BOSTON STUDIES IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

HERMENEUTIC
Editors PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE,
ROBERT S. COHEN, Boston University
nJRGEN RENN, Max-Planck-Institute for the History of Science VAN GOGH'S EYES,
KOSTAS GAVROGLU, University ofAthens
AND GOD
Editorial Advisory Board
Essays in Honor
THOMAS F. GLICK, Boston University of Patrick A. Heelan, S.J.
ADOLF GRUNBAUM, University of Pittsburgh
SYLVAN S. SCHWEBER, Brandeis University
JOHN J. STACHEL, Boston University
MARX W WARTOFSKYt, (Editor 1960-1997)
Ediied by
BABETTE E. BABICH
Fordham University, New York, N. Y, U.S.A.,
and Georgetown University, Washington D.C., U.S.A.

,
;1

.....
• • >

KLUWER ACADEMIC PUBLISHERS

VOLUME 225
" DORDRECHTI BOSTON I LONDON
A C.I.P. Catalogue recoid for this book is available from the Library of Congress.

ISBN 1-4020·0234.3

Published by Kluwer Academic Publishers,

P.O. Bo}!; 17,3300 AA Dordrecht, The Netherlands.

Sold and distributed in North, Central and South America

by Kluwer Academic Publishers,
lOJ Philip Drive, Norweii, MA 02061, U.S.A.

In all other countries, sold and distributed

by Kluwer Academic Publishers,
P.O. Bo}!; 322, 3300 AH Dordrechl, The Netherlands.

Printed on acid-free paper

All Rights Reserved

02002 Kluwer Academic Publishers
No part of the material protected by this copyright notice may be reproduced or
utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical,
inclUding photocopying, recording or by any infonnation storage and
retrieval system, without written pennission from the copyright owner.
Patrick A. Heelan, S.l., Universite Catholique de Louvain. 1964
Primect in the Netherlands.
 TABLE OF CONTENTS

Acknowledgments IX

PREFACE I "Patrick Heelan" by JEAN LADRIERE & MARC JAGER xi

lNTRODUCfION
BABETIE E. BABICH I The Fnrtunes nf Incnmmensurability: ThnughlStyles,
Paradigms, and Patrick A."Heelan's Hermeneutic of Science

HERMENEUTICS AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

SECTION SUMMARIES 19
STEPHEN TOULMIN I The Hermeneutics of the Natural Sciences 25
ROBERT P. CREASE I Experimental Life: Heelan on Quantum Mechanics 31
DIMITRI GINEV I The Henneneutic Context of Constitution 43
RAGNAR FJELLAND I The "Copenhagen Interpretation" of Quantum
Mechanics and Phenomenology 53
BABETIE E. BABICH I Sokal's Henneneutic Hoax: Physics and the New
Inquisition 67
ALLAN JANIK I Wittgenstein, Hertz, and Hermeneutics 79
JOSEPH J. KOCKELMANS I On the Interpretive Nature of Hertz's Mechanics 97
ROBERT C. SCHARFF I Comtc and the Possibility of a Henneneutics of
Science 117
THEODORE KISIEL I Was heiflt das - die Bewandtnis? Retranslating the
Categories of Heidegger's Hermeneutics of the Technical 127
THOMAS M. SEEBOHM JThe Hermeneutics of TexIS 137
RICHARD COBB-STEVENS I Husserlian Hermeneutics: Mathematics
and Theoria 153
JOHN J. CLEARY I Abstracting Aristotle's Philosophy of MaLhematics 163
WOLFE MAYS I Piagel and Husserl: On Theory and Praxis in Science 177
Patrick A. Heelan, S.J. TONY O'CONNOR I Human Agency and Lhe Social Sciences:
Photograph by Ursula Bemist From Contextual Phenomenology to Genealogy 187
JOHN J. COMPTON I Toward a Phenomenological Philosophy of Nature 195
, j JOHN ZIMAN I No Man is an Island 203
! ROM HARRE I Science as !he Work ofa Community 219

