments, it is aimed at creating a state of social
discontent212.

209
Law no. 299 from 21.12.2017 on the Concept of informational security of the Republic of Moldova, chapter I,
section no. 4, art.13. https://www.legis.md/cautare/getResults?lang=ro&doc_id=105660, (accessed 19.03.23).
210
Law no. 257 from 22.11.2018 on the approval of the Information Security Strategy of the RM for 2019-2024,
Section no. I, art.10. https://www.legis.md/cautare/getResults?doc_id=111979&lang=ro, (accessed 19.03.23).
211
Ibidem, Section II, art.59,62.
212
Law no. 257 from 22.11.2018 on the approval of the Information Security Strategy of the RM for 2019-2024,
Section II, art. 50. https://www.legis.md/cautare/getResults?doc_id=111979&lang=ro, (accessed 19.03.23).

74
 Referring particularly to the Republic of Moldova mechanism designed for addressing
HT, the Section IV of the Strategy, entitled Vision and Objectives, the III Pillar “Strengthening
operational capabilities”, provides concrete objectives for implementation that regard
addressing HT. Thus, the Objective no. 2: Developing response capabilities to HT of security
must be implemented through the:
1) Creation of an informational analytical component specialized on HT of security within
the Security Intelligence and Service;
2) Creation of the national network of authorities responsible for combating HT of security;
3) Development of operational protocols for interaction between responsible authorities and
decision-makers in case of HT of security;
4) Consolidation of the degree of knowledge and understanding of the concept of HT of
security, at the level of the bodies empowered to ensure information security and the
consolidation of the general security environment;
5) Conducting exercises to develop the capacities of authorities specialized in combating
HT of security;
6) The association of the Republic of Moldova with the European Center of Excellence for
Combating Hybrid Threats (Hybrid CoE) and the NATO Center of Excellence for
Strategic Communication213.
Also, the strategy offers a mechanism for ensuring security of the media information
space, by developing strategic communication mechanisms in order to achieve the national
interests of the country214. This tool would contribute to increasing the national resilience to HT
in various fields, not only in cyber field.
The degree of implementation of this mechanism was evaluated by the responsible
authority, in accordance with the strategy - the SIS, which issued an report in 2022 on the
assessment of the Strategy`s implementation and its Action Plan, for the period until 2021.
Therefore, the above listed objectives were implemented as follow: The first objective
was realized, and within the SIS was created the analytical-informational unit specialized on HT
of security. The second objective, was partially realized, the term for its implementation was
until 2020, but the report mentions that the SIS continued during 2021, the process of creating
the national network of authorities responsible for combating HT, the action being coordinated
by the inter-institutional working group in this regard. The third objective, was also partially

213
Law no. 257 from 22.11.2018 on the approval of the Information Security Strategy of the RM for 2019-2024,
Section no. IV, pillar III, art. 94.
214
Ibidem, pillar II, art. 89.

75
realized, the term for its implementation was 2020-2021 and the responsible authority, also SIS.
Thus, the report mentions that during 2021, the SIS developed and sent to the legal beneficiaries
and members of the working group on HT, (established by the Prime Minister's Decision no. 60
of 05.12.2018), two complex documents of inter-institutional utility: “The inter-institutional
framework of reference regarding the HT in the Republic of Moldova”, intended to standardize
knowledge at the national level on the concept and specifics of HT and “Models of hybrid
influence in the context of internal vulnerabilities”, which contains references to the main
national vulnerabilities215.
We mention, none of these documents elaborated by the SIS, of inter-institutional utility,
cannot be found yet in open sources.
The forth objective is in the process of realization until 2024, it is mentioned that during
the reference period, SIS developed the draft “Operational protocol for interaction between the
responsible authorities and decision-makers in the case of a hybrid security emergency” (action
resulting from objective 17, pillar III of the Action Plan), which is to be finalized/ coordinated
with national institutions in 2022216.
As regards the fifth objective, it is in the process of implementation until 2024. During
2021, SIS issued 35 communications and developed 7 analytical studies to national and external
beneficiaries on the subject of vulnerabilities, risks and HT. Also, during the 2021, several inter-
institutional meetings dedicated to strengthening capacities and knowledge in the field of HT
management were attended. On that platform, some studies elaborated by the SIS were submitted
to debate, as well as perspectives of the implementation of the Action Plan for the
implementation of the Strategy for Informational Security (on hybrid security threats section). In
addition, during February 18-19, 2021, a seminar on HT was organized at the Republic of
Moldova Ministry of Exterior, through TAIEX platform, attended by 20 people from national
institutions. The event pursued two main objectives: familiarizing the Moldovan side with the
Finnish experience in the field of combating hybrid threats and promoting the dialogue between
the institutions of the Republic of Moldova regarding the implementation of a national
mechanism adapted to the realities of our country, including by (re)initiating the process of

