(2021) SGHC 55

IN THE GENERAL DIVISION OF
THE HIGH COURT OF THE REPUBLIC OF SINGAPORE
[2021] SGHC 55
Originating Summons (Bankruptcy) No 69 of 2020 (Registrar’s Appeal No 13

of 2021 and Summons 600 of 2021)
In the matter of Part 14 of the Insolvency Restructuring and Dissolution Act

2018
SIFAN TRIYONO
… Applicant
GROUNDS OF DECISION
[Insolvency Law] — [Bankruptcy] — [Interim Order]
[Civil Procedure] — [Appeals to High Court from court, tribunal or person] —

[Adducing fresh evidence]
Version No 1: 11 Mar 2021 (15:43 hrs)

TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION............................................................................................1
FACTS...............................................................................................................2
DECISION BELOW ........................................................................................4
APPLICATION TO ADDUCE FURTHER EVIDENCE ............................6
ISSUES TO BE DETERMINED AT THE APPEAL .................................14
THE RELEVANT LAW................................................................................15

PRELIMINARY POINT ON WHETHER APPELLANT IS INSOLVENT .......................20
WHETHER THE AR CONSIDERED THE PROPOSAL HOLISTICALLY ...................21
WHETHER THE AR MISUNDERSTOOD THE VOLUNTARY ARRANGEMENT
PROCESS ........................................................................................................23
WHETHER THE AR INAPPROPRIATELY SCRUTINISED THE PROPOSAL .............24

CONCLUSION……………………………………………………………. 28

This judgment is subject to final editorial corrections approved by the
court and/or redaction pursuant to the publisher’s duty in compliance
with the law, for publication in LawNet and/or the Singapore Law
Reports.
Re Sifan Triyono
[2021] SGHC 55
General Division of the High Court — Originating Summons (Bankruptcy) No

69 of 2020 (Registrar’s Appeal No 13 of 2021 and Summons 600 of 2021)
Kwek Mean Luck JC
8 February 2021
11 March 2021
Kwek Mean Luck JC:
Introduction
1 This, Registrar’s Appeal No 13 of 2021, is an appeal against the decision

of the Assistant Registrar (“AR”) on 6 January 2021 dismissing his application
in Originating Summons (Bankruptcy) No 69 of 2020 for an interim order under
Part 14 of the Insolvency, Restructuring and Dissolution Act (Act 40 of 2018)
(“IRDA”). The issue in this appeal is whether the appellant’s draft proposal for
a voluntary arrangement (“the Proposal”) satisfies the requirement of being
“serious and viable”, such that it would be appropriate for the court to make an
interim order under s 279(2) IRDA. At the end of the hearing, I dismissed the
appeal and gave my brief reasons. I now set out my reasons in full.

Re Sifan Triyono [2021] SGHC 55
Facts
2 The appellant is an Indonesian businessman and a Singapore Permanent

Resident.1 He claims to be an indirect shareholder holding a majority stake in
an Indonesian company, PT Kapuas Tunggal Persada (“KTP”), which he
incorporated in 2004. The appellant claims to hold shares in multiple holding
companies that hold shares in KTP, namely PT Mutiara Bara Energy, Clearline
Holding Ltd (BVI), PT Bumi Rakasa Abadi and PT Kartika Jaya Lestari.2 KTP
holds a coal mining concession, and works with sub-contractors in relation to
the operation of the mine as a part of its business.3
3 While the appellant claims to have no knowledge of any bankruptcy

proceedings against him, he claims that one Flame S.A. (“Flame”) will pursue
execution proceedings and bankruptcy proceedings against him, in the event
that a judgment is granted in Flame’s favour in a separate suit.4 Flame had
commenced a suit on 2 October 2020 against the appellant in the High Court for
default of payment of a sum of US$900,735.47, which was due to be paid
pursuant to a settlement agreement between the appellant, the appellant’s wife,
and Flame.5
4 The appellant filed an application on 27 October 2020 for an interim

order under Part 14 of IRDA to allow for consideration of the Proposal. Out of
1 1st Affidavit of Sifan Triyono dated 26 October 2020 (“Triyono’s 1st Affidavit”) at
[16].
2 Triyono’s 1st Affidavit, Page 201 read with 3rd Affidavit of Sifan Triyono dated 5
February 2021 (“3rd Affidavit”) at Page 38.
3 Triyono’s 1st Affidavit at [18].
4 Triyono’s 1st Affidavit at [27].
5 Triyono’s 1st Affidavit at [9]-[11].

the ten creditors the appellant claims to have, two are banks holding security
over his property, and five are related and unsecured creditors (the “Related and
Unsecured Creditors”): four of which are the appellant’s relatives, while one is
a company owned by the appellant’s relatives. The remaining three creditors,
Flame, PT Harma Presis Meka Indonesia (“PT Harma”) and Suhaili are
unsecured and unrelated. Under the Proposal:6
(a) The Related and Unsecured Creditors will be excluded from the
Proposal.
(b) The three unsecured and unrelated creditors are required to take
a 60% discount of their present debt. The balance 40% (“Compromised
Total Debt”) is to be paid in monthly instalments progressively over a
period of five years between 2022 to 2026.
(c) payment for the Compromised Total Debt of approximately

SGD $2,740,789.017 is to come from KTP’s repayment of its USD
$1,077,322 debt (approximately SGD $1,441,529.88) owed to the
appellant.8
(d) KTP will fund a total of USD $2,536,080 from its forecasted
revenue from 2022 to 2026.9
5 Flame attended the hearing before the AR and objected to the application
for an interim order.
6 Triyono’s 1st Affidavit, Page 213 at [38].

