Lesson 3 Interpretation of Statutes

Key Concepts One Learning Objectives

Should Know
To understand:
• Legislature • Statutes as a will of legislature conveyed in the form of text.
• Codifying • Interpretation or construction of a statute as an age-old process
and as old as language.
• Interpretation
• The statute as an edict of the Legislature.
• Construction • The conventional way of interpreting or construing a statute.
• Proviso • The aspects of the intention of legislature.
• The process of construction, i.e., the literal and purposive
• Pari material
approaches.
• Jurisprudence • Necessity of interpretation in cases where the language of a
• Natural justice statutory provision is ambiguous, not clear or where two views are
possible or where the provision gives a different meaning defeating
the object of the statute.
• The need of recourse to various internal and external aids.
• The complexity of modern legislation that demands a clear
understanding of the principles of construction applicable to it.
• Understand the general principles of interpretation as well as
internal and external aids in interpretation of the statutes.

Lesson Outline
• Introduction – Contemporanea
• Need and Object of Expositio Est Optima Et
Interpretation Fortissima in Lege
• General Principles of – Noscitur a Sociis
Interpretation – Strict and Liberal
– Primary Rules Construction
– Mischief Rule • Presumptions
– Rule of Reasonable • Internal Aids to
Construction Interpretation
– Rule of Harmonious • External Aids to
Construction Interpretation
– Rule of Ejusdem Generis • LESSON ROUND UP
• Other Rules • GLOSSARY
– Expressio Unis Est • SELF-TEST QUESTIONS
Exclusio Alterius
• LIST OF FURTHER
READINGS

“Interpretation or construction is the process by which the Courts seek

to ascertain the meaning of the legislature through the medium of the
authoritative forms in which it is expressed.”
– Salmond
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INTRODUCTION
A statute has been defined as “the will of the legislature” (Maxwell, Interpretation of Statutes, 11th ed. p. 1).
Normally, it denotes the Act enacted by the legislature.
A statute is thus a written “will” of the legislature expressed according to the form necessary to constitute it as
a law of the State, and rendered authentic by certain prescribed forms and solemnities. (Crawford, p. 1)
According to Bouvier’s Law Dictionary, a statute is “a law established by the act of the legislative power, i.e.,
an Act of the legislature. The written will of the legislature. The term ‘statute’ is generally applied to laws and
regulations of every sort, law which ordains, permits or prohibits anything which is designated as a statute,
without considering from what source it arises”.
The Constitution of India does not use the term ‘statute’ but it employs the term “law” to describe an exercise
of legislative power.
Statutes are commonly divided into following classes:

(1) Codifying, when they codify the unwritten law on a subject;

(2) Declaratory, when they do not profess to make any alteration in the existing law, but merely declare or
explain what it is;
(3) Remedial, when they alter the common law, or the judge made (non-statutory) law;
(4) Amending, when they alter the statute law;
(5) Consolidating, when they consolidate several Question: Declatory statutes are………………..
previous statutes relating to the same subject
matter, with or without alternations of Options: (A) when they codify the unwritten law
substance; (B) when they alter the statute law
(6) Enabling, when they remove a restriction or (C) when merely explain what it is
disability;
(D) when they declare a penalty or forfeiture
(7) Disabling or restraining, when they restrain
Answer: (C)
the alienation of property;
(8) Penal, when they impose a penalty or forfeiture.

NEED AND OBJECT OF INTERPRETATION

The following observation of Denning L.J. in Seaford Court Estates Ltd. v. Asher, (1949) 2 K.B. 481 (498), on
the need for statutory interpretation is instructive: “It is not within human powers to forsee the manifold sets
of facts which may arise; and that; even if it were, it is not possible to provide for them in terms free from all
 Lesson 3 • Interpretation of Statutes 85

ambiguity. The English language is not an instrument of mathematical precision. Our literature would be much
the poorer if it were. This is where the draftsmen of Acts of Parliament have often been unfairly criticised. A
judge, believing himself to be fettered by the supposed rule that he must look to the language and nothing else,
laments that the draftsmen have not provided for this or that, or have been guilty of some or other ambiguity.
It would certainly save the judge’s trouble if Acts of Parliament were drafted with divine prescience and perfect
clarity. In the absence of it, when a defect appears, a judge cannot simply fold his hands and blame the draftsman.
He must set to work on the constructive task of finding the intention of Parliament, and he must do this, not
only from the language of the statute, but also from a consideration of the social conditions which gave rise to
it, and of the mischief which it was passed to remedy, and then he must supplement the written word so as to
give ‘force and life’ to the intention of the legislature. To put into other words : A judge should ask himself the
question : If the makers of the Act had themselves come across this luck in the texture of it, how would they have
straight ended it out? He must then do as they would have done. A judge must not alter the material of which it
is woven, but he can and should iron out the creases.
The object of interpretation has been explained in Halsbury’s Laws of England 3rd Ed., vol. 2, p. 381 in the
following words: “The object of all interpretation of a ‘Written Document’ is to discover the intention of the
author, the written declaration of whose mind the document is always considered to be. Consequently, the
construction must be as near to the minds and apparent intention of the parties as possible, and as the law will
permit. The function of the court is to ascertain what the parties meant by the words which they have used; to
declare the meaning of what is written in the instrument, and not of what was intended to have been written;
to give effect to the intention as expressed, the expressed meaning being, for the purpose of interpretation,
equivalent of the intention. It is not possible to guess at the intention of the parties and substitute the presumed
for the expressed intention. The ordinary rules of construction must be applied, although by doing so the real
intention of the parties may, in some instances be defeated. Such a course tends to establish a greater degree
of certainty in the administration of the law”. The object of interpretation, thus, in all cases is to see what is the
intention expressed by the words used. The words of the statute are to be interpreted so as to ascertain the
mind of the legislature from the natural and grammatical meaning of the words which it has used.
According to Salmond, interpretation or construction is the process by which the Court’s seek to ascertain the
meaning of the legislature through the medium of the authoritative forms in which it is expressed.

GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF INTERPRETATION

At the outset, it must be clarified that, it is only when the intention of the legislature as expressed in the statute
is not clear, that the Court in interpreting it will have any need for the rules of interpretation of statutes. It may
also be pointed out here that since our legal system is, by and large, modelled on Common Law system, our
rules of interpretation are also same as that of the system. It is further to be noted, that the so called rules of
interpretation are really guidelines.

Primary Rules

• The Primary Rule: Literal Construction

• The Mischief Rule or Heydon’s Rule
• Rule of Reasonable Construction i.e. Ut Res Magis Valeat Quam Pareat
• Rule of Harmonious Construction
• Rule of Ejusdem Generis

Other Rules of Interpretation

• Expressio Unis Est Exclusio Alterius

• Contemporanea Expositio Est Optima Et Fortissima in Lege
• Noscitur a Sociis
• Strict and Liberal Construction
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(i) Primary Rules

(a) The Primary Rule: Literal Construction
According to this rule, the words, phrases and sentences of a statute are ordinarily to be understood
in their natural, ordinary or popular and grammatical meaning unless such a construction leads to an
absurdity or the content or object of the statute suggests a different meaning. The objectives ‘natural’,
‘ordinary’ and ‘popular’ are used interchangeably.
Interpretation should not be given which would make other provisions redundant (Nand Prakash Vohra v.
State of H.P., AIR 2000 HP 65).
If there is nothing to modify, alter or qualify the language which the statute contains, it must be construed
according to the ordinary and natural meaning of the words. “The safer and more correct course of dealing
with a question of construction is to take the words themselves and arrive, if possible, at their meaning
without, in the first instance, reference to cases.”
“Whenever you have to construe a statute or document you do not construe it according to the mere
ordinary general meaning of the words, but according to the ordinary meaning of the words as applied to
the subject matter with regard to which they are used”. (Brett M.R.)
It is a corollary to the general rule of literal construction that nothing is to be added to or taken from a
statute unless there are adequate grounds to justify the inference that the legislature intended something
which it omitted to express.
A construction which would leave without effect any part of the language of a statute will normally be
rejected. Thus, where an Act plainly gave an appeal from one quarter sessions of another, it was observed
that such a provision, though extraordinary and perhaps an oversight, could not be eliminated.
Similarly, the main part of the section must not be construed in such a way as to render a proviso to the
section redundant.
Some of the other basic principles of literal construction are:
(i) Every word in the law should be given meaning as no word is unnecessarily used.
(ii) One should not presume any omissions and if a word is not there in the Statute, it shall not be given
any meaning.
While discussing rules of literal construction the Supreme Court in State of H.P v. Pawan Kumar (2005) 4
SCALE, P.1, held: One of the basic principles of interpretation of statutes is to construe them according to
plain, literal and grammatical meaning of the words.
— If that is contrary to, or inconsistent with, any express intention or declared purpose of the Statute,
or if it would involve any absurdity, repugnancy or inconsistency, the grammatical sense must then
be modified, extended, abridged, so far as to avoid such an inconvenience, but no further.
— The onus of showing that the words do not mean what they say lies heavily on the party who alleges it.
— He must advance something which clearly shows that the grammatical construction would be
repugnant to the intention of the Act or lead to some manifest absurdity.
(b) The Mischief Rule or Heydon’s Rule
In Heydon’s Case, in [1584] [76 ER 637 360 REP 7a], it was resolved by the Barons of the Exchequer “that
for the sure and true interpretation of all statutes in general (be they penal or beneficial, restrictive or
enlarging of the Common Law) four things are to be discerned and considered: (1) What was the Common
Law before the making of the Act; (2) What was the mischief and defect for which the Common Law
did not provide; (3) What remedy the Parliament had resolved and appointed to cure the disease of the
Commonwealth; and (4) The true reason of the remedy.
Although judges are unlikely to propound formally in their judgments the four questions in Heydon’s Case,
consideration of the “mischief” or “object” of the enactment is common and will often provide the solution
to a problem of interpretation. Therefore, when the material words are capable of bearing two or more
 Lesson 3 • Interpretation of Statutes 87

