Can a Muslim Be an Indian?

Author(s): Gyanendra Pandey

Source: Comparative Studies in Society and History , Oct., 1999, Vol. 41, No. 4 (Oct.,
1999), pp. 608-629
Published by: Cambridge University Press

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/179423

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Can a Muslim Be an Indian?l
GYANENDRA PANDEY

Johns Hopkins University

I want to begin this paper with two simple points. One is that
tablished by constructing a core or mainstream-the essential,
the nation, as it is claimed. The other is that minorities are co
with the nation-for they are the means of constituting nation
mainstreams. Nations, and nationalisms, are established by d
aries. However, these are not always-or perhaps, ever-sharply
fined. Nationalisms have therefore commonly moved along the
fying the core or mainstream of the nation. Alongside this em
minorities, marginal communities, or elements,2 the fuzzy e
areas around which the question of boundaries-geographical,
tural-will be negotiated or fought over.
What I seek to investigate in the following pages is the process
nationalist core is established: invisibly, non-politically, or "n
tionalists frequently suggest. I also explore the clamour that ar
time for loyalty, for proof of genuine belonging from those wh
this core: the minorities and marginal groups who might be al
of the nation, but "never quite." I wish to analyze the constructio
phenated national, the real, obvious, axiomatically natural
Nigerian, Australian, American, British, whatever-and the sim
struction of the hyphenated one-Indian Muslims, Indian Chr
Jews, or African-Americans, Mexican-Americans and indigen
for example-the latter having lived so often, in our nationalis
sign of a question mark. I shall pursue this task here through an
the assertions of citizenship, and demands for proof of loyalty

' An earlier version of this paper was presented at seminars organized by th

partments of Johns Hopkins University, Harvard University, and the Graduate
University of New York; the Committee on South Asian Studies, University of
of Social Sciences, Curtin University of Technology, Perth, Western Australi
Studies conference on "Fractured Societies, Fractured Histories" held in Luckn
I am grateful to the participants in all these meetings for their comments and
2 Brackette F. Williams makes the point as follows in her discussion of ethn
of territorial and cultural nationalism. Like tribe, race, or barbarian, she notes
identifies those who are at the borders of empire or nation. "Within putatively h
states, this border is an ideologically produced boundary between 'mainstr
categorical units of this kind of 'imagined' social order." Williams, 'A Class Act
the Race to Nation across Ethnic Terrain,' Annual Review ofAnthropology, 18

0010-4175/99/4193-0324 $7.50 + .10 ? 1999 Society for Comparative Study of

608

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 CAN A MUSLIM BE AN INDIAN? 609

in India at the time of the transfer of power and the partition of the subconti-
nent in 1947.

Two terms that have gained common currency in the discourse on the "Muslim
question," as it is called in India, may provide a useful starting point for my dis-
cussion. Though both date to before 1947, they came to acquire a new ur-
gency-even a new meaning-with the Partition and Independence of that
year. The first is the figure of the "Nationalist Muslim," the second the notion
of "minority" and "majority."
Perhaps the first point to be made about the category of the Nationalist Mus-
lim is that there is no equivalent category for the Hindus, or for that matter any
of the other religious groupings in India. Interestingly, in speaking of the poli-
tics of Hindus, the term is frequently reversed to read "Hindu nationalists." The
reversal is of course not coincidental. What does the term "Hindu nationalists"
signify? It does not refer simply to nationalists who happen to be Hindus. It is,
rather, an indication of their brand of nationalism, a brand in which the "Hin-
du" moment has considerable weight. It is a nationalism in which Hindu cul-
ture, Hindu traditions, and the Hindu community are given pride of place.
Alongside the rise of this Hindu nationalism, and much more emphatically
in the course of time, another more inclusive kind of nationalism had devel-
oped, which emphasized the composite character of Indian society and refused
to give the same sort of primacy to the Hindu element in India's history and
self-consciousness. This is what would later come to be called "secular" na-
tionalism, "real" or "Indian" nationalism as Jawaharlal Nehru had called it,
"something quite apart from .. . [the] religious and communal varieties of na-
tionalism and strictly speaking ... the only form which can be called national
ism in the modem sense of the word."3 This was the Indian nationalism of the
Indian constitution-"nationalism," pure and simple, in Nehru's phrase. Giv-
en the existence of both these brands of nationalism from the later nineteenth
century onwards, and so evidently in the 1940s and again in the 1980s and
1990s, politically conscious Hindus have readily been divided into "Hindu na-
tionalists" and "secular (or Indian) nationalists."
There were of course signs of a growing "Muslim" nationalism over the same
period. Like Hindu nationalism, this Muslim variant developed side by side
with the broader "Indian" nationalist movement, in which large numbers of
Muslims were also involved (from Badruddin Tyabji and Maulana Mohamed
Ali to Mohammad Ali Jinnah and Fazl-ul-Haq, not to mention the likes of
Mukhtar Ahmad Ansari, Abul Kalam Azad, Zakir Husain, and Sheikh Abdul-
lah). However, politically active Muslims were not divided into "Muslim na-
tionalists" and "secular nationalists." They were divided instead into "Nation-
3 J. Nehru. Glimpses of World History. (1934;2nd edition, Asia Publishing House, Bombay
1961), vol. II, 1129-30.

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6IO GYANENDRA PANDEY

alist Muslims" and "Muslims"-and here the proposition exten

to more than just those who were politically involved.
The Hindus-or the majority of politically conscious Hindus, f
in this view many who formed part of a large inert mass, and at
were loyalists-were, in other words, nationalists first and for
they were Hindu nationalists or secular nationalists was a subs
All Muslims were, however, Muslims. And the matter of politi
inertia made little difference in this instance. Some Muslims were advocates of
"Indian" nationalism, and hence "Nationalist Muslims." The remainder of that
community, however, in town and country, north and south, handloom work-
shop or building site, modest hut or railway quarters-were not likely to be sup-
porters of Indian nationalism on account of their being Muslim. The peculiar
history of Hindu-Muslim political differences from the later nineteenth centu-
ry onwards, and British efforts to keep the Muslims on their side against the ris-
ing tide of what they saw as babu-Hindu nationalism-had contributed to the
development of this view. But the years immediately preceding Partition and
Independence, Partition itself, and the very fact of agitation for separate Mus-
lim rights, clearly had more than a little to do with its wide acceptance as
axiomatic truth.

The other terms of Indian political discourse that require some attention are
"minority" and "majority." When used in conjunction with "religion" or "eth-
nicity" or "culture," these terms result in a curious ambiguity, as Talal Asad has
reminded us. For whereas majority and minority belong primarily to a vocab-
ulary of electoral and parliamentary politics, and the shifting terrain upon which
these politics are supposed to be carried out, culture (like religion, race, and so
on) is "virtually coterminous with the social life of particular populations, in-
cluding habits and beliefs conveyed across generations." To speak of cultural,
ethnic or religious minorities is therefore to posit what Asad calls "ideological
hybrids." It is "to make the implicit claim that members of some cultures truly
belong to a particular politically defined place, but those of others (minority
cultures) do not-either because of recency (immigrants) or of archaicness
(aborigines)."4 Or, one might add, simply because of unspecified, but (as it is
asserted) fundamental, "difference"-as in the case of the Indian Muslims.
What Partition and Independence did was to fix these terms in a national,
country-wide sense for Indian society and politics. The Muslims were now the
minority, as of course were Sikhs, Anglo-Indians, Indian Christians, Parsis, and
Jains, although all these did not matter as much, on account of their much small-
er numbers. The Muslims were now the "minority" even in districts, cities, or
towns where they were a numerical majority: the latter term applied only in a
descriptive sense. They were the minority that had fought for, or wanted, Pak-
istan, and they now had not only to choose where they belonged, but also to

4 Talal Asad. Genealogies of Religion: Discipline and Reasons of Power in Christianity and
Islam. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), 257.