215
Monitoring and evaluation report of the implementation of the informal security strategy of the Republic of
Moldova for the years 2019 2024 (reporting period - 2021), p. 37.
https://www.parlament.md/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=IdS8qAO3we0%3D&tabid=202&language=ro-RO, (accessed
20.03.23).
216
Ibidem, p. 37-39.

76
creating the inter-institutional framework in the Republic of Moldova The sixth objective is still
in process of implementation217.
The report also outlines as fully implemented the objective on developing strategic
communication mechanisms, noting that the SIS developed the analytical study with the title:
“Strategic communication in ensuring the national security of the Republic of Moldova”. The
study attests that the objectives of strategic communication for the achievement of the national
interests of the Republic of Moldova will contribute positively and directly to the successful
implementation of the operations, missions and activities of the SIS, through integration into the
strategic planning process of the so called “Institutional and Inter-Institutional STRATCOMs218”.
As regards the established mechanism for addressing HT, we can outline that even if the
initiative of 2016, to regulate the HT phenomenon within the National Security Strategy of the
Republic of Moldova failed by being blocked by the former Republic of Moldova M president,
nevertheless our authorities succeeded to incorporate HT and mechanisms for its combating into
the framework of the Law on the Concept of informational security and the its subsequently
Strategy along with its Action Plan. Since 2019, we have generally a good degree of the
Informational Security Strategy implementation, as was shown by the SIS Report. In addition,
this year will be issue another report which will reveal the 2022 degree of implementation. Thus,
the mechanism is at the incipient stage of implementation.
The problem is that the Informational Security Strategy is focused primly on ensuring
information security at the national level, being based on cyber resilience, but as our research
revealed, the HT are multidimensional security threats, which do not involve only cyber means,
but also exert multidomain coercion in economic, political, security, energetic, agricultural
spheres etc. Therefore, it is required the elaboration of a specialized security legal framework for
addressing HT at the national level, and ensuring resilience of the Republic of Moldova in all the
spheres.
Based on this, we can state that unlike the EU and NATO, by the Republic of Moldova
no serious actions have been taken to create state-level policies to prevent and counter HT. In
this regard, we propose first of all, to benefit from the EU and NATO experience, by fully
exploiting the existing leverages of cooperation of the Republic of Moldova with these

217
Monitoring and evaluation report of the implementation of the informal security strategy of the Republic of
Moldova for the years 2019 2024 (reporting period - 2021), p. 37-39.
https://www.parlament.md/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=IdS8qAO3we0%3D&tabid=202&language=ro-RO, (accessed
21.03.23).
218
Ibidem p. 31.