vii
 TABLE OF CONTENTS ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
TRUTIllN ART, VISUAL SPACE, AND TIlE PRAGMATIC
PHENOMENOLOGY OF PERCEPTION
SECTION SUMMARIES 231
IOSEPH MARGOLIS / Patrick Heelan's Interpretation of van Gogh's This collection was made possible in part by the institutional support generously provided by the
"Bedroom at Aries"
233 Graduate School of Georgetown University as part of the research project, Hermeneutic and
STEVEN CROWELL / Patrick Heelan's Innocent Eye 239 Phenomenological Approaches /0 the Philosophy a/Science, directed by Patrick A. Heelan, SJ.,
JACQUES TAMlNIAUX / Merleau-Ponty's Reading of Heidegger William A. Gaston Professor of Philosophy. I am grateful to Dominic Balestra, chair of the
251 Philosophy Department, together wit.h the Deans of Fordham University for a course reduction
BABETTE E. BABICH / Heidegger's Truth of Art and the Question of
from three courses to two in the Spring of2oo1 to ease some of the time demands involved with
Aesthetics 265 compiling, editing, and preparing the camera-ready copy for this volume. Joseph A. O'Hare, SJ.,
D. CYRIL BARRETT, S.I. / Phenomenology and 20th Century Artistic President of Fordham University, has warmest thanks for feting the Jesuit scholar and priest
Revolutions 279 celebrated by this Festschrift in May of2001 - and hence in advance of the official publication.
IRMA B. JAFFE I Virtue and Virtual Reality in John Trumbull's Pantheon Jean Ladriere's gracious consent to David B. Allison's translation of the encyclopredia entry
287 on "Heelan, Patrick" - first published in the Encyclopedie Phi/osophique Universelle, Ill, Les
LEO I. O'DONOVAN, SJ. / Getting at the Rapture of Seeing: Ellsworth Oeuvres Philosophiques, Dictionnaire, Tome 2: Philosophie occidentale: 1889-1990, pp. 3322-
Kelly and Visual Expe~jnc 299 3323 - as well as permision granted from the Presses Universitaires de France, is here gratefully
BARBARA SAUNDERS / Grammar(s) of Perception 305 acknowledged. Likewise, permissions from the Niels Bohr Archiv to reproduce the drawings in
JAY SCHULKfN I Cognitive Neuroscience of Social Sensibility Ragnar Fjelland, "The Copenhagen Interpretation" of Quantum Physics and Phenomenology
315 (Fig. 1) and from CERN (Fig. 2) (CERNfPIOIRA 77-4) are acknowledged with gratitude.
ROBERT CUMMINGS NEVILLE / Phenomenology and Pragmatism 323 Permissions from the United States Capitol Historical Society, Yale University Art Gallery, and
the National Gallery of Canada to reproduce John Trumbull's paintings in Irma B. Jaffe, Virtue
GOD: RELIGION AND SCIENCE and Virtual Reality in John Trumbull's Pantheon (Figs. 1-8) are gratefully acknowledged as is
permission from the Art Resource and the Metropolitan Museum of Art in New York. I also
SECTION SUMMARIES 337 acknowledge with gratitude permission granted to reproduce Van Gogh's paintings in Babette
WILLIAM J. RICHARDSON, SJ. / Psychoanalytic Praxis and the Truth E. Babich, Heidegger's Truth and the Question ofAesthetics (Fig. I and Fig. 3) from the Vincent
of Pain van Gogh Museum in Amsterdam as well as the Baltimore Art Museum (Fig. 2). I honor with
339
gratitude the contribution of the late Dr. Ursula Bemis, Buddhist nun, philosopher, and friend
RICHARD KEARNEY / Poetics of a Possihle God - Faith or Philosophy? . 351 to Patrick A. Heelan and to the editor, who took the frontispiece photograph (p. v).
THOMAS NICKLES & GAYE MCCOLLUM-NICKLES / James on Book collections are not only comprised of the essays included but are also .conjoined with
Bootstraps, Evolution, and Life 361 an invisible but important domain of omissions - declined invitations and parallel or alternate
DOMINIC BALESTRA / In-Between Science and Religion collections that might have been but for incidental exclusions and the compiler's oversight. I
377
express my deep thanks to those who, for a variety of reasons, were unable to accept the
GARRETT BARDEN / Thinking the Philosophy of Religion 385 invitation to contribute to this collection. Their humane, kind, and creative responses to my
THOMAS J. J. ALTlZER / Van Gogh's Eyes 393 queries cheered me in the task and reminded me of the project's broader value as a research
STEVE FULLER I A Catholic Stance Toward Scientific Inquiry for the resource, just as Ivan lIlich, who himself shares the same Jahrgang with Patrick, took care to
21st Century emphasize the importance of Heelan's work for his own thought in recent years. I note too, and
403 always with special gratitude, Alasdair MacIntyre, and I note the kind words of others such as
HEIDI BYRNES I The Dialogism of Meaning, The Discursive Embeddedness Gerd Buchdahl, Peter Caws, Bas van Fraassen, Ronald Giere, Friedrich Rapp, and Elisabeth
of Knowledge, The Colloquy of Being 411 StrClker. I owe·a special tribute to Robert S. Cohen for his important support of this project in its
W. NORRIS CLARKE, SJ. / The Creative Imagination 423 early stages. I acknowledge the contributions offered by Evandro Agazzi, Adolf Griinbaum,
Jean Salanskis, and Carl Friedrich von Weizs!!.cker which, solely for technical reasons, could not
ERNEST G. McCLAIN I A Priestly View of Bible Arithmetic: Deity's
be included in the final volume. Many others expressed a kind of happy dismay d'escalier and
Regulative Aesthetic Activity within Davidic Musicology 429 I regret my fault if I failed to include those who might have been included if another editor, or
PATRICKA. HEELAN, SJ. / Afterword 445 better editorial perspective, had prevailed.
Heidi Byrnes deserves all praise for her extraordinary labors which yielded a second and
very valued copy-editing of the volume.
BIBLIOGRAPHY: PATRICKA. HEELAN 461 I express my own and deepest personal thanks to David B. Allison, Richard Cobb-Stevens,
Notes on Contributors. 469 and William 1. Richardson, SJ .. And for being the kind of human being and scholar around
Index 477 whom a book of essays can come to such a philosophically diverse and wonderful constellation,
; I am grateful to Patrick A. Heelan, S.J.

viii " ix
 RAGNAR FJELLAND

THE "COPENHAGEN INTERPRETATION"

OF QUANTUM MECHANICS AND
PHENOMENOLOGY

INTRODUCTION: THE "SCIENCE WARS"

The conflict that has come to be known as the "Science Wars" started when the
biologist, Paul R. Gross, and the mathematician, Norman Levitt, published the book,
Higher Sliperstilion: The Academic Left and Its QlIarreis with Science. The book was
a fierce attack on certain quarters within the history of science, philosophy of science
and sociology of science - such as existentialism, phenomenology, postmodemism,
feminism, multiculturalism and so on. The next year, 1995, the book was followed up
with a conference in New York given by the New York Academy of Sciences titled The
Flight from Sciellce and Reason. The conflict gained momentum when the physicist
Alan Sakal published the article "Transgressing the Boundaries: Towards a
Transformative Hermeneutics of Quantum Gravity" in the journal for cultural studies,
Social Text. Soon after the article was published, Sokal revealed that the entire thing
had been a hoax. He had intentionally written an article that contained a lot of
nonsense, however it was written using fashionably correct tenninology with references
to a range of "postrnodern" thinkers. The hoax gained worldwide publicity, and many
of the participants in the debate have claimed that this debate shows that C.P. Snow's
"two cultures" still exist.!
Yet the fronts in this debate do not coinci-de with Snow's "two cultures" right off.
The two camps are not divided between the humanities/social sciences on the one side
and the natural sciences/technology on the other. The majority of the contributors to
Tile Flight from Sciellce and Reason 'were humanists and social scientists. Among these
were a well-known philosopher of science (Mario Bunge) and a well-known historian
of science (Gerard Holton). At the outset, therefore, the issues raised apply to different
academic disciplines. Alleged irrational tendencies in the natural sciences were also
attacked. That lIya Prigogine would be criticized could be expected. But it has not been
generally recognized that Niels Bohr and Werner Heisenberg were attacked from the
very beginning. Indeed, Higher Sliperstition has an article attacking Bohr and
Heisenberg, accusing them of advocating irrationalism and subjectivism'

