Available online at www.sciencedirect.

com

Procedia Economics and Finance 2 (2012) 363 – 372

2nd Annual International Conference on Qualitative and Quantitative Economics Research

(QQE 2012)

Sustainable performance evaluation of banks using a multi-attribute utility model: an

application to French banks

Sonia Rebaia, Mohamed Naceur Azaieza, Dhafer Saidaneb,*

a
Institut Supérieur de Gestion, Tunis, Tunisia
b
Skema Business School, Lille, France, Université Lille Nord de France

Abstract

The recent banking crises have led experts in finance and banking as well as scientists to think about innovative banking
practices in order to get out of the financial and economic problems that banks experienced. Nowadays, it becomes
obvious for banking experts that the solutions go further than simply improving supervision and regulation. As an
alternative, experts advocate the necessity of switching the current economy where everybody is only motivated by
maximum profits to an economy where everybody contributes for the achievement of banking sustainability. A new
concept of ‘sustainable bank’ begins to rise. The exact concept of ‘sustainable bank’ is evolving over time and is still a
subject of debate. In this study, we present our view of a ‘sustainable bank’ and we develop a framework based on multi-
attribute utility approach aiming to assess the performance of a bank from different stakeholders’ points of views in order
to appraise the degree of sustainability of the bank. This developed framework is applied to five French banks.

© 2012
© 2012 The
TheAuthors.
Authors.Published
Publishedby
byElsevier
ElsevierLtd.
Ltd.Selection and/or peer-review under responsibility of Global Science
and Technology
Selection and/orForum Open access
peer-review underunder CC BY-NC-ND
responsibility license.
of Global Science and Technology Forum Pte Ltd
Keywords: sustainability; sustainable bank; multi-attribute utility function; performance.

1. Introduction

Nowadays, sustainability in various areas constitutes one among hottest discussion topics. More than that,
the problem of global sustainability is widely acknowledged all over the world. Financial institutions have
recently recognized sustainability as an important part of their plans showing that sustainable banking may be
a powerful solution to financial crises. To go forward sustainability, banks must look for better performance

* Sonia Rebai. Tel.: +216-98666561.

E-mail address: [email protected].

2212-5671 © 2012 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. Selection and/or peer-review under responsibility of Global Science and Technology Forum
Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license. doi:10.1016/S2212-5671(12)00098-6
364 Sonia Rebai et al. / Procedia Economics and Finance 2 (2012) 363 – 372

but using a new adequate measure of performance. Over the past several years, substantial effort has been
spent into investigating the unavoidable and the tormenting question “How well are financial institutions
doing?” Answering this question of “fact” is essential to ensure that financial institutions are not only
functioning but functioning right. The review of the literature reveals that there is no clear concept used to
assess the performance of financial institutions. The performance is mainly evaluated objectively or
subjectively through a given measure that differs from one study to another. One thing in common with these
previous studies is that they were limited to a single point of view while ignoring the perceptions of the other
financial institution stakeholders. More specifically, a widespread characteristic for most of these papers is the
use of managers’ or investors’ points of view (Maudos and Pastor, 2003; Tortosa-Ausina, 2003). Only a small
number of these studies have recognized other points of view. For instance, Hussain et al., 2002
acknowledged that customer satisfaction was the main key indicator of a bank performance. Also, Dincer et
al., 2001 have adopted regulators points of view. To the best of our knowledge, only two previous studies
Garcia-Cestona and Surroca, 2008, and Avkiran and Morita, 2010 asserted that performance evaluation should
be done from a multiple stakeholders’ standpoint. Specifically, under a data envelopment analysis (DEA)
methodology, Garcia-Cestona and Surroca, 2008 built an aggregate performance index using different
stakeholders’ goals. Whereas, Avkiran and Morita, 2010 evaluated efficiency from a multiple-stakeholder
perspective through DEA using the same variables, each of which is interpreted differently either as input or
as output.
Recent crises showed that even banks that had been classified as performing encountered serious problems.
This suggests reconsidering the concept of performance evaluation of banks. In the current study, we indeed
introduce a new concept of a performing bank “sustainable bank”. We believe that all banks’ stakeholders
should participate in the process of the bank’s performance evaluation. Further, a sustainable bank has to take
into consideration the expectations of all of its stakeholders. More explicitly, we think that to evaluate the
degree of performance of a bank, we need to assess a kind of satisfactions’ tradeoffs of all of the bank’s
stakeholders. In other words, a sustainable bank is a bank that attains a certain good enough degree of global
satisfaction for all its stakeholders. To assess a global degree of satisfaction for a bank, we develop a
framework based on multi-attribute utility approach seeking to appraise the performance of a bank from each
stakeholder points of view accounting for different judgments criteria.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we identify for each stakeholder the main
criteria to use for performance evaluation. In section 3, we build the sustainable performance model with
illustration through a case study of French commercial banks. In section 4, we provide discussions and
analysis of our findings. Finally, section 5 concludes the paper and outlines some future research directions.