77
organizations. At the present stage, it is the only way for applying EU and NATO experience in
building resilience of our country to HT.
Thus, for applying the EU experience of the resilience building against HT within the
Republic of Moldova, we have to continue the EU integration path. Only by fully accomplishing
the Republic of Moldova – EU Association Agreement, our country will have the opportunity to
strengthen its democratic institutions by carrying out all the agreed political, economic and social
reforms, thus raising the standard of living, and ultimately bringing it closer to EU gradual
political and economic integration219. Only the EU integration will offer the Republic of
Moldova the opportunity to benefit from the whole EU specter of mechanisms for addressing
HT. In this regard, in its conclusions of 24 June 2022, the European Council recognized the
European perspective of the Republic of Moldova, and decided to grant it, along with Ukraine,
the status of candidate country220. The Association Implementation Report on the Republic of
Moldova issued by the EU Council on 06 February 2023, outlined the progress achieved by the
Republic of Moldova in implementation of the AA, adopting an updated EU-Moldova
Association Agenda for 2021-2027 on 22 August 2022221.
Recently, in order to benefit from the EU experience in building resilience to HT, one
step was made by the Republic of Moldova. Based on the EU European Council conclusions of
15 December 2022 where the “European Council affirmed that the EU would continue to
provide all relevant support to the Republic of Moldova as it deals with the multifaceted impact
of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine”, the Republic of Moldova Prime minister in a
letter to the High Representative dated 28 January 2023, invited the EU to deploy a civilian
mission in the country under the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP)222.
Accordingly, the Council established the EU Partnership Mission in the Republic of
Moldova (EUPM Moldova) under the CSDP. The objective of this civilian mission is to enhance
the resilience of the security sector of the country in the areas of crisis management and HT,
including cybersecurity, and countering foreign information manipulation and interference
(FIMI). To this end, the mission will provide advice at strategic level on the development of
strategies and policies, and identify the needs for capacity building for early warning, detection,

219
Association Agreement between the Republic of Moldova and the European Union.
https://dcfta.md/uploads/0/images/large/acord-de-asociere-en.pdf, (accessed 24.03.23).
220
EU Council. Press release of 24 April 2023. Moldova: EU sets up a civilian mission to strengthen the resilience of
the security sector. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2023/04/24/moldova-eu-sets-up-a-
civilian-mission-to-strengthen-the-resilience-of-the-security-sector/, (accessed 24.03.23).
221
Ibidem.
222
EU Council. Press release of 24 April 2023. Moldova: EU sets up a civilian mission to strengthen the resilience of
the security sector. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2023/04/24/moldova-eu-sets-up-a-
civilian-mission-to-strengthen-the-resilience-of-the-security-sector/, (accessed 24.03.23).

78
identification, attribution of threats and the response to HT. Also, the mission will feature
a project cell responsible for identifying and implementing projects in the aforementioned areas,
in close coordination with other like-minded actors. In response to Moldova’s request, EUPM
Moldova will have an initial mandate of two years and its Operational Headquarters will be in
Moldova223.
This is an important step took by our authorities, which already acknowledged the fact
that in the face of HT, currently our country is not able to deal alone with this type of threats.
Taking into account that Moldova does not have specific mechanisms to identify HT- such as
fake news, propaganda, and disinformation, the EU Partnership Mission will contribute to
developing by the Republic of Moldova the protection tools that will respond to rapid
technological changes. Therefore, only by continuing the process of the EU integration and fully
exploiting the existing cooperation with the EU, our country has the possibility to strengthen its
resilience against HT.
For applying NATO experience of the resilience building against HT, the Republic of
Moldova has to fully exploit the existing cooperation between the Republic of Moldova and
NATO. In this regard, the recently signed Individual Partnership Action Plan Republic of
Moldova – NATO for 2022-2023 (within the framework of the Partnership for Peace Program),
is the best tool for advancing the process of reforming and modernizing the security and national
defense sector of the Republic of Moldova in accordance with the new developments and
requirements of the current security environment224. The framework offers a good opportunity
for the Republic of Moldova to fully exploit the NATO experience, in order to develop the
necessary capabilities in for building resilience of the Republic of Moldova to HT and generally
to strengthen resilience of the country in the field of defense, without infringing the status of
permanent neutrality of our country.
Thus, the IPAP mentions that for increasing resilience in the national defense capabilities,
the Republic of Moldova will capitalize the cooperation opportunities offered by the NATO
during these nearly 30 years of cooperation: “in particular the Partnership Analysis and
Planning Process (PARP), the Defense Capability Building Initiative (DCB), the Security and
Defense Integrity Program (BI), the Professional Development Program (PDP), the Science for
Peace Program and Security (SPS), Military Training Enhancement Program (DEEP), Platform

