LT Cortesia
LT Cortesia
LT Cortesia
1. April 2009
www.bsu-bund.de
BSU
Bundesstelle für Seeunfalluntersuchung
Ref.: 01/08 Federal Bureau of Maritime Casualty Investigation
Issued by:
Federal Bureau of Maritime Casualty Investigation
Bernhard-Nocht-Str. 78
20359 Hamburg
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Bundesstelle für Seeunfalluntersuchung
Ref.: 01/08 Federal Bureau of Maritime Casualty Investigation
The following report is a joint investigation report with the Marine Accident
Investigation Branch (MAIB), UK, and the Federal Bureau of Maritime Casualty
Investigation (BSU), Germany.
The MAIB and the BSU have jointly drawn up this report pursuant to the IMO Code
for the Investigation of Marine Casualties and Incidents (Resolution A.849(20)).
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Table of Contents
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7 ACTION TAKEN............................................................................................... 51
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Index of Figures
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At 04:54 1 on 2 January 2008, the LT CORTESIA ran aground on the Varne Bank
sandbank in the English Channel. The ship was on route from Thames Port to the
Suez Canal. At the peak of the evening high tide, at 18:58, the grounded vessel was
freed with the aid of four tug boats. For investigation purposes, the vessel was
ordered to proceed to a sheltered anchorage on the coast approx. 10 nm northeast of
Dover. No major damage as a result of the grounding was identified, which meant
that the LT CORTESIA upped anchor and was able to continue on its voyage at
18:00 on 3 January 2008.
1
All times in the report refer to the ship's time = GMT UTC
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Section from the chart No. 245, Dover Strait, BSH (Federal Maritime and Hydrographic Agency)
Location of
grounding
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3 Vessel Particulars
3.1 Photo
3.2 Particulars
Name of the vessel: LT CORTESIA
Type of vessel: Container ship
Nationality/flag: German
Port of registry: Hamburg
IMO number: 9293753
Call sign: DDYY2
Vessel operator: NSB Niederelbe Schiffahrtsgesellschaft mbH
& Co.KG, Buxtehude
Year built: 2005
Shipyard/yard number: Samsung Heavy Industries, yard no. 1512
Classification society: Germanischer Lloyd
Length overall: 333.99 m
Breadth overall: 42.80 m
Gross tonnage: 90.449
Deadweight: 10,1007 t
Container capacity: 6,170 TEU
Engine rating: 65,880 kW
Main engine: Wärtsila NSD 12 RTA 96C
(Service) Speed: 24.5 kn
Draught at time of accident: aft = 11.75 m , fore = 10.52 m
Number of crew: 22
Number of passengers: 5
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With the aid of four tug boats, the LT CORTESIA was freed at 18:58, and proceeded
under its own steam to a position approx. 10 nm northeast of Dover, where it was
anchored at The Downs for inspection purposes.
There was no evidence of any oil or pollutant leaks or any container losses or
personal injury. The damage to the ship was in the form of dents in the mid-ship
area.
At 18:00 on 3 January 2008, the LT CORTESIA continued its voyage without any
further incidents.
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5 Investigation
Initial investigations were conducted on board the vessel by the MAIB 2 on 2/3
January 2008. Data from the voyage data recorder (VDR) was saved and all relevant
documents and charts were photographed. Further investigations were conducted on
board in Hamburg by the BSU on 23 February 2008. AIS data and the recordings
from the Dover regional control centre were also available for the investigation.
The Varne Bank can be passed on both sides by ships sailing in a southwesterly
direction, but ships with larger draught generally circumnavigate the Varne Bank to
the south 3 . To the northeast of the Varne Bank, there is the Varne lightship, which is
also clearly visible and identifiable as a racon on the radar. There is a further buoy
system in place for these 8-nm-long shallows in the form of the east E Varne cardinal
buoy on the southeast side, in the form of the west Mid Varne cardinal buoy on the
northwest side and in the form of the south S Varne cardinal buoy on the southwest
end.
Due to the incorrect interpretation of the radar image, mistaking E Varne and Mid
Varne buoys for fishermen, several ships have already run aground on the Varne
Bank in the past. Prior to the LT CORTESIA, the most well-known case was the
grounding of the LOWLANDS MAINE bulker on 26 April 2006 under similar
circumstances.
In the separation zone to the south of the Varne Bank lies Colbart Bank, extending
approx. 10 nm in a southwesterly direction and marked with north and south cardinal
buoys. The distance between the Colbart N and E Varne cardinal buoys is approx.
1.8 nm and the distance between the E Varne and Mid Varne cardinal buoys is
approx. 1 nm.
2
MAIB = Marine Accident Investigation Branch, United Kingdom
3
However, this is not a recommended deep water route
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5.3 Current
On the date of the incident, there was a neap tide and the time of the incident was
approx. 1 hour before high tide at Dover . According to the BSH Channel Manual No.
