BILL OF RIGHTS CASES

1. Aquino, Jr. vs. Enrile, 59 SCRA 183 atup

FACTS: The cases are all petitions for habeas corpus, the petitioners having
been arrested and detained by the military by virtue of Proclamation 1081. The
petitioners were arrested and held pursuant to General Order No.2 of the
President "for being participants or for having given aid and comfort in the
conspiracy to seize political and state power in the country and to take over the
Government by force..." General Order No. 2 was issued by the President in the
exercise of the power he assumed by virtue of Proclamation1081 placing the
entire country under martial law.

ISSUES:

1) Is the existence of conditions claimed to justify the exercise of the power to

declare martial law subject to judicial inquiry?

2) Is the detention of the petitioners legal in accordance with the declaration of

martial law?

HELD: 5 Justices held that the issue is a political question, hence, not subject
to judicial inquiry, while 4 Justices held that the issue is a justiciable one.
However, any inquiry by this Court in the present cases into the constitutional
sufficiency of the factual bases for the proclamation of martial law has become
moot and academic.

Implicit in the state of martial law is the suspension of the privilege of writ of
habeas corpus with respect to persons arrested or detained for acts related to
the basic objective of the proclamation, which is to suppress invasion,
insurrection or rebellion, or to safeguard public safety against imminent danger
thereof. The preservation of society and national survival takes precedence. The
proclamation of martial law automatically suspends the privilege of the writ as
to the persons referred to in this case.

2. Ilagan vs. Enrile, G.R. No. 70748 October 21, 1985 bais

Facts: This is a petition for Habeas Corpus filed by the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP), the Free Legal Assistance Group (FLAG) and the Movement of
Attorneys for Brotherhood, Integrity and Nationalism (MABINI) on behalf of
Attorneys Laurente C. Ilagan, Antonio B. Arellano, and Marcos Risonar, Jr.

Attorney Laurente C. Ilagan was arrested in Davao City by elements of the PC-
INP and detained at Camp Catitipan on the basis of a Mission Order allegedly
issued by the Ministry of National Defense. Fifteen lawyers from the IBP Davao
Chapter visited Atty. Ilagan. One of the visiting lawyers, Atty. Antonio Arellano,
was also arrested and detained on the basis of an unsigned Mission Order.

The military sent word to the IBP Davao Chapter that Attorney Marcos Risonar
would likewise be arrested. The latter went to Camp Catitipan to verify his
arrest papers and was detained on the basis of a Mission Order signed by
General Echavarria, Regional Unified Commander.

This petition for habeas corpus was then filed by and on behalf of the three
arrested lawyers hereinafter referred to as the detained attorneys on the
ground that their arrests were illegal and violative of the Constitution since
arrests cannot be made on the basis of Mission Orders. and that there appears
to be a military campaign to harass lawyers involved in national security cases.

Respondents filed an Urgent Motion for the Reconsideration of this Court's

Order of Release reiterating that the suspension of the Writ of Habeas Corpus
has the effect of ousting the Court of its jurisdiction to hear the case, and
attached thereto classified documents consisting of the Report of respondent
Brig. Gen. Tan-Gatue stated that the detained attorneys "were arrested not on
the basis of their 'lawyering' but for specific acts of rebellion and economic
sabotage as well as for their leadership in the CPP.

Issue: Whether or not the petition for Habeas Corpus be granted? No.

Ruling: The proper remedy, in this case, is to file in the RTC Motion to Quash
the Warrant of Arrest, and/or Information or to ask for reinvestigation of the
case.

Habeas corpus could not lie after a warrant of commitment was issued by the
Court based on the Information filed. As provided in Sec. 14, Rule 102, a
prisoner lawfully committed and charged with an offense punishable by death,
shall not be released, discharged, or bailed, but if not punishable as such, may
bail at the judge’s discretion.

