DEFINING INSURGENCY

Until the end of the Cold War, the study of insurgency focused primarily on separatist and
Marxist derived forms with an emphasis on counterinsurgency practice aimed at those forms
rather than on identifying what differences and interrelationships existed. The reason for this
is that the decades-long Cold War struggle subsumed many diverse national struggles and
tensions into a larger paradigm of conflict—a free, democratic, and capitalist West versus a
totalitarian, communist, and centrally planned East.

Legacy Insurgency Forms.

Anarchist
- Generally violent
- No replacement government or seizure of the state is being attempted nor is any form
of subversion or co-option of state institutions or the parallel building of a shadow state
taking place.
- Government can’t help the state

Separatism
- Separation from local and foreign authority
- Strategic implications: Limited

Maoist
- “People's war,” utilises peasant armies that are drawn upon for an integrated and
protracted politico-military phase strategy of eventual state takeover.

NEW AND POTENTIAL FORMS OF INSURGENCY

Radical Islamist (1979)

- mosque and state are inexorably intertwined.
- The radical Islamist form has two variants—one Shia and the other Sunni based— and
stems from the fact that Islam never underwent a historical reformation which ushered
in secular political thought and a separation of the spheres of church (or mosque) and
state
- Strategic implications: Significant.
- This insurgency form requires either federal law enforcement or the military (typically)
as the designated lead. An allof-government approach is required to mitigate and
defeat this insurgency form which possesses a terrorism component—utilising both
large scale and lone wolf attacks -- representing a direct threat to the US homeland.
- Shis (bloodline) and Sunni (Enlightened ones) - Nature of the human person
- Radically inclined to Islam
- Islamic state; gives a sense of belongingness

Liberal Democratic (1989)

- Free

c-25245
 - This insurgency form should be viewed as an opportunity to extend democratic values
rather than as an actual or potential threat of some sort to the United States or
its allies

Criminal (Early-2000s)
- the groups involved in this insurgency are viewed as a law enforcement concern.
- For the United States, the response to this insurgency form requires either federal law
enforcement (typically) or the military as the designated lead. An all-of-government
approach is required to mitigate and defeat this insurgency form.
- Nature of the human person is evil
- Economical reasons
- Means towards and end

Plutocratic (2008)
- One of the most contentious
- It specifically views the rise of globalised capital devoid of any ties to the state—in
essence, representative of an emerging form of 21st century postmodern capitalism—
in direct conflict with earlier forms of 20th century state moderated capitalism promoted
by liberal democratic governments.
- It views the rise of stateless multinational corporations, and the global elites (.001% to
1%) they serve as the major stakeholders, as insider insurgent threats to the
international order.

RETHINKING INSURGENCY

Military thinkers often say that the essence of war does not change.1 War is and always will
be the use of violence for political purposes. It is always characterised by what Clausewitz
described as:
“fog” (factors which complicate decisionmaking and force strategists to rely on
assumptions),
“friction” (the tendency of everything to operate less efficiently than in peacetime),
and the
“trinity” of rationality, passion, and chance.
But, military theorists note, war’s nature or character does change.
Insurgency also combines continuity and change, an enduring essence and a shifting
nature. Its essence is protracted, asymmetric violence; political, legal, and ethical ambiguity;
and the use of complex terrain, psychological warfare, and political mobilisation. It arises when
a group decides that the gap between their political expectations and the opportunities
afforded them is unacceptable and can only be remedied by force. Insurgents avoid battle
spaces where they are at a disadvantage—often the conventional military sphere—and focus
on those where they can attain parity, particularly the psychological and the political.
Kennedy institutionalised the notion that insurgency is a form of war. If insurgency
was, in fact, war, then the way that Americans thought about war more generally could be
extrapolated to counterinsurgency. Insurgency, like conventional war, was seen as a struggle
in which two antagonists sought to impose their will on each other. Insurgency, like war,

c-25245
was abnormal and episodic, with a clear beginning and end. The defeat of the enemy and
a return to peace was the objective. As in conventional war, diplomatic, political, economic,
psychological, and intelligence activities supported military efforts. Counterinsurgency thus
became the primary responsibility of the military.