20171, a northeasterly current of 0.75 to 1.2 kn was to be expected at the Varne
Bank.
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5.4 Crew
On the date of the incident, the ship was carrying five passengers and a 22-man
crew. According to the Minimum Safe Manning Certificate, at least 18 crew members
must be on board.
5.4.1 Captain
The captain was 57 at the time of the incident, had 22 years' shipping experience and
had held an STCW II/2 certificate since 1985. He has been employed by the shipping
company since 1993.
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5.4.3 Lookout
On the LT CORTESIA, a 29-year-old deckhand was employed as lookout at the time
of the incident. According to a statement by the chief officer, he was stood midship
with binoculars. The essential tasks of the lookout are to watch the sea-room and
report vessels and lights. The chief officer stated that he had not yet properly
assessed the lookout, as it was only the second watch on duty together. As a result,
the lookout was not given any instructions of what would be expected of him. An
assessment of the bridge microphone recordings of the voyage data recorder
produced a lack of communication between the chief officer and the lookout during
the watch prior to the grounding.
4
The documented times have been taken from the VDR
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5
Unless specifically specified otherwise, the headings/course lines are over ground.
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Bank on other ships in the past, but that he is fully aware of the
southern route.
5.6 Radio communication with the Vessel Traffic Service of the Dover
Coastguard (CNIS)
The area of sea is monitored with radar and AIS by the Vessel Traffic Service of the
Dover Coastguard. First, the LT CORTESIA was called at 04:59:02:
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04:59:37 LT CORTESIA
Who is calling LT CORTESIA ?
04:59:40 Dover Coastguard
That is Dover Coastguard
04:59:43 LT CORTESIA
Yes, Dover Coastguard
04:59:47 Dover Coastguard
You have come to a stop. You appear to be very close to the Varne
Bank
Are you ok?
04:59:55 LT CORTESIA
Just a moment, Yes of course
05:00:05 Dover Coastguard
You have got a draft to 12 meters.
Are you aground?
05:00:17 LT CORTESIA
Have I what?
Yes, we have a radar...a radar damage.
05:00:30 Dover Coastguard
I can see your radar and you appear to be trying to get off the bank
The VDR also recorded the conversations on the bridge. Due to background noise
and the fact that several people were talking on the bridge, only fragments of
conversation can be understood, while the radio conversation between Dover
Coastguard and LT CORTESIA can be heard in the background:
hard starboard....rated speed down...Where are we now?....How could that have
happened?
No technical fault with the helm, the radar system or any other faults in the electronic
navigational equipment were identified by the MAIB or the BSU. At the time of the
first VHF call, the LT CORTESIA was already aground on the Varne Bank. The radar
image showed at that time considerable wake behind the ship while sailing over
ground at just 0.08 kn. The following, somewhat lightened radar image shows the
"incoming cross traffic", the reason for the evasion manoeuvre.
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E Varne Bank
"Incoming cross
traffic"
Original
track
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Conning display
Radarpilot
Chartradar
Chartpilot
With regard to hardware, the ship is equipped, in terms of the systems installed, with
an electronic chart display and information system (ECDIS 6 ). Since no officially
approved chart data was installed in vector format (ENCs 7 ), the system only had the
status of an electronic chart system (ECS 8 ) which does not comply with the carriage
requirements under the terms of SOLAS V/19.2.1.4. According to statements given,
the electronic chart display was only used as a supplementary system and navigation
was essentially carried out on the paper chart.
The voyage plan is generally produced by the third officer. After planning has been
carried out on the paper charts, the voyage plan is then transferred on the planning
computer (Chartpilot I) at the chart table. The planning data, such as the safety
contour (Safety Contour), course monitoring, etc. are transferred to the radar screen
or chart screen at the conning position. A waypoint list generated on the computer
with courses and distances, as well as the radio sign-in and sign-out data, is printed
out and were signed off by the captain.
The planning for passing the Varne Bank by the third officer set out a course of 223°,
clearly south of the Varne Bank.
In connection with the grounding of the LT CORTESIA on the Varne Bank, the BSU
commissioned an expert's report by Prof. Capt. R. Becker-Heins, MarineServe GmbH
Hamburg. This report assesses the use and handling of the electronic navigational
6
ECDIS Electronic Chart Display and Information System. According to SOLAS Chp.V, Reg. 19.2.1.4,
this system may fulfil the carriage requirements with a chart.
7
ENC = Electronic Navigational Chart = electronic (officially approved) charts
8
ECS Electronic Chart System.
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equipment installed on board. The expert's report was to examine in particular detail
the following points:
- Evaluation of the on-board display used; comparing in particular the nautical
information taken from an ECS with that from an ECDIS.