8 Triyono’s 1st Affidavit, Page 194 at [12]; Triyono’s 1st Affidavit, Page 207 at [28].

Decision below
6 The AR found that there were serious doubts about the viability of the
Proposal and dismissed the application for the interim order. The main reasons
were:10
(a) First, it is unclear what is the legal basis of KTP’s payment to

the appellant’s creditors and how creditors will enforce any failure to
pay on the part of KTP. While the appellant is said to be the controlling
mind of KTP, KTP remains a separate legal entity. The appellant relied
on a letter dated 16 December 2020 from KTP. That letter refers to the
appellant’s first affidavit filed on 26 October 2020, which says that the
funds for the repayment of the Compromised Total Debt under the
Proposal will “come from the repayments from KTP in respect of debts
owed to” the appellant. This was different from what was submitted by
the appellant to the AR at the hearing, where it was said that the intention
is for KTP to make payment under the Proposal beyond the SGD $1
million that KTP owed to the appellant. The total amount to be paid out
under the Proposal, is approximately SGD $2.7 million. The AR
observed that there was however no evidence of an agreement on the
part of KTP to make payment beyond the SGD $1 million that KTP
owed to the appellant. Neither was there anything to suggest that KTP
would be amenable to be legally bound to make payment for the total
debts under the Proposal. Even if KTP were bound, enforcement against
KTP was uncertain given that KTP is an Indonesian company.
10 Notes of Evidence (“NE”) dated 6 January 2021, Pages 42-46.

(b) Second, there are problems with KTP’s ability to pay. It was
undisputed that KTP is presently in the red.
(i) The amount that KTP would have available to make

payment under the Proposal would depend on its projected
revenue as well as costs. The appellant provided projected
revenue and cash flow, but information on operating costs and
expenses was lacking, even though the actual revenue available
for payment would depend on the costs incurred.
(ii) In the Proposal, the appellant set out certain projected

revenue streams for KTP, to explain how the proposed
repayments will be funded. These projected revenue streams are
based on 3 contracts which the appellant says KTP has entered
into with various parties.
(A) But out of these 3 contracts, one of the contracts,

with PT Kapuas Bara Utama (“KBU”), is entirely oral in
nature. There is no evidence about the terms of the
contract, including the rate at which KBU is charged for
using KTP’s haulage road. There is no evidence of the
amount that KBU is paying KTP at present, even though
the appellant informed the AR that KBU is presently
using and paying for the usage of the haulage road.
(B) For the contract with PT Batubara Kalteng Jaya

(“BKJ”), the contract has not yet commenced. There is
also no evidence on how the contract terms translate into
the figures that the appellant has set out in the Proposal
as the projected revenue stream.

(C) For the contract with PT Pamapersada Nusantara

(“PT PN”), the contract exhibited is dated 4 August 2017
and said to last for a term of 5 years, which means that it
will end in 2022. There was no evidence as to any
agreement by the parties to extend the contract beyond
2022, which is the period in which the creditors are
supposed to be repaid under the appellant’s Proposal.
(iii) At the hearing, the AR asked the appellant if he would

like an opportunity to put in further information to address these
concerns. The hearing was stood down for the appellant to
consider, after which the appellant informed the AR that he
would decline the opportunity and stand by the Proposal as put
forth.11
Application to adduce further evidence
7 On 5 February 2021, shortly before the hearing for this appeal, the
appellant filed the third affidavit from the appellant (the “third affidavit”) in
support of SUM 600 of 2021, an application to adduce further evidence. The
third affidavit sought to adduce the following evidence.12
(a) First, an unsigned affidavit from Mr Harwo, the President

Director of KTP (“KTP’s affidavit”) containing the following:
11 NE dated 6 January 2021, Page 4 at lns 25-28.

12 3rd Affidavit of Sifan Triyono dated 5 February 2021 (“3rd Affidavit”).

(i) KTP’s confirmation that it would make available funds

to repay the appellant’s creditors under the Proposal, that such
repayments would not be solely from the debt that KTP owed to
the appellant of US$1,077,322, and that KTP would agree to be
contractually bound under the Proposal if necessary;13
(ii) a copy of KTP’s full audited financial statements

(“audited FS”) for the years 2018 and 2019; and
(iii) projections of KTP’s financial statements for the years

2022 to 2026 (“Projections”) prepared by an Indonesian
accounts and auditing advisor.
(b) Second, relevant emails between the appellant and DBS Bank
Limited (“DBS”) to show that the appellant was unable to obtain a
second mortgage on the Ardmore Park Property or obtain re-financing.
8 Although these documents were clearly directed at addressing the

concerns raised by the AR at the hearing below, the appellant asked for SUM
600 of 2021 to be heard only after RA 13 of 2021 was heard. The initial reason
given by the appellant was that they wanted to be fair to Flame and to give
counsels for Flame time to review, given the lateness of the application, which
had been filed on the Friday afternoon before the hearing on the following
Monday morning. Flame, however, indicated that they were prepared to proceed
with hearing SUM 600 of 2021 at the start of the appeal. The appellant
subsequently acknowledged that the appellant’s intention was for SUM 600 of
2021 to be kept alive, so that depending on how the appeal goes, the appellant
13 3rd Affidavit at [5].