223
EU Council. Press release of 24 April 2023. Moldova: EU sets up a civilian mission to strengthen the resilience of
the security sector. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2023/04/24/moldova-eu-sets-up-a-
civilian-mission-to-strengthen-the-resilience-of-the-security-sector/, (accessed 25.03.23).
224
The individual partnership action plan of the RM-NATO for the years 2022-2023.
https://mfa.gov.md/sites/default/files/planul_individual_de_actiuni_al_parteneriatului_ipap_republica_moldova_-
_nato_pentru_anii_2022-2023.pdf, (accessed 25.03.23).

79
for Interoperability (IP), including the relevant institutional mechanisms, created at the previous
stages of IPAP implementation”225.
Since the beginning of the cooperation, the Republic of Moldova already obtained a
series of advantages, such as strengthening the capacity to respond to internal and external
security risks, strengthening informational resilience, identifying solutions through projects in
the field of science and planning in emergency and exceptional situations, increasing
intergovernmental cooperation at the legislative level, executive and civil society, assistance in
the economic sector, strengthening institutions, respect for human rights, combating corruption
and cross-border crime, ensuring human security and others226.
The Plan also outlines that our country is determined to continue the process of reforming
and modernizing the security and defense sector in order to increase its capacities and efficiency
in reducing risks and combating threats to national security. This objective implies the
harmonization and adjustment of the legal framework and policies that regulate the national
security and defense system, as well as the establishment of a unique mechanism for national
defense planning227. In this regard, it is important to note that benefiting from the advice of
NATO experts, our country adopted a series of strategic documents: the National Defense
Strategy and the Military Strategy of the Republic of Moldova, necessary to establish the
strategic objectives in the field of defense, the ways to achieve the established objectives and the
planning of the necessary resources for this purpose228. The adoption of the above-mentioned
strategic documents contributes to strengthening resilience of our country not only in the military
and defense sector, but also of the security sector in general.
Moreover, by implementing the 2022-2023 IPAP, the Republic of Moldova will have the
opportunity not only to continue the process of reformation and modernization of the defense
and security sector, but also to strengthen resilience in various fields of strategic importance:
“cooperation with European and Euro-Atlantic structures and institutions, democratic reforms,
human rights, the rule of law, fighting corruption, territorial integrity and relations with

225
The individual partnership action plan of the RM-NATO for the years 2022-2023, Chapter 1, art. 1.2.
https://mfa.gov.md/sites/default/files/planul_individual_de_actiuni_al_parteneriatului_ipap_republica_moldova_-
_nato_pentru_anii_2022-2023.pdf, (accessed 25.03.23).
226
Mârzac E. Negru A. Parteneriatele NATO: oportunități și beneficii pentru consolidarea rezilienței în sectorul de
securitate al Republicii Moldova. Tendințe de măsurare și monitorizare a rezilienței. In: Reziliența în atenția
securității. Concepte, procese, necesități. Chișinău, 2022, p. 89.
227
The individual partnership action plan of the RM-NATO for the years 2022-2023, Chapter I, art. 1.4.
https://mfa.gov.md/sites/default/files/planul_individual_de_actiuni_al_parteneriatului_ipap_republica_moldova_-
_nato_pentru_anii_2022-2023.pdf, (accessed 26.03.23).
228
S. Sprincean, T, Paşcan. Securitatea militară a RM în contextul amplificării riscurilor și amenințărilor de
securitate în regiunea sud-est europeană, p. 119.https://ibn.idsi.md/sites/default/files/imag_file/p-116-121_1.pdf,
(accessed 26.03.2023).