constructions, the most firmly established rule for construction of such words is the rule laid down in
Heydon’s case which has “now attained the status of a classic”. The rule directs that the Courts must adopt
that construction which “shall suppress the mischief and advance the remedy”. But this does not mean
that a construction should be adopted which ignores the plain natural meaning of the words or disregard
the context and the collection in which they occur. (See Umed Singh v. Raj Singh, A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 43)
The Supreme Court in Sodra Devi’s case, AIR 1957 S.C. 832 has expressed the view that the rule in Heydon’s
case is applicable only when the words in question are ambiguous and are reasonably capable of more
than one meaning.
The correct principle is that after the words have been construed in their context and it is found that the
language is capable of bearing only one construction, the rule in Heydon’s case ceases to be controlling
and gives way to the plain meaning rule.
(c) Rule of Reasonable Construction, i.e., Ut Res Magis Valeat Quam Pareat
Normally, the words used in a statute have to be construed in their ordinary meaning, but in many cases,
judicial approach finds that the simple device of adopting the ordinary meaning of words, does not meet
the ends as a fair and a reasonable construction. Exclusive reliance on the bare dictionary meaning of
words’ may not necessarily assist a proper construction of the statutory provision in which the words
occur. Often enough interpreting the provision, it becomes necessary to have regard to the subject matter
of the statute and the object which it is intended to achieve.
According to this rule, the words of a statute must be construed ut res magis valeat quam pareat, so as to
give a sensible meaning to them. A provision of law cannot be so interpreted as to divorce it entirely from
common sense; every word or expression used in an Act should receive a natural and fair meaning.
It is the duty of a Court in constructing a statute to give effect to the intention of the legislature. If, therefore,
giving of literal meaning to a word used by the draftsman particularly in penal statute would defeat the
object of the legislature, which is to suppress a mischief, the Court can depart from the dictionary meaning
which will advance the remedy and suppress the mischief.
It is only when the language of a statute, in its ordinary meaning and grammatical construction, leads to a
manifest contradiction of the apparent purpose of the enactment, or to some inconvenience or absurdity,
hardship of injustice, presumably not intended, a construction may be put upon it which modifies the
meaning of the words and even the structure of the sentence (Tirath Singh v. Bachittar Singh, A.I.R. 1955
S.C. 830).
Courts can depart from dictionary meaning of a word and give it a meaning which will advance the remedy
and suppress the mischief provided the Court does not have to conjecture or surmise. A construction will
be adopted in accordance with the policy and object of the statute (Kanwar Singh v. Delhi Administration,
AIR 1965 S.C. 871). To make the discovered intention fit the words used in the statute, actual expression
used in it may be modified (Newman Manufacturing Co. Ltd. v. Marrables, (1931) 2 KB 297, Williams v.
Ellis, 1880 49 L.J.M.C.). If the Court considers that the litera legis is not clear, it, must interpret according
to the purpose, policy or spirit of the statute (ratio-legis). It is, thus, evident that no invariable rule can be
established for literal interpretation.
In RBI v. Peerless General Finance and Investment Co. In Municipal Corporation of
Ltd. (1987) 1 SCC 424. The Supreme Court stated that Hyderabad vs. P.N. Murthy & Ors.,
if a statute is looked at in the context of its enactment, 1987 SCR (2) 107
with the glasses of the statute makers provided by such It was observed by the Supreme
context, its scheme, the sections, clauses, phrases and Court that the scheme of the relevant
words may take colour and appear different than when sections has to be read and construed
the statute is looked at without the glasses provided by in a meaningful, purposeful and
the context. With these glasses we must look at the Act as rational manner. The expression ‘vest’
a whole and discover what each section, each clause each employed in Section 202(1)(c), under
phrase and each word is meant and designed to say as to the circumstances must of necessity be
fit into the scheme of the entire Act.(See also Chairman construed as vesting both in title as well
Indore Vikas Pradhikaran v. Pure Industrial Coke and as in possession.
Chemicals Ltd., AIR 2007 SC 2458).
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(d) Rule of Harmonious Construction

A statute must be read as a whole and one provision of the Act should be construed with reference to other
provisions in the same Act so as to make a consistent enactment of the whole statute. Such a construction
has the merit of avoiding any inconsistency or repugnancy either within a section or between a section
and other parts of the statute. It is the duty of the Courts to avoid “a head on clash” between two sections
of the same Act and, “whenever it is possible to do so, to construct provisions which appear to conflict so
that they harmonise” (Raj Krishna v. Pinod Kanungo, A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 202 at 203).
Where in an enactment, there are two provisions which cannot be reconciled with each other, they
should be so interpreted that, if possible, effect may be given to both. This is what is known as the “rule of
harmonius construction”.
The Supreme Court applied this rule in resolving a In M/s New India Sugar Mills Ltd.
conflict between Articles 25(2)(b) and 26(b) of the vs. Commissioner of Sales Tax, Bihar.
Constitution and it was held that the right of every SC, 1963 AIR 1207
religious denomination or any section thereof to manage It was observed by Supreme Court that
its own affairs in matters of religion [Article 26(b)] is It is a recognised rule of interpretation
subject to a law made by a State providing for social of statutes that the expressions used
welfare and reform or throwing open of Hindu religious therein should ordinarily be understood
institutions of a public character to all classes and in a sense in which they best harmonise
sections of Hindus [Article 25(2)(b)]. (Venkataramana with the object of the statute, and which
Devaru v. State of Mysore, A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 255). effectuate the object of the Legislature.
(e) Rule of Ejusdem Generis
Ejusdem Generis, literally means “of the same kind or species”. The rule can be stated thus:
(i) In an enumeration of different subjects in an Act, general words following specific words may be
construed with reference to the antecedent matters, and the construction may be narrowed down by
treating them as applying to things of the same kind as those previously mentioned, unless of course,
there is something to show that a wide sense was intended;
(ii) If the particular words exhaust the whole genus, then the general words are construed as embracing
a larger genus.
In other words, the ejusdem generis rule is that, where there are general words following particular and
specific words, the general words following particular and specific words must be confined to things of
the same kind as those specified, unless there is a clear manifestation of a contrary purpose. It is merely a
rule of construction to aid the Courts to find out the true intention of the Legislature (Jage Ram v. State of
Haryana, A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 1033). To apply the rule the following conditions must exist:
(1) The statute contains an enumeration by specific words,
(2) The members of the enumeration constitute a class,
Question: Which of the following is
(3) The class is not exhausted by the enumeration, not a primary rule of Interpretation?
(4) A general term follows the enumeration, Option: (A) Literal Construction
(5) There is a distinct genus which comprises more than (B) Heydon’s rule
one species, and (C) Noscitur a Sociis
(6) There is no clearly manifested intent that the general (D) Ejusdem Generis
term be given a broader meaning that the doctrine Answer: (C)
requires. (See Thakura Singh v. Revenue Minister, AIR
1965 J & K 102)
The rule of ejusdem generis must be applied with great caution because, it implies a departure from the
natural meaning of words, in order to give them a meaning or supposed intention of the legislature. The
rule must be controlled by the fundamental rule that statutes must be construed so as to carry out the
object sought to be accomplished. The rule requires that specific words are all of one genus, in which case,
the general words may be presumed to be restricted to that genus.
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Whether the rule of ejusdem generis should be applied or not to a particular provision depends upon the
purpose and object of the provision which is intended to be achieved.

