Mayo 2
Mayo 2
Mayo 2
Even in the United States, the military poses a unique set of problems for
Presidents7. Equally, no individual can have a significant effect on military budgets,
including presidents.8 The distinguishing factor between the military of advanced
societies and those of the less developed societies is the strict adherence of the former to
military professionalism imbued with national protection and the inability of the later to
curtail its gluttonous political adventure and concentrate in the assigned function of
national protection. The military in less developed societies have, for flimsy reasons and
excuses, infiltrated the political administrative machineries of the states without
correspondingly fulfilling their messianic propaganda embedded in their reasons for
military takeover.
Military Rule
The concept of military rule has often been mistaken with military government or
military regime. However, there are significant differences between and among the three
interrelated concepts. Mlitary rule is the Governance by the armed forces and the
consequent reversal from civil to military superordinacy, usually through an
unconstitutional takeover of power in a coup d’état that ousted the legitimate civil
authority, with the pretext of either restoring law and order, re-instituting legality within
the system or eradicating any other social ills affecting the state.9
This definition is important for two reasons: one, it is important for its emphasis on
military super ordinacy in governance and two, the process by which military power to
govern could be secured brute force. Nevertheless, military rule can appropriately be
M. H. Halprin, "The President and Military" In N.C. Thomas, ed. The Presidency in
7
Contemporary Context (277-289). (New York: Dodd, Mead and Company, 1975)p.5
8
Ibid
9
O. Igwe, "Politics and Globe Dictionary".p.268
9
defined as an act or process of administering a given polity by the Armed Forces which
often is acquired via the seizure of state power through force. This implies that military
power to govern is acquired not through the ballot papers but through the barrel of guns.
So, it is a power to govern a people without their consent.
Military Government
A government is that agency of the ruling class that is charged with the
responsibility of exercising state power on behalf of the whole classes. 10 It can also be
referred to as the institutionalized agency for the legitimate administration of the class
society, in effect, translating into a structured organization of power for the realization of
the objectives of the ruling class, and the major instrument of its practical exercise by its
governing elites within the state.11 However, it is important to note that not all
administrations are legitimate, as this last definition would want us to believe. Military
government therefore, refers to the administrative agency managed by the Armed Forces
and charged with the responsibility of exercising state power on behalf of the whole
social classes in a given polity. It is therefore an institution of governance that is derived
unconstitutionally.
11
O. Igwe, "Politics and Globe Dictionary". p.40
R. F. Ola, "Nigeria Political System Inputs, Outputs and Environment," (Benin City: Ambik
12
Press, 1995)p.107
10
to restore order when called upon to do so by the president,
A. O. Oronsaye, "Nigerian Government and Politics," (Benin City: United -City Press, 1997)p.
17
242
11
enemies in favour of civil duties, can be extracted from the nationwide broadcasts by the
leaders of each of the seven successful coups18.
The country' s military subsystem has been performing political functions which are
clearly outside its class or station it's not out of place to foreclose the above mentioned
conditions, which to a large extent, though illegal and ultra- vires, but, foster military
incursions into the acts of governance.22
The British colonial administration is to blame for the unfortunate situation. The
British policies of divide-and-rule, led to the regionalization of politics during the
18
Ibid
T. Ajajeoba, "Theoracle as the Obstacle", Lagos: Tell Magazine, 6, February 7., 2004)p. 3
19
M. H. Kuka. "The Western Beaten Cliche Holds True", (Lagos: Tell Magazine, 38, September
20
16, 2004) p. 38
21
A Ehizuelen, "Introduction to Nigerian politics," (Benin City: Ambik Press, 2005)p.17
R. Osagie,"The military and politics", Benin City: The Nigerian Observer, March 26,
22
1996)p.263
12
colonial era. It also provided the basis for the post-independence politics of the first and
second republics. The British colonial masters divided the country into three regions and
deliberately drew the political map of Nigeria to make the emergence of a nationally
accepted leadership difficult.23
The introduction of Richard's Constitution in January 1947 had already laid the
foundation of tribalism in Nigerian politics leading to the emergence of regional and
tribal parties. There are historical and class dimensions to the evident reliance on
structures and direct violence as twin instruments in the struggle for power and resources
in Nigeria politics. The Nigerian political system was "established and consolidated by
soldiers". Government's sponsored pillage of the local economy was made possible by
colonial army and the instruments of raw violence which it displayed arbitrarily.24
In providing its own maintenance and in protecting the interests of entrepreneurs and
settlers within the victim society, the profit-propelled colonial regime elevated violence
to the level of principle. Direct military conquest and occupation, forced labour,
compulsory taxation and the forceful seizure of land by government backed joint-stock
companies became the objective indicators of violence by which the colonial cult was
defined. The violence, by which the colonial structures were imposed, now became an
integral part of the post-colonial system. Not only did it show its imprint on the
institutional framework, but it also entered human relations25.