THE NATURE OF MODERN INSURGENCY

Old-age Truisms

(1) the insurgents and the government

are competing for the loyalty of the people;
(2) lethal force must be used
with
considerable care in
counterinsurgency operations;
(3) the key role of military force in
counterinsurgency operations is to provide a
secure environment so that needed political
and economic reforms and development can
take place;
(4) if the insurgents are cut off from
support of the people, the insurgency will
ultimately collapse; and
(5) if the insurgents obtain sanctuary and support from nearby nations the
challenge of counterinsurgency is greatly increased

Proto-insurgency
In the initial, proto-insurgency phase, the movement is small and weak. It is
normally composed of a small cadre of “true believers” who are strongly committed
to dramatic change in the political-economic status quo of a nation or region. At this
stage their capabilities—including their potential to “make trouble”—are limited.
There may be different groups with somewhat similar agendas (e.g., the overthrow of
the existing government), but these embryonic groups may actually be at odds with
each other. At this early stage of an insurgency,the main concern of the insurgents
is to survive. Indeed, most insurgencies collapse at this stage: They are swept up
by the authorities or they simply implode after failing to gain sufficient support to
expand. The initial leaders of the movement are trying to clarify their message and to
recruit loyal and trustworthy companions. At this stage, the paradox for the authorities
is that, while the insurgents are not much of a threat, they are also hard to detect.
On the other hand, if the authorities do recognize the group as a budding
insurgency intent on eventually overthrowing the government—and if they can find
the leaders—this is precisely the easiest point at which the insurgency can be
nipped in the bud. One factor contributing to the survival of small, proto-
insurgencies is that, in some cases, the threatened government may deny that an

c-25245
 insurgency even exists and attempt either to ignore the problem or to ascribe it to a
small group of unimportant crackpots or criminals. portant crackpots or criminals. At
this stage in the insurgency, the most important and applicable tools at the
government’s disposal are the police and its intelligence services. In many past
insurgencies the police have been the first line of defense against the rebels. The
police know the local communities and personalities to a far greater extent than
the military forces do—at least in most nations. The closeness of the police to the
community, plus the investigative strengths and inclination of most police forces,
means that they are an ideal agency to detect and penetrate small, clandestine
insurgent groups. Indeed, in some cases the brutality and corruption of the police can
be a contributing factor that results in more support for the insurgents. In most nations,
government military forces have little or no role at this early stage.

Small-Scale insurgency
If the insurgency survives the proto-insurgency phase it can grow into a
small-scale insurgency. At this point the insurgents will have gained sufficient numbers
and strength to start to make their presence felt. Rallies led by insurgent leaders, open
postings in public and on electronic media of calls to overthrow the corrupt government,
small-scale attacks against government infrastructure, and occasional kidnappings
and assassinations are hallmarks of this stage. The insurgents may have also been
able to secure some amount of support from sympathetic groups outside the
country, either friendly government or nongovernmental groups such as coreligionists
or political fellow travellers. Diasporas can also be a source of strength and support
for insurgent groups. Volunteers, funds, weapons, and political support from overseas
ethnic, tribal, or religious communities that are sympathetic to the insurgents can help
sustain and strengthen the insurgency.
What changes for the government at this stage of the insurgency? It is likely
that the police and intelligence services will remain in the lead. The insurgents will
still lack the capability to overthrow the government, although they will clearly be
stronger than in the proto insurgency phase. Therefore, the police should still have the
advantage in most situations. However, there may be inadequate numbers of
trained, loyal, police to provide adequate government presence in critical areas. In
such circumstances, the insurgents will start to fill the vacuum that lack of
adequate government security forces creates. If the insurgency continues to
strengthen, the police may need growing amounts of assistance from military
forces. The insurgents will almost always be able to choose when and where to make
spectacular attacks. The sheer number of possible targets—power plants,
transportation hubs, political figures, government buildings, for example—may mean
that the police will simply lack the ability to provide security to all the most likely
or important potential targets. Additionally, there may be situations where the
insurgents are strong enough locally that the police require overt support from the
military if they intend to move against a group of rebels.