(ii) Other Rules of Interpretation

(a) Expressio Unis Est Exclusio Alterius
The rule means that express mention of one thing implies the exclusion of another.
At the same time, general words in a statute must receive a general construction, unless there is in the
statute some ground for limiting and restraining their meaning by reasonable construction; because many
things are put into a statute ex abundanti cautela, and it is not to be assumed that anything not specifically
included is for that reason alone excluded from the protection of the statute. The method of construction
according to this maxim must be carefully watched. The failure to make the ‘expressio’ complete may
arise from accident. Similarly, the ‘exclusio’ is often the result of inadvertence or accident because it never
struck the draftsman that the thing supposed to be excluded requires specific mention. The maxim ought
not to be applied when its application leads to inconsistency or injustice.
Similarly, it cannot be applied when the language of the Statute is plain with clear meaning (Parbhani
Transport Co-operative Society ltd v Regional Transport Authority, AIR 1960 SC 801)
(b) Contemporanea Expositio Est Optima Et Fortissima in Lege
The maxim means that a contemporaneous exposition is the best and strongest in law. Where the words
used in a statute have undergone alteration in meaning in course of time, the words will be construed to
bear the same meaning as they had when the statute was passed on the principle expressed in the maxim.
In simple words, old statutes should be interpreted as they would have been at the date when they were
passed and prior usage and interpretation by those who have an interest or duty in enforcing the Act, and
the legal profession of the time, are presumptive evidence of their meaning when the meaning is doubtful.
But if the statute appears to be capable of only interpretation, the fact that a wrong meaning had been
attached to it for many years, will be immaterial and the correct meaning will be given by the Courts
except when title to property may be affected or when every day transactions have been entered into on
such wrong interpretation.
(c) Noscitur a Sociis
The ‘Noscitur a Sociis’, i.e., “It is known by its associates”. In other words, meaning of a word should be
known from its accompanying or associating words. It is not a sound principle in interpretation of statutes,
to lay emphasis on one word disjuncted from its preceding and succeeding words. A word in a statutory
provision is to be read in collocation with its companion words. The pristine principle based on the maxim
‘noscitur a socitis’ has much relevance in understanding the import of words in a statutory provision (K.
Bhagirathi G. Shenoy v. K.P. Ballakuraya, AIR 1999 SC 2143).
The rule states that where two or more words which are susceptible of analogous meaning are coupled
together, they are understood in their cognate sense. It is only where the intention of the legislature
in associating wider words with words of narrower significance, is doubtful that the present rule of
construction can be usefully applied.
The same words bear the same meaning in the same statute. But this rule will not apply:
(i) When the context excluded that principle.
(ii) If sufficient reason can be assigned, it is proper to construe a word in one part of an Act in a different
sense from that which it bears in another part of the Act.
(iii) Where it would cause injustice or absurdity.
(iv) Where different circumstances are being dealt with.
(v) Where the words are used in a different context. Many do not distinguish between this rule and
the ejusdem generis doctrine. But there is a subtle distinction as pointed out in the case of State of
Bombay v. Hospital Mazdoor Sabha, (1960) 2 SCR 866.
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(d) Strict and Liberal Construction

In Wiberforce on Statute Law, it is said that what is meant by ‘strict construction’ is that “Acts, are not to be
regarded as including anything which is not within their letter as well as their spirit, which is not clearly
and intelligibly described in the very words of the statute, as well as manifestly intended”, while by ‘liberal
construction’ is meant that “everything is to be done in advancement of the remedy that can be done
consistently with any construction of the statute”. Beneficial construction to suppress the mischief and
advance the remedy is generally preferred.
A Court invokes the rule which produces a result that satisfies its sense of justice in the case before it.
“Although the literal rule is the one most frequently referred to in express terms, the Courts treat all three
(viz., the literal rule, the golden rule and the mischief rule) as valid and refer to them as occasion demands,
but do not assign any reasons for choosing one rather than another. Sometimes a Court discusses all the
three approaches. Sometimes it expressly rejects the ‘mischief rule’ in favour of the ‘literal rule’. Sometimes
it prefers, although never expressly, the ‘mischief rule’ to the ‘literal rule’.