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 CAN A MUSLIM BE AN INDIAN? 611

demonstrate the sincerity of their choice: they had to prove that they were
al to India and, hence, worthy of Indian citizenship.
The Hindus were the "majority," even if substantial numbers of those d
nated or claimed as Hindus had little to gain from the appellation, were d
access to sacred Hindu sites and texts, or (in some cases) even moved to
card the denomination of "Hindu" altogether. In the tumult of Partition an
dependence, however, the "Hindus" (sometimes including Hindus and Sik
were spoken of as a unity, one that was ranged for the most part against
Muslims." The search was on for the genuine, unambiguously loyal citiz
And since, it was said, the Hindus had no other country (save Nepal, which
seen in this perspective as something of an adjunct to India), their attachm
to the Indian nation was beyond doubt. "Hindu" or "Indian" was an irrelev
distinction; the terms were practically interchangeable. The question bo
down, instead, to an inquiry into the appropriate place and appropriate stat
the "minorities."
Before I turn to the details of this nationalist inquiry and its implications,
there is one other general point about nationalism that needs to be made. This
may apply especially to the anti-colonial nationalisms of the later nineteenth
and twentieth centuries, which struggled to form a unity of "the people" in the
effort to stake a claim to independent statehood, but I think it also has a wider
resonance. Everywhere, we would argue, the nation/people has historically
come into being through struggles to define and advance a national interest.
Everywhere, however, there is a simultaneous-and, as it seems, almost nec-
essary-desire to present the nation as given, an already formed totality, even
a spirit or essence. Everywhere, moreover, once the nation comes to have a state
of its own or (in nationalist parlance) to be realised in the nation-state, this
essence, this totality, comes to be concretized in the state and its territory, and
the national interest comes to be equated with the integrity of the state and its
boundaries.

All over the world, then, there has been a tendency for the equation "the na-
tion = the people" to give way to the assertion that "the nation = the state."
Loyalty to the nation-the most generally touted test of true, unquestioned cit-
izenship-becomes loyalty to an already existing state and the interests of that
state (all that it stands for and even, literally, where it stands!). There is, how-
ever, generally a catch: the test of loyalty is in fact required only of those who
are not "real," "natural" citizens. Neither of these concepts-that of the real cit-
izen, nor that of loyalty to the nation-state-is as neutral as it appears. Neither
is admissible, in this abstract form, in anything that pretends to be a democra-
tic politics, as I hope the following discussion of debates and arguments among
Indian nationalists in 1947 and after will show.

II

The point I want to begin with is the simple one of the unrealizable quality of
the nationalist search for clarity, uniformity, and "purity" in the midst of man-

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612 GYANENDRA PANDEY

ifest uncertainty, fluidity and inequality-which is of course the actually

isting condition of all nations and nationalisms. "Are we entitled to claim
status of true citizens, who have sacrificed family, caste, community, and
gion in the name of the nation?" Indian nationalists repeatedly asked in 1
Are all citizens asked to sacrifice the claims of family, caste, community
religion? we might ask in turn.
Partition and Independence-15 August 1947-was the moment of est
lishment of the two new nation-states of India and Pakistan. But it was also-
and here the date becomes less clear-cut-the moment of the congealing of new
identities, relations, and histories, or of their being thrown into question once
again. The particular circumstances attending this birth scarcely require restate-
ment. Practically the entire "minority" population of certain areas was driven
out: Hindus and Sikhs from the West Pakistan territories, and Muslims from East
Punjab and several neighbouring tracts in India. While the figures will never be
established with certainty, it is likely that half a million or more people lost their
lives; incalculable numbers were maimed, looted and raped; and some fourteen
million were uprooted and turned into refugees for a long time to come. All of
the erstwhile "northern India" (including both the eastern and western wings of
Pakistan), and many of the central and southern states (among them Hyderabad
in southern India) were more or less seriously affected.
What made the moment of independence particularly bitter was that neither
of the two new states turned out to be quite what its proponents had hoped for.
Pakistan has perhaps had the more anguished history in this respect. It had been
proposed as a Muslim homeland, the country of the Muslim nation of the
subcontinent. There was never any question, however, that the ninety million
Muslims of undivided India-spread out all over that territory, with Muslim-
majority regions existing in northwestern and northeastern India and in pock-
ets (towns and subdistricts) elsewhere-would all be accommodated, or even
wish to migrate, to the areas that became Pakistan.
To complicate matters further, the political leaders who founded the state of
Pakistan seemed, at the moment of its foundation, to turn away from the propo-
sition of an Islamic nation-state to the conception of a secular, multireligious
Pakistan. This is what Mohammad Ali Jinnah had to say in his famous speech
at the opening session of the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan, on 11 August
1947: "You may belong to any religion or caste or creed-that has nothing to
do with the business of the state .... We are all citizens and equal citizens of
one state.... You will find that in the course of time Hindus would cease to be
Hindus and Muslims would cease to be Muslims, not in the religious sense,
because that is the personal faith of each individual but in the political sense as
citizens of the state."
This new tone produced considerable bewilderment among followers of the
Muslim League, as well as a heated counter-attack. "How could Muslims cease
to be Muslims and Hindus cease to be Hindus in the political sense when the

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 CAN A MUSLIM BE AN INDIAN? 613

religions ... were, in Jinnah's passionately held belief, so utterly different from
one another? Was Jinnah giving up the two-nation theory?" one Pakistani com-
mentator subsequently asked. In a letter to the Civil and Military Gazette of
21 October 1947, Muhammad Sa'adat Ali of Lahore protested against a Pak-
istan minister's statement that Pakistan was "a secular, democratic and not a
theocratic state." Such a statement "has absolutely no support of the Muslims,"
he wrote. "Ever since Mr. Jinnah undertook to fight our case, he has, on occa-
sions without number, proclaimed emphatically that Muslims were determined
to set up a state organised and run in accordance with the irresistible dictates of
the Islamic Shariat.... If secularization were our sole aim, India need not have
been partitioned.... We raised this storm for partition because we wanted to
live as free Muslims and organise a state on Islamic principles."
On the Indian side, too, this confusion, and the ongoing transfer of popula-
tions in the midst of unimaginable violence and bloodshed, provoked angry
questions. The Muslims had fairly widely supported the movement for Pak-
istan-though, as was already becoming evident, few had clear ideas about
what that goal meant. Be that as it may, opponents of the Pakistan scheme now
declared that the Muslims had after all got a state of their own, as they wanted.
Large numbers of Muslims had migrated to the new state. Others were fleeing.
Those that remained still harboured sympathies for Pakistan, it was widely ru-
moured, and many of them were gathering and storing arms. Was this just for
self-defense, the question was asked again and again, and were they entitled in
any case to take the question of such defense into their own hands, instead of
putting their faith in the governmental authorities? Did these suspect people,
open supporters of Pakistan until yesterday, and potential fifth columnists, have
any right to remain in India?
Partition and Independence thus gave rise to an intense debate about what
the character of the new nation-states should be: secular (which was to say
multi-community, with equal rights for all)? socialist? Hindu? Muslim? Pak-
istan emerged, after the long drawn out moment of Partition, with its commu-
nal holocaust and forced migrations as an overwhelmingly Muslim country, es-
pecially in its western half. As they saw this happening, sections of the Hindu
nationalist press in India observed that Pakistan was on its way to establishing
an "ekjatiya rashtra" (literally, a one-nation nation, or a homogenous, one-
people nation), and lamented that India might never be able to achieve the same
kind of unity (or homogeneity?). Substantial sections of the north Indian
population, especially Hindu and Sikh refugees from West Pakistan and
those most directly affected by their influx, and sections of the political lead-
ership, especially the Hindu right wing and leaders of the Sikh community, also
demanded that India (or at least some parts of it, like East Punjab, Delhi, and
the neighbouring districts of western Uttar Pradesh-earlier known as the
United Provinces of Agra and Awadh; hereafter, U.P.-where Hindu and Sikh
refugees had flooded in in the weeks before and after 15 August 1947), should