c-25245
 Large-Scale Insurgency

Assuming that the threat is not defeated or contained, it proceeds into the
large-scale insurgency phase. In this phase, the situation for the threatened
government will have become quite serious. The insurgents by now have gained
considerable support within the local population. Their numbers may be in the
many thousands, and they will have reached a level of political and armed
capability that gives them a distinct chance of succeeding. The success of the
insurgents can now be used as “proof” of the viability of the movement, thus resulting
in more local recruits and encouraging outside support from friendly governments and
nongovernmental groups. Indeed, the fact that the insurgency has reached this level
may be due in no small part to support provided by friendly “outsiders” in terms of
money, volunteers, weapons, and political support and legitimacy.
Whatever their ultimate political goal, the insurgents now have a good chance
of prevailing.
From the point of view of the government’s intelligence and security forces, the
roles of the military and police have almost certainly been reversed in this stage.
Whereas the police were in the lead in the earlier stages, at this point the sheer strength
of the insurgency will have probably forced the government to rely on its military—
specifically its ground forces—to combat the insurgents. With insurgent groups well
armed and numerous, the situation will have passed beyond the ability of the police to
cope. While the police and intelligence organisations still play absolutely vital roles in
the government’s attempt to defeat the insurgents, the armed forces will probably
be at the forefront of the counterinsurgency effort.
This changed situation highlights counterinsurgency’s “paradox of force.”
Historically, when the forces of the government employ too much lethal force, the
support of the population will often slip away.
Most military forces are not imbued with the ethic of “lethal force is the last
resort,” which is far more common in police forces. Militaries tend to be rather blunt
instruments and are probably not nearly as familiar with local populations as are the
police. Nevertheless, if the insurgency has reached this critical phase, there may be
no option other than committing military force.
If the insurgents survive the vulnerable initial phase and start to gain strength,
the relationship of the government’s police and military forces will start to change

ETHICS OF COUNTERINSURGENCY

Ethics of war courses traditionally revolve around two main claims. The first is
that ethical practices inhere in the practice of war.
‘No state at war with another shall permit such acts of hostility as would
make mutual confidence impossible during a future time of peace’ (Kant 1983:
96). The Kantian injunction cited above is to do nothing in war that makes peace
impossible.

c-25245
 We are all rational beings and therefore should be treated as ends in
ourselves, not merely as means or building blocks to the ends of others. If peace is
the only reason for going to war, then we must wage it in a way that does nothing that
makes it unattainable.
Let us remember that justice must be maintained even towards the lowliest’
(Cicero 1991: 39).
‘There is no military power so great that it can last for long under the weight of
fear’ (Cicero 1991: 2.26). For fear can beget fearfulness – to inspire fear and appear
fearful at the same time is usually ruinous – it is likely to provoke a defeated people to
revolt.
As a modern thinker, Kant preferred the word ‘responsibility’: we are
responsible for the soldiers we capture, or the women and children who fall into our
hands. And that responsibility inheres in the dialectic between war and peace. What is
important is not to stop, but to stop short: to prevent limited war from becoming
unlimited. Responsibility is a correlate of power, and the scope and the degree of
power we enjoy must determine the scope of our responsibility. What morality
restores to an increasingly uncertain world is the idea of responsibility – that what we
do severally and collectively makes a difference and that as a consequence the future
lies in our hands. Counterinsurgency operations clearly present a very demanding
ethical challenge. We do not enter into contracts with insurgents, and they certainly
have not signed up to the Geneva Convention. But most ethicists would argue that a
state is bound to honour its own customs and conventions even so.
‘Mere anarchy is loosed upon the world’. What he meant was not disorder or
anarchy as such; he meant licensed killing. Twentieth-century states licensed their
soldiers to kill in the name of abstract principles, those great ‘alibis of aggression’,
Gay calls them, which allowed them to kill with a good conscience, and to kill on a large
scale.
Tolstoy had shown how quickly civilised men can revert back to their natural
state, how war can revert very quickly to warfare or indiscriminate violence when they
see their enemy. The point is that barbarism inheres not just in our natures, but in the
tendency of war to revert back to its origins, especially when discipline breaks down.
The state of nature from which we have fled is one to which we can return quickly
enough. ‘War’ is the distance we place not between ourselves and our nature, but
between ourselves and the state of nature. The soldier must feed on war from a
distance and the discipline of war (the warrior’s honour) is precisely the distance he
must maintain.
We need an ends-means ethics which is precisely what the Geneva
Conventions provide. War is not a moral activity at all; it is ethical. To be moral, an
action must be disinterested, it must be independent of the old legal question, cui bono:
who benefits?
There is, we are told, a Western way of war practised by civilised democracies
and there is also a Muslim way of war, ‘standing eye-deep in the red barbarity of the
Fourteenth Century – a kill-the-children-first approach to war’ (Harris 2004: 20) But
we ignore the fundamental difference between their violence and ours at our peril.
Once you externalise violence onto the ‘other’, every tool and tactic becomes justified,