PRESUMPTIONS
Where the meaning of the statute is clear, there is no need for presumptions. But if the intention of the legislature
is not clear, there are number of presumptions. These are:
(a) That the words in a statute are used precisely and not loosely.
(b) That vested rights, i.e., rights which a person possessed at the time the statute was passed, are not taken
away without express words, or necessary implication or without compensation.
(c) That “mens rea”, i.e., guilty mind is required for a criminal act. There is a very strong presumption that a
statute creating a criminal offence does not intend to attach liability without a guilty intent.
The general rule applicable to criminal cases is “actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea” (The act itself does
not constitute guilt unless done with a guilty intent).
(d) That the state is not affected by a statute unless it is expressly mentioned as being so affected.
(e) That a statute is not intended to be inconsistent with the principles of International Law. Although the
judges cannot declare a statute void as being repugnant to International Law, yet if two possible alternatives
present themselves, the judges will choose that which is not at variance with it.
(f) That the legislature knows the state of the law.
(g) That the legislature does not make any alteration in the existing law unless by express enactment.
(h) That the legislature knows the practice of the executive and the judiciary.
(i) Legislature confers powers necessary to carry out duties imposed by it.
(j) That the legislature does not make mistake. The Court will not even alter an obvious one, unless it be to
correct faulty language where the intention is clear.
(jj) The law compels no man to do that which is futile or fruitless.
(k) Legal fictions may be said to be statements or suppositions which are known, to be untrue, but which are
not allowed to be denied in order that some difficulty may be overcome, and substantial justice secured. It
is a well settled rule of interpretation that in construing the scope of a legal fiction, it would be proper and
even necessary to assume all those facts on which alone the fiction can operate.
(l) Where powers and duties are inter-connected and it is not possible to separate one from the other in such
a way that powers may be delegated while duties are retained and vice versa, the delegation of powers
takes with it the duties.
(m) The doctrine of natural justice is really a doctrine for the interpretation of statutes, under which the
Court will presume that the legislature while granting a drastic power must intend that it should be fairly
exercised.
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INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL AIDS IN INTERPRETATION

Internal and External

Aids in Interpretation

Internal Aids External Aids

in Interpretation in Interpretation

- Title - Parliamentary History

- Preamble
- Reference to Reports of Committees
- Heading and Title of
a Chapter - Reference to other Statutes
- Marginal Notes - Dictionaries
- Interpretation Clauses
- Use of Foreign Decisions
- Proviso
- Illustrations or Explanation
- Schedules

In coming to a determination as to the meaning of a particular Act, it is permissible to consider two points,
namely,
(1) The external evidence derived from extraneous circumstances, such as, previous legislation and decided
cases etc., and
(2) The internal evidence derived from the Act itself.

Internal Aids in Interpretation

The following may be taken into account while interpreting a statute:
Title
The long title of an Act is a part of the Act and is admissible as an aid to its construction. The long title sets out
in general terms, the purpose of the Act and it often precedes the preamble. It must be distinguished from short
title which implies only an abbreviation for purposes of reference, the object of which is identification and not
description. The true nature of the law is determined not by the name given to it but by its substance. However,
the long title is a legitimate aid to the construction.
While dealing with the Supreme Court Advocates (Practice in High Court) Act, 1951 bearing a full title as “An Act
to authorise Advocates of the Supreme Court to practice as of right in any High Court”, S.R. Das, J. observed: “One
cannot but be impressed at once with the wording of the full title of the Act. Although there are observations in
earlier English Cases that the title is not a part of the statute and is, therefore, to be excluded from consideration
in construing the statutes. It is now a settled law that the title of a statute is an important part of the Act and
may be referred to for the purpose of ascertaining its general scope and of throwing light on its construction,
although it cannot override the clear meaning of an enactment.
Preamble
The true place of a preamble in a statute was at one time, the subject of conflicting decisions. In Mills v. Wilkins,
(1794) 6 Mad. 62, Lord Hold said: “the preamble of a statute is not part thereof, but contains generally the
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motives or inducement thereof”. On the other hand, it was said that “the preamble is to be considered, for it is
