Resilient Eu 2030

RESILIENT
EU2030
A future-oriented approach
to reinforce the EU’s
Open Strategic Autonomy
and Global Leadership
Recommended Citation:
Spain’s National Office of Foresight and Strategy. Resilient EU2030. 2023.
NIPO: 089-23-024-6
More information www.futuros.gob.es/en
RESILIENT EU2030 2
EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
This non-paper was written by the Spanish Presidency of the Council of the European Union in
close consultation with officials of the 27 Member States, the European Commission, the
Secretariat of the Council of the EU, and several academics and private sector representatives. Its
purpose is to contribute to the design of a comprehensive, balanced and forward-looking
approach to ensure the EU’s Open Strategic Autonomy and global leadership by 2030.
The introductory section provides an overview of some of the changes experienced in the
international order in recent years. It acknowledges an increase in geopolitical frictions driven
by the growing assertiveness of Russia and China and the search for greater self-reliance of the
American and the Chinese economies. However, it also challenges the idea that a major
breakdown of the multilateral order and inevitable economic fragmentation are looming. Based
on this diagnosis, it suggests that the EU should respond to the current context by working
simultaneously and evenly in two directions. On the one hand, doing all it can to enhance and
protect the international order and prevent the world’s fragmentation. On the other, to reduce its
external dependencies and strengthen its position as a technological powerhouse and global
actor.
Furthermore, this section identifies a number of concrete strategic vulnerabilities that the
EU should address in this decade, based on the combined analysis of current economic trends,
the long-term strategies approved by the European Commission and the forecasts provided by
Member States, academics and private sector representatives. The list includes key present and
future enabling technologies, digital services, and raw materials and semi-processed goods in
four critical sectors: energy, digital-tech, health and food.
The following sections propose nine lines of action to tackle the vulnerabilities identified in a
systemic and realistic way, aligned with the European principles of competitiveness and
cohesion as well as with the EU’s main economic, social and environmental goals and values.
Section one examines how to bolster and secure the EU's internal production capacities. It
suggests a list of goods and technologies for which European production should be fostered or
scaled-up to ensure its future economic security and prosperity. Moreover, it proposes a number
of measures that could help achieve this goal by acting in the fields of innovation, industrial policy,
Single Market integration and human capital. Finally, it examines some of the economic, social
and environmental trade-offs that these measures could have in the future.
RESILIENT EU2030 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 3

Section two discusses the need to monitor and limit foreign ownership or control over
certain strategic sectors and critical infrastructures. It reflects on the challenges that the
dominant presence of foreign companies in the EU’s digital and green sectors poses in terms of
security and national industrial development. It also reflects on the enormous benefits that they
bring to European economies and citizens. Accordingly, it recommends preserving and
encouraging the presence of foreign companies from like-minded countries, while working to
gradually limit the dominance of those with links to non-like-minded countries through the use of
competition and regulation.
Section three explores the possibility of setting new contingency plans to respond to future
shortages. It advocates the establishment of common strategic reserves accessible to all
Member States, the creation of minimum production capacities to ensure a basic supply in times
of crisis, and the identification and development of production capacities that could be
transformed or scaled upon demand, if needed. To design and coordinate these measures, it is
recommended to reinforce strategic foresight capabilities, anticipatory governance mechanisms
and real-time monitoring systems of Member States and EU institutions.
Section four touches on the need to achieve the EU's open strategic autonomy in full
alignment with the environmental emergency that is gripping the planet. To this end, it
suggests different measures to enhance the efficiency of our current production processes, and
to reduce waste generation by using already competitive and available European technologies
and methods.
Section five discusses how to reuse unavoidable waste by fostering circularity in the EU's
economy and society. It showcases the enormous contributions that this line of work could
provide to European resilience and proposes a number of cross-sectoral actions to pursue it.
Among others, the development of mechanisms to recycle green technologies and installations
that already exist in Europe, the exploitation of alternative and non-conventional sources of
critical raw materials and the use of agricultural left-overs and livestock.
Section six explains how the replacement of many of the raw materials and components
currently used in our industry by more accessible and sustainable alternatives could
reduce the EU’s foreign dependencies. A number of examples are analysed – from solid-state
and sodium-ion batteries to the domestic production of algae, insects and microbes as ways to
substitute a share of plant proteins brought in from abroad.
Section seven argues that, as much as the EU develops its internal capabilities and enhances
its circularity and resource efficiency, it will always depend on the global economy to thrive.
Thus, it recommends that the EU seizes the current window of opportunity to launch a new trade
expansion aimed at securing and diversifying its sources of supply by revamping existing
relationships and the establishment of new ones. The primary focus of this trade expansion
should be like-minded countries, it should leverage the competitive edge of Member States, and
it should focus on those raw materials, goods and services identified as strategic for the EU.
Nevertheless, it should also provide more horizontal and mutually-beneficial deals to its foreign
partners in order to build long-lasting and resilient relationships.
Section eight highlights the need to rebalance economic relations with China. It
acknowledges that China is an essential trading partner for the EU, and the fact that decoupling
from its economy is neither a viable nor a desirable option. However, it also argues in favour of
maintaining and reinforcing the various mechanisms deployed by the Commission to de-risk and

reduce the EU's dependence on Chinese imports, protect the integrity of the Single Market and
achieve a more level playing field.
Section nine claims that the EU should promote and lead the reform of the multilateral
system as an effective way to mitigate its foreign vulnerabilities and defend its interests
around the world. To that end, it recommends that the EU should advocate greater inclusivity
and representativity in the system, along with targeted reforms that would enhance the
performance of international institutions and an increased multi-stakeholder and multi-level
approach.
The concluding section of the non-paper reflects on the real capacity of the EU to adopt all
the afore-mentioned measures and overcome the challenges of this time. Building on data,
it shows that, despite its many weaknesses and vulnerabilities, the EU remains one of the most
socially-advanced regions in the world and one of its economic and geopolitical powerhouses.
Accordingly, the section argues that imagining an EU in 2030 with top-tier technological
companies, non-polluting and cheap energy, high quality and affordable services and higher
living standards is an empirically-based, reasonable forecast. And it states that the future of the
EU is not to prevent its decline but to lead a new era of global prosperity.

RESILIENT EU2030 6
TABLE OF CONTENTS
FOREWORD BY THE SPANISH PRESIDENCY 09
A CHANGING GEOPOLITICAL LANDSCAPE 11
Aiming for the best: a renewed, open,

rules-based international order. 15
Preparing for the worst: managing dependency

in a fragmented economy. 17
The EU’s response: OSA. 22
BOLSTERING AND SECURING

INTERNAL PRODUCTION CAPACITIES 25
1. Fostering domestic production of key goods,

services and raw materials. 26
2. Monitoring foreign ownership and control
over strategic sectors. 34
3. Setting contingency plans to respond to future shortages. 36
ENHANCING CIRCULARITY AND SMART CONSUMPTION 37
4. Increasing resource efficiency. 38

5. Fostering circularity in the economy and society. 40
6. Replacing raw materials and components
by more accessible alternatives. 42
REINVIGORATING GLOBAL TRADE

AND THE MULTILATERAL SYSTEM 45
7. Launching a new trade expansion. 46

8. Rebalancing economic relations with China. 49
9. Leading the renovation of the multilateral architecture. 50
CONCLUSIONS:
A COMPETITIVE EUROPE FOR A PROSPEROUS WORLD 53
ENDNOTES 61
RESILIENT EU2030 8
FOREWORD
International openness is a fundamental pillar of the European Union. Much of the social and
economic progress achieved over recent decades would not have occurred without it. However,
it is undeniable that the development of globalisation, both in trade and capital flows, has also
made the EU acquire several dependencies on third countries that, during recent crises such as
those caused by the Covid pandemic and the Russian military aggression against Ukraine, have
turned into significant risks for the well-being of Europeans. Moreover, there are strong reasons
to believe that these vulnerabilities might worsen and multiply in the future, due to increasing
geopolitical tensions, growing competition for some technologies and raw materials, and the
impact of megatrends such as climate change and demographic ageing.
In recent years, the concept of Open Strategic Autonomy has emerged as an interpretive key to
address such vulnerabilities, and the European Commission has drafted valuable studies and
ambitious policies to develop it. Nevertheless, the EU still lacks a comprehensive and concrete
vision on how to strike a new balance between resilience and competitiveness, as well as between
assertiveness and rules-based cooperation that would allow it to tackle its economic vulnerabilities
while maintaining its role as a global actor in this new world order that is taking shape.
Over a year ago, in July 2022, we decided that helping to craft that vision would be one of the
main priorities of the Spanish Presidency of the Council of the EU, which will run from 1 July to 31
December 2023. We also decided that the Spanish contribution would meet three guiding
principles: it would be forward-looking, it would be evidence-based, and it would be a fair
reflection of the points of views of all Member States, thus reinforcing the European unity that
these challenging times demand.
To achieve such a vision, we launched the most ambitious strategic foresight project that has
been carried out to date at an EU level. This project lasted approximately ten months, between
September 2022 and June 2023, and involved thousands of hours of research, information
exchange and working meetings. In total, about 250 experts and government officials from over
80 ministerial departments and prime ministers’ offices from all 27 Member States participated.
This international group worked under the framework of the EU-wide Foresight Network, with
support from the Secretariat of the Council and the European Commission, and under the
coordination of the Spanish National Office of Foresight and Strategy. Several academics and
business representatives were also consulted.1
RESILIENT EU2030 FOREWORD 9

This non-paper is based on this collective work. It aspires to be a fair and balanced reflection of
the points of views of the 27 Member States and relevant EU institutions. However, its sole official
author is the Spanish Presidency, which is the only body responsible for the ideas and proposals
it contains. The purpose of the non-paper is twofold. On the one hand, it aspires to advance a
comprehensive, ambitious and balanced vision of how the EU’s Open Strategic Autonomy could
be reinforced in this decade. On the other hand, it hopes to challenge the widespread pessimism
and highlight the numerous competitive edges and strengths that the EU has, to not only become
a more resilient, competitive and sustainable economy, but also a beacon of innovation,
collaboration and stability that could lead the world into a new era of global prosperity.
Pedro Sánchez
President of the Government of Spain
RESILIENT EU2030 FOREWORD 10

A CHANGING
GEOPOLITICAL
LANDSCAPE
In the 20th Century, Europeans and North Americans led the creation of an international order
based on the liberal principles of freedom, openness and multilateralism that was recognised
and observed worldwide. 2 After the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, European
countries assumed that this international order would solidify and endure indefinitely, supported
by the expansion of democracy and market capitalism,3 and they built their economic and
security systems based on that assumption. Companies expanded their supply chains across
thousands of kilometres, seeking cost-effective production. And governments slashed military
expenditure in half, while simultaneously increasing their contributions to multilateral
organisations.4 This liberal international order brought stability and prosperity to most European
nations, which enjoyed immense progress from the 1950s onwards.5
Nevertheless, in recent years, the once widely-considered beneficial international order has
started to be challenged.6 On one hand, by emerging countries such as China, India, Brazil and
South Africa, which argue that their values and substantial contributions to the global economy
are not adequately recognised.7 On the other hand, by Western nations, where some citizens
believe that the open-based system is giving rise to unfavourable phenomena (offshoring, job
losses, a relative decline of the standard of living of the middle classes, tax evasion and unfair
competition) that undermine their own interests.8 Thus, the belief that trade liberalisation would
be a positive-sum game for all countries is now giving way to the belief by some that it is a zero-
sum game and a source of vulnerability amidst current geopolitical tensions.
This has prompted various reactions that, to a certain extent, signify a questioning of the
previously dominant paradigm. National governments have taken a more proactive approach,
employing industrial policies and implementing incentives, loans and subsidies to bolster
domestic companies in the face of foreign competition.9 New trade tariffs and bans on critical
raw materials and technologies have been introduced.10 The signing of multilateral trade
agreements has declined, leading crucial negotiations to stall, and the number of bilateral and
regional trade agreements has doubled.11 Commercial disputes and disruptions have become
more frequent and “harmful interventions” have surged by 80% in just five years.12 Meanwhile,
many multilateral organisations have been questioned or directly bypassed, and companies
have started to consider the relocation of some key stages of their production chains to closer
or like-minded countries.13
Based on these trends, many observers have concluded that the open-based, multilateral order
is on a path of decline and that the world is deglobalising.14 It should be noted, nonetheless,
that there are many stylised facts that challenge this view. Data indicate that the world's
openness to trade has been plateauing since 2008, without showing a declining trend. This is
due to the dynamism of services and sectors driven by technological progress, which have
offset the moderation in the exchange of manufactured goods. In fact, after the collapse caused
by the pandemic, trade flows have rebounded and regained pre-crisis levels.15 It is true that the
RESILIENT EU2030 A CHANGING GEOPOLITICAL LANDSCAPE 12

pace of trade expansion is slower today than it was in the past. However, it is important to
remember that this "slowbalisation" did not begin with the US-China tariffs war, Covid or the
invasion of Ukraine, but with the global financial crisis of 2008.16
Furthermore, there is a lack of conclusive evidence supporting the notion of a widespread

"regionalisation" or "friendshoring" of global trade. Data suggest that exchanges between
countries within highly-integrated economic regions (such as the EU, NAFTA, MERCOSUR or
the Asia-Pacific region encompassed by the RCEP) have not increased in recent years, while
long-distance commerce has continued to grow.17 Regionalisation does not appear to be taking
place, even between the US and China. Commerce between these two global powers has
declined in recent years, but it is still strong, despite the hostile rhetoric and the establishment
of new tariffs and trade bans.18 In fact, Western trade from "like-minded countries" (defined as
those sharing similar UN voting behaviour) has not surpassed that from countries that are more
closely aligned with China.19
World Trade Trade openness by region

(sum of imports and exports, % of GDP) (sum of imports and exports, % of GDP)
65% 16% 110%

60%
90%
55% 14%
50% 70%
12%
45% 50%
40% 10%
30%
35%
30% 8% 10%
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2013
2014
2010
2011
2012
2015
2016
2018
2017
2019
2020
2021
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2013
2014
2010
2011
2012
2015
2016
2018
2017
2019
2020
2021
Total Goods Services (RHS) EU China US
Intra-regional trade by area Average distance traversed

(% of total trade) by merchandise trade (km)
70% 5200
60% 5100
5000
50%
4900
40%
4800
30% 4700
20% 4600
4500
10%
4400
0%
4300
2001
2002
2004
2005
2006
2007
2009
2015
2016
2019
2003
2008
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2017
2018
2020
2021
4200
2001
2002
2004
2005
2006
2007
2009
2015
2016
2019
2003
2008
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2017
2018
2020
2021
EU NAFTA MERCOSUR
ASEAN RCEP 7 WTO regions
22 UN regions
Source: UNCTAD and IAP20

What is observed is a strengthening of the European economic space. In recent years, there
has been a significant reduction in the number of European and non-European companies
relocating part of their production processes outside the EU. 21 At the same time, the number of
foreign companies establishing capabilities in the EU has increased. In 2009, there were 76,000
European companies controlled by foreign capital; by 2020, this figure had risen to 102,000. 22 In
a world of increasing geopolitical tensions and environmental and social concerns, Europe is
emerging as a stable, secure and competitive space to invest in and operate from.
In conclusion, while certain changes are taking place, it does not seem as if a fundamental shift
has occurred in the structure of the global economy at this time. How would geopolitical
powers and globalisation rebalance in the coming years? It is hard to say. The future is shaped
by many factors that are impossible or nearly impossible to anticipate, and the data analysed
above have a time lag of some months, which prevents us from seeing changes that might be
occurring at present.
Experts have presented a wide variety of forecasts. The most probable ones fall within the range
of two opposing scenarios. The first scenario envisions a relatively smooth, targeted
remodelling of the current multilateral order. It assumes that emerging powers would acquire
a more prominent role in global governance and that China would be accommodated within the
group of hegemons, alongside the US and Europe, in exchange for moderating its expansion
and dominance ambitions and aligning more closely with human rights and the market economy.
Global supply chains might experience some degree of further regionalisation. But global trade
would endure. This process would generate severe economic and political friction. However, it
will ultimately occur within the existing frameworks and result in an update rather than a
breakdown of the open-based, multilateral system. 23
The second future scenario is much grimmer, as it opens up the possibility of a more
fragmented, polarised and protectionist international order in the medium term. 24 It
foresees a world rigidly divided into two major blocs - the West and the East - each with its own
coalitions of like-minded countries, trade spaces, capitalist systems, technologies, standards
and multilateral organisations. These two blocs would decouple from each other and engage in
competition dynamics similar to those that existed during the Cold War. This would perhaps be
even more acute, given that Chinese economic and technological powers are significantly more
advanced than those held by the Soviet Union. 25 This could include a new arms race that threatens
humanity, espionage, far-reaching embargoes, proxy wars and a beggar-thy-neighbour economic
policy that would eventually leave most countries in a worse situation than today.
Which of the scenarios will prevail? The first, the second, something in-between or an entirely
different scenario altogether? The truth is that European governments can only provide an
honest answer to their citizens: "at this point, nobody knows". The future remains unpredictable.
Partly because the future is not what will happen, but rather what the different actors involved
will make of it. That is why, in our view, the EU should respond to the current context by
working in two directions simultaneously and evenly: 1) doing all it can to prevent and
counteract the world’s fragmentation, and 2) preparing itself for this potential eventuality.