c-25245
 including torture. Once you externalise your own actions as good, and theirs as evil,
you find it easier to humiliate them which may render it, in turn, more difficult for them
to come to terms with defeat. Kant’s key insight, that we should respect our enemies,
still holds. For he saw that the moment you externalise violence and project it onto the
‘other’, you may well fail to acknowledge the impulses within yourself that permit you
to carry out indefensible acts. In the end – watching at a distance – you end up
dismissing Guantanamo Bay or Abu Ghraib as possibly regrettable but inevitable. Like
Junger, we may even comfort ourselves with the thought that ‘things like that belong
to the style of the times’. ‘Stuff happens’, as the US Defense Secretary said notoriously
of the outbreak of the looting in Baghdad within days of the Americans arriving in the
city.
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles

We are engineering robots for many reasons. One of the most important is to
reduce human risk. It is precisely because we are weak, vulnerable beings, that the
body is exposed to harm, that we are always seeking to put ourselves out of harm’s
way. Robots may indeed enhance our ability to fight war, but they also offer a chance
to reduce suffering, both physical and mental. Among the ethical properties this may
be the most important of all. In rebooting war for our own age we aspire to go beyond
spreading risks, we aspire to eliminate them altogether. Risk avoidance has now
become an absolute military priority. Henry Yuen, an expert in anti submarine
warfare, wrote an internal paper for the Defense Department shortly after the end of
the Gulf War. ‘One of the foremost objectives in the development of new weaponry’,
he wrote, ‘should be the reduction or total elimination of human risk. Put simply,
weapons or equipment in harm’s way should, to the extent possible, be unmanned’
We use technology as a substitute for risk. We use for instance Pacbots –
a ground system that can be used for scouting hostile areas, or which can disable basic
IEDs; the advantage of such a system, according to one military officer, is ‘when a
robot dies, you don’t have to write a letter to its mother’. Fanciful or not, as Ralph
Peters, a retired Army Officer, has put it ‘there’s a uniquely American pursuit of the
Grail that technology will solve all human problems, that we can have bloodless wars’
(Singer 2009: 291). In the years to come the military will be using robots more and
more to reduce the risk of combat. Take the case of Pacbots: the service these provide
is grounded in risk aversion. John Dyer, the President of I-robot, the company that
makes them, plays up the life-saving effects: ‘Pacbot allows personnel to safely
neutralise roadside bombs, car bombs and other IEDs, and perform other life-
threatening missions, helping to save soldiers’ lives.’ The trade-off seems so obvious
and simple: why should a 20-year-old soldier have to look around a corner when a
replaceable machine can do the same job? The same is true, of course, for disposing
of potentially dangerous ordnance.
. Technology first changes the environment and then changes our way of thinking and
our values, hence the popular adage to the person whose only tool is a hammer, all
problems look like nails.

c-25245
 UAVs remove the ‘sacred’ from sacrifice. It is sacrifice – the willingness to
run risks and – if necessary – pay the supreme price with one’s life that is the chief
legitimating factor of war; ultimately, it is what makes it different from common murder.
The warrior ethos – correct behaviour concerns two related moral demands
– accepted and acceptable behaviour. Accepted behaviour is behaviour that is legally
sanctioned. Acceptable behaviour is behaviour that may be legitimate (in the eyes of
others) but which may not necessarily be within the law.
We must choose our tools carefully, not because they are inhumane (all
weapons are), but because the more we come to rely on them, the more they come to
shape our view of the world, and it is clear that as we are becoming increasingly reliant
on robotics it may be reshaping our inter-subjective experience with the enemy which
constitutes what we used to call a community of fate. We are human, wrote Richard
Rorty, to the extent that humanity is not a given; it is real only insofar as our humanity
is recognised by others in us. A weapon is merely a weapon. It is dumb, not smart.
Even today a drone pilot operating a UAV over the skies of Afghanistan does not know
when he launches it whether he is killing men who are brave or cowards. He may see
more than anyone has ever seen before, but the vision does not help that much; he
still cannot see the man within.

