Afttp 3-2.6 Jfire
Afttp 3-2.6 Jfire
Afttp 3-2.6 Jfire
MULTI-SERVICE TACTICS,
TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURES
FOR JOINT APPLICATION OF
FIREPOWER
ATP 3-09.32
MCRP 3-16.6A
NTTP 3-09.2
AFTTP 3-2.6
JANUARY 2016
REL TO NATO, FVEY, FIN, JOR, ROK, SAU, SWE, and UAE
FOREWORD
This multi-Service tactics, techniques, and procedures (MTTP) publication is a
project of the Air Land Sea Application (ALSA) Center in accordance with the
memorandum of agreement between the Headquarters of the Army, Marine
Corps, Navy, and Air Force doctrine commanders directing ALSA to develop
MTTP publications to meet the immediate needs of the warfighter.
This MTTP publication has been prepared by ALSA under our direction for
implementation by our respective commands and for use by other commands as
appropriate.
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Marine Corps PCN: 144 000033 00
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Air Force. The Air Force will incorporate the procedures in this publication in
accordance with applicable governing directives. Distribution is in accordance
with Air Force Instruction 33-360, Publications and Forms Management.
5. User Information
a. US Army Combined Arms Center; HQMC, DC, CD&I; NWDC; Curtis E.
LeMay Center for Doctrine Development and Education; and Air Land Sea
Application (ALSA) Center developed this publication with the joint
participation of the approving Service commands. ALSA will review and
update this publication as necessary.
b. This publication reflects current joint and Service doctrine, command and
control organizations, facilities, personnel, responsibilities, and procedures.
Changes in Service protocol, appropriately reflected in joint and Service
publications, will be incorporated in revisions to this document.
c. We encourage readers to recommend changes for improving this
publication. Key your comments to the specific page and paragraph and
provide a rationale for each recommendation. Send comments and
recommendations directly to:
Army
Commander, US Army Combined Arms Center
ATTN: ATZL-MCK-D
Fort Leavenworth KS 66027-6900
DSN 552-4885 COMM (913) 684-4885; [email protected]
Marine Corps
Deputy Commandant for Combat Development and Integration
ATTN: C116
3300 Russell Road, Suite 204
Quantico VA 22134-5021
DSN 278-3616/6233 COMM (703) 784-3616/6233; [email protected]
Navy
Commander, Navy Warfare Development Command
ATTN: N52
1528 Piersey St, Building O-27
Norfolk VA 23511-2723
DSN 341-4185 COMM (757) 341-4185; [email protected]
Air Force
Commander, Curtis E. LeMay Center for Doctrine Development and Education
ATTN: DDJ
401 Chennault Circle
Maxwell AFB AL 36112-6428
DSN 493-7864/1681 COMM (334) 953-7864/1681; [email protected]
ALSA
Director, ALSA Center
114 Andrews Street
Joint Base Langley-Eustis VA 23665-2785
DSN 575-0902 COMM (757) 225-0902; [email protected]
SUMMARY OF CHANGES
ATP 3-09.32/MCRP 3-16.6A/NTTP 3-09.2/AFTTP 3-2.6, Multi-Service Tactics,
Techniques, and Procedures for the Joint Application of Firepower (JFIRE).
This revision provides a significant overhaul of the MTTP. The publication was
reorganized in the following order:
• Chapter I—Planning Considerations.
• Chapter II—Surfaced-based Fire Support.
• Chapter III—Air-to-surface Fires.
• Chapter IV—Electronic Attack.
• Chapter V—Cyberspace Effects.
• Appendix A—Capabilities and Communications Equipment.
• Appendix B—Brevity.
• Appendix C—Laser Operations.
• Appendix D—Aircraft-delivered Munitions Descriptions.
• Appendix E—Collateral Damage.
• Appendix F—General Information.
• Appendix G—Medical Evacuation, Casualty Evacuation, and Landing
Zone Briefs
• Appendix H—Risk Estimate Distances.
• Appendix I—Minimum Safe Distances.
• Appendix J—Electronic Attack/Calls for Electronic Fires (SECRET).
• Appendix K—Cyberspace Effects (SECRET).
Appendices J and K are available on the Air Land Sea Application Center’s
classified website https://intelshare.intelink.sgov.gov/sites/alsa.
The following are specific changes:
• The former Chapter IV—Electronic/Cyber Fires has been split into two
chapters: Chapter IV—Electronic Attack and Chapter V—Cyber Effects.
• The term CCA, and references to it, have been removed.
• The former Appendix D—Fire Support Coordinating Measures and
Airspace Coordinating Measures was removed. Refer to MTTP Airspace
Control.
• Modifications were made to risk estimate distance and minimum safe
distance tables and methodologies.
• Unclassified surface-to-air threat tables were added.
• A significant number of tables have been added for operator use.
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21 January 2016
JFIRE
MULTI-SERVICE TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURES FOR
JOINT APPLICATION OF FIREPOWER
CHAPTER I PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS..................................................... 1
1. General Planning for Joint Fire Support .................................................. 1
2. Digitally Aided Close Air Support (DACAS) planning considerations ....... 5
3. Department of Defense (DD) Form 1972, Joint Tactical Air Strike
Request (JTAR)...................................................................................... 5
CHAPTER II SURFACE-BASED FIRE SUPPORT ............................................. 7
1. Artillery and Mortar Fire .......................................................................... 7
2. Rockets and Missiles ............................................................................ 19
3. Naval Surface Fire Support (NSFS) ...................................................... 20
4. Tomahawk Land Attack Missile (TLAM) Call For Fire ............................ 26
5. Surface Fire Munitions .......................................................................... 30
CHAPTER III AIR-TO-SURFACE FIRES .......................................................... 37
1. Close Air Support.................................................................................. 37
2. CAS Execution Considerations ............................................................. 37
3. Terminal Attack Control Responsibilities ............................................... 39
DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT D: Distribution authorized to DOD and DOD contractors only to protect
technical or operational information from automatic dissemination under the International Exchange Program
or by other means. This protection applies to publications required solely for official use and to those
containing valuable technical or operational information. This determination was made on 26 February 2015.