2. Stakeholders suggested criteria

Satisfying all stakeholders is absolutely hard. The complexity of carrying out this task adequately is mainly
due to the difficulties in meeting the conflicting requests of its various stakeholders. For instance, depositors
seek high returns. This however results in a high cost to the bank. Borrowers on the other hand wish to receive
loans at the lowest cost. This again affects negatively bank’s return. Moreover, bank owners look for earning
more by paying less which restrains the bank’s ability to provide its personnel with reasonable benefits.
Furthermore, regulators are involved in reducing the risks that a bank may take in obtaining and using funds.
This limits the bank’s ability to satisfy the remaining stakeholders. This has already been acknowledged by
Avkiran and Morita, 2010 and Hempel et al., 1994. While Hempel et al., 1994 adopted four groups of
stakeholders; namely, surplus units, deficit units, owners and regulators, Avkiran and Morita, 2010 specified
the following five stakeholders: shareholders, customers, managers, employees, and regulators. This suggests
closely considering the appropriate classification of stakeholders.
 Sonia Rebai et al. / Procedia Economics and Finance 2 (2012) 363 – 372 365

Today’s fast changing world requires figuring out the way to adequately meet the related challenges. One
of these challenges is how to achieve short term objectives without compromising the ability of future
generations in carrying out their own needs? Still, it is important to note that sustainable development cannot
be achieved by a single group of actors; but, it should be a pervasive attitude, to which every participant in the
global economy must contribute to. A sustainable bank should be suitable for that changing world. It, indeed,
should attempt to ensure a strong and recurring value creation while respecting not only its traditional
stakeholders but also taking into account the civil society as a whole. To take into account this new
dimension, we suggest adding the civil society to the previous list of stakeholders. Civil society is defined as
individuals, non-governmental organizations and institutions that manifest interests and will of citizens. That
is, to examine the sustainability of a bank, we will consider six stakeholders’ points of view; namely,
regulators, shareholders, customers, managers, employees and civil society. In the following sub-sections, we
suggest a list of criteria related to each stakeholder. These criteria are commonly used but not exhaustive in
measuring bank performance.

2.1. Regulators’ points of view

The regulation has the burden of protecting the financial system users and assuring the stability of the
financial system as a whole. To achieve these goals, regulators impose some prudential norms and consider
risks control degrees as the fundamental measure of banks performance. Insolvency risk, credit risk and
liquidity risk are some chief categories of risks. To appraise the solvency of a bank, regulators use the global
ratio of solvency as a criterion. This solvency ratio indicates the coverage degree of banks’ assets by equity.
The higher this ratio, the safer the bank is. Besides this, the fact that a bank incurs a greater portion of equity
in its activity leads it to have a tendency to adopt less risky activities. Credit risk is the risk of losses on banks
debts. It arises when counterparty is unable to meet its obligations. We evaluate credit risk through the ratio
of nonperforming loans relative to total loans. Note that a huge non-performing asset in a bank balance sheet
causes wearing away its capital base that is why measuring credit risk is imperative. Liquidity risk is the
ability of a bank to cope at any time with withdrawals of deposits. For this, a given bank must have a certain
amount of liquid assets that have to be bigger than resources of the same duration. Liquidity risk can lead to a
reduction in a bank income. In fact, faced with liquidity risk a bank may be enforced to have access to funds
at a disproportionate cost to wrap its urgent cash requests. Liquidity level can be assessed through the ratio of
loans to total assets.

2.2. Shareholders’ points of view

In addition to pleasing depositors and borrowers, shareholders have to be considered. In fact, within the
framework of banking industry a commercial bank must be treated as a firm that provides a set of products
and services to generate profits. Profitability is vital for a bank to sustain its ongoing activity. Shareholders
focus mainly on profit making and seek to attain reasonable levels of profit. For this, we suggest to use two
measures for profitability: the rate of return on equity (ROE) and the ratio of dividend payout per share
(DPS). Explicitly, ROE estimates the efficiency of the bank’s equity use. The higher these ratios, the more
shareholders are satisfied.

