The Global Oil and Gas Industry
The Global Oil and Gas Industry
The Global Oil and Gas Industry
Rev. 01/20
TB0443
Andrew Inkpen
Michael H. Moffett
With the Spindletop discovery of oil in East Texas in 1901, a new phase of the global oil industry began.
Before Spindletop, oil was used mainly for lamps and lubrication. After Spindletop, petroleum would be used
as a major fuel for new inventions, such as the airplane and automobile. Ships and trains that had previously
run on coal began to switch to oil. For the next century, oil, and then natural gas, would be the world’s most
important sources of energy.
Since the beginning of the oil industry, there have been fears from petroleum producers and consumers that
eventually the oil would run out. In 1950, the U.S. Geological Survey estimated that the world’s conventional
recoverable resource base was about one trillion barrels. Fifty years later, that estimate had tripled to three trillion
barrels. In recent years, the concept of peak oil has been much debated. The peak oil theory is based on the fact
that the amount of oil is finite.
After peak oil, according to the Hubbert Peak Theory, the rate of oil production on Earth will enter a
terminal decline. At various times, some analysts have argued that the peak has occurred, whereas others have
argued that peak oil is a myth. An article in Science stated:
Copyright © 2020 Thunderbird School of Global Management, a unit of the Arizona State University Knowledge Enterprise.
This case was written by Professors Andrew Inkpen and Michael H. Moffett for the sole purpose of providing material for class
discussion. It is not intended to illustrate either effective or ineffective handling of a managerial situation. Any reproduction, in
any form, of the material in this case is prohibited unless permission is obtained from the copyright holder.
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Calcutta from Jul 2020 to Oct 2020.
Although hydrocarbon resources are irrefutably finite, no one knows just how finite. Oil is trapped
in porous subsurface rocks, which makes it difficult to estimate how much oil there is and how much
can be effectively extracted. Some areas are still relatively unexplored or have been poorly analyzed.
Moreover, knowledge of in-ground oil resources increases dramatically as an oil reservoir is exploited.
To “cry wolf” over the availability of oil has the sole effect of perpetuating a misguided obsession
with oil security and control that is already rooted in Western public opinion—an obsession that
historically has invariably led to bad political decisions.2
Regardless of whether the peak has or has not been reached, oil and natural gas are an indispensable source of
the world’s energy and petrochemical feedstock, and will be for many years to come. The difficulty in determining
oil and gas reserves is that true reserves are a complex combination of technology, price, and politics. While
technical change continues to reveal new sources of oil and gas, prices have demonstrated continued volatility,
and resource owners have sought more control over access. As prices rise, reserves once considered non-economic
to develop may become feasible. As prices fall, the opposite occurs.
The oil and gas industry has always been cyclical, with the price of oil and gas moving up and down. The
1970s was the beginning of a turbulent period in the industry. The Arab oil embargo early in the 1970s resulted
in large price increases. Events in Iran and Iraq led to another round of crude oil price increases in 1979 and
1980 (Exhibit 1). The period 1985 to 1998 was largely a period of low prices. Prices then started back up, only
to fall after September 11, 2001. After 9/11, prices rose until the recession at the end of the decade, continued
rising until 2014, and then fell significantly.
Exhibit 1. The Price of Oil (Brent Blend), 1975-2019 (US$ per barrel)
Discovering or obtaining new oil and gas reserves is the lifeblood of the industry. Without access to new
reserves to replace oil and gas production, the industry would die. However, measuring and valuing reserves is
a scientific and business challenge because reserves can only be measured if they have value in the marketplace.