can apply for leave to adduce further evidence, which will assist the appellant’s
case in this appeal. The appellant took the position that the Proposal was serious
and viable as it stood, without the further evidence in SUM 600 of 2021. The
application to adduce further evidence, according to the appellant, was to show
the bona fides of the appellant. The appellant asked that RA 13 of 2021 proceed
first without determining SUM 600 of 2021.
9 The evidence in SUM 600 of 2021 appeared, at least from the face of
the application, to be directly related to RA 13 of 2021, since it sought to plug
the gaps that the AR below had highlighted. The appellant had also written in
earlier to inform the Court that the subject matter of SUM 600 of 2021 relates
to RA 13 of 2021 and asked that it be placed before this Court on the day of the
appeal.14
10 I therefore asked parties to address me on SUM 600 of 2021 first, after

which I heard submissions on RA 13 of 2021. In view of the appellant’s request
that SUM 600 of 2021 be kept alive until after the appeal was heard, I did not
rule on SUM 600 of 2021 after hearing parties on it, but proceeded to hear the
parties on RA 13 of 2021. In the course of submissions on RA 13 of 2021, I
considered the potential impact if any, that the evidence in the third affidavit
would have in addressing any gaps, if the third affidavit were admitted.
11 At the end of the hearing for the appeal, I dismissed the application in
SUM 600 of 2021 to adduce further evidence through the third affidavit. The
Court of Appeal has observed in JTrust Asia Pte Ltd v Group Lease Holdings
Pte Ltd and others [2018] 2 SLR 159 at [56], that the conditions to admit fresh
14 Letter to the Registrar by Solicitors for the Applicant dated 5 February 2021.

evidence on appeal stated in Ladd v Marshall [1954] 1 WLR 1489 remain a

useful analytical tool for assessing the justice of allowing fresh evidence in an
interlocutory appeal. In the context of adducing fresh evidence in a registrar’s
appeal to a judge in chambers, the Court stated that “the judge [is] entitled,
though not obliged, to employ the conditions of Ladd v Marshall to help her
decide whether or not to exercise her discretion to admit or reject the further
evidence” [emphasis in original]. I applied the conditions of Ladd v Marshall
as an analytical tool here.
12 Notably, at the hearing below before the AR, the AR had offered the
appellant the opportunity to put in further information. The hearing was stood
down for the counsel for the appellant to take instructions on this.15 Counsel for
the appellant returned and informed the AR that the appellant’s position was
that “the Proposal as put forward is serious and viable”. In other words, the
appellant had been offered an earlier opportunity by the court to put in further
evidence and the appellant declined that opportunity.
13 At the appeal, the appellant submitted that this should not be treated as
having declined the opportunity to put in evidence, but that the offer by the AR
was wrong. It was submitted that the appellant should not have been put to a
choice between leaving the evidence as it stood or taking up the AR’s offer for
leave to put in further evidence. Instead, the AR should have found that further
evidence was required and asked the appellant to put in further evidence.
14 In my judgment, the AR was not wrong in offering to allow the appellant

a choice to adduce further evidence. The AR was not in the position to know if
15 NE dated 6 January 2021, Pages 40-41.

the appellant had further evidence or would be willing to put in further evidence,
and hence was not wrong, in offering the appellant an opportunity to put in more
evidence, instead of asking that further evidence be filed by the appellant.
15 I proceed to consider the conditions under Ladd v Marshall. In respect

of the first condition of Ladd v Marshall, namely whether evidence could be
obtained with reasonable diligence, the appellant acknowledged that there are
weaknesses for the audited FS of KTP since that could be filed earlier. However,
I found that all the documents in KTP’s affidavit, including the assurance of
KTP and the Projections, have difficulty meeting the first condition. The
appellant could have taken up the opportunity given by the AR for the appellant
to put in further evidence. Instead, after the hearing stood down, the appellant
informed the Court that he was not going to put in further evidence and that the
proposal as it stood was serious and viable. Clearly, the evidence contained in
KTP’s affidavit could have been obtained with reasonable diligence. The only
reason why the evidence was not obtained earlier was that the appellant chose
not to.
16 The appellant compounded this by choosing not to have SUM 600 of

2021 heard before this appeal, but after. Again, the evidence may not have been
before this court, simply because the appellant, having obtained the evidence
chose not to do so. The operative word here is “may”, as I make this only as an
observation. In considering the merits of RA 13 of 2021, I nevertheless
considered if the evidence in SUM 600 of 2021 would have made a difference
to the Proposal.
17 Neither did I eventually take the appellant’s decision to have SUM 600
of 2021 heard after RA 13 of 2021 into account, in assessing whether SUM 600
10

of 2021 meets the first condition of Ladd v Marshall. In my judgment, the

appellant’s declining the opportunity offered by the AR to put in earlier
evidence, is sufficiently weighty in itself. As the Court of Appeal has stated in
Jurong Town Corp v Wishing Star [2004] 2 SLR(R) 427 at [27], the court
“should guard against attempts by a disappointed party seeking to ‘retrieve lost
ground in interlocutory appeals’ by relying on evidence which he could or
should have put before the court below”. That speaks aptly to this situation.
18 In addition, the evidence the appellant sought to adduce through the third
affidavit struggles to meet the second and third conditions in Ladd v Marshall,
namely, that the evidence must be such that, if given, it would probably have an
important influence on the result of the case, and that it must be apparently
credible though it need not be incontrovertible.
19 In respect of being apparently credible, Flame contested the credibility

of the KTP assurance by Mr Harwo, noting that the affidavit was not signed,
and that the usual course would be to sign such a document and state that the
signing party was not able to get to a notary in time. This was not even done
here. Flame submitted that the appellant had been hedging below and was
hedging even now.16 While I found it unusual that the affidavit by Mr Harwo
was unsigned, given its relevance to addressing one of the AR’s concerns, I did
not find that to be wholly determinative.
20 However, there were other fundamental difficulties.
(a) First, when asked at this appeal how the assurance by Mr Harwo
would address the problem of enforcement, the appellant stated that the
16 Minute Sheet for SUM 600/2021 dated 8 February 2021, Page 12.
11