2.3. Customers’ points of view

Banks are mainly considered as providers of services to customers. This means that for a bank, customers
are the source of its profits and it is crucial to make them satisfied. However, it is important to figure out how
366 Sonia Rebai et al. / Procedia Economics and Finance 2 (2012) 363 – 372

to evaluate customers’ satisfaction? In the current study, we appraise customers’ satisfaction through two
main criteria: accessibility to the bank and service quality. To evaluate accessibility, we use two sub-criteria
the number of branches and the number of automated teller machines (ATMs). It is obvious that the higher
these numbers, the higher the bank’s accessibility. The dynamism of a bank business can give an idea about
customers’ satisfaction. In fact, the more a bank gives loans the more customers are satisfied. Also, the more
customers deposit their money in a bank, the more they are satisfied. Then, loans evolution and deposits
evolution will be used as customers’ satisfaction sub-criteria.

2.4. Managers’ points of view

To evaluate the performance of a bank from managers’ points of view, we believe that the benefits and
incentives are good factors for the satisfaction of managers. To evaluate these factors, we use two measures
the evolution of the annual average wages and the evolution of the annual average bonus. It should be
obvious that the higher evolutions of wages and bonus, the higher the managers’ satisfaction.

2.5. Employees’ points of view

Employees also evaluate the performance of their bank from their own advantages. For this, we allude to
benefits and societal factors. It is obvious that benefits factors are among other factors making employees
satisfied. We consider two sub-criteria of this type. First, we use benefit and incentives sub-attribute measured
by the average remuneration per employee and the fraction of wage rolls attributed to training. Second, we
advocate the use of the sub-attribute retirement measured by the annual average retirement pension. It is
evident that employees are more satisfied with higher evolution of remuneration or retirement prime.
Moreover, they are more pleased with higher number of training hours. Note that, generally the higher the
number of training hours, the higher the ratio of training expenses to payroll.

2.6. Civil society’s points of view

The banking sector is not often seen as a key actor in sustainable development since banks are not directly
involved in socially devastating actions. However, its pivotal role in financing the economy gives the sector a
valuable advantage for interventions in this regard. This fact legitimizes the commitment of the banking sector
on this issue. As was suggested by Douglas et al., 2004 financial institutions have to play the catalytic role in
influencing the behavior of other industries towards sustainable development. But how should the
commitment of banks for sustainable development be evaluated?
First of all, let us specify that sustainable development concerns three dimensions; namely economic,
environmental, and social ones. In economic terms, performing as a responsible bank is to provide means to
play the economy financing role while controlling risks associated with bank activities such as money
laundering or over-indebtedness of individuals. In addition to an economic responsibility, a bank should also
have an environmental one. More specifically, a bank should reduce environmental risks associated with its
activity by encouraging more investments in companies that respect environment such as reducing energy
consumption or wastes. The social dimension concerns the contribution of a bank in the social systems inside
which it carries its activities. In particular, it includes practices related to labour namely compliance with
human rights, contribution to civic engagement, carrying out low cost accommodation projects, creating
employment opportunities, and developing projects for poverty alleviation. Given the lack of data in this field,
we propose to use a content analysis of the French version of published annual reports. Specifically, we
suggest using the proportion of pages related to sustainable development (PPSD) in annual reports as a first
 Sonia Rebai et al. / Procedia Economics and Finance 2 (2012) 363 – 372 367

measure and the amount of socially responsible investment (investment on green business) (SRI) as second
measure. It should be Clear that the higher the PPSD or the SRI, the higher the satisfaction of the civil society.

3. Sustainable Performance Model Development

The current research work aims at providing a performance evaluation tool for a sustainable bank
accounting for multiple stakeholders’ points of view on the one hand; and for different criteria within the
views of each stakeholder on the other hand. Given the varying criteria employed and the conflicting
objectives involved, it is important to devise a suitable quantitative tool to assess performance. As some of the
criteria account for risk and uncertainty, a multi-attribute utility function (m.a.u.f.) is suggested. First, a
marginal utility function for each sub-criterion used by each agent is developed. Next, a multi-attribute utility
function is obtained for each criterion. Later, each of these utility functions will play the role of the marginal
utility function for the relevant stakeholder. Finally, combining all assessed scores of the different
stakeholders, a global degree of satisfaction for a bank can be evaluated. This later evaluation can be used to
estimate the sustainability of banks. The assessment approach of the various utility functions assumes a
multiplicative form (which suggests verifying mutual utility independence conditions). As a result, a marginal
score between zero and one will be obtained for each stakeholder reflecting the performance with respect to
the stakeholder’s criteria. These scores can be used to rank banks on stakeholders’ levels. Fig.1 shows the
attributes and the sub-attributes in a hierarchical framework related to multiple-stakeholders used to evaluate
different facets of banks’ sustainability.