AIMING FOR THE BEST: A RENEWED, OPEN,
RULES-BASED INTERNATIONAL ORDER
The globalisation of the last 30 years has had some downsides for Europe. For starters, it
has facilitated the offshoring of a significant portion of its industry to countries with lower costs,
taxes and environmental and labour standards. 26 This has resulted in the structural change of
millions of jobs and the loss of relative weight in traditional sectors such as metallurgy, agriculture
and clothing, 27 and it has exacerbated issues such as tax dumping by millionaires and large
multinational corporations, which in turn has limited the revenue-raising capacity of many
Member States and their ability to sustain their welfare states. 28 Moreover, international
openness is also associated by some scholars with an increase in inequality, both between
territories (e.g. cities vs. rural areas) and individuals (e.g. highly-skilled workers vs. low-skilled
workers), 29 and with greater labour polarisation and social unrest.30 Lastly, openness has made
the EU more vulnerable to external shocks (e.g. pandemics) and reduced the ability of national
governments to control certain parts of their domestic realities and ensure the well-being of
their citizens.31
Acknowledging these negative effects is essential to wake the EU up from the age of innocence
in which it has lived for too long and to undertake an intelligent reform of its economic policies.
Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to forget that, despite its numerous and significant
drawbacks, the internationalisation of value chains, financial flows and trade has been
beneficial for Europeans. Consider these figures: Europe comprises only 3% of the Earth's
surface area, 6% of raw materials and 6% of the global population.32 Yet, it accounts for 15% of
the world's economy and 54% of its social welfare spending.33 This means that for every two
euros that governments around the world invest in making their citizens healthier, more
educated and safer, one goes on European citizens.
There are multiple factors that contributed to this achievement – some more honourable than
others. However, there is no doubt that the existence of an open, rules-based global order
has been key. Open markets and the abolition of barriers have provided the EU with access to
raw materials, innovation, talented individuals and countless opportunities that were not
available within its borders. This access has enabled Member States to establish a greater
number of companies than would have been possible in a fragmented world, resulting in the
creation of more jobs than those lost due to globalisation.34 In fact, it is estimated that one in
every five jobs that exists in the EU today is directly or indirectly linked to external trade.35
On a global scale, international openness has allowed a more efficient division of labour.
Goods and services are produced in countries where it is more cost-effective to do so, and then
exchanged worldwide. This has resulted in increased added value, productivity and economic
growth for the EU.36 Moreover, it has brought about greater competition, which, combined with
the afore-mentioned factors, has led to more innovation, more choices and better prices for
European consumers.37
International openness has also benefited the rest of the world. Although it is difficult to
establish causality in such large processes, there is ample empirical evidence to suggest that

globalisation has contributed to the growth of most economies, particularly smaller and less
developed ones.38 It has also helped lift over 1 billion people out of poverty, reduce inequality
between countries, mitigate the number of armed conflicts and improve living conditions for a
significant portion of mankind.39 All of these factors have, in turn, resulted in increased security,
freedom, well-being and prosperity for Europeans themselves, whose circumstances are
inherently intertwined with those of the rest of humanity.
The benefits that the EU has obtained from international openness could only be matched
by the losses that fragmentation and protectionism could create. Experts believe that the
imposition of tariffs and trade restrictions would result in a significant decline in export volumes.
This, in turn, would lead to a misallocation of resources and a loss of competitiveness. The
production of goods and services would shift from efficient locations to suboptimal ones,
resulting in higher costs, lower quality and limited resource availability. Such a scenario would
likely bring about inflationary pressures, job losses and a substantial reduction in economic
growth. In fact, it is estimated that in a severely fragmented global economy, the world GDP
could shrink by 8% to 12%.40 Europe, with its open market, would be particularly damaged in this
paradigm shift, experiencing a substantial decline of its GDP growth.41
The breakdown of global markets and the rise of economic blocs would also hamper innovation.
In order to thrive, innovation requires interconnected and open environments, where ideas,
talent and resources can freely flow across borders. Fragmentation and protectionism could
disrupt these flows, limiting access to crucial investment and collaborative opportunities. As a
result, the EU could face difficulties in effectively tackling pressing global challenges such as
climate change and adapting rapidly to ageing population dynamics.42
Geopolitical fragmentation would also make European economies more vulnerable to domestic
shocks. Protectionist strategies could reduce dependency and increase exposure to
international crises. In addition, it would also increase countries’ vulnerability to unforeseen
domestic episodes by reducing the portfolio of products and partners to which they can turn in
case of need.43
By the same token, fragmentation would make it more difficult to articulate effective and fair
policy responses to some of the greatest challenges of our time, such as global warming,
immigration, drug trafficking, cybercrime and violence, which require strong multilateral
cooperation and cross-border actions. In fact, some studies suggest that fragmentation could
increase tensions between nations and lead to an escalation of military conflicts.44
All of the above would ultimately lead to a serious deterioration of the well-being of Europeans.45
In a polarised and fragmented world, EU citizens would most likely end up having higher
prices, a lower variety of products and services, fewer jobs, lower incomes and more
uncertainty than they have today.
In short, the EU benefits from the world maintaining an open economy and a robust multilateral
architecture that can mediate between countries and coordinate their efforts in pursuit of
mutual benefits. Nevertheless, this does not mean that the EU’s goal should be to preserve
the status quo. It should not because, as pointed out, the multilateral order of recent decades
also has many shortcomings that need to be addressed. Thus, instead of simply preserving the
current international order, what the EU needs to do is foster its improvement and renewal,
make it more efficient and trustworthy for everybody, and better able to deal with the new
political, technological and environmental realities of the world.

PREPARING FOR THE WORST:
MANAGING DEPENDENCIES IN A
FRAGMENTED ECONOMY
Despite being a key global player, the future rebalancing of the geopolitical order will not solely
depend on the EU’s actions. There are many actors involved, and some structural trends are
already unfolding that may lead to increased military tensions and a more fragmented world.
The first of those trends is Russia’s growing assertiveness and direct attack on the
international order. After years of hybrid warfare against its neighbors and illegal occupations,
Russia`s unjustified and violent invasion of Ukraine has triggered an abrupt decoupling from the
West and has put the world on a path of uncertainty and tensions unprecedented in the 21st
Century. The Kremlin’s ambitions go far beyond Kyiv. Its confessed goal is to “eliminate the
vestiges of the dominance of the United States and other unfriendly countries in world politics”
and to regain Russia's lost influence, at least in the former Soviet sphere.46 Therefore, Russia’s
actions constitute a direct threat to the European Union and its Member States that could lead
to further instability, insecurity and economic stagnation in the long term.
The second trend to consider is the rise of large emerging countries, some of which now
display more economic and demographic dynamism than the West. The most prominent case
is, of course, China. After a century of poverty and struggle, this nation has regained its historical
position as one of the world's largest economies and a leader in numerous cutting-edge
technologies. China is now transitioning from the era of "reform and opening" to an era of
"security and control", with the new explicit goal of becoming a political and military hegemon,
at least in the Eastern Hemisphere. This development has led to escalating tensions with Europe
and North America - two regions that have officially declared China an "economic competitor
and a systemic rival."47 But also with neighbouring countries like India, which could become the
world's third-largest economy by 2030 and a valuable ally for the West.
The third trend is the escalating competition for natural resources among both legacy and
emerging powers. This competition is fuelled by the combined effects of climate change,
population growth and shifting consumption patterns across a significant portion of the global
population. For decades, citizens in the West have consumed resources at levels well above the
Earth’s capacity. In recent years, this consumption has reached an unsustainable point,
exceeding six times the planet's boundaries.48 This unsustainable pattern of consumption has
been facilitated by the fact that 14% of the global population consumed significantly less than
their fair share. However, the landscape is changing.49 In the Global South, 1.7 billion people are
transitioning into the middle classes and adopting consumption patterns similar to those of the
West, something that could potentially double the global demand for natural resources in the
coming decades.50 It remains uncertain whether the Earth would be able to sustain such an
accelerated pace of resource consumption in the long run. But one thing seems certain: in the
short term, the competition for resources will intensify, leading to rising tensions between those
nations that possess abundant resources and those that do not.

The EU needs to prepare to navigate these trends. That is why, at the same time as it strives
to renew the international order, it should work to tackle its internal vulnerabilities and
strengthen its position as a global actor. Part of that work will need to be undertaken in the
field of security and defence. That is those European countries that are members of NATO have
reaffirmed their commitment to the North Atlantic Alliance, and why most Member States have
increased their military spending and agreed to reinforce common capabilities and the
European military industry by 2030,51 while duly abiding by human rights and fundamental
freedoms.
However, the same priority should be given to economic security, which is where the
greatest challenges but also the greatest opportunities lie for the EU over this decade. 52
The assumption that the open international order would be maintained indefinitely led European
countries to outsource a significant portion of their economic activity and build supply chains
primarily based on relative cost criteria. This made them acquire several material dependencies
on third countries that became serious vulnerabilities during the worst international shocks of
recent years. During the Covid pandemic, Europe’s inability to produce its own ventilators,
masks and personal protective equipment resulted in thousands of deaths and millions of euros
in losses. Subsequently, the difficulties in accessing gas, cereals and critical raw materials due
to Russia's blockades and the military aggression against Ukraine caused a loss of 1.5% of GDP
and triggered an inflationary crisis from which we are still suffering.53
The challenge is that these shortages could be just the tip of the iceberg. Research
conducted by the European Commission and the European Central Bank (using trade data
specifically tailored for this study) shows that the EU has a high foreign dependency on more
than 300 products.54 This includes raw materials, energy inputs, goods and technological
components that are critical for our economy and have a limited potential for diversification and
substitution, since their production is highly concentrated in a few non-EU countries.
Distribution of 323 dependent products across trade sectors (%)
Agricultural, fish and food products 37
Products of the chemical or allied industries 27
Mechanical appliances; electrical equipment 9

Base metals & articles of base metal 7
Mineral products 7
Precision & medical instruments 4
Textiles 2
Plastics & rubber articles 2
Transport equipment 2
Miscellaneous manufactured articles 1
Precious or semi-precious stones 1

Distribution of 323 dependent products by origin (% value of total imports;
colors reflect concentration)
Source: Own elaboration based on Arjona et. al., 2023.
It is impossible to quantitatively anticipate the future evolution of these dependencies,

since that would require forecasting changes in supply and demand across the entire global
economy. However, by combining the analysis of current economic trends with the long-term
strategies already announced by the European Commission, and the qualitative expectations of
Member States, academics and businesses, we have identified some of the key strategic
vulnerabilities that the EU will have to address in this decade.
Key enabling technologies

To become a fair and prosperous, carbon-neutral society by 2050, the EU will need to triple its
solar and wind energy production, and boost the electrification of sectors such as transportation
and residential housing by 2030.56 This will entail a significant increase in demand for green
technologies.57 For instance, estimates suggest that the need for wind turbines will double,
sales of heat pumps will quadruple and the number of electric engines will increase sixfold.58
The challenge is that the EU’s current internal capabilities would only be able to meet a small
fraction of this demand. The rest would have to come from outside sources – mainly from China
- which currently concentrates the bulk of the raw materials required and has dominant market
shares in the intermediate stages of the supply chain. For instance, it produces between 35%
and 55% of the world's solar panel and wind turbine components and 90% of the permanent
magnets needed for the production of heat pumps and electric motors. The EU only holds a
prominent position in the assembly of wind turbines and heat pumps, with a global market share
of more than 30%.59
Furthermore, to address the intermittent nature of renewable energy sources and ensure a
reliable and affordable energy supply, the EU will have to increase the overall flexibility of its
systems by fostering sector integration, balancing and baseload mechanisms, demand

response and storage capabilities. This will skyrocket our demand for lithium-ion batteries, fuel
cells and electrolysers, which is expected to multiply between 10 and 30 times in the coming
years. The EU has a strong industry in the intermediate and assembly phases of the latter (where
it holds more than 50% of the global market share), but it relies heavily on China when it comes
to lithium-ion batteries and fuel cells that are, for the time being, crucial for the decarbonisation
of mobility. This dependency affects the intermediate stages of the supply chains of both
current and future technologies.60
Overall, this indicates that, without implementing strong measures, the European energy
ecosystem could have a dependency on China by 2030 of a different nature, but with a
similar severity, from the one it had on Russia before the invasion of Ukraine.
A similar scenario could unfold in the digital-tech space. Forecasts suggest that the demand
for digital devices such as sensors, drones, data servers, storage equipment (CPUs, GPUs and
DRAMs) and data transmission networks will rise sharply in this decade. The EU has a relatively
strong position in the latter, but it shows significant weaknesses in the other areas. For instance,
it only produces 6% of the world’s drones and 1% of data servers and storage equipment.61
By 2030, this foreign dependency could seriously hinder the productivity gains that the
European industry and service sector so urgently require. Furthermore, it could impede the
modernisation of its agriculture systems, which will be essential for addressing climate change;
and the digitalisation of its healthcare systems, which will rely on new wearables, prostheses
and other new medical devices to cope with an ageing population. 62
The inability to secure a stable supply of semiconductors could have even greater impacts.63
European companies play an important role in providing the equipment and high-purity
materials used in the production of chips. However, their presence in other phases of the
supply chain is insignificant. This market is dominated by South Korea, Taiwan, China and the
US, which account for the majority of global R&D spending, manufacturing and cutting-edge
models.64 In fact, the EU's global market share has decreased from 20% in the 1990s to its
current level of 9%. As a result, almost 80% of suppliers to European firms operating in this
industry are headquartered outside the EU.65
Digital Services
Unlike previous technological revolutions, the one currently underway relies on software as
much as hardware. Artificial intelligence (AI) alone will determine the prosperity or downfall of
entire industries and will have a tremendous impact on the physical and economic security of
citizens. Its application will expand to numerous areas, ranging from traffic control to medical
diagnosis. It is projected that from now until 2030, the global AI market will experience an annual
compound growth rate of more than 30%.66 Yet, despite its importance, the EU is lagging behind
China and the US in the AI race. Europe only accounts for 7% of global AI patenting and 22% of
the global AI software market, which is half of the US's share.67
The EU is also falling behind in cloud and edge computing, which are expected to be key
elements of the business models of 75% of European companies by the end of this decade.68
Today, only 14% of the cloud services used in the EU are produced by EU companies, and less
than one-tenth of the data generated by Europeans is stored on European soil.69 The same
applies to digital commerce and its associated services. European companies control less
than 25% of the marketplaces and 10% of the digital payments used in the EU.70

Other future vulnerabilities can be found in the fields of quantum technology and
cybersecurity. The US is the global leader in both, well ahead in private-sector initiatives,
patent acquisition, start-up establishment and investment. China is closing in fast. Meanwhile,
the EU holds only 14% of the global quantum technology market and 13% of the world's leading
cybersecurity firms.71 And it has no production of key components, such as high-resolution
cameras and superconducting magnets.72
If nothing is done, the EU could lose the race in many of these technologies, thus acquiring
new strategic vulnerabilities and missing out on major economic opportunities, particularly
in those digital services that, unlike other industries, tend to create “winner-takes-all
markets”, which leave little or no room for the second or third players.
Raw materials and semi-processed goods

No matter how much we digitalise our economy, its foundations will still be material. Thus, to
successfully undertake the green and digital transitions, the EU will need to consume a
significant quantity of specific raw materials. Among others, it will require increasing quantities
of lithium, boron and rare-earth elements (REE) to produce batteries, electric motors and
medical devices. Likewise, the EU will need more magnesium, cobalt and silicon to manufacture
semiconductors, computing components and solar panels; and substantial amounts of platinum
group metals for the production of electrolysers and medicines.
This projected demand poses an immense challenge to the EU for three reasons. First, because
Europe accounts for less than 7% of the world's production of these critical raw materials and
relies almost exclusively on imports from the Global South.73 Second, because deposits of these
materials are highly concentrated in a few countries that act as quasi-monopolistic suppliers.
For example, the EU imports 79% of its lithium from Chile, 97% of its magnesium from China,
and 99% of its boron from Turkey.74 Third, because it is estimated that global demand for many
of these materials will multiply more than fivefold in this decade.75
In addition, the EU might also face growing competition to access other raw materials and
semi-processed goods that will be essential for ensuring its future food security. For starters,
the EU could suffer from a scarcity of chemical fertilisers and the raw materials needed for
their production, despite the increasing use of organic fertilisers associated with the expansion
of organic farming. The EU is dependent on phosphorus, 86% of which is imported from
Kazakhstan and Vietnam; phosphatic fertilisers, mostly sourced from North Africa; and
natural gas, needed to produce ammonia and nitrogen fertilisers, mainly imported from
Algeria and Russia. Without these components, the productivity of European agriculture
could be seriously compromised.76
The EU could also face supply difficulties in agricultural products used to produce animal
feed, such as soybeans and oil-cake (solid residue after extracting the oil from seeds).77 Every
year, its livestock sector requires nearly 300 million tonnes of plant-based feed, of which over
three-quarters are imported from non-EU countries – mainly Brazil, Argentina and the US. In
fact, only 3% of the EU's agricultural land is given over to producing vegetable proteins for
animal feed, and the production of these crops is likely to be affected by more frequent
droughts and limited water availability.78
Finally, the EU may also struggle to obtain certain commodities that are critical for its healthcare
sector. This includes enriched uranium, and target materials such as Oxygen-18 and

Ytterbium-176, required to produce medical isotopes, which in turn are crucial for diagnosing
and treating cancers, Alzheimer’s, Parkinson’s and heart diseases.79 The EU is also highly
dependent on blood plasma, the demand for which is projected to rise at a compound annual
growth rate of 9.4% until 2030 due to ageing demographics and the rising prevalence of
immunodeficiency disorder. 80
Similarly, the EU could face challenges in accessing certain basic Active Pharmaceutical
Ingredients (APIs) and precursors that are essential to produce ibuprofen, and common-use
antibiotics like amoxicillin. When considering APIs with a CEP (Certificate of suitability to the
monographs of the European Pharmacopoeia), only one-third of such certificates are held by
European manufacturers. For one-sixth of the APIs for which information is available, there is no
European production at all. What is more, China and India hold over 50% of all CEPs, and it is
estimated that more than 70% of API precursors are sourced from these Asian countries.81
In conclusion, the EU faces numerous potential vulnerabilities that, if not addressed, could
seriously undermine its economic security, social welfare and freedom to defend its values
and interests globally. What needs to be done?
THE EU’S RESPONSE:

OPEN STRATEGIC AUTONOMY
Over the past few years, an understanding has emerged among Member States regarding the
need to strike a new balance between resilience and competitiveness, as well as between
assertiveness and rules-based cooperation to allow the EU to tackle its economic vulnerabilities
while maintaining its role as a global actor. This understanding has been defined under the
concept of "Open Strategic Autonomy" (OSA), which is accepted as an imperfect yet useful
reference by nearly all Member States, and which is loosely defined by the Council of the
European Union as the "capacity to act autonomously when and where necessary and with
partners wherever possible".82
Several policy actions have been undertaken or announced under the OSA framework. These
include significant regulatory, fiscal and structural measures intended to protect the Single
Market from foreign interference and predatory practices, ensure the EU's security of supply
and technological leadership in sensitive sectors, and strengthen its trade and political influence
in the world.
What we need now is a comprehensive framework that allows us to transform this OSA
concept and the ongoing measures into a true future-oriented strategy for the EU.
Suggesting a blueprint for such a framework is the primary goal of this non-paper. Building on
the agreements reached by European leaders at Versailles in March 2022, the seminal work of
the European Commission, the knowledge of the 27 Member States and the latest academic
research, it presents a comprehensive, balance and forward-looking OSA strategy to
ensure the economic security of the EU and its global leadership by 2030 in four critical
sectors (energy, digital technology, health and food).