Other requests will be referred to:
TRADOC, HQ CAC, ATTN: ATZL-MCK-D, Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-6900; HQMC, DC, CD&I, ATTN:
C116, Quantico VA, 22134-5021; NWDC, ATTN: N52, Norfolk, VA 23511-2723; and LeMay Center, ATTN:
DDJ, Maxwell AFB, AL 36112-6004. DESTRUCTION NOTICE: Destroy by any method that prevents
disclosure of contents or reconstruction of the document.
*Supersedes ATP 3-09.32/MCRP 3-16.6A/NTTP 3-09.2/AFTTP(I) 3-2.6, dated November 2012
REL TO NATO, FVEY, FIN, JOR, ROK, SAU, SWE, and UAE
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Orientation/Situation
Terrain
a. Map datum, grid reference guides, common geographic reference
system / global area reference system, and imagery.
b. Observation / fields of fire.
c. Avenues of approach.
d. Key terrain.
e. Obstacles.
f. Cover and concealment.
g. Urban environment and lighting.
h. Sea state and hydrograph.
i. Target area crests.
j. Effects of density altitude on aircraft performance.
k. Urban or mountain line-of-sight considerations (communications and
lasers).
Weather
a. Ceiling and visibility.
b. Temperature.
c. Winds (surface and at altitude).
d. Sunrise / sunset.
e. Solar elevation and azimuth.
f. Moon data (rise / set, elevation, azimuth, percent illumination, lux).
g. Thermal crossover.
h. Relative / absolute humidity.
Enemy
a. Target type, size, activity, location and priorities.
b. Strengths and weaknesses.
c. Courses of action (most likely and most dangerous).
d. Observed tactics, techniques, and procedures.
e. Air, air defense, and surface threat (type and location).
f. Intelligence collection plan and products request.
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3. Department of Defense (DD) Form 1972, Joint Tactical Air Strike Request
(JTAR)
Joint Publication (JP) 3-09.3, Close Air Support, prescribes DD Form 1972, Joint
Tactical Air Strike Request, for use at and above the battalion level to submit air
support requests (ASRs) when automated systems with an air strike request
submission capability are not available. DD Form 1972 is available at
http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/forms/index.htm. Figure 1 is a sample of this
form.
Note: Command and control (C2) agencies provide sections II and III. See JP 3-
09.3 for details.
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Note: The observer should be prepared for the FDC to authenticate the observer
after the read back in the call for fire.
b. Message to Observer (MTO). This is information sent to the observer from
the supporting FDC. The observer will acknowledge the MTO by reading it
back in its entirety. And, if conducting a grid mission, include BREAK,
DIRECTION (observer target direction) at the end. The MTO consists of the
items listed in table 6 “Message to Observer”. Items with an asterisk (*) in
table 6 are required.
c. After spotting weapons impacts and effects, the observer should send
corrections to the FDC to move the burst onto an adjusting point. The
observer sends corrections, in meters, in reverse order of that used in
spotting; that is, deviation, range, and height of burst. See table 7 for an
example of the elements contained in the adjustment transmissions.
d. At the mission completion, the call for fire concludes with a mission
complete transmission as contained in table 8.
Table 7. Adjustments
“Left / right ________________________________________________ ,
(meters, distance from impact to observer-target line [OTL])
Add / drop _________________________________________________ ,
(meters, distance from impact to target)
Up / down ____________________________________________, over.”
(meters, distance from height of burst (HOB) to desired HOB)
“Fire for effect, over.”
(Sent with the final correction, when effects on target are observed).
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“Over.”
Note: A laser grid mission is the same as a grid mission, except when the
observer announces “LASER GRID” in the warning order. Send the target
grid to a greater level of accuracy (8 or 10 digits, depending on
observation post location accuracy). In an adjust fire mission, send
corrections in the form of a grid to the burst location and announce
“BURST GRID.”
Message to Observer
Adjustments
Mission Completion
Table 10. Adjust Fire Mission (Polar Plot or Laser Polar)
Observer: “ ___________ this is __________ , adjust fire polar, over.”
(FDC’s call sign) (observer’s call sign)
“Direction ________________________________________________ .”
(observer-to-target line to the nearest 10 mils or 1 degree)
Note: Specify degrees to the FDC only if the direction is given in degrees.
“Distance ________________________________________________ .”
(to nearest 100m)
“Up / down _______________________________________________ .”
(to nearest 5m)
Note: The difference in target altitude is with respect to the observer. It is
not given if there is less than a 35m elevation difference between the
observer and target. For polar missions, the FDC must know the
observer’s location.
Target description: “ _________________________________________ .”
(target description, size, activity)
Method of engagement (optional): _______________________________
Method of fire and control (optional): _____________________________
“Over.”
Note: Laser polar differs from a polar mission in that laser data is sent to
the nearest 1mil for direction and vertical angle and the nearest 10m for
distance. The observer announces “laser polar” in the warning order.
Message to Observer
Adjustments
Mission Completion
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“Over.”
Message to Observer
Adjustments
Mission Completion
Figure 2. Mil-relation Formula in Shift From a Known Point Method
“Over.”
Message to Observer
Adjustment
Mission Completion
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WARNING
Using illumination requires care and adequate coordination to avoid
adverse impact on the operations of adjacent and supporting units.
nominal trajectory skews the fragmentation pattern forward along the GTL.
It achieves maximum lethal effect when combined with the point detonating
(PD) fuze setting.
