Energy Research & Social Science 22 (2016) 7–12

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Energy Research & Social Science

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Short communication

Historical energy transitions: Speed, prices and system

transformation夽
Roger Fouquet
Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE), United Kingdom

a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t

Article history: The relatively rare and protracted nature of energy transitions implies that it is vital to look at historical
Received 30 June 2016 experiences for lessons about how they might unfold in the future. The fastest historical sector-specific
Received in revised form 13 July 2016 energy transitions observed here was thirty years. However, full energy transitions, involving all sectors
Accepted 22 August 2016
and services, have taken much longer. Ultimately, the price of energy services played a crucial role in cre-
Available online 6 September 2016
ating the incentives to stimulate energy transitions, but energy price shocks may have acted as a catalyst
for stimulating processes that led to certain energy transitions. An additional key factor is whether the
Keyword:
new technology offers new characteristics of value to the consumer, which can help create a market even
Energy transitions
when the initial price is higher. A crucial factor that can delay a transition is the reaction of the incumbent
and declining industries. Nevertheless, governments have, in a few instances, created the institutional
setting to stimulate energy transitions to low-polluting energy sources, and this could be done again, if
the political will and alternative energy sources were available. Finally, past energy transitions have had
major impacts on the incumbent industries which have declined, on economic transformations and on
inequality.
© 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction tions to inform the present and future policies has accelerated
[48,52,8,2,45].
Since the beginning of the Industrial Revolution, the global With this in mind, the purpose of this piece is to draw partic-
economy has extracted and used 0.5 trillion tonnes of oil equiv- ularly on my own historical and long run research to offer some
alent of fossil fuels (see Fig. 1) and has led to 1.2 trillion tonnes lessons about energy transitions. To contribute to a more refined
of carbon dioxide emissions. The rising global emissions, along or at least reflexive take on energy transitions, this short commu-
with other greenhouse gas emissions, are threatening to inten- nication starts by reviewing the speed of past energy transitions.
sify climate change. This threat means that fossil fuels, without Afterwards, the role of prices in driving transitions is discussed. This
worldwide carbon capture and sequestration mechanism or suc- is followed by a comment on incumbent industries that declined,
cessful geo-engineering projects, will impose a rising burden on with a focus on the experience of the coal industry. Then, the paper
the atmosphere. This burden highlights the potential benefits from examines the impact of energy transitions on consumption pat-
a transition out of fossil fuels to low carbon energy sources. terns, economic development and inequality. Then, it explores past
Because energy transitions are seen by many scholars and experiences in which environmental policy may have influenced
analysts to be relatively rare and protracted processes, it is energy transitions.
important to look at historical experiences for lessons about
how they might unfold in the future. The literature on his-
torical energy transitions has blossomed in the last ten years 2. The speed of historical energy transitions
[22,25,5,39,36,1,3,59,50,43,33,28,32]. Perhaps triggered by unfold-
ing events, and partly stimulated by the special issue in this journal, Since the Industrial Revolution, it has taken, on average, nearly
research output on using experiences from past energy transi- fifty years for sector-specific energy transitions (i.e. the diffusion of
energy sources and technologies) to unfold in the United Kingdom
[15]. Here, the definition used for a transition was from 5% to 80%
夽 I would like to thank Benjamin Sovacool for comments related to this paper. (or the peak, if it did not reach 80%) of the energy consumption for
Support for this research from the ESRC is gratefully acknowledged. a particular service (e.g., heating, power, transportation or lighting)
E-mail address: [email protected] in a specific sector – as Sovacool [52] points-out in his conclusion,

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2016.08.014
2214-6296/© 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
8 R. Fouquet / Energy Research & Social Science 22 (2016) 7–12

