Recovery From Natural Disasters
Recovery From Natural Disasters
Recovery From Natural Disasters
This second edition was compiled by Adrian L. Sepeda, CCPS Staff Consultant with input from
Charles Cowley, CCPS Staff Consultant, and oversight by Ms. Louisa Nara, CCPS Technical
Director. It is made available for use with no legal obligations or assumptions (i.e. Use at your
own risk). Corrections, updates, additions, and recommendations should be sent to Ms. Nara at
[email protected] .
It is sincerely hoped that the information presented in this document will lead to an even more
impressive record for the entire industry; however, the American Institute of Chemical
Engineers, its consultants, CCPS Subcommittee members, their employers, and their employers’
officers and directors disclaim making or giving any warranties, expressed or implied, including
with respect to fitness, intended purpose, use or merchantability and/or correctness or accuracy
of the content of the information presented in this document. As between (1) American
Institute of Chemical Engineers, its consultants, CCPS Subcommittee members, their employers,
and their employers’ officers and directors and (2) the user of this document, the user accepts
any legal liability or responsibility whatsoever for the consequence of its use or misuse.
II. Preplan
A. Risk Assessment
B. Natural Disaster Plan
C. Communications
D. Logistics
E. Security, Identification , and Access Permissions
F. Drills and Cumulative Learnings
G. Information Sources
IV. During
A. Safety
B. Security
C. Communications
V. After
A. Damage Assessment & Short Term/Emergency Repairs
B. Security
C. Communications with Outside World
D. Recovery
E. Staffing
F. Restart
G. Critique
VI. Recovery
VII. References
VIII. Appendices
A. Example List of Major Decisions to Be Made
B. Example List of Suggested Supplies
C. Example Checklist of Communication Equipment
D. Example List of Interdependencies
E. Example Risk Analysis for Potential Onsite Consequences of Concern
F. Example Risk Analysis for Potential Offsite Consequences of Concern
Past Natural disasters have tested preparedness and response plans of the chemical and
petrochemical industries not only on or near the U. S. Gulf coast, but along the Atlantic coast,
interior sections of the US, and overseas operations. These natural disasters have occurred in
the form of tornados, hurricanes, tropical storms, tsunamis, storm surges, earthquakes and
uncontrolled wildfires. 1 The results have been everything from local flooding to widespread
flooding of significant portions of coast lines due to storm surge,2 tremendous destruction from
high winds and/or rising water, tidal waves, and fire damage to valuable wooded interior
sections of countries. Although responses were generally well managed and as efficient as
conditions allowed, there is always room for improvement. Experience is often said to be the
best teacher, but everyone should not have to experience the same adverse thing to learn from
it. AIChE’s Center for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS) member companies believe that sharing
experiences and learnings from the past and others are effective and efficient ways of improving
performance and reducing risk without suffering harm.
With that goal in mind, this pamphlet, originally funded by the generous support of the United
Engineering Foundation, pulls together, analyzes, and presents in a “how to use” format the
past experiences and successes of various CCPS member companies, the “Lessons Learned,” and
advice on how to prepare for and recover from a natural disaster. The natural disaster scenario
that is the focus of this paper are storms—hurricanes and tropical storms specifically. The other
common natural disasters, tornados, tsunamis, earthquakes and uncontrolled wildfires usually
have little or no lead/preparation time, so the suggestions offered in the body of this paper may
not be applicable. These natural disasters are addressed summarily in Appendix G.
Most of this information in this paper comes from workshops in 2006, with the April workshop
and the June teleconference as the focal events. Members of the CCPS Technical Steering
Committee who participated in the June teleconference, Scott Berger—CCPS Director, Karen
Person—CCPS Project Engineer, Karen Tancredi—Dupont, and Adrian Sepeda—CCPS Staff
Consultant, are recognized for the role they played in bringing this project to fruition. The
reader is reminded that this pamphlet merely “suggests” but in no way sets a standard or
expectation for performance or actions. Ultimately it is the responsibility of each company and
its employees to act on their beliefs and available information to secure their site and protect
their employees, the community, and the environment from harm. 3
A risk based approach in addressing the phases of dealing with a natural disaster—preplanning,
just before the disaster strikes, during the disaster, and after the disaster recovery is used for
1
Much more information and Lessons Learned now exist on Earthquakes and Tsunamis. Search for it.
2
Storm surge refers to the abnormal rise of seawater during a hurricane that can flood coastal areas.
Storm surge was the culprit behind much of the damage sustained during Superstorm Sandy along the
New Jersey Shore and in New York City, where a 13-foot wave submerged much of Lower Manhattan.
3
Your suggestions, “Lessons Learned,” and comments are welcome. This is the second edition of what
we plan to make as a living document. The more information that is gathered, codified, and generally
presented to users of this pamphlet, the better it becomes. Send your feedback to [email protected] and
mention this pamphlet by name.
Introduction
The CCPS chemical and petrochemical company members are well grounded in using risk
evaluations as a tool to operate their businesses safely. This paper uses that same risk
evaluative approach in preparing for, enduring, and recovering from a natural disaster. Each
phase of the preparation and recovery should be evaluated for risks considering probabilities,
consequences and available resources to abate risks. This facilitates the preplanning,
prioritization, scheduling, and evaluation of actions for effectiveness and impact.
Risk assessments (generally worst case scenarios, low probability events, and expected events)
should be made covering two broad categories for each of the potential Natural Disasters to
which your facility may be exposed:
• the risk that a natural disaster imposes on the safety and security of your facility, its
contents, equipment, chemicals, market share, and personnel
• the risk that your facility (while being impacted by a natural disaster) imposes on the
surrounding community and its inhabitants, ecosystem, and site personnel.
These risk evaluations facilitate understanding of appropriate actions to take, when to take
them, and the required communications for them to be effective.
II. Preplan
A. Risk Assessment
To adequately prepare for any disaster, the risks must be identified, analyzed, and prioritized.
