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VERBUM VITAE • 41/3 (2023)
Received: Jun 9, 2023 | Accepted: August 10, 2023 | Published: Oct 3, 2023
833–858

One God – Many Religions?

The Role of Negative Theology in Contemporary
Interpretations of Religious Pluralism
KRYSTIAN KAŁUŻA HTTPS:/ ORCID.ORG/0000-0002-7605-8132
University of Opole, [email protected]

Abstract: The article discusses the role of negative theology in contemporary interpretations of reli-
gious pluralism in an analytical and synthetic way. One of such interpretations is the pluralistic theology
of religion. In view of the problems encountered due to such a way of looking at religions, a different
direction of interpretation is proposed in the article. Accepting the validity of the basic intention of nega-
tive theology, the author presents a thesis that a Christian theology of religious pluralism can be based
on Trinitarian theology as a kind of “matrix” of religious experience. A systematic criterion was used in
the elaboration of the subsequent steps: (1) The faces of transcendence, (2) The pluralist hypothesis,
(3) Via negativa, (4) The limits of negation, (5) Experience and language, (6) The nature of transcendence,
(7) Toward a Trinitarian interpretation of religious pluralism. The presented model of Trinitarian interpre-
tation of religious pluralism can be called an integrative model. It is based on the assumption that it is
possible to demonstrate certain similarities between the properties of the individual Persons of the Trin-
ity and various ideas and concepts of Ultimate Reality found in different religions.
Keywords: negative theology, religious pluralism, pluralistic theology of religion, Ultimate Reality, Trini-
tarian theology

There are different images of Ultimate Reality in different religions. Where do those
differences come from? How can they be explained? Isn’t the source of religion
the revelation or experience of the same God? Is it possible for God to once reveal
himself as a personal „You” (YHWH, Heavenly Father, Allah), inviting a man to
a salvific dialogue and community of life, and another time as an impersonal and
nameless Reality (Brahman, Dharmakāya, Nirvāna, Shūnyatā), against which one
can only remain silent? The purpose of the article is, first, to find an appropriate
hermeneutic of religion to give a meaningful and theologically credible answer to
the above questions. Second, to present the role that negative theology plays in con-
temporary interpretations of religious pluralism. Apophatism is one of the pillars
of the so-called pluralistic theology of religion, according to which the plurality of
religions is the result of culturally conditioned interpretations of one and the same
Ultimate Reality, which, in itself, is incomprehensible and indescribable. In view of
the problems encountered due to such a way of looking at religions, a different di-
rection of interpretation is proposed in the article. Accepting the validity of the basic
intention of negative theology, the author presents a thesis that a Christian theology

http:/ creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/4.0 ISSN 1644-8561 | e-ISSN 2451-280X | DOI: https://doi.org/10.31743/vv.16381 Kaluza 833
Krystian Kałuża

of religious pluralism can be based on Trinitarian theology as a kind of „matrix” of

religious experience. God is the Triune God, therefore every authentic revelation or
religious experience is of the Trinitarian nature. That does not mean that all religions
contain some sort of „pre-phenomenon” or „archetype” of Trinitarian faith. It rather
means that different images and concepts of God, as well as the way of experiencing
the relationship with Him, are given different forms depending on which of the Per-
sons of the Trinity (in the Christian sense) they are specifically oriented towards.
It seems that such different understandings and approaches to the mystery of God
have surprising counterparts in the great religions of the world.

1. The Faces of Transcendence

Essentially, in terms of religions, there are two opposing concepts of Ultimate Reali-
ty: personal (theistic) and non-personal (non-theistic). The personal concept is char-
acteristic mainly of monotheistic religions such as Judaism, Christianity and Islam.
Their followers are convinced that there is a personal God, the creator of the world
and a man, the giver of life and the basis of all existence. The term “person” can be
understood in different ways. With regard to God, it indicates, first of all, that He is
a being with cognition, power and will; therefore He also has the ability to enter into
a dialogical relationship with a man.1 Such an approach to Ultimate Reality resulted
in various anthropomorphisms, which; however, began to be explained quite early as
allegories and metaphors helpful for our way of understanding God. Consequently,
the anthropomorphisms were not removed but corrected and given the appropriate
meaning and sense. While it was done, it was emphasized that no symbols or images
of God found in the Bible could be literally applied to God. As Moses Maimonides
(1135–1204) wrote: “Know that the negative attributes of God are the true attributes:
they do not include any incorrect notions or any deficiency whatever in reference to
God, while positive attributes imply polytheism, and are inadequate.”2 Consequent-
ly, one cannot know who God really is, one can only know who He is not. Such
reasoning is called the path or negative/apophatic theology (Greek: ἀπόφασις, ne-
gation): it is the path to infinity through the negation of all that is finite. It begins
when the human mind understands that it is not possible to define the mystery
of God by means of any analogies, images and concepts drawn from the created
world. The sense of inadequacy and limitation of the positive qualities attributed
to God prompts the reason to rise above positive concepts. However, that does not
mean their complete abandonment. God is the being the human mind senses in

1 Cf. Kreiner, “Gottesbegriff,” 153.

2 Moses Maimonides, The Guide for the Perplexed, 81.

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 One God – Many Religions?The Role of Negative Theology

the creation and, at the same time, He is different, absolutely transcendent in relation
to the reality of the created world.3
Non-personal concepts of Transcendent Reality are characteristic mainly of East-
ern religions, such as Hinduism, Buddhism and Taoism. Those religions are some-
times referred to as mystical or apophatic religions as they emphasize the transcen-
dent nature of Ultimate Reality.4
Hindu ideas about Ultimate Reality focus on Brahman – the impersonal and
absolutely transcendent force of the universe. In the Upanishads (thus in Vedism and
Brahmanism), Brahman is the impersonal, all-pervasive spirit of the universe. Some
Hindus emphasize that It is not emptiness, because It gathers all things within Itself.
It is unknowable; although, on the other hand, It is the “pre-basis” of everything.
Hindus also believe that It is present in every form of deity. However, despite Its
murti (personal forms), Brahman ultimately has no attributes. It is an entity „without
properties” – ineffable, immeasurable, inconceivable and amorphous. It represents
a pure idea, principle, transcendence.5
Based on the teaching of Primordial Buddhism (Hinayana), from which the Ther-
avada school – which still exists today – is derived, the Ultimate Reality is nirvana
(Pali: nibbāna). It is the highest good of a man and means the „complete extinction”
or „total annihilation” of violent desire and all passions; therefore, it is the achieve-
ment of a perfect peace of mind, supreme happiness. The Buddha spoke very little
about nirvana and refused to define it. Like the monotheistic theologians following
the path of negation, he preferred to explain what nirvana was not. Thus, he taught
that it was „a realm where there is no earth, nor water, nor fire, nor air [...] No one is
born there, no one departs or remains there [...] It is the end of all suffering (dukkha)
[...] It is the non-born, the non-created, non-made [...]”6. Is nirvana the Buddhist
equivalent of God? According to Steven Collins, nirvana should be understood as
an unconditional, timeless and indescribable reality, which is also the ultimate pur-
pose of all human endeavours. However, comparing it with the idea of God is inap-
propriate as it is nowhere referred to as “the origin or ground of the universe.”7 Chris-
topher Gowans expressed a similar opinion: “The most important are that, unlike
God, Nibbana is not the ultimate cause of the universe, and it is not a personal being
who is omnipotent, omniscient, and all-loving. Hence, it is not a reality on which
human beings depend or with whom they could form a personal relationship.”8
At the center of Daoism, on the other hand, there is the impersonal principle
of Dao (Tao), which is the eternal and unchanging fundamental basis of the world.

