Consequentialism (Utilitarianism)

This module is divided into three parts. The 1st part introduces consequentialism
as an ethical theory, and shows its differences from the other equally influential ethical
theories. The 2nd part is a general survey of the different versions of consequentialism.
The 3rd part, which focuses on the theory's most influential version, namely
utilitarianism, explains the fundamental tenets of utilitarianism and the differences
among its various forms.

A.1 Understanding Consequentialism

Consequentialism is one of the influential ethical theories. Its general claim is that
the consequences of an action are the ones that ultimately matter in judging whether the
action is morally good or bad. The morality of an action, according to this ethical theory,
is solely determined by the kind of consequences that the performance of the action
leads to. To better understand what is unique about this claim, let us examine how it
differs from the claims of the two other equally influential ethical theories, namely
deontology and virtue ethics. In addition, let us clarify a concept critical in the
understanding of its claim: the concept of the intrinsic good. Not all consequences are
deemed morally relevant by consequentialism-only those that involve an intrinsic good.

A. 2 The 3 kinds of Normative Ethics

There are 3 aspects of an action that are generally regarded
as relevant when evaluating its morality: in consequences,
the rules that it follows or violates, and the character of its
agent. In consideration of its consequences, an action is
judged to be morally good when it results to something good
or desirable, and morally bad if otherwise. Good or desirable
consequences may mean various things. They may refer to consequences that bring
about pleasurable experiences or prevent painful experiences, fulfil desires or satisfy
preferences, promote well-being, or improve the quality of life of persons.
In consideration of the rule that it follows or violates, an action is judged to be
morally good if it follows a good rule or does not conform to a bad rule, and morally bad if
it follows a bad rule or violates a good rule. And in consideration of the character of the
person who performs an action, an action is judged to be rally good if the said action is
something that a person of good character, usually called a virtuous person, would do,
and morally bad if otherwise (that is, if it is something that a vicious person would do).
This way of judging the morality of an action is what is at work when people say, for
instance, that an act of cowardice is morally wrong because cowardice is not a character
trait of a virtuous person (or that such an act is not something that a virtuous person
would do).

Most people consider all three aspects of an action in judging the morality of
actions in varying times and situations. There may be cases where all 3 aspects occur in
compatible ways, like when the action resulting in good consequences happens to follow
a good rule and be done by a virtuous person. Undeniably, however, there are cases
where a conflict arises among these moral considerations, in which, for instance, the
action that results in good consequences violates a good rule or the action done by a
virtuous person does not result in good consequences. In cases of conflict among the
three, one is inevitably faced with the question of which among the various moral
considerations is fundamental, and thus should prevail over the others. The different
answers, along with their supporting arguments, given to this question by philosophers
have given rise to the three (normative) ethical theories of consequentialism, deontology,
and virtue ethics. Accordingly, as a response to the said question, consequentialism
claims that it should be the consequences of actions, deontology claims that it should be
the rules that actions follow or violate, and virtue ethics claims that it should be the
character of the agent or the person performing such actions.

A. 3 Intrinsic and Instrumental Good

The good consequence that consequentialism regards as the basis for the moral
goodness of an act is not just any kind of good or desirable consequence; but one that is
good in itself or desirable for its own sake. Philosophers usually refer to this kind of good
as intrinsic good. Consequentialism, as explained by J.J.C. Smart, is "a theory according
to which rightness or wrongness of an act is determined solely by the intrinsic goodness
or badness of its various consequences. It is not enough that the consequences are
good for the actions that cause them to be morally good; they should be intrinsically
good.

The intrinsic good is desired for its own sake, not in order to achieve something
else that is also desired. The intrinsic good is contrasted with the instrumental good,
referring to the kind of good which is desired for the sake of something else. An
instrumental good is desired because it serves as a means to achieve a further good,
either a further instrumental good or an intrinsic good. A standard example of an intrinsic
good is happiness (which most consequentialists equate with pleasure). Happiness is
regarded as intrinsically good because one desires it for itself, that is, one desites to be
happy just to be happy (or just to experience it). In contrast, the things one desires in
order to be happy, like a successful career, good relationships, health, fame, wealth, and
being able to help people and to contribute to social development, among others, are all
instrumental goods for they are desired because they serve as means to achieve
happiness.