The oil sands of Alberta, Canada, are a good illustration of how difficult it is to accurately measure oil and gas
reserves. Oil sands are deposits of bitumen, a molasses-like viscous oil that will not flow unless heated or diluted
with lighter hydrocarbons. Although the oil sands in Alberta are now considered second only to the Saudi Arabia
reserves in the potential amount of recoverable oil, for many years these were not viewed as real reserves because
they were non-economical to develop. For most of the 2000s and through 2014, the main town in the oil sands
region, Fort McMurray, was in the midst of a boom not unlike the gold rush booms of the 1800s. Housing
and labor were scarce and the infrastructure struggled to keep pace with the influx of people, companies, and
capital. The development of the oil sands occurred because of a combination of rising oil prices and technological
In the U.S., proposals for industry excess profits taxes are common during high price cycles, prompting Lee
Raymond, former ExxonMobil CEO, to comment in 2005, “I can’t remember any of these people seven years
ago, when the price was $10 a barrel, coming forward and saying, ‘Are you guys going to have enough money
to be able to continue to invest in this business?’ I don’t recall my phone ringing and anybody asking me that
question.”3
The oil and gas industry is highly cyclical and the cycles can last many years. In the 1990s, crude oil prices
stayed low, and for the first 14 years in the new millennium, prices steadily rose (except for a brief dip in 2009). In
2014, oil prices fell significantly and by the end of the decade had yet to return to the high prices of 2008–2014.
Many small and mid-size U.S. producers were struggling in 2020 as prices remained low for both oil and gas.
Although the oil industry is highly profitable in some years, its long-term profitability is not much higher
than average profitability across many industries. As evidence, some years ago Fortune reported that the oil
industry ranked 30th out of 36 industries in return to investors over the 1985–1995 period, 34th out of 36
U.S. industries in return on equity in 1995, and 32nd in return on sales.4 In the U.S., the oil and gas industry
has earned return on sales (net income divided by revenue) of about 8%, compared to an average of about 6%
for all U.S. manufacturing, mining, and wholesale trade corporations.
One comparative measure of financial performance is shown in Exhibit 4, a comparison of the S&P 500
index of equities and the S&P 500 Energy Sector index. The Energy Sector index comprises companies engaged
in exploration and production, refining, marketing, storage, and transportation of oil and gas and coal and
consumable fuels. It also includes companies that offer oil and gas equipment and services. After 2014, Energy
Sector performance lagged behind the S&P 500.
Source: Data drawn from Standard & Poors. The S&P 500® Energy comprises those companies included in the S&P 500 that are classified as
members of the GICS® energy sector.
OPEC’s mission is “to coordinate and unify the petroleum policies of Member Countries and ensure the
stabilization of oil prices in order to secure an efficient, economic, and regular supply of petroleum to consumers,
a steady income to producers, and a fair return on capital to those investing in the petroleum industry.”5 Despite
being a cartel, OPEC’s ability to control prices is questionable. Surging oil prices in the 1980s resulted in energy
conservation and increased exploration outside OPEC. Maintaining discipline among OPEC members has been
a major problem (as is typical in all cartels). Massive cheating was blamed for the oil price crash of 1986, and in
the 1990s, Venezuela was considered one of the bigger OPEC cheats in regularly producing more than its quota.
Exhibit 5 shows OPEC production and crude oil prices. Although OPEC in the past was instrumental in
sending periodic shocks to the system, OPEC’s influence had waned over the previous decades.
Source: Data drawn from “BP Statistical Review of World Energy,” June 2019. All data is annual average.
For many years, the largest IOCs (also known as oil majors) were the Seven Sisters, and included:
1. Standard Oil of New Jersey (Esso), which later became Exxon and then merged with Mobil to create
ExxonMobil
2. Royal Dutch Shell
3. Anglo-Persian Oil Company, which became British Petroleum, then BP Amoco following a merger
with Amoco (which was formerly Standard Oil of Indiana). The company is now known as BP.
4. Standard Oil of New York (Socony) became Mobil, which merged with Exxon
5. Standard Oil of California (Socal) became Chevron
6. Gulf Oil, most of which became part of Chevron
7. Texaco, which merged with Chevron in 2001
Exhibits 6 and 7 show the world’s largest oil and gas companies by stock market capitalization and revenue.
The exhibits show that the industry is dominated by a mix of global IOCs and national oil companies (NOCs).
Based on market capitalization, the largest publicly traded (and in some cases, government-controlled) companies
are a diverse and global set of firms, such as ExxonMobil (United States), Gazprom (Russia), Petrochina (China),
Sinopec (China), and Total (France).
The urge to get larger and more integrated can be seen in comments from the Oil and Natural Gas
Corporation (ONGC) chairman. ONGC, an Indian state-controlled firm, and primarily an upstream company,
made public its commitment to participate in the entire hydrocarbon value-chain. According to the former
chairman of ONGC:
We have to be an integrated oil company. Every major global oil company is an integrated player.