reality is that the assurance of Mr Harwo in KTP’s affidavit “does not

help very much” in addressing the problem of enforcement against an
Indonesian third party that does not pay and that the proposal would fail
immediately if KTP does not pay. The assurance was more an
expression of bona fides on the part of the appellant.
(b) Second, the Projections, as pointed out by Flame, are based on

the audited FS, which shows different figures from the KTP financial
statements submitted in the hearing below. For example, while there
were figures for net sales in the earlier KTP financial statements, net
sales in the audited FS for both 2018 and 2019 are reflected as nil.17 In
addition, the audited FS now reflects Flame as a creditor, in amounts
which Flame said they were not previously aware of, when the earlier
financial statement did not show that Flame was a creditor at all.18 Given
such inconsistencies, it is not clear to what extent both sets of financial
statements are the same, and where there are changes, whether the
numbers in the audited FS are credible.
(c) Third, the Projections still reflect a very negative financial

situation for KTP. For example, the total current liability for KTP in
2022 is still about US$67 million.19 This is a significant amount of
negative equity, far outstripping the amounts that the appellant claimed
KTP would be able to pay creditors.
17 3rd Affidavit, Page 19.

18 3rd Affidavit, Page 40 at [16].
19 3rd Affidavit, Page 73
12

(d) Fourth, neither do the Projections address the earlier concern

with the three contracts underpinning the repayment schedule from
KTP, which is that two of the contracts are oral agreements with
unspecified terms and one contract ends in 2022 when repayment is
scheduled to start in 2022.
(e) Fifth, the reliability of the Projections is compounded by the lack

of visibility as to its working assumptions. The report containing the
Projections prepared by the appellant’s auditor states that the
information contained therein is based primarily on, inter alia,
assumptions from the management of KTP.20 The appellant informed the
court that the Projections are based on how KTP addressed them to the
auditor and that assumptions were made, but such assumptions were not
available to Flame or this court.
21 Thus, even if KTP’s affidavit was admitted, it would not have made a
difference in strengthening the Proposal. It would be far from probably having
an important influence on the result of the case, which is the second condition
of Ladd v Marshall. Given the disparity between the audited FS and the KTP
financial statement submitted in the court below, as well as the lack of
transparency on the assumptions underlying the Projections, it also does not
meet the condition of being apparently credible. For these reasons, after hearing
this application along with the appeal, I dismissed SUM 600 of 2021.
20 3rd Affidavit, Page 55.
13

Issues to be determined at the appeal
22 The appeal itself, RA 13 of 2021, proceeded on three planks of

arguments by the appellant:
(a) First, the AR did not consider the Proposal holistically, including
the following: 21
(i) KTP’s confirmation that the matters of the Proposal were

true and accurate, ie, confirmation that KTP will make the
proposed repayments under the Proposal.
(ii) The appellant’s suggestion that KTP will agree to be

bound to the appellant’s creditors (through an amended
Proposal) would give the creditors recourse against KTP.
(b) Second, the AR misunderstood the voluntary arrangement

process:22
(i) The appellant would not gain an unfair advantage if the

Proposal fails, as the creditors will revert to their original
position as against the appellant.
(ii) There was hence no need to consider the contractual

obligations and liabilities of KTP vis-à-vis the creditors, nor was
there a need to consider the creditor’s ease of enforcement
against KTP.
21 Applicant-Appellant’s Skeletal Submissions (“Appellant’s Skeletal Submissions”),

Page 15.
22 Appellant’s Skeletal Submissions, Page 16.
14

(c) Third, the AR inappropriately scrutinised the Proposal:23
(i) A proposal is by definition nascent and necessarily

incomplete. Any issues should be ironed out through the
voluntary arrangement process.
(ii) A broad assessment should have been applied. It was

inappropriate for the AR to have conducted close scrutiny of the
excerpts of KTP’s financial statements and concluded that the
forecasted revenues of KTP were unrealistic. The proper party to
scrutinise the details of a proposed voluntary arrangement is the
nominee, who is to conduct a study of the proposed voluntary
arrangement at a later juncture.
The relevant law
23 Before I address these issues, it would be useful to set out the relevant
law.
24 The voluntary arrangement scheme under Part 14 of the IRDA was

introduced by way of the Bankruptcy Act in 1995, which was modified from
the United Kingdom’s Insolvency Act 1986 (c 45) (“the UK Insolvency Act”).
The objective was to encourage debtors to settle their debts early so as to avoid
bankruptcy: see Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Official Report (25 August
1994), vol 63 at cols 401—402. As the court has aptly observed in Re Aathar
Ah Kong Andrew [2018] SGHC 124 at [53] (affirmed on appeal), a voluntary
arrangement enables a debtor to stave off multiple lawsuits by offering creditors
the assurance of an earlier satisfaction. A good voluntary arrangement benefits
23 Appellant’s Skeletal Submissions, Page 17.
15

all involved, obviating the longer process and higher costs of bankruptcy
administration.
25 Under s 276(1) IRDA, any insolvent debtor who intends to make a

proposal to the debtor’s creditors for a voluntary arrangement may apply to the
Court for an interim order. Section 279 IRDA sets out the conditions for an
interim order and states:
279.—(1) The Court must not make an interim order on an

