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IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 4

Vs.

RESPONDENT:
SANJAY KUMAR & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 01/05/1998

BENCH:
M.K. MUKHERJEE, SYED SHAH MOHAMMED QUADRI

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT:
J U D G M E N T
QUADRI, J.
Special leave is granted.
The state of Rajasthan has assailed the validity of the
judgment and order of the High Court of Rajasthan in S.B.
Crl. Misc. Petition No. 293 of 1996 dated April 11, 1996.
On February 29, 1988, the Senior Drugs Inspector
(I.B.), collected samples of (i) tenokap suspension B. No.
303 and (ii) Tab. Oxyphenbutabne I.P. B. No. 1114 from M/s .
Jayshree Medical Centre, Baroda (Gujarat), meant for public
sale . He sent those samples for chemicals analysis to
Government Analyst, Food and Drugs Laboratory, baroda on
March 2,1988. In his report of July 2,1988, the Government
Analyst opined that those drugs were not of standard
quality. After due enquiry and investigation the Drug
Controller ordered prosecution of t he respondents on
February 3, 1990 and accordingly the Drugs Inspector (IB),
Directorate, Medical and Health Services, Rajasthan, Jaipur,
filed complaint under Section 18(A) read with Sections 16,17
and 17A punishable under Sections 27(d) and 27(b)(i) of the
Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940, on June 28,1991. On the same
day, the learned Additional Civil Judge & C.J.M., Court
No.6, Jaipur City jaipur took cognizance on the said
complaint as Criminal Case No. 247/91 and issued summons to
all the respondents. That order of the learned magistrate
was questioned by the respondents before the High Court in
S.B.Crl. Misc. Petition No. 293 of barred by limitation
under Section 468(2)(c) Cr. P.C. By order of April 11, 1996,
the learned Single Judge of the High Court who dealt with
that petition accepted that contention and quashed the
proceeding in the said criminal case initiated by the
learned Magistrate on June 28, 1991.
Shri Aruneshwar Gupta, the learned counsel appearing
for the State, contends that the High Court was in error in
computing the period of limitation from the date of
collecting samples instead of from the date of the report
dated July 2, 1988 of the Government Analyst. Learned
counsel for the respondents while supporting the order of
the High Court argued that the date when the samples were
collected was the date of the offence so it was rightly
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taken as the starting point of limitation and from that date
the complaint was clearly barred by limitation.
The only question that arises for consideration is:
whether the complaint in question is barred by limitation
under Section 468 Cr. P.C.
In the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, Chapter XXXVI
has been added prescribing limitation for taking cognizance
of certain offences with a view to expedite the process of
detection and investigation of crimes and also to ensure
observances of the principle of fairness in the total of the
offences by barring belated prosecution. Delay in
prosecution of offences causes undue hardship as it keeps
the sword handing on the heads of accused persons and it
also results in the material evidence getting vanished. This
chapter applies to all such offences for which punishment
prescribed is less than three years. But it does not apply
to offences for which punishment prescribed is more than
three years and to economic offences under various Acts,
which are excluded under Central Act 12 of 1974 or any State
Acts. It contains seven sections (467-473). Section 467
defines the expression ’period of limitation’ used in the
chapter. Section 468 creates bar to taking cognizance of
offences after lapse of period of limitation. Sections 469
to 473 deal with various aspects of computation of
limitation. Of the aforementioned provisions, we are
concerned with Sections 468 and 469. Sub-section (1) of
Section 468 ordains that no Court shall take cognizance of
an offence of the category specified in sub-section (2),
after the expiry of the ’period of limitation’ prescribed
thereunder. This, however, is subject to the other
provisions of the Code. Sub-section (2) postulates different
period of limitation for offences with reference to the
punishment provided for them; if the punishment provided for
an offence in any Act is only fine, the period of limitation
fixed is six months; if the offence is punishable with
imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year, the period
of limitation prescribed is one year and if the offence is
punishable with imprisonment for a term exceeding one year
but not exceeding three years, the period of limitation laid
down is three years. And sub-section (3) spells out the rule
of limitation in cases of joinder of charges; if a person is
tried for more offences than one, then the period of
limitation will be determined with reference to the offence
which is punishable with the more severe punishment or, as
the case may be, the most severe punishment; for example, if
a person is tried for various offences and some of them are
punishable with fine and some with imprisonment for a term
less than a year and some for which the punishment is
provided upto three years, then the period of limitation for
all the offences, if they are tried together, will be three
years.
Section 469 deals with commencement of the period of
limitation and it reads thus:
" 469. Commencement of the period
of limitation - (1) The period of
limitation, in relation to an
offender, shall commence -
(a) on the date of the
offence; or
(b) where the commission of
the offence was not known
to the person aggrieved
by the offence or to any
police officer, the first
day on which such offence
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comes to the knowledge of
such person or to any
police officer, whichever
is earlier; or
(c) where it is not known by
whom the offence was
committed, the first the
day on which the identity
of the offender is known
to the person aggrieved
by the offence or to the
police officer making
investigation into the
offence, whichever is
earlier."
A plain reading of the provision extracted above shows
that in sub-section (1) three alternative starting points of
limitation have been specified - (a) the date of the
offence; (b) the first day on which an offence came to the
knowledge of the person aggrieved by the offence or to any
police officer, whichever is earlier, in a case where the
commission of the offence was not known to any of them,
or(c) the first day on which the identity of the offender is
known to the person aggrieved by the offence or to the
police officer making investigation into the offence,
whichever is earlier, but this can be called in aid in a
case where it is not known by whom the offence was
committed. basically from the date of the offence the period
of limitation will start but there will be cases where the
commission of offence or identity of the offender comes to
knowledge of those concerned with it long thereafter so in
such situations clauses (b) and (c), as the case may be,
would be the date of commencement of period of limitation.
Now we shall see which clause of sub-section (1) of
Section 469 is attracted to the facts of the case. For this
purpose it will be necessary to revert to the facts of this
case. The essence of the offences charged is manufacture of
adulterated, sub-standard, misbranded, spurious drugs within
the meaning of the relevant provisions of the Act and/or
storage, distribution and sale of such drugs in
contravention of the provisions of the Act. On the date of
collection of samples from respondent No.16, on February 29,
1988, it could not have been said that any offence was
committed as selling of drugs per se is no offence and the
quality of the drugs was not known to the Drugs Inspector,
the complainant on that date. It is only, when the report of
the Government Analyst was receive, that it came to light
that the provisions of the Act are violated and offence is
committed. So on the facts of this case it cannot be said
that Clause (a) of Section 469(1) is attracted. That the
drugs which were offered for sale were sub-
standard/adulterated, within the meaning of the Act, came to
the knowledge of the Drugs Inspector only on July 2, 1988
when the report of the Government Analyst was received by
him; and therefore, clause (b) of Section 469(1) will be
attracted.
Under cognate legislations of different States, similar
questions arose before the High Courts. In R.S. Arora vs.
The State (1987) Crl. Law Journal 1225, the question which
fell for consideration of Delhi High Court was whether for
prosecution under Sections 7, 19 and 16(1) of the Seeds Act,
1966, the period of limitation of six months would start
from the date of collection of samples under clause (a) or
from the date of Seed Analyst report for purposes of clause
(b) of Section 469(1) Cr.P.C. The learned Single Judge of
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the Delhi High Court took the view that the limitation
commences from the date of submission of the report by the
Seed Analyst to the Inspector, so Section 469(1) (b) would
apply. The same view was taken by the Bombay High Court in
Omprakash Gulabchandji Partani vs. Ashok & Anr. (1992) Crl.
L. J. 2704.
In M/s. Satyanarayana General Traders & Ors. vs. State
(1993) 2 Crimes 203, a learned Single Judge of the Andhra
Pradesh high Court held that for prosecution of offences of
mis-branding under Insecticides Act, the period of
limitation would start from the date on which the report of
the Analyst was received but not from the date of taking
samples and thus Section 469(1) (b) would be attracted.
We are in entire agreement with the views expressed by
the learned Judges of the High Courts in the above cases.
For the above reasons, in the instant case, the
limitation for the purpose of Section 468(2) (c) will
commence from July 2, 1988, the date of knowledge of the
commission of offence to the concerned officer under Section
469(1) (b) but not from February 29,1988 (the date of
collection of samples by the Drugs Inspector) and as the
complaint was filed on June 28, 1991 which is within three
years so the complaint is not barred by limitation under
Section 468(2) (c). The High Court has missed this germane
aspect erroneously took the date of commencement of the
limitation as February 29,1988 , the date on which the
samples were collected by the Drugs Inspector form accused
No. 16. It is thus clear that the High Court has committed
illegality in so computing the period of limitation, which
results in miscarriage of justice.
In the result, we set aside the impugned order of the
learned Single Judge of the High Court dated April 11,1996,
allow the appeal and remand the case to the learned
Additional Civil Judge and Chief Judicial Magistrate, Court
No. 6 Jaipur City Jaipur, for disposal in accordance with
law.