Law and Ethics
Law and Ethics
Law and Ethics
1-7-1991
Recommended Citation
Menon, NR Madhava (1991) "Law and Ethics," National Law School Journal: Vol. 3: Iss. 1, Article 4.
Available at: https://repository.nls.ac.in/nlsj/vol3/iss1/4
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in National Law School Journal by an authorized editor of Scholarship Repository. For more information,
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(1991) 3 NLSJ 71
moral thought
Vedic law. In fact,
that itthe ideabirth
gave of Rta as moral
in later lawtoassumed
periods such aofdominant
the principles Dharma. influ~nce in
All ePics of
Hindu religion do contain infinite examples of the existence of good and evil invariably
leading to the ultimate victory of good over evil. Even the moral character of Gods and
Goddesses is depicted in relation to truth and virtue. This stream of ethical thought
developed through the Vedic period characterised the endeavours of ancient thinkers to
realize Rta in Nature.
The evolution of ethical notions in later periods as depicted in Smrithi (that which is
remembered) literature, particularly the Dharma Sastras teach general principles of Dharma
NLSJ-6
72 National Law School Journal
Modem law in many spheres has attempted to make fine distinctions between private
and public morality, indivi~ual and collective responsibility as well as different standards
of such responsibility. Certain set of values have been legislated as fundamental to the
governance of the society and are even incorporated as part of the basic structure of the
Constitution. Nevertheless, when it comes to individual behaviour, it comes down to the
sense of fairness and righteousness inherent in the level of moral consciousness of the
individual concerned. As such, no civilised society can now be structured without
developing its moral fibre and consciousness either through law, religion, education or
other instruments of social control.
The society evolved in Europe based on Christian ethics and the Natural Law
Philosophy of that period had an ethical theory based on the greatest good of the greatest
number of persons. Good was understood in this context as that which satisfies the
impulses of human nature. The ethics of that period has been predominantly utilitarian
and individualistic. It based all values relative to experience and self-realization. The
nature of polity, government and legal system were justified or opposed in relation to that
standard of ethics. A theory of basic human right and a set of principles founded on
democracy and limited government emerged out of the ethical theory which, in turn, led to
many political revolutions in Europe and elsewhere. The feudal structure of the society,
the absolute hold of organised religion on man, and the practice of slavery got transformed
in the process in many societies. The philosophy of public service and the emergence of
the so-called noble professions have added new dimensions to the ethics of the times.
In jurisprudence, the concepts of law, rights justice, sovereignty etc. were subjected
to fresh analysis and elucidation in the context of changing values and perceptions. The
,growth in education, communication and intellectual contacts at several levels provided
fresh inputs to the interaction between law, ethics and society. The rationalist and secular
movements and the advance of science and technology gave new meaning to concepts of
right and wrong, good and bad. Law distinguished from Justice, Natural Law distinguished
from positive law, and private morality distinguished from pubic morality, induced a type
of dualism in ethical theory which resulted in more problems than it could solve.
Whatever be the final outcome of this trend in different Societies, one thing is certain:
that standards of ethics in individuals or institutions will no more be taken for granted.
Law based on fear and punishment will have to assume a dominant role in regulating
conduct in the future, perhaps in all societies.
Law and Etbics 73
which all types of relatives of judges are allowed to build up roaring practice mainly on
the basis of contact and relatiol'lship, vitiating the purity of administration of justice.
Time and again, there was public outcry against the escalating cost of justice through
the court system. Despite this, many leaders of the profession have become notorious for
charging unconscionable fees wholly disproportionate to the services rendered. Rules of
court, prescribing the schedule of professional fees, are openly flouted with total impunity
and a situation has reached wherein quality legal services are now beyond the reach of the
majority of litigants in the country. It is indeed paradoxical that the legal system requires
the services of professional lawyers for its effective use and at the same time keeps such
services beyond the reach of the average man. Although normatively, the law is the same
for all citizens, functionally it varies according to the socio-economic status of the
persons involved. It is not that the person who needs the services most get them, but that
the person who can buy the best available legal talents get maximum services. People
living in the far-flung countryside and in locations geographically handicapped including
tribal areas have a whole range of unmet legal needs for which the existing professional
set-up has little relevance. The monopoly on legal practice granted to the profession has
accentuated the problem and marginalised a large section of Indian people in terms of
availability of legal services and access to justice. There is no scheme of legal aid
systematically administered by the private Bar and, individual practitioners, if they render
legal aid, it is at the instance of the court or as a matter of charity. Even the Rules of
professional Ethics adopted by the Bar Council of India require the lawyers to give legal
aid only subject to their economic circumstances.