In being good in itself, the intrinsic good does not derive its goodness from
another good. In this regard, the intrinsic good is also called inherent good. In contrast,
the instrumental good is not being good in itself, it derives its goodness from another
good; and for this reason, is also called derived good. Furthermore, the intrinsic good,
being good in itself, is always good whatever the condition of its occurrence is. It remains
desirable even if nobody actually desires it. For this reason, the intrinsic good is also
called unconditional good. In contrast, the instrumental good is good only under certain
conditions, generally when it serves as a means to achieve a further good; and for this
reason, is also called conditional good.
B. Varieties of Consequentialism

While all consequentialists agree that our moral duty is to maximize an intrinsic
good through the consequences of our actions, they, however, do not agree on certain
aspect about the intrinsic good. For instance, for purposes of illustration, we spoke of
happiness as an example of an intrinsic good. While many consequentialists, as our later
discussion will show, indeed recognize happiness as an intrinsic good, there are also
some who do not. Furthermore, it may be assumed that the happiness that matters in
one's actions is solely one's own. Consequentialists have varying views on this. Their
disagreements en these points and related ones have given rise to the different versions
of Consequentialism.

For an orderly presentation of these variants of consequentialism, we shall explain

them in terms of how they deal with two central questions concerning the intrinsic good
The first question is, "Is pleasure (or happiness) the only intrinsic good?" (The
correlate of this question is, "Is pain the only intrinsic bad or evil?") In saying that
pleasure is the only intrinsic good, we imply that all other things that can possibly be
regarded as good are only instrumentally good; that is, they are good only in so far as
they serve as means to achieve pleasure. The second question is, "Is the agent's own
intrinsic good the only one the morally matters? The extended version of this
question is, "Is the agent's intrinsic good the only one that is morally relevant in judging
the morality of his/her actions?" In saying that the agent's own intrinsic good is the only
one that morally matters, we imply that the possible intrinsic goods of other people are
not a relevant factor in the moral evaluation of the person's action. If we again take
pleasure to be an intrinsic good, this means that the agent's own pleasure is the only one
that morally matters. The possible pleasures (or pain of other people are not morally
relevant in evaluating the person's actions. The differences among the various kinds of
consequentialism can be presented a different ways of responding to the two questions.
Accordingly, responding to the question gives rise to the general distinction between
hedonistic and non-hedonistic types of consequentialism. Hedonistic consequentialism
gives an affirmative answer to the question, while non-hedonistic consequentialism gives
a negative answer to it. On the other hand, responding to the second question gives rise
to the general distinction between agent relative and agent-neutral types of
consequentialism. Agent-relative consequentialism gives an affirmative answer to the
question, while agent-neutral consequentialism gives a negative answer to it. Let us, in
what follows, elaborate on these distinctions.

B.2 Hedonism and Non-Hedonism

Hedonistic consequentialism, simply referred to as hedonism, believes that pleasure is

the only intrinsic good, and its opposite, pain, the only intrinsic bad or evil. As Jeremy
Bentham, who strongly supports this view, remarks: "Nature has placed mankind under
the governance of two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure. It is for them alone to point
out what we ought to do, as well as to determine what we shall do." The term
"hedonism" was derived from the Greek word "hedone," whose ordinary meaning is
pleasure. Following most consequentialists, supporters of hedonism equate pleasure
with happiness. John Stuart Mill, for instance, writes: "By happiness,' is intended
pleasure, and the absence of pain; by unhappiness, pain, and the privation of pleasure."
Hedonism advances the thesis that the pleasure and pain that an action brings about are
the primary standards for judging the morality of this action. Specifically, it regards an
action to be morally good if and only if it maximizes pleasure or results in the greatest
pleasurable consequences, while it is morally bad if otherwise.

Hedonists, to justify their claim, argue that we cannot escape from the standards
of pleasure and pain in evaluating our actions. Even when we try to, we will allegedly end
up using such standards. As Bentham (2000, Chap. I, I), referring to pleasures and
pains, explains: "They govern us in all we do, in all we say, in all we think: every effort
we can make to throw off our subjection, will serve but to demonstrate and confirm it."
We can try using standards other than the standards of pleasure and pain, but, according
to Bentham, the moment we ask what makes these other standards worthy of being
used, we will allegedly end up saying that it is because using them will lead to pleasure
and avoid pain.

On the other hand, there is another version of consequentialism, called non-

bedonistic consequentialism or simply non-hedonism, emerged. Non-hedonism rejects
hedonism, but maintains the general view of consequentialism. Its rejection of hedonism
comes in two ways, thereby giving rise to the two versions of non-hedonism. The first
version rejects the view of hedonism that pleasure is an intrinsic good. We shall call this
version of non-hedonism exclusive non-hedonism in consideration of the fact that it
excludes pleasure from the list of intrinsic goods. The second version of non-hedonism
rejects the view of hedonism that pleasure is the only intrinsic good. We shall call this
version of non hedonism inclusive non-hedonism in consideration of the fact that it
includes pleasure in the list of intrinsic goods. When non-hedonism rejects the general
claim of hedonism, it rejects either one of hedonism's two-component claims. Exclusive
non-hedonism rejects the component claim that pleasure is an intrinsic good. For this
kind of non-hedonism, the intrinsic good is something else which some believe to be
power or desire-satisfaction, among others. On the other hand, inclusive non-hedonism
rejects the component claim that pleasure is the only intrinsic good there is. For this kind
of non-hedonism, aside from pleasure, there are other intrinsic goods which include
knowledge, power, beauty, freedom, desire-satisfaction, and healthy relationships,
among others.