Overall Performance Score

Stakeholders
Customers Regulators Shareholders Civil Society Managers Employees

Risk Profitability Benefit &

Sustainable Benefit
Incentives

Attributes
Accessibility Development Incentives
Service Economic Social
Liquidity
Insolvency

Quality Sustainability Incentives

Dividends

Returns

Wage

Training
ATMs

incentives
Wage and

Sub-Attributes
Branches

Investment

Retirement
Bonus
Belief
Deposits
Loans

Credit

Fig. 1. Hierarchical framework of multiple-stakeholders banks’ sustainability evaluation

3.1. Utility functions assessment

A n multi-attribute utility function is defined as u(x)=f[u1(x1), u2(x2), ..., un(xn)], where x is a vector of the n
attributes (x1, x2,…, xn) and ui (xi) is the marginal single-attribute utility function (s.a.u.f) of the attribute xi
(i=1,…, n).
368 Sonia Rebai et al. / Procedia Economics and Finance 2 (2012) 363 – 372

The utility function is assessed in four steps. First, attributes (xi) have to be identified. Second, the s.a.u.f
(ui) have to be assessed. Third, weights to aggregate these s.a.u.f are evaluated. Finally, the n m.a.u.f. (u) is
calculated. In order to assess the utility functions, one needs to make assumptions regarding utility mutual
independence (m.u.i). In the case of our study, we performed a number of tests with some experts in order to
check for each m.u.i of the suggested attributes. The outcomes reveal that m.u.i. is a valid assumption.
Therefore, according to Keeney and Raiffa, 1976 the m.a.u.f. is multi-linear and can be written in the form

–i 1[kkiui ( xi )  1]
n
ku ( x)  1 (1 )

where k and ki are scaling constants for i =1,…, n.

To asses the s.a.u.f ui, we apply the well-known approach due to Keeney and Raiffa (the five-point
assessment method). Since we use a similar m.a.u.f assessment procedure, we choose to give details only for
regulators’ m.a.u.f. the other functions are assessed using the same approach. As aforementioned, we
considered a case study of five French banks; namely, BNP Paribas, Banques Populaires Caisses d’Epargne
(BPCE), Crédit Agricole (CA), Crédit Mutuel (CM) et Société Générale (SG). Data used in this study are
from the 2010 annual reports of these banks.
For the rest of the paper, the following notations are introduced:
xLij is the jth sub-attribute of the ith attribute for the stakeholder L.
uLij is the s.a.u.f of the jth sub-attribute of the ith attribute for the stakeholder L.
xLi is the ith attribute for the stakeholder L.
ULi is the m.a.u.f of the ith attribute for the stakeholder L.
UL is the m.a.u.f of the stakeholder L.
U is the overall performance function.
xLij,q is the sub-attribute measure value such that uLij(xLij,q) = q.
kLij and kLi are scaling constants used in the assessment of the m.a.u.f ULi for each stakeholder and each
relevant attribute i and sub-attribute j.