53

B. E. Babich (ed.), Hermenewic Philosophy ofScience, Van Gogh's Eyes, and God:
Essays in Honor ofPatrick A. Heelan. 8.J., 53--65.
lC 2002 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed i" the Netherlands.
54 RAGNAR FJELLAND QUANTUM MECHANlCS AND PHENOMENOLOGY 55

The stumbling block is what is known as the "Copenhagen interpretation of un"certainty relations, according to which the product of the uncertainties in two (non-
quantum mechanics," The name al1udes to the central role played,by Bohr and his commuting) entities must necessarily exceed a given constant. This can be written
institute in Copenhagen in the development of the interpretation. However, it was early ll.X • 6p ~ h/4n

accepted by the majority of physicists, and in ordinary discourse the "Copenhagen For example, x can denote the position of a particle, and p its linear momentum. AX is
interpretation of quantum mechanics" is synonymous with "quantum mechanics." then the uncertainty in the determination of the position, and bp is the uncertainty in the
One example is the article by Mara Beller, professor of history and philosophy of determination of the momentum of the same particle. h is Planck's constant. The
science at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem: "At Whom are We Laughing?" Its main implications are radical. For example, if we know the position of a particle exactly, its
thesis is that Sakal's hoax applies to the founders of quantum mechanics as much as momentum is totally unknown, and if we know the momentum exactly, its position is
it applies to the "postmodem" milieus that Sakal wanted to ridicule.) The irony is that totally unknown.
the attacks on Bohr and Heisenberg indirectly constitute an assault on what may be However, this relation may be interpreted in different ways. One might argue that
regarded as the very foundation of modem physics. the particle has a well-defined position and momentum, but our knowledge of these
In this article I shaIllry to show that the attack 00 (the Copenhagen intepretation of) magnitudes is limited. This is the hidden variable interpretation of quantum mechanics.
quantum mechanics in the SciencC<,. Wars is no accident, and that quantum mechanics We shall later see that among others Albert Einstein maintained this view. However,
and phenomenology have more in·common than being attacked in the Science Wars. according to the Copenhagen interpretation, we cannot ascribe physical reality to
magnitUdes that are not measured. Heisenberg put it this way:
When one wants to clarify the meaning of the words "the position of an object," for example an
A SHORT HISTORY OF QUANTUM MECHANICS electron (relative to a given frame of reference), one has 10 specify certain experiments with which
one can measure the "position of the electron": if this is not the case, the words have IlQ meaning.'
It is no·..... one hundred years since Max Planck hesita.l1~y introduced ihe noiion of the
quantum, as an attempt to solve a specific problem in physics concerning so-called EINSTEIN: QUANTUM MECHANICS IS INCOMPLETE
black-body radiation. The next step was taken by Albert Einstein in 1905. He was able
to explain a hitherto unexplained phenomenon related to the photoelectric effect by Although the Copenhag~. interpretation was quickly accepted by the majority of
assuming that light can only transfer energy in specific quantities, so-called light quanta physicists, there were som~ famous dissidents. They count Einstein, Schrodinger, and
or photons. III 1913, Bohr proposed his model of the hydrogen atom, which implies that Sohm, to name a few. In a paper from 1935, "Can Quantum-Mechanical Description
electrons in an atom can only circle the nucleus in certain orbits, and that a light of Physical Reality be Considered Complete?" Einstein and his co-authors Podolsky
quantum is absorbed or emitted when the electron jumps from one orbit to another. and Rosen challenged the Copenhagen interpretation. Because this article set the stage
This was in accord with Einstein's photon hypothesis. In 1924, Louis de Broglie for all subsequent debates on the interpretation of quantum mechanics, I outline the
assumed that matter, for example electrons, may be regarded as waves. But this main arguments of the article.
assumption implied a paradox. Light, which was previously regarded as waves, Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen start with two criteria which any acceptable theory
revealed properties which could only be explained by assuming that it consisted of must satisfy: I) It must be correct and 2) it must be complete. The first criterion was
particles. Matter, which was regarded as being made up of particles, revealed properties not a problem, because quantum mechanics was in tn~merga with known observations
that could only be explained by assuming that the alleged particles behaved as waves. at the time. Therefore, the paper discusses the second criterion exclusively, the question
But can something be both a wave and a particle at the same time? if quantum mechanics may be regarded as a complete theory. Completeness is defined
Bohr early recognized that quantum mechanics was incompatible with some of the as the requirement that "every clement of the physical reality must have a counterpart
basic assumptions in classical physics, assumptions that had been taken for granted in the physical theory (condition of completeness)." But the term "physical reality"
since Galileo and Descartes. One assumption was that a complete description of the which appears in the definition cannot be taken for granted. The authors do not attempt
world in the final outcome had to be deterministic. Another was that objectivity means to give a complete 'definition of reality, but give the following criterion, which is
describing reality as it is independently of man. According to Bohr and his pupil crucial in the later discussion:
Heisenberg· it is impossible to maintain this notion of objectivity. The observer has to If. without in any way disturbing a system, we can predict with certainty (i.e. with probability
equal to unity) the value or a physical quantity, then there exists an element of physical reality
be taken into consideration, and they emphasized that in quantum mechanics it is corresponding to this physical quantity (criterion of physical reality].l
impossible to maintain an absolute separation between the knowing subject and the The first deals with the observation of a single particle. According to Heisenberg's
object of knowledge. In Heisenberg's words: uncertainty principle, in the case that the position is exactly known, the momentum is
...the traditional requirement of science ...permits a division of the world into subject and object
(observer and observed)...This assumption is not permissible in atomic physics; the interaction completely unknown. According to the criterion of physical reality the momentum has
between observer and object causes uncontrollable large changes in the system being observed, no physical reality because it cannot be predicted at all. In this case one may argue that
because of the discontinuous changes characteristic of the atomic processes.' this is due 10 the inevitable disturbance of the system in carrying out measurements. So
Therefore, in observing a property, for example, the position of an electron, a far it looks plausible. However, when Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen extend the
disturbance of the object is unavoidable. In 1927 Heisenberg formulated his famous example to two particles, an apparent paradox arises. I shall give a simplified version
56 RAGNAR FJELLAND QUANTUM MECHAN1CS AND PHENOMENOLOGY 57