led by supply-side transformations. Thus, the policy drivers for

stimulating energy transitions in developing economies and post-
industrialised economies may be very different.
Rubio and Folchi [47] present evidence on the energy transitions
from coal to oil for 20 Latin American countries over the first half
of the 20th century. They argue that these small energy consumers
had earlier and faster transitions than leading nations. By outlining
a whole series of energy transitions, they identify a number of dif-
ferent energy transition processes. Factors such as domestic energy
resources, the size of the internal market for energy services, trade
relations and policy decisions have been important in determining
the nature and speed of the transitions experienced. They suggest
that the lessons will be particularly relevant for understanding the
way in which non-pioneering countries might adopt low carbon
energy sources and technologies.
Underlying every full energy transition – from biomass to coal,
coal to oil or oil to natural gas – is a disaggregation of a number
Fig. 1. Global Primary Energy Consumption, 1800–2010 [14]. of sectors and services. For every sector (including the residential,
industrial and transport sectors) and for every services (e.g., heating
and lighting), technological and institutional solutions needed to be
the definition is critical for determining the duration of transitions. developed to achieve a specific transition. The technology and insti-
As shown in Table 1, the average duration of the innovation chain tutions needed for each individual transition often differed for each
(i.e., from the invention of the key technology to 80% share of energy sector and service. As a result, there has been a tendency towards
consumption, or to the peak) was 95 years. very slow full or aggregated energy transitions (for a more detailed
To put this in context, the wind turbine (which converted wind discussion of the complexities of transforming energy systems, see
power into electricity) was introduced in the 1880s. More recently, Refs. [29,51]. Whether a full transition can be accelerated, as Sova-
the invention of solar photovoltaics (SPV) was in 1954. In other cool [52], Kern and Rogge [35] and Bromley [7] argue, depends on
words, it is unlikely that either technology will meet the average creating all the correct conditions for this to occur.
duration of the innovation chain for successful energy transitions
(although, SPVs may still do so, if they reach a share of 80% by 2050).
However, it could be argued that because of the large number of
inventions in energy technologies in the last 150 years, the strong 3. The role of prices in energy transitions
path dependence in modern energy systems has delayed the uptake
of certain technologies [19]. For each individual energy transition, the technology or new
The shortest period between invention and uptake was ten energy source that emerged and would eventually become domi-
years. This occurred in the cases of gas and kerosene lighting. The nant started as a niche product. A small group of consumers were
lack of technological lock-ins (as they were competing with the willing to pay a premium for the energy services attached to the
primitive tallow candles), the dramatically superior qualities of the new technology. A successful new energy source or technology pro-
energy source and the technology compared with the incumbent vided the same service (i.e. heating, power, transport or light) with
and the great demand for lighting in the nineteenth century implied superior or additional characteristics (e.g. easier, cleaner or more
that the innovation chain was exceptionally rapid [21]. The fastest flexible to use). For instance, electric lighting in the late nineteenth
diffusion was from horse to railways in the mid-nineteenth century century, which was more costly than gas lighting, offered a nov-
and steam engines to electricity in the first-half of the twenti- elty factor that expensive restaurants and theatres were willing to
eth century. These new technologies and energy sources provided pay for. Over time, economies of scale subsequently improved the
cheaper and better quality services. As a result, despite the need for technology and the price of the energy source, driving down the
an infrastructure to use the new energy source or technology, both cost of generating energy services, making it competitive with the
made the transition very quickly – in 30 years. incumbent energy technology and source.
In other words, the speed of uptake of new technologies and However, the price of the energy service is crucial for achieving
energy transitions is influenced by the rise in demand for energy a full energy transition. If the price of the service fell suffi-
services. Faster growth (due to high income elasticities and ris- ciently (either because the energy efficiency improved or the
ing incomes, which will be discussed below) is likely to imply a price of energy declined), full transitions could occur. For instance,
faster potential energy transitions. This also suggests that energy kerosene was used for lighting in the late 1800s largely by the
transitions may be more demand-led. Alternatively, when income poor and rural population that could not afford the investment in
elasticities are low, demand may be less of a driver of energy the infrastructure to supply gas to their homes. However, in urban
transitions. When income elasticities are low, such as at high lev- areas, the price of kerosene lighting never dropped cheap enough to
els of economic development, energy transitions may have to be compete with gas lighting (once piping was installed) and, there-

Table 1
The Average Duration of Energy Transitions in the United Kingdom.

Period Driver Duration of Innovation Chain Duration of Diffusion

Shortest 700–2000 – 50 years 30 years

Average 700–2000 – 245 years 125 years
Average 1700–2000 – 95 years 49 years
Average 1700–2000 Cheaper Service 65 years 40 years
Average 1700–2000 Better Service 155 years 51 years

Source: Fouquet [15].