application under section 276 unless it is satisfied that —
(a) the debtor intends to make a proposal for a voluntary
arrangement;
(b) no previous application for an interim order has been
made by or in respect of the debtor during the period of
12 months immediately before the date of the
application; and
(c) the nominee appointed by the debtor’s proposal is
qualified and willing to act in relation to the proposal.
(2) The Court may make an interim order if it thinks that it
would be appropriate to do so for the purpose of facilitating the
consideration and implementation of the debtor’s proposal.
26 Under s 279(1) IRDA, the court must not make an interim order, unless
it is satisfied that the gateway conditions therein are met.
27 Once the gateway conditions are satisfied, the court may make an
interim order under s 279(2) IRDA, if it thinks that it would be “appropriate to
do so for purpose of facilitating the consideration and implementation of the
debtor’s proposal”.
28 Section 279 IRDA is drawn from s 255 of UK Insolvency Act and is

materially the same. Section 255(1) and (2) of the UK Insolvency Act states:
16

255(1): The court shall not make an interim order on an

application under section 253 unless it is satisfied: -
(a) that the debtor intends to make a proposal under this
Part;
(b) that on the day of the making of the application the
debtor was an undischarged bankrupt or was able to
make a bankruptcy application;
(c) that no previous application has been made by the
debtor for an interim order in the period 12 months
ending with that day; and
(d) that the nominee under the debtor’s proposal is
willing to act in relation to the proposal.
(2) The court may make an order if it thinks that it would be
appropriate to do so for the purpose of facilitating the
consideration and implementation of the proposal.
29 Cases from the United Kingdom have provided useful guidance on what
would be “appropriate” when considering the making of an interim order. In
particular, it has been held that in determining “appropriateness”, the court will
consider whether the debtor’s proposal for voluntary arrangement is “serious
and viable”: see Cooper v Fearnley, re a debtor (No 103 of 1994) [1997] BPIR
20 (“Cooper v Fearnley”) at 21. In Hook v Jewson Ltd [1997] B.C.C. 752
(“Hook v Jewson”), which followed Cooper v Fearnley, it was held that:
… If, in a particular case, the judge before whom the

application for an interim order concludes that the proposal is
not one which can be described as serious and viable, it would
be expected that as a matter of discretion, the judge would
refuse to make an interim order. Judges must, I think, be
careful not to allow applications for interim orders simply to
become a means of postponing the making of bankruptcy
orders, in circumstances where there is no apparent likelihood
of benefit to the creditors from such a postponement.
30 In Hook v Jewson, the Vice-Chancellor (“V-C”) upheld the district

judge’s refusal to make an interim order to enable a proposal to be put to a
meeting under s 257 of the UK Insolvency Act 1986. In particular, the V-C
17

rejected the counsel’s argument that the court’s discretion to refuse an interim
order under s 255 of the UK Insolvency Act is limited. The V-C noted that
Section 255 of the UK Insolvency Act prevents the court from making an order
unless prescribed conditions are satisfied, but there is no indication of any
limitation on the court's discretion to refuse. On the facts, the V-C noted various
deficiencies with the proposal. To start with, it failed to comply with the
requirements under r 5.3 of the Insolvency Rules 1986 (UK) (SI 1986/1925)
(which is in pari materia with r 5(2)(a) of the Insolvency, Restructuring and
Dissolution (Voluntary Arrangements) Regulations 2020), as there was no
information about the applicant’s assets and which particular assets are to be
excluded from the voluntary arrangement. The V-C also found other serious
deficiencies with the proposal: the details of the applicant’s creditors were
inaccurate; the applicant proposed to repay part of his debts from litigations he
hoped to pursue, but there was no evidence on the substance of his legal claims.
Hence, the V-C found the proposal to be a “hopeless one” that was not fit to be
placed before creditors.
31 The UK courts have also held that in considering the making of the
interim order, the court will be conscious that one of the reasons for the
discretion is to filter out proposals that are not viable, so as to avoid unnecessary
and wasteful convening of creditors’ meetings. The court should not expose
creditors to the cost and expense of considering a proposal which has no real
prospect of being productive: see Fletcher v Vooght [2000] BPIR 435 and
Davidson v Stanley [2005] BPIR 279.
32 Our courts in Singapore have taken the same approach as the UK courts.
In Re Aathar Ah Kong Andrew [2019] 3 SLR 1242 (“Re Aathar Ah Kong
Andrew”) at [41], it was recognised that “the effect of an interim order is a
18

serious incursion into the rights of creditors to proceed against a debtor to

recover what is owed.” To avoid unnecessary delay and waste of expenses on
the part of creditors, Singapore courts would consider whether the debtor’s
proposal is “serious and viable” when determining if it is “appropriate” to make
the interim order for the purposes of s 279(2) IRDA: see Re Lim Wee Beng Eddie
[2001] SGHC 103 which followed Hook v Jewson.
33 In addition, it has been emphasised that the debtor’s plan must contain
sufficient details at the outset in order for the court to assess whether the
proposal is “serious and viable”. In Re Andrla, Dominic and another matter
[2019] SGHC 77 (“Re Andrla, Dominic”), the court stated at [25] and [27]:
[25] … in order to persuade the court that the proposal is, to

cite Re Lim Wee Beng Eddie, ‘serious and viable’, the appellant
must put up a plan that contains sufficient information on how
he is able to raise the funds set out in the proposal. He cannot
rely on hints and innuendo …
…
[27] … In order to enable the court to decide whether a proposal
is viable, sufficient details must be given at the outset in order to
prevent abuse … It is incumbent on this court to ensure that
applications for interim orders not be used to delay bankruptcy
proceedings by requiring such applications to be accompanied
by proposals that are serious and viable. If such a proposal is
not provided at the outset, a court should dismiss the application
…
[emphasis added]
34 Following this overview of the authorities in the UK and Singapore, let

me summarise the relevant principles in considering the making of an interim
order under s 279(2) IRDA:
19