(3) GMLRS is capable of converged (point) and circular sheafs. The
launcher can calculate two types of circular sheafs: open and closed,
which differ in the total radius of the geometry.
c. Rocket and missile artillery airspace coordination does not differ
fundamentally from other surface fires. Refer to “Integration Techniques” in
chapter III for target area integration techniques. Because of GMLRS’ and
ATACMS’ long ranges and high MAXORDs, additional planning may be
necessary to coordinate the rest of the trajectory.
3. Naval Surface Fire Support (NSFS)
a. Communications.
(1) Naval gun fire (NGF) ground spot net: high frequency/very high
frequency (VHF) (Voice).
(2) NGF air spot net: ultrahigh frequency/VHF (Voice).
(3) Shore fire control party local net: VHF (Voice).
b. Brevity words.
(1) PEPPER. Nonscheduled fire mission report. Ships make these to a
supporting arms coordination center (SACC) as soon as possible after
firing.
(2) HONEY. New target report. Spotters make these to a SACC as soon
as new targets are discovered or when known targets are given corrected
locations.
(3) PICKLE. Unfired target report. A ship or spotter makes these to a
SACC when scheduled targets cannot be fired or when effectiveness is
assessed as under 50 percent.
(4) CANDY. Ammunition remaining report. This is sent, coded, according
to the operations order.
(5) GURF. Guns up ready to fire report (GURF). Ship make these when
coming onto a naval gunfire support (NGS) station. The GURF
summarizes NGS capability when it may be unknown to NGS agencies.
c. Mission Formats. NGS reports are designed to keep interested agencies
informed of NGS status with the minimum of radio traffic. They are made by
ships to the SACC, FSCC, or spotters using the NGS report formats in
tables18, 19, and 20.
Note: In regard to NSFS, there are reports used by North Atlantic Treaty
Organization countries that are based on STANAG 1034, Allied Tactical
Publication 4(F), Allied Naval Fire Support, regarding the employment of NSFS.
These requests include the Naval Gunfire Request Form and Naval Gunfire
Allotment Signal and Ship Status Codes (November Codes).
Table 18. Guns Up Ready to Fire (GURF) Report
This format is used to report naval gun fire (NGF) ship capabilities when a
ship comes on station.
ELEMENT INFORMATION
Line A Call sign of the ship and date-time group (DTG) of the
message assigning the ship to the NGF mission.
Line B “On station and ready” and DTG (local) end of NGF ship’s
assignment.
Line C Planned firing location (grid coordinates). If the ship will be
firing from a track, enter the approximate center of the
track.
Line D Significant reduction in capability, including mount
casualties and / or ammunition shortages.
Line E Ammunition aboard, by type, available for NGF.
Line F Any other information of value.
EXAMPLE GURF:
Line A A2W, 012100Z NOV 00
Line B On station and ready, 022200P NOV 00
Line C MB 614 212
Line D High explosive 60, white phosphorous 15
Line E High explosive 140, white phosphorous 60
Line F Starting 021700P AUG 00, off station for 60 minutes for
ammunition resupply
Note: Use only applicable lines.
Note: NSFS ships will make some of the following reports, when appropriate,
during an amphibious assault.
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ALPHA __________________________________________________
(type of mission)
BRAVO __________________________________________________
(target number and grid coordinates)
CHARLIE __________________________________________________
(target description)
DELTA __________________________________________________
(agency controlling fire—voice call)
ECHO __________________________________________________
(target assessment—destroyed / neutralized / details)
FOXTROT __________________________________________________
(ammunition expended—code, number, type, and caliber)
GOLF __________________________________________________
(reason target not fired on)
HOTEL __________________________________________________
(enter, using code, amount, type, and caliber of each type of
bombardment ammunition remaining)
INDIA __________________________________________________
(action taken or under consideration)
d. Execution. The format shown in table 20 is used for NSFS.
Table 20. Naval Surface Fire Support Call for Fire
(Grid / Polar Plot / Shift from a Known Point)
First Transmission (spotter ID, warning order to include target #)
“ ____________________ , this is _________________ , fire mission,
(ship’s call sign) (observer’s call sign)
target # ___________________ , over.”
(assigned by observer)
Second Transmission (grid, polar plot or shift from a known point, to
include target description, method of engagement, method of control)
Target Location—Grid
“Grid __________________ , altitude___________________ ,
(6-digit minimum) (meters (m) mean sea level (MSL))
direction _________________ .”
(mils / degrees (deg))
Target Location—Polar Plot
“Direction ______________ ” in mils / deg (to nearest 10 mils / deg)
“Distance _______________ ” in meters (to nearest 100m)
“Up / down ______________ ” in meters (to nearest 5m)
(vertical shift)
Target Location—Shift from a Known Point
“Shift ___________________ ”
(target number / reference point)
“Direction _______________ ” in mils / deg (to nearest 10 mils / deg)
(from observer to target)
“Left / right ______________ ” in meters (to nearest 10m)
(lateral shift)
“Add / drop ______________ ” in meters (to nearest 100m)
(range shift)
“Up / down _______________ ” in meters (to nearest 5m)
(vertical shift)
Target Description: (type, size, degree of protection).
Method of Engagement: (danger close, trajectory, ammo, fuze type,
# guns, # salvos, special instructions).
Method of Control: (spotter adjust, ship adjust, fire for effect, cannot
observe, at my command) “Over”.
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e. Other Missions. Tables 21 and 22 give examples of fresh and new targets.
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(8) Tables 23–26 contain the TLAM mission and MTO templates, and a
call for fire and MTO example.
Table 23. Tomahawk Land Attack Missile (TLAM) Call for Fire
(Call for fire given in two transmissions)
First Transmission (spotter ID, warning order to include target #)
“ _________________ , this is ________________ , TLAM fire mission,
(ship’s call sign) (observer’s call sign)
target # _____________________ , over.”