I’m not being arrogant, but oil and gas is big business where the big boys play. You can survive in
this business only if you are integrated; otherwise, you will be out.7
Given the long product lifecycles and the huge capital investment required in the oil industry, the large
IOCs are often described as stodgy and conservative. Before its bankruptcy, Enron executives regularly derided
the oil majors as dinosaurs that were too slow moving and that would eventually become extinct. The reality,
of course, is very different. Oil majors like BP, ExxonMobil, and Shell and their predecessor companies have
been around for more than a century. Through experience that was occasionally painful, the IOCs learned how
to deal with the enormous financial and political risks of the oil and gas industry. The IOCs took a long-term
view and recognized that cycles and uncertainty were an inherent part of the industry. Lee Raymond, former
ExxonMobil CEO, said:
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Calcutta from Jul 2020 to Oct 2020.
We’re in a commodity [business]. We go through peaks and valleys, but our business is to level out the
peaks and valleys, so that over the cycle our shareholders see an adequate return on their investment.8
On the surface, the IOCs looked similar in terms of the activities they performed. All appeared to be
vertically integrated from exploration to distribution of refined products. However, there were fundamental
cultural, organizational, and financial differences among the firms. The IOCs used various organizational designs
to deal with vertical integration. The IOCs had different portfolios of projects and business lines around the
world, and over the years developed different relationships with various governments and national oil companies.
Source: Individual company reports and Investopedia, November 9, 2018. mmboe/d is million barrels of oil equivalent (combined oil and natural
gas) per day.
Viewed from a business perspective, the NOCs have a mixed reputation. The national oil company of
Indonesia, Pertamina, was described a few years ago as a bloated and inefficient bureaucracy:
. . . [Pertamina] operated almost as sovereignty unto itself, ignoring transparent business practices,
often acting independently of any ministry, and increasingly taking on the role of a cash cow for then-
President Suharto and his cronies. During the 32-year tenure of President Suharto, Pertamina awarded
159 contracts to companies linked to his family and cronies. These contracts were awarded without
formal bidding or negotiation processes. . . Indonesian petroleum law dictated that every aspect of
operation in the country was subject to approval by Pertamina’s foreign contractor management body,
Bppka. Dealing with the incomprehensible Bppka bureaucracy on simple matters, such as acquiring
work permits for expatriate personnel, can take hours of filling in applications and months of waiting.9
Venezuela nationalized its oil industry in the 1970s and created Petróleos de Venezuela (PDVSA). PDVSA
developed a reputation for professionalism and competence and was relatively free from the corruption and
cronyism that pervaded, and continues to pervade, so many of the NOCs.10 By 1998, 36 foreign oil firms were
operating in Venezuela, and PDVSA had ambitious expansion plans. In 1999, Hugo Chávez became president and
almost immediately began to question the management and autonomy of PDVSA. After a bitter strike in 2002,
PDVSA lost about two-thirds of its managerial and technical staff. In 2006, the Venezuelan Congress approved
new guidelines to turn 32 privately run oil fields over to state-controlled joint ventures. From a peak of 2.9 million
b/d in 1998, PDVSA output was less than 1 million in 2019. As a company, PDVSA is indistinguishable from
the government. Its top officials are appointed from the government. The company is required to spend much
of its investment budget on social programs. Company hiring policy is based on social and political goals; e.g.,
candidates from larger families are given priority.
Some NOCs are well-run and profitable enterprises. Statoil of Norway is considered among the best of the
NOCs. The NOCs of Brazil and Malaysia are viewed as reasonably well-run companies. Petrobras has developed
leading technology in deepwater drilling and, until its 2014 corruption scandal, had a market capitalization
rivaling that of the IOCs.
The role that NOCs will play in the future is not clear. Some analysts see NOCs as inefficient and corrupt
arms of government that will never compete in a true economic sense. Other analysts raise different issues,
suggesting that the NOCs are in a period of transition and will become competitive forces to be reckoned with.
Regardless of what happens, the NOCs and their sovereign owners control most of the world’s oil and gas reserves.