of the example, leaving out all technicalities, but retaining the essential features. [n the orie unseparable system. Bohr therefore chases the second of Einstein, Podolsky, and
thought experiment two particles have interacted so that we know that they have Rosen's alternatives: violation of Einstein locality (non-locality or quantum entangle-
correlated properties. The properties used by Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen are position ment).
and momentum of each particle. After the interaction the two particles fly off in Bohr rejected Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen's definition of physical reality. His
different directions. They do not interact any more, and may therefore be regarded as own alternative goes like this: "In objective description, it is indeed more appropriate
two separate systems. to use the word phenomenon only to refer to observations obtained under specified
Let us call the two particles I and IT respectively. and we carry out measurements circumstances, including an account of the whole experimental arrangement."IO
on particle I. Because the two particles are correlated, we can infer from particle I to It is worth noticing that whereas Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen's definition of
particle II. We have then two possibilities: 1) We can either measure the position of physical reality is basically the same as Galileo's and Descartes', Bohr's definition is
particle I, and infer the position of particle II, or 2) we can measure the momentum of m0l:e in accordance with the notion of objectivity held by a working scientist. The basic
particle I, and infer the momentum of particle II. According to Einstein, Podolsky, and requirement in experimental science is the reproduceabililty of an experiment by fellow
Rosen, the paradox arises in the following way: On particle I we either measure the scientists. However, this is only feasible when an adequate description of the
position or the momentum. Whetrone of them is measured, the other is excluded. This experimental setting is provided.
follows directly from Heisenberg's uncertainty relations and can be explained by the The controversy between Bohr and Einstein concerned the philosophical
inevitable disturbance involved in the measuring process. We should keep in mind that iflterpretation of quantum mechanics, and not its empirical validity. On the contrary,
according to the Copenhagen interpretation the unknown property has no physical it looked as if the two interpretations would always yield the same predictions.
reality, and this applies to particle II as well as to particle I. Therefore, in case I) the Howeve(, in 1964, John Bell formulated the relations that have later been known as the
position of particle n has no physical reality, and in case 2) the momentum of particle "B~l inequalities." If Einstein, Podolsl...y and Rosen's interpretation of quanlum
II has no physical reality. But according to Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen, particle II mechanics was correct, the inequalities would not be violated, but if the Copenhagen
is a different system, separated from particle I. In observing particle I, particle n has interpretation was correct, they would in some situations be violated. Therefore, it
not been affected. They therefore ask the question: How is it possible that what we looked as if the controversy could be settled through experiments. The first experiments
observe on particle I, may determine which property of particle II hafphysical reality? were carried out in 1972; and later a series of experiments have been carried out, the
Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen propose two possible alternatives: The first most famous being the "Aspect experiments." With a few exceptions they have all
alternative is that the magnitudes do not have physical reality when they are not violated the Bell inequalities and supported the Copenhagen interpretation. However,
observed·. According to their view this implies that the event that particle I is observed needless to say, the experimental results have not ended the controversy.ll
is transmitted to particle II with a velocity that exceeds the velocity of light. According
to the special theory of relativity signals cannot be transmitted faster than the velocity . IS THE COPENHAGEN INTERPRETATION POSITIVIST?
of light ("Einstein locality"). Therefore, this alternative violates Einstein locality, and
Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen exclude this possibility. (Einstein later called this Bohr's and Heisenberg's position is sometimes regarded as positivist or instrumentalist.
alternative "spooky action at a distance"). According to the second alternative there are Like Emst Mach they allegedly regarded physical magnitudes as nothing but theoretical
elements of physical reality (in case 1 the momentum of particle II and in case 2 the constructions. There are reasons for maintaining iliat at least Heisenberg was
position of particle II) which are not represented in the theory. They conclude that the influenced by Mach, and if we look at the quotation from Heisenberg cited above, this
theory is incomplete. allegation has some plausibility. There are also quotations from Bohr that have a
In an article with the same title as Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen's article, Bohr positivist flavour. One example is the following: "There is no quantum world. There
answered the criticism, and argued that quantum mechanics is indeed complete. He is only an abstract quantum description. It is a mistake to think that it is the task of
makes two main points. The first is that the expression "without in any way disturbing physics to find how nature is. Physics is about what we can say about nature. "12
the system," in the criterion of physical reality is inadequate. Any description of But nevertheless it is a misunderstanding to regard the Copenhagen interpretation
physical reality must include the measuring instroments required to observe this reality. of quantum mechanics as positivism. The root of this misunderstanding is the simple
Bohr gives a detailed analysis of measurements of the position and momentum of a dichotomy used in much of the literature addressing this question. It is inferred that
particle. The conclusion of these considerations reflects "even at this stage" Bohr was a positivist by using the following argument: Einstein was a realist and there
there is essentially the question of an influence on the very conditions which define the possible was a fundamental disagreement between Bohr and Einstein. Therefore, Bohr was a
types ofpredictions regarding the future behavior ofthe system. Since these conditions constitute positivist. In this context, "realism" means Einstein's realism. But Einstein's realism
an inherent element of the description of any phenomenon to which the tenn "physical reality" can
be properly attached. we see that the argumentation of the mentioned authors does notjuslify their
is not the only realist alternative. We remember that according to realism, scientific
conclusion that quantum-mechanical description is essentially incomplete.' objectivity describes physical reality independently of man. This is essentially the
Bohr's second point is that the two particles in the thought experiment cannot be realism of Galileo and Descartes. Bohr doubtless did not accept such a naive realism.
separated into two systems. Even if the two particles are travelling in opposite But this does not make him a positivist. 13 To avoid this fallacy requires distinctions
directions with the speed of light, they are from a quantum mechanical point of view other than the realist! instrumentalist dichotomy. I shall not discuss realism. But I shall
58 RAGNAR FJELLAND QUANTUM MECHANICS AND PHENOMENOLOGY 59