(assigned by observer)
Second Transmission (location, elevation, target description, method
of engagement, method of control)
Target Location:
“Location ___________________ , elevation ____________________ ,
(10-digit MGRS or DD-MM-SS.ss) (feet MSL or feet HAE)
Target Description: ____________________________________________
(type, size, degree of protection)
Method of Engagement: _______________________________________
(Danger close, ordnance type (3C or 4E), desired
number of missiles, special Instructions, desired
final attack heading, or desired dive angle)
Method of Control: _____________________________________________
(At my command (standard), launch time soonest,
specified time on target, or no earlier / later than time)
“Over.”
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MTSQ,
Delay
HE, WP, ILLUM, PD, VT, 18.3 or 22.0 18.0 or 30.1 2 4 for 2
APICM, DPICM, MT, ET, w/ M795 28.2 w/ minutes
155mm
M198
charge)
Notes:
1. Excalibur rounds are not authorized for the M109A5.
2. There are two NSFS-type ships: the USS Arleigh Burke-class guided-
missile destroyer (DDG), a one-gun ship; and the USS Ticonderoga-class,
guided-missile cruiser (CG) a two-gun ship. The biggest limitation to NSFS is
the hydrography, the average draft of an NSFS ship is 29 feet.
3. See Appendix H, Risk Estimate Distances, for a detailed discussion of
danger close.
Legend:
APICM—antipersonnel improved MT—mechanical time
conventional munition MTSQ—mechanical time superquick
CVT—controlled variable time NSFS––naval surface fire support
DPICM—dual purpose improved PD—point detonating
conventional munition RAP—rocket assisted projectile
ET—electronic time SCATMINE—scatterable mine
HE—high explosive sust—sustained
ILLUM—illumination VT—variable time
max—maximum WP—white phosphorous
mm—millimeter
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6. Situation Update
a. JTACs or FAC(A)s will provide the situation update to arriving aircraft,
when able.
b. Arriving aircraft should provide the JTAC with factor threat information, if
known. Tables 37 and 38 contain examples of situation updates.
Table 37. Situation Update Example 1
Situation
Close Air Support (CAS)
Update Battlefield Handover (BHO)
Situation Update
Line
Threat • Give general locations of surface-to-air threats not already
provided.
• Pass the time of the last observed surface-to-air fires.
Targets • Give the general enemy • Give the general enemy
disposition. disposition.
• Avoid giving a list of grids. • Include ground combat
Specific targets and locations element (GCE) targeting
will be addressed in a CAS priorities.
brief. • Include target location grids.
This may require breaking up
the transmission.
• Provide a GCE attack
guidance matrix and target
priority list.
Friendly • Provide the general situation and scheme of maneuver for
friendly forces.
• Use geographic references, phase lines, checkpoints, etc. The
technique is to use general terms: “all friendlies are east of the
94 easting.”
• Do not pass friendly grids, if it can be avoided. If necessary,
use no more than 6 digits.
• Include all friendlies that may be factors during time on station
(TOS), not just the joint terminal attack controller (JTAC).
• Include all CAS assets, ordnance, and TOS remaining for
BHO.
Artillery • Indirect fire assets that could • Include the firing unit’s
be factors during TOS, may location, call sign, frequency,
include the general direction and status.
of fire.
Clearance • Omit it if the speaker has control.
Authority • Clarify roles if there could be confusion due to multiple voices
on tactical air direction (e.g., “Savage 13 has control and is
located in the combat operations center, my JFO call sign E4B
is located with Charlie company, and is up this net”).
• Determine who has which elements of brief, stack, mark, and
control.
• Pass a plan for approving fires for BHO, if one has not been
prebriefed.
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Note: For off-axis weapons, the weapons final attack heading may differ from the
aircraft heading at the time of release. The aircrew should inform JTAC when this
occurs and ensure weapon final attack headings comply with given restrictions.
8. Threat Mitigation Plan (Avoid-Suppress-Kill)
a. Factor threats are known threats in the AO that will affect the attacking
aircraft’s ingress or egress geometry or weapons delivery. JTACs or FAC(A)s
and the aircrew should coordinate to identify factor threats for the attack.
b. If the tactical situation allows, the aircrew will avoid factor threats using
standoff weapons, avoid the threat envelope using modified flight profiles,
masked ingress and egress profiles, or countermeasures.
c. If CAS aircraft cannot avoid the threat and provide the ground force
commander’s (GFC’s) desired effects on the target, JTACs or FAC(A)s and
the aircrew should develop a suppression plan using available assets.
Effective suppression must be timely and accurate.
d. If a located factor threat will impair the CAS aircraft’s ability to achieve the
GFC’s intent on the target, JTACs or FAC(A)s and the aircrew may elect to kill
(neutralize or destroy) the threat to allow follow-on attacks on the primary
target. Figure 6 displays an avoid-suppress-kill threat mitigation methodology.
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Note: The joint standard for coordinated attack deconfliction refers to the
avenue of approach.
11. Joint Air Attack Team (JAAT)
a. A JAAT operation is a coordinated attack using a combination of FW and
Army RW assets normally supported by artillery or NSFS. Electronic warfare
(EW), air defense artillery, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
assets also may support a JAAT. To maximize the effectiveness of a JAAT,
fires are integrated, mutually supportive, and synergistic, not simply
deconflicted.
b. The supported ground commander must designate an air mission
commander (AMC) for JAAT operations. The AMC serves as an extension of
the ground commander. A tactical lead should coordinate all attacks through
the AMC. Detailed planning and thorough rehearsals are required to maximize
JAAT synergies and increase the possibility of mission success.
c. To maximize the effectiveness of a JAAT, the AMC should possess the
authority to coordinate attack execution directly with other elements. When
using CAS procedures, a JTAC or FAC(A) must be available to provide
terminal attack control. In a “non-CAS” JAAT application, the JTAC or FAC(A)
may perform duties as directed by the AMC in support of the ground
commander’s scheme of maneuver, but is not required to for terminal attack
control.
d. JAAT mission flow.