As Paolo Scaroni, the chairman of ENI, the Italian IOC, commented:
Big Western oil firms are like addicts in denial. The oil giants are trying to do business as usual
as if nothing was wrong. Yet they are, in fact, having trouble laying their hands on their own basic
product. State-owned national or state-controlled oil companies are sitting on as much as 90% of the
world’s oil and gas and are restricting outsiders’ access to it. Worse, the best NOCs are beginning to
expand beyond their own frontiers and to compete with the oil majors for control over the remaining
10% of resources. The first step in overcoming this predicament is admitting that it is a problem.11
Two IOCs are shown separately: Total (France) and ENI (Italy) because both firms are publicly traded and
also tightly connected to their respective national government. A small group of firms is termed hybrids: well-run
publicly traded firms with government control that includes Petrobras and Statoil. Other state-owned firms that
are traded on stock exchanges include Saudi Aramco, Gazprom, Rosneft, and PetroChina.
Another set of firms is 100% government-owned and controlled but employs strong financial discipline
and stewardship. Petronas (Malaysia) and many African NOCs fall into this category. Finally, there is set of
government-owned and government-controlled NOCs that seem to exist primarily as public policy arms of
their government owners. This set includes the NOCs of Iran, Mexico, Nigeria, and Venezuela. These firms have
limited shareholder value goals (i.e., goals tied to financial metrics such as ROI and ROCE).
Independents
Independents are the non-government-owned companies that focus on either the upstream or the downstream.
Many of these companies are sizable players and rank in the top 50 of all non-government-owned oil and gas
companies. The largest E&P independents include U.S. firms such as Marathon, Occidental, CononcoPhilips,
Apache, and Woodside of Australia. Exhibit 10 shows the largest independent E&P firms by revenue.
In the downstream sector, the largest independents are scattered around the world’s largest energy-consuming
countries. The downstream independents include Phillips66 and Valero in the United States, and Neste and
Tamoil in Europe. Some downstream independents are involved in multiple businesses such as refining, pipelines,
Other Firms
In addition to the IOCs, NOCs, and independents, the oil and gas industry includes many other firms that perform
important functions. The oilfield services firms, the three largest of which are Schlumberger (100,000 employees),
Baker Hughes (66,000 employees), and Halliburton (60,000 employees), play a critical role throughout the
exploration, development, and production phases. These firms provide both products and services that, according
to Baker Hughes’ website, help oil and gas producers “find, develop, produce, and manage oil and gas reservoirs.”
Because the oilfield service firms do not seek ownership rights to oil and gas reserves, their role could become
increasingly important in the future as partners to the NOCs. Exhibit 11 shows the largest oilfield services firms
by market capitalization, and Exhibit 12 shows the range of activities performed by oilfield services firms.
Thousands of other firms provide a vast array of services and products for the industry. For example, gas
utilities such as Gaz de France and Tokyo Gas are major customers for gas producers. Pipeline companies distribute
gas, crude oil, and petroleum products. The firms involved in drilling and seismic services provide drilling rigs
and expertise for onshore and offshore wells.
The method used to bid for, grant, and then renew or extend oil and gas rights varies from country to
country. Once the rights to explore are acquired, a well is drilled. A financial analysis is a determining factor in
the classification of a well as an oil well, natural gas well, or dry hole. If the well can produce enough oil or gas
to cover the cost of completion and production, it will be put into production. Otherwise, it is classified as a dry
hole, even if oil or gas is found. The percentage of wells completed is used as a measure of success. Immediately
after World War II, 65% of the wells drilled were completed as oil or gas wells. This percentage declined to about
57% by the end of the 1960s. It then rose steadily during the 1970s to reach 70% at the end of that decade,
primarily because of the rise in oil prices. This was followed by a plateau or modest decline through most of the
1980s. Beginning in 1990, completion rates increased significantly. The increases of recent years have more to
do with new technology than higher prices.13
Most upstream projects are done in some type of partnership structure. For example, a production-sharing
agreement for the Azeri, Chirag, and Gunashli development in Azerbaijan was signed in September 1994. BP was
the operator with a 34.1% stake; the partners were Chevron with 10.3%, Socar 10%, Inpex 10%, StatoilHydro
8.56%, ExxonMobil 8%, TPAO 6.8%, Devon 5.6%, Itochu 3.9%, and Hess 2.7%.