The ethics of the Suicide Bomber

The ethics of war for state actors revolves around killing. For non-state
actors there is another dimension – it revolves around dying. ‘And we must tremble
so long as we have not learned to heal the sinister ease of dying.’ Sacrifice becomes
problematic when dying becomes too easy. Sacrifice becomes problematic when it
appears to betray a contempt for life which is at the centre not of heroism, but of
fanaticism.
One of the chief objections to suicide bombing is that it reduces life to Hobbes’
state of nature – the war of all against all, ‘every man the enemy of every man’. What
is distinctive about the state of nature is the absence of any instrumental dimension.
The young (usually young men but sometimes women) are corrupted by the violence
to which they resort. It is in this sense that the one-dimensional existential view of war
is so deeply corrupting. Referring to the lone individual who takes his own life, Camus
also used the same phrase as Hugo – ‘a terrible strength’. Yeats used a different
phrase about the Easter Rising in Ireland in 1916 – another foolhardy revolt by young
men. He called it a ‘terrible beauty’. Camus’ ‘terrible strength’ is now, alas, a feature of
politics in the Middle East. And because it is ‘political’ – because it’s intended to
influence others, particularly, impressionable, young men – it is used to dominate
others and allow the bombers (and especially their controllers) to dominate the moral
high ground in the region where a willingness to die for one’s beliefs is so often
taken as a sign of moral conviction.
The suicide bomber is an existentialist tout court. He kills, of course, as well as
dies. He dies in order to kill. The mark of warrior cultures throughout history and the
reason why people dislike them is that one can only hazard one’s life for glory if one is
prepared to take the life of another. This is what makes the warrior such an ambiguous

c-25245
 figure in the Western world. But the true warrior is a better man for the experience;
whether he survives or not he still masters it. And that is why the world is often a better
place because of him.
The violence of the suicide bomber is unmediated which is why suicide is not
an act of war, but what Hobbes calls ‘warre’ – the war of all against all, prior to the
state. Like Hobbes’ creature in the state of nature he is a lonely, atomised figure finding
solace only in the company of like-minded persons. He tends to be driven by impotent
rage, easy prey for those who can give their empty lives a sense of significance or
meaning. War is the great educator; Hegel claimed it educates for freedom. It is rite of
passage; a developer of character; a way by which a warrior may come to know
himself, and ‘become’ what he is as a result of insight into his own nature. ‘the man
who kills a man kills a man. The man who kills himself, kills all men; as far as he
is concerned he wipes out the world’. There is much truth in Chesterton’s remark.
Indeed, we can echo him by asserting that his acts threaten to ‘wipe out the world’
because they end that dialogue which war constitutes and which makes peace
possible. This is an ultimate negation of Kant’s injunction that we should do nothing in
war that would put permanent peace forever out of reach.
STATE COLLAPSE AND SOCIAL REVOLUTIONS

In some cases social revolutions have given rise to models and ideals of
enormous international impact and appeal. What the Russian Revolution was for the first
half of the twentieth century, the Chinese has been for the second half.
Social revolutions are rapid, basic transformations of a society's state and class
structures; and they are accompanied and in part carried through by class-based
revolts from below. Social revolutions are set apart from other sorts of conflicts and
transformative processes above all by the combination of two coincidences: the coincidence
of societal structural change with class upheaval; and the coincidence of political with social
transformation. In contrast, rebellions, even when successful, may involve the revolt of
subordinate classes- but they do not eventuate in structural change.3 Political revolutions
transform state structures but not social structures, and they are not necessarily accomplished
through class conflict.4 And processes such as industrialization can transform social
structures without necessarily bringing about, or resulting from, sudden political upheavals or
basic political-structural changes.
Marx understood revolutions ,as isolated episodes of violence or conflict but as class-
based movements growing out of objective structural contradictions within historically
developing and inherently conflict-ridden societies. . For Marx, the key to any society is its
mode of production or specific combination of socioeco forces. of production (technology and
division of labour) and class relations of property ownership and surplus appropriation. The
basic source of a revolutionary contradiction in society is the emergence of a disjuncture' within
a mode of production between the social forces and social) Ions of production.
In short, Marx sees revolutions as emerging out of class-divided modes of production,
and transforming one mode of production into another through class conflict. aggregate-
psychological theories, which attempt to expIain revolutions in terms of people's
psychological motivations for engaging in political violence or joining oppositional movements,
systems/values consensus theories, which attempt to explain revolutions as violent