The function of the special proceeding of habeas corpus is to inquire into the
legality of one's detention. Now that the detained attorneys' incarceration is by
virtue of a judicial order in relation to criminal cases subsequently filed against
them before the Regional Trial Couravao City, the remedy of habeas corpus no
longer lies.

If the detained attorneys question their detention because of improper arrest,

or that no preliminary investigation has been conducted, the remedy is not a
petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus but a Motion before the trial court to
quash the Warrant of Arrest, and /or the Information on grounds provided by
the Rules or to ask for an investigation/reinvestigation of the case. Habeas
corpus would not lie after the Warrant of commitment was issued by the Court
based on the Information filed against the accused.

Petition for Habeas Corpus is hereby dismissed for having become moot and
academic.

3. Enrile vs. Salazar G.R. 92163, June 5, 1990 banggat

Facts: In the afternoon of February 27, 1990, Senate Minority Floor Leader
Juan Ponce Enrile was arrested by law enforcement officers led by Director
Alfredo Lim of the National Bureau of Investigation on the strength of a warrant
issued by Hon. Jaime Salazar of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City
Branch 103, in Criminal Case No. 9010941.

The warrant had issued on an information signed and earlier that day filed by a
panel of prosecutors composed of Senior State Prosecutor Aurelio C. Trampe,
State Prosecutor Ferdinand R. Abesamis and Assistant City Prosecutor Eulogio
Mananquil, Jr., charging Senator Enrile, the spouses Rebecco and Erlinda
Panlilio, and Gregorio Honasan with the crime of rebellion with murder and
multiple frustrated murder allegedly committed during the period of the failed
coup attempt from November 29 to December 10, 1990.

Senator Enrile was taken to and held overnight at the NBI headquarters on Taft
Avenue, Manila, without bail, none having been recommended in the
information and none fixed in the arrest warrant. The following morning,
February 28, 1990, he was brought to Camp Tomas Karingal in Quezon City
where he was given over to the custody of the Superintendent of the Northern
Police District, Brig. Gen. Edgardo Dula Torres.

On the same date of February 28, 1990, Senator Enrile, through counsel, filed
the petition for habeas corpus herein (which was followed by a supplemental
petition filed on March 2, 1990), alleging that he was deprived of his
constitutional rights.

Issue:
(a) Whether the petitioner has committed complex crimes (delito compleio)
arising from an offense being a necessary means for committing another, which
is referred to in the second clause of Article 48, Revised Penal Code?

(b) Whether or not the petitioner was deprived of his constitutional right to bail
.

Held: There is one other reason and a fundamental one at that why Article 48
of the Penal Code cannot be applied in the case at bar. If murder were not
complexed with rebellion, and the two crimes were punished separately
(assuming that this could be done), the following penalties would be imposable
upon the movant, namely: (1) for the crime of rebellion, a fine not exceeding
P20,000 and prision mayor, in the corresponding period, depending upon the
modifying circumstances present, but never exceeding 12 years of prision
mayor, and (2) for the crime of murder, reclusion temporal in its maximum
period to death, depending upon the modifying circumstances present. In other
words, in the absence of aggravating circumstances, the extreme penalty could
not be imposed upon him. However, under Article 48 said penalty would have
to be meted out to him, even in the absence of a single aggravating
circumstance. Thus, said provision, if construed in conformity with the theory
of the prosecution, would be unfavorable to the movant.

The plaint of petitioner's counsel that he is charged with a crime that does not
exist in the statute books, while technically correct so far as the Court has
ruled that rebellion may not be complexed with other offenses committed on
the occasion thereof, must therefore be dismissed as a mere flight of rhetoric.
Read in the context of Hernandez, the information does indeed charge the
petitioner with a crime defined and punished by the Revised Penal Code:
simple rebellion.