3.2. Assessment of the regulators’ marginal utility function (u R)

A single attribute (Risk) and three sub-attributes (Insolvency Risk, Credit Risk and Liquidity Risk) are
selected for the regulator. In table 1, we give for each bank the data used to appraise respectively the sub-
attributes. It is worth noting that, to be safe a sustainable bank should seek high solvency ratio and low credit
risk and liquidity risk ratios.
As shown in table 1, the highest solvency ratio found is 14.5%, while the lowest ratio is 11.2%. Applying
the standards of Basel 2, banks are required to comply at all times a capital ratio of at least 8%. Some banks
must also, because of their status as Financial Holding Companies in the United States, maintain a solvency
ratio of 10%. Consequently, let us assume that the solvency ratios are fluctuating between 10% and 20%. That
is, the best ratio (20%) is given a utility of 1, and the worst ratio (10%) is given a utility of 0. Accordingly, we
set uR11(10%) = 0 and uR11(20%) = 1. Then, a sequence of 50-50 lotteries have been proposed to a local expert
in regulation to assess through the certainty equivalence procedure the values of xR11,1/2, xR11,1/4, xR11,3/4. More
specifically, in order to evaluate say xR11,1/2, the expert is asked whether he would choose a given sure lottery
involving a certain solvency ratio to a 50–50 one involving the best and the worst solvency ratios. Many
values of the certain ratio were suggested until the expert became indifferent between the certain lottery and
the risky one. For this latter value, the expected utilities of the two lotteries are equal. We find that the expert
is indifferent between 13.5% for sure and 50-50 lottery yielding either 10% or 20%. Therefore, 13.5% is the
certainty-equivalent of this latter lottery (uR11(13.5%) = 0.5uR11(10%)+0.5uR11(20%)=0.5). In a similar way,
 Sonia Rebai et al. / Procedia Economics and Finance 2 (2012) 363 – 372 369

we found, for a 50-50 lottery, that the expert is indifferent between 12% and the 50-50 lottery yielding 10% or
13.5%. In addition, 16% was the certainty-equivalent of the 50-50 lottery leading to 13.5% or 20%. This
indicates that uR11(12%) = 0.25 and uR11(16%) = 0.75. A utility curve can then be built-in using the five
empirically evaluated points (see Table 2). In this case, the curve has a concave shape exhibiting a risk-averse
attitude of the regulator.

Table 1. Risk’s sub-attributes measures.

Bank BNP Paribas BPCE CA CM SG

Solvency Ratio (%) (xR11) 14.5 11.2 12.8 11.5 12.1
Credit Risk Ratio (%) (xR12) 4.4 3.5 3.9 4.2 4.5
Liquidity Risk Ratio (%) (xR13) 37 67 49.8 62.6 39.1

Using the same previous process, we assess the s.a.u.f for the remaining two sub-attributes. Having
estimated the relevant s.a.u.f we can assess the m.a.u.f for risk. UR1 can be written in the following form:

–j
3
kR1U R1( xR1 )  1 [kR1kR1 j uR1 j ( xR1 j )  1]
1
(2)

where xR1 is a vector of the three sub-attributes (xR11, xR12, xR13).

In order to estimate UR1, we need appraising the scaling constants, kR1j to aggregate the three s.a.u.f. To
find kR1j we use a similar procedure as used previously. More specifically, we present to the regulation expert
a choice between two lotteries L1 and L2:
x (L1) get for sure the best level for the sub-attribute xR1j and the worst levels for the other two attributes; or
x (L2) get the uncertain lottery providing the three sub-attributes attributes at their best levels with
probability p and the three sub-attributes at their worst level with probability 1-p.
The probability p is gradually varied (in a trial-and-error fashion) until we find the p value that makes the
expert indifferent between the two lotteries. The last obtained resulting value of p equals the scaling constant
kRi for the attribute at the best level in the sure lottery. Figure 2 illustrates the assessment of the insolvency
risk scaling constant kR11.

Solvency Ratio = 20 % (best)

p
Credit Risk Ratio = 0 % (best)
Liquidity Ratio = 20 % (best)
1 Solvency Ratio = 20 % (best)
Lottery L1 Credit Risk Ratio = 8 % (worst) Lottery L2
Liquidity Ratio = 80 % (worst)
1-p Solvency Ratio = 10 % (worst)
Credit Risk Ratio = 8 % (worst)
Liquidity Ratio = 80 % (worst)

Fig 2: Assessing insolvency risk scaling constant

After some manipulations of probabilities we obtain the three following scaling constants values:
kR11=0.25, kR12=0.75 and kR13= 0.60. We can easily check that ¦i 1 k R1 j z 1 , therefore kR1 can be evaluated by
3

solving the following equation:

– j 1[k R1k R1 j  1]
3
k R1  1 (3)
370 Sonia Rebai et al. / Procedia Economics and Finance 2 (2012) 363 – 372

In order to preserve the utility independence properties of the utility function, kR1 must be between -1 and
0. Using the kR1j values, we found kR1 = - 0.87001. Substituting the scaling constants by their respective
values in equation (2), we obtain the Risk m.a.u.f. It should be clear that the Regulators’ utility function is the
utility of risk (UR(xR) = UR1(xR1)). In Table 2, we summarize the different results and the used values in the
assessment of these functions.