the key to open the meaning of the makers of the Act, and the mischief it was intended to remedy”. The modern
rule lies between these two extremes and is that where the enacting part is explicit and unambiguous the
preamble cannot be resorted to, control, qualify or restrict it, but where the enacting part is ambiguous, the
preamble can be referred to explain and elucidate it (Raj Mal v. Harnam Singh, (1928) 9 Lah. 260). In Powell
v. Kempton Park Race Course Co., (1899) AC 143, 157, Lord Halsbury said: “Two propositions are quite clear
— One that a preamble may afford useful light as to what a statute intends to reach and another that, if an
enactment is itself clear and unambiguous, no preamble can qualify or cut down the enactment”. This rule has
been applied to Indian statutes also by the Privy Council in Secretary of State v. Maharaja Bobbili, (1920) 43
Mad. 529, and by the Courts in India in a number of cases (See for example, Burrakur Coal Co. v. Union of India,
AIR 1961 SC 154. Referring to the cases in Re. Kerala Education Bill, AIR 1958 SC 956 and Bishambar Singh v.
State of Orissa, AIR 1954 SC 139, the Allahabad High Court has held in Kashi Prasad v. State, AIR 1967 All. 173,
that even though the preamble cannot be used to defeat the enacting clauses of a statute, it has been treated to
be a key for the interpretation of the statute.
Supreme Court in Kamalpura Kochunni v. State of Madras, AIR 1960 SC 1080, pointed out that the preamble may
be legitimately consulted in case any ambiguity arises in the construction of an Act and it may be useful to fix
the meaning of words used so as to keep the effect of the statute within its real scope.
Heading and Title of a Chapter
In different parts of an Act, there is generally found a series or class of enactments applicable to some special
object, and such sections are in many instances, preceded by a heading. It is now settled that the headings or
titles prefixed to sections or group of sections can be referred to in construing an Act of the legislature. But
conflicting opinions have been expressed on the question as to what weight should be attached to the headings.
A “heading”, according to one view “is to be regarded as giving the key to the interpretation of clauses ranged
under it, unless the wording is inconsistent with such interpretation; and so that headings, might be treated “as
preambles to the provisions following them”. But according to the other view, resort to the heading can only be
taken when the enacting words are ambiguous. So Lord Goddard, C.J. expressed himself as: However, the Court
is entitled to look at the headings in an Act of Parliament to resolve any doubt they may have as to ambiguous
words, the law is clear that those headings cannot be used to give a different effect to clear words in the sections
where there cannot be any doubt as to the ordinary meaning of the words”. Similarly, it was said by Patanjali
Shastri, J.: “Nor can the title of a chapter be legitimately used to restrict the plain terms of an enactment”. In this
regard, the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Suresh Kumar v. Town Improvement Trust, AIR 1975 MP 189, has held:
“Headings or titles prefixed to sections or group of sections may be referred to as to construction of doubtful
expressions; but the title of a chapter cannot be used to restrict the plain terms of an enactment”.
The Supreme Court observed that, “the headings prefixed to sections or entries (of a Tariff Schedule) cannot
control the plain words of the provision; they cannot also be referred to for the purpose of construing the
provision when the words used in the provision are clear and unambiguous; nor can they be used for cutting
down the plain meaning of the words in the provision. Only in the case of ambiguity or doubt the heading or the
sub-heading may be referred to as an aid for construing the provision but even in such a case aid could not be
used for cutting down the wide application of the clear words used in the provision” (Frick India Ltd. v. Union of
India, AIR 1990 SC 689).
Marginal Notes
In England, the disposition of the Court is to disregard the marginal notes. In our country the Courts have
entertained different views. Although opinion is not uniform, the weight of authority is in favour of the view
that the marginal note appended to a section cannot be used for construing the section.
“There seems to be no reason for giving the marginal notes in an Indian statute any greater authority than the
marginal notes in an English Act of Parliament” (Balraj Kumar v. Jagatpal Singh, 26 All. 393). Patanjali Shastri,
J., after referring to the above case with approval observed: “Marginal notes in an Indian statute, as in an Act
of Parliament cannot be referred to for the purpose of construing the Statute” (C.I.T. v. Anand Bhai Umar Bhai,
A.I.R. 1950 S.C. 134). At any rate, there can be no justification for restricting the section by the marginal note,
and the marginal note cannot certainly control the meaning of the body of the section if the language employed
therein is clear and unambiguous (Chandraji Rao v. Income-tax Commissioner, A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 158).
 Lesson 3 • Interpretation of Statutes 93