Reservoir Management
For companies involved in the upstream, reservoir management is an essential skill. Reservoir management involves
ensuring that reserves are replaced and that existing oil and gas fields are efficiently managed. Asset acquisition,
divestiture, and partnering are key aspects of reservoir management. Upstream companies try to replace more
than 100% of the oil and gas produced. Determining the level of proved reserves (the amount of oil and gas the
firm is reasonably certain to recover under existing economic and operating conditions) is a complex process.
Consider the following comment on the auditing of reserves:
Though the word “audit” is customarily used for these evaluations, oil and gas reserves cannot be
“audited” in the conventional sense of a warehouse inventory or a company’s cash balances. Rather,
“proved reserves” are an approximation about formations thousands and even tens of thousands of
feet below ground. Their size, shape, content, and production potential are estimated in a complex
combination of direct evidence and expert interpretation from a variety of scientific disciplines and
methodologies. Added to the science is economics; if it costs more to produce oil from a reservoir
than one can sell it for profitably, then one cannot “book it” as a reserve. Reserves are “proved”
if there is a 90% chance that ultimate recovery will exceed that level. As perverse as it may sound,
under the “production-sharing agreements” that are common in many oil-producing countries, when
the price goes up, proved reserves go down.14
Matthew Simmons, founder of the energy-focused investment bank Simmons and Company (now a
division of PiperJaffray), commented that “95% of world’s ‘proven reserves’ are in-house guesses,” “most reserve
appreciation is exaggerated,” and “95% of the world’s ‘proven reserves’ are unaudited.”15 The pressure to replace
reserves has, on occasion, resulted in some unintended behaviors. In 2004, Shell’s CEO left earlier than anticipated
after revelations that the company had overstated its reserves by nearly 25%.
Upstream Profitability
The profitability of crude oil is a function of the market value for oil and the costs to extract and transport it to
market. The most important cost determinant is the reservoir—where oil is found and how much there is. For
Production costs change over time. Technological advances continue to drive down costs, especially for
deepwater and unconventional oil. The economic cycle also impacts costs. Costs for labor, energy, and materials
rise and fall through the cycles. For example, it was estimated that operating costs in the Alberta oil sands fell
about 20% in 2014 as the industry went through a down cycle in oil prices.16
The term breakeven price was also used to understand the relationship between oil exporting nations and
their fiscal management. In other words, what is the oil price that a country requires in order to match oil revenues
to planned government expenditures—its fiscal breakeven price. Many oil-exporting nations have seen their
fiscal breakeven prices rise significantly over the past decade as they increased spending on social and military
programs. After the price decrease in 2014, the major oil-exporting nations of Africa and the Middle East saw
budget surpluses swing to deficits.
Crude oil has little or no value until it is refined into products such as gasoline and diesel. Thus, producers
of crude oil must sell and transport their product to refineries. The market for crude oil involves many players,
including refiners, speculators, commodities exchanges, shipping companies, IOCs, NOCs, independents, and
OPEC. Market-making activities in the oil business have become front-page news, and the daily price of crude
oil is as frequently reported in the news as the weather.
The ease by which liquids can be transported is a key reason why crude oil has become such an important
source of energy. Although pipelines, ships, and barges are the most common transportation platforms for crude
oil, railroads and tank trucks are also used in some parts of the world. In recent years, railroads have made a
resurgence in the United States and Canada because of the rapid growth in production of oil in North Dakota
and Alberta and a shortage of pipeline capacity. The shipping industry is very fragmented, and because oil tankers
travel for the most part in international waters, largely unregulated. New technologies in ship building in recent
decades have allowed ships to become larger and safer.
Pipelines in Alaska, Chad, Russia, and other countries have allowed oil to be transported from very remote
locations to markets. The construction and management of pipelines is fraught with geopolitical challenges,
which means the pipeline development process takes many years or even decades. Pipelines that cross national
borders are enormously complex to negotiate and build. Countries with pipelines that cross their territory have
been known to use them as bargaining chips. Terrorists often sabotage pipelines and, in some countries, such as
Nigeria and Iraq, oil theft from pipelines and the associated environmental and safety issues are daily occurrences.
The financial performance of the refining sector has always been volatile. The primary measure of industry
profitability is the refining margin, which is the difference between the price of crude oil and refined products.
Exhibit 15 tracks the refining margins in the three main regional markets: North America (U.S. Gulf Coast),
Europe, and Asia Pacific (Singapore).