Nine lines of actions are identified:
Bolstering and securing 1. Fostering domestic production of key goods, services

internal production and raw materials
capacities 2. Monitoring and limiting foreign ownership or control over
strategic sectors and infrastructures
3. Setting contingency plans to respond to future shortages
Enhancing circularity 4. Enhancing resource efficiency

and smart consumption 5. Fostering circularity in economy and society
6. Replacing raw materials and components by more
accessible alternatives
Reinvigorating global 7. Launching a new trade expansion

trade and the multilateral 8. Rebalancing economic relations with China
system
9. Leading the renovation of the multilateral architecture
The proposal is based on the following ideas:
• The strategy should reflect the agreements and interests of the 27 Member States.
• The pursuit of greater open strategic autonomy should not be pursued at the expense of
other previously-agreed economic, social and environmental goals, but in coordination
with them. By the same token, it should not be achieved by increasing the existing gaps
between Member States, but by building a more cohesive and convergent EU.
• The solutions to the vulnerabilities of the EU lie in the future, not in the past. The focus
should be on technological innovation and new evidence-based policies.
• It is necessary to overcome the false binary logic that often associates openness with
vulnerability and self-sufficiency with resilience. The European economy, like any advanced
economy, is deeply intertwined with the rest of the world. This interconnection is a source
of risks but also the best way to address them.
• The global economy is not, and should not become, a zero-sum game. The EU will only
thrive if the rest of the world prospers, and vice versa.
• There are no silver bullets to solve the vulnerabilities of the EU. What is required is a systemic
approach that combines different solutions, leveraging the synergies between them,
assessing their potential impacts and calibrating their trade-offs.
• Measures should be developed in a market-orientated manner, taking into account cost-
effectiveness, technological development and fair competition. Governments must play a
regulatory and facilitating role. But ultimately, it should be the private sector that takes the
necessary steps to manage risks and ensure the resilience of its global supply changes.

Lines of action
Industrial Policy Single Market

Reinvigorate
forums
Multi-stakeholder R&D
multilateralism
Skills
Fostering
domestic
Governance process control Investment screening
Updating
Institutional multilateral
representativity architect Anti-coercion
instrument
Bolstering
Export controls internal production
Ownership or
capacities control over
Rebalancing Compliance
relations Reinvigorating key sectors
with China and rebalancing
EU’s global trade New standards
Negotiation
B2B
mechanisms Fostering Contingency
collaboration
plans
circularity and
Know-how sharing smart consumption
Expanding Emergency
trade production
Workers mobility Increasing
resource capabilities
efficiency
Social and green Replacement Circularity
standards of raw materials Stockpiling
and components
Trade Eco-Design
agreements
New trade Innovation

approach Recycling

BOLSTERING
AND SECURING
INTERNAL
PRODUCTION
CAPACITIES
The days of unchecked offshoring and blind reliance on imports are
over. The EU needs to secure its economy to protect its citizens
from future external shocks. To achieve this, it will be essential to
bolster and secure the EU’s internal production capacities by:
• Fostering and scaling-up domestic production of key goods,

services and raw materials.
• Monitoring and limiting foreign ownership or control over strategic
sectors and critical infrastructures.
• Establishing contingency plans to respond to future shortages.
1. FOSTERING DOMESTIC PRODUCTION

OF KEY GOODS, SERVICES AND RAW
MATERIALS
The world is experiencing a variety of technological, social and political changes that, if
harnessed well, could help the EU to increase its competitive edge, strengthen its productive
capacities and consolidate its technological leadership in this decade. Relative costs will
continue to play an important role in companies' allocation decisions. But they will no longer be
the only criteria. On the one hand, the increase in environmental and social demands will foster
production on European soil, a region that is closer to consumers and leads the global race in
sustainability and labour quality. On the other hand, the expectation of future geopolitical
tensions will discourage offshoring movements and attract companies in search of economic
stability, regulatory security and a non-polarising geopolitical position to the EU.
Moreover, the growing importance of digital services and advanced industries, rising
environmental taxes and the adoption of technologies such as advanced robotics, AI and 3D
printing will contribute to narrowing the production cost gap between Europe and many
emerging countries. This reduction will be particularly evident in sectors that offer higher added
value, where the availability of cheap labour is less important.
There is an understanding regarding the need to seize this opportunity to strengthen the EU's
internal production capacities. However, the key questions are: which ones exactly and how?
Having a clear and shared list of priorities is essential. The EU should not attempt to produce
everything that it currently imports. There are areas where its capabilities are limited, hard or
not worth expanding. Thus, the EU’s future efforts should focus on enhancing the internal
production of goods that meet at least one of the following three criteria: 1) the EU already
possesses a competitive edge, 2) it has the potential to establish itself as a frontrunner, or 3) it
needs to have adequate capacities as they are crucial for its future economic security.
RESILIENT EU2030 BOLSTERING AND SECURING INTERNAL PRODUCTION CAPACITIES 26

As a general rule, this approach should focus on the production of goods with high added value
and the potential to create high-quality jobs. There should, however, be room for it to encompass
the internationally-competitive production of basic goods that are crucial for survival (for instance,
medicines and active pharmaceutical ingredients), on the basis of high-tech production processes.
Enhancing Internal Capacity: Goods and Technologies
Competitive edge Potential to be Need to have a

a frontrunner minimal/critical
capacity
Artificial Intelligence
Data servers
Cybersecurity
Alternative sources of protein Solar panels
Data transmission networks for animal feed
Electric motors
Electrolysers Green and white ammonia
Cutting-edge microchips
Organic fertilisers Wind turbines
APIs
Innovative medicines New batteries
Critical raw materials
Bio-based electronics Optical cellulose materials
and batteries
Digital services
Decarbonisation technologies
Based on these criteria, the following priorities are brought forward:83
First, the EU should enhance its manufacturing capacity for components and assembly of
green technologies. For some technologies, this will entail increasing the European output of
certain critical segments of the supply chain, including low-carbon silicon, polysilicon, wafer,
cell production for solar photovoltaics and battery components like anodes, cathodes and
membranes. For others, like wind turbines, the focus should be on scaling up existing
technologies like offshore wind and creating capabilities with a more innovative and long-term
outlook. Noteworthy examples include the development of alternative generators that reduce
reliance on rare-earth elements, and superconductor-based generators.84 For those Member
States relying on gas, geothermal and nuclear energy, it will also be important to ensure the
domestic production of the new generation of these technologies.85
As regards digital technologies, the EU should consolidate its pre-existing capabilities and foster
its innovation efforts in next-generation solutions. Building on its considerable market share in
the value chain of data servers and storage, the EU should step up its production of components
like copper semis, epoxide resins and silicon carbide, and develop minimum strategic capabilities
in assembly. The creation of green zero-emission data centres is a promising line of action.86 To
increase the resilience of data transmission networks, the EU should build additional cable
system capacities, address the rising concentration of submarine cable ownership and ensure
the successful deployment of 5G technology through public and private investment.87 Finally, the
EU should begin building capacities in cutting-edge microchips, including those with nodes as
small as two nanometres and below, as supported by the European Chips Act.88

The EU should also improve its internal capacity in digital services, particularly in the fields of AI
and quantum computing, and incentivise their adoption among companies and public
authorities. Areas that could help achieve this include the creation of new Public-Private
Partnerships, the promotion of open-source projects to facilitate technology transfer and the
establishment of a European Agency of Future Tech to support start-ups, boost digital
sovereignty and prioritise industrial applications in strategic sectors.89 It would also be useful to
further foster interoperability between digital goods and services, and to enhance synergies
between digital services – for instance, by supporting the implementation of generative AI
techniques in developing cybersecurity tools - or the use of digital twins for the design of new
advanced materials and smart factories.90 By the same token, the EU should boost its
connectivity infrastructure through new terrestrial and submarine cables, but also satellites,
Internet exchange points and data centres.
Other areas in which the EU needs to enhance its minimum production capacities are mining,
refining, reclying and the processing of critical and essential raw materials. 91 Recent
discoveries of REE deposits in Sweden, Finland and Greece, and the presence of lithium in
Austria, the Czech Republic, Portugal, Spain and Germany, are just a few examples of the
promising prospects for sustainable mining in the EU.92 Implementing the investments identified
by the European Raw Materials Alliance (ERMA) would enable the EU to meet 20% of its rare-
earth magnet needs internally by 2030.93 The expansion of mining should be coupled with the
enhancement of refining capabilities to maximise the added value from the raw materials
extracted. In the case of batteries, a refining capacity for lithium, nickel and graphite is feasible,
and will considerably reduce supply risks for downstream manufacturers.
In the agricultural sector, the EU should focus on two priorities. On the one hand, reducing its
dependence on chemical fertilisers.94 The most effective way to achieve that would be by
expanding organic farming. The second-best solution would be to strengthen the EU’s organic
fertiliser production in order to make European countries less dependent on foreign natural
gas and phosphorus, improve soil quality and mitigate volatility in agricultural production costs.
The EU currently holds a strong position in this area: it accounts for 25% of global production,
and it has introduced a number of measures to encourage farmers to adopt sustainable
techniques.95 In the future, this industry could be scaled-up through the development of green,
white and low-carbon ammonia, which are produced from green hydrogen, recovered waste
streams and low-carbon hydrogen, respectively. Equally important would be to foster new
smart and precise agriculture techniques, such as improved nutrient management, integrated
pest management and biological alternatives to chemical pesticides.
On the other hand, the EU would have to promote the domestic production of plant-based
proteins (soy, rapeseed and lupin) and encourage the utilisation of alternative sources of
protein for animal feed in order to enhance the competitiveness and sustainability of its
livestock sector. Projections indicate a substantial increase in soy and rapeseed production by
2030, without a significantly higher use of agricultural land.96 In turn, the widespread adoption
of leguminous, clovers, lucerne and vetches plants which are rich in foliar proteins as new
sources of animal feed will be crucial to reduce our dependence on a limited range of crops.97
Simultaneously, on-farm production of animal feed should be promoted through financial
incentives for farmers.98
The EU should also promote the enhancement of its pharmaceutical production capacity,
which has experienced a significant decline over the past two decades.99 One priority should
be the manufacturing of antibiotics, anaesthetics, haematological and oncological drugs,

vaccines and "less profitable medicines" that are needed to treat diseases like neurodegenerative
disorders and paediatric cancers.100 Another should be the establishment of a green and
sustainable ecosystem for API production, 101 to which end it will be crucial to expand domestic
capacities in nitration and fermentation in segregated plants to avoid the cross-contamination
of penicillin. 102
Ensuring the EU’s health security will also require ensuring a reliable and sustainable supply of
the isotopes needed for radiopharmaceuticals. For that, it would be advisable to update
those enrichment facilities that are reaching the end of their lifespan, the construction of new
facilities for electromagnetic and distillation and to foster the production of high-assay low-
enriched uranium in line with the ongoing SAMIRA efforts.103
Beside medicines for human use, attention should also be paid to veterinary medicines, which
could play a key role in combating future zoonoses or epidemic outbreaks.
Means to an end
To enhance the afore-mentioned strategic industries, the EU will need to deploy coordinated
and sustained efforts on four main fronts.
1.1. Boosting innovation

For starters, the EU will need to position itself at the forefront of science and deep tech. This will
require increasing public and private investment in R&D to reach the goal of 3% of GDP on a
country-by-country basis.104 It will also require enhancing knowledge development in academia
and its transference to businesses, improving the management of intellectual property, enabling
experimentation spaces, developing innovation-friendly regulations, fostering data sharing,
increasing the availability of capital for start-ups and scale-ups in deep tech and creating
regional innovation hubs all over Europe. The New Industrial Strategy and the European
Innovation Agenda already mark the way forward.105
These innovation efforts should pay close attention to develop solutions that will reduce the
EU’s future vulnerabilities. They should respect the principle of technological neutrality, but they
should also prioritize those solutions in which Europe has a competitive advantage. For instance,
on the green technologies front, a specific priority should be to increase efficiency and extend
the lifespan of solar panels and electrolysers, while also improving the processes to recycle
them. For instance, the EU should support the development and optimisation of perovskite
solar cells to make them more commercially viable and competitive, and improve their resistance
to harsh environmental conditions and durability.106 An exemplary initiative making strides in
this field is the Clean Hydrogen Partnership.107
There is also tremendous potential in exploring incipient energy storage solutions. These
include technologies like solid-state and sodium-ion batteries (particularly important for
electrifying heavy transportation), thermochemical heat storage (as an alternative to fossil fuels
in heating systems), hydrogen banks, and long-duration options such as flow batteries, green
hydrogen, pumped hydro storage and compressed air energy storage.108 In addition, the EU
should make an effort to enhance its capabilities in carbon capture techniques, as stated in the
Net Zero Industry Act.109

Another promising line is the development of the bio-economy and the bio-based materials,
which can reduce the EU’s foreign dependencies while acting at the same time as a carbon sink
to fight climate change. The biggest potential is for the replacement of non-critical parts and
the production of new alternative components, such as bio-plastics and batteries with lignin
from trees.
In digital technologies, the EU could achieve leadership in generating smaller and faster
chips and reinforce its capacities in chip design, manufacturing and packaging, as
suggested in the European Chips Act.110 In parallel, it should accelerate the development of
the Quantum Communication Infrastructure (QCI) and leverage innovative solutions like
End-to-End Encryption (E2EE) to ensure secure communications and safeguard against
unauthorised access.111
Technological advances in the miniaturisation of materials could play a vital role in decreasing
the overall demand for critical raw materials in the production of electronic devices. Discovering
substitute materials that can effectively replace existing raw materials without compromising
their properties is another important area of focus in order to replace permanent magnets used
in electric motors or to develop low- or zero-PGM (Platinum Group Metal) catalysts for fuel cells.112
In the agricultural sector, innovation should pursue the development of alternative methods
for large-scale animal feed production, including legumes adapted to forthcoming climate
conditions, insect proteins and fat, microalgal biomass and single-cell proteins, which utilise
biotechnology to convert CO2 into protein for animal feed. In addition, it would be good to
pursue manure management practices to improve soil nutrients, as well as to effectively convert
wastewater sludge and manure into valuable fertilisers.113 Finally, further enhancements in smart
and precision farming technologies, such as drones, state-of-the-art sensors, and oil microbiome
tests are essential to minimise fertiliser use, improve soil quality, prevent water pollution and
promote the reduction of water consumption.114
Increasing R&D investments in the production of green APIs and key starting materials, as
well as improving the sustainability of excipients and packaging materials used in pharmaceutical
production will enable us to reduce our vulnerabilities in the supply chains of pharmaceuticals
while also mitigating our carbon footprint. Also, decisively investing in the R&D of new
pharmaceutical products and advanced therapies, in which Europe is lagging behind vis-à-vis
China and the US, will help cope with the rise of such illnesses as cancer, maintain Europe’s
competitiveness in the pharmaceutical industry and ensure affordable access to innovative
medicine by EU citizens.115
1.2. Revitalising industrial policy

Fostering the development of some of the afore-mentioned solutions will likely require close
collaboration between the public and private sectors, particularly in a context in which most of
the world’s largest nations are deploying massive subsidy programmes that need to be
counteracted. The EU’s industrial policy must therefore step up and fight for European interests,
following four fundamental principles. First, this industrial policy should aim to strengthen the
EU’s technological global leadership by promoting the development of key competitive
advantages in innovative and knowledge-intensive ecosystems, with a focus on ensuring
their sustained development beyond the specific policy's duration. Targeted interventions will
be key to preventing unintended negative consequences for the economy, such as capital
misallocation or decreased competition in product markets.

Second, the EU’s industrial policy should be framed to stimulate competition whilst
minimising any distortions on overall competitiveness. Research shows that, while State aid may
be suitable for achieving industrial goals, it can also lead to negative spillover effects, such as
productivity losses, detrimental trade practices and potential retaliation measures, acting as de
facto tariffs.116 To avoid them, European industrial policy should aim to keep State aid based on
competition and open markets with effective rules that guarantee a level playing field, steering
clear of simplistic temptations that stem from protectionism and market distortions.117
Third, the EU's industrial policy should be implemented according to European, rather than
national, logic. This means that the reindustrialisation process should not exclusively consider
criteria like economies of scale or the pre-existing capabilities of certain territories, but also
factors such as balanced regional development and fairness, and the need to foster economic,
social and territorial convergence. The risk of a subsidy race between Member States should
also be minimised. The excessive loosening of State aid rules could lead to an uneven playing
field in the Single Market and to a widening gap in the economic and technological capabilities
of Member States.
Fourth, it should be structured in a way that incentivises private investment. To enhance its
industrial capacity, the EU will require significant amounts of public funding, both national
and European. To ensure its availability, it will be important to streamline administrative
procedures, reinforce some of the current common financing tools, and explore the creation
of new ones. Nevertheless, it will be equally crucial to mobilize more private funding. One
effective tool to achieve that could be the Important Projects of Common European Interest
(IPCEIs). National IPCEI funding and EU funding instruments should be combined to maximise
investment and avoid unbalanced participation between larger and smaller Member States,
while ensuring compliance with relevant financial and competition rules, and promoting the
participation of SMEs.118
1.3. Developing the integration of the Single Market

Strengthening the Single Market is a prerequisite to improving the EU's long-term
competitiveness and economic resilience. This is true for two reasons. First, because this would
provide European businesses with opportunities to scale up on a genuine level playing field,
promoting synergies between different regions and the creation of European value chains.
Second, because a robust Single Market would help the EU to establish global quality standards
in areas like environmental protection, human rights and fair competition.
To achieve further integration, it will be necessary to enhance regulation. The EU has a unique
set of pioneering rules and standards designed to combine market efficiency with individual
protection that could become a reference for the rest of the world and provide a major
competitive edge for Member States. But in order to fulfil this purpose, regulations need to be
improved. The Single Market needs to have a common, clear and consistent legal framework
that encourages cross-border activities, allows innovative European industries to scale up and
creates legal certainty for investments. To achieve this, the EU should rationalise its regulatory
deployment, unify standards, overcome existing overlaps and contradictions, simplify
bureaucratic procedures, ensure the predictability and stability of rules and harmonise
enforcement and governance mechanisms. Instruments on Better Regulation should be
consistently applied, paying close attention to both ex-post evaluations of existing legislation
and ex-ante impact assessments of new legislative proposals at an EU level.