 R. Fouquet / Energy Research & Social Science 22 (2016) 7–12 9

threatened industries, such as those producing fossil fuels. In other

words, transitions are just as much about the decline of incumbent
industries, as about the rise of new ones.
So, the decline may involve powerful pressure groups, economic
and technological sailing-ship effects, unemployment and social
tensions. Madureira [40] focuses on one crucial industry of this
ultimately international transition and industrial revolution. He
compares the experiences of iron industries in different countries
during the Industrial Revolution, with a particular emphasis on how
the declining charcoal industry reacted to the emergence of coke.
He suggests that during the transition the incumbent industry may
follow a number of different experiences, including rapid decline
or defiance and temporary expansion. This may in part be due to
the decline in the price of incumbent energy sources following the
advances of new energy sources and technologies [9].
In a similar vein, Turnheim and Geels [53] explore the desta-
bilisation and decline of an incumbent industry, and illustrate the
application of their analytical approach by applying it to the experi-
Fig. 2. Share of Primary Energy Consumption in Europe, 1800–2008.
ences of the British coal industry between 1913 and 1967, and then
from 1967 to 1997. The destabilisation is seen to result from a com-
fore, gas lighting remained the dominant source of lighting until bination of external pressures and internal reactions. The British
the price of electric lighting dropped sufficiently. coal industry’s inability to adjust to new circumstances (because it
The price of the energy service matters in the long run, but the was locked into the old regime) was instrumental in its destabilisa-
fluctuations in the price of energy can create tipping-points and tion and ultimate decline. Using a multi-dimensional framework,
lock-ins. Energy price shocks, as occurred in 1915–1917, 1921 and the authors show that, although economic and technical factors
1926 for British coal or in 1973, 1979 and 2008 for international may drive external pressures, political, social and cultural factors
oil, were critical junctures in the history of energy transitions and play a pivotal role in directing the pressures and determining the
of energy technological developments [58,30]. They pushed con- reactions to them. These experiences offer some important lessons
sumers to become more efficient and away from the expensive for the way fossil fuel industries may react to demands for regime
energy source. Then, in the next period of economic growth, some changes towards a low carbon economy and how governments
producers and consumers were willing to make investments in new might aid the transformation of the energy system.
energy technologies and networks. Larger and more concentrated energy firms and industries are
For instance, during the First World War, the price of coal likely to exert more pressure on governments to protect their domi-
imported from Britain soared and a number of economies, nant position [19]. Evidence indicates that, in France, where nuclear
such as France, Germany, Italy Austria and Sweden, invested in power is the dominant source of power, a highly concentrated
hydropower to limit their dependence on coal-generated electric- industry, and closely involved in political decision-making, the pro-
ity [33]. It also triggered the transition to oil, which lasted for more cess of liberalising and ‘competivising’ the electricity markets and
than fifty years (see Fig. 2). However, the oil shocks in the 1970s potentially shifting to a different energy system has been slower
led most economies to reduce their dependence on oil – in Europe, than in other economies [26]. Similarly, the large expenditure on
falling from 52% in 1973 to 34% in 2008 (see Fig. 2). Given the long lobbying by energy-intensive companies to derail US climate pol-
lifespan of energy-using equipment, this process of adoption of new icy is evident [41]. In 2014, six of the top ten largest companies
technologies often took ten to twenty to fifty years. Thus, in terms in the world (as measured by sales revenue) were oil companies
of efficiency improvements and energy transitions, the global econ- and two of the other four in the top ten were car companies, also
omy has only seen the beginning of the full impacts of the oil price part of the fossil fuel-based energy system [12] – their revenues
shock in 2008. They are likely to push global markets further away amount to 4% of global GDP. As a comparison, in 1900, when coal
from oil and are likely to take several decades to unfold. Never- was king, global revenue from coal was roughly 2% of global GDP
theless, currently low energy prices imply that pressure for energy [42,6], though this level of financial power did not halt the tran-
transitions have now declined for a number of years. sition towards oil. In other words, as Barbier [4] stresses, there is
considerable financial and political power to delay a transition to
4. Energy transitions and declining industries low carbon energy sources and technologies.

