In The United States District Court For The Eastern District of North Carolina Western Division No. 5:18-CV-0073-D
In The United States District Court For The Eastern District of North Carolina Western Division No. 5:18-CV-0073-D
In The United States District Court For The Eastern District of North Carolina Western Division No. 5:18-CV-0073-D
Plaintiffs,
Case No. 5:18-cv-0073-D
v.
Defendants.
Plaintiffs,
Case No. 5:20-CV-00208-D
v.
Defendants.
Plaintiffs James S. Dew and James O’Brien, et al. and Defendants The Chemours Company
FC, LLC, The Chemours Company, and EIDP, Inc. (collectively, the “Parties”) file this Joint
Submission Regarding Trial Selections pursuant to the Court’s Fourth Amended Scheduling Order,
1. The Parties have met and conferred in good faith regarding the order of trials for final
cases as well as the number of trials for the final cases, but have been unable to reach agreement on
2. This consolidated case currently includes over 2,300 individual plaintiffs. See, e.g.,
Dkts. 76, 85, 86, 94, 97, 98, 100, 104, 105, 109, 115, 117, 124, 143, and 148.
selected five cases for inclusion in the trial pool, totaling ten “original cases.” In February 2023, the
parties each selected three of the original cases to proceed to expert discovery, totaling six “final
cases.”
4. Expert discovery for those six final cases closes on the date of this filing, December
11, 2023.
5. Pursuant to the Court’s Fourth Amended Scheduling Order, Dkt. 123, the Parties will
file dispositive motions by February 12, 2024, followed by responses and replies subject to Local
Rules 7.1, 7.2, and 56.1. Upon conclusion of dispositive motion briefing, the parties are prepared to
6. Plaintiffs’ and Defendants’ separate proposals for the number and length of trials are
Plaintiffs’ Proposal
1. Plaintiffs propose two, two-week trials with each trial addressing three of the six Plaintiffs.
a. Trial 1: Richard & Patsy Davis; Allison Pini; and Paul & Socorra Abril
b. Trial 2: John and Anne Stevens; Sandra Riggins Branch; and Cynthia Faircloth
3. Consolidation maximizes efficiency and can be done in a fair, balanced manner. The
six cases overlap considerably. The six cases involve the same causes of action, the same lawyers, the
same experts, and largely the same evidence. Plaintiffs in all six cases allege PFAS contamination
caused by air emissions from Defendants’ Fayetteville Works facility and will use the same evidence
and experts to demonstrate much of their case, including: the types of PFAS manufactured and released
from Defendants’ Fayetteville Works facility; Defendants’ knowledge of PFAS emissions from the
facility; Defendants’ efforts – or lack thereof – to reduce or eliminate PFAS air emissions; violations
of corporate responsibility standards; toxicity of the PFAS found in Plaintiffs’ wells and soil; and
Case 5:18-cv-00073-D Document 1502 Filed 12/11/23 Page 2 of 8
Defendants’ historical PFAS toxicological testing practices, among other things. Moreover,
consolidated trials would not prejudice Defendants. The likelihood of case confusion is low. Much of
Plaintiffs’ case relates to evidence of Defendants’ culpability, which is the same for all Plaintiffs. If
necessary, evidence of individualized harm (including damages) could be presented separately for
each Plaintiff --- even on separate days --- which would make clear that each Plaintiff has their own,
separate injury.
4. Plaintiffs would be prejudiced by individual trials. The six trial plaintiffs have
designated thirteen experts, many of whom are located out of state. The costs to try Plaintiffs’ cases
will be considerable. If individual trials are required, a Plaintiff could succeed at trial but see most of
their recovery go to costs. Through a consolidated trial, per-plaintiff costs would be significantly
reduced. Plus, over 2300 plaintiffs await trial after conclusion of the first six cases. Proceeding in
5. The Court may consolidate trials under Rule 42 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
to prevent needless repetition, delay, or unnecessary costs. See, e.g., Roanoke River Basin Ass'n v.
Duke Energy Progress, LLC, No. 1:16-CV-607, 2018 WL 11449626, at *1 (M.D.N.C. May 8, 2018);
Brinson v. Brosnan, No. 5:21-CV-00151-M, 2021 WL 2188671, at *1 (E.D.N.C. May 28, 2021); see
also Livingston v. Kehagias, No. 5:16-CV-906-BO, 2017 WL 2297004, at *2 (E.D.N.C. May 24, 2017)
(“While there may be a risk of possible confusion in a multi-plaintiff trial such as this, this risk may
be mitigated against with proper instructions to the jury, . . . , and it does not outweigh the burden and
6. Plaintiffs dispute Defendants’ position that Due Process requires subsequent trials to
wait on resolution of an appeal of the first case. This issue is not ripe, so it need not be determined
now. However, Plaintiffs contend that the second trial should begin soon after the conclusion of the
first, and any potential appeal can occur simultaneously with a subsequent trial. Over 2300 plaintiffs
await trial, and a delay for appeal creates a delay for all.