It will also be necessary to create more favourable conditions for transnational investment. In
this regard, access to venture capital available across the EU should be facilitated by completing
the Banking and Capital Markets Union, and tools like the Critical Raw Materials Act and the Net
Zero Industry Act, which can contribute to stimulating the availability and the scaling-up of key
materials, technologies and services across all 27 Member States, including the removal of
obstacles to cross-border trade.119
Another priority should be establishing new rules and truly cross border European data
spaces in order to foster R&D and improve evidence-based policy design and decision-making
among national governments and businesses. Initiatives like the European Health Data Space
should be replicated in as many areas and with as many stakeholders as relevant.120 By the same
token, the EU should strive to make e-Government services more integrated at a European level,
fostering the use of European Digital Identity Wallets and various electronic trust services, and
emphasising the “digital by default” approach.
On the energy front, it will be essential to achieve an effective European Energy Union by
adapting regulations, expanding and modernising its infrastructure and increasing
interconnections beyond the agreed 15% electricity interconnectivity target for 2030.121 If the EU
wants to ensure its energy security and competitiveness, it needs to develop a European Smart
Grid and a European Hydrogen Network that enable sharing the electricity and hydrogen
generated across the Continent, combining the different energy mixes of Member States, and
capitalising the time difference that exists in demand peaks between the East and the West.
Increasing its energy efficiency will be also crucial.
On the healthcare front, it will be essential to reinforce the EU's supply chains, ensure access
by all Member States to pharmaceutical products and strengthen the joint procurement of
medicines at an EU level, using the opportunity created by the Pharmaceutical Strategy.
Finally, it will be crucial to ensure solidarity obligations among Member States and the proper
functioning of the Single Market in times of emergency. Episodes like those experienced during
the early weeks of the pandemic, where some Member States prohibited the export of medical
supplies to others, should not be repeated. To prevent these situations, future contingency
plans should clearly outline the measures and conditions under which "solidarity" among
Member States, as stated in EU legislation, can be requested and constitutes an obligation.122
They should also prohibit unjustified export restrictions.123
In addition to furthering the integration of the Single Market, the EU should work to expand it. In
this sense, the future enlargement of the Union is expected to play a prominent role in increasing
the EU’s economic security, reducing its dependencies, and strengthening its global position.
1.4. Improving human capital

By 2030, the EU is expected to experience a decrease of 3.6 million working-age people due to
demographic ageing.124 This reduction could lead to intense labour shortages and pose a
significant challenge to the future development of European industrial capabilities. For instance,
it is estimated that the green transition will require over 800,000 new workers by 2030 compared
with a business-as-usual scenario,125 and the Digital Decade strategy will demand over 20 million
ICT specialists in Europe in this decade alone.126
To meet this demand, the EU will have to act on two fronts. On the one hand, it will have to boost
its ability to educate, upskill and re-skill its population, both at VET and higher education levels.

Particular attention should be given to training professionals throughout the value chain of
green energy and low carbon technologies, semiconductors and medical devices, but also
professionals that master advanced therapies and sustainable farming techniques.
On the other hand, the EU will need to increase its ability to recruit foreign talent from beyond
European soil. At present, many Member States already heavily rely on non-EU foreign-trained
workers to maintain activity in sectors such as healthcare and agriculture.127 By 2030, these
migrant professionals will be even more crucial to address generational replacement.128
Trade-offs: anticipating and tackling

potential negative effect
The relocation of a part of current production back to European soil will be beneficial in many
dimensions; however, this will also come with additional costs and potentially negative
consequences that must be minimised.
In economic terms, reshoring efforts may result in suboptimal resource allocation and decreased
competition in the global market, thereby undermining incentives for productivity improvements
and innovation.129 The pursuit of greater production autonomy could result in price increases due
to the adoption of stricter quality standards, regulatory compliance, the influence of workers'
bargaining power and rising production costs and raw materials. These factors could directly
impact affordability by reducing domestic consumption and fixed investment, which in turn has
a disproportionate impact on low-income households and small firms.
Alongside concerns about competitiveness, certain specific changes in production processes

could also generate productivity losses. For instance, the transition from mineral to organic
fertilisers could adversely impact field productivity, reduce supply and further exacerbate the
spiral of price increases. Furthermore, the reduction in external exposure through increased
domestic production could result in unintended consequences, potentially increasing the
vulnerability of economies to disruptions in domestic supply and demand.130 For this reason, it is
crucial to promote substitutability and diversify supply sources within the EU while actively
seeking reliable partners overseas.
The increase in internal production also raises concerns about potential environmental
degradation. Despite stricter environmental regulations in the EU, the internal production of
certain strategic goods could still result in increased air pollution and environmental harm.
Implementing renewable energy sources like wind turbines and solar photovoltaic technology
can also have adverse impacts on landscapes, biodiversity, water consumption and land use in
certain territories.131 In addition, the increased cultivation of some crops like soy and rapeseed
poses environmental challenges due to their high water requirements. 132
Finally, there are also several social challenges that may give rise to local unrest, influenced by a
range of factors. The loss of purchasing power due to potentially higher inflation and the growing
automation of domestic production processes due to technical progress and labour shortages
could contribute to economic uncertainty and job insecurity, heightening social tensions.
Moreover, the development of renewable energy projects and mining in certain territories could
generate a sense of comparative grievance in the territories they are undertaken.133 For instance,
while major cities consume significant volumes of energy and natural resources like water, the
implementation of renewable energy infrastructures primarily occurs in rural areas, widening the
rural-urban divide and creating a sense of inequity.134 Finally, another source of discontent may

arise from the challenges faced by certain sectors in achieving climate neutrality goals while
maintaining the profitability of their businesses. A prime example of this is the agricultural sector.135
This requires the EU to work towards ensuring that the development of internal capacities is not
only environmentally sustainable but also socially sustainable.
Of course, all the afore-mentioned threads could be avoided or overcome. Renewable energies
can be deployed without harming ecosystems and local communities. Sustainable and
competitive agriculture can be achieved through circularity and innovation. The right policies
could help to tackle inequality, support vulnerable sectors and guarantee a socially fair transition
for all European citizens and territories.
2. MONITORING AND LIMITING FOREIGN

OWNERSHIP OR CONTROL OVER
STRATEGIC SECTORS AND CRITICAL
INFRASTRUCTURE
Over the past three decades, the economic openness of the EU has attracted thousands of
foreign companies into the Single Market, some of which have gained a significant presence in
critical sectors. For instance, these companies provide 84% of cloud services, 75% of
e-commerce, and 90% of digital payments used in the EU.136
The presence of foreign companies becomes particularly evident when looking at the European
critical infrastructure map. The EU relies on a vast network of infrastructure that extends from
the depths of the seabed to outer space, and includes assets such as data and electric grids,
gas pipelines, refineries, storage facilities, wind and solar farms, ports, airports, railways, roads,
hospitals, laboratories, cloud centres, telecommunications antennas, satellites, desalination
plants and dams. Many of these infrastructure facilities are now partially in the hands of foreign
companies. Ports are a prime example of this: China has stakes in 7 out of the 10 largest ports in
the EU and handles about 10% of Europe's shipping container capacity.
The significant presence of foreign companies poses two challenges for the EU. The first
concerns security. Foreign firms could leverage their position to gain access to sensitive
information, put Member States against each other, coerce the EU into advancing their
economic and policy goals, and ultimately disrupt vital telecommunications, energy systems
and supply chains in the event of a conflict with their home countries. This risk is particularly
high in the case of digital services, which could be shut down in a matter of seconds.
The presence of foreign companies also poses a challenge to the industrial development of
the EU. There is a substantial body of research that demonstrates that the dominance exerted
by big tech, energy and food companies in the US has resulted in less innovation, higher prices
for consumers, lower wages for workers and reduced entrepreneurial activity.137 The danger
now is that this same pattern could happen in the EU, at a time when these things are more
necessary than ever.

Nevertheless, against this background, the enormous benefits that the presence of foreign
companies brings to the EU should be considered. In the last decade alone, these firms have
created over 24 million jobs, accounting for 16% of today’s total employment in the EU.138 They
help train workers, giving them access to knowledge and experience that they could not find
elsewhere.139 They provide European companies, governments and the self-employed with
access to highly advanced goods and services that they need to remain competitive.140 And, in
many cases, they also serve as catalysts for innovation and entrepreneurship, fostering the
development of start-ups and the growth of SMEs around them.141
Moreover, it is important to realise that the presence of foreign companies is an inevitable

consequence of commercial reciprocity. A reciprocity that is essential for maintaining an open
international economy and that, in general, is highly advantageous for the EU. This is particularly
true in the case of the US. American big tech companies dominate the European market. But it
should not be forgotten that, in the bigger scheme of things, the EU has a trade surplus in goods
of 150 billion euros with the US.142
It is therefore in the interest of the EU to preserve the presence of foreign companies, and even
leverage its strategic advantages to attract new companies. At the same time, however, the EU
should endeavour to mitigate risk by gradually limiting the dominance of foreign companies
with links to non-like-minded countries in strategic sectors and critical infrastructures.
This could be accomplished through the use of regulation, strengthening tools such as the
common framework for FDI screening and the new rules for ensuring resilience of critical
entities. However, this should primarily be attained through competition, respecting the
principles of the rules-based international order and fostering the development of
European companies in these critical sectors. To that end, it is important to ensure that large
foreign companies operating in the Single Market become facilitators of European innovation
and entrepreneurialism, rather than hindering it.
At the same time, the EU should raise security and predictability requirements in conformity
with WTO rules for those foreign companies providing strategic services, for instance, by
expanding cyber proofing standards. When doing so, the EU should be cautious not to hinder
the development of European SMEs. Some of the legislation introduced in the past with the aim
of impeding the growth of foreign leaders ended up harming EU companies, which tend to have
fewer resources and compliance capabilities.143

3. SETTING CONTINGENCY PLANS TO
RESPOND TO FUTURE SHORTAGES
Even if the EU reinforces its internal production capacities and secures its critical sectors and
infrastructure, it will always be exposed to a certain level of risk. No European government can
prevent a natural disaster, armed conflict or accident from disrupting global supply chains
hundreds of kilometres from its borders. However, what they can do is prepare for it. That is why
it is important for the EU to reinforce the structural efforts mentioned above with the development
of comprehensive contingency measures.
Over the past two years, the European Commission has launched important initiatives on this
front, implementing new tools and plans to guarantee access to essential goods and resources
in times of crisis.144 In the future, they should be reinforced through the development of other
responses.
One of these responses could be the establishment of common strategic reserves. There
was a time when companies used to maintain ample stocks of raw materials and components;
unfortunately, the desire to reduce costs put an end to this practice. It might now be time to
partially recover this practice. The EU has the RescEU reserve, which includes emergency-
related items such as firefighting planes, field hospitals and basic medical supplies, and HERA is
now seeking to reinforce this with critical medical countermeasures.145 However, the variety and
quantity of these reserves are very limited. Therefore, it would be prudent to expand these
reserves at an EU or country level and on a voluntary basis to also include critical raw materials,
technological components and energy resources that are beyond Europe's production
capacities – as is already done with oil and gas stock-holding obligations. These reserves should
be located in such a manner that they are easily accessible to all Member States.
Moreover, the EU should encourage and support Member States to develop both common
and national contingency production capacities that ensure a minimum supply in times of
crisis. Some of these capacities could be set up permanently and receive public support from
national governments or EU institutions in the form of tax exemptions or public procurement
contracts.
The EU should also identify and develop production capacities that can be transformed or
scaled upon demand. The pharmaceutical sector provides interesting examples in this regard.
On the one hand, there is the Network of Ever-warm Production Capacities for Vaccines and
Therapeutics Manufacturing (EU-FAB), an initiative launched by HERA, which reserves
production capacities to manufacture vaccines when needed.146 On the other hand, there is the
"Evolutive Vaccine Facility," which is fully digitalised and capable of initiating the production of a
completely new vaccine in under 15 days. Similar capacities should be developed to manufacture
other essential goods that may experience temporary shortages during crises.
To successfully design and update these measures, Member States and EU institutions should
reinforce their strategic foresight capabilities, their anticipatory governance mechanisms and
their real-time monitoring systems.

ENHANCING
CIRCULARITY
AND SMART
CONSUMPTION
The reinforcement of the EU's open strategic autonomy cannot be
achieved while turning a blind eye to the environmental emergency
that is gripping the planet. Rather, it should be achieved through a
profound and coordinated response. Current production and
consumption systems are unsustainable. Humanity has already
trespassed 6 out of the 9 planetary boundaries;147 it is emitting 40
billion tonnes of greenhouse gases every year that the atmosphere
cannot absorb, and it is depleting natural resources at a faster rate
than the biosphere needs to regenerate them.148 If things continue
this way, the global consumption of materials will double in the coming
decades and waste generation will increase by 70%, posing a severe
threat not only to European security but to humanity as a whole.149
Therefore, it is crucial for the EU to align its search for greater

economic security with a far-reaching transformation of its
production systems by:
• Increasing resource efficiency.

• Fostering circularity in the economy and society.
• Substituting current materials with more sustainable
alternatives.
4. INCREASING RESOURCE EFFICIENCY
Over the past three decades, the EU has significantly reduced its consumption of natural
resources despite the fact that its population and economies have grown. For instance, its raw
material consumption has decreased by 14% since 2000, its overall household energy
consumption has dropped by 5%, and its use of nitrogen fertilisers has seen a reduction of 13%
during the same period.150 Europeans have been learning to do more with less for decades.
Today, we have the technology and knowledge required to achieve even greater productivity
gains in our strategic sectors.
Consider the energy field. Estimates indicate that just by deploying already available technologies
(such as renewable and efficient heating and cooling systems, building insulation solutions and
smart-home applications), the average European household has the potential to reduce its energy
consumption by 18% by 2030.151 This means that, through this approach, the total energy
consumption of Member States could be lowered by 5% to 7% in this decade alone.152
And that is just the tip of the iceberg. The conversion of the current fleet of internal combustion
vehicles into electric and fuel cell-powered vehicles, coupled with a shift towards more public
RESILIENT EU2030 ENHANCING CIRCULARITY AND SMART CONSUMPTION 38

transport and active mobility, along with improvements in urban transport planning, could
contribute an additional reduction of 25% by 2030.153 Likewise, the adoption of new production
methods in the steel industry (e.g. electric arc furnaces) and the capture and reutilisation of
carbon in the petrochemical and other emitting industries could lead to energy reductions of
up to 16% by the end of the decade.154
In short, the possibilities are immense. Accordingly, the EU should increase its support for this
kind of intervention as part of its strategic toolbox, and raise its current energy reduction targets
for 2030,155 as recently suggested by the Council and the European Parliament.156
Productivity gains could also be monumental in our agri-food sector. In the EU, there are
already hundreds of organic, vertical or automated farms that employ new crops, robots,
drones, sensors and satellites to enhance their irrigation, fertilisation and harvesting processes.157
They are capable of producing vegetables using much less water and fertiliser than traditional
systems.158 And breed healthy cattle with a quarter of the antibiotics of conventional large-scale
holdings.159 Our priority for the coming years should be to expand these smart and sustainable
farming techniques. This will assist in reducing the EU’s external dependencies and counteract
the potential decline in agricultural productivity caused by climate change and the increase in
forestry and urbanisation.160
We could also achieve major efficiency gains in the healthcare sector by speeding up the
modernisation of our hospitals with the next generation of medical tech. Consider, for
instance, the case of MRI scanners. Today’s devices require a regular supply of 1,500 litres of
helium to function, a material that is only found in a limited number of countries such as the US,
Qatar and Algeria. However, there are already new models that only require 7 litres.
In addition to enhancing the efficiency of their production processes, Europeans must also
reduce waste. This does not imply embracing those “degrowth” theses that advocate a
reduction in global production as the sole path to achieving environmental sustainability. Rather,
it involves addressing the numerous areas in which our countries employ raw materials, energy,
space and human resources to produce goods that are either unused or misused.
Take the case of the healthcare industry. People and livestock in Europe are overmedicated,
meaning that sometimes they consume more medicines than they actually need. For instance,
it is estimated that 10% of EU citizens take antibiotics without a prescription.161 A significant
reduction in these percentages would allow us to save millions of medication doses annually,
which would, in turn, yield numerous economic and health benefits. To achieve this, we must
prescribe more accurate dosages, foster the implementation of AI-based diagnostic systems,
encourage the use of wearables and implanted devices in our national healthcare systems, and
prioritise preventive medicine treatments over long-term symptom management.
A restrictive approach should also be taken in the veterinary field. Estimates are that, in the EU,
animals receive one-third more antibiotics than the recommended amount.162 In the last three
years, approximately one third of the 50% reduction target of veterinary antimicrobial sales for
2030, established in the Farm to Fork Strategy, has been achieved. Nonetheless, further efforts
must be maintained and stepped up in order to achieve the afore-mentioned 50% reduction target.
Greater efficiency should also be sought in the food sector. Every year, 59 million tonnes of
food are wasted in the EU.163 Around 10% of this food waste occurs in primary production, where
farmers often find themselves forced to let their crops rot to prevent oversupply and maintain
fair prices. This constitutes a huge loss for producers, companies and households, a serious

misuse of valuable natural resources like water, and a serious threat to the climate that accounts
for nearly one tenth of global greenhouse gas emissions. However, today we have both the
means and the incentives to put an end to this waste. The EU should actively promote the
development of databases and digital tools that allow farmers to anticipate harvests and gain
insights into market trends and demand. Even more crucially, it should facilitate the distribution
of surpluses across the Single Market and beyond, encourage the consumption of local and
seasonal products, and assist farmers in transitioning from crops prone to oversupply to those
for which EU production remains insufficient. 164
The remaining 50% of food waste comes from households.165 To reduce this, the EU should
enforce regulations requiring food retailers to provide consumers with clear information on
proper storage requirements, accurate expiration dates and recommended portion sizes.166 It
should also actively promote more responsible consumption habits among citizens, and foster
the development of mechanisms for collecting and reusing food, since unsuitable foodstuffs
for human consumption are still suitable for animal feed production.167
Taken together, these and other measures will help us significantly reduce waste generation in
Europe. And for the waste we cannot avoid generating, we must find ways to harness it.
5. FOSTERING CIRCULARITY IN THE