- Analysis of the settings carried out on the bridge and overridden alarms based on
an evaluation of the VDR.
- On board, data was recorded in the voyage data recorder (VDR). The files for the
relevant period were read out and made accessible for a PC with replay software.
- Photos of the relevant bridge consoles (3 January 2008 and 23 February 2008)
The next day following the grounding, the ship, which had since been hauled free
and was anchored on the roadstead, was inspected by the MAIB, and numerous
photographs were taken of the individual bridge consoles, the bridge arrangement
and the ship itself.
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One thing that all systems have in common is that they comprise the following
components:
- The "hardware" involving a computer that has the necessary computing power
and storage capacity for the large data volumes to be processed.
- The application software that encompasses all programs that organise and
analyse the database content and convert it into graphical information. They also
provide the navigator with the necessary navigational and administrative functions
to enable him to use the electronic chart efficiently.
If the system is an ECDIS, it is equivalent to navigation using the paper chart, i.e.
navigation can take place – where necessary also exclusively – on the computer
(SOLAS Chp. V, Reg. 19.2.1.4). According to an IMO resolution, the flag country is
ultimately responsible for deciding whether, when a ship is equipped with ECDIS, to
dispense completely with the additional use of paper charts for navigation. Any
9
As explained below, an "ECDIS" is operated in three different modes (ECDIS; ECS; RCDS), which,
even where equipment conditions are otherwise the same, is solely dependent on the chart data
called up. The term "Voyage Management System (VMS)" is used as a generic term for an "ECDIS" –
without any special mode being specified.
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For ECDIS operating mode, the IMO minimum requirements for ECDIS (ECDIS
Performance Standard) are defined in the IMO Resolutions A.817(19), MSC.64(67)
and MSC.86(70) and also apply to vessels sailing under a German flag. Their content
covers the following requirements:
- Based on type testing by the Flag State the compliance of the ECDIS system with
the aforementioned IMO documents must have been confirmed. In Germany and
the other Member States of the European Union this verification is effected
pursuant to the requirements of the ship carriage guideline of the council
96/98/EG. This, amongst others, stipulates type testing under the terms of the
respective requirements of IEC 11 . Here the combination of appliance software,
computer and monitor is being tested and approved. The approval is being
effected within the European Union by organizations, which are appointed for the
carriage requirement guideline by a Member State of the Union, the so called
appointed institutions. In Germany, the Federal Maritime and Hydrographic
Agency (BSH) is responsible for type testing. This authority certifies the
successful type testing according to module B.
- The database must contain official chart data in vector format, so-called ENCs
(Electronic Navigational Charts). Charts are official if they are authorised by a
national government authority responsible for hydrographical data collection and
processing. For example, the BSH in Germany. ENC data is vector-based data –
compared with raster nautical charts produced by simply scanning a paper chart
(RNC data). It is only through the use of the vector system that the full
functionality of an ECDIS can be realised by linking data. Aside from a loss-free
display when enlarging chart sections or filtering the information displayed, one of
the greatest advantages is the activation of alarms when certain objects draw
near or in the event of other hazards, for example areas of shallow water.
In contrast, the use of private suppliers' charts that were not drawn up on the
instruction of such a hydrographical institute is, in principle, contradictory to the
use of the system as an ECDIS. A system operated in ECDIS mode and
displaying such data of a private supplier would fall back to the status of an ECD,
which is a navigational aid, and on its own not complying with the SOLAS
requirements.
10
IMO SLS.14/Circ.190
11
International Electrotechnical Commission, IEC 61174
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- Ultimately, the ECDIS system must be protected in the event of a possible failure
with suitable back-up devices to ensure the safe conclusion of the ship's voyage.
In line with the current regulatory situation, possible options are the dual
installation of ECDIS systems of the same construction or the additional use of a
complete set of amended official paper charts for navigation.
If a ship only has an ECS, there is a risk that it is unseaworthy or unfit for voyage
from the start. This could affect the liability in the context of maritime law of a
shipping company on various points.
The electronic chart display system is part of the equipment of a ship. This means
that its task, alongside other items of equipment, is, among other things, to enable
the ship's crew to overcome the foreseeable hazards of a sea voyage. As a
navigational tool used on the bridge, its functioning is critical to the safety of the ship.
At the same time, as it is not fully automatic, it also has to be operated by the bridge
personnel. This requires training in the handling of the chart display system. If, for
example, a ship grounds due to incorrect interpretation of the displayed chart image,
this is brought about by an inadequately trained or inadvertent user "failing to identify"
the navigational situation.
The use of a voyage management system can point to at least two indicators of a
ship's seaworthiness. Namely "proper equipment" in the case of blind faith in the
information of an ECS or "proper manning", if the system was operated in ECDIS
mode but the officer on watch could not safely operate the system.
The first category includes risks that may arise from system-related shortcomings.