Table 2. Single-attribute utility functions and scaling constants for risk attribute

Scaling
Sub- Sub-attributes measures
Sub-attribute utility constants
Attribute attributes
Intermediate xRi,q function curve
(j) Worst Best kRij kRi
xRi,1/4 xRi,1/2 xRi,3/4

Insolvency
Risk (%) 10 20 12 13.5 16 0.25
(xR11)

Credit
Risk Risk (%) 8 0 6.2 5 3.4 0.75 -0.87
(xR1)
(xR12)

Liquidity
Risk (%) 80 20 67 60 40 0.60
(xR13)

3.3. Assessment of the remaining marginal utility functions

Given the repetitive nature of the assessment procedure and for space reasons, we will content specifying
the main characteristics of the considered attributes in a first step. Then, we will display all the combined
findings of the various marginal utility functions in Table 3. The corresponding detailed calculations are
omitted.
To evaluate shareholders’ marginal utility, we also use a single-attribute (Profitability) and two
subattributes (Returns and Dividends). We consider two attributes from customers’ points of view:
Accessibility and Service Quality. For each attribute we propose two sub-attributes; namely, we use Branches
and ATMs as sub-attributes for accessibility, and Loans and Deposits as sub-attributes for service quality.
Concerning managers, we consider again a single attribute (Benefit & Incentives) and two sub-attributes
(Wage and Bonus). For employees, we consider Benefit and Social Incentives as two attributes. On one hand,
to appraise Benefit we use two sub-attributes: Remuneration & Incentives and Training. On the other hand, to
assess Social Incentives, we limit our study to a single sub-attribute Retirement. Finally, for civil society, we
suggest the use of two attributes and a single sub-attribute for each one. The first attribute Sustainable
Development is assessed by the sub- attribute Belief this later gives idea about how much the bank believes in
getting involved in sustainable development through its activities. Whereas, the second attribute Investment
evaluate the socially responsible investment. The related assessments are omitted for space reasons. In Table
3, we summarize the assessed m.a.u.f. for different stakeholders. It is worth noting that the m.a.u.f. for
 Sonia Rebai et al. / Procedia Economics and Finance 2 (2012) 363 – 372 371

customers, managers, employees and civil society are obtained by combining two relevant marginal sub-
attributes utility functions, each of which has been assessed in turn through two marginal sub-utility functions.

Table 3. Single-attribute utility functions and scaling constants for risk attribute

Stakeholders Attributes Stakeholder’s utility function

Insolvency Risk
(xR1) UR(xR1, xR2, xR3) =
Regulators Credit Risk - 0.85 uR1(xR1)uR2(xR2)uR3(xR3) - 0.16uR1(xR1)uR2(xR2) –
(R) (xR2) 0.13uR1(xR1)uR3(xR3) - 0.39uR2(xR2)uR3(xR3) + 0.25uR1(xR1) +
Liquidity Risk 0.79uR2(xR2) + 0.6uR3(xR3)
(xR3)
Shareholders Profitability
US(xS1) =US1(xS1)
(S) (xS1)
Accessibility
Customers (xC1) UC(xC1, xC2) = - 0.11 UC1(xC1) UC2(xC2) + 0.35 UC1(xC1)
(C) Service quality + 0.76UC2(xC2)
(xC2)
Managers Benefit Incentives
UM (xM1) = UM1(xM1)
(M) (xM1)

Benefit Incentives
Employees (xE1) UE(xE1, xE2) = -0.59 UE1(xE1) UE2(xE2)
(E) Societal Incentives +0.75UE1(xE1)+0.45UE2(xE2)
(xE2)
Sustainable
Development
Civil Society (xCv1) UCv(xCv1, xCv2) =
(Cv) -0.04UCv1(xCv1)UCv2(xCv2)+0.05 UCv1(xCv1) +0.99UCv2(xCv1)
Economic
Sustainability (xCv2)

3.4. Assessment of the bank sustainability degree

Individual stakeholders’ scores can be aggregated reflecting the degree of sustainability of the bank. More
specifically, this aggregated score gives for each bank, its degree of achievement of the status of being a
sustainable bank. Note however, that a lot of care should be exercised in order to assign importance weights
of various stakeholders.