3 Hryniewicz, Hermeneutyka w dialogu, 50.

4 Schmidt-Leukel, Das himmlische Geflecht, 64–71.
5 Cf. Nelson, “Krishna,” 309–328.
6 Majjhima Nikāya 63. As cited in: Thanippara, “Nirwana,” 286.
7 Collins, Nirvana, 176–177.
8 Gowans, Philosophy of the Buddha, 151.

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Krystian Kałuża

“Dao” literally means a “way” or a “path,” although Its semantic scope is much wider.
Dao is perfectly transcendent, therefore It cannot be described or expressed with
the use of terms. It is nameless as each name means something existing in a certain
way. Dao, on the other hand, eludes any distinction; It is the overriding principle.
Nevertheless, Its “strength” or “power” (de) manifests itself in nature, which is ex-
pressed in the order of things.9
Thus, it can be seen that the field of religious beliefs is highly complex, hetero-
geneous and incommensurable. Moreover, in many cases, the beliefs are opposed to
each other and a conflict arises between them. It is reflected not only in the sphere of
subjective belief, where individuals choose a particular religion, but it can also lead
to social conflicts and even religious wars. “Fields of Blood,” which mark the history
of religion, are a telling testimony to the above.10 This raises the question of whether
it is possible to create such a theory that would, on the one hand, analyze the main
causes of the conflict of religious beliefs – show its social, cultural and doctrinal con-
ditions – and, on the other hand, would indicate the way to overcome them. Accord-
ing to some philosophers and theologians of religion, such a theory is presented by
the so-called pluralistic theology of religion. One of the main pillars of its theoretical
edifice is negative or apophatic theology.

2. The Pluralist Hypothesis

The origins of pluralistic theology of religion (known as “pluralism” for short) date
back to the 1970s and are associated with the first publications of John Hick from
that period. Its main representatives – apart from Hick, who promoted the concept
of the “Copernican Revolution” in theology – are Wilfred C. Smith, Paul F. Knitter,
Raimon Panikkar and Perry Schmidt-Leukel, inter alia. The basic thesis of pluralism
is that at the center of the world of religions, there is the unknowable and indescrib-
able Divine Reality and religions are the space in which it is revealed in the form
of personal and non-personal absolutes. Different Divine characters and different
non-personal manifestations of the sacrum are various types of transformations of
the „impact” of the Transcendent Reality on our minds. Transcendence, however,
in its inner nature, stays beyond the reach of our conscious experience. It can nei-
ther be described nor understood since it goes beyond the systems of concepts and
categories within which a man is capable of thinking. In that sense, it is trans-cate-
gorial, outside the scope of human perception.11 One can only describe its “impact”

9 Ching – Chang, “Dao,” 82.

10 Cf. Armstrong, Fields of Blood, 3–4.
11 Hick, The New Frontier of Religion and Science, 163.

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 One God – Many Religions?The Role of Negative Theology

on us. That impact is experienced, interpreted and expressed through concepts and
perceptions specific to a given culture and religion. Consequently, all religions are
culturally conditioned elements of one dynamic Continuum, and the factor that dif-
ferentiates them is historical and cultural conditions. In that context, Hick quotes
the Persian poet and Sufi, Rumi (1207–1273), who stated: “The lamps are different,
but the Light is the same; it comes from Beyond.”12
Among the main theoretical and cognitive assumptions of the pluralistic the-
ology of religion, the following should be mentioned: the concept of Transcendent
Reality, the concept of religious experience and the specific understanding of truth
and religious language.
As already mentioned, the “pluralists” assume that at the foundation of all the great
religions of the world, there is one, incomprehensible and ineffable Ultimate Reality.
The concept of Ultimate Reality is so broad that its content seems to go beyond not
only the boundaries set for it by various theisms and philosophies related to God but
also by individual religions. Also in that matter, the supporters of the pluralist option
can refer to a rich philosophical and theological tradition. Karl Rahner, for example,
speaks of a “mystery” that is “nameless and infinitely sacred.” That “sacred mystery”
is given in the “where to” of human transcendence as “unmanageable and disposing,
as inaccessible and receding away.”13 In Christianity, that absolutely existing sacred
mystery is called “God.”14 Paul Tillich uses the term “the God above the God of the-
ism,” which refers to an absolute faith that goes beyond the theistic objectification of
God.15 Gordon D. Kaufman distinguishes between “real God” and “available God”
while stating that the former is “utterly unknowable X” and the latter is “essentially
a mental or imaginative construct.”16 Ninian Smart mentions “the noumenal Focus
of religion which so to say lies behind the phenomenal Foci of religious experience
and practice.”17 Langdon Gilkey assumes that all religious concepts, doctrines and
images of God are culturally conditioned, and therefore “no cultural logos is final
and therefore universal.”18 The American theologian uses such terms as: “the abso-
lute,” “encompassing mystery,” “infinite mystery,” which are meant to designate some
unspecified reality, non-relational, supra-cultural and supra-religious.19 According
to Gilkey, the infinite can be conceptualized as God, and God, as a symbol, can be
conceptualized in relation to the mystery that transcends Him.20

12 Hick, The New Frontier of Religion and Science, 153.

13 Rahner, Grundkurs des Glaubens, 74.
14 Rahner, Grundkurs des Glaubens, 76.
15 Tillich, The Courage to Be, 190.
16 Kaufman, God the Problem, 85–86.
17 Smart, “Our Experience of the Ultimate,” 24.
18 Gilkey, “Plurality,” 48.
19 Gilkey, “Plurality,” 48–49.
20 Cf. Kondrat, Racjonalność, 265.

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Krystian Kałuża

In the view of pluralists, such a way of understanding Ultimate Reality is a good

starting point for formulating a hypothesis that the great religions of the world (Hick
means the religions that emerged during and after the “Axial” era [approximately 800
to 200 BC])21 – each with its own temples, spiritual practices, cultural expression,
lifestyles, laws and customs, doctrines, art forms, etc. – are the result of different
responses of a man to one and the same Transcendent Reality. That reality, in itself,
is beyond the reach of human conceptual systems and categories. Nevertheless, it is
universally present as an essential basis of our existence. Interacting with the reli-
gious aspect of human nature, it has produced – depending on culture, language
and even personality conditions – both personal and non-personal foci of religious
worship and meditation (gods and absolutes), which exist on a common ground con-
necting the Real and the human mind.22 Therefore, such concepts as God, YHWH,
Allah, Brahman, Vishnu, Krishna, Sunyata do not refer to different ultimate realities23
but express human experiences and representations of the Real. According to Hick,
all of them (personal and non-personal) are equally important and equivalent, as
long as they result from the authentic attitude of believers towards Ultimate Reality.24

3. Via Negativa

The theological justification for such an interpretation of religious pluralism is pro-

vided, according to the “pluralists,” by negative (or apophatic) theology, based on
which one cannot say who God is, but only who He is not.25 Dionysius the Areopagite,
one of the most prominent representatives of that trend, expressed the above thought
as follows: “The negations respecting things Divine are true, but the affirmations are
inappropriate.”26 This means that anything that something can be said about is not
God.27 For God completely transcends human concepts, images and imagination,

21 Hick, The Fifth Dimension, 24–25.

22 Hick, The Fifth Dimension, 100.
23 Based on the most extreme form of pluralism, referred to as “polycentric pluralism,” religions are com-
pletely separate and unrelated, each of them worshiping or responding to its own Ultimate Reality and
constituting an autonomous path leading to its assumed goal. Schmidt-Leukel, Gott ohne Grenzen, 176.
24 See Hick, “Eine Philosophie,” 301–318.
25 Thomas Aquinas, Summa contra gentiles I, 14, 2: “We are unable to apprehend [the divine substance] by
knowing what it is. Yet we are able to have some knowledge of it by knowing what it is not.”
26 Pseudo-Dionysius Areopagita, De coelesti hierarchia II, 3.
27 Cf. von Balthasar, Kosmische Liturgie, 84: “Evagrius is the author of the expression that summarizes
the entire teaching on mystical cognition, from Philo to Maximus: ‘The mind is not able to apprehend
God cognitively. If it does, it is certainly not God’. [...] Maximus also says: ‘If someone claims to have seen
God and know what they have seen, they have certainly seen nothing’.”