The nature of a new energy technology (as well as the companies

or organisations selling and promoting it) has played a crucial role 5. Energy transitions and energy consumption
in its uptake [50]. However, successful uptake tended to depend on
the co-evolution of technologies, industries and institutions that One important observation is that past energy transitions have
enabled new energy sources to emerge from niches and become been characterised by major increases in energy consumption [27].
core elements in the regime [24]. This allowed ‘technological clus- Indeed, the transition from biomass to coal, which began on a global
ters’ to dominate and ultimately create ‘lock-ins’ [27,54,55,19]. scale at the end of the nineteenth century, and the transition from
One of the most important factors in determining the speed of a coal to oil, which unfolded after the second World War, led to dra-
transition is the process of ‘un-locking’ of technology and industry matically greater levels of energy consumption (Fig. 1).
clusters and, in particular, how incumbents react to new competi- If this was true for future transitions, it would have major
tors. The threatened incumbents in transitions have been known to implications for long run demand for energy and carbon diox-
‘fight back’, potentially creating ‘sailing ship’ or ‘last-gasp’ effects ide emissions. A transition to, for instance, electric vehicles might,
[46,56,4,45]. Also, in certain countries, resource endowments and therefore, produce major increases in electricity demand (beyond
government objectives were pivotal in pushing or delaying the the expected substitution from petroleum), and may lead to large
uptake [39]. And, of course, political decisions can be influenced by emissions if it was generated from fossil fuels.
10 R. Fouquet / Energy Research & Social Science 22 (2016) 7–12

6. Impacts of energy transitions: transformation and

inequality

Energy technologies and sources are central to economic pro-

duction and the consumption of energy services, such as heating,
power, transport and lighting. In addition to the changes in energy
consumption following energy transitions, there is also some evi-
dence that energy transitions have also transformed production
processes. These have often altered social structures which may
have put new pressures on political systems. Thus, while appre-
ciating the role of many other factors at play, energy transitions
can be seen as catalysts for certain economic, social and political
transformations.
For instance, the introduction of steam engines offered addi-
tional flexibility to the geography of industrial activities. Power was
no longer limited to being close to a source of running water, which
provided the main source of power for major industrial activities,
Fig. 3. Income and Price Elasticities of Demand for Energy Services, 1800–2010. such as textile manufacturing. In addition, steam engines were less
intermittent than hydropower. As a result, steam engines could
spread across the whole country and be used all year [13]. In turn,
However, energy consumption is driven by the price of energy the introduction of steam engines in the nineteenth altered the role
services, the demand for energy services and the shifts in this of workers [31]. Finally, the growth in production associated with
demand, resulting from changes in income, in particular [20]. This steam engines generated a huge increase in the demand for labour
implies that the impact on energy transitions on energy consump- and led to a rural exodus towards the cities [1].
tion depends, to a large extent, on the decline in the price of energy Similarly, the shift from steam engines to electricity enabled a
services (i.e. often, the combination of the price of energy and the much more flexible and decentralised production process. As elec-
improvements in energy efficiency) and the income and price elas- trification of industrial activity intensified, it led to major changes in
ticities of demand for these energy services. Since there is evidence the production process itself. Before, a factory was designed around
that income elasticities have followed an inverse U-shape curve a single power source. A large waterwheel or a steam engine pro-
and price elasticities have followed a U-shape curve with economic vided the power down a long line of machines. Initially, the electric