This assessment for a manufacturing facility includes two separate considerations. The first
analysis is to determine the risks that the natural disaster imposes on the facility itself. The
second analysis is to determine what risks the facility imposes on the employees, the ecosystem,
and the community as a consequence of the disaster. These risks may be similar or completely
different from the risks the facility naturally imposes on the community during normal
operations.
The risk assessment process highlights decisions that should be made regarding what can be
sacrificed and what is to be secured, perhaps at all costs. It may also be dynamic, addressing
changing risks with changing circumstances. Depending on your risk assessment methodology,
you may estimate actual risk or prioritize identified risks. Either way it gives you a framework
for managing them.
Consider the hazards the natural disaster will bring to your facility. These might be rising
water/flooding, high winds, heavy rain, storm surge 4, electrical disturbances, ground tremors,
etc., or a combination of all of these. Convert those hazards to risks by estimating the
probability of occurrence and then the consequences if they occur. Probabilities are easier to
estimate because they are often disaster specific—for instance, if the natural disaster is a
hurricane you can expect heavy rain and strong winds. Hurricanes often spawn tornadoes so
that probability should be relatively high also. Expect past problems to be problems again. For
instance, if flooding has been a problem in the past, expect it again.
2. Risks the Facility Imposes on the Employees, Ecosystem and the Community:
Knowing the risks and potential consequences at your facility during a natural disaster helps you
estimate the risks your facility will impose on the on-site employees, other facilities and their
employees on-site, the ecosystem, and surrounding community. Determine these risks by
estimating the probability of occurrence and then estimating the consequences if they do occur.
Use the same logic that you used for estimating risks to your facility, but recognize that your
facility could, should it lose containment of chemicals, energy, or site materials, impose
significant risks to employees remaining onsite, other manufacturing sites, the surrounding
community (people structures, and infrastructure), and the ecosystem. Your plans should be for
the worst case scenarios; do not spend a lot of time evaluating relatively low level
consequences. If you are prepared for major consequences, the lesser consequences will
usually be covered also. To estimate offsite consequences, consider those that might occur
within your facility and convert them to an outside-of-the-facility impact. See Appendix F—
Example List of Risk Analysis for Potential Offsite Consequences of Concern.
The Natural Disaster Plan should document all of the things that you want to happen (your
plans) for all of the considered events (disasters). It describes “who” is to do “what,” “when,”
and “how.” Using the risk based approach identifies and documents the ways that you will
address 1) the risks your facility will incur due to the disaster and 2) the risks your facility will
impose on others, all within the “who,” “what,” “when” and “how” descriptions. The plan
should also document the communication protocols to be used and any interdependency
4
Storm surge, which refers to the abnormal rise of seawater during a hurricane that can flood coastal
areas, was the culprit behind much of the damage sustained during Superstorm Sandy along the New
Jersey Shore and in New York City, where a 13-foot wave submerged much of Lower Manhattan.
Your Natural Disaster plan should also consider the following elements:
1. Interdependency:
Interdependency is the relationship of how your facility depends on and influences other things
around it and how those things depend on and influence your facility. Interdependencies
should be communicated to any and all agencies and/or organizations that might benefit from
that knowledge. A plan for the effective use of interdependencies to facilitate disaster recovery
should be developed, shared with, and agreed upon by all affected parties.
Your natural disaster plan should include all interdependencies your facility has. Particular
attention should be given to those interdependencies that would play a major role during or
after an emergency. For instance, if we follow through with the example above and your onsite
cogeneration system is down due to the disaster, you will need power from the commercial
generator to get your system up and running. Why would they spend time just to get your
system up? Because when your system is running you can supply power to the grid for others to
use, thereby effecting a faster and safer recover for all users on the grid. Effective use of
interdependency is a key, but often hidden asset. Make sure that those who will be making
2. Inventory Philosophy:
A key risk decision that must be made is how to handle inventories. The decision process must
consider the risks associated with leaving the inventories (feed stocks/raw materials, in-process
materials, and finished goods) at normal levels verses decreasing them. To make this analysis,
estimate the risk (consequences and probability) of loss of containment and compare that to the
estimated consequences and probability of unwanted scenarios due to lack of inventory. For
instance, if a tank contains a flammable toxic liquid, you should evaluate the probability and
consequence of loss of containment. If it is reasonable that some loss of containment may
occur during the disaster and the liquid, if spilled, would pollute waterways, groundwater and
could possibly ignite, compare that risk to risks associated with removal prior to the disaster.
This analysis should consider risks associated with the deinventorying process, what would
happen to the empty tank—float off, wind damage etc., and risks associated with reinventorying
the tank and preparing it for reuse. Your analysis might indicate that refilling the tank with
water to prevent float off damage is a viable action. If that is the case, don’t forget to analyze
the risks associated with preparing the tank for process chemicals after the disaster and possible
startup issues because of latent water.
An inventory philosophy and plan should be made for each vessel of concern. Potentially, the
situations would be different and the risk analyses might yield different results. The inventory
philosophy should be converted to action plans that are to be enacted during the early stages of
preparing for the disaster. Coordinate your Inventory Philosophy (Section II. B.) with your
Logistics plan (Sections II. D.).
3. Utility Services:
The same risk analysis process should be made to determine the actions to take regarding utility
services. This would apply to inbound utility services (water, electricity, fuel, purchased
compressed air from a neighbor plant, etc.) and outbound services (cogeneration excess
electricity, fuel sold, compressed air sent offsite, etc.). Consider interdependencies when
making this risk assessment. Do not assume that it is less risky to discontinue all services.
Conduct a risk assessment to decide which services to continue and which ones to discontinue
during the disaster.
The risk analysis for electrical power interruption is generally straight forward. Determine what
items in your facility must have electrical power to meet the functions described in your Natural
Disaster Plan. If the facility is shut down, (and it probably is at this point), there will be a
significant reduction in electrical power needs—potentially to the point that emergency onsite
generators can meet the needs described in your Natural Disaster Plan. Even though it is
probable, it is not positive, so the availability should be confirmed.