The turbulence of colonial rule depicted the initial and primary misfortunes of
Nigeria as a transitional society, oscillating between an aversion to the past and a crude
inclination towards the essential features of a new but bestial political system. In the
words of Dorgu the Bayelsa State Governor's Special Representative in Abuja,
23
M. Onuorah, "Politics of leadership", Lagos: The Guardian, September 12th, 2000)p. 25
Some of the causes of these coups may be traced to constitutional factors. 29 For
instance, in Nigeria, the constitutional legacy bequeathed by Britain created a situation in
which the North had a permanent dominating position over the other three southern
regions30. From the factors mentioned above, it is unarguable that the loophole or political
gap occasioned by the departing colonial intrigues left not only an enabling environment
but a fertile ground for misunderstanding among the emergent Nigeria state. This no
doubt brought chaos, anarchy and upheavals among the elites and the political class
which allowed the military to assume the false status of being the unequalled umpires.
Their presence in political administration is a clear negation of their constitutional roles
as contained in the Nigeria Constitutions of 1960, 1963 and.1979.31
26
S. Dorgu. "Democracy on Trial in Nigeria", (Lagos: The Guardian, 2008)p.8
A. O. Oronsaye, "Nigerian Government and Politics, Benin City: United -City Press,
27
1997)p.248
28
Ibid
30
Ibid
31
Ibid
14
Corruption and other vices by the politicians of the First Republic (1960-1966)
provoked the militant majors in the Armed Forces to overthrow the Tafawa Balewa
government32. An often quoted section of the broadcast by Nzeogwu Chukwuma was that
mutineers have to intervene to save Nigeria from "ten percen ters and VIP's of wastes
who made the country look big for nothing in international circles 33". The financial
misdemeanours some of the politicians committed were considered scandalous enough to
bait the soldiers to strike. Akpata stated thus:
This focus presupposes that the motivational basis of a military putsch must not be
ascertained from their class character, concrete ideological orientation, leanings and
action because military coups are a politically salient mechanism. The apolitical tradition
of the armed forces is fake and does not explain anything particularly because soldiers
constitute a viable mechanism with which electoral processes are rigged and the people
defrauded. Beyond that, the top military brass are members of the governing class. They
have a serious stake in preserving the dominant configuration of power and interest.35
S. Darah, "The Military High Command and Corruption in Nigeria," (Lagos: Imprint Publishers
32
Ltd, 2001)p.17
33
Ibid
T. Akpata, "Anatomy of Military Coups" (Lagos: The Guardian, January 10, 1994.)p.27
34
Politics. p.94
15
The history of military coups in the country reveals that except for the January 1966,
when the then acting President, Dr. Nwafor Orizu asked for military intervention in view
of the political horizon of the time, all other military interventions have been organized
by them and they execute their action by pointing accusing fingers at their civilian
counterparts. Whatever may be the justification for military involvement in politics, it is
clear that the Nigerian military elites have abandoned the task for which they have
sufficient training and expertise in favour of one over which they lack the requisite
wherewithal.
Other factors for military interventions are loaded in internal dynamics of the
officer's corps. As they are unable to accommodate and tolerate abuses of power, the
army intervenes to tidy up the mess and to create political order or stability. 38 Jang quoted
Olusegun Obasanjo as saying that corruption has grown bigger with every new regime
including his corruption has become a national malaise and how we should solve it,
Nigerians must decide.39
The military must not only be subjected to civil control, it must be thoroughly
overhauled and weeded of all politicians and rogues who hide behind the uniform to seize
power and plunder the nation.