(a) the effect of an interim order, which holds off all proceedings
against the debtor, is a serious incursion into the rights of creditors to
proceed against a debtor to recover what is owed.
(b) in considering the making of an interim order, the court will be

conscious that one of the reasons for the discretion is to filter out
proposals which are not serious and viable, so as to avoid the
unnecessary and wasteful convening of creditors’ meetings.
(c) In order for the court to decide whether a proposal is serious and
viable, the debtor’s plan must contain sufficient details at the outset.
(d) If the judge concludes, taking into account all the evidence
available, that the proposal is not one which can be described as serious
and viable, such as where there is no apparent likelihood of benefit to
the creditors, nor any real prospect of the proposal being productive, it
would be expected that as a matter of discretion, the judge would refuse
to make an interim order. Otherwise, an interim order would simply
become a means of postponing the making of bankruptcy orders.
Preliminary point on whether appellant is insolvent
35 Before I move on to address the substance of the appellant’s appeal, let

me address a preliminary point that arose in the course of the appeal.
36 One of the gateway conditions under s 276(1) IRDA is that the applicant
is insolvent. Flame initially contested the appellant’s assertion that he was
insolvent under the balance sheet test. Flame submitted that since the appellant
claimed to be able to direct two Indonesian companies that he controlled to
make repayments for his debt under the Proposal, the assets or value of these
20

two companies should be considered as part of the appellant’s assets. When the
appellant stated at the hearing that these two companies did not form part of the
debt servicing arrangement under the Proposal, Flame agreed not to contest the
appellant’s insolvency status. It was thus agreed by the parties, that the appellant
meets the gateway conditions under s 279(1) IRDA.
37 Let me now address the appellant’s three planks of appeal.
Whether the AR considered the Proposal holistically
38 The first plank of appeal is that the AR did not consider the Proposal
holistically. In this regard, the appellant refers to a letter dated 16 December
2020, where KTP stated that it had been provided with a copy of the appellant’s
first affidavit dated 26 October 2020 and that it had “reviewed the same and
confirm that the matters therein, insofar as they relates to PT Kapus Tunggal
Persada, are true and accurate”.24 The appellant also refers to his suggestion of
binding KTP to the creditors, as giving the creditors additional recourse against
KTP.
39 However, these matters were explicitly considered by the AR. KTP’s

letter dated 16 December 2020 was considered by the AR, who noted that this
letter referred to the appellant’s first affidavit filed on 26 October 2020.25 That
affidavit says that the funds for the repayment of the compromised total debt
under the Proposal will “come from the repayments from KTP in respect of
debts owed to” the appellant. This was different from the appellant’s
24 Second Affidavit of Sifan Triyono dated 21 December 2020 (“Triyono’s 2nd

Affidavit”), Page 51.
25 NE dated 6 January 2021, Page 43 at lines 11-14.
21

submissions at the hearing before the AR, that the intention was for KTP to go
beyond the SGD $1million that it owed to the appellant, to cover the debts under
the proposal of approximately SGD $2.7 million.
40 The AR then went on to observe that:26
(a) there was no evidence of an agreement on the part of KTP to

make payment beyond the SGD $1 million that KTP owed to the
appellant.
(b) Neither was there anything to suggest that KTP would be

amenable to being legally bound to make payment for the total debts
under the proposal.
(c) Even if KTP were bound, enforcement against KTP was

uncertain given that KTP is an Indonesian company.
41 The unsigned KTP’s affidavit from Mr Harwo in the third affidavit,

contained statements that addressed points (a) and (b) above. However, the
unsigned KTP’s affidavit did not address the critical point at (c). Even if KTP’s
affidavit was admitted, the uncertainty of enforcement against an Indonesian
company, which affects the viability of the Proposal, remains. When asked
about this, the counsel for the appellant replied that the assurance of KTP in
KTP’s affidavit does not help very much in addressing the problem of
enforcement against an Indonesian company that does not pay, and that the
Proposal would fail immediately if KTP does not pay. Instead, the assurance
was there to show the bona fides of the appellant.
26 NE dated 6 January 2021, Page 44.
22

42 Assessing the observations of the AR, I found that the AR did consider
the proposal holistically. The AR was right to be concerned about the problem
of enforcement against an Indonesian third party that is funding the entire
repayment, as this is crucial to the viability of the Proposal.
Whether the AR misunderstood the voluntary arrangement process
43 The appellant’s second plank of appeal is that the AR misunderstood the

voluntary arrangement process, as the appellant will not gain an unfair
advantage if KTP fails to pay under the proposal. Instead, the creditors will
revert to their original position as against the appellant. There is hence no need
to consider the contractual obligations and liabilities of KTP vis-à-vis the
creditors, nor a need to consider the creditors’ ease of enforcement against KTP.
44 This submission misunderstood the tension and balance underpinning

the granting of an interim order. The debtor who has a serious proposal to make
should be granted the opportunity to do so to satisfy his creditors and avert a
bankruptcy order. But an interim order, if granted, means that creditors who are
entitled to resort to a bankruptcy order to enforce their right to payment will
have their claims delayed. As the court in Re Aathar Ah Kong Andrew stated,
noted above at [32], “the effect of an interim order is a serious incursion into
the rights of creditors to proceed against a debtor to recover what is owed”, and
“a tight leash is kept right from the start”. Hence, as rightly noted by the court
in Re Dominic Andrla at [27], the court has to balance the interests of both sides,
by requiring a serious and viable proposal at the outset.
45 While the interim order allows for a standstill of 42 days, subject to