Petitioner finally claims that he was denied the right to bail. In the light of the
Court's reaffirmation of Hernandez as applicable to petitioner's case, and of the
logical and necessary corollary that the information against him should be
considered as charging only the crime of simple rebellion, which is bailable
before conviction, that must now be accepted as a correct proposition. But the
question remains: Given the facts from which this case arose, was a petition for
habeas corpus in this Court the appropriate vehicle for asserting a right to bail
or vindicating its denial? The criminal case before the respondent Judge was
the normal venue for invoking the petitioner's right to have provisional liberty
pending trial and judgment. The original jurisdiction to grant or deny bail
rested with said respondent. The correct course was for petitioner to invoke
that jurisdiction by filing a petition to be admitted to bail, claiming a right to
bail per se by reason of the weakness of the evidence against him. Only after
that remedy was denied by the trial court should the review jurisdiction of this
Court have been invoked, and even then, not without first applying to the
Court of Appeals if appropriate relief was also available there.

The Court reiterates that based on the doctrine enunciated in People vs.
Hernandez, the questioned information filed against petitioners Juan Ponce
Enrile and the spouses Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio must be read as charging
simple rebellion only, hence said petitioners are entitled to bail, before final
conviction, as a matter of right. The Court's earlier grant of bail to petitioners
being merely provisional in character, the proceedings in both cases are
ordered remanded to the respondent Judge to fix the amount of bail to be
posted by the petitioners. Once bail is fixed by said respondent for any of the
petitioners, the corresponding bail bond flied with this Court shall become
functus oficio. No pronouncement as to costs.

2. As to the second issue, Yes, holding that the Hernandez Doctrine is

applicable in the case at bar and that the information filed against the must be
read as charging simple rebellion, a bailable offense. Thus, petitioner is entitled
to bail before final conviction.

4. Brocka et. al. vs. Enrile G.R. No. 69863-65 (December 10, 1990)
bontuyan

FACTS: Petitioners were arrested on January 28, 1985 by elements of the

Northern Police District following the forcible and violent dispersal of a
demonstration held in sympathy with the jeepney strike. Except for Brocka, et
al. who were charged as leaders of the offense of Illegal Assembly and for whom
no bail was recommended, the other petitioners were released on bail. Brocka,
et al.'s provisional release was ordered only upon an urgent petition for bail.
However, despite service of the order of release on February 9, 1985, Brocka, et
al. remained in detention, respondents having invoked a Preventive Detention
Action (PDA) allegedly issued against them. Neither the original, duplicate
original nor certified true copy of the PDA was ever shown to them.

Brocka, et al. were subsequently charged on February 11, 1985 with Inciting to
Sedition, without prior notice to their counsel. The original information filed
recommended no bail. The circumstances surrounding the hasty filing of this
second offense are cited by Brocka, et al. As a result, they were released
provisionally on February 14, 1985, on orders of then President F. E. Marcos.

Brocka, et al. contend that respondents' manifest bad faith and/or harassment
are sufficient bases for enjoining their criminal prosecution, aside from the fact
that the second offense of inciting to sedition is illegal, since it is premised on
one and the same act of attending and participating in the ACTO jeepney
strike. They maintain that while there may be a complex crime from a single
act (Art. 48, RTC), the law does not allow the splitting of a single act into two
offenses and filing two information therefor, further, that they will be placed in
double jeopardy.

ISSUE: Whether or not it is legal to enjoin criminal prosecution for the second
offense of inciting to sedition.

RULING: Yes. We rule in favor of Brocka, et al. and enjoin their criminal
prosecution for the second offense of inciting to sedition. The general rule is
that criminal prosecution may not be restrained or stayed by injunction,
preliminary or final. There are however exceptions, among which are:

a. To afford adequate protection to the constitutional rights of the

accused.

b. When necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid

oppression or multiplicity of actions.

c. When there is a pre-judicial question which is sub judice.

d. When the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority.

e. Where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation.

f. When double jeopardy is clearly apparent.

 g. Where the court has no jurisdiction over the offense.

h. Where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution.

i. Where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust
for vengeance; and

j. When there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused and
a motion to quash on that ground has been denied.

k. Preliminary injunction has been issued by the Supreme Court to

prevent the threatened unlawful arrest of petitioners.