216
37
Ibid
38
Ibid
D. Jang, "The myilitary now Enjoys Power"., (Jos: The News, 5, February 7, 1997)p.17
39
16
Some fascinating causes of military control of governmental apparatus and
involvement in governance to include:40
experimentation;
political governance.41
A. Mazrui. "How Culture Forces and Shapes the Modern World. (Lagos: The Guardian, July 4,
40
1994)p.94
41
Ibid
42
A. Nwankwo, p. 104
17
many occasions led the military to do more than provide coercive power for use against
external enemies; whereas the army would have allowed the civil government to learn
from its mistakes. That is the hallmark of democracy the world over.43
The Western Region crisis of 1962 constituted one of the immediate causes of the
subsequent military coup of January 1966. The military further adduced corruption,
oppression, inefficiency, tribalism, nepotism, wastes and divisiveness which characterize
political leadership as well as weak political cultures, low mobilization, low
institutionalization and general absence of civil order as causes why they struck.
The issue of dealing with the military is in the hands of Nigerians themselves
because Nigerians are part and parcel of the problem 44. The proper role of the military is
to be servants of the people and not their masters. 45 If the citizens are able to gather their
thoughts together by giving the elected people the chance to survive by being patient, the
military will not have any excuse to take over government. In a state where there is no
recognized government, even members of the military establishment associate democracy
with anarchy, insubordination and lack of discipline among civilian politicians, and are
afraid that democracy might undermine their authority. In such a situation, the army
became the logical, coherent force to assume leadership.46
The January 15th 1966 military coup was the culmination of a series of violations of
the spirit of the Nigerian constitution by political leaders of the three major political
parties. That after the attainment of independence, the struggle for power and control of
the federal government raged with reckless abandon, and the leaders ignored all rules of
democratic processes. As a result, the major political upheavals already mentioned ripped
the foundation of the federation between 1962 and 1965 and prepared the way for a
military putsch.
The selfishness and irresponsibility of members of the so-called political class have
to do with the concentration of power at the centre. 47 The struggle to control the centre
43
Ibid
I. Gambari, "Nigeria is Now a Nation of Scorn". (Lagos: Tell Magazine, 22, May 29, 1995)p.26
44
45
Ibid
46
Ibid
A. Akinola "Federalism and Democracy in Nigeria", (Lagos: The Pan African Weekly, 41,
47
The reasons for frequent interventions of armed forces in politics in West African
states and Nigeria in particular, are complex and diverse. 49 They are categorized them
under political, constitutional, socio-economic and foreign relations factors 50. Opposition
parties lack patience of long waiting and have often resorted to unconstitutional methods
of vaulting into power; that soldiers hate to see politicians using governmental authority
for their selfish ends and abuse of elections politicians. The struggle by among political
leaders themselves, official and tribalism in politics therefore necessitate military
interventions51. Also, schism among the political elites, violent political rivalry, etc, are
the major causes of the frequent military incursions in Nigerian politics stunted the
democratic process since political independence. Further, the corruption, which have idea
of cross-carpeting and hob-knobbing with the winning winner takes all syndrome are
indicative of the absence of a parties and the stable political culture in Nigeria. Until
Nigeria elites and politicians learn to exercise restraints, the nascent quest for an enduring
democracy will be an illusion.52
There have been a large number of successful and failed military coups in Nigeria
since the country's independence in 1960. A military coup is the violent or non-violent
overthrow of an existing political regime by the military. Between 1966 and 1999 the
army held power in Nigeria without interruption apart from a short-lived return to
democracy between 1979 to 198353
48
Ibid
50
Ibid
51
Ibid
52
Ibid
53
Ibid
19
The January 1966 coup was carried out by mostly Igbo army officers including Major
Kaduna Nzeogwu, Major Emmanuel Ifeajuna among others. The casualties of the coup
included the Prime Minister Alhaji Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, the Sardauna of Sokoto Sir
Ahmadu Bello, the Premier of the Western Region Samuel Akintola, the finance minister
Festus Okotie-Eboh among others.54
General Yakubu Gowon was ousted in a palace coup on 30 July 1975, which brought
then Brigadier Murtala Muhammed to power as Head of State.