B.3 Agent Relativity and Neutrality

Among the possible consequences of a given action, there are those that are agent-
related. They are the consequences that directly concern or affect the welfare (or well-
being) of the agent or the person who performs the action. On the other hand, there are
also those that are non-agent-related, referring to consequences that do not directly
concern or affect the welfare of the agent, but instead directly concern or affect the
welfare of other persons. Agent-relative consequentialism (also known as egoistic
consequentialism) claims that the only consequences that morally matter (or that are
morally relevant in judging the morality of an action) are the agent-related ones; whereas
agent-neutral consequentialism (also known as impartial consequentialism) claims that
both agent-related and non-agent-related consequences morally matter. If we take
happiness as the intrinsic good, agent-relative consequentialism would only consider the
happiness brought by an action to its agent in judging the morality of his/her action. In
contrast, agent-neutral consequentialism would consider the happiness of all persons
affected by an action (including the agent's own) in judging the morality of this action.
While agent-relative consequentialism gives metal priority to the agent of an action,
agent-neutral consequentialism is impartial to whoever is or are affected by an action.

For agent neutral consequentialism, none among the persons affected by an action is
morally privileged or has moral priority. Everyone gets equal consideration when
determining the morality of the act. Given this, what then decides which action is motally
good is an impartial principle which aims to maximize the aggregate good (usually in the
form of promoting the greatest happiness among the persons involved). Based on this
impartial principle, the action whose consequences produce the greatest possible good,
or maximize the aggregate good, is the morally correct one, regardless of who happens
to be the recipient of this good.

B. 4 Consequentialism in the History of Philosophy

In this section, we shall examine some representative views of the two agent-relative
forms of consequentialism, i.e. Agent-relative hedonism and agent relative non-
hedonism. We shall examine some of the representative views for the agent-neutral
forms, i.e.. Agent-neutral hedonism and agent-neutral non-hedonism in the next section,
where we shall focus on the best expression of agent-neutral consequentialism namely
utilitarianism.

For agent-relative hedonism, 2 good representative ethical theories are those advanced
by the two ancient Greek philosophers namely Aristippus and Epicurus. The ethical
theory of Aristippus is referred to as Cyrenaicism while that of Epicurus is simply
referred to as Epicureanism. Aristippus and Epicurus are both hedonists as they both
believe that pleasure and pain are the only ones that have intrinsic value: pleasure being
the only intrinsic good, and pain being the only intrinsic evil. In addition, they both believe
that the pleasures and pains that an action bring to the agent are the only ones that are
morally relevant in judging the morality of the action. In sum, they both subscribe to the
view that an action is morally good if it brings maximum pleasure to the agent, and it is
morally bad if otherwise.

Aristippus and Epicurus both believe that what gives moral worth to an action is not just
any kind of pleasures; it has to be the right kind of pleasures. Morality, for these two
Greek philosophers, involves choosing the right kind of pleasures to desire. They,
however, differ on what these pleasures are. During their time, pleasures were divided
into two general kinds based on the contrasting relations of the duration and intensity of
pleasures. Thus, the first kind refers to the momentary, but more intense pleasures, while
the second kind refers to the long lasting, but less intense pleasures. Aristippus goes for
the first kind, while Epicurus goes for the second one. Aristippus promotes sensory
pleasures (the pleasures that can be immediately gratified), as they are greatly intense
though short-lived. On the other hand, Epicuns promotes freedom from pain in the mind
(gained through cultivating mental tranquility) and the body (gained through developing a
healthy body), as these are long-lasting pleasures, though their intensity may not be as
intense as sensory pleasures. As Epicurus claims, happiness is gained not through "a
constant succession of intense sensual pleasures" but through the state of serenity,
which characterizes "freedom from trouble in the mind and pain in the body"

Pleasures are also classified as active and passive. Active pleasures refer to the
please one experiences when specific wants or desires are gratified: while passive
pleasures refer to the pleasures one experiences when pain, either mental or bodily, are
absent. This division of pleasures correlates to the earlier one, in that active pleasures
are momentary but more intense, while passive pleasures are less intense but long-
lasting. Consequently, the kind of hedonism that Aristippus advances, for preferring the
active pleasures, has also been referred to as activehedonism, while that of Epicurus, for
preferring the passive pleasures, as passive hedonism (ibid.).