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614 GYANENDRA PANDEY

be cleared of Muslims: the latter should be sent to Pakistan, and the territory
handed over to the Sikhs and Hindus.
Could any substantial body of Indian Muslims stay on in India in these con-
ditions? The answer to this question was perhaps provided in the end by sheer
exhaustion, by the recognition that killing and counterkilling, massacre and
countermassacre could not go on endlessly without destroying everything and
everybody, by the fact that in some areas there was no one left to kill (except in
fairly well-guarded refugee camps), and the awareness that the entire body of
Muslims in India could not be driven out anyway. This growing exhaustion and
awareness, however dim, was aided by the combined efforts of the governments
on both sides to provide safe passage to all those who wished to migrate, espe-
cially from the two Punjabs; by the determination of a large section of India's
nationalist (and left wing) leaders and workers to stand by the goals of the In-
dian freedom struggle and fight for a secular republic where all of India's in-
habitants were entitled to live, irrespective of religious denomination; and by
the assassination of Mahatma Gandhi in January 1948 at the hands of a Hindu
extremist, which seems to have brought a good deal of northern India back to
its senses and marked a turning point in the debate between "secular nation"
and "Hindu nation."
The Muslims stayed, constituting ten percent of the new nation-state's pop-
ulation.5 But the question remained: can a Muslim really be an Indian? This is
one of the enduring legacies of Partition in India, and it has more than a little
to do with the way in which Indian nationalism and the Indian state have gone
about the task of managing "difference" from that day to this.

III

Which were the Muslims who had the right to stay on in India? Gandh
Nehru and other major nationalist leaders answered the question categori
in 1947 and 1948: all those who wished to. But there were doubts even in the
minds of many who espoused this policy, and more than a little resistance from
other quarters. The recriminations, calculations, bitterness, and violence of the
preceding year showed no signs of abating after 15 August 1947. Large num-
bers of politically conscious and mobilized Hindus felt betrayed, and openly
moved to right wing positions. The Sikhs, split down the middle by the parti-
tion of Punjab, were angry and bewildered almost as a community.6 Muslim
Leaguers in those provinces that remained in India, where Muslims were a mi-
nority-having obtained a partition which they had probably never expected,
and about the practical implications of which they had certainly thought little-
were at a loss.7
Few people now cared to differentiate carefully among the Muslims of In-
dia. The regional, caste and occupational markers by which generations of Mus-
5 The same held true in East Pakistan, which was to become Bangladesh in 1971, where the
Hindu population has remained as high as ten percent of the total.

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 CAN A MUSLIM BE AN INDIAN? 615

lims had been known-and privileged, denigrated, or even declared to be only

"half-Muslims"-seemed to lose much of their significance. The Muslims
were now, more and more-in official documents, in journalism, and in com-
mon conversation-simply "Muslims," and all of them were suspect as open
or closet Pakistanis. When Gandhi declared it the duty of the central govern-
ment and all provincial governments in India to ensure that "full justice" was
done to the Muslims, there were many outraged protests. The comments of a
Kanpur nationalist daily on 19 June 1947 provide an indication of the tone of
much of this reaction. "We are prepared to deny our instinctive feelings," the
editors wrote, "and go along with Mahatma Gandhi to the extent that we accept
the good faith not only of Congress members but of all nationalist Muslims
[though their numbers are "steadily declining," the same paper would observe
a couple of months later], and give to them the rights of Indian citizens .... But
it would be a political blunder of a high order if we were to give these privi-
leges to every Muslim living in India."8 The "Muslims"-that blanket, undif-
ferentiated category-had been too much involved in the Muslim League de-
mand for Pakistan: their sympathies were not likely to change overnight, and
their loyalty could not be counted upon.
The same suspicion spread, where it did not already exist, among the ranks
of the senior Congress leadership. An article published by Babu Sampurnanand,
then Education Minister in the Congress Government of U.P., two weeks be-
fore official Partition and Independence, illustrates the point very well indeed.9
Sampurnanand looked forward to the 15th of August with the mixture of excite-
ment and sadness that was the common lot of thinking nationalists at this time.
He spelled out the reasons for the sadness as follows: "In earlier times too, India
has for centuries been divided into small independent states, but overriding these
political boundaries a cultural uniformity held these provinces together in a com-
mon bond. Today, this bond is breaking: the culture that the leaders [of Pakistan]

6 See, for example, Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, New Delhi, AICC Papers, G-34/
1947, Resolutions from several villages of Ferozepur and 'Hindu and Sikh Public of Campbellpur,'
sent to President, Indian National Congress, 9 July 1947; also (India Office Records, London)
T. W. Rees Collection (uncatalogued at the time I saw it), "A Note on the Communal and Political
Situation in the Punjab" (Appendix A to Lahore Area Op. Instr. No. 6, dated 23 July 1947); "Pun-
jab Boundary Force Intelligence Summary No. I," 6 August 1947; and "Report of the Punjab
Boundary Force, 1 August-l t/2nd September 1947" (New Delhi, 15 November 1947), ch. 2 and
passim. (I am grateful to Professor Robin Jeffrey for first drawing my attention to these papers,
which have now been acquired by the India Office Library and Records.)
7 See the U.P. Governor's report to the viceroy in early June, after the public announcement that
India was to be partitioned into the two new states of India and Pakistan. The Muslim League leg-
islators in U.P. are "coo[ing] like doves," he reported, now that a "national home" for the Muslims
has been conceded: "the whole attitude now is that in the U.P. we must forget the past and become
all brothers together." (India Office Records, London) Mss. Eur. F200/168, Wylie-Mountbatten,
9 June 1947.
8 Vartman, 19 June 1947. (I am grateful to Saumya Gupta for giving me access to her photo-
copies of the files of this newspaper.)
9 Ibid. 30 July 1947.

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616 GYANENDRA PANDEY

have promised to develop for the provinces that are breaking away is utterly
Indian." Sampuranand still expressed the hope that the "two halves" woul
come together again, but when or how this might happen, he could not say.
In spite of this sorrow, swa-raj (self-rule, independence) was to be wel-
comed. India was losing something, wrote Sampurnanand, but what she w
gaining was greater by far: "we are going to recover that [precious] thing t
we lost a thousand years ago." Note how easily, not to say naturally, the "w
is constructed as "Hindu": today "we" (Hindus/Indians) are going to recov
that freedom which we lost with the coming of "Muslim" power. The Cong
leader says this explicitly in his next sentence: "With the defeat of Prithviraj
the hands of Mohammad Ghori] at the battle of Thanesar, Bharat [India] lost
swa [one's own, or self]. Look at the history of our science and our philo
phy. Over the last one thousand years there has not been even one developm
[aavishkar, literally, invention] which has contributed a mite to the sum
human knowledge." [emphasis added]
Finally, Sampurnanand mentioned a lurking fear about the potential loyalt
of Muslims in independent India. To put this in context it is necessary to r
erate that the theme of "the defense of our borders" is a crucial ingredient
modern states and their nationalisms. Sampurnanand's article was full of it
The northwestern frontier of India was at the Khyber Pass. This was no pol
cal fantasy, it was "nature's arrangement," he wrote. Now unfortunately the b
den of the defense of this frontier would fall on the young and inexperien
shoulders of Pakistan.