c-25245
responses of ideological movements to severe disequilibrium in social systems; and political-
conflict theories, which argue that conflict among governments and various organized
groups contending for power must be placed at the center of attention to explain collective
violence and revolution.
Gurr’s theory is complex and full of interesting nuances in its full elabora tion but is
simple enough in essence: Political violence occurs when many 'people in society
become angry, especially if existing cultural and practical conditions provide encouragement
for aggression against political targets.And people become angry when there occurs a gap
between the valued things and opportunities they feel entitled to and the things and opportuni
ties they actually get: a condition known as "relative deprivation.". Revolutions are included
in the internal-war category, along with large-scale terrorism, guerrilla wars, and civil wars.
Political-conflict theorists argue that no matter how discontented an aggregate of
people may become, they cannot engage in political action (including violence) unless they
are part of at least minimally organised groups with access to some resources.
Instead, the objective of analysis is "collective action," defined as "people's acting
together in pursuit of common interests." Tilly analyses collective action with the aid of two
general models: the “polity model” and a "mobilization model. " The major elements of the
polity model are governments (organizations that control the principal concentrated means of
coercion in a population) and groups contending for power, including both members
(contenders that have routine, low cost access to government resources), and challengers (all
other contenders). The mobilization model includes variables designed to explain the pattern
of collective action engaged in by given contenders. These variables refer to group interests,
to degrees of organization, to amounts of resources under collective control, and to the
opportunities and threats that given contenders face in their relationships to governments and
other contending groups

If one steps back from the clashes among the leading perspectives on revolution, what
seems most striking is the sameness of the image of the overall revolutionary process that
underlies and informs all four approaches. According to that shared image: First, changes in
social systems or societies give rise to grievances, social disorientation, or new class or group
interests and potentials for collective mobilization. Then there develops a purposive, mass-
based movement- coalescing with the aid of ideology and organization -that consciously
undertakes to overthrow the exist ing government and perhaps the entire social order. Finally,
the revolution ary movement fights it out with the authorities or dominant class and, if it wins,
it undertakes to establish its own authority and program.

c-25245
 INS332
POLITICAL SPECTRUM

Total Auth Dem Capit Socia

All So Freedom, Private Private but

enterprises, me units rights, limitations individuals own with social use
business, are still Our big businesses Social
everything is privately rights end when Private counterpart, social
owned/controll owned the right of others ownership is responsibility
ed by the gov’t are violated allowed
Own

CNN (CPP-NPA-NDF)

It has two main bands:

- Legal (upper)
- Illegal (lower)
The CPP-1968 is legal but its members have chosen to be clandestine because they intend to
overthrow the state and they are more effective in pursuing such an aim if they are felt but not seen.

 Lower part is illegal/clandestine

 At the core are the Underground Political Parties (UPPs) which is the CPP

c-25245
 CPP control NPA

 CPP also controls the Underground Mass Organizations (UMOs)

 UMO = Nat’l Democratic Front (NDF)
 NDF serves as the means of expansion of the CPP; they are in charge of recruitment of
“middle forces”
 Middle forces do not want to join the CPP but are willing to accept party leadership by the
CPP
 The NDF has 15 groups.
 Main group is the CPP, second is the NPA

Some groups:
 Christians for National Liberation (CNL)
 Katipunan ng Gurong Makabayan (KGM) – for teachers
 Artista at Manunulat para sa Sambayanan (ARMAS) – for artists and writers
 Pambansang Katipunan ng mga Mambubukid (PKM) – for peasant; it is a UPP controlling the
LPP - KMP
 Kilusang Mambubukid ng Pilipinas (KMP)- LPP for peasants

There are two main coonfigurations at upper/ legal level:

1. Legal Political Parties (LPP)
- Bayan Muna
o A multisectoral group that spun off and controls the 5 other groups namely:
1. Gabriela Women’s Party (GABRIELA) – for women
2. ANAKPAWIS – for peasants, workers, and urban poor
3. Ang Nagkakaisang Kabataan para sa Sambayanan (ANAK NG BAYAN) – for the youth
4. SUARA MINDANAO / SUARA BANGSAMORO – for muslims
5. MIGRANTE – for OFWs