80
neighbors; reform of the security and defense sector, democratic control of the Armed Forces,
combating terrorism, ensuring cyber defense, sustainable economic development and energy
security”229.
In addition, the IPAP offers the Republic of Moldova a good opportunity to benefit from
NATO experience in building resilience against HT by “exploring the NATO mechanisms in
order to strengthen strategic communication capabilities at national level. As part of this
process, the national authorities will further develop cooperation with the NATO Center of
Excellence for Strategic Communication in Riga230”. An objective also outlined within the
Informational Security Strategy. By taking over the practice and expertise of NATO Strategic
Communications Centre of Excellence in Riga, the Republic of Moldova will increase its
reaction to HT and disinformation, thus contributing to building national resilience against HT.
Another important aspect, on which Republic of Moldova would benefit from NATO
experience form IPAP, is on ensuring cyber defense, in particular by “developing cooperation
with NATO and allies to increase the resilience of its critical infrastructure to cyber threats”. In
this regard, the RM will make efforts to increase institutional capacities in the field of cyber
defense and the protection of strategic communication and information systems against cyber-
attacks.
Therefore, we can outline that by fully exploiting the existing cooperation with NATO,
the Republic of Moldova will be able to increase first of all, resilience of the security and
defense sector - the essential precondition in strengthening the country's resilience to HT, but
also its resilience within the other strategic sectors which are currently vulnerable to HT.
On this part, we can outline that at the current stage, the fundamental security documents
which regulates the national security policy of the Republic of Moldova do not provide any
references to the HT. The only national mechanism designed for addressing HT is regulated
within the Information security strategy of for 2019–2024 and its Action Plan. Even if the SIS
Report on the implementation of the above mentioned strategy notices a good degree of
implementation, the mechanism is still at the incipient stage, thus is very hard to outline the
progress made in this regard. One problem identified, is that the Informational Security Strategy
is focused primly on ensuring information security at the national level, being based on cyber
resilience, therefore, it is required the elaboration of a specialized security legal framework for

229
The individual partnership action plan of the RM – NATO for the years 2022-2023, Chapter I.
https://mfa.gov.md/sites/default/files/planul_individual_de_actiuni_al_parteneriatului_ipap_republica_moldova_-
_nato_pentru_anii_2022-2023.pdf, (accessed 26.03.23).
230
The individual partnership action plan of the RM – NATO for the years 2022-2023, Chapter III, 3.1.
https://mfa.gov.md/sites/default/files/planul_individual_de_actiuni_al_parteneriatului_ipap_republica_moldova_-
_nato_pentru_anii_2022-2023.pdf, (accessed 26.03.23).

81
 addressing HT at the national level, and ensuring resilience of the Republic of Moldova in all the
spheres.
Unlike the EU and NATO, by the Republic of Moldova no serious actions have been
taken to create state-level policies to prevent and counter HT. Therefore, the only way to apply at
the national level the EU and NATO experience of building resilience to HT is by fully
exploiting the existing leverages of cooperation with these organizations.

3.3. Conclusions to Chapter 3.

The conducted research on the selected cases from the Republic of Moldova environment
helped us to reveal that both cases meets all the characteristics of a hybrid way of fighting and can
therefore be considered a hybrid threat to the national security of the Republic of Moldova applied
by the Russian Federation. In order to increase resilience of the Republic of Moldova within the
energy sector as well as to prevent exploitation of another the constant vulnerability of the
Republic of Moldova – Tansnistrian conflict, we propose the following recommendations:
- To continue the diversification of the energy supplies in cooperation with Romania as
well as other relevant international partners;
- To prepare a stronger negotiating position with the Russian Federation regarding the gas
supply contract and solve the issue of the Republic of Moldova debts. In this sense, it is very
important to coordinate positions with Ukraine in order to avoid critical interpretations in case of
contract extension. At the same time, it is necessary to form a working group with experts from
the government, civil society and development partners, who will develop scenarios and prepare
operative analyzes for conducting negotiations with Gazprom, including scenarios related to the
Transnistrian region, the evaluation of Gazprom's export interests, in conditions for the gradual
reduction of Russian gas purchases in Europe, careful monitoring of the evolution of Russian-
European gas relations;
- To maintain and strengthen the Transnistrian economic reliance on Chisinau, by
elaboration a concrete plan of economic measures which will regard a set of customs and fiscal
regulatory instruments, in order to put the economic pressure of the so called Transistrian
authorities and therefore to speed up the conflict settlement, taking advantage form the regional
security situation.
The conducted research on the EU and NATO experience in strengthening resilience
against HT, offered us important references for building resilience of the Republic of Moldova
against this phenomenon. In this regard, we first of all identified and analyzed the current
security mechanism of our county designed for addressing HT. And on this this part, we can