5. Staffing Plan:
A key decision here is whether or not the facility will be staffed during the natural disaster. The
second decision is if it is to be staffed, by whom should it be staffed and what are they to do?
Key considerations in this decision process should be:
• Why staff the plant?—there must be a valid reason, such as significant risk reduction,
for you to decide to keep people in harms way.
• What will you want them to do?—clearly define their roles after the plant has been
evacuated and prior to the natural disaster, during the natural disaster, and after the
disaster. Develop a Job Hazard Analysis (JHA) for each of the tasks you expect of them
and establish appropriate safety and health procedures and protocols they should
follow.
• Who should they be?—identify people based on the skills needed to fulfill your
expectations. Request volunteers with the needed skills; don’t assign an unwilling
person. Recognize that this team of volunteers may have a different order of command
and authority than during normal times. Choose volunteers who understand that
potential change and can live with it as well as people who can work together in
isolation for several days.
• How will they be rescued if necessary?—talk this over with the federal, state, and local
emergency response agencies.
If the decision is to staff the facility during the natural disaster, primary staffers and alternates
should be named, trained, and educated as to their assignments, performance expectations, and
reporting scheme. Particular attention may be required for the families of those who will staff
the facility during this time. For these staffers to perform as needed, it is important that they
know that their families are safe. Plans must be in place to assure that their families are
protected and/or evacuated.
6. Data Protection:
Data protection falls in to two broad categories—onsite or offsite. Onsite data protection
requires the recognition of the difference between volatile data and fixed data. Volatile data
requires continuous power if it is to be retained whereas fixed data does not. For instance, your
computer systems contain both types of data. When you save a file to the hard drive, that data
is fixed and no electrical power is required for it to remain there. On the other hand, if you fail
to save it and shut your computer down, the data is lost because it was in the part of the
Some data may already reside offsite having been transferred via internet routes, “T” line
transfers, or other physical or electronic transfer modes. This data may inherently be protected
from local natural disasters simply because of its remoteness and redundancy. Other onsite
data can be collected and sent offsite to secure locations via those same routes or simply by
making electronic copies and sending via a variety of modes. Regardless, it is important to
identify data that should be protected, develop a protection scheme, and then put that scheme
into action prior to the onset of the natural disaster.
7. Safety Procedures:
It may be appropriate to modify safety procedures and protocol during and immediately after
the natural disaster. This is not a lessening of safety, but rather an adaptation to the special
circumstances. Some changes may involve not having the usual personnel available for checking
and authorizing certain safety procedures, such as MOCs or lock outs, etc. To manage this risk,
ensure that those who will be involved in authorizing safety permits have the proper training
and experience to do so and that they fully understand their role and responsibilities. Conduct a
risk analysis using your management of change procedure to uncover any unrecognized
unwanted consequences of modified safety procedures.
While all safety procedures are important, take special care with management of change (MOC)
requests and pre-startup safety reviews (PSSRs). There will be pressure to quickly approve
requested changes necessitated by plant damage, unusual equipment configuration, and/or the
rush to return to normalcy. No shortcuts allowed! The facility may be in an unusual
configuration and contamination may also be present. Changes must be reviewed thoroughly
and with special attention to hidden consequences. PSSRs must be done with critical diligence
since there may be many potential anomalies and hidden hazards.
C. Communications
Communications during and after an emergency or disaster are more than just a convenience;
they are essential for personnel safety, ecosystem protection, and facility well-being. Therefore,
preplanning your communication strategy is a key ingredient in ensuring its reliability and
effectiveness. To ensure that this vital link exists, two things are needed—the right equipment
and a plan for how it will be used.
1. Communications Equipment:
Conventional communication equipment may or may not work during a disaster. Hope that it
does, but have a plan should it fail. It is common and almost expected that land line telephone
• Get GETS: Register for GETS, the Government Emergency Telecommunications Service
that supports federal, state, local, and tribal government, industry, and non-
governmental organization personnel in performing their National Security and
Emergency Preparedness missions. GETS provides emergency access and priority
processing in the local and long distance segments of the Public Switched Telephone
Network when regular telephone service is congested. To learn more about GETS
and/or register, go to: http://gets.ncs.gov/.
• Radio: Consider purchasing a NOAA Weather radio with a warning tone and battery
back up for your emergency command centers.
• Cell Phones: Increase the chance of connecting with a cell telephone service that is
operable by subscribing to several different providers.
• Satellite Phones: Consider purchasing or renting satellite telephones and a base
station. Satellite phones are more complicated to operate than cell phones so train
several people in their use. They also require a relatively unobstructed path to the
satellite. Plan on using them outdoors or connected to a remote antenna.
• Internet Communication Systems: Computer and PDA internet-based devices may
work in bad weather if the sending, relay, and receiving systems are still intact.
Consider having key personnel or the emergency command post stocked with a
computer and a PDA device (Blackberry, I-Phone, etc.). Each will need a contracted
internet provider. Consider allowing this “emergency use computer” to be directly
connected to the “outside” world and not routed through your company’s firewall,
spam filters, etc. These systems could hinder or completely block its use during an
emergency.
• Citizen Band Radios: CB’s have long been recognized and used as emergency use
communication devices. Consider having a CB base station and an appropriate number
of portable units in your emergency command post. CB operators must be licensed
and may need training on the equipment you buy. There may be licensed CB operators
already working at your facility who would volunteer to staff the equipment in an
emergency.
• Walkie-Talkies: These may or may not help you communicate with the “outside” world,
but will generally allow you to communicate with those left to staff the plant during the
emergency. If you already have a system, make sure that your emergency command
post has the ability to use it (perhaps add a second base station in the command post)
and that extra radios are available. If you do not use this type communication system,
consider purchasing a small one for your emergency command post use only. Keep a
stock of charged batteries available and put the battery chargers on your emergency
power supply.
All the equipment in the world will not help if you don’t have anyone to communicate with. So,
you need a communication plan—in fact, you need several communication plans.