What could be the reasons for their respective preference? Aristippus came earlier
than Epicurus: and unlike Epicurus whose writings we have access to, we only know of
the ideas of Aristippus from commentaries of philosophers, which include Epicurus
himself. We can surmise that Aristippus's preference for the active pleasures has
something to do with the fact that life is short and uncertain. For it is only in light of this
fact that "the most intense sensual pleasure of the moment" becomes preferable to the
other kind. It is life's uncertainty that gives rise to the sense of urgency to exhaust
pleasures that one can possibly enjoy while still alive. In other words, why sacrifice
pleasures that you can now enjoy for the sake of some greater pleasures in the future
when we are not sure whether we will still be alive in the future? But while Aristippus
promotes the maximization of our immediate pleasures, he also says that it is important
that we are in control of our pleasures, not them controlling us This is because "excess of
pleasure leads to pain and that the limitation of desires is a condition of their satisfaction"
(Macintyre, 1998, 65).

Epicurus, on the other hand, explains that experience shows us that the desire for
life filled with intense pleasures will be frustrated, because there are not enough of them
in the ordinary course of events .Meaning, a life of active pleasures is less sustainable
than a life of passive pleasures, as the gratification of desires is more difficult to sustain
than the absence of pain. Now, as mental tranquility is a pleasure of great value for
Epicurus, he offers ways to properly deal with certain things that threaten to disrupt it.
Epicurus highlights our worry about how God or the gods will punish us for our misdeeds
and about our death. The possibility that we will be punished by God for our actions in
this or the next life and that we will someday die creates anxiety that disturbs our mind.
With regard to divine punishments, Epicurus states that it is useless to worry about them
since we will never know how God or the gods think anyway, the divine mind works is
something beyond our comprehension. Epicurus likewise considers it pointless to worry
about or to fear our death. This is for the obvious fact that while we are still alive we are
not yet dead, and when we are already dead we no longer exist. In Epicurus' own words
"So death, the most terrifying of ills, is nothing to us, since so long as we exist, death is
not with us; but when death comes, then we do not exist. It does not then concern either
the living or the dead, since for the former it is not, and the latter are no more" (quoted in
Denise et al., 1996, 56).

For agent-relative non-hedonism, a good representative of the exclusive form is the

ethical theory espoused by Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900).Nietzsche believes that
there is something more fundamental thanpleasure, namely power generally understood
as having control over things. In this regard Nietzsche (1987, 231) remarks: "What is
good?-All that heightens the feeling of power, the will to power, power itself in man. What
is bad?-All that proceeds from weaknes What is happiness? The feeling that power
increases that a resistance is overcome." By will to power, Nietzsche means the will to
overcome the challenges of life which tend to weaken our determination to live.
Consequently, for Nietzsche, all other things that we call good, including pleasure or
happiness, are good only in so far as they enhance our will to power.

Nietzsche thus rejects hedonism by denying that pleasure is the intrinsic good and pain
the intrinsic evil. For Nietzsche, will or the will to power is the intrinsic good. It is the mos
fundamental value for humans, such that everything else has value only in so far as they
enable us to attain power or to enhance our will to power.

C. Utilitarianism
Utilitarianism is the most influential form of consequentialism, such that some authors
equate (though inaccurately) consequentialism with utilitarianism. To have a better of this
ethical theory, we shall elaborate on its basic elements and examine its various forms.
Being an agent-neutral form of consequentialism, the specific versions of utilitarianism
that we shall cover serve as representative ethical theories for agent-neutral
consequentialism.

Basic Elements of Utilitarianism

Following Richard Hare, what utilitarianism claims about morality is best understood by
examining its three main elements: consequentialism, welfarism, and aggregationism.
First, utilitarianism is a consequentialist theory for it determines the morality of an action
based on the kind of consequences that the action has or results. Secondly, utilitarianism
is a welfarist theory because the consequences that it considers to be morally relevant
are those that affect the welfare (or well-being) of persons. Welfare here generally means
whatever that benefits the persons affected by an action or improves the quality of their
life. As Hare explains: "We may define 'welfare as the 'obtaining to a high or at least
reasonable degree of a quality of life which on the whole a person wants or prefers to
have." What welfare specifically refers to, however, varies among proponents of
utilitarianism. For some, it means the experience of pleasure and/or beauty, or the
attainment of knowledge; but for some, it is the fulfilment of desires or satisfaction of
preferences. Third, utilitarianism is an aggregationist theory since the welfare that it
considers to be morally relevant is the maximum aggregate or sum total of welfare of all
affected persons. This feature of utilitarianism follows naturally from its being an agent
neutral form of consequentialism, in which, as Mill (2004, 197-98) states, the "standard is
not the agent's own greatest happiness, but the greatest amount of happiness
altogether," "not the agent's own happiness, but that of all concerned. Accordingly, the
morally good act is the one that produces the maximum aggregate or the greatest sum
total of welfare of all affected persons.
If we understand welfare as happiness, the greatest net total of welfare is what
would be meant by the popular formulation of the utilitarian moral standard as "the
greatest happiness of the greatest number of people" (also known as the "greatest
happiness principle"). This formulation, however, is prone to misinterpretation. It seems
to suggest something similar to the majority rule where the action that favors the majority
is deemed the right one. Utilitarianism is not a numbers game in terms of persons who
will benefit from an action It is rather a calculation of which action maximizes aggregate
welfare for all the person involved. If the calculation happens to show that one person's
welfare far exceeds the others' in combination, then the action that promotes this
person's welfare is the moral good action.