This means malfunctioning of the ECDIS or ECS. Technical deficiencies such as a
flickering screen light diffuse color contrasts through to complete device malfunction
are conceivable.
12
The term "shortcomings" was chosen here, because its meaning encompasses all unwanted
characteristics of a situation. It therefore covers the similar terms "error" and "deficiency", which,
however, in this case, describe a shortcoming in the sense of the non-functioning (error) or in the
sense of poor functioning or inadequacy (deficiency).
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Equally varied are the risks that fall under the second category. These refer to user-
related shortcomings. They include application errors, caused by the incorrect usage
of electronic chart display systems. Generally, they are based on a lack of
understanding or blind faith in the technology. It is precisely these risks that call for
closer investigation when looking at a specific case, because they often lead to an
escalation of the risk for the ship.
One of the most urgent problems borne out by the Hailwood report is the lack of
understanding of equipment and usage regulations relating to electronic chart display
systems. One of the reasons for this is the fact that the seminars and training
courses on ECDIS offered by the shipping companies are rarely taken up. This
means that the majority of those asked were unable to distinguish between ECDIS
and ECS 13 .
When asked whether companies had experience of ECDIS or ECS, the majority
intuitively gave the response "ECDIS". When asked follow-up questions, however, it
became apparent that the systems actually installed were, in most cases, ECS.
Subsequently, the Hailwood report emphasises the risk that may arise from a user's
lack of understanding. The incorrect application of a (possibly also defective) ECS as
a navigational tool prior to a grounding must definitely be viewed critically. It is
therefore possible to criticise the situation on the ship side, whereby the careful
handling requirements demanded have not been sufficiently fulfilled.
13
This assessment was provided by Dr. Andy Norris (CNI).
14
The term "Integrated Navigational System INS" refers to systems that comply with the specified
performance requirements of the IMO(MSC Circ.) or a national authority
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even under the influence of current and wind. In a control process, the INS evaluates
the data via the ship position, the adjacent course and the ship's speed, applies this
data to a mathematical model of the ship, enabling the ship's behaviour to be
predicted, and finally determines the necessary rudder angle. If only the heading is
controlled, the autopilot remains in "Heading Control" mode.
An INS would also be able to follow the route planned on the voyage management
system at the speeds specified for each section. For this, INS would have to have
access to the engine speed - something which, however, is, in practice, rejected by
most vessels' commands.
On board the LT CORTESIA, NACOS (Navigation and Command System) from the
company SAM Electronics had been installed but does not have approval as a fully
adequate INS. It does only have approval as track control system. The NACOS must
not implicitly comprise and meet all aspects of an INS. Depending on the
requirements, this system offers various configurations within the consoles. They are:
- Radarpilot: constitutes a radar system that, aside from the radar functions,
enables the autopilot/trackpilot to be operated and therefore track control.
- Chartpilot: refers to a VMS workstation with type testing for an ECDIS.
- Chartradar: describes a radar system that can, in addition to the functions of the
Radarpilot, overlay a VMS layer from a connected Chartpilot on the radar image.
- Conning display: refers to a display for the permanent relaying of Conning
information, which can be read out from an available Chartpilot or Multipilot.
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However, the need for VMS and ECDIS training is not currently set out in a
transparent way. Although, up to now, no training requirement has arisen on the
basis of the STCW Code, individual flag countries could request at national level that
this be one of the conditions for the acceptance of an ECDIS as a substitute for
paper charts. For ships sailing under a German flag, no such supplementary
requirement is set out. Ultimately, such a demand could only come about from the
checking instructions of officers from port state controls 15 . Irrespective of official
training requirements, the operators of nautical vessels are obliged in accordance
with ISM Code to determine training requirements for their crew and to ensure a
15
Port State Control Committee Instruction 34/2001/02
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relevant training program. The vessel operator NSB runs an own training center with
two different simulators in the form of the “NSB academy”. Holder of nautical and
technical certificates of competence are obliged to regularly participate in seminars
and training courses.
For additional safety, every officially approved ECDIS must have a function 17
available to check for any dangers on the planned route that may arise from sailing
close to objects and critical contour lines 18 on the chart. When the "Check" function 19
is activated, the entire length of the route is checked within an adjustable corridor. If
the route comes too close to a possible hazard, the operator is notified of this via a
warning message.
Generally, all bridge officers record the fact that they have taken note of the voyage
plan by signing it. In this respect, the chief officer of the LT CORTESIA must have
been informed of the peculiarities of the Varne Bank. A printout of the voyage plan
must also be retained after conclusion of the voyage.
If a voyage plan was generated using a VMS, then when later following the
waypoints, there are two options for the use of the stored route.