• State and Federal Emergency Services: It is important that State and Federal Emergency
Service Providers be able to communicate with your Company’s Emergency Response &
Coordination Center and the facility being impacted by the natural disaster (if it is
staffed). To facilitate this, establish and agree on communication protocols with each
agency and exchange lists of telephone numbers and people to call. Agree on who calls
whom and when. Call prompts might be agreed upon periodic (every hour, for instance)
updates or when there are significant changes in risks or circumstances. As part of the
preplan, all communications modes should be tested.
o To improve the probability that Communication Plans actually work properly
when needed, strongly consider including the state and Federal emergency
response agencies in your table top exercises and mock drills. By so doing,
communication issues can be identified and corrected before they are a “life
and death” communication. Further, it gives the Federal and state authorities
the opportunity to understand your plan and offer improvement suggestions
just as you have the same opportunity to critique their plans.
• Company Emergency Response & Coordination Center: This is your communication
center for managing emergencies and disaster response. Obviously, to function
effectively, it must have the ability to gather and disseminate information. This facility
or system should be located so that it is not directly impacted by the disaster itself. It
should be able to communicate in all available modes—land line telephone, GETS, cell
telephones, satellite telephones, internet devices/PDAs/computer e-mails, CB radios,
etc. Since it will function as the hub of most communications, it should have an up to
date list of contacts, telephone numbers and e-mails. A plan or protocol as to who
handles the calls should be established and tested. As part of the preplan, all
communications modes should be tested.
• Employees: Your employees may or may not be displaced by the disaster. Regardless,
they need a way to contact you, and you probably want to talk with them. To
communicate with employees not in the plant, consider one or both of the following
mechanisms.
1. talk with someone about their status and the plant’s status,
2. leave a message, or
3. hear a message.
The base or operator/receptionist of the 1-800 line should be remote from the natural
disaster area. The line can be staffed full time or it can serve only as a recorded
message center. Make sure that all of your employees know the 1-800 number and how
it is to be used. Explain that if they are displaced, they can use this system to let the
company know where they are and what their status is as well as hearing your status.
o Establish a computer internet site or Web page that can receive and send e-
mails. Use and staff it much like you would the 1-800 number call in system.
Publicize the internet site along with the 1-800 emergency telephone number.
Remember that everyone is not internet fluent, so if you can have only one
emergency communication system for your employees, use the 1-800
telephone system.
• Communications and Education: Each company should establish when the preplan
actions are to be initiated. That decision should trigger a refresher training and
education effort. Employees and their families need to be given last- minute/up to date
information so that they can take care of themselves and help you take care of the
facility. It is important that the families of employees who will remain onsite to help are
safe and that the employee knows it.
o For Employees: Make sure that all employees know how to take care of their
families as a first priority and offer assistance if needed. Tell the employees
who will remain onsite the contact numbers and methods that are expected to
be available for contacting their families and for their families to contact them.
Remind each employee of the part they are to play in securing the plant site for
the natural disaster and conduct overview/refresher training sessions, if
needed. If special equipment, such as satellite phones, etc. is to be used,
conduct refresher training on where it is, how to access it, and how it is to be
used. Go over the assignment list and reporting protocol and compensate for
any absences or vacancies.
D. Logistics
Having people and materials located where they are safe but can be accessed quickly is a key
component of preplanning that minimizes ongoing damage and facilitates recover after a
disaster. The two broad groups to be considered are 1) emergency recovery: assistance,
materials and supplies, and 2) manufacturing materials: raw materials and products. Make
arrangements with the local, state, and federal agencies that will control access to the disaster
I. Emergency Recovery:
Some people have specialized skills and expertise that may be needed during or immediately
after an emergency to minimize safety hazards, onsite or offsite damage, and/or environmental
contamination. Choose these people carefully based on their expertise, ability to function under
pressure and adverse circumstances, and their safety ethic. Your preplan should position these
people out of harm’s way during the disaster but make them available quickly should the need
arise. Make sure that your emergency command center communication team knows who these
people are, what they can do, and how to activate them.
Emergency recovery materials and supplies (such as food, water, clothing, shelter, first aid,
repair materials, extra communication equipment, etc.) should be staged and stored in a secure
area not expected to be impacted by the disaster, but readily available to replenish exhausted or
damaged onsite supplies. Have a delivery system predesigned and ready to respond as the need
arises and flexible enough to gather additional items if not already stocked.
In your risk assessment, you developed an inventory philosophy (Section II. B.) regarding storage
of feed stocks and finished goods onsite or offsite. Based on those decisions, develop a staging
plan if one is needed for feed stocks/raw materials and finished goods. Conduct a risk
assessment of the staging plan and available options. Just because the materials are not on
your site during the disaster does not mean that there are no risks of concern. Be careful not to
trade one risk for an equal or higher risk. Check with your suppliers to confirm that they can
delay/hold/store materials for you at their unimpacted sites. If so, they can probably do so with
less risk than you having to make temporary arrangements with others not accustomed to
storing the materials. Regardless of the system chosen, determine the risks and make informed
risk-based decisions regarding offsite storage/staging of materials. Make arrangements well in
advance of any need (perhaps at the beginning of the hurricane season) with your suppliers,
your customers, and owner/operators of potential storage locations for use prior, during and
after a natural disaster. Plans made just before a natural disaster strikes are more likely to be
flawed and/or incomplete.
Your site must be secure from unwanted visitors and observers (including the media), but it
must be accessible to key employees and other specialists before and after the disaster. To
facilitate access for those needed at the site, contact the local, state, and federal authorities to
understand:
Area access may be restricted well before the disaster hits. Develop a plan for emergency
access credentials for employees who will be coming in to staff the plant during the emergency.
Do not count on employees being able to get in just because the disaster had not yet occurred.
Local emergency officials may have already closed roads to all travelers without appropriate
credentials.
After the disaster, area access is almost always restricted for safety and security reasons. The
emergency access credentials that you get should be for personnel who can help resolve the
issues and lessen the risk. Visitors and bystanders are not needed. Determine if different
credentials are required for access before and after the event. Make sure that the right people
have the right credentials by having the governing agencies and authorities validate them.