Aggregationism naturally leads to impartiality. As Mill explains: "A between his

own happiness and that of others, utilitarianism requires him to be as strictly impartial as
a disinterested and benevolent spectator." The welfare of all affected are given equal
consideration in the process of determining the net total of welfare of the persons. By
"equal consideration," it is meant that everyone is treated the same in terms of their
experience of pleasure and pain; that is, nobody's experience of pleasure and pain has a
special value just because of his/her identity as a person. This implies that the agent of
the act is not in a privileged position. If the action that has the higher net total of welfare
happens to be the one not beneficial to the agent, then the agent has the moral duty to
sacrifice his/her own personal welfare to promote the morally correct course of action
person

Hedonistic and Non-Hedonistic Utilitarianism

There are two general divisions in utilitarianism: the first is between hedonistic and no
hedonistic utilitarianism; the second is between act and rule utilitarianism. In this section,
we shall focus on the first general division, which arises from the question of what
constitutes the intrinsic good that ought to be maximized. Under each of these two
general types of utilitarianism (hedonistic and non-hedonistic types) are specific forms
arising from further considerations.

Hedonistic Forms of Utilitarianism Hedonistic utilitarianism,

just like hedonistic consequentialism in general, claims that
pleasure is the only intrinsic good and pain is the only
intrinsic bad. This kind of utilitarianism is best represented by
the ethical views of Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill.

John Stuart Mill Jeremy Bentham

Bentham in this regard, writes: "By the principle of utility meant that principle which
approves or disapproves of every action whatsoever according to the tendency it
appears to have to augment or diminish the happiness of the party whose interest is in
question: or, what is the same thing in other words to promote or oppose that
happiness." And Mill states:

Utility, or the Greatest Happiness Principle, holds that actions are right in
proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse
of happiness. By happiness is intended pleasure and the absence of pain; by
unhappiness, pain and the privation of pleasure. Pleasure, and freedom from pain, are
the only things desirable as ends; and all desirable things are desirable either for the
pleasure inherent in themselves, or as means to the promotion of pleasure and the
prevention of pain.While being both hedonistic and utilitarian, their ethical views, however,
have important differences. Bentham's version of hedonistic utilitarianism emphasizes the
quantitative differences among types of pleasures; and for this reason, may be called
quantitative hedonistic utilitarianism or, for short, quantitative utilitarianion. On the other
hand, Mill's version emphasizes the qualitative differences among types of pleasures and
for this reason may be called qualitative hedonistic utilitarianism or, for short, qualitative
utilitarianism. More specifically, for quantitative utilitarianism, there is no significant
difference between physical and mental pleasures; while for qualitative utilitarianism,
there is. For instance, for Bentham there is no significant difference between the pleasure
one derives from playing a simple children's game (Bentham gives the game of pushpin
as an example) and the pleasure one derives from reading a poem; but for Mill there is.

To quantitatively calculate which among alternative pleasures ought to be preferred.

Bentham comes up with a set of criteria called the calculus of felicity or hedonistic
calculus. As listed below, these criteria are intended to serve as a guide for measuring
the quantity of pleasures that actions may produce.
1. Intensity - The more intense the experience of pleasure, the greater the value of the
pleasure.
2. Duration - The longer the experience of pleasure, the greater the value of the pleasure.
3. Certainty-The greater the probability that the desired pleasure will be experienced, the
greater the value of the pleasure.
4. Propinquity (or remoteness) - The shorter the temporal distance between an act and
the pleasure that it will produce, the greater the value of the pleasure.
5. Fecundity (the chance a sensation will be followed by sensations of the same kind:
pleasures, if it is be pleasure, pains, if it is be pain) - The higher the probability an
experience of pleasure will be followed by further experiences of pleasure, the greater the
value of the pleasure.
6. Purity (the chance a sensation will not be followed by sensations of the opposite kind:
pains, if it is be pleasure; pleasures, if it is be pain) - The higher the probability that the
experience of pleasure will not be followed by an experience of pain, the greater the value
of the pleasure.
7. Extent (the number of persons affected by the sensation) -The higher the number of
persons to experience the pleasure, the greater the value of the pleasure.