(1) The supporting aircraft contacts the AMC on an assigned frequency.
(2) The AMC verifies the aircraft received the current target and threat
information.
(3) The AMC briefs situation updates, followed by the JAAT attack plan,
including TOTs for indirect fire, FW and RW attacks, and attack type and
timing as described in table 40. The 9 Line CAS brief is the standard for
providing targeting information to CAS aircraft.
12. Battle Damage Assessment (BDA)
a. An accurate BDA is critical to confirm CAS attacks meet the GFC’s intent.
b. Attacking aircraft will frequently be able to provide a BDA post attack.
However, other CAS team members (such as the JTAC or FAC(A), joint fires
observers (JFOs), or other observers) also may be able to provide accurate
BDA.
c. Size, activity, location, time, remarks (SALT-R) is the standard format for
passing BDA information, as shown in table 41. Minimum requirements
include successful, unsuccessful, or unknown.
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b. JFOs may pass the observer lineup (see table 43), the CAS situation
update, and observer target brief (lines 4 through 8 of the CAS 9-Line shown
in table 44) directly to the JTAC or may require the CAS aircraft to relay the
situation update to the JTAC.
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Caution:
Proceed with caution if a capable JTAC or FAC(A) is not available.
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d. Army attack aviation call for fire can be used for all threat conditions. It
does not affect the aircrew’s tactics in executing attacks.
e. When operating in close proximity to friendly forces, the AMC or flight lead
must have direct communication with the ground commander or observer on
the scene to provide direct fire support. After receiving the army attack
aviation call for fire from the ground forces, the aircrews must positively
identify the location of the friendly element and the target prior to conducting
any engagement. Methods for marking the location of friendlies and the
enemy include, but are not limited to: laser hand off, tracer fire, marking
rounds (flares or mortars), smoke grenades, signal mirrors, VS-17 panels, IR
strobe lights, laser target marker, or chemical sticks.
19. Army Attack Aviation and Special Operations Forces (SOF) Gunship
Call for Fire
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Note: For detailed information on EA, see the EW Toolbox SECRET Internet
Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET) Web site:
http://ewtoolbox.eglin.af.smil.mil/default.asp
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3. CERF
a. The CERF is a formal request originating from any level within a combatant
command (CCMD) through the United States Cyberspace Command
(USCYBERCOM) to a cyber component. It initiates cyber strike or mission
package development against an already validated CCMD target.
b. The information required are the same on a manual CERF and a
USCYBERCOM digital CERF. The digital CERF is located on USCYBERCOM
Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System sharepoint at
https://intelshare.intelink.ic.gov/sites/uscc-j3f/CERF/SitePages/Home.aspx.
4. JTCR
The JTCR (table 55) is the format for tactical units to request the timing and
tempo of cyberspace effects. Generally, tactical units complete sections 1–3 and
submit requests to the CCMD 72 hours prior to execution via fire support request
channels. The CCMD submits the digital request via the cyber C2 portal for
operations to be included in the cyber tasking order.
5. Details
For more information on cyberspace operations, CERFs, and JTCRs, consult the
classified appendix K to JFIRE on the Air Land Sea Application Center’s
SIPRNET Web site: https://intelshare.intelink.sgov.gov/sites/alsa.
Table 55. Joint Tactical Cyber Request
1. Mission Request Description of Request - Required
JTCR Priority [___High] [___Medium] [___Low]
Cyber Operation Type [___OCO] [___DCO] [___DODIN] [___cyber ISR/OPE]
Operation ISO
Related CERF
Requesting Organization
2. Timing and Tempo Description of Request (Required)
Planning [___Preplanned] [___Immediate]
Schedule Type [___Scheduled] [___Immediate]
Start By mm/dd/yyyy hh:mm Z
Finish By mm/dd/yyyy hh:mm Z
3. Effects Requested Description of Request (Required)
Requested Effect
Target / Threat Location
Desired Effects
Termination Criteria
4. Cyber ISR / OPE Mission Description of Request (Only required for Cyber ISR & OPE missions)
Area of Operations
ISR Reference Points
Amplifying Information
5. DCO Mission Description of Request (Only required for DCO missions)
Threat
Assessment Type
Assessment Location
Amplifying Information
6. OCO Mission Description of Request (Only required for OCO missions)
Intel Trigger (optional)
IO Product (optional)
Valid Targets
Amplifying Information
7. DODIN Mission Description of Request (Only required for DODIN POND missions)
Justification
Locations Affected
Amplifying Information Provide a list of services and circuits.
Legend: ISR—intelligence, surveillance, and
CERF—cyber effects request format reconnaissance
DCO—defensive cyber operations JTCR—joint tactical cyber request
DODIN—Department of Defense Information OCO—offensive cyber operations
Network OPE—operational preparation of the environment
IO—information operations POND—period of non-disruption
ISO—information security officer
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
All listed UAS are Rover 6 Capable. RQ-11, RQ-12, RQ-20, and MQ-1C are not Rover 4 or
5 capable.
Legend:
AIS—automatic information system LTD—laser target designator
CDL—Common Data Link MFAS—multifunctional active sensor
CT—cypher text MTS—multi-spectral targeting system
DTV—day television MWIR—mid-wavelength infrared
EO—electro-optical SAR—synthetic aperture radar
GBU—guided bomb unit SATCOM—satellite communications
GMTI—ground moving target indicator SINCGARS—single-channel ground and
IR—infrared airborne radio system
LLLTV—low-light level television SWIR—short-wave infrared
LRF—laser range finder TCDL—Tactical Common Data Link
2. Aircraft Sensor Capabilities
Table 59 contains aircraft sensor capabilities.