Firstly, the voyage plan can only be loaded (Loaded Track). In this case, the tracking
of the waypoints and the sections between them is displayed graphically on the
electronic chart, but, aside from the display, VMS does not carry out any other
functions or checks with regard to a track control. The VMS also does not issue any
alarm signals, e.g. if the ship moves more than a specified tolerance away from the
planned track.
One of the loaded voyage plans can then be activated (System Track). The planned
route is still displayed on the screen but now, the VMS can execute additional
functions. If the ship's autopilot has a track control mode (this would be the Trackpilot
in the NACOS), the VMS can send the track control module the necessary
information to sail via the waypoints and the ship would automatically follow the
specified route. As a further option, if the track was activated, the VMS would be able
16
IMO Resolution A 893(21) - Guidelines for Voyage Planning
17
IMO Res. A 817(19) Performance Standards
18
Can be set via the "Safety Contour" menu option, which is otherwise used for colour differentiation
of the contour zones on the chart.
19
"Check" is a term used by the manufacturer SAM Electronics; other manufacturers, for example,
may call the function "Validation".
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– if the regulatory prerequisites on board are in place – to also control the engine
speed so that a specified speed profile is adhered to (Speedpilot).
Irrespective of the existence of waypoint planning, when the ship sails, a defined
safety zone around the ship is always monitored in terms of chart information 20 . The
length of this foreseeable sector can be set by the operator but is at least 1 nautical
mile 21 when the track is activated. An alarm is triggered if chart objects such as
buoys enter the monitoring sector or a minimum selectable depth is breached by
water depths on the chart. Before running aground in shallows, the VMS would issue
alarm signals accordingly. However, in the Chartpilot from the manufacturer SAM
Electronics, this alarm function can be deactivated by the operator.
20
In view of the data structure, this monitoring function only works on the basis of vector charts.
21
Pursuant to the product specification of the manufacturer SAM Electronics
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- In the centre at the height of the central console is a Conning display, which
permanently displays the navigation data of a connected Chartpilot or Multipilot
but does not demonstrate any further functionality.
Only limited operating functions are available on the Chartradar for the selection
and display of chart information. The Chartradar operator can choose what
hydrographical data is imported, i.e. ENC or CM-93/2. RNC data, for example,
cannot be displayed on the chartradar. A number of presentation parameters can
also be defined, for example to enlarge the chart section or set the density and
type of chart symbols. However, based on this Chartradar query, the Chartpilot
only delivers a "chart picture" bit map.
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values must be transferred from the settings on the Chartpilot, even if other charts
are currently displayed there (if necessary, also in another format). The test
standard for the chartradar according to IEC 60936-3 does not prescribe alarm
functions. However, they are partly displaced on the chartradar.
On ships with a gross tonnage greater than 3.000, with keel laying after the
01.07.2002, it is necessary to install two radar systems. Pursuant to SOLAS V/19
one of these has to be an X band and the other an S band, whereby the allocation
of the radar screens to the display and operating consoles - in this case the
Chartradars – is being left up to the operator. The Chartradar described here was
allocated to the S band.
The recordings of the VDR come from this screen according to the
determinations. The direct device settings, as made on the Chartpilot, can
therefore only be simulated to a limited extent. However, if a VMS is actually run
as an ECDIS, i.e. as the primary navigational tool, storing this data in the VDR
would also be useful in order to later ensure that information about the
navigational settings and the chart work carried out (which cannot be simulated
here) can be received in the fullest extent possible by the officer on watch.
- The device next on the right, i.e. with the screen on the far right, is a Chartpilot.
As previously explained, the Chartpilot would fulfil all system-related requirements
to enable a voyage management system to be operated in ECDIS status.
Although a large number of the settings carried out here have an effect on the
behaviour of the VMS and therefore also on the chart display on the Chartradar,
this data has not been stored in the VDR. An operator can therefore, for example,
only deactivate the alarms on the Chartpilot in the case of the automatic
monitoring of the safety sector around the ship, but no obstacle or shallow water
alarms would be output on the Chartradar.
22
ARCS Admirality Raster Chart Service
23
RCDS Raster Chart Display System
24
In view of this deficiency in functionality, a Chartradar can never achieve the status of an actual
ECDIS, and chart transfer will always remain an ECS layer (ECS Electronic Chart System -
navigational tool that does, however, not fulfil the carriage requirements in accordance with SOLAS
Chp.V, Reg.19
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- On the left next to the central console is the second radar 25 . The same applies
correspondingly to this radar, as to the Chartradar at the officer on watch
workstation. As a radar display, however, the screen of the X band radar was
probably displayed here.
- To achieve the required duplication of the ECDIS, so that the VMS constellation
could replace the use of paper charts as an actual ECDIS, as shown in the photo
below, a second Chartpilot has been set up as a so-called planning station in the
rear section of the bridge at the chart table.