ECONOMY AND SOCIETY
Each year, the EU imports over 250 million tonnes of metals from foreign countries to sustain its
production processes.168 Simultaneously, it generates a staggering 94 million tonnes of scrap,
of which only 76% is recycled.169 The rest is either dumped into European landfills (0.7%) or
shipped back abroad (23%), predominantly to developing nations with lower environmental and
social standards.170 The same applies to many other raw materials and products consumed in
the EU – from paper and cardboard to textiles, minerals and plastics.
The EU remains trapped in a linear model of consumption (extract, import, use and dispose) that
is causing serious harm to the planet and increasing its dependency on third countries. We
must abandon this linear model and embrace a circular approach, where products are reused,
repurposed or recycled. By doing so, we would greatly reduce our foreign vulnerabilities and
reduce our environmental footprint.
Achieving full circularity will not be easy. It will require fundamental transformations across all
stages of the majority of our value chains – ranging from the initial phases of eco-design to the
recycling of materials when products reach the end of their useful life. It will also entail developing
new business models where services, rather than products, are commercialised 171 and
establishing new mechanisms for transparency to ensure a competitive edge for circular
material flows, similar to those being discussed in the context of the EU Battery Pass.
The good news is that the EU is taking significant steps to foster this paradigm shift. In recent
years, the European Commission and Member States have approved and implemented
various mechanisms and laws to foster circularity. They have also set ambitious recycling

targets, such as the requirement to collect at least 65% of electronic waste and 15% of critical
raw materials by 2030.172
These efforts will have to be accompanied by additional cross-sectoral actions. One crucial
priority should be the development of mechanisms that enable the recycling of materials
from existing green technologies in Europe. The first generation of wind turbines installed on
European soil is projected to reach it’s the end of its useful life by 2030. Solar panels will endure
a few more years, but they would also need to be disposed of eventually. It is therefore imperative
for the EU to establish the appropriate collection, dismantling and recycling processes and
ensure a fully-functioning intra-EU cross-border trade in waste and secondary raw materials.
This will facilitate the reuse of rare-earth elements and other primary materials present in these
devices, effectively meeting a substantial portion of future demand.173
In addition, it will be essential to explore alternative and non-conventional sources of critical

raw materials, including those obtained from extractive waste, old mining tailings and spoil
heaps. Promising initiatives include the recovery of iron, gallium and rare-earth elements from
bauxite residues generated in the production of alumina, the use of internal combustion engines
as a source of platinum for electrolyser manufacturing, the use of bacteria to recover rare-earth
elements from industrial sewage or the recovery of iron, aluminium and copper from electronic
waste.174 By the same token, it will be crucial to recycle more commonly found materials that can
be easily recycled. A good example of this is steel, which is extensively used in construction and
is easy to recycle.175 By using scrap steel instead of newly mined ore, we could reduce energy
consumption by 75% and save approximately 90% of raw materials.176
The European agri-food industry can also become an immense source of circularity. Every
year, it generates 6 million tonnes of waste, which causes severe environmental issues and high
management costs.177 However, today we have the technology to prevent this waste or to
transform it into valuable resources, as set out in the “Moerman Ladder” framework. Agricultural
left-overs can be used to produce animal feed, bio-based products and biofuels that may
replace oil in our internal combustion engines in the near future.178 Likewise, livestock manure
can be turned into RENURE fertilisers that can substitute the mineral fertilisers we currently
import, primarily from Russia and Egypt.179
Circularity can also fuel the medical industry. Between 3% and 8% of medicines sold in
Europe for human use are wasted.180 Part of this waste is managed through take-back
programmes designed to ensure health and environmental safety. Unfortunately, only a tiny
fraction is currently reused. This needs to change. Although the purity requirements for
medicines pose a challenge for their second life, there are several recovery techniques with
great potential.181 For instance, some active pharmaceutical ingredients can be reused in new
formulations through green engineering techniques.182 On a different level, there are also
methods to use radioactive waste to produce medical isotopes.183
Governments could support the development of the afore-mentioned circularity practices in

various ways: directing public R&D towards eco-design and recycling, establishing realistic yet
ambitious waste collection and recycling quotas for industries, providing incentives for companies
to modernise their production processes, and promoting circularity in public procurement and
in trade agreements with non-EU countries.184 Schemes such as the deposit refund scheme,
where a deposit fee is charged when purchasing a product with a container and refunded when
the container is returned, should also be established at an EU level.185 On the demand side, it
would be good to establish trustworthy product labels that inform customers about reparability.
These labels could contribute to shifting consumer preferences towards circular products.186

Ultimately, the goal should be to transform the European industrial arena into a symbiotic system
in which the residues from one sector become a resource for others. This would reduce the EU’s
demand for non-renewable primary materials and decrease its dependency on imports, and it
would help enhance environmental sustainability.
Such a paradigm shift could be achieved without substantially increasing costs or compromising
the competitiveness of our industries. Becoming the first developers of circular production
systems would provide our companies with a competitive edge, helping them thrive in a world
where environmental concerns and greater pressure on raw materials are practically a certainty.
In addition, circularity will create new sectors responsible for activities such as recycling, which,
according to some estimates, could increase the EU's GDP by 0.5% and create 700,000
additional jobs by 2030.187
6. REPLACING RAW MATERIALS AND

COMPONENTS BY MORE ACCESSIBLE
ALTERNATIVES
In this world, almost nothing is irreplaceable. That includes most of the materials used in our
production systems. They were selected decades ago, primarily based on cost considerations.
But now, things have changed. New criteria have become relevant, the geopolitics have shifted,
and science has dramatically expanded the range of possibilities. In the coming years, European
industries will have to adapt to the new circumstances and use those opportunities to replace
many of the materials currently used in their production processes with more available, safer
and more environmentally-friendly alternatives. Governments will have to facilitate this
transformation through incentives for innovation and the right regulations.
The possibilities are plentiful. Consider, for instance, the energy sector. In the short term, the
lithium-ion batteries used in today’s vehicles could, to some extent, be replaced by nickel-rich
and lithium iron phosphate batteries, two technologies that are rapidly maturing and whose
raw materials offer a broader supply diversification.188 In the medium term, they could be
replaced by solid-state batteries (which have a higher energy density and are made of
common polymers, oxides and sulphites) and sodium-ion batteries might also become a
major factor for energy storage. On a wider perspective, the use of hydrogen and pumped
hydro-storage could help reduce the need for batteries and other storage equipment that
consumes raw materials altogether.
By the same token, permanent magnets found in wind turbines, electric cars and heat pumps
could be produced out of ferrite and aluminium, instead of rare earths. Alternatively, they could
be entirely replaced by multi-polar synchronous generators, squirrel cage induction generators,
and superconductor-based generators, which are currently being developed by the industry.189
These changes will significantly reduce some of the EU’s key foreign dependencies and make
our energy ecosystem more resilient.
Similarly, in the ICT sector, there is a potential for replacing platinum, which is currently utilised
in data storage and servers, with ceramic capacitor producers that employ nickel-based

electrode systems. These alternative materials not only offer cost-effective solutions but also
alleviate the challenges associated with availability. Moreover, it is crucial to invest in reducing
the dependence of data transmission networks on permanent magnets that contain rare-earth
elements like dysprosium and terbium, which are predominantly concentrated in China. By
decreasing or even completely eliminating reliance on such elements, we can enhance the
sustainability and resilience of our ICT infrastructure.190
The same applies to our agri-food sector. Currently, the majority of plant proteins used to feed
our livestock comes from soybeans, mainly imported from Brazil and the US, and rapeseed,
produced in the EU but with a lower protein content. In the near future, a large share of these
plant proteins could be replaced by the cultivation of legumes, which has a significant untapped
potential in European farming. Another share could be replaced by algae, insects and microbes,
three technologies that are already being used by the industry.191 In fact, by 2030, European
production of insects for animal feed is expected to reach 1 million tonnes, and the demand for
algae is projected to increase from the current 270,000 tonnes to 8 million tonnes.192 This means
that at least 2% of animal feed consumed in Europe will come from these sources. The benefits
of this change will be enormous. Algae, insects and microbes require lower land and water
usage than traditional sources, and have the potential to transform food waste into nutritious
feed.193 What is now needed is to optimise their production processes and scale them up to
make them competitive in terms of price. This will not only drastically reduce our dependence
on imports but will also have the potential to generate between 40,000 and 63,000 direct jobs
and €11.3 billion in annual revenue for the EU by 2030.194

RESILIENT EU2030 44
REINVIGORATING
GLOBAL TRADE AND
THE MULTILATERAL
SYSTEM
As much as the EU develops its internal capabilities and invests in
circularity and efficiency, it will always depend, to a certain extent,
on third countries. The more factories it has, the more it will need to
import raw materials, components, innovation and talent from
abroad, and the more important it will be to access foreign markets
to sell part of its production. Moreover, it is worth noting that, in the
coming years, the EU will have to face global challenges like climate
change, migration and security that will require further collaboration
between countries. That is why the EU cannot choose between
reinforcing its internal capabilities and boosting its participation in
global trade and governance; it has to do both.
To achieve the latter, it is essential to develop in three directions:
• Launching a new trade expansion.

• Rebalancing economic relations with China.
• Leading the renovation of the multilateral systems.
7. LAUNCHING A NEW TRADE EXPANSION
In recent times, buzzwords like "deglobalisation", "fragmentation" and "decoupling" have

become commonplace in newspapers and round tables, and there has been an increase in the
number of voices that consider that the EU should quickly transform its entire economy to
prepare for this imminent scenario.
Nevertheless, the truth is, as we have already seen, that this doomist trend is nowhere to be
found in the empirical evidence. The US and China are indeed becoming increasingly self-reliant
– they have been doing so since the early 2010s. But data show that global trade flows are
neither declining nor fragmenting into blocs of like-minded countries. More importantly, there
are strong reasons to assume that they will not do this in the future either. First, because trade
flows are already highly regionalised.195 Second, because most economic actors have already
expressed their intention to support global openness and not foster sum-zero competition.196
Third, because most of the factors that spurred the expansion of global supply changes in the
past continue to operate. Long-distance trade still contributes to specialisation and economies
of scale. It still provides access to raw materials and labour that may be more expensive, scarce
or simply unavailable in a given region. And it is still competitive in cost, since shipping rates are
actually falling and green taxes are still low.
Thus, instead of just preparing the EU to survive in a fragmented world that may never
materialise, the priority should be to prepare it to compete and prosper in a global economy
that is certainly changing but that is by no means showing signs of exhaustion.
RESILIENT EU2030 REINVIGORATING GLOBAL TRADE AND THE MULTILATERAL SYSTEM 46

The window of opportunity is huge. On the one hand, the US is closing it by itself, raising its
tariffs and stopping the establishment of new FTAs.197 On the other hand, China’s aggressive
expansion to third countries is starting to be perceived as unbeneficial by many, due to its
coercion practices, debt traps and the disregard by Chinese companies for local workers,
communities and laws.198 Meanwhile, the EU continues to be the largest trading agent in the
world, and its model is becoming increasingly appealing to a majority of countries that do not
want to increase geopolitical tensions and seek to improve the social and environmental
conditions of their citizens. In fact, surveys show that, although the Global South tends to see
the EU as a more limited actor than the US and China when it comes to mobilising investment
and developing infrastructure, it considers it to be the best partner to establish fair, stable and
mutually-beneficial trade relations, as well as to foster environmental and social progress in
their own countries.199
The EU should seize this opportunity to launch a new trade expansion aimed at revamping
its existing relationships and establishing new ones with a primary focus on like-minded and
trustworthy partners. This includes natural allies of the EU, such as Australia, Canada, Japan,
New Zealand, UK, the US and the Balkans and Eastern partner countries. But also other low- and
middle-income countries in Latin America, Africa and Asia. The direct economic gains of these
new relations may be modest at first. However, their contribution to the EU’s interests could be
enormous, since they could help reduce its foreign dependency by diversifying its sources of
supply. After all, many of the raw materials and manufactured products that we currently import
from a single country could be found or produced in other countries with which the EU has
trade relations. For instance, the rare-earth materials that, at present, are mainly acquired from
China, could also be acquired from Australia, Brazil, Canada, South Africa, Thailand and
Ukraine. 200 The phosphorus that the EU currently buys from Vietnam and Kazakhstan also exists
in Algeria, Mexico and Morocco. The APIs that the European pharmaceutical industry acquires
from China and India could also be produced in Latin America.
Main suppliers (large bubbles) and potential suppliers (small bubbles) of critical
raw materials for the EU (% of global mineral reserves)
Silicon Phosphorus Niobium Magnesium Lithium Gallium Boron
Russia:
Boron: 3%
Gallium: 1.1%
Mag.: 33.8%
Canada: Norway: Silicon: 7.3% China:
Niobium: 9.4% Phosp.: 49.3% Boron: 1.6%
Lithium: 7.7%
Silicon: 68.2%
United States: Phosp.: 1.3%
Boron: 3%
Lithium: 3.8%
Niobium: 1.2%
Silicon: 3.5% Morocco:
Phosp.: 35.2% Slovakia: Japan:
Algeria: Mag.: 5.4% Gallium: 1.1%
Phosp.: 1.5% Ukraine: R. Korea:
Tunisia: Gallium: 1.7% Gallium: 1.8%
Phosp.: 1.8% Greece:
Egypt: Mag.: 1.4%
Chile: Phosp.: 2%
Boron: 2.6%
Brazil:
Silicon: 4.5% Australia:
Argentina: Lithium: 23.8%
Mag.: 4.3%
Lithium: 10.4%
Source: Author based on USGS 201

The new trade expansion should be deployed on the basis of competitiveness and reciprocity,
and in a smart way, amending past mistakes made by Europeans, taking advantage of the
shortcomings of the Chinese and American models, and capitalising on the growing alignment
that exists between European values and the needs and aspirations of a significant part of the
world’s population. In this regard, the EU should cast itself as a non-polarising and trustworthy
agent that offers its partners a horizontal and mutually-beneficial relationship that would help
them become more resilient, competitive, environmentally sustainable and socially advanced. 202
Accordingly, the EU should devote more efforts to helping trade partners develop manufacturing
and service industries, and not just primary activities such as agriculture and mining. Many low-
and middle-income countries are tired of the exclusively extractive relationship that global
powers have with them. They want their economies to modernise too, and the EU must become
their best option to do so.
In that spirit, the EU should increase its technical and financial support for the enhancement of
local capabilities, with the Global Gateway as its centrepiece, and expanding initiatives such as
the TAIEX, the MAV+, the Twinning instrument, and the EU-LAC Digital Alliance to cover other
critical areas. 203 Moreover, the EU should help those countries with critical natural resources to
improve their refining and processing capacities, facilitating their integration into the value
chain of key enabling technologies like batteries, as has recently been done with Namibia. 204
Similarly, the EU should extend its R&D collaboration with its trading partners, facilitating
knowledge exchange, promoting voluntary technology transfer and fostering the creation of
cross-regional innovation ecosystems.
Particular efforts should be devoted to increasing trade in digital services, in line with the
EU’s Digital Strategy. This sector shows great potential205 and the EU is already leading globally
in regulating and facilitating digital service flows. Continuing with this effort would allow the EU
to earn a privileged position in areas concerning movement of data, e-commerce and investment
which will be crucial in the future. 206 Progressing in the development of common frameworks
for interoperability would also help foster more exchanges in areas such as the data economy
and secure connectivity. In this regard, the notions of cyber-proofing and data free flow with
trust are fundamental blocks to build upon.
One way to complement the EU's trade offer could be by offering partners ways to improve
their human capital. Europe has the best educational ecosystem in the world and is the
preferred place to study and work for the majority of citizens from the Global South. Meanwhile,
the EU has a strong need to attract workers and students. This creates a potential win-win
situation that should be explored. For instance, the EU could sponsor the creation of training
centres in emerging countries, increase its temporary mobility agreements for workers and
students, and facilitate travel and residence – particularly at university and VET levels. Programs
like Youth Mobility for Africa and Erasmus+ are good examples to follow.
Furthermore, the EU should also encourage greater participation in its trade relations with
European and non-European SMEs, which account for 85% of European exporters and 28% of
global exports. 207 To achieve this, it would be advisable to better reflect the needs of SMEs in
present and future FTAs, connect with business incubators worldwide, strengthen financing
mechanisms such as the European Enterprise Network and facilitate bureaucratic procedures.
For the latter, the EU could develop online tools to help SMEs obtain electronic certificates and
acquire direct information on exporting SMEs through Access2Markets. It could also create help-
desks in third countries to provide information and regulatory assistance to their local SMEs.208

Finally, the EU should leverage its globally-acknowledged ability to set rules and standards
that combine market efficiency with social and environmental protection as an added
value of its trade activity. Many countries need to enhance their standardisation and
certification systems, and strengthen their regulation in fields such as environmental protection,
food security, labour conditions, human health, data and emerging technologies. The EU should
become a source of technical support and compliance pressure for them. 209 At the same time,
it should back the "trade and sustainable development" provisions in its FTAs as a way to
reinforce adherence to international treaties on labour rights and environmental protection.
To undertake this trade expansion, the EU would need to update many of its 46 FTAs and sign
new ones, both multilateral and bilateral210 – something important considering that over 60% of
the EU's external trade still takes part outside of preferential agreements. These FTAs could be
complemented with new model agreements211 (like the Sustainable Investment Facilitation
Agreements) and new sectoral partnerships, which can help achieve a similar purpose, without
having to deal with the difficulties that come with FTA negotiations. 212 When deploying these new
associations, priority should be given to like-minded countries, social rights and environmental
sustainability. Nevertheless, we should carefully calibrate the conditionality of our FTAs in order
to facilitate trade diversification and the mitigation of the EU’s dependencies.
8. REBALANCING ECONOMIC RELATIONS

WITH CHINA
China is the world’s second largest economy, an industrial powerhouse, and the EU’s largest
trade partner in goods. 213 Yet, it is undeniable that the EU-China economic relationship has
deteriorated in recent years. The EU trade in goods deficit has more than doubled (jumping
from €182 billion in 2020 to €396 billion in 2022)214 and its dependency on key Chinese raw
materials and technology components has increased. 215
This imbalance has not happened by chance. Rather, it is the result of a State-led Chinese
strategy aimed at reducing the role of foreign trade and technology in its internal market while
extending the global economy’s dependence on China. Such a strategy has been stated by the
Chinese authorities themselves and includes a broad set of aggressive measures: targeted
tariffs and subsidies, selective opening/closure of sectors, forced technology transfers, violation
of intellectual property rights, strong support for State-owned enterprises, discriminatory
procurement policies and even interference in digital markets. 216 These actions are hampering
European companies’ access to the Chinese market, distorting reciprocity between these two
economies, and threatening fair competition and sound trade worldwide.
Decoupling from the Chinese economy is not a viable or a desirable option for the EU. Nor
is subscribing to the idea of a zero-sum game. On the contrary, it is in the world's best interest
for the EU and China to have stable and fluid relations. However, in order to achieve this, the
principles of transparency, predictability and reciprocity should be observed. Thus, China
should eliminate the afore-mentioned distortions, guarantee compliance with international
rules and standards, ensure a level playing field and open its market to European companies, so
that the EU does not have to close its own.