The State-sponsored legal aid schemes have not yet made any substantial
improvement in the condition of the poor in need of legal services. There are complaints
that the schemes are not picking up at least partly because of the unhelpful attitude of
some sections of the Bar. People have therefore enthusiastically welcomed the advent of
"Lok Adalats" to settle disputes out of court even without the involvement of legal
practitioners. Sensing the mood of the people and realising the inevitable drawbacks of
the adjudicatory process in the formal court system, legislatures have increasingly tended
to exclude appearance of lawyers by way of right. Today, there is a conscious and
deliberate search for alternate dispute resolution mechanisms wherein the procedure can be
less formal and the lawyer involvement can be minimal or avoidable. Without passin&-
any judgement on this trend in the legislative and adjudicative processes, one can argue
that professional re-organization could go a long way in better delivery of legal services in
and outside the court system.
The case for restructuring the profession is canvassed by a section of the
professionals themselves. It is common knowledge that work is unduly concentrated in a
few hands at the top of the professional pyramid keeping a large bottom layer under-
employed and under-paid. Concentration of work leads to demands for adjouurnments and
delays in the judicial process. It further tends to the uneven distribution of professional
competence resulting in the poor people receiving the least competent personnel in the
organization. The mounting fees charged by the lawyers on the top is also a direct result
of undue concentration of work maintained by a vicious system of cornering "Legal
business" through methods legitimate and otherwise.
If equal justice under law is to become a more realistic goal there is need for a
rational re-organization of the private Bar. In England and the United States the problem
appears to have been tackled to a large extent by a massive programme of State-funded
legal aid schemes. In socialist countries it is tackled by greater social control of the
profession and by statutory creation of lawyers' collectives for defined regions with pre-
determined service charges. In some other places legal insurance is being attempted.
78 National Law School Journal
discipline enforcement mechanism of the Bar Councils. The severity of punishments need
an upward revision in case of repeated violations or gross misconduct particularly when
the lawyer involved is a senior member of the Bar. The electoral process by which Bar
Council members are elected also need changes with a view to let public-spirited,
professon-minded lawyers assume charge of the decision-making bodies of the organized
Bar. The superviosry role of the High Courts on disciplinary matters may have to be
revived at least in a limited manner to enforce accountability from indisciplined members
of the Bar.
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80 National Law School Journal
Supreme Court and few High Courts have shaken the faith of the public in the integrity
and fairness of our judicial system and unless something drastic is done without delay, the
system may receive such a shock from which it may become difficult to recover.
Law, Lawyers and Public Interest
Legal profession is by and large a private sector activity. As its role in society is
heavily oriented towards the cause of public interest, the people have reposed trust on the
members of the profession to govern themselves and conferred monopoly protection on
the services offered. With the decline in the quality of services, the increase in the cost and
delay in litigation and the non-accountability of some sections of lawyers, a situation has
reached for a thorough re-appraisal of the role of the profession in society. A people
oriented profession rooted in public service has to reflect publi,c accountability and
concern for the common man in need of legal services. The legal profession took a
leading role in the Freedom Movement and took public responsibilities in a spirit of
service to the nation and its people. Today it has become a market place where the highest
bidder got l;he services and the common man is totally neglected. For nearly a generation
or two the Indian Bar, excepting some honourable exceptions failed to respond to issues
of access to justice to the disadvantaged, equal justice to all, law reform in public interest,
communal harmony and peace within the country and outside. On some occasions, there
is evidence to argue that members of the profession have gone against public interest
prompted by pure selfish interests. Does the same rule of ethics which they adopt in
litigation between private parties apply with same emphasis to issu~s involving public
interest? Are there not issues in a developing and unequal society like India which warrant
public interest advocacy where the adversary model of adjudication has very little or no
relevance? Is there not a need for a public sector in the legal profession with a new set of
ethics articulated largely on meeting the unment legal needs of the rural and urban poor?
Can any professional, even under the adversary system, deny the need for a certain level of
personal responsibility not necessarily subsumed in what is conceived as professional
responsibility?
It was Gandhi who was himself a lawyer who articulated a different role for lawyers
both in the profession and in society. Uniting parties through conciliatory methods,
reaching compromises without compromising trust and conscience, winning clients' cases
only if it so deserved according to one's own conscience and keeping the purity of
administration of justice in all that one does was the message of the Father of the Nation
to his professional colleagues. Gandhiji would not subscribe to the theory that it is the
duty of an advocate to defend a client whom he knows to be guilty. This is the Indian
understanding of professional ethics which unfortunately has been ignored with the decline
of the indigenous legal system. An agonising re-appraisal of professional obligations is
high on the agenda of the nation. Profession for the people and not vice-versa has to
inform the organization and functioning of the profession at every level.
The relationship between Law and Ethics ultimately comes down to the norms and
standards of conduct practised by lawyers, judges and other functionaries of the legal
system. While a substantial majority of law persons are still keeping up the ethical
demands of the profession, an increasing number of professional deviants are creating
serious problems which leads society to question the very ability of the profession to
correct the distortions and to serve the public interest. It is time that all right thinking
members in society within the profession and outside take an active interest in the
organization and functioning of the legal system lest posterity should accuse the present
generation for being silent conspirators to the murder of democracy, rule of law and
Constitutional government.