Below, only selected display elements are to be examined in further detail. If settings
have been changed compared with the previous settings, this can never occur
automatically, but rather always calls for the intervention of the officer on watch. The
settings would remain unchanged throughout the entire voyage as long as the officer
on watch does not modify them. Even when the Chartradar is restarted, many of the
"old" settings would be reloaded again 26 .
25
According to the carriage catalogue the LT CORTESIA is equipped with a chartradar and a
radarpilot
26
With the exception of the screen presentation, which is set to "Standard"
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Ref.: 01/08 Federal Bureau of Maritime Casualty Investigation
CLEAN SWP This screen clearing process has been set to MEDIUM. This
correlation function did not necessarily have to be activated.
However, no radar targets appear to have been lost.
VRM A circle with a radius 0.5 nm around the ship was set using
the Variable Range Marker. This may also be used to mark
the close range.
RANGE / OFF CENT In addition to the range of 6 nm, the centre of the radar
screen was shifted towards the direction of the heading. This
resulted in a recording range in the direction ahead of the
ship of some 9 nm, which was adapted to the traffic situation
along the one-way lane.
BUZZER OFF The line through the loudspeaker indicates that the BUZZER
OFF function was activated. In most cases, this suppresses
the acoustic alarm output.
27
ROT = Rate of Turn
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Bundesstelle für Seeunfalluntersuchung
Ref.: 01/08 Federal Bureau of Maritime Casualty Investigation
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Ref.: 01/08 Federal Bureau of Maritime Casualty Investigation
10
30
20
29
E.g. based on hydrodynamic phenomena, such as squat
30
Possible is also a 2 colour distinction with the subdivision into blue=not navigable critical areas and
white= unrestrictable navigable
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Bundesstelle für Seeunfalluntersuchung
Ref.: 01/08 Federal Bureau of Maritime Casualty Investigation
Figure 13: "Day" display type. Varne Bank shows up as dark blue
However, with the brightness configuration “NIGHT” selected
at the time of the accident the buoy symbols are almost not
visible and the display of the depth contours is low in contrast
to such an extent that no differentiation can be identified
between the shallower or deeper areas of the Shallow
Contour.
Figure 14: "Night" display type. No contrast against the surrounding area
31
Meanwhile issue 4.2
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Bundesstelle für Seeunfalluntersuchung
Ref.: 01/08 Federal Bureau of Maritime Casualty Investigation
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Ref.: 01/08 Federal Bureau of Maritime Casualty Investigation
On examing the screenshots, it is apparent that, during the entire recorded time, no
trial manoeuvre was attempted. With a trial manoeuvre, an officer on watch can plan
which course and/or heading change would enable him to avoid coming into close
range of oncoming traffic 32 . However, leaving the track and changing course to
starboard at 04.36 due to a suspected close range situation with another vessel
were, in fact, the catalyst events that led to the ship running aground.
However, most relevant radar targets were acquired by the chief officer, including the
Varne shallow buoys as targets 9 and 11, which were later indicated as Dangerous
Targets on the target display. The acoustic alarms that sounded were suppressed by
the "BUZZER OFF" setting.
If safety alarms had been generated on the connected Chartpilot, which is the only
place where the safety zone is monitored through critical chart data, they would also
have been forwarded through to the Chartradar. However, the VDR recording shows
that, in the period in question, no such hazard warnings were issued on the
Chartradar. Approaching the Varne Bank marked with buoys would have been cause
for such alarms in any case.
Firstly, when a chart object, like the buoys for example, are recorded by the
monitoring sector (where the set maximum range ahead could not be reconstructed)
or areas with too low depths compared with the Safety Contour, and secondly, when
the ship moves directly into the danger area.
32
According to regulation 8 of the International Regulations for Preventing Collisioss at Sea from 1972
„Manoeuvres to avoid collisions“ such a manoeuvre planning is rquired in terms of section d
33
Although the own course amounted to 228° at this time, the course of the incomer to 247°, the
course difference amounted to 19°
34
Presupposing close range of 0.5 nm
35
Time of Closest Point of Approach= Time up to the closest approach
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The fact that no such alarm could be recorded on the Chartradar can only be caused,
ultimately, by two factors, taking into consideration the fact that the Chartradar itself
cannot trigger such alarms but rather "only" takes on the alarms of the Chartpilot.
Either the Chart Alarms in the relevant Chartpilot menu were deactivated by the
operator or raster data was being run on the Chartpilot. In view of the data structure,
no such monitoring can generally be linked with raster data.
Figure 15: Menu for Chart Alarms on the Chartpilot (later simulation)
The following examines the actions of the officer on watch on the Chartradar in
chronological order. The times are from VDR information.