85
86
87
88
89
90
Caution:
This technique may damage night vision devices.
91
92
93
94
95
96
WARNING
Infrared (IR) pointers or laser sources should not be used as the sole
source for target mark or verification. Attack aircraft may confuse an IR
pointer or laser energy source with the intended target. When using IR
pointers or lasers to mark a target, include “IR POINTER” or “LASER” in
the marks portion (Line 7) of the close air support briefing. Joint terminal
attack controllers (JTACs) also should provide the pointer-target-line or
laser-target-line in degrees magnetic from the energy source to the
target. JTACs should consider using a discriminate target mark
whenever possible.
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99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
(8) GBU-39 small diameter bomb (SDB). This is effective against fixed or
stationary targets and has limited penetration capabilities. As a standoff
weapon, the SDB may climb in altitude after release to assume its glide
profile. The weapon’s flight path may present deconfliction problems
depending on the airspace coordination areas in place.
b. Paveway II. This is a laser-guided, free-fall weapon. Laser codes are
preflight selectable (code 1511-1788). GBU-51/B is a laser-guided, free-fall
GBU-12 kit with a BLU-126 LCDB body.
c. Paveway III. This is a low-level, laser-guided, maneuverable free-fall
weapon.
(1) Paveway III uses Mk-84 (GBU-24), BLU-109 (GBU-24A) or BLU-116
advanced unitary penetrator (AUP) bomb bodies. AUP is a 2,000-lb class
penetrator bomb with twice the penetration capability of the BLU-109. It is
used only in GBU-24C/B (USAF) and GBU-24D/B (USN). Preflight
selectable codes.
(2) Effects are cratering and hard target penetration as with the Ml-84.
GBU-24E/B adds GPS/INS guidance to allow adverse weather capability
with the BLU-109 bomb body. It can be released from very low or very high
altitudes. It can be released below a low overcast (3,000–4,500 feet (ft)
above ground level (AGL)) if the correct mode switches have been set
prior to takeoff. It can be launched without laser signal acquisition.
d. GBU-54 laser JDAM (LJDAM). LJDAM is a multi-mode weapon (including
guidance via GPS) with coordinate refinement through laser updates. It can
be used in legacy mode as GPS only with no degradation in capability.
LJDAM is capable of hitting high speed, moving targets. Target heading and
velocity can be programmed into the weapon to generate an impact point in
front of the target. At 4.5 kilometers (km), if laser energy is present, the
LJDAM will calculate new coordinates based on the movement of the laser.
Then, the weapon will guide to the updated lead point. If the weapon loses
laser energy, it will guide on the last known coordinates.
3. Guided Missiles
a. Air-to-ground missile (AGM)-65 (Maverick). Designed for strike against
tanks and a variety of tactical targets, including moving vehicles. Maverick
seeker locks on to the target prior to release and guides autonomously
(except AGM-65E/E2/L), providing standoff ranges of up to 10 nautical miles
(nms).
Note: For ground-based laser employment, use the 120-degree attack wedge
discussed in Joint Publication (JP) 3-09.3, Close Air Support. Using AGM-
65E/E2/L on a moving target with a ground-based designator as the primary
designator is not recommended due to the rapidly changing laser safety cone.
(1) Guidance: television (A, B, H, K); infrared (IR) (D, F, G2); Laser (E/L).
(2) Warheads: a 125-lb shaped charge jet and blast (A, B, D, H) or a 300-
lb penetrator/blast-fragmentation (E, E2, F, G2, K).
b. AGM-84E Stand-off Land Attack Missile (SLAM)-AGM-84H/K (SLAM-
Expanded Range (ER)). An intermediate range (over 150 nm for SLAM-ER)
missile designed to provide day, night, and adverse weather precision strike
capability against land targets and ships in port. The SLAM uses INS with
GPS, IR terminal guidance coupled with automated target recognition, and
man-in-the-loop control.
c. AGM-88 High-speed Antiradiation Missile. A supersonic missile designed
to seek and destroy radar equipped air defense systems (range>40 nm).
d. AGM-114 (Hellfire). This is a laser or radar frequency guided missile.
Radar frequency Hellfire (Longbow) is all weather capable
(1) A/B/C/F/K. Shaped charge warheads designed for use against
armored vehicles.
(2) F/A,K2A. This is a shaped charge warhead with a fragmentation
sleeve.
(3) L. This is a millimeter wave radar guided, shaped charge
warheadcompatible with the AH-64D Apache Longbow.
(4) M. This is a blast-fragmentation warhead with delay fuse only.
(5) N/N-5. This is a thermobaric blast-fragmentation warhead with a metal
augmented charge. It is designed to kill by overpressure and
overtemperature in confined spaces. Delay fuse only.
(6) P+ - 3 variants. These are capable of unmanned aircraft system
(UAS), off-axis employment. They are designed for structures, armor, light
vehicles and personnel.
(a) P4. Shaped charge warhead (K).
(b) P-AA. Shaped charge warhead with a fragmentation sleeve.
(c) P2A. Shaped charge warhead with fragmentation sleeve (K2A).
(d) N4. Blast-fragmentation warhead with metal augmented charge.
(7) R/R2. This is a multirole, programmable fuze, integrated blast
fragmentation sleeve warhead; tandem shaped charge, blast
fragmentation warhead; and integrated steel sleeve in a single warhead
system. UAS high off-axis capable. Designed for structures, armor,
vehicles, and personnel.