82
state that at the current stage, the fundamental security documents such as the Concept of
National Security of the Republic of Moldova from 2008 and the National Security Strategy
from 2011, which regulates the national security policy of the Republic of Moldova, do not
provide any references to the HT.
A significant step for establishing a mechanism for dealing with HT, were made by the
national authorities within the Information security strategy of for 2019–2024 and its Action
Plan. Therefore, currently it is the only national framework which regulates the mechanism
designed for addressing HT. Even if the SIS Report on the implementation of the above
mentioned strategy notices a good degree of implementation, the mechanism is still at the
incipient stage, thus is very hard to outline the progress made in this regard. One problem
identified, is that the Informational Security Strategy is focused primly on ensuring information
security at the national level, being based on cyber resilience, therefore, it is required the
elaboration of a specialized security legal framework for addressing HT at the national level, and
ensuring resilience of the Republic of Moldova in all the spheres. Based on this, we can state that
at the present stage, the only opportunity for applying the EU and NATO experience in building
resilience of our country to HT is by fully by exploiting the existing framework for cooperation
with these organizations at the present stage.
Only by fully accomplishing the Republic of Moldova – EU Association Agreement, our
country will have the opportunity to strengthen its democratic institutions by carrying out all the
agreed political, economic and social reforms, thus raising the standard of living, and ultimately
bringing it closer to EU gradual political and economic integration. Only the EU integration will
offer the Republic of Moldova the opportunity to benefit from the whole EU specter of
mechanisms for addressing HT. In addition, the EU Partnership Mission which will be
established by the EU in near future will contribute to strengthen resilience of our county against
HT. As regards NATO, the recently signed Individual Partnership Action Plan Republic of
Moldova – NATO for 2022-2023 is the best tool for advancing the process of reforming and
modernizing the security and national defense sector of the Republic of Moldova in accordance
with the new developments and requirements of the current security environment. Also, taking
over the practice and expertise of NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence in
Riga, the Republic of Moldova will increase its reaction to HT and disinformation, thus
contributing to building national resilience against HT.
Based on this, we recommend continuing cooperation with the EU and NATO in order to
take best practices of strengthening resilience to hybrid threats, and subsequently incorporating
them into the national security mechanism of addressing hybrid threats.

83
 GENERAL CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The conducted research offers us a solid ground to claim that from theoretical approaches
and empirical realities, to its concrete applicability in policies, strategies, plans, programs or
political and administrative decisions, Resilience becomes more than a concept, it is a framework
for thinking that opens an integrative, dynamic perspective and that creates a favorable basis for
further analysis.
Therefore, based on the analysis of historiographical research of resilience from the
security perspective, it can be concluded that before percolated in to the security field, resilience
has been subject of various works of scholars from various disciplines as mechanics, psychology,
social studies, engineering, ecology, urban planning, and disaster management. Beginning with
2014, due to significant shifts within the global security landscape and the emergence of hybrid
threats – Resilience started to gain prominence within the Western security research, especially
in International Politics, International Relations and Security Studies.
The current Western, Russian and Romanian studies explore resilience as a measure
against hybrid threats. Within the Republic of Moldova, resilience issue is a recent phenomenon
studied within the security literature. Even though, the awareness over the newly emerging
hybrid threats raised the engagement of the local scholars with the resilience study as a measure
to hybrid threats.
The research on theoretical-conceptual bases of resilience in the security field, allowed us
to reveal that there is no generally accepted definition of resilience. Therefore, all provided
definitions are somehow related to the original one provide by Canadian ecologist C. S. Holling.
Later, the concept started to be adopted by some important international organization as EU,
OECD or NATO in their security policies. We identified that OECD approach on resilience
offered a more integrative, dynamic perspective on conceptualizing resilience within the security
field by introducing resilience system analysis, which seeks to explore the connections between
various risks and vulnerabilities.
Analyzing more definitions of resilience we established that there are some
characteristics which are constantly present in all approaches to resilience. The identified
characteristics helped us to develop our own definition of the concept of resilience within the
security field: the ability of a state and its institutions, but also of society as a whole to withstand
crises of various types, as for example armed attacks, to recover from them by using state`s
power resources (economics, diplomatic, informational, military) with the joint efforts of the
state institutions.