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 One God – Many Religions?The Role of Negative Theology

and thus remains totally inexpressible, incomprehensible and indescribable.28 Hence

the ultimate “word” to be used to mention God should be reverent silence.29
Negative theology is not an original project of Christian thought and has its or-
igin in Hellenistic philosophy.30 Christian theology has always taught about God’s
transcendence; however, the issue of God’s unknowability gained prominence only
through Neoplatonic influence.31 Unlike in Plato, for whom God was difficult to
comprehend and impossible to express,32 Gregory of Nazianzus declares that “while
it is impossible to express (what God is), it is even more impossible to comprehend
Him.”33 The expression: si comprehendis, non est Deus!, taken over from the Greeks,
goes from Augustine deep into the Middle Ages as: “that infinite cannot be compre-
hended by any mode of knowledge.”34
From the 4th century, especially from Gregory of Nyssa, negative theology be-
comes “the crown” of Christian theology.35 Its radical form can be found in the works
of the aforementioned Dionysius the Areopagite, for whom the Godhead was beyond
existence and unity. “It hath no name, nor can It be grasped by the reason; It dwells
in a region beyond us, where our feet cannot tread. Even the title of ‘Goodness’ we do
not ascribe to It because we think such a name suitable.”36
Among the heirs of the ancient tradition of negative theology, Thomas Aquinas,
Meister Eckhart and Nicholas of Cusa are usually mentioned. In his commentary
on Boethius’ treatise De Trinitate, Thomas Aquinas states: “God as an unknown is
said to be the terminus of our knowledge in the following respect: that the mind is
found to be most perfectly in possession of knowledge of God when it is recognized

28 The concept of indescribability should be distinguished from that of incomprehensibility, most often
associated with negative theology. For it is legitimate to say that since God is indescribable He is also in-
comprehensible. However, the incomprehensibility of God does not necessarily imply the indescribability
of God. The thesis about the indescribability of God is therefore stronger than the one about the incom-
prehensibility of God. Cf. Kreiner, Das wahre Antlitz Gottes, 32.
29 It is worth noting that the thesis of the incomprehensibility or indescribability of God ultimately leads
to the adoption of the thesis that the set of properties (predicates) used to refer to God is an empty set,
or to the statement that every sentence such as “God is (has property) x” is a false one (a radical form of
negative theology). However, if the meaning of the word “God” cannot be established at the level of con-
cepts, the suspicion arises that the word means nothing, and theology – as critical and responsible “talk of
God” – is a groundless and meaningless undertaking. See Kałuża, Granice apofazy, 369–392.
30 See Hadot, Filozofia, 239–252.
31 Hadot, Filozofia, 247: “It should be clearly stated that the theologians from the patristic period introduced
apophatism into Christian theology using the arguments and technical vocabulary of the Neoplatonists.
In particular, the influence of the Neoplatonist Proclus on the works of Dionysius the Areopagite is indis-
putable.”
32 Plato, Tim. 28 c.
33 As cited in: von Balthasar, Theologik, 82.
34 Augustinus, Civ., XII, 18: “Neque ab hac fide me philosophorum argumenta deterrent, quorum acutissi-
mum illud putatur, quod dicunt nulla infinita ulla scientia posse conprehendi.”
35 Hadot, Filozofia, 246.
36 Pseudo-Dionysius Areopagita, De divinis nominibus XIII, 3.

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Krystian Kałuża

that His essence is above everything that the mind is capable of apprehending in
this life; and thus, although what He is remains unknown, yet it is known that He
is.”37 Although Thomas places great emphasis on the apophatic side of his theology,
he differs from Dionysius the Areopagite in the thesis that attributes expressing per-
fection are predicated of God “not as the cause only, but also essentially.”38 That is
an extremely important point as the proponents of the pluralist option often refer to
the works of Thomas Aquinas to support their radical apophatism.39
Meister Eckhart also emphasizes the indescribability and unknowability of God:
“If I had a God that I could get to know, I would never consider Him to be God.”40
No one is able to, in the proper sense, define who God is. “God is beyond anything
that can be put into words.”41 Similar statements can be found in Nicholas of Cusa,
who argued that no word, even “ineffable,” could be rightly attributed to God. And
if He cannot be called “Nothingness,” it is because “Nothingness” is also a name. He
cannot be called “something” either as the word applies only to individual entities.
Thus, God is “supra Nihil et aliquid.”42
It is worth noting here that there is a significant difference between the “found-
ing fathers” of Christian negative theology and its contemporary followers in the field
of pluralistic theology of religion. For Dionysius the Areopagite, it was clear that
apophatic theology was part of a broader project that included cataphatic theology,
while the goal of transcending language was the glorification of God and mystical
union with Him. The starting point of the “mystical apophase” is not the absolute
unknowability of God (the Absolute), as the “pluralists” want, but the awareness that
everything temporal that surrounds a man cannot be what they seek as it is finite
and transient so it must be negated as such. In that sense, God’s transcendence pre-
cedes His immanence. However, the effort of a man in search of God – even if that
search is carried out somewhat “in the dark” (cf. Acts 17:27) – cannot be deprived
of objective justification as it would be no different from agnosticism capitulating at
the beginning of the path.43 In that sense, God’s immanence precedes His transcen-

37 Thomas Aquinas, Super Boetium De Trinitate, I, q. 1, a. 2, ad 1: “Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod se-
cundum hoc dicimur in fine nostre cognitionis Deum tamquam ignotum cognescere, quia tunc maxime
mens in cognitione profecisse inuenitur, quando cognoscit eius essentiam esse supra omne quod appre-
hendere potest in statu uie; et sic quamuis maneat ignotum quid est, scitur tamen quia est.”
38 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae I, q. 13, a. 6, corp.: “[…] huiusmodi nomina non solum dicuntur de
Deo causaliter, sed etiam essentialiter. Cum enim dicitur Deus est bonus, vel sapiens, non solum significa-
tur quod ipse sit causa sapientie vel bonitas, sed quod haec in eo eminentius praeexistunt.”
39 E.g., Schmidt-Leukel, “Niemand hat Gott je gesehen?,” 279: “In a sense [...] Thomas and Hick agree with
each other: a finite man can only get to know and experience the infinite God in a way marked by their
own finitude, so the infinite essence of God remains to a man an incomprehensible mystery forever.”
40 Meister Eckhart, Predigten, II, 193.
41 Meister Eckhart, Predigten, I, 635.
42 Kołakowski, Horror metaphysicus, 64.
43 Cf. von Kutschera, Vernunft und Glaube, 73–74.