The European Union has taken important steps to promote that change, dealing with China
simultaneously as a partner for cooperation, an economic competitor and a systemic rival. 217
Among other things, it has adopted new tools to protect Member States from foreign economic
coercion, to combat foreign subsidies that distort the internal market and to screen FDI flows
related to strategic assets and infrastructure. In addition, it has developed industrial plans to cut
dependency on Chinese and other foreign suppliers in some strategic areas.
In the future, these actions should be maintained and reinforced with others not particularly
targeted at China, but at all countries. For instance, the EU could explore the possibility of
creating a joint risk framework to control and restrict the export of certain sensitive technologies,
and of establishing specific guidelines for research collaboration in higher education between
the two regions, aimed at preventing unwanted knowledge transfer and the dual and unintended
use of findings (e.g. military use of civilian technologies). The new European Economic Security
Strategy successfully marks the way forward in this area. 218
The EU should explore and deploy these measures with prudence, so they do not hamper
foreign investment or undermine the integrity of the Single Market. But it should also act with
confidence, remaining faithful to its interests and values, and aware of its significant
strengths. After all, the EU accounts for more than one-quarter of the total FDI stock of China,
as one of the largest foreign investors in the country. 219 There are entire sectors of the Chinese
economy that depend on the know-how and technology of European companies, and the
balance of trade in services is €21 billion in favour of the EU. 220
9. LEADING THE RENOVATION OF THE

MULTILATERAL ARCHITECTURE
One of the best ways for the EU to mitigate its future vulnerabilities and defend its interests
in the world is to become a key player in improving the multilateral system. For decades,
multilateral institutions have played a vital role in global governance, facilitating agreements,
alleviating tensions between States and promoting economic and social development
worldwide. 221 Nevertheless, in recent times, many of these institutions have fallen into a deep
crisis, driven by a questioning of their legitimacy and effectiveness. 222
The EU should advocate a reform of these multilateral institutions and play a leading role in it. 223
It should do so in pursuit of its own interests and by speaking with a single voice – “delivering as
one to succeed as one”. 224 Four priorities should be considered.
First, the EU should promote greater inclusivity in the system, so it better reflects the
diversity of the international community. 225 Many emerging economies demand and deserve
a stronger voice and participation in global decision-making processes. This might pose some
challenges to the international community. Yet, it is in the EU's interest to address these
economies’ demands and find ways to better adjust the membership quotas and voting systems
of multilateral organisations. A failure to do so may accelerate the fragmentation of the traditional
multilateral order and the creation of a parallel multilateral system led by China. 226 The potential
expansion of the BRICS countries, the growth of development banks like the Asian Infrastructure

Investment Bank (AIIB) and the New Development Bank (NDB), and the proliferation of
agreements such as the Cross-Border Interbank Payment System (CIPS) and the Regional
Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) show the need to counter this threat.
Secondly, the EU should foster improvements in the performance of multilateral

organisations, which need to become more responsive and effective to keep up with an
increasingly fast-paced world. 227 To achieve this, the EU should actively promote the use of
plurilateral negotiations, sectoral agreements and ad hoc alliances, such as the Joint Statement
Initiatives of the WTO. 228 By the same logic, it should support the strengthening of those judicial
institutions and binding mechanisms that help address non-compliance, resolve disputes and
enforce global rules. 229 Issues such as the dysfunctionality of the Dispute Settlement Mechanism
of the WTO need to be solved as soon as possible. At the same time, it would be advisable to
demand more transparent and comprehensive procedures for auditing, access to information
and the evaluation of the results of multilateral institutions. 230
Thirdly, the EU should advocate an increased multi-stakeholder and multi-level approach

in the multilateral architecture. 231 Greater participation from civil society (academia, NGOs,
private companies, trade unions, foundations and CBOs) in multilateral organisations would
help boost their legitimacy and improve their delivery – as demonstrated by the experience of
the EU itself. Similarly, collaboration with different tiers of government should be fostered, both
within European territory (national parliaments, regional parliaments and local governments)
and with other regions (such as the African Union, the Organization of American States, the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations, the Organisation of African, Caribbean and Pacific
States, and the League of Arab States). 232
Lastly, the EU should lead the modernisation and revitalisation of forums that host global
debates on emerging challenges, such as Internet governance, AI, cybersecurity, space and
trade sustainability. 233
Taken together, these measures would contribute to the modernisation and strengthening
of the present multilateral system, enabling the EU to address its foreign vulnerabilities and
defend its interests in the world more effectively and peacefully.

RESILIENT EU2030 52
CONCLUSIONS:
A COMPETITIVE
EUROPE FOR A
PROSPEROUS
WORLD
Scanning today's headlines, one might conclude that the EU is
doomed. That it has irremediably lost the innovation race due to its
excessive bureaucracy and the complacency of its population. That
its excessive adherence to environmentalism and social welfare
has undermined its competitiveness. And that, thanks to this, it will
lose its global importance and that the future international order
will be entirely determined by the US and China.234
Nevertheless, it is worth noting that this feeling is neither new nor grounded in facts.
Europeans have been announcing their own collapse (and attributing it to these same factors)
long before Europe existed as a political reality. In the 1930s, bestselling author Arnold J.
Toynbee argued that Europe had lost the "spiritual force" required to succeed and foresaw its
downfall by the year 2000 at the hands of a dictatorial Chinese power resulting from a "fusion"
of communism and capitalism. 235 In the 1960s, the construction of the Berlin Wall was interpreted
by many as a sign of the definitive fracture of Europe into two irreconcilable parts. In the 1970s,
the economic recessions caused by the two oil crises led doom-mongers to announce the end
of European growth and prosperity and the dawn of an age of scarcity. In the 1980s, the
European Economic Community's enlargement to the South was interpreted by critics as a
fundamental mistake that would break the EU project. In 2008, it was said that the financial
crisis would provoke the collapse of the euro and the return of national currencies. In 2016,
experts confidently predicted that Brexit would be "the beginning of the end of the EU" since the
UK would be followed by many other Member States.
These are just a few examples. The forecasts of Europe's demise have been repeated incessantly
throughout the past century. So much so that George Steiner, a Franco-American philosopher
widely recognised as one of the most prominent Western polymaths, did not hesitate to consider
the obsession with its own declinism as one of the "five signs of European identity". 236
In reality, what Europe has done over the last 50 years has primarily constituted progress.
Its income per capita has grown by 147%, its exports have increased by 30 percentage points
and its patent production has multiplied sevenfold. 237 Most importantly, Europeans have
managed to translate this economic development into greater social welfare for the vast
majority of people, and to decouple CO2 emissions and economic growth, thereby achieving a
crucial milestone in the history of sustainability. 238
It is true that, in relative terms, Europe has lost its global weight in many areas. However, in most
cases, this is not because Member States have regressed or stopped progressing, but rather
because other countries in the Global South have emerged and closed the gap, often thanks to
Europe’s support. For instance, it is worth remembering that, in just the last decade alone, the
EU has provided about 7.5 billion euros in official development assistance to China. 239
Thus, there are no empirical arguments to say that the EU is declining. Nor are there arguments
to suggest that it is doomed to decline in the future. Critics often portray Europe as an old and
outdated continent that must resign itself to accommodating its inevitable decline to the new
RESILIENT EU2030 CONCLUSIONS: A COMPETITIVE EUROPE FOR A PROSPEROUS WORLD 54

global order that the US and China will create and dominate. However, data reveal a very different
reality, showing that, despite its many weaknesses and vulnerabilities, the EU remains one of
the most socially-advanced places in the world and one of its economic and geopolitical
powerhouses.
The EU is the world’s third-largest economy, accounting for 15% of global GDP, slightly behind
the US (15.7%) and China (18.6%) – which has three times its population. 240 This is partly due to
the fact that the EU is the largest global trading entity in both manufactured goods and services,
acting as the top trading partner for half of the world's countries. 241
Main trading partner (by value of exports and imports in goods and services), 2020
EU
China
US
EU China US Source: UNCTAD242
Europeans often complain about the excesses of the bureaucracy of its institutions and how
this discourages investment. And they are right. But still, we must be doing something right
when the EU is the main recipient of foreign direct investment in the world, with 28% of total
global FDI. 243 Likewise, the EU is the world’s largest investor. All outward FDI stocks from the EU
reach 34% of world stocks of outward FDI whereas China has a share of 6% and the US a share of
21%.244
In terms of business, the EU also holds a position of global strength. It only hosts 8% of the
world's unicorns and 8% of the largest companies by market capitalisation. 245 But it has global
champions in key industries such as automotive, pharma, biotech, banking, infrastructure, retail,
renewable energy and telecommunications, and one of the most dynamic and competitive
SME ecosystems on the planet. 246 And, if we can draw a lesson from the experiences of the
Covid pandemic and the war in Ukraine, it is that the European business fabric is far more
resilient and adaptable than we often presume.
Beyond strictly economic aspects, the EU also holds a position of great strength in many of the
areas that will determine the development of nations in the future. In terms of human capital,

the EU workforce is one of the most qualified in the world, surpassing the US and China. 247 It is
also one of the most productive, with GDP output per worker of $98,000, slightly lower than the
figure for the US, but above the OECD average ($96,600) and almost three times the figure for
China ($33,300). 248
In terms of innovation, the EU is lagging behind in some crucial areas, as has been discussed.
However, it has the second most powerful regional innovation ecosystem in the world (56.5),
trailing behind the US (61.8) but ahead of China (55.3). 249 In fact, more than half of the top 20
countries with a higher economic complexity are European Member States. 250 While American
and Chinese companies have the upper hand in sectors such as AI and cloud services, the EU
maintains its global leadership in other cutting-edge sectors, such as industrial robotics,
quantum research, next-gen materials and future cleantech. 251
The EU also stands out for the quality of its institutions. European Member States often top
global rankings in regulatory quality, political stability, rule of law, accountability, transparency,
the digitalisation of public authorities and government effectiveness, with scores consistently
higher than those of the US and China. 252 Moreover, the EU often plays a leading role in the
setting of new international rules and standards, thereby shaping the functioning of global
economics. 253
The EU is also recognised as the least unequal region of the world, according to various
indicators. 254 This is fundamental because a better distribution of opportunities and lower
inequality ultimately lead to higher growth, increased productivity, more dynamism and greater
stability. 255
Finally, the EU stands as the most environmentally-sustainable region on the planet, with an
Environmental Performance Index (EPI) score of 59.9 – significantly higher than that of the US
(51.1) and China (28.4). 256 Among other reasons, this is due to the fact that the EU is decarbonising
its economy faster than other regions and leading in areas such as organic farming, renewable
energy and clean mobility. 257 In the future, the regions that will thrive the most will be those that
can grow within the planetary boundaries, and today, the EU is the one that is closest to achieving
that goal.
In conclusion, the EU is far more competitive than is often assumed. It does have significant
vulnerabilities. Some of them are so systemic that, if left unattended, they could seriously
hamper the welfare and freedom of its citizens. But the evidence discussed in this non-paper
shows that the EU has everything it takes to overcome such vulnerabilities and create a more
competitive, sustainable and resilient economy in this decade. This includes a robust
industrial base, high-quality research, skilled workers, top-notch infrastructures, clean and
affordable energy, advanced circularity systems and a leading position in global trade and
multilateral organisations. Now is the time to mobilise and scale up these capacities in a
coordinated fashion to ensure the EU's economic security and technological and trade
leadership by 2030.

EU, US and China in data
EU China US
GDP (share of world, %)

15 16 19
Net national income per capita (in US dollars)

7,439 25,277 49,410
Trade (exports and imports, % GDP)

26 30 38
FDI Inward (world stocks, %)

5 26 29
FDI Outward (world stocks, %)

6 21 34
Labour productivity (GDP per hour worked)

14 53 71
Human capital (0-1 index)

0.65 0.70 0.73
Research & Development (% GDP)

2.4 3.3 3.4
Global innovation (0-100 index)

55 57 62
Economic complexity score (-3 to 3 index)

1.1 1.3 1.5
Democracy (1-10 index)

1.9 7.8 7.9

Rule of Law (1-10 index)
4.7 7.0 7.3
Government effectiveness (1-100 index)

76 80 88
Digital Government (0-1 index)

0.66 0.76 0.80
Voice and accountability (1-100 index)

5 75 83
Inequality (share net personal wealth: top 1%)

0.26 0.33 0.35
Environmental performance (1-100 index)

28 51 60
Renewable energy (% of electricity capacity)

30 45 81
Agricultural land organic farming (% of total)

0.5 0.6 9
Various sources.258 Dates range from 2020 to 2022
This non-paper has suggested a number of principles and actions to achieve this goal. Ultimately,
its many ideas can be summarised in five priorities of equal importance:
1. Internal production: The times of unchecked, cost-driven offshoring are over. The EU
needs more factories and more businesses within its territory. And governments and the
private sector must collaborate to make this possible. This industrial effort, however, needs
to be targeted and smart. It should be effectively coordinated at an EU level and it should be
aimed at developing those goods and services with high added value in which the EU a)
already possesses a competitive edge, b) has the potential to establish itself as a global
frontrunner, or c) needs to have a minimum level of capacity to guarantee its future
economic security. In this regard, a special priority should be given to the production of AI
systems, cutting-edge semiconductors, data servers and transmission networks, renewable
energies systems, electrolysers, electric motors, new batteries, innovative pharmaceuticals,
APIs, organic fertilisers and alternative sources of protein for animal feed, among others.

2. Integration: To ensure its economic security and global leadership, the EU will have to
make concrete and substantial progress towards greater integration. This includes the
completion of a resilient, enhanced and fully functioning Single Market that acts as a "base
camp" for EU companies in the face of international competition, but also progress in areas
such as digital services, AI, the capital markets union and the energy union. The interests
and sovereignty of Member States must always be respected. But they should be
coordinated so that they do not undermine Europe's unity or strength. 259
3. Innovation: The solutions that the EU needs do not lie in the past, but in the future. Member
States should not replace many of the goods, services and raw materials that they currently
import from abroad with equivalents produced domestically or in other foreign countries,
but with those new and more available, competitive and sustainable alternatives that
science has to offer. To achieve this, a decisive commitment to R&D and the adoption of
new technologies and organisational forms in compliance with the precautionary principle
will be paramount. Supporting further capacity-building in areas like new infrastructure
and skills will also be essential.
4. Internationalisation: The best way to ensure the EU’s economic security is not by closing
itself off from the global economy, but by increasing its participation and leadership. To
achieve this, the EU should deploy a threefold strategy. First, it should foster the enhancement
of the multilateral system and the strengthening of those binding mechanisms that help
address non-compliance, resolve disputes and enforce global rules. Second, the EU should
launch a new trade expansion aimed at rebalancing, diversifying, revamping and increasing
its economic relationships, especially in the Atlantic basin. This trade effort should be based
on the principles of openness, sustainability and assertiveness, and it should have a primary
focus on like-minded partners like Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea,
the US, and the Balkans and Eastern European countries, but also other low- and middle-
income countries in Latin America, Africa and Asia. Third, the EU should reinforce its
capacity to act swiftly and robustly as a geopolitical entity. This includes the ability to protect
its global supply chains, neutralise and respond to hybrid threats, and shape the economic
environment of external actors that threaten its security.
5. Inner confidence: The world has changed much over the past decades, and yet Europe has
remained a leading power. Imagining an EU in 2030 with top-tier technological companies,
non-polluting and affordable energy, high-quality medical care, affordable and nutritious
food, higher incomes and better standards of living is not naïve or delusional — it is simply
recognising that the progress that has been ongoing for the past 200 years will not stop
now. The future of the EU is not to prevent its decline; it is to lead a new era of global prosperity.

RESILIENT EU2030 60
ENDNOTES
A changing geopolitical landscape
1
This project was conducted in close coordination with the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) and Chips and Science Act,
European Commission and the making of its new 2023 Japan’s ban on Russia, India’s ban on wheat exports, Russia’s
Strategic Foresight Report. exports restrictions on raw materials. Lastly, the US-China
trade war is the most extreme scenario. For more details on
2
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The degree of trade openness, measured as the import and
9
Gunnella, Vanessa, and Lucia Quaglietti. The economic impli- export value over the world’s GDP, has been stable and close to
cations of rising protectionism: a euro area and global per- the level of 57% over the last decade. Over the period from 2011
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europa.eu/media/54773/20220311-versailles-declaration-en. Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions. Step-
pdf. ping up Europe’s 2030 climate ambition. Investing in a cli-
mate-neutral future for the benefit of our people. COM(2020)
52
Joint Communication to the European Parliament, the 562 final. European Commission, 17 September 2020, https://
European Council and the Council on “European Economic eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX-
Security Strategy”. 20 June 2023, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/ :52020DC0562; Carrara, Samuel et al. Supply chain analysis
legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52023JC0020. and material demand forecast in strategic technologies and
sectors in the EU–A foresight study. Joint Research Centre,
53
Both the ECB and the OECD estimated that the economic
March 2023, doi:10.2760/334074, JRC132889.
cost of the invasion of Ukraine for the euro area would range
from 1.2 pp to 1.4 pp of GDP in 2022. For more details, see Mac- 57
Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on
roeconomic projections for the euro area. European Central the promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources.
Bank, 2022, https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/projections/html/ DIRECTIVE (EU) 2018/2002. European Union, 11 December
ecb.projections202203_ecbstaff~44f998dfd7.en.html#toc1; 2018, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PD-
OECD Economic Outlook. Economic and social impacts and F/?uri=CELEX:32018L2001&from=EN; Communication from
policy implications of the war in Ukraine, OECD, March 2022, the Commission to the European Parliament, the European
doi:10.1787/4181d61b-en. Council, the Council, the European Economic and Social Com-
mittee and the Committee of the Regions. REPowerEU Plan.
54
Based on an analysis of external trade flows for over 5,000
COM(2022) 230 final, 18 May 2022, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/
products and the work of the EC and the ECB, we have identified
resource.html?uri=cellar:fc930f14-d7ae-11ec-a95f-01aa75e-
323 specific products that are associated with highly sensitive
d71a1.0001.02/DOC_1&format=PDF.
ecosystems in the fields of energy, health, digital technologies
and agrifood. To assess these dependencies, we have 58
Carrara, Samuel et al. Supply chain analysis and material
calculated three key dependency indicators. The first indicator demand forecast in strategic technologies and sectors in the
measures the level of diversification, focusing on products EU–A foresight study. Joint Research Centre, March 2023.
doi:10.2760/334074, JRC132889.