Hedonistic utilitarianism' claims that the action that produces the greatest amount of
pleasure is the morally correct action. The greatest amount of pleasure, for Bentham, is
determined quantitatively by means of the hedonistic calculus. If action X results in an
experience of pleasure that has a greater intensity or duration than that of action Y,
action X is the morally correct action. If both actions involve more criteria, then we need
to calculate which action will produce the greater amount of pleasures based on these
criteria. Thus, suppose actions X and Y will produce pleasures of different kinds in
varying degrees which can be measured by the criteria of the hedonistic calculus in the
following way (for purposes of illustration, let us suppose we can assign numerical values
to each of the criteria in the calculus).

Here, the action that is morally good is action X for the pleasure it produces has a
total value that is higher than that of action Y. Now, if we are dealing with actions that will
result in pain, hedonistic utilitarianism claims that the action that produces the least
amount of pain is the morally good action. It corresponds to the action that produces the
pain that has the lowest total value in the hedonistic calculus. While the criteria in the
hedonistic calculus are expressed in terms of pleasures, they equally apply to pains.
While pleasures have positive values, pains have negative ones. Meaning, between two
actions that produce pleasures, the one that produces the greater pleasure has the
higher moral value and thus should be preferred: but between two actions that produce
pains, the one that produces the lesser value of pain has the higher moral value and thus
should be preferred. When the alternative actions have both pleasures and pains as
consequences, we subtract the total value of pain from the total value of pleasure to get
the net total value of pleasure of each alternative action. The action that has the greater
net total value of pleasure is the morally good choice.

Mill, on the other hand, develops his own version of utilitarianism, what we have
called qualitative utilitarianism, in the course of answering certain objections to
utilitarianism. Let us examine how Mill responds to three of such objections. The first
objection states that utilitarianism allegedly endorses a "swinish doctrine," for in taking
pleasure and pain as the only intrinsic good and evil, respectively, it in effect puts the
value of human pleasures and pains on the same level as the value of animal pleasures
and pains. Since both humans and animals are capable of experiencing pleasures and
pains, making pleasure and pain as the fundamental bases of moral values is allegedly
tantamount to saying that in terms of moral values, humans are no different from
animals. Mill answers this, following Epicurus, by pointing to a difference between mental
and bodily pleasures or between intellectual and physical pleasures. According to Mill, as
rationality (the capacity for intelligence and free choice) is a higher faculty than sentience
(the capacity for sensory experiences), the pleasures of rationality (the mental pleasures)
are higher in quality than the pleasures of sentience (the bodily pleasures) (Mill 2004,
197-98). To emphasize this point, Mill famously remarks that "It is better to be a human
being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better to be a Socrates dissatisfied than a fool
satisfied." Meaning, some pains of humans are better than the pleasures of animals, or
some pains of humans who use their reason are better than the pleasures of humans
who do not. Mill, consequently, rejects Bentham's view that the pleasures derived from
playing a board game and from reading poetry are qualitatively the same.

The second objection states that utilitarianism is bound to fail because there is no
objective way by which we can decide on which type of pleasure is superior or more
valuable than other types. Mill responds that an objective way to settle this issue is
provided by the competent judges on the relative values of pleasures. These competent
judge are those who have experienced the entire spectrum of pleasures. Mill (ibid.)
explains: "From the verdict of competent judges, there can be no appeal. There is no
other tribunal, even on the question of quantity. What means are there of determining
which is the acutest of two pains, except the feelings and judgment of the experienced?"
In other words, the competent judge who can objectively say which between pleasure A
and pleasure B is the superior pleasure is the person who has experienced both
pleasures.

The third objection states that utilitarianism cannot account for the moral
goodness of acts of martyrdom or self-sacrifice. If pleasure is the basis of moral
goodness, how can acts that renounce one's pleasures (as in the case of martyrdom) be
morally good? Mill answers that this objection misinterprets utilitarianism to be a doctrine
that gives priority to the pleasures of the person who does the action. Based on our
classification of the types of consequentialism, this objection, in effect, mistakes
utilitarianism as an agent-relative or egoistic type of consequentialism. Utilitarianism, Mill
clarifies, is after the greatest happiness of the greatest number of people, which will
sometimes require individuals to sacrifice their own personal happiness. Furthermore,
Mill notes that self sacrifice (say giving up one's life to save another) is not always
morally good; it is only so when it promotes the greatest happiness principle (say the
person being saved will be able to do greater things than the saving person). Mill (2004,
197-98) explains: "The utilitarian morality does recognize in human beings the power of
sacrificing their own greatest good for the good of others. It only refuses to admit that the
sacrifice is itself a good. A sacrifice which does not increase, or tend to increase, the sum
total of happiness, is wasted."