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 One God – Many Religions?The Role of Negative Theology

dence.44 As Hans Urs von Batlthasar notes: “The search has its origin in a certain
pre-relation to the Sought-after, although that relation, especially in the biblical per-
spective, but also already on the basis of the pre-knowledge of the Seeker, contains
some sort of a contradiction.”45 In that context, Alois M. Haas speaks of a “mystical
paradox,” where the last “word” about God (Christianity is a religion of the Word)
is transformed into a reverent silence.46 In Neoplatonism, as well as in Eastern reli-
gions such as Mahayana Buddhism and Zen Buddhism, that dual (paradoxical) refer-
ence to the inaccessible Absolute – total conceptual elusiveness on the one hand, and
a constant, circling search that may temporarily end with “touching” and “finding”
on the other hand – becomes the focal point of an increasingly ambivalent philoso-
phy: no speculation can lead to mysticism, no mystical experience can be translat-
ed into speculation.47 Therefore, as von Balthasar concludes: “if there is ‘silence«’ at
the end of philosophical negative theology, as the arrows of all concepts and words
fall to the ground before reaching their target, there is another type of silence at
the end of Christian theology: adoration that, due to the abundance of what has been
given, is also breathtaking.”48 The similarities and differences between the two forms
of silence beyond all that can be uttered will have to be considered later on. It will be
done in the context of the issue of religious experience, since it is mainly the category
on which the apophatism of pluralistic theology of religion is based. The fundamen-
tal question that arises here is: how far can one go in negations without falling into
logical contradictions and, above all, without losing the essential meaning of negative
theology as a project of Christian theology?

44 It is worth remembering that ignorance (αγνώσια), as discussed by Dionysius the Areopagite, is not
an a priori assumption from which reflection on God should begin. It is rather a state of mind reached
through the successive stages of getting to know God. Cf. Striet, Offenbares Geheimnis, 53–54: “Dionysius
the Areopagite develops the concept of negative theology, the guiding principle of which is the belief in
the unknowability and absolute transcendence of God. [...] At the same time, according to Dionysius
the Areopagite, the unknowability of God is a conceptual unknowability (‘begriffene Unerkennbarkeit’).
The assertion of God’s unknowability is not the result of ‘some vague irrationality’ (‘einer diffusen Irratio-
nalität’). The statement [by Dionysius the Areopagite; KK] that God is incomprehensible, and that reason
must therefore plunge into mystical ‘darkness’, is an opinion achieved through cognition and in connec-
tion with that cognition, and not an expression of agnosticism.”
45 Von Balthasar, Theologik, 83.
46 See Haas, Mystik als Aussage, 127–171.
47 See Hochstaffl, Negative Theologie, 65–81.
48 Von Balthasar, Theologik, 98.

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4. The Limits of Negation

As already mentioned, the radical form of negative theology is expressed in the belief
that any sentence such as “God is x” is a false one.49 Consequently, the language of re-
ligion has no cognitive value, but a pragmatic-expressive value at most, which means
that its task is not to provide a man with some information about God, but to express
religious feelings and arouse the appropriate attitude towards Him.50 For God, in His
essence, is indescribable and therefore unknowable – Quid est Deus nescimus.51
The metaphysical basis of the above statement is usually found in the transcen-
dence of God, that is, in the ontological difference between God and the world, be-
tween the Creator and the creation. At first glance, that argument seems quite con-
vincing; however, on longer reflection, it is easy to see the aporia hidden in it. Stating
that type of difference presupposes exactly what is attempted to be denied on its
basis, namely, the possibility of speaking of God, that is, His describability. As Peter
Kügler notes: “The first problem is that by saying that ‘God is indescribable’ one
actually describes Him. ‘God is indescribable’ is a description of God, therefore it is
not true that God is indescribable. The sentence ‘God is indescribable’ is self-contra-
dictory, thus it cannot be true.”52 That raises the question of the logical consistency of
the thesis of God’s indescribability.
Hick is also aware of this problem.53 He admits that “it would indeed not make
sense to say of X that none of our concepts apply to it. […] For it is obviously impos-
sible to refer to something that does not even have the property od ‘being able to be
referred to’.”54 In his opinion, the property “being such that our concepts do not apply
to it” cannot refer to that very property as this would lead to a contradiction.55 Ulti-
mately; however, Hick believes that those difficulties are merely “logical pedantries”
that should not trouble anyone who, while constructing their theological system,
refers to the statement about “ineffability of the divine nature.”56
Hick’s key argument to solve the issue of the possibility of relating concepts to Ul-
timate Reality that goes beyond human thought categories is to distinguish between
“substantial properties, such as ‘being good’, ‘being powerful’, ‘having knowledge’, and
purely formal and logically generated properties such as ‘being a referent of a term’

49 Kreiner, Das wahre Antlitz Gottes, 32; cf. Stace, Time and Eternity, 33: “To say that God is ineffable is to say
that no concepts apply to Him, and that He is without qualities. […] And this implies that any statement
of the form ‘God is x’ is false.”
50 Cf. Werbick, Gott verbindlich, 84–86.
51 Thomas Aquinas, De potentia, q. 7, a. 2, ad. 11.
52 Kügler, Übernatürlich und unbegreifbar, 125.
53 Cf. Hick, An Interpretation of Religion, 239–240.
54 Hick, An Interpretation of Religion, 239.
55 Hick, An Interpretation of Religion, 239.
56 Cf. Hick, An Interpretation of Religion, 239.

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 One God – Many Religions?The Role of Negative Theology

and ‘being such that our substantial concepts do not apply’.”57 According to Hick,
apophatic thinkers claim that no substantial property can be related to the essence of
God/Transcendence as it is completely unknowable and inexpressible to a man. That
is the role of via negationis (or via remotionis): through negative statements about
God or the divine, to lead to the conviction that no positive-substantial descriptions
are able to convey His essence. In that specific sense, it can be said that no substantial
properties (concepts) apply to Ultimate Reality.58
Hick’s proposal is usually criticized for not specifying what exactly is the dif-
ference between the formal and substantial nature of the properties attributed to
God/the Real.59 In view of this apparent deficiency, Christopher J. Insole proposes to
consider formal properties as those “which determine directly and solely what other
properties can (or cannot) be ascribed to the subject,”60 stressing that this is the only
information that such properties convey (e.g., “it is inappropriate to predicate color
properties”). Formal properties are not; however – as Hick argues – logically gener-
ated, unless one defines God as “x to which no substantial properties apply.” Yet, also
here, logical rules alone are not enough to formulate such a claim. For some knowl-
edge of God is necessary for one to be able to say about Him that “no substantial
properties apply to Him.” Consequently, it turns out that certain formal properties
are attributed to God based on the knowledge of His substantial properties.61 Insole
thus demonstrates that to assign a formal property to God, one needs to know more
about Him than when one wants to define Him using a substantial property. This is
because formal properties determine which substantial properties can be attributed
to an object. However, to be aware what substantial properties an object may or may
not have, it is important to know (1) its ontological type (physical object, fictional,
divine, etc.), (2) its ontological nature (simple, complex, personal, transcendent, im-
manent, etc.), our cognitive status with respect to that type of object, and (4) the type
of properties that can be assigned (based on the knowledge of 1, 2, 3) to the object.
The situation is different in the case of substantial properties. Here, it is not necessary
to have such extensive knowledge.62

57 Hick, An Interpretation of Religion, 239.

58 Cf. Hick, An Interpretation of Religion, 239.
59 Cf. Rowe, “Religious pluralism,” 139–150. William L. Rowe proposes his own terms for formal and sub-
stantial properties, formed based on the works of Hick. According to him “a formal property of the Real is
some abstract characteristic the Real has that is a condition for our bing able either to refer to it or to pos-
tulate it as that which is encountered trough the personal deities and impersonal absolutes of the major
religious traditions” (145). In turn, “a substantial property of the Real would be a property that belongs to
its essential nature” (145). While doing so, Rowe criticises the statement of Hick that the Real completely
goes beyond the network of human concepts. For it is impossible to utter that sentence without falling
into a contradiction as the word “exceeds” used in it is also a concept. Thus, the aforementioned logical
problem remains unsolved.
60 Insole, “Why John Hick,” 28.
61 Cf. Insole, “Why John Hick,” 28–29.
62 Cf. Insole, “Why John Hick,” 29–30.