"Non-violence is of no use under the present circumstances in India," Ma-

jor-General K. M. Cariappa, deputy chief of the Indian Army Staff, was to say
shortly; only a strong army could make India "one of the greatest nations in the
world."'0 Durga Das, a young correspondent of the pro-Congress Hindustan
Times, went further and demanded the building of a strong state by liquidating
enemy pockets, and of a strong army on the Nazi model." Nathuram Godse,
Gandhi's assassin, put it no less plainly in explaining his opposition to Gand-
hi: India needed to become a "modern" nation, "practical, able to retaliate, and
... powerful with the armed forces,"12 For this purpose Gandhian notions of
non-violence and turning the other cheek were simply of no use.
In the midst of this rising feeling, Sampurnanand wrote of the need for a mil-
itant, modern nationalism. If, "God forbid," there was ever a war between In-
dia and Pakistan, "our worries will be greatly increased, for it is not impossi-
ble that the sympathies of our Muslim population will veer towards Pakistan."
The fear expressed here grew in strength in the weeks and months that followed,
as Partition worked itself out and large numbers of Indian Muslims were pushed

10 Statesman, 29 October 1947.

1 Hindustan Times, 28 September 1947, cited in People's Age, 12 October 1947.
12 Cited in Ashish Nandy. At the Edge of Psychology: Essays in Politics and Culture. (Delhi:
Oxford University Press, 1980), 91.

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 CAN A MUSLIM BE AN INDIAN? 617

into a corner. Indeed the political history of India for some time afterwards, and
some might say until today, has in no small part been the history of a struggle
to control this fear.
In the later months of 1947, a wide range of India's nationalist leaders began
to focus on the issues that Sampurnanand had raised-war, and loyalty in war.
The renowned Socialist leader Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia, speaking at a public
meeting in Delhi on 11 October 1947, urged the people to "rally round the
Nehru Government and make it strong enough to take, when necessary, effec-
tive measures against the Pakistan Government." This was an appeal to all com-
munal forces, Hindu, Muslim, and Sikh, and to those who harboured doubts
about the government's declared secular platform. But three days earlier, at an-
other rally in Delhi, Lohia had pointedly asked India's Muslims to "surrender
arms and ... be loyal citizens of India, ready to fight, if need be, against Pak-
istan or any other country."'3
At the same time, Govind Ballabh Pant, Congress Chief Minister of Uttar
Pradesh-accomplished parliamentarian, able administrator, and a man of
large, secular, human sympathies-was driving home the same point. Every In-
dian Muslim should "realize clearly" what loyalty to the nation would mean if
Pakistan invaded India, he declared. "Every Muslim in India would be required
to shed his blood fighting the Pakistani hordes, and each one should search his
heart now, and decide whether he should migrate to Pakistan or not."14
Muslim leaders who stayed on in India were also under some pressure to ex-
press themselves in these terms. The Raja of Mahmudabad, Secretary of the All-
India Muslim League and Jinnah's right-hand man for much of the decade be-
fore 1947, provides a striking illustration. As with so many other Muslim
League leaders of U.P. and Bihar, Mahmudabad had never contemplated leav-
ing his native land. Broken by the experience that Partition turned out to be, he
resigned from the Muslim League in September 1947. The party had commit-
ted hara-kiri, he said. To keep it alive in India now was a cruel joke. Most of its
leaders-Mahmudabad actually said "all"-had run away from India, leaving
the Indian Muslims to their fate. These opportunists should now be clear in their
minds that they would never be able to mislead the Muslim masses again. "All
Indian Muslims would go to war for India, even if they had to go to war against
Pakistan." 5 Taking a similar tack, M. A. Salam, a member of the Madras Leg-
islative Assembly and of the All-India Muslim League Council, declared that
his community of Andhra Muslims was loyal to the Indian Union and "shall de-
fend it against anybody to the last drop of their blood."'6 That last contention

13 The Statesman, 9 October and 12 October 1947. At the end of September, at a public meet-
ing of prominent citizens addressed by Gandhi, one person declared that "the citizens of Delhi [sic]
were ready to live in peace with the Muslims provided they were loyal to the Union and surren-
dered all arms and ammunition which they possessed without a license." The Statesman, 2 Octo-
ber 1947.
14 Ibid. See Aj, 22 September 1947 for report of another, very similar speech by Pant.
15 Aj, 7 October 1947. 16 Pakistan Times, 8 October 1947.

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6I8 GYANENDRA PANDEY

had become a password to citizenship, as it were: it is a password that

demanded of Muslims in India, in one form or another, ever since.
Partition produced a plethora of ideas on the question of what would
tute an adequate proof of loyalty to India on the part of the Indian M
Many called for the disbanding of the Muslim League, and the giving u
demand that smacked even remotely of "separatism"-such as appeals f
arate electorates, or an assured quota of legislative seats for Muslim
deputy Prime Minister of India, Vallabhbhai Patel, put it in the Constit
sembly debate on minority rights, these were the measures that had resu
"the separation of the country": "Those who want that kind of thing hav
in Pakistan, not here (applause) ... we are laying the foundations of
tion, and those who choose to divide again [sic] and sow the seeds of
tion will have no place, no quarter here . . . (Hear, hear!)."17 Today,
host of other groups have demanded, and obtained, "reservations" of
kinds to enable them to compete more equally in the administrative an
cal processes of India, and it is just possible that sections of the Musli
munity will also be allowed to espouse similar demands. But that wa
different moment, fifty years ago.
The "Muslim League mentality" was by that time pronounced as bei
pletely unacceptable. As part of this pronouncement, many national
servers declared that Muslim government officials in India, who had
Muslim professionals and educated urban youth in generating enthusi
the Pakistan idea, and who had opted for Pakistan in substantial numbe
the option was available (at different levels of the bureaucracy), neede
ing. Those who reversed an earlier option in favor of working in Pakis
decided to stay on in India, needed to be watched even more carefully,
reversal might well be part of a plot hatched by the Muslim League and t
ers of Pakistan to plant spies in the corridors of power in India.
In support of this theory, the nationalist press gave much prominenc
ports of documents recovered from passengers departing to or returni
Pakistan, of arms and machinery found on the persons or in the baggage
lim officials in transit, and of the inefficient implementation of govern
ders by subordinate Muslim officials (as if they alone were guilty of
ciency!). In one instance the incriminating "documents" seized at Luc
airport appear to have been handwritten letters sent by refugees in Pa
their relatives in India, urging them to come away as soon as possible
conditions in India were (from all reports) very bad and the future wa
dictable. Among reports of "arms" seizures, it is no surprise to find me
electric batteries, kerosene oil, bales of cloth, and air guns, along with
daggers, spears, guns and more serious weapons. A Delhi paper reporte
tember 1947 that a "large number" of Muslim police officers were fo