Case 5:18-cv-00073-D Document 1503 Filed 12/11/23 Page 3 of 8
7. Should the Court consolidate trials, Plaintiffs acknowledge that meeting and conferring
with Defendants to determine plaintiff groupings and trial order may be appropriate.
Defendants’ Proposal
8. Defendants propose individual trials for each of the six final cases, with each trial
9. In support of this position, Defendants point to the unique circumstances of each of the
plaintiffs in the six final cases that could confuse a jury were the facts consolidated with other
plaintiffs. For example, Sandra Riggins Branch owns two properties that would be the subject of the
trial: one property that is connected to public utility water and one next-door property that sources
water from a well. Issues of public utility water and ownership of multiple properties are unique to
Ms. Riggins Branch and would inject confusion if combined with a plaintiff who owns one property
that utilizes only well water. Other issues, such as proof of property ownership, rental of the property,
length of ownership, time of purchase in relation to knowledge of PFAS, property value, actual PFAS
testing results, variance in water usage for different purposes, installation of different types of filtration
systems, and others will all vary among the plaintiffs in each of the six final cases. The consolidation
of so many differences among the plaintiffs risks jury confusion and prejudice to Defendants at trial.
10. Moreover, the well-established rule when considering requests for consolidation is that
a court should not “sacrifice basic fairness” in the “interests of expediency.” Malcolm v. National
Gypsum Co., 995 F. 2d 346, 354 (2d Cir. 1993). Consolidating these unique cases for trial would
violate Defendants’ Due Process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. U.S. Const. amend. 4.
Indeed, “even where cases involve some common issues of law or fact, consolidation may be
inappropriate where individual issues predominate.” Michael v. Wyeth, LLC, Nos. 2:04–0435, 2:04–
0690, 2:04–0692, 2011 WL 1527581, at *2 (S.D.W.Va. Apr. 20, 2011) (denying plaintiffs’ motion to
consolidate trials). In Michael, several individual issues differed among the plaintiffs despite the fact
that the plaintiffs asserted identical claims against the same defendants. Id. Given those discrepancies,
Case 5:18-cv-00073-D Document 1504 Filed 12/11/23 Page 4 of 8
the court concluded “that consolidating these cases for trial would create a significant risk of jury
confusion and prejudice to defendants. The predominance of individual issues also creates a low risk
of inconsistent adjudications of common factual and legal issues should these cases proceed
separately.” Id. at *3. The court recognize the fact that “[t]here will be overlap in expert and lay
witness testimony among the cases, increased expenses, and a greater drain on judicial resources.” Id.
Nevertheless, the court concluded that “the factors weighing in favor of consolidation for trial are
overborne by risks of prejudice and possible confusion.” Id. (internal quotation omitted). As
explained above, material differences between individual plaintiffs are likely to cause significant juror
confusion and prejudice to Defendants if consolidated. Defendants should not be prejudiced because
of the number of experts Plaintiffs disclosed or intend to call at trial. To avoid violation of Defendants’
due process rights and significant juror confusion, Defendants respectfully request shorter, individual
trials.
b. Allison Pini
f. Cynthia Faircloth
12. Defendants also preserve their right to appeal following the first trial in this matter.
Due Process dictates that the second trial would need to wait until resolution of any appeal by either
13. If the Court is inclined to consolidate the trials pursuant to Plaintiffs’ proposals, then
Defendants request the opportunity to: (1) submit a brief fully explaining Defendants’ Due Process
Plaintiffs’ counsel regarding which of the final cases to include in any consolidated trials.
Joint Request
14. Given the numerous logistical and practical issues involved in determining the number
and length of trials as well as the order of the plaintiffs within the trials, the Parties jointly request a
preliminary pretrial conference to discuss these issues with the Court prior to the entry of any trial
order. Local Rule 16.1 provides that “[i]n the court’s discretion and upon request of any party or on
the court’s own initiative, a preliminary or ‘working’ pretrial conference may be scheduled.” To most
efficiently address the differing proposals above, the Parties request a preliminary pretrial conference
pursuant to Local Rule 16.1 before the Court schedules any trials in this matter.
I hereby certify that on December 11, 2023, I electronically filed the foregoing with the Clerk
of the Court using the CM/ECF system which will send notification of such filing to all counsel of