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5. Experience and Language

Epistemology, which Hick makes one of the pillars of his concept of religious ex-
perience, plays a special role in justifying the pluralist hypothesis. In this regard,
the British philosopher points to three main positions on the relationship between
our experience of the world and the world we are aware of.63
The first position is naive realism. It is based on our natural assumption that
the world around us is exactly the way we perceive it. That belief works perfectly well
in practice. Over the course of evolution, our senses have evolved to register only
those aspects of the environment that we need to be aware of to survive and develop.
However, the world we experience is actually only a small part of the whole being
discovered by natural science. We hear only a small part of the sound scale – some
animals are able to hear sounds above or below our hearing threshold. We also fail to
capture most of the chemical differences in our environment. We are simply aware
of the form of the world around us that suits our needs as the organisms that we are:
formed by our inherited niche, both on a macro and a micro scale.64
The opposing position is “idealism,” according to which the world we perceive
exists only in our minds (or rather, in my mind, since others are also part of the world
I perceive). The sophist Gorgias (c. 480–385 BC) is considered the founder of that
view. Of a similar opinion, but without a solipsistic conclusion, was George Berke-
ley (1685–1753). That Anglican bishop and scholar claimed that there was a God,
independent of our mind, who imposed our perceptions on us, guaranteeing their
continuity and coherence at the same time. Since those perceptions are ordered, we
call them the order of nature65.
The third position, advocated by Hick, is a middle approach called critical re-
alism66. The prominent thinker of the modern era, Immanuel Kant (1724–1804), is
considered its precursor. The German philosopher affirmed the existence of a reality
independent of us (realism), recognizing at the same time that it was not given to us
in itself, i.e. outside of experience, but only in such a way that the innate structure of
the human mind was capable of showing the influence of that reality on the conscious-
ness of a man, that is, in the form of phenomena (critical realism). In other words, we
are not able to know things the way they are. We only know phenomena, i.e. the ob-
jects within the field of experience. Things-in-themselves are outside the field of
experience, they are not phenomena but, as Kant says, noumena (from Greek
νoούμενον, “something that is only conceived, imagined”). Therefore, we are not
able to get to know them67. Consequently, Kant speaks of a “Copernican revolution,”

63 Hick, The New Frontier of Religion and Science, 137–140.

64 Hick, The New Frontier of Religion and Science, 137.
65 Hick, The New Frontier of Religion and Science, 128; 137–138.
66 Hick, The New Frontier of Religion and Science, 138; cf. Hick, The Fifth Dimension, 57–59.
67 Cf. Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, B 307.

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 One God – Many Religions?The Role of Negative Theology

to which leads the concept of cognition proposed by him: there is no object without
a subject since the subject is the condition of its cognition.68 To put it differently,
the object is “constructed” or “constituted” (Edmund Husserl) by the subject from
the impressions that come from it. According to Hick, that view is confirmed by
modern sciences, especially cognitive psychology and sociology of knowledge, as
well as quantum physics.69 However, the basis of that idea was expressed centuries
earlier by Thomas Aquinas in his statement: “The things known is in the knower
according to the mode of the knower.”70
Kant’s distinction between the phenomenal world and the world of noumena is
of a philosophical nature; however, formally, it is strikingly reminiscent of Neopla-
tonic apophaticism (Plotinus, Proclus, Damascius), according to which an absolute
principle cannot be the subject of knowledge.71 It is therefore not surprising that Hick
makes the above one of the basic assumptions of his concept of religious experience.
The British philosopher says directly: “the Transcendent is the noumenal reality of
which the humanly thought and experienced objects of devotion are the phenomenal
manifestations.”72 Therefore “the different [religious; KK] traditions are not reporting
experiences of the Real in itself, but of its different manifestations within human con-
sciousness.”73 Elsewhere, Hick says that the various divine personages and the various
impersonal manifestations of the sacrum are „different transformations of the impact
upon us of the ultimately Real,”74 meaning that “impact” is not to be understood in
the literal sense (one body comes into contact with another one and thus affects
it) but that there is an “aspect” within us which is “in tune” with the Transcendent.
That aspect is like the image of God within us; or the “divine spark” – mentioned by
Meister Eckhart; or the atman that we all are in our deepest nature; or the universal
nature of Buddha within us.75 It is that aspect of our being that is affected by the Real
to the extent that we are open to that reality.
Therefore, Ultimate Reality, being itself beyond the reach of conscious human ex-
perience, does not fit into any systems of concepts within which we are capable of
thinking. In a key passage on that issue, Hick states: “It follows from this distinction

68 Cf. Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, B XVI–XVII.

69 Nadeau – Kafatos, The Non-Local Universe, 41: “In quantum physics, observational conditions and re-
sults are such that we cannot presume a categorical distinction between the observer and the observing
apparatus, or between the mind of the physicist and the results of physical experiments. The measuring
apparatus and the existence of an observer are essential aspects of the act of observation.”
70 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae II–II, q. 1, a. 2: “Cognita sunt in cognoscente secundum modum
cognoscentis.” Hick quotes that statement of Thomas Aquinas very often, e.g., Hick, An Interpretation of
Religion, 240–241; Hick, The New Frontier of Religion and Science, 163; Hick, The Fifth Dimension, 69.
71 E.g., Damascius, Dubitationes et solutiones 7 (Ruelle, I, 11): “We prove our ignorance and the impossibility
of talking about it.” As cited in: Hadot, Filozofia, 246.
72 Hick, The New Frontier of Religion and Science, 171.
73 Hick, The New Frontier of Religion and Science, 171.
74 Hick, The Fifth Dimension, 66.
75 Cf. Hick, The Fifth Dimension, 67.

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between the Real as it is in itself and as it is thought and experienced through our
religious concepts that we cannot apply to the Real an sich the characteristics en-
countered in its personae and impersonae. Thus it cannot be said to be one or many,
person or thing, substance or process, good or evil, purposive or non-purposive.
None of the concrete descriptions that apply within the realm of human experi-
ence can apply literally to the unexperiencable ground of that realm.”76 Neverthe-
less, the British philosopher argues that the Real is the primal basis and source of
the properties that actually apply to the manifestations of the ineffable Transcendent
Reality, to the personal and non-personal „absolutes” that are the particular objects
of worship, meditation, and mystical experience. Those objects are not fiction or
pure human projection but are authentic manifestations of the Transcendent both
inside and outside of us, deep within our being and within the religious communities
where which they are worshipped.77
Hick’s pluralistic hypothesis, maintained in the presented form, aroused many
controversies among both philosophers and theologians. While there is a general
agreement on the postulate of the existence of one Ultimate Reality, the question
of its nature turns out to be a considerable problem.78 Kenneth Surin, for example,
sees a serious difficulty in any attempt to formulate a trans-religious definition of
God. In his opinion, the elimination of confessional elements in such an approach
poses a threat of distortion of fundamental religious ideas79. In turn, Harold A. Net-
land asks: “Given Hick’s contention that the Real an sich transcends even distinctions
between good and evil, right and wrong […], what sense does it make to speak of
an ethical criterion for distinguishing appropriate from inappropriate dispositional
responses to the Real?”80
However, interpreting religious experience based on Kant‘s distinction „noume-
non“ – „phenomenon“ leads primarily to considerable theoretical-cognitive difficul-
ties. As Armin Kreiner notes, the very distinction between the object „a“ and its
experience as „φ“ may be meaningful; however, how does one know that a = φ (in
the sense: „a“ is the authentic experience of „φ”)? The answer may be: if there are no
rational reasons to question the validity of that equation, it can be assumed that in-
deed a = φ. We are also entitled to assume that someone else sees „a” as „δ.” If there is
no reason to doubt the veracity of that person’s experience of „a” as „δ,” in that case,
a = δ. However, it is not true that a = φ and a = δ. The truth of a sentence is some-
thing other than a rational belief in its truth, hence there may be mutually exclusive
beliefs that will be the subject of rational belief. However, as long as the contents of

76 Hick, An Interpretation of Religion, 246; cf. Hick, The New Frontier of Religion and Science, 169.
77 Cf. Hick, An Interpretation of Religion, 247.
78 Kondrat, Racjonalność, 271–272.
79 Surin, “Revelation,” 340.
80 Netland, Dissonant Voices, 227.