Crude prices fluctuate for many reasons. Weather in the Gulf Coast states, political instability in oil-
producing countries, or economic growth reports from China can all impact the price of crude oil. These
fluctuations are not always accompanied by matching changes in the price of finished products, leading to large
expansions or contractions in the refining margin. Refiners also get squeezed between the commodity markets
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Calcutta from Jul 2020 to Oct 2020.
for crude oil (crude is the largest cost to a refiner) and commodity markets for refined products like gasoline.
According to the New York Mercantile Exchange:
A petroleum refiner, like most manufacturers, is caught between two markets: the raw materials he
needs to purchase, and the finished products he offers for sale. The prices of crude oil and its principal
refined products, heating oil and unleaded gasoline, are often independently subject to variables of
supply, demand, production economics, environmental regulations, and other factors. As such, refiners
and non-integrated marketers can be at enormous risk when the prices of crude oil rise, while the
prices of the finished products remain static, or even decline. Such a situation can severely narrow the
crack spread, the margin a refiner realizes when he procures crude oil while simultaneously selling
the products into an increasingly competitive market. Because refiners are on both sides of the market
at once, their exposure to market risk can be greater than that incurred by companies who simply
sell crude oil at the wellhead, or sell products to the wholesale and retail markets.17
Profits on refining are usually lower than profits in other lines of business for oil and gas companies. Shell’s
head of downstream operations described the business as, “Grubbing [i.e., begging] for pennies in a street…
If this industry, and especially the downstream, were to let its cost base slip, then we’re going to have difficulty
getting through those down-low cycles.”18 The refining sector typically does well during a period of falling oil
prices, then flattens out and starts declining in profit as oil prices stop falling or start rising.
After a so-called golden age of refining from 2002 to about 2006, refining entered a new and more uncertain
age. Many U.S. and European refineries were either shut down or on the verge of closure. Exhibit 16 shows
average oil refinery utilization rates by region. Industry experts view rates below 80% as unsustainable. A report
by ATKearney concluded that by 2021, every refinery in Western Europe and North America would have to
restructure, strategically reposition their assets, or leave the market.19 Some of the larger refineries in Europe,
such as Repsol’s Cartagena facility, were making major investments to increase production of ultra-low sulfur
diesel and improve conversion capacity. In the United States, no new greenfield refineries have been built for
decades, and many small refineries were closed. Nevertheless, total refining capacity continued to rise through
debottlenecking and expansions to existing sites.
In contrast to the United States and Europe, the last few decades saw aggressive expansion of greenfield
refining capacity in Asia, Brazil, Eastern Europe, and the Middle East. In 2009, Reliance Industries completed
the world’s largest refinery complex at Jamnagar in India. The Jamnagar complex has a capacity of 1.24 million
b/d. In the near term, Jamnagar is expected to focus on export markets. The largest market for Jamnagar is in
the Middle East, followed by Africa, Europe, and the United States. Shipping costs are only pennies per gallon
for finished products, even from India to the United States.
There is no best competitive model in refining. In North America and Western Europe, the oil majors were
divesting or closing refineries. ConocoPhillips and Marathon split into upstream and downstream companies.
In contrast, Petrobras, Pemex, and several Middle East NOCs were expanding refining capacity.
Source: Wood Mackenzie, as quoted in “Europe’s Move to Cleaner Energy Hits Refineries Hard.” The Wall Street Journal. Dec. 23, 2019. Forecast
values from 2019-2025.
traditional retail barriers to competition gone, the majors sold most of their company-owned service stations
in countries around the world. The buyers were a mix of convenience store specialists, such as Couche-Tard of
Canada (more than 16,000 fuel stores around the world), franchisers, distributors, and independent dealers.
Natural Gas
Although the industry has always been colloquially referred to as “oil and gas,” the two hydrocarbons are very
different in use, transportability, and markets. In recent years, natural gas has played a much more important
role in the global energy mix. The growth in liquefied natural gas (LNG) supply has had a major impact on
gas markets. For many years, natural gas was a niche product because, unlike crude oil, natural gas is not easily
transported. Without a pipeline infrastructure, natural gas in its gas form cannot be transported far from its
source. In some parts of the world, such as Western and Central Europe and North America, a network of
pipelines allows gas to be produced and distributed efficiently. In the U.S., gas pipeline companies operate more
than 285,000 miles of pipe. In other parts of the world, such as offshore Africa or Qatar, pipelines to a large
customer base are not feasible.