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Ref.: 01/08 Federal Bureau of Maritime Casualty Investigation
04:34:00 With the aid of the EBL 36 , the officer on watch plots the
course through the two E Varne and Mid Varne shallow
buoys. As already mentioned, in view of the inverse colour
allocation in NIGHT mode and the activation of Paper Chart
Symbols, the buoy symbols are difficult to identify as such,
but on closer inspection, the markings should have been
recognised as buoys at least by this point. The buoy echoes
also do not have any kind of sailing vector, as "True" vectors
were set. Confusing the objects with fishing vessels would
therefore have been avoidable if the necessary care and
attention had been taken. (See Fig. 19)
04:44:00 At a distance of some 2.5 nm, the two shallow buoys E Varne
and Mid Varne are acquired on the radar. As their relative
motion moves into close range 37 , the buoys are displayed as
Dangerous Targets with the numbers 9 and 11 in the target
data window. The True Speed of both buoys is given as 0.4
kn (see Fig. 17). Even if the LT CORTESIA were sailing at a
speed over ground of 21 kn, the grounding incident could still
have been avoided by changing course to port. As the figure
below shows, the buoy symbols are definitely weak but can
still be identified.
36
EBL Electronic Bearing Line
37
In view of the size of the VRM, close range is assumed at 0.5 nm. This value could then also have
been entered as a CPA limit value on the ARPA
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- Of the relevant data, in relation to the surrounding the Varne Bank area, the
unofficial CM-93/2 information is no more enlightening than the ENC data
records. It appears that both data records contain the same important
hydrographical information. In this case then, the use of official ENCs instead of
private CM-93/2 data would not have resulted in additional or better hazard
warnings on the VMS/ECDIS. Although officially, reading in CM-93/2 data would
mean that the system becomes a non-SOLAS-compliant ECS and navigation
according to this information would have been "in contravention of the
regulations", this can, nevertheless, NOT be deemed the cause of the grounding.
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Ref.: 01/08 Federal Bureau of Maritime Casualty Investigation
- Monitoring of the safety zone around the ship and the ship's position itself is also
possible with CM-93/2 charts. As already mentioned, a hazard warning is even
triggered twice; firstly when the safety sector encounters a chart object or a depth
area that is too shallow, and secondly when the ship's position moves into a
danger area. Only if the Chart Alarm is deactivated are NO such alarms
generated. In this respect, it can be assumed that these chart alarms had actually
been switched off. Although, according to information from the crew, the Depth
Alarm was set to 10 m at the time of the incident, the value for this Under Keel
Clearance in a simulator run was set to 5 m or, in the second run, to 12 m.
Various methods can be applied in order to determine a safety depth for the depth
alarm. Ultimately the safety depth is specified by the master. It would for example be
conceivable to take the draft of the ship plus 2 m safety depth. In this precise case
with a draft of 12 m this would lead to a safety depth of 14 m.
The setting of the depth alarm of 10 m stated by the crew would result in a similar
critical water depth. As can be learned from the manual of the chartpilot the depth
alarm refers to the water depth measured under the keel by echo sounder, the Under
Keel Clearance. If the stated 10 m for the depth alarm are added to the draft of 12 m
astern this well lead to a critical water depth of 22 m.
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Ref.: 01/08 Federal Bureau of Maritime Casualty Investigation
When the clearance fell below the set Safety Depth (Under Keel Clearance), a
corresponding alarm was triggered in the simulator operation 38 . Generally, the
Depth Alarm is displayed on all devices on the bridge that show the water depth
and also has to be stopped on each device individually. However, the acoustic
alarm is suppressed when Buzzer Off is activated.
The fact that, during the grounding, the Depth Alarm did not show up on the
Chartradar leads to the conclusion that this function had already be deactivated
on the Chartpilot. This means that setting the Depth Alarm to the 10 m specified
by the crew would have been meaningless.
The different colour display was tested when changing the Depth Contours and
the Safety Depth:
Depth
Contour
Safety
Depth
In the case of the above "NIGHT" setting, the Varne Bank, as well as the buoy
symbols, does not stand out, since they are in the unsafe area, where according to
the definition no maritime shipping should take place and which should therefore be
avoided
When set to day mode, as below, the Varne Bank is identifiable as dark blue,
but it is still behind the Safety Contour:
38
The simulation computer cannot show the actual depth profile for the simulation. More often,
simplified profiles are used for calculation
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Wrecks
Safety
Depth
Shipping
Obstruc-
tion
With this display the Varne Bank as well as the buoy symbols in the light blue and
grey area stand out. Wrecks and shipping obstructions are highlighted.