(8) R9E. This is a multirole, programmable fuze, integrated blast
fragmentation warhead with an internal tungsten sleeve; designed for
structures, vehicles, and personnel.
e. AGM-154 Joint Stand-off Weapon (JSOW). This is a low observable, all
weather 1,000-lb class family of standoff air-to-ground glide weapons. It is a
modular payload assembly designed to attack armored and light-armored
vehicle columns, surface-to-air targets, and personnel.
(1) Guidance.
(a) AGM-154A and B-INS/GPS.
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112
9. Weapon Pairings
Table 69 provides recommended target-to-weapon pairings.
Table 69. Recommended Target-Weapon Pairings
Targets Recommended Ordnance Priority1
Priority 1 Priority 2 Priority 3 Priority 4
Soft targets: Hellfire LJDAM2 JDAM2 GP2
vehicles, radar, K2A/P4A/R DMLGB2 Flechette FW: 20–40mm
aircraft in open Maverick LGB2 Rockets SAPHEI
DMS HE Rockets RW 7.62-
Brimstone Hellfire 30mm
Griffin M/N/N4/N-5 SAPHEI
2
Moving vehicles Hellfire LJDAM Hellfire Flechette
K2A/P4A/R DMLGB2 M/N/N4/N-5 Rockets
Maverick LGB2 HE Rockets
DMS FW 20–40mm
Brimstone SAPHEI
Griffin RW 7.62-
30mm
SAPHEI
Armored Hellfire LJDAM2 JDAM2 CBUs
2
vehicles: K/K2A/P4A/R DMLGB SDB
(moving or Maverick LGB2 CBU-97
stationary) tanks, DMS
armored Brimstone
personnel
carriers
Personnel: LJDAM2 Maverick JDAM2 HE Rockets
Individual/small DMLGB2 Flechette CBU FW 20-40mm
group LGB2 Rockets Hellfire HEI
SDB GP2 M/N//N4/N-5
DMS RW 7.62-
Brimstone 30mm HEI
Hellfire
K2A/P4A/R
Griffin
Table 69. Recommended Target-Weapon Pairings (cont’d)
Targets Recommended Ordnance Priority1
Priority 1 Priority 2 Priority 3 Priority 4
Personnel: LJDAM2 Maverick JDAM2 HE Rockets
Individual/small DMLGB2 Flechette CBU FW 20–40mm
group LGB2 Rockets Hellfire HEI
2
SDB GP M/N//N4/N-5
DMS RW 7.62-
Brimstone 30mm HEI
Hellfire
K2A/P4A/R
Griffin
Large group LJDAM2 Flechette GP2 (INST and FW 20–40mm
DMLGB2 Rockets airburst) HEI
LGB2 SDB HE Rockets
SDB Maverick RW 7.62-
INST JDAM2 30mm HEI
CBU
Griffin
(multiple
missiles)
In tree line or LJDAM2 LGB2 Maverick HE Rockets
cover JDAM2 SDB GP2 FW 20–40mm
DMLGB2 Griffin Flechette HEI
Rockets RW 7.62-
30mm HEI
Hardened JDAM2 SDB Hellfire
position (i.e., LJDAM2 Maverick K/K2A/P4A
sandbag fortified, DMLGB2 Hellfire DMS
bunkers) LGB2 M/N/N4/N-5/R Brimstone
Griffin
Buildings3 JDAM2 Maverick GP2 HE Rockets
DMLGB2 Hellfire FW 20–40mm
LGB2 M/N4/N5/R SAPHEI
LJDAM2 SDB RW 20–30mm
SAPHEI
Artillery / Fixed LJDAM2 Hellfire Hellfire GP
AAA DMLGB2 K2A/P4A/R M/N/N4/N5
LGB2 DMS Maverick
JDAM2 Brimstone
SDB
113
114
Notes:
1. Priorities 1–4 represent the recommended weapon-to-target match to achieve
the most destructive effect on the target. Consider the type of aircraft, aiming
system, delivery mode, threat, and required time to employ to select the most
appropriate weapon for the tactical situation.
2. All LGBs, DMLGBs, LJDAMs, JDAMs, and GPs (except SDB (GBU-39)) are
assumed to use 500-pound class, or higher, bomb bodies.
3. Building construction type can vary greatly among structures. Material
composition and construction techniques will directly impact weapon
effectiveness. The weapons in Priority 1 may provide a greater damage
mechanism than those in Priority 2 due to their warhead size. If localized effects
to specific rooms or smaller structures are desired, consider Priority 2 weapons
as the primary weapon-to-target match.
Legend:
AAA––antiaircraft artillery LGB—laser-guided bomb
CBU—cluster bomb unit LJDAM—laser Joint Direct Attack
DMLGB—dual-mode laser-guided bomb Munition
DMS—dual-mode seeker mm—millimeter
FW—fixed-wing RW—rotary-wing
GP—general purpose SAM—surface-to-air missile
HE—high explosive SAPHEI—semi-armor piercing, high
HEI—high explosive incendiary explosive incendiary
INST—instantaneous SDB—small diameter bomb
JDAM—Joint Direct Attack Munition
Appendix E
COLLATERAL DAMAGE
1. Collateral Damage
a. Collateral damage is the unintentional or incidental injury or damage to
persons or objects that are not lawful military targets. The collateral damage
estimation (CDE) methodology balances operational imperatives and legal
requirements to determine if a strike is proportional given the circumstances.
There are five levels of collateral damage estimation. CDE Levels 1–4 refine
the targeting and weaponeering to assess and reduce the possibility of
collateral damage and still achieve the desired effects. CDE Level 5 assesses
the amount of collateral damage that will occur if the target is destroyed.
b. For detailed information on CDE methodology, refer to Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3160.01, No-Strike and the Collateral Damage
Estimation Methodology. Classified collateral damage tables can be found at:
https://jtcg.amsaa.army.smil.mil/jpias/index.html. The methodology is outlined
in table 70.