try to show that tbere are interesting parallels between Bohr"s philosophy and No wonder Ihat the Aristotelian felt himsclfastonished and bewildered by this amazing attempt
to explain the real by the impossible - or, which is the same thing, to explain real being by
phenomenology (in particular the later Edmund Husserl), and that the Copenhagen
mathematical being, because, as I have mentioned already, these bodies moving in straight lines
interpretation of quantum mechanics is much closer to phenomenology than to in infinite empty space arc not real bodies moving in real space, but mathematical bodies moving
positivism. in mathematical space. 20
Koyre was a historian of science. But Husserl regarded history as a key to the present,
THE REJECTION OF "OBJECTIVISM" thus his project may be regarded as a "rational reconstruction" ofGalileo's science, and
of modem science in general. His basic idea is that the fundamental misunderstanding
The primary source ofHusserl's later philosophy is the (partly unfinished) manuscripts of modern science is that one has forgotten that even the most theoretical sciences are
that were later published as Die Krisis der europiiisclren Wissellschaften und grounded in the life-world. In Husserl's words:
transzendelllale Phiinomeno!ogie, mainly written around 1935. 14 As the title indicates, Briefly reminding ourselves of our earlier discussions, let us recall the faci we have emphasized,
Husser! was concerned with what he regarded as a deep crisis in modern science. In namely, that science is a human spiritual accomplishment which presupposes as its point of
spite of tremendous success, the crisis was rooted in a lack of understanding of modem departure, both historically and for each new student, the intuitive surrounding world of life,
pregiven as existing for all in common. FurthemlOre, it is an accomplishment which, in being
science, and he traces this lack of understanding back to Galileo Galilei and the birth ~racti ed and carried forward, continues to presuppose this surrounding world as it is given in its
of modern science. particularity to the scientist. For example, for the physicist it is the world in which he sees his
Husserl's Galileo is different from the traditional view ofGalileo using a telescope measuring instruments, hears timebeats, estimates visible magnitudes, etc. - the world in which,
to observe the moons of Jupiter. Husserl emphasizes the importance of measurement furthermore, he knows himself to be included wilh all his activity and all his theoretical ideas. ll
and the uses of mathematics in Galileo's science. According to Husserl there is nothing Husserl does not mention quantum mechanics, but he makes explicit reference to
wrong with making measurements the basis of science. The problem is that Galileo the theory of relativity. According to Husserl, the theory of relativity relies on
took the mathematizability of nature more or less for granted, and he had no reason for Michelson's experiment '(usually known as the Michelson-Morley experiment),
asking for the very meaning of this mathematization. Therefore, he was "at once a including his apparatus with scales of measurement, etc.n Although the reference to the
discoverer and a concealing genius."u Michelson-Morley experiment is historically erroneous,21 his main point is correct:
Husserl was not the only one to maintain this view. The view of Galileo as a good measuring instruments ar~ ~xplic t y referred to in the (special) theory of relativity.
empiricist was modified in the 1930's, and different authors pointed to the "Platonist" Bohr's position is similar to Husserl's, although to my knowledge none of them
elements of his philosophy of science. One of the first was the french historian of ever referred to each other. Bohr never tired of emphasizing that physics is a human
science Alexandre Koyre: 6 According to Koyre, modern science is characterised by accomplishment, and presupposes skill and ordinary language. The human agent cannot
two changes, which are intimately related: the geometrization of space and what he be abstracted away from the results of science. Therefore, objectivity in science is not
calls "dissolution of the Cosmos." By the second phrase Koyre means the substitution depicting a world independently of man. According to Bohr, it is impossible to
of an abstract Euclidean space for the orderly Cosmos of pre-Galilean physics. As maintain such an ideal of objectivity. Objectivity must rather be understood as
geometrization is the most fundamental of these two, the very essence of modem intersrJbjectivity.24 In a letter to the Danish author H. P. E. Hansen, Bohr writes: "In
science, according to Koyr.¢, is geometrization. Hence"... the precursor and inspirer of physics we learn [...) time and again that our task is not to penetrate into the essence of
classical physics was not B\.aridan or Nicole Oresme but Archimedes,.. '7 things, the meaning of which we don't know anyway, b4t rather to develop concepts
Thus we can draw a line from Plato via Archimedes and to Galileo. Galileo which allow us to talk in a productive way about phenomena in nature.'m
developed an "abstract" physics, in which the laws of motion, the law of freely falling Attention has often focussed on Bohr's emphasis on ordinary language as a
bodies, are deduced "abstractly" without involving the idea of force, and without precondition for the language of physics, and one draws a parallel to Wittgenstein's
recourse to experiments with real bodies, The "experiments" that Galileo appealed to, later philosophy. However, it can be argued that Wittgenstein's later philosophy entails
even those which he did actually perfonn, were not any more than thought experi- a relativism: language is an integrated part of a-lifestyle, and one lifestyle is as good as
I'
ments, These are the only kind that could be perfonned on the objects of his physics, another. There is no yardstick to measure and compare them. However, in Bohr there
because the objects ofGalileo's physics were not real, but ideal bodies. Real, material is no trace of this kind of relativism. In the next section I shall try to show why.
bodies cannot be introduced into the unreal space of geometry. According to Koyre,
Aristotle understood this perfectly well. But he had not understood that one can AN ALTERNATIVE ACCOUNT OF SCIENTIFIC OBJECTIVITY
postulate abstract bodies, as had been recognised by Plato, and as had been done by the
Platonist Archimedes. There was, however, one important difference. Plato and We have seen that both Bohr and Husserl pointed to the importance of technology, in
particular instruments, in science. Bohr, for example, emphasized the indispensability
Archimedes could not think of setting these abstract bodies in motion. This was first
of "rigid, stable bodies like measuring rods, pointers, clocks, plates etc." in making
carried out by Galileo. 19
At another locus where Koyre describes the disagreement between Galileo and his observations.'26 However, according to Bohr, the measuring instruments must be
described in the language of classical physics. One might think that it is quite the
Aristotelian, opponents, he places an even stronger emphasis on the Platonist aspect of
Galileo's science: opposite, that quantum mechanics is a precondition for classical physics, because
quantum mechanics describes the world at a more fundamental level than classical
60 RAGNAR FJELLAND QUANTUM MECHANICS AND PHENOMENOLOGY 61