4. Results and Discussion

This study provides useful insights on the views of different stakeholders. In fact, the assessed utility
functions are used to compute utility indices for each bank according to each stakeholder; then, overall
performance indices have been calculated. This overall performance measure gives an idea about the degree
of sustainability of each bank. All these banks are not 100% sustainable banks. In fact, each of these banks
needs some corrective actions from at least one stakeholder’s points of view. According to shareholders, they
are better satisfied in BNP Paribas and SG followed by BPCE and CM. Indeed, all these four banks achieved
almost a score of profitability greater than or equal to 0.7. However, some corrective actions are needed to
enhance the CA profitability. Under the managers’ dimension, all banks display weak scores (less than 0.23).
372 Sonia Rebai et al. / Procedia Economics and Finance 2 (2012) 363 – 372

These low scores indicate that the managers’ benefits and incentives growth was not very large especially for
CA. Under regulator’s points of view, all banks are roughly similar. All banks accomplished medium scores.
This may be due to the restrictive prudential norms imposed in the banking system. Also from customers and
employees sides, banks attained similar scores. However, in both cases some improvements are needed given
that the registered scores are below 0.5. Finally, in accordance with civil society, CA, BNP Paribas and SG
are more advanced than SG and CM. These later two banks have also recorded some progress in sustainable
development; however, greater efforts are needed.
Furthermore, the developed model can also be considered as a valuable tool in assisting banks in their
strategic choices in order to achieve their ultimate objective of being a sustainable bank. Indeed, an in-depth
analysis can be conducted for each bank. More specifically, using the assessed s.a.u.f. and m.a.u.f., strengths
and weaknesses can be detected for each bank and then necessary corrective actions and enforcement
measures can consequently be identified and implemented. For instance, BNP Paribas shows low scores both
in terms of deposits evolution and retirement prime evolution. Consequently, it would be worth for BNP
Paribas to be more careful about both its quality of service and its relation with its employees.

5. Conclusion

Although many earlier studies have developed a number of banks’ performance evaluation models, these
studies have not developed an aggregate index taking into account multiple-criteria from many stakeholders’
points of views. To our knowledge, the present study represents the first attempt to overcome these
beforehand weaknesses. That is, we developed a multi-attribute utility model providing an evaluation for
banks accounting for different criteria within the views of each stakeholder. This model was, then, applied to
five French banks in order to evaluate their degree in achieving a sustainable bank status.
Within this framework, we plan on carrying out additional research to improve our approach. First, in
assessing some utility functions, we assumed that the opinions of the authors reflect the preferences of the
stakeholders. In future research, stakeholders’ opinions should be drawn out through interviews. Second, in a
future study, we plan to consider more attributes and sub-attributes. Finally, we need to perform sensitivity
analyses for utility functions forms and attributes weights.

References
Maudos, J., Pastor, J. M., 2003, Cost and Profit Efficiency in the Spanish Banking sector (1985–1996): a Non-Parametric Approach,
Applied Financial Economics, 13(1), p. 1.
Tortosa-Ausina, E., 2003, Nontraditional Activities and Bank Efficiency Revisited: A Distributional Analysis for Spanish Financial
Institutions, Journal of Economics and Business, 5(4), p. 371.
Hussain, M., Gunasekaran, A., Islam, M. M., 2002, Implications of Non-Financial Performance Measures in Finnish Banks, Managerial
Auditing Journal, 17(8), p. 452.
Dincer, H., Gencer, G., Orhan, N., Sahinbas, K. A., 2001, Performance Evaluation of the Turkish Banking Sector after the Global Cisis
via Camels Ratios, Procedia Social and Behavioral Sciences, 24, p. 1530.
Garcia-Cestona, M., Surroca, J., 2008, Multiple Goals and Ownership Structure: Effects on the Performance of Spanish Savings banks,
European Journal of Operational Research, 187, p. 582.
Avkiran, N. K., Morita, H., 2010, Benchmarking Firm Performance from a Multiple-Stakeholder Perspective with an Application to
Chinese banking, Omega, The International Journal of Management Science, 38, p. 501.
Hempel, G. H., Simon, D. G., Coleman, A. B., 1994, Bank Management Text and Cases, John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
Douglas, A., Doris, J., Johnson, B., 2004, Corporate Social Reporting in Irish Financial Institutions, The TQM Magazine, 16 (6), p. 387.
Keeney, R. L., Raiffa, H., 1976, Decisions with Multiple Objectives: Preferences and Value Tradeoffs, John Wiley, New York.