development (see Fig. 3), the scale of the increase in energy con- motors that replaced steam engines followed this design. How-
sumption following an energy transition depends considerably on ever, large energy savings could be achieved if a series of motors
the level of economic development. each powered only a few machines. It became appropriate to fit
Indeed, income and price elasticities were very high (in abso- each machine with its own motor. This shift reduced the amount
lute terms) in the United Kingdom at the end of the nineteenth of energy required for the power generated and allowed greater
century and in the first half of the twentieth century (See Fig. 3). flexibility in the production process [11].
As a result, energy transitions fed through into large increases in Another issue to consider is the inequality associated with
energy consumption. In other currently industrialised economies, energy transitions. In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries,
which developed twenty to fifty years after the United Kingdom, as new energy sources and technologies were introduced (such as
may well have experienced peaks in elasticities between the 1920s gas and electricity, as well as railways), large shares of the popula-
and 1960s, and, therefore, the increase in consumption follow- tion were left on the margins of these revolutions for decades [10].
ing energy transitions would have been greatest in this period. Only later, did energy and energy service companies provide access
Today, with substantially lower elasticities, energy transitions to poorer populations, often due to the pressure of government. The
would have less impact on consumption. For currently industri- growth of the provision of third class railway services waited until
alising economies, their elasticities may be peaking today [18,57]. the introduction of the Cheap Train Act of 1886 [38]. The provision
As a result, present or near future energy transitions would through of the prepayment devices to enable poorer households to use gas
into rapidly greater consumption in industrialising economies. lighting (without them needing to invest in the capital investment)
One caveat related to the declining impacts of energy transi- had to wait until gas companies’ market shares were threatened by
tions is if the new technology offers new characteristics, altering the development of electric lighting [21].
the value of the service to the consumer. For instance, gas central A key problem in present-day developing economies is provid-
heating radically altered residential energy consumption. Similarly, ing universal access to energy services to poorer members of society
the steam locomotive greatly changed conceptions of mobility, [34,37]. Historical experiences of the unequal access to energy ser-
space, and time [49] – arguably, without railways, and perhaps the vices and policies to meet a large latent demand have not been
telegraph, Albert Einstein may not have developed his theory of rel- properly understood, and they are likely to be of great relevance to
ativity [23]. Equally, driving a car rather than taking a bus allowed present-day developing countries, with large shares of the popula-
for greater flexibility and privacy of transport services, with major tion at the margins of the energy service revolutions.
impacts on urbanisation and society [44]. As a result, the energy and
technological transition led to increases in demand (and rises in the
income elasticity of demand), thus, meaning that energy consump- 7. Transitions to low polluting energy sources
tion increased substantially, despite being at relatively high levels
of economic development. Looking forward, it is possible to imag- Throughout history, citizens have been harmed by environmen-
ine that the diffusion of driver-less cars (although not necessarily tal problems resulting from fuel combustion. For example, Fouquet
related to an energy substitution, has been associated with elec- [16] shows that, after a period of declining coal prices and soaring
tric vehicles) may have a significant impact on the consumption consumption of energy services and, thus, of coal, which fuelled
of passenger transport services and, therefore, on overall energy the First and part of the Second Industrial Revolution, the nine-
consumption. teenth century British firms and households were externalising the
 R. Fouquet / Energy Research & Social Science 22 (2016) 7–12 11