2. The Five Basic Questions of CDE
a. Question 1. Are there protected or collateral objects, civilian or
noncombatant personnel, involuntary human shields, or significant
environmental concerns within the effects range of the weapon I would like to
use to attack the target?
Question 2. Can I positively identify and validate the object that I want to
affect? (Positive identification is derived from observation and analysis of
target characteristics including visual recognition, electronic support systems,
noncooperative target recognition techniques, identification friend or foe
systems, or other physics-based identification techniques. Validation ensures
targets meet the objectives and criteria outlined by the commander’s guidance
and ensures compliance with the law of war and rules of engagement (ROE).
b. Question 3. Can I mitigate damage to those collateral concerns by
attacking the target with a different weapon or with a different method of
engagement, yet accomplish the mission?
c. Question 4. If not, how many civilians and noncombatants do I think will be
injured or killed by the attack?
d. Question 5. Are the collateral effects of my attack excessive in relation to
the expected military advantage gained, and do I need to elevate this decision
to the next level of command to attack the target based on the ROE in effect?
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118
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120
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122
Legend:
APC—armored personnel carrier
Appendix G
MEDICAL EVACUATION (MEDEVAC), CASUALTY EVACUATION
(CASEVAC), AND LANDING ZONE (LZ) BRIEFS
1. MEDEVAC
A MEDEVAC is moving patients using tactical or logistical assets, equipped and
staffed with medical attendants for en route care. See table 77 for a MEDEVAC
breifing.
Note: The Geneva Convention places aircraft conducting MEDEVAC missions in
a protected status. Aircraft must be clearly marked (e.g., a red cross) and used
exclusively in removing the wounded and sick.
2. CASEVAC
A CASEVAC uses available assets that are not equipped and staffed with
medical attendants for en route care (unless augmentation is included in the
operation plan).
Note: The Geneva Convention does not place aircraft conducting CASEVAC
missions in a protected status.
3. Helicopter Landing Zone (HLZ)/Tilt-Rotor LZ Brief
Table 78 is a simple tool for informing aircraft about a particular zone. If more
information is necessary to ensure an aircraft has an appropriate level of
situational awareness, it shall be included. Table 78 does not preclude a
conversation or plain language dialogue from taking place to ensure ground
personnel and aircrew know exactly what needs to happen and why.
Table 77. MEDEVAC or CASEVAC Brief
Line Item Explanation
1 Location (using the
military grid reference
system)
2 Call Sign and HLZ Call sign and suffix may be transmitted
Frequency in the clear
3 Number and A—Urgent
Precedence of B—Priority
Casualties C—Routine
4 Special Equipment A—None
Required B—Hoist
C—Extraction equipment
D—Ventilator
Other (Specify)
123
124
125
126
WARNING
The risk estimate distances in this document are
highly generalized and will not apply to all cases
encountered on the battlefield. For more detailed
values and assumptions, refer to the ALSA
classified website.
WARNING
Commanders, controllers, and aircrews will
apply danger close procedures at, or inside, the
ranges listed under the standing column for air-
to-surface risk estimate distances.
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128
WARNING
The risk estimate distances in the Prone
Protected column should not be used without
understanding the detailed assumptions used to
develop these values. A comprehensive
explanation should be viewed on the ALSA
classified website.
2. Surface-to-Surface REDs
Surface-to-surface danger close distances are much more generic than air-to-
surface distances, and are not directly tied to PI, in most cases.
WARNING
Cannon risk estimate distances were calculated
assuming an observer has adjusted fires onto
the target. Unadjusted fire for effect missions
may significantly increase the 0.1% probability of
incapcitation (PI) distances.
129
130
131
132
133
134
WARNING
Users must adhere to all local range procedures and Service
directives; the minimum safe distances provided are not intended to
allow personnel to deviate from any published guidance. They are
authorized only for aircrew and joint terminal attack controllers (JTACs)
conducting close air support (CAS) training in accordance with the
established tactics, techniques, and procedures in Joint Publication 3-
09.3, Close Air Support.
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144
Air Land Sea Applications Center classified and unclassified (restricted) website
http://www.alsa.mil (last accessed 28 Nov 2015)
145
146
TGT target
TISU thermal imaging system upgrade
TLAM Tomahawk Land Attack Missile
TLE target location error
TN track number
TOC tactical operations center
TOF time of flight
TOL time of launch
TOS time on station
TOT time on target
TP target practice
TPT target practice tracer
TRADOC United States Army Training and Doctrine Command
TRP target reference point
TSS target sight system
TTOF total time of flight
TTP tactics, techniques, and procedures
TTT time to target
TV television
U
UAS unmanned aircraft system
UHF ultrahigh frequency
UK United Kingdom
URN unit reference number
US United States
USA United States Army
USAF United States Air Force
USCYBERCOM United States Cyberspace Command
USMC United States Marine Corps
USN United States Navy
V
VDL video downlink
VHF very high frequency
VMF variable message format
VT variable time
W, X, Y, Z
WCMD wind corrected munitions dispenser
WDU weapons detonation unit
WDZ weapon danger zone
WP white phosphorous
ATP 3-09.32
MCRP 3-16.6A
NTTP 3-09.2
AFTTP 3-2.6
21 January 2016
By Order of the Secretary of the Army
GERALD B. O’KEEFE
Administrative Assistant to
The Secretary of the Army
1536202
DISTRIBUTION:
Active Army, Army National Guard, and US Army Reserve: Distribute in accordance with the
initial distribution number (ID) 114378, requirements for ATP 3-09.32.
TIMOTHY J. LEAHY
Major General, USAF
Commander
Curtis E. LeMay Center for Doctrine
Development and Education