59
Ibid. https://www.ceps.eu/ceps-publications/hidden-treasures/.
60
Ibid. 70
Digital commerce: The rest of the amount spent is divided
between the US leaders - Amazon (36%) and eBay (18%) - and
61
Ibid. other non-EU companies (21%). Digital payments: Approxi-
mately, 90% of the EU digital payments market is in the hands
Muench, Stefan et al. Towards a green & digital future. Joint
62
of Mastercard and Visa, US companies, without a serious Euro-
Research Centre, June 2022, doi:10.2760/977331.
pean alternative. For more details, see Cashless talk. The Econ-
63
For more details, see European Chips Survey Report. Direc- omist, May 2023, https://www.economist.com/special-re-
torate-General for Internal Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship port/2023-05-20; Top 100 Marketplaces in Europe: Annual
and SMEs and Directorate-General for the Joint Research Ranking 2022. “Cross-Border Commerce Europe, 22 Septem-
Centre, July 2022, https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/li- ber 2022, https://bit.ly/3rACnom. Press release; "The most out
brary/european-chips-survey; Van Wieringen, Kjeld. Strength- of the digital-payments boom”, The Economist, 3 October
ening EU chip capabilities: How will the chips act reinforce Eu- 2020, https://econ.st/3OmUYgj.
rope's semiconductor sector by 2030? European 71
In 2019, 67 of the global leading 500 cybersecurity firms were
Parliamentary Research Service, July 2022, https://www.eu-
EU-based cybersecurity companies. While many companies
roparl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2022/733585/EPRS_
with high growth have their representative offices in the Europe-
BRI(2022)733585_EN.pdf.
an Union, the vast majority of these companies are not headquar-
64
Ioannou, Demosthenes et al. The EU's Open Strategic tered there. See: McDonaugh, Brendan et al, European Cyberse-
Autonomy from a central banking perspective. Challenges to curity Investment Platform. European Commission and European
the monetary policy landscape from a changing geopolitical Investment Bank, 2022, https://www.eib.org/attachments/lu-
environment. European Central Bank, March 2023, https:// calli/20220206-european-cybersecurity-investment-plat-
www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/scpops/ecb.op311~5065ff588c. form-en.pdf; Candelon, François et al. Can Europe Catch Up with
en.pdf. the US (and China) in Quantum Computing? Boston Consulting
Group, 2022, https://www.bcg.com/publications/2022/can-eu-
65
Ciani, Andrea and Michela Nardo. The position of the EU in rope-catch-up-in-quantum-computer-race.
the semiconductor value chain: evidence on trade, foreign ac-
quisitions, and ownership. Joint Research Centre, 2022, https://
72
Riekeles, Georg, E. Quantum technologies and value chains:
joint-research-centre.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2022-04/ Why and how Europe must act now. European Policy Centre,
JRC129035.pdf. March 2023, https://www.epc.eu/content/PDF/2023/Quan-
tum_Technologies_DP.pdf.
66
Artificial Intelligence Market Size, Share & Trends Analysis
Report By Solution, By Technology (Deep Learning, Machine
73
Learning), By End-use, By Region, And Segment Forecasts, demand forecast in strategic technologies and sectors in the
2023 - 2030. Grand View Research, 2023, https://www.grand- EU–A foresight study. Joint Research Centre, March 2023,
viewresearch.com/industry-analysis/artificial-intelli- doi:10.2760/334074, JRC132889.
gence-ai-market/methodology.
Grohol, Milan and Veeh, Constanze. Study on the Critical Raw
74
67
Statista. Revenues from the artificial intelligence software Materials for the EU 2023, Directorate-General for Internal
market worldwide from 2018 to 2025, by region, https://www. Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship and SMEs, 2023.
statista.com/statistics/721747/worldwide-artificial-intelli- doi:10.2873/725585.
gence-market-by-region/; Della Porta, Maria Rosaria. “The po- 75
tential of AI and the position of the EU in the AI race”. Pro-
demand forecast in strategic technologies and sectors in the
methEUs, September 2021, https://www.prometheusnetwork.
EU–A foresight study. Joint Research Centre, March 2023.
eu/blog/ai-global-race/. Blog; Zhang, Daniel et al. The AI Index
doi:10.2760/334074, JRC132889.
2021 Annual Report. Stanford’s Institute for Human-Centered
Artificial Intelligence, 2021, doi:10.48550/arXiv.2103.06312; Pro- 76
Mineral Commodity Summaries 2023. United States
posal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Geological Survey, January 2023, doi:10.3133/mcs2023.
Council on laying down harmonised rules on artificial intelli-
gence. COM(2021) 206 final. European Union, 21 April 2021, 77
The European compound feed industry is also heavily
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTM- dependent on imports from China for some additives and
L/?uri=CELEX:52021PC0206. vitamins such as biotin, folic acid and pyridoxine. Furthermore,
amino acids like lysine, and other enzymes, antioxidants and
68
“Europe’s Digital Decade: digital targets for 2030”, European prebiotics and probiotics are also mainly produced outside the
Commission, 2023; https://commission.europa.eu/strate- EU. For more details, see Shurson et al. “Understanding the
gy-and-policy/priorities-2019-2024/europe-fit-digital-age/eu- vitamin supply chain and relative risk of transmission of foreign
ropes-digital-decade-digital-targets-2030_en. animal diseases.” University of Minnesota, 2019, pp. 1-50,
https://hdl.handle.net/11299/220189.
69
Synergy Research Group. European Cloud Providers Contin-
ue to Grow but Still Lose Market Share”, 2022, https://www.sr- Albadalejo Román, Antonio. EU feed autonomy: Closing the
78
gresearch.com/articles/european-cloud-providers-continue- gaps in European food security. European Parliamentary

to-grow-but-still-lose-market-share; Klaff, Donald, and Andrea Research Service, February 2023, https://www.europarl.
Renda. Hidden Treasures. Mapping Europe’s sources of com- europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2023/739328/EPRS_
petitive advantage in doing business. CEPS Paperback 2019, BRI(2023)739328_EN.pdf.

79
For more details, see Mario, N. et al. Co-ordinated approach 82
For more details on the Council of the European Union’s defi-
to the development and supply of radionuclides in the EU. Final nition of Open Strategic Autonomy, see Council Conclusions
report. European Commission, Directorate-General for Energy, on implementing the EU global strategy in the area of security
August 2021, doi:10.2833/120792; Euratom Supply Agency. and defence. CFSP/PESC 906, 14 November 2016, https://
“Supply of medical radioisotopes”, 2023, https://euratom- www.consilium.europa.eu/media/22459/eugsconclu-
supply.ec.europa.eu/activities/supply-medical-radioisotopes_ sions-st14149en16.pdf. Two of the most salient and up-to-date
en; International Panel on Fissile Materials. “Materials: Highly definitions of OSA are the ones contained in the European
enriched uranium”, 2022, https://fissilematerials.org/materials/ Commission’s Industrial Strategy and the European Commis-
heu.html. sion’s Trade Policy Review. For more details on the European
Commission’s Industrial Strategy, see Commission Staff Work-
80
Study supporting the impact assessment of the revision of ing Document. Strategic dependencies and capacities.
Directive 2002/98/EC on safety and quality of human blood SWD(2021) 352 final, 5 May 2021, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/le-
and blood components and of Directive 2004/23/EC on safety gal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52021SC0352. For more
and quality of human tissues and cells and of their implementing details on the European Commission’s Trade Policy Review, see
acts. Final report. European Health and Digital Executive Communication from the Commission to the European Parlia-
Agency, January 2022, doi:10.2925/057450. Allied Market ment, the European Council, the Council, the European Eco-
Research. Blood Plasma Derivatives Market by Product Type nomic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Re-
and User End, 2021, https://www.alliedmarketresearch.com/ gions. Trade Policy Review: An open, sustainable and assertive
blood-plasma-derivatives-market. trade policy. COM(2021) 66 final, 18 February 2021, https://eur-
l e x . e u ro p a . e u / l e g a l - c o n t e n t / E N / T X T/ ? u r i = C E L E X-
Where do our active pharmaceutical ingredients come from? A
81
%3A52021DC0066.
world map of API production. Pro Generika, September 2020.
https://progenerika.de/app/uploads/2020/11/API-Study_long-
version_EN.pdf; Executive summary. EU fine chemical
commercial KPI, IQVIA, December 2020, https://efcg.cefic.org/
wp-content/uploads/2021/06/20201211_IQVIA-for-EFCG_
Executive-summary.pdf.
Bolstering and securing internal production capacities
83
The listed priorities are not, of course, set in stone. They will Connecting Europe’s Facility - CEF digital, 2023, https://
have to be reviewed and updated in the future based on new digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/activities/cef-digital
technological developments and changes in the international
context.
88
For more details, see European Commission. European
Chips Act, 2023, https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-
84
Carrara, Samuel et al. Supply chain analysis and material and-policy/priorities-2019-2024/europe-fit-digital-age/
demand forecast in strategic technologies and sectors in the european-chips-act_en; Carrara, Samuel et al. Supply chain
EU–A foresight study. Joint Research Centre, March 2023. analysis and material demand forecast in strategic
https://publications.jrc.ec.europa.eu/repository/handle/ technologies and sectors in the EU–A foresight study. Joint
JRC132889. Research Centre, March 2023. doi:10.2760/334074,
JRC132889.
85
In 2021, the energy consumed in the EU consisted of 70%
fossil fuels, 17% renewables and 13% nuclear (Eurostat, 2023 ). 89
“The case for an EU AI Agency.” European Digital SME
According to projections made by the Joint Research Centre, Alliance, 5 December 2022, https://www.digitalsme.eu/the-
being aligned with the Paris Agreement by 2030 would mean case-for-an-eu-ai-agency/. Press release.
having an energy mix consisting of 43% of renewables
sources, 6% of nuclear and 51% of fossil fuels. See: Eurostat.
90
European Commission. Shaping Europe’s digital future:
Simplified energy balances [NRG_BAL_S], https://ec.europa. quantum, 2023, https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/
e u /e u r o s t a t /d a t a b r o w s e r/v i e w/ N R G _ B A L _ S _ _ policies/quantum.
custom_1946578/bookmark/table?lang=en&bookmarkId=8
At least 10% of the EU’s annual consumption for extraction
91
760d5fb-bdbe-4cfe-9b79-c0dc3eaafe8f, and Global Energy
and at least 40% of the EU’s annual consumption for
and Climate Outlook 2022: Energy trade in a decarbonised
processing. For more details, see “Critical Raw Materials:
world. Joint Research Centre, December 2022.
ensuring secure and sustainable supply chains for EU's green
doi:10.2760/863694.
and digital future.” Press corner, European Commission, 16
86
European Commission. Shaping Europe’s digital future: March 2023, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/
Green Cloud and Green data centers, 2022, https://digital- detail/en/ip_23_1661. Press release.
strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/green-cloud. 92
While the EU’s exploration budget is increasing, it remains
87
European Commission. Shaping Europe’s digital future: very low compared with other world regions, accounting for
about 2% to 3% of global exploration expenditure in 2010-

2022, while the European continent represents around 7% of 96
Soy production is expected to grow by an impressive 33%
the Earth’s landmass (Finland, Sweden and Spain accounted compared with 3% for rapeseed. In fact, in 2032, the area for
for 50% of total spending). For more details, see European protein crops is expected to grow by 34% (to 2.8 million ha),
Union, European Commission. Proposal for a Regulation of and the EU will reach 4.02% of its land devoted to vegetable
the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a proteins (it is currently 3%). For more details, see EU
framework for ensuring a secure and sustainable supply of agricultural outlook, for markets, income and environment
critical raw materials and amending Regulations (EU) 2022-2032. European Commission, December 2022. https://
168/2013, (EU) 2018/858, 2018/1724 and (EU) 2019/1020. agriculture.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2023-04/agricultural-
SWD(2023) 161 final. European Commission, 16 March 2023, outlook-2022-report_en_0.pdf.
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PD-
F/?uri=CELEX:52023SC0161.
97
The CAP supports the cultivation of leguminous crops to re-
duce the EU’s dependency on imports of plant proteins for
93
For more details, see European Raw Material Alliance. 2023, feed, see Common Agricultural Policy for 2023-2027. 28 CAP
https://erma.eu/; Carrara, Samuel et al. Supply chain analysis strategic plans at a glance. European Commission, December
and material demand forecast in strategic technologies and 2022, p. 3. https://agriculture.ec.europa.eu/system/
sectors in the EU–A foresight study. Joint Research Centre, files/2022-12/csp-at-a-glance-eu-countries_en.pdf. See also,
March 2023. https://publications.jrc.ec.europa.eu/repository/ European Commission, Report from the Commission to the
handle/JRC132889. Council and the European Parliament on the development of
plant proteins in the European Union, November 2018. https://
94
Currently organic farming represents 9% of the EU’s crops. eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX-
Assuming this, we can expect that 91% of the rest of the crops :52018DC0757.
use any type of mineral fertiliser. If the EU reaches the target
of 25% of organic agriculture by 2030, the use of chemical 98
Currently, organic farming and animal production have a
fertilisers would be reduced but would still represent 75% of relatively low presence in Europe. In 2020, approximately 6%
total manure. As regards chemical fertilisers, we expect an in- of the cattle herd and 7.2% of sheep and goat flocks were
crease of 2% in Potash fertilisers and a reduction of 1% and estimated to be raised organically, while for poultry and pigs,
4% in Phosphate and Nitrogen fertilisers, respectively, until the figures were 3.6% and 1% respectively. Extensive grass-
2032. For more details regarding the target of reducing the fed systems for cattle, sheep and goats can be easier and
use of fertilisers, see Farm to fork strategy. For a fair, healthy cheaper to convert into organic produce. For more details,
and environmentally-friendly food system. European Com- see Organic Farming in the EU. A decade of organic growth.
mission, May 2020. https://ec.europa.eu/food/system/ European Commission, January 2023. https://agriculture.ec.
files/2020-05/f2f_action-plan_2020_strategy-info_en.pdf. europa.eu/system/files/2023-04/agri-market-brief-20-
For more details regarding the use of chemical fertilisers, see organic-farming-eu_en.pdf.
Forecast of food, farming & fertiliser use in the European
Union 2022-2032. Fertilisers Europe, December 2022, https://
99
The industry has expressed concerns about potential dis-
www.fertiliserseurope.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/ ruptions in the future, primarily stemming from Asian suppli-
Forecast-2022-32.pdf. ers due to unforeseen closures of production units, new envi-
ronmental regulations and shortages of precursor materials
95
As part of the From Farm to Fork strategy, the European required for API production. Following the Pharmaceutical
Commission aims to see a reduction in nutrient losses of at Strategy, various efforts have been made to produce an EU-
least 50%, which implies a reduction in fertiliser use of at least wide list of critical medicines, to allow for the identification of
20%. In addition, the EU Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) supply chain vulnerabilities and assess the EU’s manufactur-
provides direct green payments of up to 30% of the budget to ing capacities. Also in line with the recommendations provid-
farmers to support sustainable farming. For more details reed by the EC's SWD Structured Dialogue on the Security of
garding the target of reducing the use of fertilisers, see Farm Medicines Supply, and with the proposal for the reform of
to fork strategy. For a fair, healthy and environmentally-friendly pharmaceutical legislation, the HMA EMA Task Force on Avail-
food system. European Commission, May 2020. https://ec.eu- ability of Authorised Medicines will develop a list of critical
ropa.eu/food/system/files/2020-05/f2f_action-plan_2020_ medicines to EU Health Systems. In addition, the EMA has al-
strategy-info_en.pdf. For more details regarding organic fer- ready defined a list of the main therapeutic groups for crisis
tilisers, see Altman, Marina. Biofertilizers 2021. S&P Global, preparedness, and HERA is working on a list of medical
April 2021, https://www.spglobal.com/commodityinsights/en/ countermeasures for stockpiling. For more details on the
ci/research-analysis/biofertilizers-2021.html. For more details Pharmaceutical Strategy, see Pharmaceutical Strategy for
regarding the CAP measures to incentivise sustainable agri- Europe. European Commission, November 2020, https://
cultural practices, see European Commission. The common health.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2022-10/mp_vulnerabili-
agricultural policy: 2023-27, https://agriculture.ec.europa.eu/ ties_global-supply_swd_en.pdf. For more details on the
common-agricultural-policy/cap-overview/cap-2023-27_en; Structured Dialogue, see European Commission. Commis-
European Commission, Sustainable land use (greening), sion Staff Working Document. Vulnerabilities of the Global
https://agriculture.ec.europa.eu/common-agricultural-policy/ Supply Chains of Medicines. Structured Dialogue on the Se-
income-support/greening_en. For more information regard- curity of Medicines Supply. European Commission, October
ing the industry of organic fertilisers in the EU, see Markets 2022, https://health.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2022-10/mp_
and Markets. Biofertilizers Market Overview, https://www.mar- vulnerabilities_global-supply_swd_en.pdf. For more details
ketsandmarkets.com/Market-Reports/compound-biofer- on the reform of pharmaceutical legislation, see Communica-
tilisers-customized-fertilisers-market-856.html. tion from the Commission to the European Parliament, the
European Council, the Council, the European Economic and

Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions. Reform demand forecast in strategic technologies and sectors in the
of the pharmaceutical legislation and measures addressing EU–A foresight study. Joint Research Centre, March 2023.
antimicrobial resistance. COM(2023) 190 final. European doi:10.2760/334074, JRC132889.
Commission, 26 April 2023, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/le-
gal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52023DC0190. European Commission. Recommendation on Energy Stor-
108
age. Underpinning a decarbonised and secure EU energy