17 Constituent Assembly Debates: Official Report. vol. V, 271.

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 CAN A MUSLIM BE AN INDIAN? 619

ing to leave for Pakistan "without notice," taking with them their "uniforms and
weapons!"'8
Muslim Leaguers and Muslim bureaucrats who remained in India amidst all
these accusations and suspicions, scarcely proved their loyalty in the eyes of
their interrogators by taking that difficult decision to stay on. They were called
upon, of course, to swear oaths of loyalty to the new state, which they did. How-
ever, a demonstration of Muslim loyalty to the nation now forbade any asser-
tion of separate Muslim needs or of a "Muslim" perspective. Thus the Aj of Ba-
naras, perhaps the most important Congress paper in the Hindi belt, welcomed
the pledge of loyalty to the constitution taken by the Muslim League members
of the Constituent Assembly, but asked on 20 August 1947 why the same peo-
ple had absented themselves at the time of the singing of "Bande Mataram,"
the "national song" (as Aj called it) composed by Bankimchandra Chattopad-
hyay, with its fairly pronounced Hindu overtones. The Muslim legislators had
explained that they had abstained on grounds of religious sensibility. The edi-
tors of the Banaras daily shot back that while this anthem, unlike the flag, had
not so far been ratified by the Constituent Assembly, it nevertheless had the
stamp of "historical legitimacy."
As we have noted, some Muslim leaders in India demanded the disbanding
of the League and the strengthening of the "secular," "democratic" Indian Na-
tional Congress, as the one party that could guarantee the safety and rights of
Muslims. Others argued that the League should continue, but as an unambigu-
ously secular party, working with other secular parties in India for the common
advancement of the masses. The Muslim League leaders in India had readily
sworn an oath of loyalty to the Indian flag and constitution. Yet many contin-
ued-as they had to, because of troubled conditions-to meet relatives and as-
sociates, and for political negotiations-to go and come between India and Pak-
istan, and a few still looked to Jinnah for guidance on how the Indian Muslims
should be led.19 Their supporters, and large numbers of other ordinary, "non-
political" Muslims hoisted the Indian tricolor and joined enthusiastically in the
Independence Day celebrations on 15 August. Yet, in the prevailing circum-
stances, some prepared to defend themselves in case of attack, while many oth-
ers sat in readiness to flee, should developments make it even more dangerous
to stay.
The swearing of oaths was scarcely going to be seen as an adequate proof of
loyalty in this context. "Loyalty is not established by mere verbal protestation,"
declared the Vartman on 27 September 1947, "how do we have any demon-
stration of it without deeds [amal]?" The proofs called for were curious and var-
ied. Muslims alone could stop the killings in Punjab and other parts of north-

18 Tej (Urdu), 18 September 1947.

19 Cf.Choudhry Khaliquzzaman's Pathway to Pakistan. (London: Longman's, 1961), 411, on
his reasons for resigning from the leadership of the Muslim League in the Indian Constituent
Assembly.

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620 GYANENDRA PANDEY

ern India, it was said: all those who had any links with the Muslim Leag
should urge "their Pakistani brethren" to put an end to the violence. Lea
must make an unqualified denunciation of the two-nation theory and cam
actively for reunification. Muslims generally must step forward to help H
and Sikh refugees, and thereby demonstrate their patriotism. They shoul
port fellow Muslims who collected arms or otherwise created trouble. T
should be prepared to go to West Punjab and "take up the cudgels against
Pakistani brothers for their misdeeds." Indian Muslims would of course have
to be prepared to lay down their lives for the country, as we have noted, but
even before war broke out, they could prove their loyalty by taking up arms
against "their Pakistani brothers!"20
Two comments made during the debate on minority rights in the Constituent
Assembly sum up the position of the Indian Muslims in the aftermath of Parti-
tion. One came from Mahavir Tyagi, a prominent Congressman of western U.P.,
when the debate was being wound up on 26 May 1949: "The Muslims already
know that they will not be returned [in elections to the various legislatures] for
some time to come, so long as they do not rehabilitate themselves among the
masses and assure the rest of the people that they are one with them. They have
been separate in every matter for a long time past and in a day you can't switch
over from Communalism to Nationalism."2' The other was a straightforward
statement from Vallabhbhai Patel to the Muslims, made in the course of the
speech quoted earlier in this paper: "you must change your attitude, adapt your-
self to the changed conditions ... don't pretend to say 'Oh, our affection is great
for you.' We have seen your affection. Let us forget the affection. Let us face
the realities. Ask yourself whether you really want to stand here and cooperate
with us or you want to play disruptive tactics."22

IV

It remains for us to examine how the (supposedly natural) "we"/"us" of India

nationalism was constructed at the moment of Partition and Independence. Th
suspicion that came to be attached to a section of Muslims is not altogether sur-
prising, given the confusion attending the establishment of Pakistan, althoug
the extension of the argument to encompass all Muslims as potential fifth
columnists was patently unjust and loaded with dangerous implications. How
ever, it was the manner in which the four accepted columns-the "we" of In-
dian nationalism-came to be presented at this juncture that was particularl
insidious, because it proceeded without the need for any argument, axiomati
cally as it were. The "we" just happened to be that: the real, essential nation.
In adopting this view, I am suggesting, Indian nationalism was by no mean
exceptional.

20 See the comments of the U.P. Congress leaders A. P. Jain and Charan Singh, as reported in
Aj, 26 September, and Pakistan Times, 11 October 1947, respectively; also other reports in A
7 October, and Vartman, 27 September 1947.
21 Constituent Assembly Debates. Vol. VIII, 346. 22 Ibid. Vol. V, 271. (Emphasis added).

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 CAN A MUSLIM BE AN INDIAN? 621

Many elaborations of the "us" and "them" of Indian nationalism during

late 1940s served to reinforce the conceptual split between the Hindu/India
the one hand, and the Muslim/foreigner on the other. Occasionally, this was
sented as a division between the "majority" and the "minorities," as in num
ous Constituent Assembly speeches on the "generosity" of the majority tow
the minorities. The easy, almost invisible, construction of the Hindus as the r
Indians, and the others-especially the Muslims, who, as we have seen, st
particularly under the sign of a question mark-as communities on trial, is
be found in other kinds of nationalist statement as well. The vernacular pr
speaking for the non-metropolitan intelligentsia-provincial notables, sm
town professionals, teachers, journalists, traders and clerks, who lent a gr
deal of the most vocal support to the nationalism of this period-provide
numerous excellent illustrations.

Let me cite only one such example, from an editorial published in the Kan-
pur Hindi daily Vartman of 12 October 1947, which asks the question "Whose
country is this?" in its first line. The answer is given at once: "All those who
can call India their native land [swadesh] in the real sense of the term, this coun-
try is theirs." The editors then proceed to spell out how the Buddhists and Jains,
Sikhs, Christians, Anglo-Indians, and Parsis all belong here, because they think
of India as their native land. Persecuted in early times, some Hindus became
Buddhist and Jains. "However, they did not change their nationality [sic]. They
did not leave the country. They did not start calling themselves Chinese or
Japanese." Similarly, a Sikh panth (community or tradition) arose. "This Sikh
community also recognizes India as their janmabhumi [land of their birth] and
therefore their country."
The analysis so far is simple. The Buddhists (even though they have practi-
cally disappeared from the land of the Buddha), Jains, and Sikhs treated India
as the land of their birth because this is where they and their religious traditions
were born. They are, in that sense, "original", "natural" Indians. The argument
in the case of the other small religious (and racial) groupings-the Christians,
Anglo-Indians, and Parsis-is not quite so straightforward. Many of the low-
est castes and classes had embraced Christianity in recent times, the editorial
noted, to escape the worst oppressions of untouchability, as much as anything
else. "Yet they did not forget that they could never go and settle in Europe; [they
knew that] India would always be their country."
The Anglo-Indians had, on the other hand, remained ambivalent for some
time. They were after all Eurasian, both English and Indian by blood, and many
of them had sought to migrate (as they would continue to do during the 1950s,
and to some extent later). But there were two points which went in their favour,
as Vartman saw it. First, their numbers were never very great: they could nev-
er match those of the Muslims. Secondly, the departing British had left them to
fend for themselves: "they came to their senses as soon as the British left" and
recognized India as their native land.
The propositions here are patronizing, and full of paradoxes. The Indian