In the instant case, Brocka, et al. have cited the circumstances to show that
the criminal proceedings had become a case of persecution, having been
undertaken by state officials in bad faith. The hasty filing of the second offense,
premised on a spurious and inoperational PDA, certainly betrays respondent’s
bad faith and malicious intent to pursue criminal charges against Brocka, et
al.

We have expressed Our view in the Ilagan case that "individuals against whom
PDAs have been issued should be furnished with the original, and the
duplicate original, and a certified true copy issued by the official having official
custody of the PDA, at the time of the apprehension".

The tenacious invocation of a spurious and inoperational PDA and the sham
and hasty preliminary investigation were clear signals that the prosecutors
intended to keep Brocka, et al. in detention until the second offense of "Inciting
to Sedition" could be facilitated and justified without need of issuing a warrant
of arrest anew. As a matter of fact the corresponding information for this
second offense was hastily filed on February 11, 1985, or two days after
Brocka, et al.'s release from detention was ordered by the trial judge on
February 9, 1985. Constitutional rights must be upheld at all costs, for this
gesture is the true sign of democracy. These may not be set aside to satisfy
perceived illusory visions of national grandeur.

5. Ocampo et al. vs. Enriquez, G.R. Nos. 225973, November 2016 dacaldacal
FACTS: During the 2016 Presidential Election, then candidate Rodrigo Duterte
publicly announce that he would allow the burial of former President Marcos at
the Libingan ng mga Bayani (LNMB). After PRRD assumed his office, a verbal
order was given to implement his election promise to have the remains of the
late former President Marcos be interred at LNMB.

ISSUES:
1. WON Pres Duterte’s determination to have the remains of Marcos
interred at the LNMB poses a justiciable controversy
2. WON the petitioners have locus standi to file the instant petition
3. WON the issuance and implementation of the assailed memorandum and
directive violate the constitution, domestic and international laws

HELD:

1. WON Pres Duterte’s determination to have the remains of Marcos

interred at the LNMB poses a justiciable controversy. NO.

No question involving the constitutionality or validity of a law or governmental

act may be heard and decided by the Court unless the following requisites for
judicial inquiry are present:
a. there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise
of judicial power;
b. the person challenging the act must have the standing to question
the validity of the subject act or issuance;
c. the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest
opportunity; and
d. the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.

The Court agrees with the OSG that President Duterte's decision to have the
remains of Marcos interred at the LNMB involves a political question that is not
a justiciable controversy. In the exercise of his powers under the Constitution
and the Executive Order (E.O.) No. 292 (otherwise known as the Administrative
Code of 1987) to allow the interment of Marcos at the LNMB, which is a land of
the public domain devoted for national military cemetery and military shrine
purposes, President Duterte decided a question of policy based on his wisdom
that it shall promote national healing and forgiveness. There being no taint of
grave abuse in the exercise of such discretion, as discussed below, President
Duterte's decision on that political question is outside the ambit of judicial
review.
 2. WON the petitioners have locus standi to file the instant petition.
NO

Locus standi is defines as a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given

question. It requires that a party alleges such personal stake in the outcome of
the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the
presentation of issues upon which the court depends for illumination of
difficult constitutional questions. Unless a person has sustained or is in
imminent danger of sustaining an injury as a result of an act complained of,
such proper party has no standing. Petitioners, who filed their respective
petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, in their capacities as
citizens, human rights violations victims, legislators, members of the Bar and
taxpayers, have no legal standing to file such petitions because they failed to
show that they have suffered or will suffer direct and personal injury as a
result of the interment of Marcos at the LNMB.

Taxpayers have been allowed to sue where there is a claim that public funds
are illegally disbursed or that public money is being deflected to any improper
purpose, or that public funds are wasted through the enforcement of an invalid
or unconstitutional law. In this case, what is essentially being assailed is the
wisdom behind the decision of the President to proceed with the interment of
Marcos at the LNMB. As taxpayers, petitioners merely claim illegal
disbursement of public funds, without showing that Marcos is disqualified to
be interred at the LNMB by either express or implied provision of the
Constitution, the laws or jurisprudence.