84
 The conducted research on the concept of HT, tools and modus-operandi, allowed us to
reveal that despite being excessively discussed since 2014, at the present stage, the concept of
HT lacks a comprehensive and universal definition. In addition, we established that HT and HW
are two viewpoints, or phases, of the same phenomenon.
The analysis of the historical evolution of the concept of HT helped us to reveal that the
origins of the concept within the security field can be traced to the works of well-known
American military theorist, Colonel Frank Hoffmann, who used the term HT in reference to his
own concept of hybrid warfare. A key moment in the journey of the term HT was the annexation
of Crimea by the Russian Federation in 2014.
After the research on the EU institution`s approach to HT, it can be stated that in the
European view the concept of hybrid threats must remain flexible in order to be able to respond
to HT evolving nature. Nevertheless, the European view describes HT as multidimensional
threats, which combines coercive and subversive measures, using both conventional and
unconventional tools and tactics. They are designed to be difficult to detect or attribute. These
threats target critical vulnerabilities and seek to create confusion to hinder swift and effective
decision-making.
After the research on the American and European perspectives of HT, we can outline the
following features/ characteristics or hybrid indicators of HT phenomenon: The originator of the
activity is the state, or a non-state actor cooperating with the state power; in order to achieve its
strategic goal, HT exploits the opponent's vulnerabilities through the usage of the combination of
the military and non-military means simultaneously; the HT activities seeks to achieve specific
objectives while remaining below the threshold of formally declared warfare.
After the analysis of the main EU and NATO strategic documents which regard resilience
as a key measure for counteracting HT, we can outline that at the ground of the EU and NATO
models of strengthening resilience to HT lies the fact that countering HT, is first of all, a national
responsibility of each member state. Starting from this, since 2014, the EU and NATO
established their own distinct organizational models for countering HT by enhancing resilience
as a mechanism of response. From EU-NATO perspective, achieving common, shared, resilience
is a first line of defense against HT. It requires identification of key vulnerabilities and a
common risk assessment in order to gain common understanding of security threats, a
synchronization of efforts between partners, member states, the sector civil and private and EU-
NATO institutions. This joint EU-NATO desire in the strategy to combat HT by strengthening
resilience is understood to be achievable only in cooperation with the partner states of the two
organizations.

85
 Referring particularly to the Republic of Moldova, we can outline that the conducted
research on the selected cases from the country` security environment, helped us to reveal that
since 24 February 2022, the Republic of Moldova is a subject to hybrid threats perpetrated by the
Russian Federation state. Thus, since the beginning of the war in Ukraine, Russian Federation
exploits one of the main vulnerability of the Republic of Moldova - its energy dependence on the
Russian gas by deploying wide range of hybrid tools in order to achieve its strategic goal. The
second vulnerability exploited by the same state actor, is the issue of territorial integrity - the
unresolved Transnistrian conflict. The main strategic goal in this regard is to place/ maintain the
Republic of Moldova in its sphere of geopolitical influence, thus blocking the process of the
country`s integration in EU and/ or accession to NATO.
After analyzing the actual security framework of the country it must be outlined that at
the current stage, the fundamental security documents such as the Concept of National Security of
the Republic of Moldova from 2008 and the National Security Strategy from 2011, which
regulates the national security policy of the Republic of Moldova, do not provide any references to
the HT. Nevertheless, the viable mechanism designed for addressing HT is regulated within the
Information security strategy of for 2019–2024 and its Action Plan. Even if the SIS Report on the
implementation of the above mentioned strategy notices a good degree of implementation, the
mechanism is still at the incipient stage, thus is very hard to outline the progress made in this
regard.
Taking into account that the current security mechanism for addressing hybrid threats is
at the incipient stage of development and implementation, at the present stage, the only
opportunity for applying the EU and NATO experience in building resilience of our country to
HT is by fully by exploiting the existing framework for cooperation with these organizations at
the present stage. Only by fully accomplishing the Republic of Moldova – EU Association
Agreement, the recently signed Individual Partnership Action Plan Republic of Moldova –
NATO for 2022-2023 our country will have the opportunity to strengthen its resilience against
hybrid threats.
Based on the obtained results, the following recommendations can be formulated in order
to increase the resilience of the Republic of Moldova to hybrid threats of national security:
1. Speeding the process of elaboration and adoption of the new National Security Strategy
of the Republic of Moldova, which will reflect the actual geopolitical context of the international
and regional security environment, taking into account that the current National Security
Strategy, adopted by Parliament Decision no. 153 of 15.07.2011, no longer represents a source of
relevant solutions in the process of ensuring national security, especially against hybrid security