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622 GYANENDRA PANDEY

Christians could not dream of settling in Europe. The Anglo-Indians did dr

of it, but were left high and dry by the departing colonial rulers. In any case
two communities were numerically small and quite widely dispersed. They
no other country to go to, and they constituted no threat to the nation or its
ture. India could therefore be treated as their native land.
The argument was different again in the case of the Parsis. They came to the
country from Iran, but as refugees, fleeing to save their lives, not as aggressors
or missionaries. Nor did they give up their religion, culture, or language on
settling here. "Nevertheless, many of them have contributed to the economic,
intellectual, social, and political development of India like true citizens." This
is a line of reasoning with which we are not unfamiliar. Wealthy Japanese busi-
ness people and Arab sheikhs are welcome in England, the United States, and
Australia because they contribute to the "economic" and "intellectual" devel-
opment of these areas: not so the Bradford Muslims or Sikhs of Southall, the
Mexican casual labourers or Vietnamese boat-people. That was what went in
favour of the Parsis in India: they were a small, almost a microscopic minori-
ty, and because of the fairly privileged economic and social position they en-
joyed in places like Bombay, many of them had-"like true citizens," as it was
said-contributed to the economic, intellectual, social, and political develop-
ment of India.

The case of the Muslims of India was another matter altogether. Conversions
to Islam had taken place on a very large scale, so that there were now ninety
million Muslims in India, twenty-five percent of the total population of undi-
vided India. The majority of these Muslims had come from the depressed class-
es of the Hindu population, the paper acknowledged: they had become Mus-
lims to escape from the extreme sanctions and disabilities of the caste system.
However, resisting the oppressiveness of the Hindu caste system was one thing,
and shedding one's "national" culture, religion, language, and dress another.
"Flesh and blood of the Hindus though they were, these Hindavi Muslims came
to think of themselves as belonging to the Arab and Mughal communities [or
nations, since the term jati can refer to either] ... Rulers like Aurangzeb, and
later on the British, never tired of preaching that they [the Muslims] have been
the governors of this country, and that their direct links are with Arabia, Persia,
and Turkey. Their language, appearance, religion, and practices are all differ-
ent from those of the Hindus."
The Vartman editorial refers to the tyranny and destructiveness of the Mus-
lim invaders. It adds that the local converts have been even more tyrannical and
destructive, attacking Hindu temples, images, and religious processions, and
making a point of sacrificing the cow at the Baqr Id precisely because the cow
was sacred to the Hindus. But these sweeping and astonishing generalizations
are by way of rhetorical flourish: "well known" propositions, we are told, that
serve only to underline the basic argument that the Muslims of India are (or may
be suspected of being) alien because "when they changed their religion, they

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 CAN A MUSLIM BE AN INDIAN? 623

also dreamt up schemes of changing their country." "They did not think of the
[other] people living in India as their own. They thought of the local language
[as if there were only one!] as foreign. They cut themselves off from Indian civ-
ilization and culture."
In the course of the anti-colonial struggle, the argument goes on, when peo-
ple of every other community joined in a common fight for freedom, the Mus-
lims stood in the way. They made separatist demands, played into the hands of
the British, and were rewarded, finally, with the prize of Pakistan-from where
Hindus were now being driven out. Many Indian Muslims had earlier tried to
migrate to Persia, Arabia, Mesopotamia, and Turkey, only to return disap-
pointed. Today, "if there was place in Pakistan, if there were agricultural lands,
jobs, and if they had their way, [these Muslims] would undoubtedly go and set-
tle there." On other occasions, the editors of Vartman had declared that Pak-
istan was like Mecca, like paradise even, for every Indian Muslim, and Jinnah
was like their Prophet.
Now, on 12 October 1947, the editorial continued: large numbers of Muslims
had already gone to settle in Pakistan, and many more sat waiting to go. As for
the rest, who had decided to stay back, did they show signs of willingness to
live in peace with the other communities of India-"Sikh, Jain, Buddhists,
Christians, Parsis and Anglo-Indians?" "These machine-guns, mortars, rifles,
pistols, bombs, dynamite, swords, spears and daggers, that are being discov-
ered daily [in Muslim houses and localities], are all these being collected for
the defense of India?" The problem, in the editors' view, was that there was just
not enough place for all of these Muslims in Pakistan. But the fact that so many
stayed on in India was no reason to think of them automatically as Indian. There
was need for greater discrimination than that.
It would perhaps be a waste of time to point out all the errors of fact and the
blatant half-truths that pepper Vartman's analysis of the Muslim condition.23
There is one feature of the statement, however, that requires special emphasis.
At some stage in this articulation of the conditions of citizenship, an argument
about culture gives way almost imperceptibly to an argument about politics-
or, more precisely, about political power. The Anglo-Indians, unable to attain
the numerical strength of the Muslims, never constituted a threat. The Parsis re-
mained different in religion, culture, and "language", as the Hindi paper had it,

23 In connection with the proposition that the "language, appearance, religion, and practices" of
the Muslims were "all different" from those of the Hindus, I might note only that all the Indian
Muslims I know or have heard of speak the Bengali, Gujarati, Marathi, Malayalam, Punjabi, Hin-
di, Urdu (or to break the vernaculars down further, the Awadhi, Bhojpuri, Magahi, etc.) of their re-
gions. I should add that Urdu-designated the language of the Indian Muslims, which is also my
language, and the language of very large numbers of Hindus and Sikhs of my parents' and grand-
parents' generation-whatever else it might be, is not a foreign language, but distinctively Indian
(or, now, subcontinental). And just as Indian intellectuals claim, with considerable justification, that
English is now one of the languages of India, one would also have to assert that Islam is now (and
has long been) one of the religions of India.

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624 GYANENDRA PANDEY

but they had contributed significantly to "our" political, economic, intellectu-

al, and social development. The Muslims had, on the other hand, put forward
their own, separatist demands, and had stood in the way of the united struggle
against the British. They had not accepted "our" conception of India: they were
therefore not Indians.

There is another important aspect of this articulation. It is noteworthy that in

the entire analysis the Hindus appear only a couple of times, in passing, as the
people from whom the Muslims sought to differentiate themselves. An editor-
ial that elaborates the character and place of the different religious communi-
ties of India in answer to the question, "Whose country is this?," does not even
feel the need to mention the Hindu community as a separate constituent of the
nation. For the Hindus are not a constituent. They are the nation, the "we" who
demand cooperation from the minorities, the "us" that the Muslims have to
learn to live with. Like the land and the trees, the rivers and mountains, these
invisible Hindus are the nation's natural condition, its essence and spirit. Their
culture is the nation's culture, their history its history. This needs no stating.
There was a poignant moment in the Constituent Assembly debates on
the question of minority rights when Frank Anthony, the leader of the Anglo-
Indians, referred to a comment sometimes made to him that he should drop the
prefix "Anglo" from his description of his community if he was as strongly
committed to India as he claimed. Anthony's response was that, "good or bad",
"rightly or wrongly", the word "Anglo-Indian" "connotes to me many things
which I hold dear." He went further, however: "I will drop it readily, as soon as
you drop your label.... The day you drop the label of 'Hindu,' the day you for-
get that you are a Hindu, that day-no, two days before that-I will drop by
deed poll, by beat of drum if necessary, the prefix "Anglo."' That day, he added,
"will be welcome first and foremost to the minorities of India."24
The Anglo-Indian leader's argument was logical, but misplaced. It would
have appeared meaningless to many Hindus, who did not have to use the des-
ignation "Hindu" in any case. At Partition and for a long time afterwards, they
were the silent majority. They did not need to advertise the fact that they were
Hindus: for some time after the assassination of Gandhi by a Hindu extremist,
it was even a little difficult for the more militant among them to do so. Inas-
much as they were Hindu, they were automatically Indian. It was enough in this
age of high nationalism to claim the latter designation. The question of what it
meant to be a Hindu, what advantages such a classification brought to the low-
er castes and classes, and whether the Hindus as a whole were disprivileged,
was not to be taken up in a sustained way until the 1980s or 90s.25
To have given greater political visibility to the category of the Hindus at the
moment of nationalist triumph in the 1940s would perhaps have meant running