2. Legal Mass Organizations (LMOs)

- Bagong Alyansang Makabayan (BAYAN)
- Confederation for Unity Recognition, and Advancement (COURAGE) – for gov’t employees
- Crispin Tagamolia Movement – recruiting members among young officers and their families
and among civilian employees from the PNP and AFP

 CPP-1968 members are all party members

 NPA is NOT 100% communist
 Only 60-70% of NPA are CPP-1968 members
 High commanders have to belong to the CPP-1968
 As one goes upward to the LMOs, as they pass through the NDF, the number of party-
members get lesser

c-25245
 EXPANDED ROLES OF THE AFP IN NATION BUILDING

Traditional Role of the AFP

The traditional role of the AFP as defender of the state and protector of national sovereignty
and territorial integrity.
Nontraditional role of the AFP
The role actually began as early as 1951 during the Huk campaign when President Ramon
Magsaysay, advised by Colonel Edward Lansdale and the Central Intelligence Agency, had the AFP
adopt the “left-hand/right-hand” approach
The left hand offered developmental projects to rebels who needed them, while the right hand
firmly dealt with the rebels who refused and challenged the authority of the government
Triad concept or the synergistic employment of combat operations, intelligence, and civil-
military operations.
The involvement of the AFP in election duties began the erosion of the AFP’s core values
The People Power Revolution on the Epifanio de los Santos Avenue (or EDSA, the main
highway of Metro Manila) in 1986 transformed the nontraditional role of the AFP.
Current Nat’l Security Challenges - Primary
The primary national security challenge confronting the AFP continues to be the threat posed
by the CPP/NPA.
One factor does seem consistent. The insurgency feeds on public discontent with the status quo.
The more discontent there is, the more the insurgents fuel it—and the stronger the insurgency becomes
Another primary security challenge, next only to the CPP/NPA in severity, is the secessionist
threat from the MILF. Beginning in 1975, this insurgency continues because there are enough Filipino
Muslims who are unhappy with the way they have been treated by the predominantly Christian nation
and therefore want to live in a territory of their own, namely a portion of Mindanao
Current Nat’l Security Challenges - Secondary
The characteristics common to developing countries also become the national security
challenges to so-called soft states. Recurrent issues such as the general lack of resources due to poverty,
endemic graft and corruption, incompetence, weak institutions, lack of political will, and oligarchic
political and economic control are the security challenges from within
Conversion is the misappropriation of public funds to make the money appear as if it was spent
as intended, when in reality it was used elsewhere.

Strengthening the argument for the security and development model, U.S. forces found little
ideological support—just government inability to provide for the basic needs and security of the people.
Furthermore, implementing security and development projects in local areas restored the government’s
legitimacy in the eyes of the public, thereby eroding the base of support for the insurgents.

Public Expectations of the AFP

Similar to what is expected of the armed forces in any democracy, the Filipino people expect
the AFP to fulfill its constitutional role as protector of the people and state.
As a partner in development, the AFP has been known to help the victims of crises and
emergencies.

c-25245
 Risks from AFP Expanded Nontraditional Role
The first is that AFP resources dedicated to development are resources taken away from the
AFP’s core function of warfighting.
Although its developmental role is important, its main task remains winning the nation’s wars.
There is no other organization in the Philippines that has that role.
Although the left-hand/right-hand approach to winning insurgencies is a proven formula, it also
has a critical weakness. If left to the AFP to perform both roles, the left-hand role could ultimately
weaken the right-hand role.
The most critical risks to the core values of the AFP are graft and corruption, which have grown
to become the AFP’s enemy within.
Conclusion
The security and development (left-hand/ right-hand) approach toward winning insurgencies is
a time-tested and proven formula.
The positive experience can be attributed to the AFP’s contribution of its military values to its
external environment, while much of the negative experience is accounted for by its expanded exposure
to politics, which have undermined its core values.
GOOD GOVERNANCE VS COERCIVE APPROACH

Good governance
“Good governance” typically means economic growth, political representation, and efficient
administration.
In this view, good governance is necessary to defeat insurgencies because it is bad governance
that causes them in the first place.
The good governance approach includes direct military targeting of insurgents, but
governments must prevent harm to civilians because harm will only increase support for the insurgency.
Limits to the Good governance approach
The lack of rigor hinders consideration of which types of government behavior are more
likely to contribute to success in which types of cases.

c-25245