physics. Fonnally clas i~ l physics is a limiting case of quantum mechanics, when we Figure 2 gives an illustration of an accelerator. The basic Euclidean forms, straight
operate at a scale where Heisenberg's uncertainty relation is insignificant. Nevertheless, line, circle and right angle. are evident. Giere points to the fact that geometrical aspects
Bohr argued that classical physics - in a certain sense - is a precondition for quantum also appear in formal and informal presentations in particle physics. He seeks part of
mechanics. His argument is that the measuring instruments must obey the laws of the explanation for this in cognitive patterns in our brains, making us predisposed to
classical physics in order to function as measuring instruments. This is one of the more Euclidean geometry. He refers to experiments with rats which allegedly demonstrate
difficult points of Bohr's theory, and one of the most important. that rats are also predisposed to Euclidean geometry. However, although I certainly
agree with Giere when he points to the significance of Euclidean geometry, I disagree
with his explanation of its significance. I think he is wrong in indicating that our
perceived world is Euclidean. Heelan has shown convincingly that the structure of
perceived space is not Euclidean. 1'The history of geometry supports this view. For
example, Greek geometry was not a theory of (the structure of) space. The two relevant
Greek words are "topos" and "chora." Neither of these words should be translated as
"space," and especially not as "Euclidean space." I think Martin Heidegger is right
when he asserts that the Greeks had neither a word nor a concept for what We call
"space."n What Comford says of Plato's use of the word "chora" could be said of the
Greek use of that word in general:
Chora is used of the post, station, office, 'place' thai is filled, nOI vacant space... 'Place' would,
indeed, be a less misleading translation of chora than 'space', because 'place' does not suggest an
Figure la. Figure lb. Infinite extent of vacancy lying beyond the finite sphere of the universe. lO
Measuring instruments constructed by Bohr for use in the thought experiments discussed with Einstein. Aristotle's theory of the universe as a system of "natural places" is very well in
I will go one step further, and emphasize the importance of Euclidean geometry in agreement with this.view. The natural place of a thing cannot be determined by, say.
the construction and operation of scientific instruments. Therefore, as Husserl argued, three values in a cordi.n~te system. To be in a natural place means to be part of a
a proper understanding of Euclidean geometry is the key to understanding the whole. I think it is a good analogy to the Greek conception of place to say that a thing
mathematical sciences. This view is supported by Bohr's own illustrations (Figures 1a is in its natural place in the same way as an organ is in its natural place in the organism.
and 1band 2). The instrument consists of a diaphragm with a slit suspended by weak Indeed, the Greek way of thinking was highly organic. This applied both to their
springs from a solid yoke bolted to the support. It is important to recognize that the thinking about society, nature and the universe.
bolts and the springs in Bohr's illustrations are not just ornamental. They are there to In "The Origin of Geometry,")] Husserl sets out to trace the origin of Euclidean
show which parts of the instruments are rigidly connected, and which parts are geometry. He reconstructs the origin of geometry roughly as follows: The world
moveable. Even more striking are the basic Euclidean forms of the instruments. The consists of material bodies, with different shapes and "material" qualities (color,
bolts and the springs can be replaced by technically more sophisticated devices, but in warmth, weight, hardness and so on). For technical praxis some particular shapes were
the last resort we need rigid bodies to carry out measurements. preferred. These are partly selected, partly produced and improved according to cert.ain
The philosopher of science Ronald Giere reports how surprised he was when he directions of gradualness. Husser! describes how special fonus are singled out: surfaces
noticed that the geometrical forms of a cyclotron facility were clearly visible in aerial according to if they are more or less smooth. more or less perfect. Edges according to
photographs." if they are more or less rough or even, for example more or less pure lines, angles,
more or less perfect points. Among surfaces, even surfaces are preferred and among
lines, straight lines are preferred, and so on. As-technology makes progress, there is an
increasing interest in what is technically more refined. The ideal of perfection is pushed
further and further. So there is always an open horizon of conceivable improvements
to be further pursued.
The ideal shapes of EuClidean geometry, like straight lines and planes, grew out of
the praxis of technical perfecting. Husserl called them limit-shapes [Limesgestalten].
These can be regarded as the ideal limit that the process of perfection is approaching.
When these ideal shapes are made our objects of investigation, when we are engaged
in determining them and in constructing new shapes out of those already determined,
we are "geometers." Therefore" the ideal geometrical figures are produced by the
"method of idealization."
Figure 2. The CERN proIon syncrotron from 1967. Patrick Heelan objects that Husserl makes an unwarranted assumption: we cannot
in general assume that "the sequence of particulars-and the technologies necessary to
62 RAGNAR FJELLAND QUANTUM MECHANICS AND PHENOMENOLOGY 63