Include the use of emergency access and needed credentials in each drill to train your
employees to bring them and to “condition” authorities to expect requests for entry using these
documents.
Design your drills for the types of natural disasters you can reasonably expect depending on
your facility’s location, natural disaster history, and emergency response agencies preparedness
plans. Make your drills as realistic and comprehensive as possible. Of particular importance to
validate/test during the drill are:
If a natural disaster has occurred in the past and/or if one has occurred at another facility similar
to yours, use that as a model for your drill. If it is impossible or impractical to conduct a full
involvement drill, start to finish, consider conducting staged or topic drills. For instance,
conduct a staged drill starting on the “Preplan” activities and critique it. Then at a later date,
conduct a drill on the “Shortly Before” activities, then later on the “During” activities, and finally
on the “After” activities and critique each stage. Another approach is to drill on functions or
actions—such as “Communications” then later on “Security, Identification and Access” and so
on. Critique each function and make upgrades as needed.
Now is the time to secure the facility and ensure it is as ready as possible for the type of disaster
and hazards expected. Check supplies and confirm that they are accessible and conduct last
minute tests of backup systems. There may be extra employees available to help with these
tasks. When the job is done, they will leave and only those employees designated to remain
onsite during the disaster will be left.
Securing the facility involves reducing the risks that the facility will impose on itself and others
during the natural disaster. One risk reduction item to address is housekeeping. Any and all
items that might become missiles in high winds must be removed, stored away, and/or tied
down. Look for any chemicals stored in drums or buckets and store them in a secure location to
prevent spillage. Remove unnecessary vehicles from roads, clean out truck beds of items that
may fly off, pick up loose insulation and uninstalled piping materials and tools, signs, etc. Look
for anything that will impose a hazard in high winds or rising water. Bottom line—clean house
like your mother-in-law will be visiting!
Another risk reduction opportunity is to configure the facility to withstand the disaster. Based
on your preplan, you have already decided what to do about inbound raw materials and
outbound products. Enact those plans now. Your preplan risk assessments also helped you
decide what to do about tank inventories and securing tanks that are emptied. Enact those
plans now.
Test and confirm adequacy of all modes of communication. Don’t wait until they are needed to
find out they don’t work as expected.
And, finally, evacuate all unnecessary personnel (no visitors and/or “just to observe” people)
and activate your Natural Disaster Safety and Security System as a line of protection against
unwanted intruders—human or animal.
Conduct an inventory of the onsite supplies matching actual quantities to listed required
quantities. If there are shortfalls, arrange for them to be addressed quickly. Pay particular
attention to batteries. Electrical power failure is relatively common so battery chargers may not
work. Ensure that there are plenty of charged walkie-talkie, cell phone and satellite phone
batteries. Make sure that supplies are accessible from the onsite Emergency Command post.
See Appendix B for suggested supply lists. Be sure that those that will staff the onsite command
The onsite Emergency Command post should be inspected thoroughly and all equipment tested.
Pay particularly attention to the safety features and the communications systems. If emergency
generators, any other fuel consuming equipment, or wet cell batteries are inside the command
center, ensure that there is proper ventilation! Check oxygen sensors (in the command center
and/or the personal ones) to make sure that they are working. Test all equipment, including
communications, ventilation fans, alarms, etc.
C. Back-Up Systems
The person responsible for each back-up system should test it and make sure that the system
they are responsible for is ready to go. They should also confirm the “as hooked up”
configuration, extra fuel availability, and ventilation.
IV. During
During the height of the natural disaster, the primary role of those chosen to remain in the
facility is to:
A. Safety
Safety of the onsite personnel is vital. How to take care of themselves and others during this
stressful time must be part of their training program and emphasized strongly. There will be
tremendous pressure to shortcut safety procedures to respond to emergencies. These actions,
although superficially heroic, can be misplaced and lead to unnecessary risks and injuries.
(Coordinate with Preplan, Natural Disaster Plan, Safety Procedures, Section II. B.) Require all
onsite personnel to have first aid training. (Advanced first aid training would be even better.)
B. Security
During the disaster, the facility may incur damages that adversely affect its security or security
systems. Usually little, if anything, can be done during the disaster. Notification should be made
to the offsite Emergency Command Center, and plans for immediate repairs should be
scheduled as soon as circumstances allow it to be done safely. If complete repairs are not
possible in the short term, consider temporary repairs and/or alternate systems.
Communicating is often the primary role onsite staffers provide during the disaster. It is their
responsibility to observe, deduce, and understand just what damage is being done, the effect of
that damage on the facility’s well-being, security, safety, and the potential offsite impacts. Their
role is to communicate observations and deductions to the offsite Emergency Command Center
so that coordinated repair plans and notifications to other response agencies can be made.
Being able to make sufficient observations during the disaster may be challenging, but safety
should not be compromised in an effort to make them. (Reference Preplan, Natural Disaster
Plan, Section II. B.) Several communication tools should be available to the onsite staffers.
(Reference Preplan, Communications, Sections II. C.)
V. After
Immediately after the disaster there will be a strong desire to get outside to see the damages.
Resist that urge until you are sure that the danger has passed and it is safe to venture outside of
the command post. Consider the possibility of chemical releases. Use the appropriate personal
protective equipment (PPE) when venturing outside until monitoring proves it is safe.
Communicate your status to the offsite command post and let them know that you are going
outside. Consider sending a small team out first to validate your assumption that it is safe.
Then follow up with more people in small groups. Keep the small groups separate from each
other so that each can function as a rescue team for any other team that needs help. Until you
are absolutely sure that the hazards are recognized and the risk is tolerable, keep at least one
person in the command post. All teams should carry portable communication equipment and
stay in touch with the other teams and the command post.