Petitioners failed to demonstrate a clear and imminent threat to their

fundamental constitutional rights. In the absence of a clear showing of any
direct injury to their person or the institution to which they belong, their
standing as members of the Congress cannot be upheld. They do not specifically
claim that the official actions complained of, i.e., the memorandum of the
Secretary of National Defense and the directive of the AFP Chief of Staff
regarding the interment of Marcos at the LNMB, encroach on their prerogatives
as legislators.

3. WON the issuance and implementation of the assailed

memorandum and directive violate the constitution, domestic and
international laws
Petitioners argue that the burial of Marcos at the LNMB should not be allowed
because it has the effect of not just rewriting history as to the Filipino people's
act of revolting against an authoritarian ruler but also condoning the abuses
committed during the Martial Law, thereby violating the letter and spirit of the
1987 Constitution, which is a "post-dictatorship charter" and a "human rights
constitution."

Tañada vs Angara already ruled that the provisions in Article II of the

Constitution are not self-executing. Thus: By its very title, Article II of the
Constitution is a "declaration of principles and state policies." These principles
in Article II are not intended to be self¬ executing principles ready for
enforcement through the courts. They are used by the judiciary as aids or as
guides in the exercise of its power of judicial review, and by the legislature in
its enactment of laws. As held in the leading case of Kilosbayan, Incorporated
vs. Morato, the principles and state policies enumerated in Article II x x x are
not "self-executing provisions, the disregard of which can give rise to a cause of
action in the courts. They do not embody judicially enforceable constitutional
rights but guidelines for legislation."

Petitioner’s reliance on Sec 3(2) of Art XIV and Sec 26 of the Art XVIII of the
Constitution is also misplaced. Sec 3(2) of Art. XIV refers to the constitutional
duty of educational institutions in teaching the values of patriotism and
nationalism and respect for human rights, while Sec. 26 of Art. XVIII is a
transitory provision on sequestration or freeze orders in relation to the recovery
of Marcos' ill-gotten wealth. Clearly, with respect to these provisions, there is
no direct or indirect prohibition to Marcos' interment at the LNMB.

As to Sec 17 of Art VII, it is not violated by the public respondent. Being the
Chief Executive, the President represents the government as a whole and sees
to it that all laws are enforced by the officials and employees of his or her
department. Under the Faithful Execution Clause, the President has the power
to take "necessary and proper steps" to carry into execution the law. The
mandate is self-executory by virtue of its being inherently executive in nature
and is intimately related to the other executive functions.

Consistent with President Duterte's mandate under Sec. 17, Art. VII of the
Constitution, the burial of Marcos at the LNMB does not contravene R.A. No.
289, R.A. No. 10368, and the international human rights laws cited by
petitioners.
6. Carino vs. Insular Government 212 U.S. 449 (1909) calamba

Facts: The applicant and plaintiff, Carino, is an Igorot of the Province of Benguet,
where the land lies. For more than fifty years before the Treaty of Paris, April 11,
1899, as far back as the findings go, the plaintiff and his ancestors had held the
land as owners. His grandfather had lived upon it, and had maintained fences
sufficient for the holding of cattle, according to the custom of the country, some of
the fences, it seems, having been of much earlier date. His father had cultivated
parts and had used parts for pasturing cattle, and he had used it for pasture in
his turn.

They all had been recognized as owners by the Igorots, and he had inherited or
received the land from his father in accordance with Igorot custom. However, there
was no document of title for this ownership. In 1893-1894 and again in 1896-
1897, he made application for one under the royal decrees then in force, but
nothing seems to have come of it, unless, perhaps, information that lands in
Benguet could not be conceded until those to be occupied for a sanatorium, etc.,
had been designated -- a purpose that has been carried out by the Philippine
government and the United States. In 1901, the plaintiff filed a petition, alleging
ownership, under the mortgage law, and the lands were registered to him, that
process, however, establishing only a possessory title, it is said.