24 Constituent Assembly Debates. Vol. VIII, 329.

25 Ambedkar and other Dalit leaders had of course already initiated a significant debate about
the relevance of the category "Hindu" for their followers, and similar questions had been raised in
connection with the adivasis in the work of anthropologists like G. S. Ghurye and Verrier Elwin.

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 CAN A MUSLIM BE AN INDIAN? 625

the risk of differentiating and problematizing it, and of having to recognize that
history and culture and naturalness are not uncontested. This may also be the
reason why the argument about whose country this is could not be acknowl-
edged as apolitical argument. For to concede that the nation was a political pro-
ject, first and foremost, would be to concede its historicity. To acknowledge that
the nationalist struggle was a struggle for political power would be to open up
the question of who should wield that power and to what end-for the progress
of the nation could not mean exactly the same thing to all parts of that imag-
ined community.
There was a tacit agreement (as it seemed) that, while these political ques-
tions would certainly be tackled in the constitution-making body and elsewhere,
they must be kept separate from the sacred and natural history of nationalism.
This set of questions therefore remained suspended in the nationalist debates at
the moment of Partition and Independence. Thus, a particular conception of the
Indian nation emerged, in which the Muslims had an unenviable place, the
Dalits and other oppressed castes and classes were invisible or only symboli-
cally present (as the "backward" parts of the nation, to be lifted up by those who
ruled in the "general interest," for the advancement of the nation as a whole),
and other religious minorities and marginal nationalities had to work in collab-
oration with, and willy-nilly in subordination to, that other invisible category,
the "mainstream, Hindu majority."

It may be said that my analysis of nationalist discourse in India is skewed by

the fact that I have investigated it at an exceptional time, amidst all the extra-
ordinary pressures and demands of Independence and, especially, Partition. My
response is simply this: all nations, all nationalisms and nationalist discourses,
are made in exceptional (that is to say, particular, if not unique) historical cir-
cumstances. It was in the particular context of 1947-building on more than a
century of colonial governance premised on the division between Hindus and
Muslims, and on an extended (and oft-retold) history of Muslim adventurers
raiding the land, settling, and setting up towns and kingdoms in which the ques-
tion of religious and ethnic identities became important political issues-that
the "we" of Indian nationalism came to be elaborated, and the Muslims came
to be marked out as a minority.
It was whiteness that came to be constructed as the core of American, or Aus-
tralian, nationhood, and Englishness that became the core of the British nation,
though, in all of these cases, the demographic and political changes brought by
a more recent history of substantial colored immigration (at times actively en-
couraged for economic reasons, at other times severely discouraged) have
pushed the "mainstream" into other channels or, at least, different debates. In
other circumstances-such as those of the subcontinent, where diverse regions
have fought to retain a greater degree of autonomy and political power-na-
tional cores have crystallized very differently. Indeed, even within one given

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626 GYANENDRA PANDEY

set of historical circumstances, there remains the distinct possibility of natio

al identities and boundaries and "mainstreams" crystallizing in different w
Surely the India of 1947 provides striking testimony to this.
Partition and Independence (not only in the form of divisions on the map,
of divisions on the ground and in the mind-the uprooting and looting, the
and the recovery operations) marked a moment of enormous uncertainty in
political and social life of the people of the subcontinent. There was no kn
ing in 1947, nor for some time afterwards, who would belong where wh
things "finally" settled down. There was the redesignation of local castes
communities: those who had long adhered somewhat loosely to the label
Muslim, Hindu, or Sikh were now categorically named as one or the other.
Meos of Mewat, the Momins of U.P. and Bihar, the Mapillas of Malabar-a
became simply "Muslims," and for a while nothing else. There was, as we
noted, confusion about the meaning of Pakistan: was it to be a Muslim na
or a secular nation? What were the minorities to do there? Could any Mus
from any part of the subcontinent go and settle in that country? (Of course,
of the same questions applied in the new India, too.) There was uncertain
about the future of the Princely States, about national boundaries (would G
daspur, or Khulna, or particular tahsils and even villages in those districts
India or Pakistan? Where would Kashmir go?), and about whether pe
would be free to come and go between Karachi and Bombay, Dacca and C
cutta and Hyderabad, as they had so long done, and continued to do for y
after the official partition.
A few concrete examples will help to clarify the point. In July 1947, Vallab
bhai Patel, Home Member in the Interim Government and acclaimed "str
man" of the Congress party, wrote to an anxious Hindu correspondent fr
West Punjab that the matter of citizenship was under the consideration of
Indian Constituent Assembly at that moment, but "whatever the definition m
be, you can rest assured that the Hindus and Sikhs of Pakistan cannot be
sidered as aliens in India [sic]."26 This is a particularly remarkable commen
light of all the charges that were to be leveled within the next few weeks
months against Muslims living in India.
In September 1947 Pakistani Army Headquarters approached the autho
ties at Aligarh Muslim University, 80 miles east of Delhi-practically in t
heart of the political and sectarian upheaval in India at the time-to prov
appropriate candidates from the university for recruitment to regular co
missions in the Pakistan army. That request, and the university authorities
nocent response-"Those interested in the above [call for applicatio
should see me in the Geography Department with a written application
ing full particulars"27-indicates how little the idea had sunk in, even for
ple in Government, that these were now separate countries, and that exis

26 Patel's letter of 16 July 1947 to Parmanand Trehan, in Durga Das, ed, Sardar Patel's Cor
spondence, 1945-50. Vol. V (Ahmedabad: Navajivan Publishing House, 1973), 289.
27 Ibid. Vol. IV (1972), 426-7.

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 CAN A MUSLIM BE AN INDIAN? 627