Popularly and erroneously known as the 'Dimka Coup', this bloody and aborted coup led
to the assassination of General Murtala Muhammed. Upon General Muhammed's death
and the foiling of the coup, then Lt General Olusegun Obasanjo became Head of State.56
The Nigerian Military Coup of December 31, 1983 was led by a group of senior
army officers who overthrew the democratically elected government of President Shehu
Shagari. Participants included Majors General Ibrahim Babangida and Muhammadu
Buhari, Brigadiers Ibrahim Bako, Sani Abacha, and Tunde Idiagbon. Major General
Buhari was appointed Head of State by the conspirators.
Ibrahim Bako (then Director of the Army Faculty at the Armed Forces Command
and staff College, Jaji) and acting GOC 1 Mechanised Division, Kaduna was tasked by
the coup conspirators with arresting President Shehu Shagari presumably after Shagari's
Brigade was killed.by Col Tunde Ogbeha. Author Max Siollun notes that Bako was
54
Ibid
55
Ibid
56
Ibid
20
chosen for the arresting role because Bako's father was a personal friend to Shagari.
Unknown to Bako was the fact that the coup plot had leaked to President Shagari whose
guards were on high alert. After arriving at the Presidential residence with an armed
detachment to arrest the President, Bako was shot dead, while sitting in the passenger
side of a UNIMOG utility truck, in an ensuing fire fight between troops from Bako's
detachment and the Brigade of Guards soldiers under the command of Captain Augustine
Anyogo. The UNIMOG utility truck that Bako was killed in is on display at the Nigerian
Army Museum in Zaria, Nigeria.
Major General Ibrahim Babangida (Director of Army Staff Duties and Plans)
Major Sambo Dasuki (Military Assistant to the Chief of Army Staff, Lt-General
Wushishi)
21
This was a palace coup led by then Chief of Army Staff, Major General Ibrahim
Babangida who overthrew the administration of Major General Muhammadu Buhari.57
Hundreds of military officers were arrested, some were tried, convicted and eventually
executed for conspiring to overthrow the Babangida administration. The conspirators
were alleged to have been led by Major General Mamman Jiya Vatsa.58
Major Gideon Orkar staged a violent and failed attempt to overthrow the government of
General Ibrahim Babangida.59
At the end of the colonialism in Africa, it was natural, that the political culture of the
colonialist had been imbibed. The political institutions that were developed or borrowed
were democratic ones61. However, Africans were learning the operations of these
institutions across the continent when suddenly in 1952, the Egyptians military overthrew
King Farouk62. This singular phenomenon unleashed a ‘bush-fire’ effect in Africa, for
57
Ibid
58
Ibid
59
Ibid
60
Ibid
The causes of military intrusion into the Nigerian polity could be grouped into
Ecological and Societal factors, Extra-Societal and Contagious factors, Intra-military or
Socio-Military and Miscellaneous variables. The African armies have been described as
tending to be the most detribalized, westernized, modernized, integrated, and cohesive
institutions in their respective states. The army is usually the most disciplined agency in
the state. It often enjoys greater sense of national identity than other institutions. Its
technical skill, including the capacity to coerce and to communicate, is the most effective
agency in the country and a more vivid symbol of sovereignty than the flag, the
constitution, or the parliament…66. This is perhaps because they come from different
cultural backgrounds and are wielded together in the army with symbol to look up to.
63
Ibid
64
Ibid
65
Ibid
E. W. Lefever "Spear and Scepter: Army, Police and Politics in Tropical Africa".( Washington
66
It has been said that the education and training, which soldiers receive, make them
professional men. It is also assumed that such acquired values or attributes are
transferable into situations or occupational roles, which may not be entirely military. The
third assumption is that in the process of governing a civilian society, these military
values are transmitted to the rest of the society in a way that regulates societal behavior
and consequently changes such societies69. The point here is that, the long years of
military rule, made the boundaries between the barracks and the civil society so
permeable that the ethos of the military affected the entire society. The outcomes were
that, at the entry of the civil government, politicians had adapted to the command system
of the military, which they have been subjected to considerably.