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 One God – Many Religions?The Role of Negative Theology

those beliefs contradict each other, they cannot be true at the same time.81 As a result,
the pluralistic hypothesis promoted by Hick – that the same noumenal reality corre-
sponds to different experiences of Transcendent Reality – separates the noumenon
(“God in himself ”) from the phenomenon (“God for me”) so much that it is impossi-
ble to ultimately verify whether a given religious experience is really a “dialogue with
reality” (Richard Schaeffler) or merely a projection.82 Hence the critical questions:
How can “a” be authentically experienced as „φ” when „a in itself ” is not „φ”? How
can the interpretation of „a” as „φ” become a catalyst for salvific action consisting in
the transformation of self-centered existence (self-centredness) into God’s reality-cen-
tred existence (Reality-centredness) if „a in itself ” is not the same as „φ”? According
to Kreiner, the main epistemological problem that the pluralistic hypothesis must
face is directly related to the mysterious nature of the Ultimate Reality. „The more
radically and consistently the ineffability of the incomprehensibility of the Transcen-
dent is emphasised, the more convincing the pluralistic hypothesis developed by
Hick will appear. And vice versa – the more optimistic the cognitive possibilities (as
opposed to the possibility of experience) of the human spirit are assessed in relation
to God’s reality, the less credible the aforementioned hypothesis will seem.”83

6. The Nature of Transcendence

The dispute over the limits of negation is in fact a dispute over the nature of Tran-
scendence. As mentioned, in Christianity, apophatic theology is part of a broader
project, a part of which is also cataphatic theology. The indispensability of positive
theology results, among other things, from the need to preserve semantic rules. For
if we say that the object of religious reference is an incomprehensible and ineffable
Mystery, we must first know what kind of reality we are talking about to be able to
attribute such properties to it. As Peter Byrne aptly observes: “We know enough to
know we cannot comprehend the transcendent.”84 Therefore, the Ultimate Reali-
ty that religions speak of cannot be an absolutely “unknowable X,” some arbitrary
“something” to which such properties as “unknowability,” “indescribability” or
“ineffability” are randomly assigned. Otherwise, negative theology will neces-
sarily lead to religious nihilism or even atheism.85 Especially from the perspec-
tive of faith, the word “God” is not just a nameless cipher of infinite Transcen-
dence, but the One who can be called by name, to whom one can say, “Elohejnu

81 Kreiner, “Philosophische Probleme,” 128.

82 Kreiner, “Philosophische Probleme,” 129.
83 Kreiner, “Philosophische Probleme,” 131.
84 Byrne, Prolegomena to Religious Pluralism, 141.
85 Scheler, Problemy religii, 108.

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we-Elohej-abothejnu” – „Thou, our God and God of our fathers.” Thus, whoever
believes is aware of what and who they believe in.86
From the biblical perspective, God’s transcendence is related to His imma-
nence. The theology of the chosen people is not speculative in nature, but it was
born from the experience of God present in their midst and acting in their histo-
ry. The Hebrews experienced God’s immanence and at the same time, as part of
that experience, discovered that God is transcendent, i.e. completely different from
the order in which He acts. God’s otherness in relation to the creation is indicated
primarily by His names: El Elyôn (“God Most High”), El Olam (“Everlasting God”),
El Shaddai (“God Almighty”), Abir (“Mighty One”), Adônai (“Lord”), Yahweh Sa-
baoth (“Lord of Hosts”). Especially as YHWH (“I am he who is” or “I am the one
who exists”87), God remains a “mystery” – a “Wholly Other.”88 On the other hand,
the names indicate God’s presence and activity in the world. This is also the essen-
tial difference between the God of the Bible and the God of Greek philosophy. For
the Greeks, God can abide in his transcendent nature, and thus in His true divinity,
if He remains outside finite reality and is inaccessible to it. Consequently, the God
of philosophy does not know that something else exists, and therefore never acts in
the cosmos (Aristotle), or only enters into a relationship with it through the media-
tion of lower beings – Demiurge, Nous or Logos (Platonism) – thus protecting His
transcendence. This Greek way of looking at transcendence never entered the He-
brew understanding of God, precisely because the Israelites’ understanding of God’s
otherness was born out of the experience of His real presence among them, His
action in time and history.89
Nevertheless, the relationship of God’s immanence to transcendence (and vice
versa) is not arbitrary. As Thomas G. Weinandy aptly notes: “From within biblical
revelation then, the immanence of God takes epistemological precedence. It is only
because God first revealed himself within the created order, within time and his-
tory, that he came to be known as someone who, in some sense, is transcendent.”90
In turn, ontic precedence falls to the transcendence of God: “God revealed himself
within time and history, and thus came to be known, only because he is the kind
of God he is, that is, as one who is transcendent, and yet, capable of acting within
the historical lives of persons and nations.”91 The nature of God’s immanence is

86 Cf. Wendel, Gott, 93.

87 Samuel Terrien (The Elusive Presence, 119) prefers another translation of God’s name: “I shall be who-
ever I shall be” – and formulates a conclusion: “According to this interpretation, the name indeed car-
ries the connotation of divine presence, but it also confers upon this presence a quality of elusiveness.
The God of biblical faith, even in the midst of a theophany, is at once Deus revelatus atquae absconditus.
He is known as unknown.”
88 On the biblical theology of God’s names, see Feldmeier – Spieckermann, Der Gott der Lebendigen, 17–52.
89 Weinandy, Does God Suffer?, 44.
90 Weinandy, Does God Suffer?, 42.
91 Weinandy, Does God Suffer?, 42.