100
Pharmaceutical Strategy for Europe. European Commis- system, 2023/C 103/01, European Commission, 20 March
sion, 2020. https://health.ec.europa.eu/system/ 2023, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PD-
files/2021-02/pharma-strategy_report_en_0.pdf. Communi- F/?uri=CELEX:32023H0320(01)&from=EN
cation from the Commission to the European Parliament, the
European Council, the Council, the European Economic and
109
The Net Zero Industry Act sets an EU target to reach an
Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions. Reform annual 50Mt injection capacity in strategic CO2 storage sites
of the pharmaceutical legislation and measures addressing in the EU by 2030, with proportional contributions from EU oil
antimicrobial resistance. COM(2023) 190 final, European and gas producers. For more details, see “Net-Zero Industry
Commission, 26 April 2023, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/le- Act: Making the EU the home of clean technologies
gal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52023DC0190. manufacturing and green jobs.” European Commission, 16
March 2023, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/
It is worth noting that most of the innovative APIs that meet
101
detail/en/IP_23_1665. Press release.
stringent environmental, safety and quality standards are still
manufactured in Europe. For more details on the reform of
110
European Commission. European Chips Act, 2023, https://
pharmaceutical legislation, see Communication from the c o m m i s s i o n . e u ro p a . e u /s t r a t e g y - a n d - p o l i c y/p r i o r i -
Commission to the European Parliament, the European ties-2019-2024/europe-fit-digital-age/european-chips-act_
Council, the Council, the European Economic and Social en; Carrara, Samuel et al. Supply chain analysis and material
Committee and the Committee of the Regions. Reform of the demand forecast in strategic technologies and sectors in the
pharmaceutical legislation and measures addressing EU–A foresight study. Joint Research Centre, March 2023.
antimicrobial resistance. COM(2023) 190 final. European doi:10.2760/334074, JRC132889.
Commission, 26 April 2023, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal- 111
European Commission. The European Quantum
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52023DC0190.
Communication Infrastructure (EuroQCI) Initiative, 2023,
102
EU Fine Chemical Commercial KPI. Executive Summary. https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/european-
IQVIA, 2020, https://efcg.cefic.org/wp-content/up- quantum-communication-infrastructure-euroqci.
loads/2021/06/20201211_IQVIA-for-EFCG_Executive-sum-
112
mary.pdf.
demand forecast in strategic technologies and sectors in the
For more details, see European Commission. SAMIRA
103 EU–A foresight study. Joint Research Centre, March 2023.
Action Plan, 2021, https://energy.ec.europa.eu/topics/ doi:10.2760/334074, JRC132889.
nuclear-energy/radiological-and-nuclear-technology-
These technologies, utilising movable and semi-permeable
113
health/samira-action-plan_en.
membranes, create an enclosed space for composting that
104
The Europe 2020 strategy established an R&D investment allows essential molecules to pass through while blocking
target of 3% of GDP. For more details, see Europe 2020: A odorous substances like ammonia. This breakthrough
strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth. reduces environmental nuisances, shortens processing
COM(2010) 2020. European Commission, 3 March 2010. times, and improves overall organic manure production. As
https://bit.ly/3Ong8Lr. these technologies evolve, they have significant potential to
enhance agricultural sustainability and contribute to a circular
For more details, see Communication from the Commission
105
economy. Regarding sludge and fertilisers, see Santos,
to the European Parliament, the European Council, the Andreia F. et al. “From wastewater to fertiliser products:
Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and Alternative paths to mitigate phosphorus demand in
the Committee of the Regions. A New Industrial Strategy for European countries”. Chemosphere, 2021, vol. 284, p. 131-258.
Europe. COM(2020) 102 final. European Commission, 10 doi:10.1016/j.chemosphere.2021.131258.
March 2020, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/
T X T/ P D F/ ? u r i = C E L E X : 5 2 0 2 0 D C 0 1 0 2 & f r o m = E N ; European Commission. The future of farming is here, 2023,
114
Communication the Commission to the European Parliament, https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/fu-

the European Council, the Council, the European Economic ture-farming.
and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions. A
EFPIA Pipeline Innovation Review. IQVIA, August 2022,
115
New European Innovation Agenda. COM(2022) 332 final.
https://www.efpia.eu/media/676661/iqvia_efpia-pipeline-
European Commission, 5 July 2022, https://eur-lex.europa.
review_final-report_public-final.pdf. Regenerative Medicine:
eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52022DC0332.
The Pipeline Momentum Builds. Alliance for Regenerative
106 Medicine, September 2022, http://alliancerm.org/wp-
demand forecast in strategic technologies and sectors in the content/uploads/2022/10/ARM-H1-2022-R13.pdf.
EU–A foresight study. Joint Research Centre, March 2023. 116
Hoekman, Bernard and Nelson Douglas. “Rethinking
doi:10.2760/334074, JRC132889.
international subsidy rules.” The World Economy, vol. 43, no.
107
Carrara, Samuel et al. Supply chain analysis and material 12, 2020, pp. 3104-3132, doi:10.1111/twec.13022. Ioannou,

Demosthenes et al. The EU's Open Strategic Autonomy from Research Centre, European Commission, November 2021,
a central banking perspective. Challenges to the monetary doi:10.2760/07981.
policy landscape from a changing geopolitical environment.
European Central Bank, March 2023, https://www.ecb.
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183 193
We assume the same consumption of animal feed in the
www.sckcen.be/en/infrastructure/recumo. 2030 horizon. In this regard, 9 million tonnes of algae and
insects in 2030 amounts to 2% of the current 450 million tonnes
184
Effectiveness of environmental taxes and charges for of animal feed consumed in the EU. See: “Animal Feed.”
managing sand, gravel and rock extraction in selected EU European Commission, 2023, https://food.ec.europa.eu/safety/
countries. European Environment Agency, June 2008, https:// animal-feed_en.
www.eea.europa.eu/publications/eea_report_2008_2. Project
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194
The result of between 40,000 and 63,000 new jobs in 2030
“Circular Economy Action Plan.” European Commission, 2021, in the algae and insects for animal feed sector is obtained by the
https://environment.ec.europa.eu/strategy/circular-economy- sum of 25,000 direct jobs in the insect sector for animal feed
action-plan_en. and among 15,000 and 38,000 new jobs in the algae sector.
Also, the economic revenue is the result of the sum of 2 billion
Ensuring that Polluters Pay. Deposit Refund Schemes.
185
euros from the insect industry plus 9.3 billion from the algae in-
European Commission, 2021, https://environment.ec.europa. dustry. Information on insects: Albaladejo-Román, Antonio. EU
eu/economy-and-finance/ensuring-polluters-pay_en. feed autonomy Closing the gaps in European food security. Eu-
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for a sustainable European future. Seaweed for Europe, Octo-
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ber 2020, pp. 1-60. https://www.seaweedeurope.com/wp-con-
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eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/fc373862-704d-11e8-
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Reinvigorating global trade and the multilateral system
195
Over 54% of today’s trade takes place within regions. In uploads/ABVII_US-China_Report-EN.pdf; EU Regional
2000, it was 57%. By 2030, that share could increase by 10 Communication Programme for the Eastern Neighbourhood.
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unlikely event, this would hardly mean a major transformation Belarus, Georgia, the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine”, 2022,
of the system or the fragmentation of the global economy. For https://euneighbourseast.eu/news/opinion-polls/opinion-
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200
It is worth noting that “most of the 17 rare earth minerals
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distributed, though they are expensive and polluting to mine
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Some examples are: World opinion on globalization and and produce”. A New World: The Geopolitics of the Energy
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Survey for the World Economic Forum. Ipsos, August 2021, f i l e s / i r e n a /a g e n c y/p u b l i c a t i o n / 2 0 1 9 / j a n /g l o b a l _
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201
content/uploads/2025/07/The-State-of-SEA-2023-Final- summing up the data available for each country in the report.
Digital-V4-09-Feb-2023.pdf. For the data of gallium reserves, the production capacity was
used as a proxy of the reserves. And, for the data on silicon
For more details, see Swanson, Ana. “Biden’s Reluctant
197
reserves, the production was used as a proxy of the reserves.
Approach to Free Trade Draws Backlash.” The New York Times, As for phosphorus, the figures were updated to take into
3 April 2023, https://www.nytimes.com/2023/04/03/us/ account the reserves recently found in Norway. (https://www.
politics/biden-free-trade.html; Stott, Michael. “US reluctance euractiv.com/section/energy-environment/news/great-
on trade deals sends Latin America towards China.” Financial news-eu-hails-discovery-of-massive-phosphate-rock-
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For more details, see Seaman, John et al. Dependence in
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See, for instance: What are Latin America’s perceptions on 203
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n u s o . o r g /d o w n l o a d s / W h a t - a r e - L a t i n - A m e r i c a s - assistance/taiex_en. For more details on the MAV+ initiative in
perceptions-on-the-European-Union-datanuso.pdf; Shikwati Africa, see European Commission. “Team Europe Initiative on
, James, Adero, Nashon and Juma Josephat. The Clash of manufacturing and access to vaccines, medicines and health
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al. The State of Southeast Asia: 2023 Survey Report. ISEAS- vaccines-medicines-and-health-technologies-africa_en. For
Yusof Ishak Institute, February 2023, https://www.iseas.edu. more details on the EU-LAC Digital Alliance, see European
sg/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/The-State-of-SEA-2023- Commission, “Global Gateway: EU, Latin America and
Final-Digital-V4-09-Feb-2023.pdf; Robbins, Michael. Public Caribbean partners launch in Colombia the EU-LAC Digital
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article/digital-diplomacy-how-to-unlock-the-global- third for EU exports. For more details, see Trade in goods with
gateways-potential-in-latin-america-and-the-caribbean/. China. European Commission, Director General for Trade,
ECFR. April 2023. https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/isdb_results/
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Communication from the Commission to the European
Parliament, the Council, the Economic and Social Committee
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European Commission. “EU trade relations with China.
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Open, Sustainable and Assertive Trade Policy. COM(2021) 66 trade.ec.europa.eu/eu-trade-relationships-country-and-
final. European Commission, 18 February 2021, https://eur-lex. region/countries-and-regions/china_en.
europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:5bf4e9d0-71d2-11eb-
Cagnin, Cristiano et al. Shaping and securing the EU’s Open
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9ac9-01aa75ed71a1.0001.02/DOC_1&format=PDF; Dennison,
Strategic Autonomy by 2040 and beyond. Joint Research
Susi, and Engström, Mats. “Decarbonisation nations: How EU
Centre, September 2021, doi:10.2760/414963.
climate diplomacy can save the world.” ECFR, 4 May 2023.
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216
eu-climate-diplomacy-can-save-the-world/. China 2025”), the 14th Five Year Plan, and the China Standards
2035. For more details on the EU's position, see European
205
Baldwin, Richard. “The peak globalisation myth: Services
Parliament Resolution on a new EU-China strategy.
trade did not peak.” Columns, 3 September 2022, https://
[2021/2037(INI)]. European Parliament, 2021, https://www.
cepr.org/voxeu/columns/peak-globalisation-myth-part-4-
europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-9-2021-0382_EN.
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The Future of EU Trade Policy: A programme for action, 217
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JOIN(2019) 5 final. European Commission, 2019, https://com-
rapporter/2020/the-future-of-eu-trade-policy.pdf.
mission.europa.eu/system/files/2019-03/communica-
207
SMEs represent 85% of the number of European export tion-eu-china-a-strategic-outlook.pdf.
firms and the share of export value traded by SMEs (10-249 218
Joint Communication to the European Parliament, the
employees) at the OECD equates to 27.5% out of the total in
European Council and the Council on “European Economic
2020. For more details, see Opinion of the European Economic
Security Strategy”. 20 June 2023, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/
and Social Committee on the Trade Policy Review - An Open,
legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52023JC0020.
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219
Committee, 8 July 2021, https://www.eesc.europa.eu/en/our- Member States belonging to the OECD. For more details, see
work/opinions-information-reports/opinions/trade-policy- OECD. Outward FDI stocks by partner country, https://data.
review-open-sustainable-and-assertive-trade-policy; OECD, oecd.org/fdi/outward-fdi-stocks-by-partner-country.
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ko m m e r s ko l l e g i u m . s e /g l o b a l a s s e t s /p u b l i k a t i o n e r/ region/countries-and-regions/china_en.
rapporter/2020/the-future-of-eu-trade-policy.pdf.
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232
For more details on the EU’s position on multi-level
224
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Conclusions: A competitive Europe for a prosperous world
234
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public opinion one year into Russia’s war on Ukraine”, European China for 52, and the US for 31, in 2020. UNCTAD STAT.
Power, 2023. https://ecfr.eu/publication/united-west-divided- International merchandise trade, 2020, https://unctadstat.
from-the-rest-global-public-opinion-one-year-into-russias- unctad.org/wds/ReportFolders/reportFolders.aspx.
war-on-ukraine/#fragmentation-v-polarisation-what-will-
define-the-next-world-order. European Council on Foreign Eurostat, This includes intra and extra EU investment. For
243
Relations. more details, see Key Figures on the EU in the World. 2023
edition, 2023, doi:10.2785/515035.
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Toynbee, Arnold J. A. Study of History. Volume I: Abridgement
of Volumes I-VI. Oxford Paperbacks, 1987. Eurostat, Key Figures on the EU in the World. 2023 edition,
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2023, doi:10.2785/515035.
236
“It is as if Europe, unlike other civilizations, had intuited that
it would one day collapse under the paradoxical weight of its
245
There are 102 unicorns based in the EU in 2023 (out of a to-
achievements and the unparalleled wealth and complication tal of 1,216 unicorns in the world). For more details, see “The
of its history.” See: Steiner, George. The idea of Europe: An Complete List of Unicorns”, CB Insights, 2023, https://www.
essay. Overlook Duckworth, 2015. cbinsights.com/research-unicorn-companies; “Global Top
100 companies - By market capitalisation”, PwC, 2022, https://
237
Income per capita has increased by 147% between 1970 www.pwc.com/gx/en/audit-services/publications/top100/
and 2021, measured as real GDP per capita in 2015. For more pwc-global-top-100-companies-by-market-capitalisa-
details, see World Bank. GDP per capita (constant 2015 US$) - tion-2022.pdf.
European Union, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.
GDP.PCAP.KD?locations=EU. Exports of goods and services,
246
According to The Global 2000 Ranking (2022), drawn up by
measured as a share of GDP, have increased by 31 pp between Forbes, 15 of the 100 largest companies in the world are based
1970 and 2021. For more details, see World Bank. Exports of in the EU. Some examples of major European companies in
goods and services (% of GDP) - European Union, https://data. strategic sectors include BNP Paribas and Santander
worldbank.org/indicator/NE.EXP.GNFS.ZS?locations=EU. Pat- (banking), Total and Equinor (petrochemicals), Sanofi
ent applications to EPO have increased by 634% between (pharmaceuticals), Deutsche Telekom (telecommunications),
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adult person, in constant 2021 euros, has increased by 87% 247
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The EU is the main trade partner by value of goods and market-share. Securing Europe’s competitiveness. Addressing

its technological gap, Synergy Research Group, McKinsey Yale Center for Environmental Law & Policy, “Environmental
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252
According to the World Bank’s government effectiveness
index, when compared with the US and China, the EU stands 257
Regarding decarbonisation, it should be highlighted that
out with a score of 83 on the voice and accountability indicator, 50% of installed electricity in Europe comes from renewables
the US 75 and China 5. A score of 80 on the government versus 41% in China and 25% in the United States. Moreover,
effectiveness indicator, the US 88 and China 76. A score of 82 European CO2 emissions are declining faster. In the period
on the regulatory quality indicator, the US 90 and China 31. A 2010-2019, they reduced by 6% on average whereas other ma-
score of 81 on the rule of law indicator, the US 89 and China 54. jor regions only reduced them by 5% (China) and 4.7% (US).
A score of 78 on the control of corruption indicator, the US 84 The EU is also the global leader in organic farming. It accounts
and China 54. In all of these indexes, Austria, Belgium, for more than 9% of the total agricultural land in the region
Germany, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Ireland, (while in the US and China it is only 0.6% and 0.5%, respective-
Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Sweden are all above the ly). For more details on electricity and emissions, see Securing
US and China. The political stability of the EU is outstanding, Europe’s competitiveness. Addressing its technological gap,
V-DEM scores the EU with 0.7, the US with 0.01 and China with McKinsey Global Institute, September 2022, https://bit.
-0.5 (-2.5 [low stability] to 2.5 [high stability]). According to the ly/43BqYle. For additional data on organic farming see Eu-
GovTech Maturity index, 21 out of the 27 EU countries (i.e. 78%) rostat. Developments in Organic Farming, 2020, https://ec.eu-
are above the US in the maturity of their digital administration. ropa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Devel-
The EU average is 0.8, compared with 0.76 for the US, and 0.66 opments_in_organic_farming; FiBL Statistics, “Data on
for China (range from 0 to 1). Luxembourg, Finland, Denmark, Organic Area in Worldwide”, 2021,
Netherlands, Sweden, Germany, Estonia and Ireland are well
above the US in the World Bank regulatory quality index, and
258
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all of the EU members are ranked above China. Finally, the EU World. 2023 edition, 2023, doi:10.2785/515035; World Bank.
sets international regulatory standards. For more details, see World Development Indicators, https://databank.worldbank.
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indicators”, Worldbank, 2021, https://info.worldbank.org/ bour Organization. Statistics on Labour Productivity, https://
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RESILIENT A future-oriented approach
to reinforce the EU’s
EU2030
Open Strategic Autonomy
and Global Leadership

Resilient Eu 2030

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RESILIENT

RESILIENT EU2030 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 3

RESILIENT EU2030 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 4

RESILIENT EU2030 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 5

FOREWORD BY THE SPANISH PRESIDENCY 09

A CHANGING GEOPOLITICAL LANDSCAPE 11

Aiming for the best: a renewed, open,

Preparing for the worst: managing dependency

The EU’s response: OSA. 22

BOLSTERING AND SECURING

1. Fostering domestic production of key goods,

ENHANCING CIRCULARITY AND SMART CONSUMPTION 37

4. Increasing resource efficiency. 38

REINVIGORATING GLOBAL TRADE

7. Launching a new trade expansion. 46

RESILIENT EU2030 FOREWORD 9

RESILIENT EU2030 FOREWORD 10

RESILIENT EU2030 A CHANGING GEOPOLITICAL LANDSCAPE 12

Furthermore, there is a lack of conclusive evidence supporting the notion of a widespread

World Trade Trade openness by region

65% 16% 110%

Intra-regional trade by area Average distance traversed

ASEAN RCEP 7 WTO regions

Source: UNCTAD and IAP20

RESILIENT EU2030 A CHANGING GEOPOLITICAL LANDSCAPE 13

RESILIENT EU2030 A CHANGING GEOPOLITICAL LANDSCAPE 14

RESILIENT EU2030 A CHANGING GEOPOLITICAL LANDSCAPE 15

RESILIENT EU2030 A CHANGING GEOPOLITICAL LANDSCAPE 16

RESILIENT EU2030 A CHANGING GEOPOLITICAL LANDSCAPE 17

Distribution of 323 dependent products across trade sectors (%)

Agricultural, fish and food products 37

Products of the chemical or allied industries 27

Mechanical appliances; electrical equipment 9

Precision & medical instruments 4

Plastics & rubber articles 2

Miscellaneous manufactured articles 1

Precious or semi-precious stones 1

RESILIENT EU2030 A CHANGING GEOPOLITICAL LANDSCAPE 18

Source: Own elaboration based on Arjona et. al., 2023.

It is impossible to quantitatively anticipate the future evolution of these dependencies,

Key enabling technologies

RESILIENT EU2030 A CHANGING GEOPOLITICAL LANDSCAPE 19

RESILIENT EU2030 A CHANGING GEOPOLITICAL LANDSCAPE 20

Raw materials and semi-processed goods

RESILIENT EU2030 A CHANGING GEOPOLITICAL LANDSCAPE 21

THE EU’S RESPONSE:

RESILIENT EU2030 A CHANGING GEOPOLITICAL LANDSCAPE 22

Bolstering and securing 1. Fostering domestic production of key goods, services

Enhancing circularity 4. Enhancing resource efficiency

Reinvigorating global 7. Launching a new trade expansion

The proposal is based on the following ideas:

RESILIENT EU2030 A CHANGING GEOPOLITICAL LANDSCAPE 23

Industrial Policy Single Market

New trade Innovation

RESILIENT EU2030 A CHANGING GEOPOLITICAL LANDSCAPE 24

• Fostering and scaling-up domestic production of key goods,

1. FOSTERING DOMESTIC PRODUCTION

RESILIENT EU2030 BOLSTERING AND SECURING INTERNAL PRODUCTION CAPACITIES 26

Enhancing Internal Capacity: Goods and Technologies

Competitive edge Potential to be Need to have a