The position of the government is that Spain assumed, asserted, and had title to
all the land in the Philippines except so far as it saw fit to permit private titles to
be acquired; that there was no prescription against the Crown, and that, if there
was, a decree of June 25, 1880, required registration within a limited time to
make the title good; that the plaintiff's land was not registered, and therefore
became, if it was not always, public land; that the United States succeeded to the
title of Spain, and so that the plaintiff has no rights that the Philippine
government is bound to respect.

Issue: Whether or not the plaintiff owns the land?

Ruling: Yes, the plaintiff owns the land.

The US Court held that every presumption is and ought to be against the
government in a case like the present. It might, perhaps, be proper and sufficient
to say that when, as far back as testimony or memory goes, the land has been
held by individuals under a claim of private ownership, it will be presumed to have
been held in the same way from before the Spanish conquest, and never to have
been public land. Certainly, in a case like this, if there is doubt or ambiguity in
the Spanish law, the Court ought to give the applicant the benefit of the doubt.
Whether justice to the natives and the import of the organic act ought not to carry
us beyond a subtle examination of ancient texts, or perhaps even beyond the
attitude of Spanish law, humane though it was, it is unnecessary to decide.

In this case, the plaintiff and his ancestors had held the land as owners. They all
had been recognized as owners by the Igorots, and he had inherited or received
the land from his father in accordance with Igorot custom.

The Organic Act provides that all the property and rights acquired there by the
United States are to be administered "for the benefit of the inhabitants thereof." It
is reasonable to suppose that the attitude thus assumed by the United States with
regard to what was unquestionably its own is also its attitude in deciding what it
will claim for its own. The same statute made a bill of rights, embodying the
safeguards of the Constitution, and, like the Constitution, extends those
safeguards to all. It provides that:

"no law shall be enacted in said islands which shall deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property without due process of law, or deny to any person
therein the equal protection of the laws."

7. Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators v. City Mayor of Manila, 20

SCRA 849 camacho

FACTS: On June 13, 1963, the Manila Municipal Board enacted Ordinance
No. 4760 and the same was approved by then acting mayor Astorga.

Ordinance No. 4760 sought to regulate hotels and motels. It classified them
into 1st class (taxed at P6,000.00 per annum) and 2nd class (taxed at
4,500.00 per annum). It also compelled hotels/motels to get the
demographics of anyone who checks in to their rooms. Moreover, it
compelled hotels/motels to have wide open spaces so as not to conceal the
identity of their patrons.

Ermita-Malate impugned the validity of the law averring that such is

oppressive, arbitrary and against due process. Ermita-Malate Hotel and
Motel Operators Association, and one of its members Hotel del Mar Inc.
petitioned for the prohibition of Ordinance 4670 on June 14, 1963 to be
applicable in the city of Manila.

They claimed that the ordinance was beyond the powers of the Manila City
Board to regulate due to the fact that hotels were not part of its regulatory
powers. They also asserted that Section 1 of the challenged ordinance was
unconstitutional and void for being unreasonable and violative of due
process because it would impose P6,000.00 license fee per annum for first
class motels and P4,500.00 for second class motels.

The challenged ordinance also caused the automatic cancellation of the

license of the hotels that violated the ordinance.

The lower court declared the ordinance unconstitutional. Hence, this appeal
by the city of Manila.

ISSUE: Whether Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila is violative of the
due process clause?

RULING: NO, the challenged ordinance does not deny equal protection
clause. Since the challenged ordinance applies to all the motels in Manila,
an assertion that there is denial of equal protection would be extremely far-
fetched.

As an exercise of police power, the challenged ordinance was precisely

enacted to minimize certain practices hurtful to public morals.

As a due process requirement, an ordinance must not outrun the bounds of

reason and result in sheer oppression for it to be valid.