lines of communication and supply would therefore have to be reconsidered,

if not cut off.
Indeed it was in December 1947 that the government of India declared Pak-
istan to be "foreign territory" for the purpose-and for this restricted purpose
alone-of levying duties on raw jute and jute manufactures exported from In-
dia.28 Exit permits, passports, and visas for travel between India and Pakistan-
a special "Pakistan passport" first, and only later the standard passport needed
for international travel-were still some time in the future. On the Indian side,
in 1947-48, there was continued talk of possible reunification, and many, even
in high political circles, thought that Pakistan simply would not last.
Yet, virtually from 15 August 1947, when India and Pakistan were constitu-
tionally established as independent states, in the midst of this unparalleled un-
certainty, the Muslims of India were asked to make a categorical declaration of
the nation they belonged to: India or Pakistan. Towards the end of September
1947 even Jawaharlal Nehru was constrained to remark that only those men and
women, Hindus or Muslims, were welcome to live in India who considered it
their own nation, gave it their undivided loyalty, and refused to look to any out-
side agency for help. Removed from the confusion, suspicions, and violence of
the time, this was an unexceptionable statement. But as the Calcutta daily, The
Statesman, commented editorially on 5 October of that year, how were the Mus-
lims of India to prove their loyalty when the very act of fleeing in fear from their
homes was interpreted as a sign of disloyalty and extra-territorial attachment?
The consequences were hard, even for the more privileged among the Mus-
lims living in Indian territory. In October 1947, Choudhry Khaliquzzaman-
high-profile leader of the Muslim League in the Indian Constituent Assembly,
long time ally of Nehru and other Congress leaders in U.P. and subsequently a
vocal champion of the rights of India's Muslims-unexpectedly and abruptly
migrated to Pakistan, leaving a bewildered Muslim League party behind. No
one knew quite why he had suddenly made this decision, and his own expla-
nations-that he wanted to make way for younger blood, that he could not rec-
oncile himself to learning Hindi (which had been made the official language of
U.P., and (in his autobiography, ten years later) that he felt someone who had
Jinnah's continued confidence should replace him and serve as the leader of the
Indian Muslims-did not set the controversy at rest.
Somewhat later, in 1949, Z. H. Lari, the deputy leader of the Muslim League
in the U.P. legislature, also left for Pakistan, although he had by then spoken
out strongly against the "two-nation" theory, "separate electorates," "reserva-
tions" and the accompanying baggage. It was, as many who lived through those
times recall, primarily a question of where one could live in relative mental, and
physical, peace.
Ustad Bade Ghulam Ali Khan, the doyen of the Patiala gharana (school) of

28 Hindustan Times, 23 December 1947; see Ganda Singh's "Diary of Partition Days," cited in
Mushirul Hasan, ed. India Partitioned: The Other Face of Freedom. (Delhi: Roli Books, 1995),
vol. 2, 87.

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628 GYANENDRA PANDEY

Hindustani music, moved to Pakistan, to live there in obscurity for five y

and then returned to India before his death. Josh Malihabadi, the great U
poet from Malihabad, near Lucknow, who had declared along with a hos
other progressive writers that "we cannot partition Urdu,"29 went and came
went again, several times over, unhappy in that he had no nation, no home n
and probably unclear to the end whether Urdu had been partitioned and
its fate would be in the two countries.
The fact is that the choice between India and Pakistan could have no clear
meaning for Muslims living in what were called the "Muslim-minority
provinces" of British India, especially in the immediate aftermath of Partition
and Independence. The individuals mentioned in the preceding paragraphs
were part of an elite, and possessed the resources, as well as the bureaucratic
and political contacts, that enabled them to move to and fro, at least for a time.
There were innumerable others who did not have the luxury of such trial peri-
ods-or the chance of an appeal to Jawaharlal Nehru-yet moved one way and
then the other in search of security and peace.30 In November 1947, for in-
stance, it was reported that nearly five thousand Muslim railwaymen who had
earlier opted for service in Pakistan, had now "set the authorities a serious prob-
lem" by withdrawing their preference for Pakistan and refusing to leave India.
They were of course, by this change of decision, laying themselves open to the
charge of being Pakistani agents engaged in a conspiracy, though their motives
were almost certainly more mundane, the result of news of troubles on that side
of the border too, and of the fact that working in Pakistan would create its own
set of problems. Even their co-workers in U.P. were not inclined to be so gen-
erous, however. Hindu railwaymen in Lucknow threatened to go on strike if the
"Pakistan personnel" (sic) were allowed to stay, and the railway authorities in-
sisted that those who had opted for service in Pakistan must now go.31
A letter from one such railway worker, and the Indian government's response
to it, may serve as an appropriate conclusion to this paper. The letter was written
in September 1947 by Safdar Ali Khan, "Guard, Moradabad," to the Secretary,
"Partition Department," Government of India. Headed "Permission to revise my
decision 'to serve in India,' it said: "I had submitted my final choice to serve in

29 People's Age, 7 September 1947.

30 Thus a member of the staff of the British High Commission in Delhi, on tour on 17 Novem-
ber 1947, learned of a convoy of eighty thousand Meo peasants on their way to Pakistan along the
Alwar road, which was likely to delay his motor car by several hours between Sohna and Gurgaon.
On his homeward journey the next day, he saw that "the return movement of refugees had greatly
increased," the returnees including a group of some ten thousand Meos at Sohna who had decided
against going to Pakistan after all, judging that the dangers of going forward were greater than those
of turning back. (India Office Records, London) L/P & J/7/12589, R. C. Hadow's report on his
visit to Alwar.
31 Statesman, 23 November 1947. Cf. Statesman, 15 October 1947, in which their Lucknow cor-
respondent reports that "By an interesting unanimity of purpose, backed, no doubt, by a firm ad-
ministration of law and order, [the Muslims of U.P., who, he notes, form the largest concentration
of Muslims outside the "Pakistan areas"] have been determined hitherto to stay put."

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 CAN A MUSLIM BE AN INDIAN? 629

Pakistan.... The persuasions of my fellow-workers and friends favoured

[forced?] me to come to this decision at which I am rubbing my hands now
[sic].... My old mother is lying very seriously ill and she is not in a mood to al-
low me to go to Pakistan as she has no hope to survive her illness.... I have blun-
dered in favour of Pakistan. Really speaking, as I have stated above, the decision
was not my own but... made under compulsion. I am an Indian first and an In-
dian last. I want to live in India and die in India.... Hence I humbly request your
honour to permit me to revise my decision and allow me to serve in India."32
Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, the Education Minister of India, forwarded this
letter to the Home Minister, Vallabhbhai Patel, who responded briefly: "The
Partition Council decision has been that once a final choice is made it should
be adhered to. I [can] see no prospect, therefore, of the gentleman, whose ap-
plication you have sent me, being allowed to change his option now."33
There is a bureaucratic imperative at work here: two new state administra-
tions are being set up, rules have to be made and followed. But there is a na-
tionalist imperative as well. People simply have to decide where they stand and
who they are, once and for all: and this is a demand, as we have observed, that
is made insistently of one part of the nation's inhabitants.
There were perhaps two voices of nationalism that could be heard in the
above exchange, but it was the second that won out, as it has so often done in
our times, asserting certainty even in the midst of the wholly uncertain. Na-
tionalist thought has, indeed, always tended towards this end: by its separation
of the public from the private-of the citizen from the merchant, from the day-
laborer, the landowner, the religious person, and the Jew, as Marx noted fa-
mously in his "On the Jewish Question."34
Yet these private selves necessarily intrude upon the public. The corruptions
that nationalists decry go to make up history and the concrete conditions in
which we live. History, one might say, is nothing if it is not a process of cont-
amination (to use a nationalist term): and a visionary politics has to be a con-
tinual process of negotiating new beginnings.
No nation, no state is natural; no people as chosen or pure as they might pre-
tend. This is as true of Germany in the 1930s as it is of Germany today; as it is
of Israel or Japan or any other modern nation-state. And it is-one might say
fortunately-manifestly true in the Indian case. No citizen of India can avoid
being Hindu/Muslim, Bengali/Kannadiga, shopkeeper/laborer, man/woman,
father/mother, lower caste/upper caste, at the same time. It is tyrannical, in my
view, to suggest that this is somehow traitorous.

32 Das. Patel's Correspondence. Vol. IV, 421.

33 Ibid. 422.
34 "The difference between the religious man and the citizen is the [same as the] difference be-
tween the merchant and the citizen, between the day-labourer and the citizen, between the landown-
er and the citizen, between the living individual and the citizen." Karl Marx. "On the Jewish Ques-
tion," in Karl Marx, Early Writings (London: Penguin Books, 1975), 220-221 (emphasis Marx's).

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