produce or recognize them - is infinitely perfectible. ,,)2 On the contrary, the practising incompetent or his tools are bad, the measurements wi1l be poor as well. But how can
experimental scientist knows that there is no such ideal limit: "Experience with we decide if an instrument, for instance a watch. is a good one? Regarded as a physical
experimental processes indicates that for every kind of measurement process, there is object it can neither be good nor bad. But regarded as a tool its quality can be assessed,
an optimal level of precision beyond which the validity of background assumptions and it is assessed in relation to the function it was constructed to perform.
fail." I thirik Heelan is right. Husserl's background from pure mathematics and his One of the explicit aims ofHusserl's Crisis was to demonstrate that a "scientific"
focus on an axiomatic ideal of mathematics and scientific theories prevented him from psychology cannot be constructed after the ideal of physics. "The world of physics" is
being fully aware of the preconditions of scientific practice. However, he was aware grounded in the life-world, and constructed by idealization, as indicated previously.
of some of the preconditions of measurements, for example in the following quotation: "The world of psychology" is rather the life-world. Therefore, Husserl's program for
This purpose [of producing objectivity] is obviously served by the art of measuring. This art psychology was contrary to the "unity of science" movement of the logical positivists.
involves a great deal, of which the actual measuring is only the concluding part. On the one hand,
His program was rather the "disunity of science." Bohr maintained a similar view. His
for the bodily shapes of rivers, mountains, buildings, etc., which as a rule lack strictly detennining
concepts and names, it must create such concepts - first for their "fonns" (in tenns of pictured alternative to reductionism in both biology and psychology was the notion of
similarity).)) complementarity. He first used the term complementarity in 1927 in the disc~on of
It is interesting to notice that Husserl mentions rivers and mountains. That the the particle/wave dualism in quantum mechanics: The particle and wave pictures
problems involved in measuring this kind of object are far from trivial has later been display complementary, mutually excluding aspects of matter. Bohr later extended the
demonstrated by the mathematician Benoit Mandelbrot. He asked what might look like notion of complementarity to biology and psychology. For example, free will and
a trivial question: How long is a coastline? He had observed that when he asked how determinism are examples of complementary phenomena.
long the coast of for example Britain is, he always got one of two answers: "] don't However, although free will and causal explanation of human actions represent
know, it is not my field," or "I don't know, but I will look it up in an encyclopaedia." comp,lementary aspects, they are not on the same par. In tl-Je same way as Husser!
In both cases it is assumed that the question has an unambiguous answer. But it is not a
argued for the primacy of the life-world vis vis (for example) the world of physics,
that easy, and Mandelbrot used the coast of Britain to illustrate the difficulties involved. the notions of free will and oflife are prior to notions like determinism and control. The
A coastline is an example of an object where the ideal limit does not exist. It is a fractal following quotation on the irreducibility of the phenomenon oflife supports this view:)j
curve. and strictly speaking it is infinitely long.).t [W]e must keep in minet;-however, that the conditions holding for biological and physical
researches are not directly comp3l1!lble, since the necessity of keeping the object alive imposes a
restriction on the fonner, which finds no counterpan in the laner. Thus we should doubtlessly kill
ANTI-REDUCTIONISM an animal if we tried to cany the investigation of its organs so far that we could describe the/nile
played by single atoms in vital functions. In every experiment on living organisms, there must
remain an uncertainty as regards the physical conditions to which they are subjected, and the idea
It is one of the main insights of Husserl's Crisis that almost all philosophers since
suggests itself that the minimal freedom we must allow the organism in this respect is just large
Descartes have taken a scientific world view as their starting point. In contrast to this enough to pennit it, so to say, to hide its ultimate secrets from us. On this view, the existence of
the slogan of phenomenology was: "Zur Sache selbst." I think that an even better life must in biology be considered as an elementary fact that cannot be explained, but must be
characterization of Hu~serl's later philosophy would be the slogan: "Back to the Iife- taken as a starting point in biology, in similar way as the quantum of action, which appears as an
world!" irrational element from the point of view of classical mechanical physics, taken together with the
existence of the elementary particles, fonns the foundation of atomic physics. The asserted
The most important difference between the life-world and the world of physics is impossibility of a physical or chemical explanation of the function peculiar to life would in this
that the former has meaning, whereas the latter does not. This fundamental aspect of sense be analogous to the insufficience of the mechanical analysis for the understanding of the
the life-world may be illuminated by Heidegger's analysis of the concept of a thing in stability of the atoms.)(
Sein und Zeit. Heidegger starts by asking: Is it not an obvious starting point to claim
that the world consists of things? His answer is ".o~· According to Heidegger the CONCLUSION
entities of the world of science are the result of theoretical attitude. But this way of The "Science Wars" are about many things. However. I want to draw the attention to
looking at things is secondary. Primarily we use and regard things as articles for an article by one who has been fighting at the frontlines from the very beginning:
everyday use. A hammer (to take one of Heidegger's favourite examples) is primarily Norman Levitt. He was the co-author both of Higher Superstition and The Flight from
an article which we use for driving nails and so on. and only secondarily it is a physical Science and Reason. In a recent article, Levitt sums up the state of modem science:
thing. Hence the hammer has a meaning, it refers to what tasks it can be used to I shall merely assert what can easily be argued: From the conceptual point ofview, the sciences
perform. To understand the meaning of a hammer is precisely to know what it can be are in an unprecedentedly robust state of health, strength, and vigor. Theoretical understanding
used for, and how to use it. Heidegger points out that the meaning of articles does not from biology to physics is deeper and sharper than it has ever been. Overall, there is greater unity
and greater cross·fertilizatio'n among the various scientific disciplines than has ever been seen. The
come in addition to their being physical objects. On the contrary, to regard something
monistic, reductionistic point of view that fonn the main philosophical current of science seems
as a physical object presupposes an assumption of it as a tool. The experimental increasingly to be vindicated by a string ofbreakthroughs. ll
physicist normally uses more complicated equipment than hammers, but measuring I think that monistic and reductionistic are key words here. According to this view
instruments are nevertheless tools. To make experiments he has to handle those of science, both phenomenology and (the Copenhagen interpretation of) quantum
instruments in a competent manner, and he needs good instruments. If he is
•
64 RAGNAR FJELLAND QUANTUM MECHANICS AND PHENOMENOLOGY 65

II Needless to say, this is an extreme interpretation. An almost opposite view, stressing the importance of
mechanics are regarded as "subjectivist" and therefore anti-science. Hence it is no
Galileo's experiments, can be found in Stillman Drake, Galileo at Work (Chicago and London: University
accident that they are both under fire in the "science wars." of Chicago Press, 1978). However, without following Koyre all the way, one may nevertheless maintain that
he focussed on an essential aspect of Galilco's science.
If Koyre, 37-38.
University ofBergen. Nonvay 1O Koyre, "Galilco and Plato" in Kayre: Metaphysics and Measurement (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins

University Press, 1968 (19431), 34.