social costs of energy production and consumption on a massive death toll in London was particularly shocking and scientists could
scale. In the 1880s, nearly £(2000) 20 billion (around 20% of GDP) attribute these deaths to poor air quality, and a growing range of
of estimated damage was being caused by air pollution resulting substitute fuels and heating technologies was available [17].
from coal combustion. The study also indicates that the relationship However, even with a major demand for improvements and
between air pollution concentration and damage was non-linear, legislation introduced, it is far from certain that the legislation
and increasing at higher levels. As a comparison, air pollution in will be effective. Legislation was often weak or included loop-
China in 1995 was estimated to have caused damage equivalent to holes, such as the addressing black smoke and industrialists argued
9% of GDP, although the level of concentrations in London and other their smoke was “brown”. . . Alternatively, legislation is often not
British cities was roughly 50% higher. enforced or requires lengthy court proceedings. The smoke abate-
As a result, citizens have demanded reductions in pollution and, ment movement in the Victorian era faced a case of government
at times, transitions to low polluting energy sources [17]. These failure because of politicians’ belief that legislation would harm
experiences offer interesting parallels with a potential low car- business and industry [17]. Thus, overcoming the perceived eco-
bon transition. In particular, they indicate that greater demand for nomic damage from legislations is still the most likely way to sway
environmental legislation tended to coincide with periods of eco- politicians. Yet, just like in Victorian Britain, while politicians are
nomic growth, because, first, the damage increased due to greater cautious of harming industries, they are even more reluctant to
consumption and pollution and, second, rising incomes enabled address household behaviour, and their emissions associated with
citizens to be concerned with more than their basic economic residential and transport energy consumption, because of the fear
needs. Also important in influencing the demand for environmen- of losing votes – so, presumably, less democratic systems can over-
tal change was the public’s awareness of the impacts. The outrage come this problem more easily.
and political action following the 1952 Big Smog in London indi- So, even with effective legislation introduced, for it to be sus-
cates that the demand for climate stability will probably increase tained (i.e., enforced and not revoked by future governments), it
as a result of extreme and shocking events that (most, particularly must be of limited cost to polluters, and pro-legislation pressure
mainstream media, will agree) can be attributed (with a high degree groups must continue to maintain their pressures on politicians
of confidence) to climate change – such as when Bloomberg Busi- over long periods of time (e.g. a decade or more). For demand to
nessweek used the title “It’s Global Warming, Stupid” after Super be sustained, it seems likely to either require a series of shocking
Storm Sandy devastated New York City. events, or a wide scale change in value systems that can support
Independently of governments, markets have sought energy (and in lifestyles that can accommodate) long term political pres-
transitions [15]. In the case of low-polluting energy transitions, sure.
there have been few examples, but the switches to gas and elec- Nevertheless, the Alkali Act of 1863 (and the Montreal Proto-
tric cookers in the early twentieth century hint at the possibility col in 1979) show that environmental legislation can be effective
that markets might take the lead in certain sectors and services in if the victims are sufficiently influential, the polluters are a clearly
the transition to low carbon energy sources. This is particularly of defined and observable group, relatively cheap solutions are avail-
interest when the niche demand leads to declining prices through able and equipment exists for monitoring pollution levels. This
a process of economies of scale and learning by doing, as solar pan- suggests that legislation targeted at specific groups may be more
els have been doing. A niche non-free-riding demand can exist for effective and sustainable than when covering a heterogeneous
low carbon energy sources and technologies. This demand will be array of polluters [17].
greater if the sources and technologies have desirable character- Finally, crucial to the outcome of past experiences was the evo-
istics that fossil fuels and their related equipment do not have. lution of ideology, of government attitudes towards intervention
The demand for gas and electric cookers was driven in part by and of the relationship between the market and the state. It would
the desire for cleaner and easier to use fuels. In turn, a powerful be difficult to identify trends in the forces over the next cen-
driver of demands for the gas and electric cookers was social status. tury. Nevertheless, they will evolve, such as perhaps new beliefs
Thus, if low carbon sources and technologies can be seen as status- about our relationship with nature or the potential globalisation
enhancing, they may achieve an important niche demand. If this of markets and governments, and will play an important role in
niche demand develops, and producers can achieve economies of determining any transition to a low carbon economy.
scale, then the prices might become competitive with fossil fuels. In
this case, markets could drive part of the transition to a low carbon
economy [17].
More probably, though, government will need to help create 8. Conclusions
the demand for these energy sources, especially when the price
of the low-carbon option is more expensive. Transitions have The purpose of this short communication was to outline some
often required the discovery of new solutions for many differ- of the key issues identified from research on historical energy
ent sectors and services, the transformation of energy systems transitions. Critical issues to consider are the speed of transitions
[19], and the decline of energy industries and technologies that (sector-specific and full economy transitions), the price of energy
were represented by powerful pressure groups [15]. Thus, given services, as well as shocks that can trigger unfolding events, the
the scale of the change and the time they took to unfold, govern- benefits that the consumer may gain from the transformation, the
ments have tended to be reluctant to push for energy transitions role of government ply in internalising the external costs of pollu-
in the first instance. Furthermore, transitions have and may cre- tants, the industries that will decline, other transformations that
ate new environmental problems (as did coke and town gas, will ensue and the changes in inequality that may occur.
petroleum products, nuclear power and even certain renewable Undoubtedly, one should be aware of the uncertainties about
energy sources). the relevance and transferability of historical insights to potential
Nevertheless, the experience of the Clean Air Act of 1956 shows future energy transitions. Theory acts as the bridge between pre-
that, with sufficient pressure and resolve, governments can initi- vious experiences and lessons for understanding future behaviour
ate transitions to low polluting energy sources. Despite it having and formulating policies. However, at present, no formal economic
been a general period of low air pollution by historical (though theory of how energy transitions unfold exists – although others
not today’s) standards, the episode with the strongest demand for have presented potential frameworks for thinking about energy
improvements in Britain was after the Big Smog of 1952 when the transitions [25,2]. Thus, one should take care about understanding
12 R. Fouquet / Energy Research & Social Science 22 (2016) 7–12

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