further extensions on the application of the nominee, that is not so small an
advantage that the court should, as submitted by the appellant, ignore basic
23

considerations such as whether a foreign third party funder is able and obligated
to make the repayments and the difficulties creditors may encounter in enforcing
such repayments. Where a proposal lacks such basic considerations and cannot
be said to be serious and viable, it is incumbent on the court to dismiss the
application for interim order so that the application is not used to delay
bankruptcy proceedings, thereby prejudicing the rights of creditors.
46 In my judgment, the AR had understood the nature of the interim order

in the voluntary arrangement process and was right in asking about the lack of
contractual obligations of KTP to the creditors and the difficulties of
enforcement against an Indonesian third party.
Whether the AR inappropriately scrutinised the proposal
47 The third plank of the appeal is that the AR inappropriately scrutinised

the Proposal. The appellant submits that a proposal is by definition, nascent and
necessarily incomplete. The appellant relies on Re IM Skaugen SE and other
matters [2019] 3 SLR 979 at [35], where the court adopted the test stated in Re
Conchubar Aromatics Ltd and other matters [2015] SGHC 322, in the context
of a moratorium application relating to a scheme of arrangement under the
Companies Act (Cap 50, 2006 Rev Ed) (“Companies Act”), that it is sufficient
for the court to “make a broad assessment that there was a reasonable prospect
of the scheme working and being acceptable to the general run of creditors.”
48 However, this test was in relation to proposing a scheme of arrangement

under the Companies Act, entailing different statutory provisions and schema.
While there may be similar considerations in granting a moratorium for a
scheme of arrangement, which may be analogised to the considerations in
granting an interim order for voluntary arrangement, no argument has been put
24

forth by the parties in this regard. Further, even in the context of granting a
moratorium under s 210(10) of the Companies Act, the court in Re Pacific
Andes Resources Development Ltd [2018] 5 SLR 125 (“Re Pacific Andes”) has
observed at [61] that there is nothing in the language of s 210(10) to restrict the
court’s power to grant the moratorium “subject to such terms as it deems fit”. I
note that this observation is similar to that made by the V-C in Hook v Jewson
with respect to the wording of s 255 of the UK Insolvency Act for the making
of an interim order. The scrutiny exercised by the court in granting a moratorium
enables the court to exercise a “close control over the restructuring process” to
strike a balance between the competing interests of the debtor and its creditors.
Even on “a broad assessment” basis, the court needs to be satisfied that “there
is a plan that has a reasonable prospect of working and being acceptable to the
general run of creditors” (Re Pacific Andes at [65]). Hence, even in the context
of granting a moratorium for corporate restructuring, the “broad assessment”
approach does not give the debtor a carte blanche to restructure its debts, with
no oversight from the court at all.
49 Moreover, even on the appellant’s submitted yardstick of “a broad

assessment”, it was undisputed by the parties that the court should look at the
financial statements that support a proposal. It is also undisputed by parties that
the relevant test of what is “appropriate” under s 279(2) IRDA is whether the
proposal is serious and viable. In the face of glaring data in the financial
statements, pointing to the current financial difficulties of a third party company
that is supposed to make future repayments, the court should ask how valid the
optimistic future revenue projections are, and whether the third party company
is indeed capable of funding the repayment to make the proposal a viable one.
25

50 The difficulties in the appellant’s Proposal do not arise from any

inappropriate scrutiny undertaken by the AR, but from questions that flow from
the inconsistencies apparent in the documents produced by the appellant,
questions which are relevant to whether the Proposal is viable, questions which
although raised earlier, continue to be left unanswered.
51 The Proposal is for KTP to pay the creditors approximately SGD $2.7
million between 2022 to 2026. However, the financial statement for KTP,
produced by the appellant, shows that:27
(a) KTP was operating at a net loss in 2018 and 2019, of USD
$12,209,523 and USD $ 5,799,952 respectively for these years.
(b) Net sales in 2018 were USD $942,614 in 2018 and USD$
587,452 in 2019. Cost of Sales was USD $9,906,333 in 2018 and USD
$6,055,885 in 2019. Revenue from sales thus appear to be only 10% of
the costs of sales, raising questions about the sustainability and
profitability of KTP.
(c) Finance costs amount to about USD $2.83 million each year, in
2018 and 2019, while the General and Administrative Expenses
amounted to USD $629,394 in 2018 and USD $771,678 in 2019.
52 The current pessimistic financial state of KTP in 2018 and 2019 stands
in stark contrast to the optimistic KTP revenue projections contained in the
Proposal, where KTP is projected to earn about USD $2.4 million of revenue in
2022, increasing yearly to reach revenues of USD $4.45 million in 2026.
27 Triyono’s 1st Affidavit, Page 429.
26