To transport gas to distant markets, it can be converted to LNG. To liquefy natural gas, impurities such
as water, carbon dioxide, sulfur, and some of the heavier hydrocarbons are removed. The gas is then cooled to
-259 degrees F (-162 degrees C) at atmospheric pressure to condense the gas to liquid form. The liquefied gas is
transported by specially designed cryogenic sea vessels and road tankers to maintain its temperature and liquid
form. In the past few decades, LNG has moved from being a niche product to a vital part of the global energy
business. As more players take part in investment, both upstream and downstream, and as new technologies are
adopted, the prices for construction of LNG plants, receiving terminals, and ships have fallen, making LNG a
more competitive energy source. LNG ships are also getting much larger and more efficient.
Major technological and structural changes continue to occur in the LNG business. The floating liquefied
natural gas (FLNG) vessel is a technology that allows producers to commercialize offshore gas deposits without
pipelines and onshore infrastructure. FLNGs create opportunities to commercialize gas fields that would otherwise
be untouched. Another innovation is the floating natural gas liquefaction, regasification, and storage (FLRSU)
vessel which moves the various industrial processes offshore and makes the equipment available for redeployment
at the end of the resource life.
The increased use of gas for power generation has also had a major impact on gas markets. Significantly
cleaner than coal, natural gas has been characterized as the preferable bridge fuel between coal and renewables like
wind and solar. This power demand market growth has been expedited by the lower costs and more widespread
use of LNG. As illustrated by Exhibit 17, gas prices have been much more volatile over the last 20 years as both
demand (power generation) and supply (LNG-facilitated stranded gas and unconventional gas development like
shale gas) have whip-sawed the market. Note how closely natural gas prices have tracked oil prices (in terms of
btus) for many years. This is a result of what is called “oil-to-gas pricing”—markets regularly benchmarked oil
as the value of a btu in the absence of well-defined natural gas markets.
Petrochemicals
Petrochemicals, which are organic chemical products derived from oil and gas, are the farthest downstream activity
in the value chain. Although all of the major IOCs are involved in chemicals to some degree, they have different
strategic approaches. Exhibit 18 shows the world’s largest petrochemical companies. ExxonMobil Chemical
produces both cyclical commodity type products, such as olefins and polyethylene, as well as a range of less-
cyclical specialty businesses. Many of ExxonMobil’s refineries and chemical plants were co-located, providing
opportunities for shared knowledge and support services and the creation of product-based synergies. In the past,
BP and Shell had chemical businesses that were among the largest in the world.20 In 2005, BP sold the majority
of its chemical business to Ineos. Shell also downsized its chemicals business. The rising players in chemicals in
the Middle East and Asia include state-controlled companies, such as Sabic (Saudi Arabia) and Sinopec, and
non-state companies, such as Reliance (India).
Source: Chemical and Engineering News. Note: DowDuPont split into three separate companies in 2019.
The commodity side of the petrochemical sector is capital-intensive and deeply cyclical. Margins and
profitability for commodity chemicals depend on scale, capacity utilization, operating cost discipline, and access to
low-cost feedstock. Specialty chemicals, at the other end of the spectrum, are sold on the basis of their performance
in customer applications, not chemical composition. Patented products or technologies can enhance the value of
specialty chemicals. Product differentiation may be the result of proprietary technologies such as unique catalysts
or chemical processes, and it can also be the result of brand names, marketing, customer service, and delivery.
In chemicals, Ineos, the privately held British company, grew through a series of related acquisitions to
become one of the world’s largest chemical companies. In the upstream, the huge financial scale of projects such
as Gorgon, Kashagan, or Sakhalin I and II make it unlikely that a new entrant could challenge the majors in the
India is also a force to be reckoned with in the global oil and gas industry. India, the third largest oil
consumer, needs energy to feed its rapidly growing and industrializing economy. Companies such as Reliance are
moving aggressively into the upstream, and state-owned companies such as ONGC, Oil India Limited, and Gas
Authority of India are slowly becoming more productive. Like China, India is far from self-sufficient in energy
and must find new energy sources.