All hazards may not be easily observable. Take special precautions, such as using dielectric
boots and rubber gloves when first venturing outside. Be careful of what you touch and where
you walk since electrical and/or electronic equipment may have shorted out. If the electrical
power is off, electrical hazards may not be apparent until the power is turned back on. Resurvey
for electrical hazards after the power has been restored. Chemical hazards may be hidden also.
Some caustic chemicals and some acids look like water. Some float on top of the water and
some are heavier than water so the water floats on them.
If there is physical damage to your facility, this presents (new) physical hazards. These are often
observable, but some can be hidden. Take special care when walking under equipment or
structures. They may be damaged or have debris on them that could fall off at any time. Be
aware of sharp and jagged edges, broken glass, tripping and slipping hazards, and
“visitors/critters.” Depending on where your facility is located, you may find cows, dogs, cats,
snakes, alligators, and a variety of wild life, wandering around your facility. Most will be
distressed, tired, frightened, hungry, and not in a good mood at all. This is not the time to pick a
pet. Get the help needed (sometimes experts are needed) to rescue “critters” safely.
As soon as it is safe, survey the facility to assess damages. Look first for things that are severe
safety and/or environmental risks requiring immediate attention. Then look for damages that
B. Security
As soon as the critical safety and environmental issues are identified and are being addressed,
turn your attention to site security. Site security involves problems that might be caused by
news people, scavengers, looters, curious citizens, terrorists, opportunists, people who are lost
or injured and animals of all sorts. On a more somber note, it might also include human bodies
and bodies of a variety of animals and reptiles, so be prepared.
As soon as services are available, activate as many of the security systems as possible—including
lighting, video monitoring, motion detectors, gate locks, access authorization cards, and guards
as soon as it is safe for them to be there. Train guards for the type of situations they may
encounter at this time. Since a fence around your facility is a basic form of security, have it
repaired as soon as possible.
Make and enact plans to remove the dead (human and animal) as soon as possible and
remember to be particularly cautious as corpses may be laden with pollutants, insects, disease,
and animals, snakes and rats. Any and all may carry disease and will be a threat to your safety.
1. News People:
News people have the right to document and report on the news. They do not have the right to
come onto private or company property without permission. They do not have the right to
endanger others and/or the safety and security of your facility or the chemicals onsite. They
may bring new risks to the location in the form of lack of knowledge of how to conduct
themselves in a chemical manufacturing environment, lack of knowledge of the hazards
imposed by the chemicals being handled, and risks imposed on the facility simply from the
equipment they may bring.
If possible, keep them out of your facility until it is completely safe and secure and you receive
authorization from senior management to grant them access. Try to intercept them before they
actually get on the property and explain that safety checks are not yet complete and, therefore,
no visitors are allowed in yet. Also tell them that access to the site can be granted only by
senior management located in the offsite command center, law enforcement, or certain state or
federal agencies, and then only for cause. If already on the property, escort them off. Be polite
but firm. Do not say the situation is unsafe unless you want to make the 5:00 o’clock news. Say
only that a safety evaluation is being made and is not yet complete. Everything you say or do
may be videotaped or recorded and played on the news, so act accordingly.
These people will probably leave as soon as they see you. If not, ask them to leave. Have the
person staffing your onsite command center notify law enforcement. If safe to do so, take their
picture for law enforcement follow-up, but do not try to apprehend them yourself.
The primary focus of communications with the outside world at this time is to relay messages
regarding injury reports, condition of the facility, damages, needed supplies, unusual situations
or activities, risks involving release of chemicals, and resources needed. Ongoing risks onsite
with possible offsite consequences should be evaluated and described in detail so that
appropriate responses can be made. Needed resources may be anything from people with
specialized expertise or knowledge to specific types of equipment.
This is the time also for those in the facility to make contact with their families to assure them
that they are well and safe and to get caught up on how their families weathered the natural
disaster. The offsite command center should recognize this need and facilitate contacts. This
is not the time to call television or radio stations and make statements or give narrations of
what happened. Do not receive these calls either. If some get through to you, politely tell them
that you are busy and cannot talk with them now.
D. Recovery
The disaster has passed and now it is time to deal with the aftermath and get back to normal.
Not only will there be damaged equipment to repair, there will be contamination to deal with,
hidden or silent failures, new hazards associated with old equipment, and the usual startup risks
and problems. Your recovery and recommissioning plan must be as comprehensive as the initial
start-up of a new facility, perhaps even more rigorous. The risks will be very similar except with
one extra twist—things that may have worked properly before the disaster may not work after
it—but you might not know that until something goes drastically wrong. Don’t assume that past
performance will be repeated. Confirm it.
1. Repairs:
After the critical emergency repairs are made, begin to compile and categorize the other
damages that must be repaired before restart. Some damages will be obvious, but some will
not. Consider dividing the repairs into categories—such as obvious physical/mechanical
damage, potential hidden damages, contamination, support services impairments, electrical
outages, electronic/signal failures, and computer issues. Assign appropriate teams to ferret out
the extent of the damages and make repair decisions. Remember that some repairs may
require Code stamps (API, ASME, ASTM, U or R code stamp, etc.) and/or worker certification of
some type. Other repairs may have to conform to national codes (national electrical code, for
instance) or standards (ISA is one example) and others may require conformance to your
company standards. Be sure those making repairs are qualified to do so and don’t forget to do
the paperwork—which might include getting a certified inspector to approve the repair.
2. Recommissioning:
Recommissioning involves preparing equipment and personnel again for all of the tasks
associated with manufacturing a product. A special recommissioning plan should be developed
for recovery from natural disaster-related shutdowns where damages and contaminations are
expected. Just because it worked as you wanted it to before the disaster doesn’t mean that it
will work now, even if there are no apparent damages. Damages may be hidden, calibration
may be lost, or contamination might have occurred. Instrumentation is particularly vulnerable
to hidden damages, lost calibration, and contamination.
For instrumentation, step through the process one stage at a time and check configuration and
responses ensuring that each item is performing as designed. Check for responses to out-of-
acceptable or operational-range conditions to ensure that the process controls and safety
instrumented systems will bring the process back under control or to a safe configuration.