53 In light of such contrasting data between KTP’s financial statement for

2018—2019 and the projected revenues for 2022—2026, it is natural and indeed
correct, for the AR to examine if the projected revenue streams stated in the
Proposal are viable, as that fundamentally affects the viability of the entire
proposal. The AR’s inquiry touched on basic points:28
(a) One contract, with KBU, is entirely oral in nature. There is no

evidence on the contractual rate at which KBU would be charged for
using KTP’s haulage road, nor evidence of how much KBU is paying
KTP now, even though the Appellant informed the AR that KBU is
presently using and paying for KTP’s haulage road.
(b) Another contract, with BKJ, has not yet commenced and there is
also no evidence on how the contract terms translate into the project
revenue figures in the Proposal.
(c) The third contract, PT PN, will end in 2022. There was no
evidence of any agreement by the parties to extend the contract beyond
2022, which is the period in which the creditors are supposed to be
repaid under the Proposal.
54 These issues were flagged out in the hearing before the AR and by
Flame. As Flame pointed out, the appellant chose not to respond to clarify any
of these issues, but instead submitted that there should not be such scrutiny at
the point of seeking an interim order, and that such questions should be left to
the nominee to address at the next stage. But the legal requirement is for an
applicant to demonstrate to the court that his proposal is serious and viable at
28 NE dated 6 January 2021, Pages 45—46.
27

the outset, and the points raised, undeniably affect whether the Proposal is
serious and viable.
55 The questions above remain unanswered even if the third affidavit is

admitted.
(a) First, the reliability of the Projections in the third affidavit is

uncertain, since is the Projections are based on a set of financial
statements that show different figures from those submitted in the court
below.
(b) Second, questions about the poor financial health of KTP

remain. For example, in the audited FS, the total current liability for
2022 is still about USD $67 million. This is a significant amount of
negative equity, far outstripping the amounts that the appellant claims
KTP would be able to pay the creditors in the future. The appellant was
unable to explain why the significant negative equity of KTP would not
affect repayment.
(c) Third, the forecast is based on assumptions provided by KTP to

the auditors, assumptions that were not made available to either Flame
or this court.
Conclusion
56 In conclusion, the appellant has not shown that the Proposal is serious
and viable, even if the evidence in SUM 600 of 2021 is admitted. The current
dismal financial state of KTP calls into question its ability to make future
repayments. The lack of clarity about the contracts that underpin KTP’s ability
to make future payments, and the lack of transparency about how the financial
28

and operational costs would affect future revenue, affects the viability of the
proposed repayments. The uncertainty arising from enforcement against an
foreign third party raises another set of doubts, which remain unanswered.
57 For the reasons given above, I dismissed the appeal. I heard the parties
on costs and awarded Flame costs of $17,000 inclusive of disbursements, for
both RA 13 of 2021 and SUM 600 of 2021.
Kwek Mean Luck

Judicial Commissioner
Kyle Gabriel Peters and Feng Zhuo (PDLegal LLC) for the
Appellant;
Song Swee Lian Corina Mrs Corina Song Jeremiah, Liang Junhong
Daniel and Lim Wan Jen Melissa (Allen & Gledhill LLP) for Flame
S.A.
29

(2021) SGHC 55

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IN THE GENERAL DIVISION OF

THE HIGH COURT OF THE REPUBLIC OF SINGAPORE

Originating Summons (Bankruptcy) No 69 of 2020 (Registrar’s Appeal No 13

In the matter of Part 14 of the Insolvency Restructuring and Dissolution Act

[Insolvency Law] — [Bankruptcy] — [Interim Order]

[Civil Procedure] — [Appeals to High Court from court, tribunal or person] —

Version No 1: 11 Mar 2021 (15:43 hrs)

DECISION BELOW ........................................................................................4

APPLICATION TO ADDUCE FURTHER EVIDENCE ............................6

ISSUES TO BE DETERMINED AT THE APPEAL .................................14

THE RELEVANT LAW................................................................................15

WHETHER THE AR INAPPROPRIATELY SCRUTINISED THE PROPOSAL .............24

Version No 1: 11 Mar 2021 (15:43 hrs)

General Division of the High Court — Originating Summons (Bankruptcy) No

Kwek Mean Luck JC:

1 This, Registrar’s Appeal No 13 of 2021, is an appeal against the decision

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2 The appellant is an Indonesian businessman and a Singapore Permanent

3 While the appellant claims to have no knowledge of any bankruptcy

4 The appellant filed an application on 27 October 2020 for an interim

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(c) payment for the Compromised Total Debt of approximately

6 Triyono’s 1st Affidavit, Page 213 at [38].

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(a) First, it is unclear what is the legal basis of KTP’s payment to

10 Notes of Evidence (“NE”) dated 6 January 2021, Pages 42-46.

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(i) The amount that KTP would have available to make

(ii) In the Proposal, the appellant set out certain projected

(A) But out of these 3 contracts, one of the contracts,

(B) For the contract with PT Batubara Kalteng Jaya

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(C) For the contract with PT Pamapersada Nusantara

(iii) At the hearing, the AR asked the appellant if he would

Application to adduce further evidence

(a) First, an unsigned affidavit from Mr Harwo, the President

11 NE dated 6 January 2021, Page 4 at lns 25-28.

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(i) KTP’s confirmation that it would make available funds

(ii) a copy of KTP’s full audited financial statements

(iii) projections of KTP’s financial statements for the years

8 Although these documents were clearly directed at addressing the

13 3rd Affidavit at [5].

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10 I therefore asked parties to address me on SUM 600 of 2021 first, after

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evidence on appeal stated in Ladd v Marshall [1954] 1 WLR 1489 remain a

14 In my judgment, the AR was not wrong in offering to allow the appellant

15 NE dated 6 January 2021, Pages 40-41.

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15 I proceed to consider the conditions under Ladd v Marshall. In respect

16 The appellant compounded this by choosing not to have SUM 600 of

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of 2021 meets the first condition of Ladd v Marshall. In my judgment, the

19 In respect of being apparently credible, Flame contested the credibility

20 However, there were other fundamental difficulties.

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reality is that the assurance of Mr Harwo in KTP’s affidavit “does not

(b) Second, the Projections, as pointed out by Flame, are based on