86
threats. In addition, taking into account the actual security situation, more specifically the war in
Ukraine launched by the Russian Federation, another short-term imperative in the field of
building resilience of our country to hybrid security treats is also the elaboration in cooperation
with the scientific society of the Action Plan for implementing the new National Security
Strategy of the Republic of Moldova.
2. The decision-making factor from the Republic of Moldova must strengthen the
international cooperation with the EU and NATO organizations, as well as their member states,
in order to adjust the actual security mechanism designed for addressing hybrid threats. Due to
the fact that the Informational Security Strategy is focused primly on ensuring information
security at the national level, being primarily based on strengthening cyber resilience against
hybrid threats, the elaboration of a specialized security legal framework for addressing HT at the
national level is required, which will provide viable measures for other strategically important
sectors of our country, the experience of EU and NATO in this regard being of particular
relevance for our country.
3. Establishment of an analysis and forecasting center at the national level that will ensure
relevant studies able to provide multidimensional analyzes of security risks and threats in the
short, medium and long term, in order to identify at the incipient stage the potential hybrid
security threats in order to be able to build resilience against them.
4. In the long term, strategic communication should become a constant component of the
national security of the Republic of Moldova, which will develop resilience and ensure the
protection and presentation of national interests, strengthening the societal cohesion of the state
both among the population and external partners. At the same time, state and non-state actors
should adopt and fully implement long-term national strategies aimed at combating
disinformation campaigns and producing coherent narratives towards vulnerable groups of the
population.

87
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 APPENDIXES

Appendix no. 1: Evolution of the term resilience: from ancient times to disaster and risk
reduction management field of study.

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 Appendix no. 2: The genealogy of the resilience concept.

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 Appendix no. 3: Triangular relationship of security, resilience, and non-security politics.

Source: Boubreau P., J. Vuori. Security, resilience, and desecuritization: multidirectional

moves and dynamics. In: Critical studies on security, vol. 3, no. 3, 2015, p. 8.

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Appendix no.4: The list of hybrid tools by EU Commission Joint Research Centre.

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 Source: EU Commision, Hybrid CoE. The Landscape of Hybrid Threats: A Conceptual
Model Public Version, p. 33. https://publications.jrc.ec.europa.eu/repository/handle/JRC123305,
(accessed 18.02.23).

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 Appendix no.5: Phases of a hybrid threat influencing by the Hybrid CoE.

Source: Hybrid CoE research: Helsinki in the era of hybrid threats – Hybrid influencing
and the city, p. 5.
https://www.hel.fi/static/kanslia/Julkaisut/2018/hybridiraportti_eng_020818_netti.pdf,
(accessed 18.02.23).

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Subsemnatul, declar pe răspundere personală că materialele prezentate în teza de master

sunt rezultatul propriilor cercetări şi realizări ştiinţifice. Conştientizez că, în caz contrar, urmează
să suport consecinţele în conformitate cu legislaţia în vigoare.

Numele de familie, prenumele

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Data

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