JI Husserl,121.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT II [bid.,125.r'
U For more details, see Pais 'Sub/Ie is the Loni... ' The Science and Life 01Albert Einstein, 116-117.
I wanl to thank the Niels Bohr Archive for the pennission 10 reproduce the two drawings in Figure 1 and I 14 Cf. Murdoch, 105.
thank CERN for Ihc pennission to reproduce Figure 2 (CERNIPIO/RA 774). u 20 July 1935. In Pais, Niels Bohr's Time, in Physics, Philosophy and Polity, 446.
lj David Favrholdt, Fysik, bevidJthed, /iv. Studier j Niels Bohrsfilosofi (Odense: Odense Universitetsforlag
1995),89.
NOTES U Ronald H. Giere, Explaining Science: A Cognitive Approach (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1988), 133.
I want to point oul thai I find Sokal's article both clever and amusing, and that I regard the reaction of the :zt Heelan, Space-Perception and the Philosophy olScience (Berkeley: University ofCalifomi a Press, 1988).
editors of Social Text as both irrational and eyen ridiculous. lJ Hcidegger, "Vom Weseo und Begriff der fysis" in Wegmarken (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1978),246.
1 Sheldon Goldstein, ·'Quantum Philosophy: The Flight from Reason in Science" in Paul Gross & Nannan III F. M. Comford, Plato's Cosmology. The Timaeus olPlalo (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1977),
Levitt, cds., Higher Superstition: The Academic Left and Its Quarrels with Science (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 200n.
University Press, 1994). 119-126. II Included as Appendix VI in the English translation of Edmunds Husserl's, The Crisis o/the European
l Mara Beller, "The Sakal Hoax: At Whom Are We Laughing?," Physics Today, September 1998: 29. Sciences and Transcendental Phennmennlngy, trans. n. Carr (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press,
in Ihis article i stress the close relationship between Bohr and Heisenberg. However, as pointed out by 1970).
Palrick A. Heelan, Quantum Mechanics and Objectivity. A Study 01 the Physical Philosophy 01 Werner )1 Heelan, Space-Perception and the Philosophy olScience, 378.
Heisenberg (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1965) there were no doubt important differences between them. II Husserl, 1954,27.
S Werner Heisenberg, Physikalische Prinzipien der Quantentheorie (Mannheim: Bibliographisches Institul )4 Benoit Mande1brot, 'The Fractal Geometry olNature (New York: Freeman and Company, 1983), 25ff.
1958 [1930]), 48 U For a more detailed discu!sionofcomplementarity and biology, see Henry J. Folse Jr., "Complementarity
, Heisenberg, "The Physical Content of Quantum Kinematics and Dynamics," reprinted in lA. Wheeler, and the Description of Nature in Biological Science," Biology and Philosophy 5/1990: 211-224.
W.H. Zurek, eds., Quantum Theory and Measuremenl (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983 [1927]), " Bohr, "Light and Life" in Bohr, Col/ecud Works, vol. 10: 34.
64. lJ Norman Levitt, '11le End of Science, the Central Dogma of Science Studies, Monsieur Jourdain, and
Albert Einslein, Boris Podolsky, and Nathan Rosen. "Can Quantum-Mechanical Description of Physical Uncle Vanya" in Norena Koertge, ed.,A Howe Built on Sand. Exposing Posrmodernist Myths About &ience
Reality Be Considered Complete?" Physical Review 47/1935;777-80, reprinled in J.A. Wheeler and W.H. (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998),280.
Zurek, eds., Quantum Theory and Measurement.
I In an article with the title "Is the Moon There When Nobody Looks?" (Ph)'!ics Today, April 1985: 38-47)
David Mermin quotes the following passage from Abraham Pais: "We often discussC;d his notions on
objective reality. I recall that during one walk Einstein suddenly stopped, turned to me and asked whether I
really believed that the moon exists only when J look at it." Pais, 'Sublle is the Lord... ' The Science and Life
01 Albert Einstein (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983).
, Niels Bohr, "Can Quantum-Mechanical Description of Physical Reality Be Considered Complete?"
PhysiCtJI Review4811935:696-702, reprinted in Wheeler and Zurek, cds., Quantum Theory and Measurement,
148.
10 Bohr, "Science and the Unity of Knowledge," reprinted in Niels Bohr. Collected Works, vol. 10

(Amsterdam: Elsevier, 1999 (1955]), 79-98. 89.

liOn the Bell inequalities and EPR experiments, see for example J. S. Bell, Speakable and Unspeakable
in Quantum Mechanics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987).
11 Quoted from Abraham Pais, Niels Bohr's Time. in Physics, Philosophy and Polily (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1991),426.
I) In support of this view, see for example Dugald Murdoch, Niels Bohr's Philosophy 0/ Physics
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989).
14 For historical details, see Heelan, "Husserl's Later Philosophy of Natural Science," PhilosophyolScience
54/1987: 368. Heelan has a much more detailed description of Husserl's project in Crisis than 1 can offer
here. .
" Edmund Husserl, Die Krisis der europIJischen Wissenschaften und die lranszendenlale Phllflomenologie,
Walter Biemel, ed. (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1954),52.
16 See Edwin A. Burtt., The Metaphysical Foundalion 01 Modern Physical Science (London: Routledge and
Kegan Paul, 1972, Sec. rev. ed. (1924]). On the Platonist aspects of Galilco's science, see especially pp. 64·
73.
n Alexandre Koyre, Galileo Studies (London: Harvester, 1978 (19391): 3.