Non-Hedonistic Forms of Utilitarianism

Non-hedonistic utilitarianism, being a form of non-hedonistic consequentialism, rejects

the view that pleasure and pain are the only intrinsic good and bad, respectively.
Following non hedonistic consequentialism, this rejection also comes in two ways. The
first claims that pleasure is not the intrinsic good, but something else. The second claims
that while pleasure is an intrinsic good, there are other intrinsic good as well. We may
refer to the kind of utilitarianism that rejects hedonism in the first way as exclusive non-
hedonistic utilitarianism and that which rejects hedonism in the second way as inclusive
non-hedonistic utilitarianism. The most influential representative of exclusive non-
hedonistic utilitarianism is the kind of utilitarianism called preference utilitarianism (also
called satisfaction utilitarianism); while that of the inclusive non-hedonistic utilitarianism is
the kind of utilitarianism called pluralistic utilitarianion (also called ideal utilitarianism).

Preference utilitarianism claims that what should be maximized is not the experience of
pleasure, but the satisfaction of preferences (desires or interests). Two of its
mostprominent proponents are Richard Hare (1919-2002) and Peter Singer (1946-).
Preference utilitarianism assumes that the experience of pleasure is not the intrinsic
good, but it is the satisfaction of preferences. The desire to experience pleasure and to
be free from pain is itself a preference that one may decide to satisfy. But there are other
preferences that have nothing to do with pleasure and pain, such as those a person may
decide to satisfy himself/herself by foregoing a pleasurable esperience or by undergoing
a painful experience. This explains why some people, on some occasions, would prefer
to suffer just to have their preferences satisfied Consequently, preference utilitarianism
contends that an action is morally good when it leads to the greatest satisfaction of
preferences for the greatest number of persons; while it is morally bad if otherwise.

Wlodek Rabinowicz provides, in what follows, a good illustration for how moral reasoning
works for preference utilitarianism:

Suppose I have agreed to meet John and Mary, two of my students, at the
department today. We haven't fixed any definite time for the meeting but the secretary
phonies me at home with the message that the students have already arrived and are
waiting. Since the weather is beautiful, I would much prefer to go by bike to the office
rather than to drive. The students, on the other hand, dislike waiting: They would prefer
that I arrive as soon as possible. So, our preferences are in conflict. The preference-
utilitarian solution would prescribe the action that best satisfies the aggregated
preferences of the persons involved. The issue is decided by balancing: My preference
for going by bike is weighed in proportion to its strength against the students' opposing
preferences. Suppose that each of the latter is weaker than my own but that together they
weigh more. Under these circumstances, I ought to abstain from going by bike and take
the car instead.

For purposes of explanation, let us assign numeral units for the strength of the
preferences involved. Suppose the strength of the professor's preference is 4, while that
of John's is 3 and of Mary's is 2. If the conflict were just between the professor's
preference and the preference of any one of his students, then the professor's
preference should be satisfied. But in the case presented, the professor's preference
conflicts with the preferences of both students, whose total strength is greater than his;
and so, his students' preferences are the ones that should be satisfied.

To weigh the relative strengths of the preferences involved in a given situation (a

process called preference balancing). Hare suggests that we put ourselves in the shoes
of the other persons whose preferences conflict with ours. In this way, these preferences
and the ensuing conflict have somehow become our own. Consequently, deciding on this
conflict somehow becomes a personal decision-as if one is deciding on a conflict
between one's own preferences. In the previous example, this means that the professor,
in order to assess the relative strength of his own preference against his students'
preferences, should pu himself in the shoes of his students.

Act and Rule Utilitarianism

Aside from its hedonistic and non-hedonistic forms, another general division in
utilitarianism is between act utilitarianism and rule utilitarianism. This division arises from
the question as to which the utilitarian principle of maximizing aggregate good or welfare
should be applied to determine the morality of an act-the act itself or the rule that governs
the act. According to act utilitarianism, the utilitarian principle should be applied to the act
itself while according to rule utilitarianism, it should be applied to the rule governing the
ast (see Brandt, 2004).

A rule can be good in various ways, From a deontological viewpoint, a rule is good if it
conforms to some higher law such as the will of God, a natural law, or the law of reason
(this shall be discussed in the module). From a utilitarian viewpoint, however, a rule is
good if following it produces the maximum aggregate good or welfare. Following some
philosophers (Smart, 2004, 206), let us conveniently refer to a good rule in this utilitarian
sense as an optimific rule. An optimific rule, thus, is a rule which when generally followed
(or conformed to) produces the maximum aggregate good.