Consequent upon the long years of military governance, the obvious outcome would
be militarized political culture, manifested in the political behaviors of the dramatis
S. Huntington "Political Order in Changing Societies" (New Haven :Yale University Press,
67
1968)p 33
It is instructive to recall that the researchers had pursued the argument that the
militarization of governance engenders a militarized civic culture the outcome of which is
militarized psyche. It is herein stated that there is a significant incongruence between the
internalized military culture, character, and the demands of democratic process 72. As a
result, the democratic arena is seen as an extension of the barrack. This point is given
credence to with the dominance of exmilitary men as politicians who are yet to be
recivilianized. This explicates the behavior of politicians since 1999. The behaviors are
the direct correlates of the dialectics of military governance 73. The discussions of the
manifestations of these behavioral dispositions are illustrated below;
i. Sometimes between April and July 2002, the President amended the capital
provisions of the 2002 Appropriation Act by reducing the capital budget to 44%
without forwarding the said amendments to the national Assembly for passage in
violation of section 80(4) of the 1999, constitution that act amounts to gross
misconduct.
M. J Sodaro, "Comparative Politics-A Global Introduction". (New York: McGraw Hill, 2008)
70
71
Ibid
72
E. O. Frank and W. I . Ukpere "The Impact of Military Rule on Democracy in Nigeria"
(Article in Journal of Social Sciences, December 2012)p.288
73
Ibid
25
ii. About the month of July 2002 a Presidential order was issued purporting sameto
constitute an amendment to the revenue allocation Act which action amounted to
the violation of section 162(1) and (2) section 315 of 1999 constitution, which is
equal to a gross misconduct, and a violation of the constitution as amended.
iii. From1999-2002 the government had consistently indulged in extra budgetary
expenses contrary to section 80(2), (3) and (4) of the 1999 constitution which is
a clear violation of the constitution which going through the due process; with
the expenditure on the national stadium in excess of appropriated sum, excess
expenditure on the national identity card from N5.9 billion to N9.5 billion above
the sum approved in the 2001 and 2002 Appropriation Acts respectively. The
authorization of the purchase of 63 houses and their furnishing for Ministers in
the year 2002 to the tune of N3,019,153,178.06 without any budgetary
provisions in the 2002 appropriation Act..This was when the National Assembly
was not on recess.
iv. In the year 2000, he authorized the deployment of military troops to ‘Odi’
Bayelsa State to massacre innocent citizens without recourse to the National
Assembly contrary to section 217 (2) C of the 1999 constitution which requires
first for some conditions to be prescribed by an Act of the National Assembly
for the.use of the military in that regard.
v. In the year 2001, the President without lawful ‘authority authorized the
deployment of military troops to ‘Zaki Biam’.(Benue State) which occasioned
the murder of innocent citizens and the destruction of properties, contrary to
section 217(2) C of the 1999 constitution as amended which requires firstly for
some conditions to be prescribed by an Act of the National Assembly for the use
of military in this regard’ (Djeba 2002).
vi. The development of military social classes: Military rule inadvertently leads to
the formations of military social classes (military and civilian). As the military
become the dormant social groups in the society, they allocate economic
advantages derived in Nigeria from contracts and allocation of oil blocks to
themselves/colleagues. In and out of the military, this social group possesses
enormous wealth from these sources to influence the course of politics in
democratic dispensation. The military acquire their prejudices and ideas
ingrained in the minds of the dominant social classes, the civil servant and the
business classes. A class is thereby formed to hold on, for them to drop the
military uniform. The implication is that in the nearest future the ex-military
men will continue to be those with enormous resources in politics than their
civilian counterpart. This is the ‘embourgeoment’ of the military class courtesy
26
of Professor Ali Mazrui74 writing on the Ugandan military. This political culture
is as well dialectic of militarism in democracy.
In the wake of the attack which was unleashed on ‘Odi’ community in ‘Bayelsa
State’ by a detachment of the Nigerian troops in November 1999, the National Assembly
failed to call the President to order, but kept mute in cold complicity. The invasion of
‘Zaki Biam’ in Benue state took place shortly afterwards, both houses of the national
assembly also kept mute on the issue. This was one of the outcomes of militarized psyche
which cherished obedience without complain. Thus, Nigerian parliament in violation of
democratic principles did and said nothing of these warrior traditions in civil
dispensation.