Carefully check (functional check preferred) each safety device or system:
• Basic process controls
• Preventative safety systems
o Active safety systems
o Passive safety systems
• Mitigative safety systems
o Active safety systems
o Passive safety systems
Do not forget that your distributative control system(s) (DCS) may be the hub of most of these
instrumented systems, so check functionality all the way through the DSC.
For processing equipment, check for damages and contamination and confirm that each is ready
to receive materials. Pay particular attention to storage tanks that may have been emptied or
filled with water during the disaster. Look for displacement and damage to foundations or to
tankage due to floating. Also look for piping damage due to tankage displacement and/or
impacts from flying debris. After you are sure of the integrity of the equipment, start
reinventorying it based on your startup plan. Support systems, such as lubrication, compressed
air, inerting, and fuel supply systems should be carefully checked for contamination and product
quality. Bearings and seals may have been compromised so check them for contamination
including grease/packing and local lubrication supply systems. If you are uncertain regarding
contamination, assume it to have occurred and flush/replace lubrication systems and supplies.
3. Training:
Remember to train (or refresher train) employees who will be recommissioning the facility.
Don’t assume that just because they were good operators before the disaster that they will
remember how to start up a facility recovering from a complete shutdown. Consider training
recommissioning personnel together so that they develop a team concept and are accustomed
to working with each other. If contractors are involved, make them part of the retraining and
Recommissioning may highlight several changes that may be needed to compensate for missing
and/or damaged equipment or makeshift repairs. Use the specially developed MOC process and
do not shortcut the system in an effort to get the facility ready for restart quickly. Changes
made in this stage can be particularly risky and, if not properly analyzed, can cause catastrophic
consequences. The same thought process should be applied to Prestart-up Safety Reviews.
These must be thorough and comprehensive. See Section F for a more complete description of
how to conduct PSSRs after a disaster.
4. Interdependencies:
Startup may be contingent on help from others, perhaps for electrical power or water supply.
Consider the interdependencies developed and discussed in Section II, B and use them to your
advantage. Recognize that this is a give-and-take proposition—you may be called on to give a
service associated with interdependencies with another company before you can receive a
service from them. Either way, play your part and do what you can to help everyone, including
yourself, recover from the disaster.
When developing recovery and recommissioning plans, consider what interdependent services
will be available and how they might be used to help you recover from the disaster and restart
your facility. Make it known just what services you need and explain how those services will
enable your facility to provide services to others. Follow through on your “promises” by
providing services to others as outlined in the interdependencies section of your disaster
preplan. (See Appendix D—Example List of Interdependencies)
Make sure that the agencies understand the interdepencies and how proper utilization will
facilitate recovery and restart not only for manufacturing facilities but for the community as
well. In addition to interdepencies, don’t be shy in asking the agencies for help in recovery.
They may be able to provide expedited routes for repair materials, some security assistance,
technical expertise, and establish communication mechanisms.
E. Staffing
Staffing the facility for emergency repairs, long term repairs, and eventual restart has several
phases each with different needs. Staffing may be with company employees only, but will
probably include contractors as well. To keep staffing levels manageable and working
effectively, develop a time line or sequence chart of what needs to be done and in what order.
Match required expertise to the different tasks and then develop a staffing chart to match. As
projects are completed, adjust staffing accordingly.
Your preplans should have included a mechanism for employees to contact the company and a
way for the company to contact and/or in some way get messages to employees. See Section II.
C—Communications. Based on the staffing chart developed above in Section V, E—Staffing,
schedule identified employees to come back into the plant. This should be voluntary if at all
possible. Recognize that some employees may not be available because of significant damages
to their homes and/or family issues associated with the evacuation requiring their attention.
2. Lodging:
After needed employees and contractors are back onsite, they may need local housing and
services which they may not be able to secure on their own. If you expect them to continue
helping secure, repair, and start up the plant, you may have to provide housing and services for
them. Consider contracting with a local hotel or motel to provide them. If that is not possible or
if local services are damaged beyond use, consider installing temporary housing, laundry,
kitchen, etc. onsite. Also consider bringing in additional contractors to operate these temporary
facilities and services.
It may be that your employees’ homes were damaged and their families have no place to stay.
Consider making arrangements for them to be housed in surrounding areas not severely
impacted by the disaster. It is important that you take care of your employees and their families
during this time. The cost to do so will probably be insignificant when compared to the total
disaster cost. The favor will be returned.
F. Restart
Restarting your facility after a natural disaster could be a very hazardous event if not planned
properly. Before starting manufacturing operations a number of risks must be identified and
addressed. These risks range from making sure those responsible for the startup are properly
trained to ensuring that the equipment is ready to receive the chemicals and that all operational
and safety systems are functional.
1. Operational PSSRs:
After the disaster, inspect your facility even better than you would a new facility. Section the
facility into blocks of equipment or processing mini-sections and perform a PSSR 5 on each
section using the employees who will operate and service the area with help from specialists.
Don’t forget to function test equipment, especially instrumentation and safety systems. Look
for blockages (for instance in relief valve discharge pipes) and debris that might impair the
functionality of equipment (for instance a twig prohibiting a valve from stroking). Note areas
where insulation has been damaged and restrict access if personnel safety is involved.
5
Guidelines for Performing Effective Pre-Startup Safety Reviews, Center for Chemical Process Safety, New
York, 2007.
If strong winds were involved, look for debris-impact damage such as missing insulation, broken
tubing and wiring, dented piping, and bent structural supports. Pay particular attention to
sensitive or fragile instrumentation systems.
2. Safety PSSRs:
After the operational PSSRs, re-review the area and pay particular attention to tripping, falling,
cutting, and “critter” hazards. Remember that snakes, spiders, dogs, cats, and even alligators
may have been looking for a safe haven during the storm. By now, they are sure to be
frightened, hungry, tired, uncomfortable, and dangerous. Cautiously open equipment, panels,
and drainage trenches.