The Privy Council in Balraj Kumar v. Jagatpal Singh, (1904) 26 All. 393, has held that the marginal notes to the
sections are not to be referred to for the purpose of construction. The Supreme Court in Western India Theatres
Ltd. v. Municipal Corporation of Poona, (1959) S.C.J. 390, has also held, that a marginal note cannot be invoked
for construction where the meaning is clear.
Marginal notes appended to the Articles of the Constitution have been held to constitute part of the Constitution
as passed by the Constituent Assembly and therefore, they have been made use of in consulting the Articles, e.g.
Article 286, as furnishing prima facie, “some clue as to the meaning and purpose of the Article”.
When reference to marginal note is relevant? The Supreme Court has held that the marginal note although
may not be relevant for rendition of decisions in all types of cases but where the main provision is sought to be
interpreted differently, reference to marginal note would be permissible in law. [Sarbajit Rick Singh v. Union of
India (2008) 2 SCC 417; See also Dewan Singh v. Rajendra Prasad (2007) 1 Scale 32].
Interpretation Clauses
It is common to find in statutes “definitions” of certain words and expressions used elsewhere in the body of
the statute. The object of such a definition is to avoid the necessity of frequent repetitions in describing all
the subject-matter to which the word or expression so defined is intended to apply. A definition section may
borrow definitions from an earlier Act and definitions so borrowed need not be found in the definition section
but in some provisions of the earlier Act.
The definition of a word in the definition section may either be restrictive of its ordinary meaning or it may be
extensive of the same. When a word is defined to ‘mean’ such and such, the definition is prima facie restrictive
and exhaustive, whereas where the word defined is declared to ‘include’ such and such, the definition is prima
facie extensive. Further, a definition may be in the form of ‘means and includes’, where again the definition is
exhaustive. On the other hand, if a word is defined ‘to apply to and include’, the definition is understood as
extensive. (See Balkrishan v. M. Bhai AIR 1999 MP 86)
A definition section may also be worded in the form ‘so deemed to include’ which again is an inclusive or
extensive definition and such a form is used to bring in by a legal fiction something within the word defined
which according to ordinary meaning is not included within it.
A definition may be both inclusive and exclusive, i.e., it may include certain things and exclude others. In such
a case limited exclusion of a thing may suggest that other categories of that thing which are not excluded fall
within the inclusive definition.
The definition section may itself be ambiguous and may have to be interpreted in the light of the other provisions
of the Act and having regard to the ordinary connotation of the word defined. A definition is not to be read in
isolation. It must be read in the context of the phrase which it defines, realising that the function of a definition
is to give precision and certainty to a word or a phrase which would otherwise be vague and uncertain but not
to contradict or supplement it altogether.
When a word has been defined in the interpretation clause, prima facie that definition governs whenever that
word is used in the body of the statute.
When a word is defined to bear a number of inclusive meanings, the sense in which the word is used in a
particular provision must be ascertained from the context of the scheme of the Act, the language, the provision
and the object intended to be served thereby.
Proviso
“When one finds a proviso to a section the natural presumption is that, but for the proviso, the enacting part of
the section would have included the subject-matter of proviso”. In the words of Lord Macmillan: “The proper
function of a proviso is to except and to deal with a case which would otherwise fall within the general language
of the main enactment, and its effect is confined to the case”.
As stated by Hidayatullah, J. : “As a general rule, a proviso is added to an enactment to qualify or create an
exception to what is in the enactment, and ordinarily, a proviso is not interpreted as stating a general rule”.
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A distinction is said to exist between the provisions worded as ‘proviso’, ‘exception’ or ‘saving clause’. ‘Exception’
is intended to restrain the enacting clause to particular cases; ‘proviso’ is used to remove special cases from the
general enactment and provide for them specially; and ‘saving clause’ is used to preserve from destruction
certain rights, remedies or privileges already existing.
Illustrations or Explanation
“Illustrations attached to sections are part of the statute and they are useful so far as they help to furnish same
indication of the presumable intention of the legislature. An explanation is at times appended to a section to
explain the meaning of words contained in the section. It becomes a part and parcel of the enactment. But
illustrations cannot have the effect of modifying the language of the section and they cannot either curtail or
expand the ambit of the section which alone forms the enactment. The meaning to be given to an ‘explanation’
must depend upon its terms, and ‘no theory of its purpose can be entertained unless it is to be inferred from the
language used” (Lalla Ballanmal v. Ahmad Shah, 1918 P.C. 249).
An explanation, normally, should be so read as to harmonise with and clear up any ambiguity in the main section
and should not be so construed as to widen the ambit of the section. It is also possible that an explanation may
have been added ex abundanti cautela to allay groundless apprehension.
Schedules
The schedules form a part of the statute and must be read together with it for all purposes of construction. But
expression in the schedule cannot control or prevail against the express enactment (Allen v. Flicker, 1989, 10 A
and F 6.40).
In Ramchand Textile v. Sales Tax Officer, A.I.R. 1961, All. 24, the Allahabad High Court has held that, if there is
any appearance of inconsistency between the schedule and the enactment, the enactment shall prevail. If the
enacting part and the schedule cannot be made to correspond, the latter must yield to the former.
There are two principles or rules of interpretation which ought to be applied to the combination of an Act and
its schedule. If the Act says that the schedule is to be used for a certain purpose and the heading of the part of
the schedule in question shows that it is prima facie at any rate devoted to that purpose, then the Act and the
schedule must be read as if the schedule were operating for that purpose only. If the language of a clause in the
schedule can be satisfied without extending it beyond for a certain purpose, in spite of that, if the language of
the schedule has in its words and terms that go clearly outside the purpose, the effect must be given by them
and they must not be treated as limited by the heading of the part of the schedule or by the purpose mentioned
in the Act for which the schedule is prima facie to be used. One cannot refuse to give effect to clear words simply
because prima facie they seem to be limited by the heading of the schedule and the definition of the purpose of
the schedule contained in the Act.
Whether a particular requirement prescribed by a form is mandatory or directory may have to be decided in
each case having regard to the purpose or object of the requirement and its interrelation with other enacting
provisions of the statute; and it is difficult to lay down any uniform rule. Where forms prescribed under the
rules become part of rules and, the Act confers an authority prescribed by rules to frame particulars of an
application form, such authority may exercise the power to prescribe a particular form of application.
The statement of objects and reasons as well as the ‘notes on clauses of the Bill relating to any particular
legislation may be relied upon for construing any of its provisions where the clauses have been adopted by the
Parliament without any change in enacting the Bill, but where there have been extensive changes during the
passage of the Bill in Parliament, the objects and reasons of the changed provisions may or may not be the same
as of the clauses of the original Bill and it will be unsafe to attach undue importance to the statement of objects
and reasons or notes on clauses.
The Courts have only to enquire, what the legislature has thought fit to enact?
Regarding the reference to the statement of objects and reasons, it is a settled law that it can legitimately be
referred to for a correct appreciation of:
(1) what was the law before the disputed Act was passed;
(2) what was the mischief or defect for which the law had not provided;
(3) what remedy the legislature has intended; and
(4) the reasons for the statute.
 Lesson 3 • Interpretation of Statutes 95