An illustration of the militarized civic culture was ably demonstrated during the
cases of impeachments recently. The Federal government raised the allegations,
substantiated and adjudicated it. It consisted in the main of: raise the allegations, pretend
not to know what the constitution prescribed in such matters, invite the Economic and
Financial Crime Commission (EFCC) to substantiate the allegation no matter how vague,
pick up some officials of the state legislature to sign impeachment notices, or throw them
A. A. Mazrui. "Soldiers as traditionalizers: Military rule and the Re-Africanization Africa". In:
74
A A Mazrui Leiden (Ed.): The Warrior Tradition in Modern Africa. Netherlands: E. J. Brill,
1977)
75
E. O. Frank and W. I . Ukpere "The Impact of Military Rule on Democracy in Nigeria"
(Article in Journal of Social Sciences, December 2012)p.288
27
into jail, create a semblance of insecurity in the place, set the place ready for emergency
rule, sponsor protests against the governor, hold-up state fiscal allocation, sponsor some
indigene of the state often those with political ambition to speak against the governor,
take away some members of the legislature indoctrinate them and bring them to the
assembly under arm escort to effect the impeachment. 76This was the scenario used
against DSP Alamesieaya- former Governor of Bayelsa and Plateau states respectively.77
The explanation for the above situation is derived from the low of political culture
which Nigeria belong, characterized by; low level of political secularization in which
ethnicity rather than issues determine the course of action; Politics is not about an
alternative view point of how to resolve issues but on where he comes from; in this
system, the end justify the means used, no matter how unlawful the action deployed; 78
Military rule receives great reception with the civil society because they are weakly
organized to pose any opposition to it. In this socio-political setting, the military
institution is looked upon as an alternative political party.
The military is at the level of supplantment or governance. Due to consistent rule, its
ethos permeates the society, and many people internalized the military ways of
conducting businesses, in military vocabulary etc. The militarization of the social forces,
led eventually to the economic underdevelopment because the military were not trained
for governance in several respects. The economic underdevelopment leads to discontent
in the system and a praetorian social situation is created. Social upheaval and discontent
characterized this state of affairs but were suppressed. 79The soldiers also coup and the
circle is vicious. The salient impact of militarization in Nigeria included but not limited
to the ones discussed below as:
It is a known fact that the command structure of the military gives no room to
dialogue, negotiation, arbitration and conciliation. The absence of this in social discourse
76
Ibid
77
Ibid
78
Ibid
79
S. Huntington "Political Order in Changing Societies" (New Haven :Yale University Press,
1968)p 33
28
brought to the fore the principles of ‘with immediate effect’ in the conduct of social
engagement. Today, Nigerians employ the concept of ‘with immediate effect’ in social
discourse. The military were trained to war, maim and die or survive in the process. In
the current dispensation, the President had enjoined the members of his party to regard
the election as a ‘do or die affair’. This is reminiscent of militarization of semantics and
aberration of democracy.80
In post-Obasanjo era, Yar Adua had re-enacted same with ‘Channels Television’ and
‘This Day Newspaper’ respectively even with the claim of due process and the Rule of
Law’ as the mantra of his regime. This was an indication that beyond 2007, the military
values pervaded the polity. The dialectics of the garrison state in a democratic setting is
explicable.
S. Decalo. "Coups and Army Rule in Africa: Studies in Military Style." (New Haven: Yale
80
the 5th Annual Conference of the Nigerian political Science Association, 1978)p 34
82
E. O. Frank and W. I . Ukpere "The Impact of Military Rule on Democracy in Nigeria"
(Article in Journal of Social Sciences, December 2012)p.289
29
iii) Political Intimidation
iv) Uni-cameralism
Finally, the conduct of democratic elections in Nigeria bore a mark of warfare and
events in a garrison state. During elections military men are made battle ready, policemen
are seen everywhere, their sights engendered fear in the civil populace. Secondly,
international borders are always closed. Considerable contradictions marked the
preparation and execution of the elections as some candidates’ names were/would not be
included in the ballot papers. This was a further attempt to shrink the democratic space. It
matters little whether an ex-military officer is the President or not. The values were
learned by all from the military and would always be replicated in the democratic arena.
83
Ibid
84
Ibid
85
Ibid
30