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 One God – Many Religions?The Role of Negative Theology

therefore dependent on the nature of God’s transcendence, which the Hebrew peo-
ple came to know through God’s presence and activity in the world. This statement
not only rules out radical apophatism, but also guarantees the unity of the object
of religious reference. “While there is an epistemological priority in the manner in
which God is known and an ontological priority in the manner in which God is,
and so can be known, the God who is transcendent is the same God who is imma-
nent and vice-versa.”92
Ultimately, as Dionysius the Areopagite and Thomas Aquinas teach, the way to
God must be threefold: the way of causality (via causalitatis), the way of negation
(via negativa) and the way of eminence (via eminentiae). If we grant God ontologi-
cal precedence as the Ultimate Reality, then the direct conclusions that follow from
this run along via negativa. This is because the First Cause, which creation theology
identifies with the God of faith, must be completely different from everything else:
it must be transcendent to all the features of the world that testify to metaphysical
limitations and imperfections. Therefore, via causalitas (which is the starting point
of theological reflection, as it allows us to establish the ontological relationship be-
tween God and the world) leads directly to via negativa as the negation of every-
thing that is incompatible with God as First Cause and Pure Act. However, negative
judgments about God are made on the basis of previous positive claims about God’s
metaphysical primacy. This means that via negativa logically presupposes the min-
imal positive knowledge required by via causalitas; otherwise, the negation process
would be incoherent, since there would be no basis for determining what must be
negated about God.93
From the point of view of Christian theology, the impassable boundary of
apophaticism is Christology. This is because the essence of the Christian confession
of faith in Jesus as Christ is contained in the conviction that in Him – in His words
and deeds – God himself has given himself to man as absolute, irrevocable and im-
perishable love (ἀγάπη). Jesus – in all the glory of His personal being – was actually
(and not just symbolically or metaphorically) the „place” of the historically concret-
ized presence of God-Agápē. If, therefore, in Christ God has revealed himself to man,
then negation cannot be the last word in theology. For negation is impossible to
love – Negationes non summe amamus.94 This, of course, does not mean that God’s
self-revelation in Christ makes God henceforth cease to be a „hidden God” (Deus ab-
sconditus). Even the highest theophany, which is the Incarnation of the Word, cannot

92 Weinandy, Does God Suffer?, 42. Weinandy emphasizes that the Hebrews believed that the God they expe-
rienced, who entered into a relationship with them and acted in their midst, was God as He truly is, not
some stripped-down revelation tailored to human capabilities. This statement is radically different from
the one made by Hick as part of his interpretation of religious pluralism.
93 Shanley, The Thomist Tradition, 47.
94 Ioannis Duns Scotus, Ordinatio I, dist. III, pars I, q. 2, a. 10: „Negationes etiam tantum, non summe ama-
mus.”

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deprive God of His mystery. In this sense, negative theology still retains its value;
however, its place, function and reach within the Christian doctrine of God remain
an open question.95

7. Toward a Trinitarian Interpretation of Religious Pluralism

It seems that a good “base theory” for an adequate interpretation of religious plural-
ism is Trinitarian theology.96 Not only does it allow for the integration of the various
images and concepts of Ultimate Reality present in different religions, but it addi-
tionally takes into account the tension that exists between positive (cataphatic) the-
ology and negative (apophatic) theology. This does not mean, of course, that all re-
ligions feature some kind of “pre-phenomenon” of Trinitarian faith through which
they could achieve a kind of supra-religious unity. The point is merely that different
images and concepts of God, as well as the way of experiencing the relationship with
Him, are given different forms depending on which of the Persons of the Trinity they
are specifically oriented towards. It seems that such different understandings and ap-
proaches to the mystery of God have surprising counterparts in the great religions of
the world.97 Following this pattern, one can distinguish three basic types of religious
experience and the corresponding concepts of God or Ultimate Reality.98
The first type of religious experience portrays God as an unfathomable mystery,
eluding human cognition and conceptualization. God is “Wholly Other,” infinite,
“nameless.” No one can behold His face. One can even say: God is not, He has „no
ex-sistenstia, not even being.”99 For since He is the source of all being, He alone can-
not be it. In this sense, He is “Nothingness,” “Beyond-Being” – a reality that cannot
be defined by any concepts or images, as it transcends all possible categories.
Such an approach is characteristic especially of the so-called apophatic religions,
according to which the Ultimate Reality is in such absolute transcendence that it is

95 Cf. Kałuża, “Jezus jako obraz Nieprzedstawialnego,” 115–116.

96 See Bernhardt, “Trinitätstheologie,” 287–301; Bernhardt, Monotheismus und Trinität, 290–322; Kałuża,
“Teologia trynitarna,” 277–312.
97 Raimon Panikkar (Das Göttliche in Allem, 55) talks of “homeomorphic equivalencies” that determine
the similarities between religions. Of course, indicating the existence of such similarities or analogies calls
for more detailed analyses based on empirical material (holy books, works of theologians and religious
thinkers, the world of symbols, rituals, liturgies, etc.), which could confirm the thesis promoted here. This
study does not have the space for such analyses. It is worth adding that the traditionally practiced theology
of religion is today increasingly being supplanted by so-called comparative theology which, by definition,
takes into account the results of religious studies. See Kałuża, “Czy teologia komparatywna zastąpi teolo-
gię religii?,” 319–358.
98 See Greshake, Der dreieine Gott, 506–511; Kessler, “Religiöse Grunderfahrungen,” 28–51; Kałuża, “Między
ekskluzywizmem a pluralizmem,” 32–37.
99 Panikkar, Trinität, 74.

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only possible to speak of it in a negative form. Here one can point to the Buddhist
experience of nirvana, as well as the special mystical experience present in many
of the world’s religions, where the last word about God is reverent silence. Trin-
itarian theology points here to the mystery of the Father. The Father is not only
the infinitely remote primordial source of all creatures but also the Trinitarian divine
being. He is „the incomprehensible, bottomless mystery of self-giving.”100 It is in this
sense that He is „silence.”
The second type of religious experience captures God as a (transcendent) Per-
son, emerging from the abyss of silence and speaking to man. God is someone “with
whom it is possible to speak, engage in a dialog, establish a connection [...]; He is
the Divine ‘You’ who is in relation, or better: He is a relation to man and one of
the poles of his entire existence.”101 God acts and creates; through Him, everything
happened; in Him, all things have their beginning. Above all, however, He is the God
of revelation, the God who can be called by name.
This way of understanding Ultimate Reality is characteristic of theism, and
its differing realizations can be found in Judaism, Christianity and Islam. What is
important here is the opportunity to establish a “personal relationship” with God
(e.g. through prayer) and to walk the path He has set for us. Trinitarian theology
points here to the Person of the Son.102
The third type of religious experience captures God as “the interior of all being.”103
The word “interior” here means the innermost whole, in which God and the cos-
mos – thus everything – form a unity. In this context, Raimon Panikkar speaks of
“cosmotheandric” reality, which he sees, among other things, in the experience of ad-
vaita (nonduality) and in the hymnal formula saccidānanda, which describes the es-
sence of Brahman.104 From the point of view of Trinitarian theology, it is possible to
say: “God is the deep, inner heart of all being, that ‘point’ where all particularisms,
differences and ‘self-existences’ are overcome and made familiar.”105 This image of
Ultimate Reality is mainly inherent in Far Eastern religions. In the West, we find it in
some strands of mysticism, especially where the main role is not so much a dialogue
with God, but a “consciousness” of immersion in the immeasurable depths of the Ab-
solute, and even losing oneself in it (e.g. Meister Eckhart).
Christian Trinitarian theology points here to the mystery of the Holy Spirit.
He is the one who creates the bond between the Persons of the Trinity and cre-
ation. In Him all differences become one. If the Father is the source and the Son is
the stream flowing from Him, then the Spirit is “the ultimate end, the measureless

100 Greshake, Wierzę w Boga Trójjedynego, 35.

101 Greshake, Der dreieine Gott, 508.
102 Greshake, Wierzę w Boga Trójjedynego, 92–93.
103 Panikkar, Trinität, 88.
104 See Panikkar, The Cosmotheandric Experience, 54–77.
105 Greshake, Wierzę w Boga Trójjedynego, 93.