(b) External Aids in Interpretation

Apart from the intrinsic aids, such as preamble and purview of the Act, the Court can consider resources outside
the Act, called the extrinsic aids, in interpreting and finding out the purposes of the Act. Where the words
of an Act are clear and unambiguous, no resource to extrinsic matter, even if it consists of the sources of the
codification, is permissible. But where it is not so, the Court can consider, apart from the intrinsic aids, such as
preamble and the purview of the Act, both the prior events leading up to the introduction of the Bill, out of the
which the Act has emerged, and subsequent events from the time of its introduction until its final enactment
like the legislation, history of the Bill, Select Committee reports.
Parliamentary History
The Supreme Court, enunciated the rule of exclusion of Parliamentary history in the way it is enunciated by
English Courts, but on many occasions, the Court used this aid in resolving questions of construction. The Court
has now veered to the view that legislative history within circumspect limits may be consulted by Courts in
resolving ambiguities.
It has already been noticed that the Court is entitled to take into account “such external or historical facts
as may be necessary to understand the subject-matter of the statute”, or to have regard to “the surrounding
circumstances” which existed at the time of passing of the statute. Like any other external aid, the inferences
from historical facts and surrounding circumstances must give way to the clear language employed in the
enactment itself.
Reference to Reports of Committees
The report of a Select Committee or other Committee on whose report an enactment is based, can be looked
into “so as to see the background against which the legislation was enacted, the fact cannot be ignored that
Parliament may, and often does, decide to do something different to cure the mischief. So we should not be
unduly influenced by the Report (Letang v. Cooper (1964) 2 All. E.R. 929; see also Assam Railways & Trading Co.
Ltd. v. I.R.C. (1935) A.C. 445).
When Parliament has enacted a statute as recommended by the Report of a Committee and there is ambiguity
or uncertainty in any provision of the statute, the Court may have regard to the report of the Committee for
ascertaining the intention behind the provision (Davis v. Johnson (1978) 1 All. E.R. 1132. But where the words used
are plain and clear, no intention other than what the words convey can be imported in order to avoid anomalies.
Present trends in the European Economic Community Countries and the European Court, however, is to interpret
treaties, conventions, statutes, etc. by reference to travaux preparatories, that is, all preparatory records such as
reports and other historical material.
Reference to other Statutes
It has already been stated that a statute must be read as a whole as words are to be understood in their context.
Extension of this rule of context, permits reference to other statutes in pari materia, i.e., statutes dealing with
the same subject matter or forming part of the same system. Viscount Simonds conceived it to be a right and
duty to construe every word of a statute in its context and he used the word in its widest sense including other
statutes in pari materia.
The meaning of the phrase ‘pari materia’ has been explained in an American case in the following words:
“Statutes are in pari materia which relate to the same person or thing, or to the same class of persons or things.
The word par must not be confounded with the words simlis. It is used in opposition to it intimating not likeness
merely, but identity. It is a phrase applicable to public statutes or general laws made at different times and in
reference to the same subject. When the two pieces of legislation are of differing scopes, it cannot be said that
they are in pari materia.
It is a well accepted legislative practice to incorporate by reference, if the legislature so chooses, the provisions
of some other Act in so far as they are relevant for the purposes of and in furtherance of the scheme and subjects
of the Act.
Words in a later enactment cannot ordinarily be construed with reference to the meaning given to those or
similar words in an earlier statute. But the later law is entitled to weight when it comes to the problem of
construction.
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Generally speaking, a subsequent Act of a legislature affords no useful guide to the meaning of another Act
which comes into existence before the later one was ever framed. Under special circumstances the law does,
however, admit of a subsequent Act to be resorted to for this purpose but the conditions, under which the later
Act may be resorted to for the interpretation of the earlier Act are strict. Both must be laws on the same subject
and the part of the earlier Act which is sought to be construed must be ambiguous and capable of different
meanings.
Although a repealed statute has to be considered, as if it had never existed, this does not prevent the Court from
looking at the repealed Act in pari materia on a question of construction.
The regulations themselves cannot alter or vary the meaning of the words of a statute, but they may be looked
at as being an interpretation placed by the appropriate Government department on the words of the statute.
Though the regulations cannot control construction of the Act, yet they may be looked at, to assist in the
interpretation of the Act and may be referred to as working out in detail the provisions of the Act consistently
with their terms.
Dictionaries
When a word is not defined in the Act itself, it is permissible to refer to dictionaries to find out the general
sense in which that word is understood in common parlance. However, in selecting one out of the various
meanings of the word, regard must always be had to the context as it is a fundamental rule that “the meaning
of words and expressions used in an Act must take their colour from the context in which they appear”. Therefore,
when the context makes the meaning of a word quite clear, it becomes unnecessary to search for and select a
particular meaning out of the diverse meanings a word is capable of, according to lexicographers”. As stated by
Krishna Aiyar, J. “Dictionaries are not dictators of statutory construction where the benignant mood of a law,
and more emphatically the definition clause furnish a different denotation”. Further, words and expressions at
times have a ‘technical’ or a ‘legal meaning’ and in that case, they are understood in that sense. Again, judicial
decisions expounding the meaning of words in construing statutes in pari materia will have more weight than
the meaning furnished by dictionaries.
Use of Foreign Decisions Question: Which of the following is
Use of foreign decisions of countries following the same system Internal aid to Interpretation?
of jurisprudence as ours and rendered on statutes in pari Options: (A) Marginal Notes
materia has been permitted by practice in Indian Courts. The (B) Parliamentary History
assistance of such decisions is subject to the qualification that
prime importance is always to be given to the language of the (C)Reference to Reports of Committees
relevant Indian Statute, the circumstances and the setting in (D) Reference to other Statutes
which it is enacted and the Indian conditions where it is to be Answer: (A)
applied.

LESSON ROUND-UP

• A statute normally denotes the Act enacted by the legislature. The object of interpretation in all cases is
to see what is the intention expressed by the words used. The words of the statute are to be interpreted
so as to ascertain the mind of the legislature from the natural and grammatical meaning of the words
which it has used.
• The General Principles of Interpretation are Primary Rules and other Rules of Interpretation.
• The primary rules are:

o Literal Construction
o The Mischief Rule or Heydon’s Rule
o Rule of Reasonable Construction, i.e., Ut Res Magis Valeat Quam Pareat
o Rule of Harmonious Construction
o Rule of Ejusdem Generis