3. Training:
We tend to spend many more training hours on how to operate the facility than we do on
shutting it down and starting it up—which are often the most dangerous periods. Startup after
a disaster, where contamination, damage, unusual location of processing materials, and a
taxed/tired support system might coexist with unhappy and frightened “critters”, could be
particularly hazardous.
To offset this hazard, retrain (or give refresher training to) all the employees who will be
responsible for startup. This includes operational, maintenance, safety, engineering and
supervision. Training should focus on recognizing anomalies in the startup sequence and how to
correct them. Consider training people together in teams of operations, maintenance,
engineers, and supervision so that they become familiar with each other’s actions and “styles.”
For support personnel (mechanics, electricians, and instrument specialists), consider retraining
them on recognizing early effects of contamination, electrical issues, and failed safety systems.
Supervisors and engineers should be reminded of and retrained in the part they are to play in
the startup, how they are to interact, and their specific responsibilities and authorities. Spend
some training time on protocols for communicating requests for help, status reports, and
concerns. Consider training a process safety person (or team) to function as an “unbiased”
advisor to give the startup team advice on potential responses to risks encountered.
Give everyone refresher training on the basic safety procedures that may be used during
startup. Pay particular attention to recognizing and responding to changes required. Retraining
on your MOC procedure, or training on the MOC procedure developed just for this startup,
would be very valuable. Remind startup personnel that the plant may be occupied by
unwanted visitors, such as snakes, spiders, and even alligators. Educate/ reeducate them on
safety procedures for opening panels, junction boxes and going into confined spaces as to how
G. Critique
“Lessons Learned” come from having experiences and then documenting them in order to learn
from and share them. As soon as possible after the natural disaster, have everyone involved
compile their notes and experiences so that a critique of the events and responses can be made.
Each person should list all of the things that:
If possible, ask neighboring facilities and the civic authorities who participated in managing the
disaster and/or response to do the same.
Have a meeting where this information is shared, learned from, and factored into an updated
overall disaster plan. Don’t make this a “blame somebody” type meeting, but rather a meeting
in which all learn what worked, what did not work, and how the approaches and actions can be
changed so that everything works better the next time. Everyone should work within the
alliances already established in preparing for the disaster and walk away from the meeting with
assignments on improving various issues within their realm of responsibilities. If
interdependencies were involved, try to get other company facilities, utilities, or services that
were interdependent with your facility involved also. Set up a follow-up meeting in about six
months to review status reports and needs for further assistance/ resources, etc. Have a full drill
about a year after the disaster (or just before the next natural disaster season) to confirm that
progress has been made. Try to include everyone and every function, agency/etc. that
participated in the real thing a year earlier. Test all systems, communications, responses, and
recovery actions. Make it as real as possible. Critique the drill and continue to learn and
improve.
VII. Appendices
A. Example List of Major Decisions to be made
B. Example List of Suggested supplies
C. Example Checklist of Communication Equipment
D. Example List of Interdependencies
E. Example Risk Analysis for Potential Onsite Consequences of Concern
F. Example Risk Analysis for Potential Offsite Consequences of Concern
G. Natural Disasters that may occur without (much) Warning
* This is an example. You should develop your own checklist specific for your situation.
* This is an example listing of supplies that should/could be on hand for those remaining onsite.
It does not include quantities. Those who have experienced hurricanes say that you probably
should increase your original quantity estimate by 50%. You should develop your own checklist
and quantities specific for your situation and expected needs.
Food Supplies:
* This is an example. You should develop your own checklist specific for your situation and the equipment you will use.
* This is an example. You should develop your own checklist specific to interdependencies for your situation.
Example Risk analysis of consequence sequences that may be of concern onsite include:
* This is an example. You should develop your own consequences of concern, risk and abating actions specific for your situation.
Hazard Initial onsite Consequence Secondary onsite Consequence Risk Rating Abating Action
Heavy rain shorting out control • Loss of process Medium Waterproof, cover, and protect all junction
instruments, safety containment for hazardous boxes, switchgear, electrical cabinets, and
instrumentation or systems, chemicals enclosures.
and/or communication • Loss of communication
equipment capabilities
Heavy rain causing a high weight load • Structural failure, roof High Clear all roof gutters and downspouts,
on structures and buildings collapse, possible injuries check all drainage routes, and do not allow
roofs people in building or upper floors.
Flooding causing tanks to break loose
from their tie-downs and
float off
Flooding causing surge pits/waste
water ponds/etc. to
overflow releasing their
contents to the surrounding
area
Lightning strike destroys your process
computer and/or SIS
systems
Lightning strike damages your
communication equipment
Lightning strike Ignites flammable storage Damage / collapse of nearby High Empty and rinse tanks
tanks tanks
High Winds damages structures; wind
blown shrapnel
Example Risk analysis of consequence sequences that may be of concern offsite include:
* This is an example. You should develop your own consequences of concern, risk and abating actions specific for your situation.
Hazard Initial onsite Consequence Secondary onsite Consequence Risk Rating Abating Action
Loss of process • Air borne toxics • Respiratory injury to Medium Reduce all toxic chemical inventory to
chemical • Water borne people minimal levels and secure remaining
containment toxics/pollutants • Animal injury or death supplies in strongest tanks
Storage or process • Impact damage to • Displaced inhabitants Low • Reduce all toxic chemical inventory to
tanks break loose structures, homes and • Pollution and toxic minimal levels and secure remaining
from their restraints utility services contamination/injuries supplies in strongest tanks
and float off • Carries possible • Secure tankage from floating
contaminants
Storage or process • Contamination
tanks overflow due • Pollution/toxic effects
to rain water • Possible increase in fire
intrusion hazard
Explosion causing • Impact damage to
shrapnel to be structures, homes and
thrown utility services
• People and livestock
injuries/deaths
Debris blown from Same as explosion Same as explosion High Housekeeping + tying everything down
plant and/or storing all loose items in buildings
Develop your own
unimaginable list of
consequences that
potentially will occur