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Krystian Kałuża

ocean in which the river of divine life reaches its full perfection, quietens and com-
pletes itself [...]. There can be no ‘personal relationship’ to the Spirit [...].”106 Entering
the path of the Spirit, we reach the extra-ontic foundation of all things. Therefore,
contemplation in the Spirit is devoid of all intellectual content – it is beyond all
categories.
Thus understood, the model of the Trinitarian interpretation of religious plu-
ralism undoubtedly has its advantages. First and foremost, it helps integrate the dif-
ferent images and concepts of Ultimate Reality present in the world’s various reli-
gions. The inclusion of negative theology, which is integral to this model (mainly
within the first and third types of religious experience), further demonstrates that
non-personal concepts of the Absolute characteristic of the so-called apophatic re-
ligions (some strands of Hinduism, early Buddhism, Taoism and others) need not
be regarded as contradictory to the personal concepts inherent in the so-called pro-
phetic religions (Judaism, Christianity, Islam). Moreover, it turns out that also within
prophetic traditions, such as Christianity, one can find non-personal concepts of Ul-
timate Reality (e.g. Meister Eckhart) that do not necessarily conflict with the person-
al concept that dominates the tradition. A similar phenomenon can be observed in
some apophatic traditions, such as Buddhism, which also developed personal forms
of religious reference later in its development (e.g. amidism). Perry Schmidt-Leukel,
who has analyzed this phenomenon in detail, has proposed a fractal concept for in-
terpreting religious pluralism in this context. At its center is the belief that typologi-
cal distinctions, by which differences between religions are defined, are often found
in modified form within the same religious tradition. Religions are thus neither
the same nor radically different; rather, they are similar precisely in their internal
differentiation.107 This is undoubtedly an original and interesting way of looking at
the diversity of religions, but nevertheless, in the opinion of the author, it is not suf-
ficient to provide a theologically legitimate (and not just formally adequate) expla-
nation of the similarities between religions. The Trinitarian perspective seems more
promising here, especially since it takes into account the Christian interpretation of
Ultimate Reality, thus avoiding the creation of a kind of “global theology,” unrelated
to any particular religious tradition.108
More broadly, the model for interpreting religious pluralism proposed here fits
into the paradigm of open inclusivism. It makes it possible, on the one hand, to talk
about the true knowledge of God/Ultimate Reality in non-Christian religions, and,
on the other hand, provides an opportunity to positively evaluate these religions
against the backdrop of a single, albeit internally diverse and multifaceted salvation
history. The differences between religions are not merely the expression of cultural

106 Panikkar, Trinität, 92–93.

107 Schmidt-Leukel, “Eine fraktale Interpretation,” 134–150.
108 Cf. Hick, “Straightening the Record,” 190.

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 One God – Many Religions?The Role of Negative Theology

differences and the result of a more or less arbitrary interpretation of always already
conditioned religious experience, whose “object” (God, the Absolute, the Real) in
itself is unknowable and indescribable, but have their origin in God himself, who “at
many times and in various ways” (Heb 1:1) spoke to man, revealing himself and His
saving intentions to him. While such an understanding of plurality and diversity is
not immune to the temptation of syncretism and relativism, in principle it provides
a good foundation for developing an open yet deeply Christian hermeneutics of re-
ligious pluralism.

Conclusions

Different religions have different concepts of Ultimate Reality. In some of them, it is

understood personally as YHWH, God or Allah, in others non-personally as Brah-
man, Nirvana or Tao (and many other examples). This diversity often leads to con-
flicting religious beliefs. This conflict is revealed not only in the realm of objective
belief, which concerns the meaning of religious language and the basic structure and
ways of justifying religious claims, but also in the realm of subjective belief, which
concerns the situations in which individuals make a decision about their choice of
a particular religion. This fact can also be an obstacle to interreligious dialogue and,
in extreme cases, become the cause of doctrinal conflicts. Therefore, an increasing
number of theologians and philosophers of religion raise the question of the theo-
retical possibility of partially overcoming the conflict of religious beliefs by formu-
lating appropriate assumptions, theses, claims and postulates that make it possible,
on the one hand, to understand the essence and genesis of religious pluralism, and
on the other hand, to build a theoretical basis for dialogue and exchange of spiritual
experiences between religions.
One such proposal is the pluralistic theology of religion. Its representatives are
convinced that the plurality of religions is the result of different human reactions
to one and the same Transcendent Reality. This reality, in itself, is beyond the reach
of human conceptual systems and categories, and can therefore be understood and
interpreted differently. Consequently, concepts such as God, YHWH, Allah, Brah-
man, Vishnu, Krishna, Sunyata, do not refer to different ultimate realities but express
human experiences and representations of the Real. According to the “pluralists,”
all of them (personal and non-personal) are equally important and equivalent, as
long as they result from the authentic attitude of believers towards the Real. Among
the arguments to justify this view of religions, a special place is given to negative the-
ology. Nevertheless, there is a significant difference between the “founding fathers”
of Christian negative theology and its contemporary followers in the field of plural-
istic theology of religion. For Dionysius the Areopagite and Thomas Aquinas, it was

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Krystian Kałuża

clear that apophatic theology was part of a broader project that included cataphatic
theology, while the goal of transcending language was the glorification of God and
mystical union with Him. Meanwhile, “pluralists” so separate God’s transcendence
(“God in himself ”; νoούμενον) from God’s immanence (“God for us”; φαινόμενον)
that they are forced to reject any possibility of knowing God as He really is. In this
perspective, speaking of divine revelation as self-revelation (in the sense of autorev-
elatio et autodonatio) becomes essentially impossible. Hick makes no reference at
all to the concept of revelation, which presupposes the ability of Ultimate Reality
to act intentionally (and thus its de facto personal character). Instead, he seeks to
justify „that there is an inbuilt human capacity to be aware of the universal presence
of the Transcendent, in virtue of its immanence within our own nature […] which
is, however, always manifested in particular culturally and historically conditioned
ways.”109 As a result, the various religious traditions do not describe the experiences
of the Real in itself, but its various manifestations in human consciousness.110
From the point of view of Christian theology, the impassable boundary of
apophaticism is Christology. This is because the essence of Christian belief in Jesus
as Christ is contained in the conviction that in Him – in His life, death and resur-
rection – God himself has given himself to man as unconditional, irrevocable and
imperishable love. Consequently, Jesus is not just a „symbol of God” (Roger Haight),
but the „place” (sacrament) of his real self-giving to man. With all this in mind,
the article proposed a different direction for interpreting religious pluralism. Its basis
is the Christian doctrine of the Trinity. Importantly, Trinitarian dogma also takes
into account the mysterious nature of the Ultimate Reality, but apophaticism is here
integrated into the broader framework of revelation theology, so that God’s tran-
scendence is not separated from His immanence. Adopting this kind of bipolarity is
necessary to maintain the integrity of Christology, without which one cannot talk of
the uniqueness of Christianity as a fully revealed and salvific religion.
Contemporary theology of religion is familiar with various models of Trinitar-
ian interpretation of religious pluralism.111 The model presented here can be called
the integrative model. It is based on the assumption that it is possible to demonstrate
certain similarities between the properties of the individual Persons of the Trinity
and various ideas and concepts of Ultimate Reality found in different religions. Such
a synthesis does not necessarily have to lead to a syncretic combination of different
images of God or paths to God, but can be seen as an invitation to see the “abso-
lute” and the “unconditional” in the perspective of the three dimensions that are
revealed in every authentic religious experience. This is possible because, according
to the Christian faith, God himself has appeared in this way and allowed himself to be

109 Hick, The New Frontier of Religion and Science, 164.

110 Cf. Hick, The New Frontier of Religion and Science, 171.
111 Kałuża, “Teologia trynitarna,” 281.

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 One God – Many Religions?The Role of Negative Theology

experienced. Consequently, interreligious dialogue need not be limited to showing

differences between religions as having their justification in Trinitarian differences,
but it can lead to the discovery of the mutual perichoresis of the three fundamental
images of God/Ultimate Reality to which religions bear witness, and provide encour-
agement to realise them within one’s own spiritual and religious tradition.

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