Thus, to determine whether action X (say the act of breaking a promise) is morally good
or bad, act utilitarianism asks, does performing action X maximize aggregate good? If it
does, then it is morally good; if not, then it is morally bad. On the other hand, rule
utilitarianism asks, does action X follow an optimific rule (say the rule "Thou shall not
lie)? If it does, then it is morally good; if not, then it is morally bad. It will be observed that
the morality of the act in consideration, whether it is morally good or bad, will sometimes
vary in these two versions of utilitarianism. For rule utilitarianism, even if the act
maximizes aggregate good but follows a non-optimific rule, then it is morally bad. Act
utilitarianism, on the other hand, does not care about the rules that an act may follow
orviolate; as such, if the act maximizes aggregate good, then it is morally good,
regardless of whether the rule that it follows or violates is optimific or not. Followers of
each version of utilitarianism usually points to certain weaknesses of the other version.
Followers of rule utilitarianism usually cite the absurdity of act utilitarianism in certain
cases, such as the following one. Suppose an act utilitarian seeks the services of a
plumber for a certain fee, which the plumber successfully performs. Before paying the
plumber, the act utilitarian will first consider whether there is an alternative use of the
money supposed to be given to the plumber as payment for his services that will promote
a greater aggregate good, say giving it to charitable institutions or to the victims of a
calamity. If there is such an alternative use of the money, then not paying the plumber
and instead using the money for said alternative purposes is the morally preferable
action. Rule utilitarians resolve this absurdity by considering the rule "honor one's
contract with another," which the act of not paying the plumber for his services clearly
violates. They argue that since the said rule is optimific, for it brings stability to social
relations, among others, then it is morally good to conform to this rule. So, the morally
correct option for the person who hires the plumber, from the viewpoint of rule
utilitarianism, should be to honor his/her contract with the plumber by paying him for his
services.

Followers of act utilitarianism, on the other hand, claim that rule utilitarianism has the
danger of resulting into "rule worship" (an argument usually made against deontology as
well) wherein a rule is being followed for the sake of following it even if it will not lead to
the best consequences. Consider the situation called the "desert island promise" as
narrated by Smart (2004, 207):
 I have promised a dying man on a desert island, from which subsequently I
alone am rescued, to give his hoard of gold to the South Australian Jockey Club.
On my return I give it to the Royal Adelaide Hospital, which badly needs it for a
new X-ray machine. Could anybody deny that I had done rightly without being
open to the charge of heartlessness? (Remember that the promise was known
only to me, and so my action will not weaken the general confidence in the social
institution of promising.) Think of the persons dying of painful tumors who could
have been saved by the desert island gold!

In this situation, for the person to still keep his promise to the dying man, given the
surrounding circumstances (the person to whom the promise was made is already dead.
nobody else knows about the promise, and breaking the promise will be done in order to
save sick persons from dying), is, from the viewpoint of act utilitarianism, a form of rule
worship.

We earlier noted that consequentialism differs from deontological ethics in that the
ones that matter in making moral judgments for consequentialism are the consequences
of actions, whereas for deontology are the rules that actions follow or violate. In making
rules morally relevant, does this not make rule utilitarianism a form of deontological
ethics? Since the goodness of a rule in rule utilitarianism is still defined in
consequentialist terms, rule utilitarianism is still widely classified as a form of
consequentialist ethical theory, rather than as a form of deontological ethics. Some,
however, maintain that rule utilitarianismis a compromise between deontology and
utilitarianism, or a way of accommodating deontology into the utilitarian perspective, in
order to prevent the possibility that applications of the utilitarian standard will lead to
absurd situations.

Summary

Consequentialism is an ethical theory which contends that what matters in determining

the moral worth of an action is the kind of consequences that the action leads to. Such
consequences are those that lead to the experience of an intrinsic good. An intrinsic
good such as happiness, is one that is good in itself or desirable for its own sake. It
contrast with an instrumental good, which is a good that serves as a means to attain a
further good. Consequentialism comes in various forms which can be understood as
ways of responding to two questions concerning the intrinsic good: whether pleasure is
the only intrinsic good and whether the agent's intrinsic good is the only one that morally
matters. Accordingly, hedonistic consequentialism regards pleasure as the only intrinsic
good, while non-hedonistic consequentialism regards it as neither an intrinsic good nor
the only intrinsic good. On the other hand, agent-relative consequentialism regards only
agent related consequences as morally relevant, while agent-neutral consequentialism
regards the consequences to all affected persons as morally relevant. These
classifications combine to form complex forms of consequentialism.
Utilitarianism embodies the agent-neutral form of consequentialism, whose moral
principle is the maximization of the aggregate good. In addition to having hedonistic and
non-hedonistic versions, utilitarianism also has act and rule versions. Its hedonistic
version is either quantitative, when bodily and mental pleasures are treated as the same
in moral value, or qualitative, when mental pleasures are regarded as having a higher
moral value than bodily pleasures. Its non-hedonistic version is represented by
preference utilitarianism, which regards preference-satisfaction as the intrinsic good, and
pluralistic utilitarianism which accepts a number of intrinsic goods. Act utilitarianism
applies the utilitarian moral principle to actions, whereas rule utilitarianism applies it to
the rules governing actions. These classifications likewise combine to form complex
forms of utilitarianism.