The display grows even more clear with the setting of the Safety Depth and the
Safety Contour on 20 m. The one way waterway is displayed as largely navigable
water area. The passage between both sand banks is visible and more shipping
obstructions and less wrecks are displayed:
Shipping
Obstruc-
tion
Wrecks
Safety
Depth
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Ref.: 01/08 Federal Bureau of Maritime Casualty Investigation
The work times of the chief officer significantly exceed the maximum work times in
accordance with the Seamen's Law. The work times on 29 December and
31 December 2007 are given as up to 18 hours in a 24-hour period.
In the 30 hours prior to the incident, the documented work and rest times are in order
from a legal viewpoint. From experience the expert of the AfA Hamburg
commissioned by the BSU supposed that it seems likely that, during the stay in port
in Thames Port on 1 January 2008 between 14:00 and 20:00, there was no
opportunity for the Chief Officer to catch up on sufficient sleep.
The count of weekly work times, at 76.5 hours, is high. This value is only kept down
by the recordings on 2 and 3 January 2008 (after the incident). It is not possible to
assess whether, during normal navigation at sea, these excessive work times would
have been offset, for example, by relief from duty.
The investigated work time sheets did not point to any manipulation or
"embellishment" of the work times.
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6 Analysis
The serious marine casualty is due to misconduct on the part of the chief officer. The
traffic situation was not correctly assessed and, as a result of a number of wrong
decisions, the LT CORTESIA ran aground on the Varne Bank.
After a holiday phase of several weeks, the chief officer signed on in Hamburg on 28
December 2007 in a well-rested state. He was not experiencing any health or
personal problems. However, there are legitimate indications that, on the day of the
incident, after just six days on board, the chief officer was overtired and/or limited in
his actions. The response to the calls from the Dover Vessel Traffic Service and the
failure to recognise that the ship had run aground would, for example, only be
explained by overtiredness. It can be assumed that, as a result of the unforeseen oil
spill in Rotterdam and additional activities associated with this, a large portion of the
scheduled/necessary rest times could not be observed and therefore full productivity
and attentiveness were not possible.
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If the Chartpilot had been run with such CM-93/2 charts, the nautical chart display
system would have already switched, as a result, to the non-official status of an ECS.
Navigating with this type system instead of the use of paper charts would have
represented a breach of the equipment regulations in accordance with SOLAS Chp.
V, Reg. 19.2.1.4 and the German Ship Safety Act and would therefore have been in
contravention of the regulations. However, in the laboratory trial, the alarm behaviour
of the ENC and the CM-93/2 charts shows no difference. The use of the Chartpilot
and/or the Chartradar in ECS status was, in this respect, not a decisive factor for the
grounding. With good seamanship, the navigational situation would also have been
correctly identifiable on an ECS (i.e. also based on CM-93/2 data).
Ultimately, from a navigational viewpoint, the ship ran aground as a result of two
main factors:
- The crew's inadequate voyage management system skills and the resulting
incorrect settings, particularly in relation to the Depth Contours, the Chart Alarms
and the Depth Alarm settings.
- The resulting errors of judgement being made, which were caused by the chief
officer and/or the bridge team disregarding conventional navigation.
Applying the otherwise usual navigational caution would also have avoided the
incident. GPS positions are to be checked by conventional navigational procedures
(bearings, distance measurements). The extent to which this was carried out by the
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chief officer cannot be verified on the basis of the VDR Chartradar images. However,
if these observed positions had been plotted on the paper chart, which would have
been necessary with ECS status, the danger posed by the Varne Bank would have
definitely caught the attention of the chief officer.
During the marine casualty investigation, it was not possible to determine whether
navigation was actually carried out using the paper charts available on board. There
are also contradictory statements as to whether the handover of watch duty took
place at the chart table or at the Chartpilot. In this respect, it can be assumed that,
during his bridge watch, the chief officer relied too much on the (supposed) "ECDIS"
displays and navigated solely "according to the computer". A chief officer with such
extensive professional experience must have been able to foresee that such action
entails extreme risks.
Training of the crews in the available, installed voyage management systems, which
is currently not internationally regulated, should be intensified and particular attention
should be given to preparing, implementing and monitoring the voyage. In addition
the setting of the Depth Contours with regard to the existing Depth Contour lines in
the database should be observed.
More Depth Contour Lines in the areas 10-20 m and 20-30 m would be desirable.
Furthermore, the varying significance of VMS status as an ECDIS, ECS or RCDS for
the ship's voyage-worthiness is to be clarified.
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7 Action taken
The vessel operator of the LT CORTESIA has evaluated this serious accident. The
nautical officers were in informed about the course of the accident in written form.
During the training in the in-house simulator this accident is being simulated in order
to prevent this kind of accident or similar accidents in future. In particular it is dealt
with risks associated with unfavorable settings of the systems.
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8 Safety recommendations
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Ref.: 01/08 Federal Bureau of Maritime Casualty Investigation
9 Sources
• Written statements
- Vessel's command
- Shipping company/owner
- Classification society
• Witness accounts
• Nautical charts and vessel data as well as providing simulation technic of the
Federal Maritime and Hydrographic Agency/Bundesamt für Seeschifffahrt und
Hydrographie (BSH)
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