Thus, it would be unreasonable to stigmatize an ordinance enacted precisely

for the well-being of the people, especially if there is no factual foundation
being laid to prove its alleged violation of due process and offset the
ordinance’s presumed validity.

8. Ang Tibay v. CIR, 69 Phil 635 cericon

 FACTS:
Teodoro Toribio owns and operates Ang Tibay, a leather company which
supplies the Philippine Army. Due to an alleged shortage of leather, Toribio
caused the lay off of a number of his employees. However, the National
Labor Union, Inc. (NLU) questioned the validity of said lay off as it averred
that the said employees laid off were members of NLU while no members of
the rival labor union (National Worker’s Brotherhood) were laid off. NLU
claims that NWB is a company dominated union and Toribio was merely
busting NLU. The case reached the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) where
Toribio and NWB won. Eventually, NLU went to the Supreme Court invoking
its right for a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence. The
Supreme Court agreed with NLU. The Solicitor General, arguing for the CIR,
filed a motion for reconsideration.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Motion for New Trial is meritorious to be

granted.

RULING: THE COURT HELD IN THE AFFIRMATIVE.

The CIR is a special court whose functions are specifically stated in the law
of its creation which is the Commonwealth Act No. 103). It is more an
administrative board than a part of the integrated judicial system of the nation.
It is not intended to be a mere receptive organ of the government. Unlike a
court of justice which is essentially passive, acting only when its jurisdiction is
invoked and deciding only cases that are presented to it by the parties litigant,
the function of the CIR, as will appear from perusal of its organic law, is more
active, affirmative and dynamic.

The SC also outlined that administrative bodies, like the CIR, although not
strictly bound by the Rules of Court must also make sure that they comply
with the requirements of due process. For administrative bodies, due process
can be complied with by observing the following:

(1) The right to a hearing which includes the right of the party interested
or affected to present his own case and submit evidence in support
thereof.

(2) Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case
and to adduce evidence tending to establish the rights which he asserts
but the tribunal must consider the evidence presented.

(3) While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide
right, it does imply a necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely, that
of having something to support its decision. A decision with absolutely
nothing to support it is a nullity, a place when directly attached.

(4) Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or

conclusion but the evidence must be “substantial.” Substantial evidence
is more than a mere scintilla It means such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.

(5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the

hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties
affected.

(6) The administrative body or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its
or his own independent consideration of the law and facts of the
controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving
at a decision.

(7) The administrative body should, in all controversial questions, render

its decision in such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can know
the various issues involved, and the reasons for the decisions rendered.
The performance of this duty is inseparable from the authority conferred
upon it

The failure to grasp the fundamental issue involved is not entirely attributable
to the parties adversely affected by the result. Accordingly, the motion for a
new trial should be and the same is hereby granted, and the entire record of
this case shall be remanded to the Court of Industrial Relations, with
instruction that it reopen the case, receive all such evidence as may be relevant
and otherwise proceed in accordance with the requirements set forth.

9. Rubi vs. Provincial Board Mindoro, G.R. No. L-14078, March 7, 1919
diana

G.R. No. L-14078 March 7, 1919

RUBI, ET AL. (manguianes), plaintiffs,

vs.
THE PROVINCIAL BOARD OF MINDORO, defendant

FACTS:

1. The Provincial Governor of Mindoro and the Provincial board

thereof directed the Manguianes in question to take up their habitation in
Tigbao, a site on the shore of the Lakw naujan, selected by the provincial
governor and approved by the provincial board.

2. The provincial governor of Mindoro and the provincial board

thereof directed the Manguianes in question to take up their habitation in
Tigbao, a site on the shore of Lake Naujan, selected by the provincial governor
and approved by the provincial board.

3. The action was taken in accordance with section 2145 of the

Administrative Code of 1917, and was duly approved by the Secretary of the
Interior as required by said action.

Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 reads as follows:

SEC. 2145. Establishment of non-Christian upon sites selected by provincial
governor. — With the prior approval of the Department Head, the provincial
governor of any province in which non-Christian inhabitants are found is
authorized, when such a course is deemed necessary in the interest of law and
order, to direct such inhabitants to take up their habitation on sites on
unoccupied public lands to be selected by him an approved by the provincial
board.
Petitioners, however, challenge the validity of this section of the Administrative
Code.

Arguments of the Petitioners:

1. The first constitutional objection which confronts us is that the

Legislature could not delegate this power to provincial authorities. In so
attempting, it is contended, the Philippine Legislature has abdicated its
authority and avoided its full responsibility.

2. The law "constitutes an attempt by the Legislature to discriminate

between individuals because of their religious beliefs, and is, consequently,
unconstitutional

3. It is a violation of those portions of the President's instructions of

to the Commission, the Philippine Bill, and the Jones Law, providing "That no
law shall be enacted in said Islands which shall deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law, or deny to any person therein
the equal protection of the laws."
ISSUE:
WON section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is unconstitutional

HELD:
No. It is not Unconstitutional.

1. The Philippine Legislature has here conferred authority upon the

Province of Mindoro, to be exercised by the provincial governor and the
provincial board.
In determining whether the delegation of legislative power is valid or not, the
distinction is between the delegation of power to make the law, which
necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring an
authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in
pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the later no valid objection
can be made. Discretion may be committed by the Legislature to an executive
department or official. The Legislature may make decisions of executive
departments of subordinate official thereof, to whom it has committed the
execution of certain acts, final on questions of fact. The growing tendency in
the decision is to give prominence to the "necessity" of the case.
In enacting the said provision of the Administrative Code, the Legislature
merely conferred upon the provincial governor, with the approval of the
provincial board and the Department Head, discretionary authority as to the
execution of the law. This is necessary since the provincial governor and the
provincial board, as the official representatives of the province, are better
qualified to judge “when such as course is deemed necessary in the interest of
law and order”. As officials charged with the administration of the province and
the protection of its inhabitants, they are better fitted to select sites which have
the conditions most favorable for improving the people who have the
misfortune of being in a backward state.

2. Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917, does not

discriminate between individuals an account of religious differences.
It was held that the term “non-Christian” should not be given a literal meaning
or a religious signification, but that it was intended to relate to degrees of
civilization. The term “non-Christian” it was said, refers not to religious belief,
but in a way to geographical area, and more directly to natives of the Philippine
Islands of a low grade of civilization.
3. Section 2145 of the Administrative Code does not deprive a person
of his liberty without due process of law and does not deny to him the equal
protection of the laws.
Civil Liberty may be said to mean that measure of freedom which may be
enjoyed in a civilized community, consistently with the peaceful enjoyment of
like freedom in others. The right to Liberty guaranteed by the Constitution
includes the right to exist and the right to be free from arbitrary personal
restraint or servitude. The term cannot be dwarfed into mere freedom from
physical restraint of the person of the citizen, but is deemed to embrace the
right of man to enjoy the faculties with which he has been endowed by this
Creator, subject only to such restraints as are necessary for the common
welfare. As enunciated in a long array of authorities including epoch-making
decisions of the United States Supreme Court, Liberty includes the right of the
citizens to be free to use his faculties in all lawful ways; to live an work where
he will; to earn his livelihood by an lawful calling; to pursue any avocations, an
for that purpose. to enter into all contracts which may be proper, necessary,
and essential to his carrying out these purposes to a successful conclusion.
The chief elements of the guaranty are the right to contract, the right to choose
one's employment, the right to labor, and the right of locomotion.
Further, one cannot hold that the liberty of the citizen is unduly interfered
without when the degree of civilization of the Manguianes is considered. They
are restrained for their own good and the general good of the Philippines. Nor
can one say that due process of law has not been followed. To go back to our
definition of due process of law and equal protection of the law, there exists a
law ; the law seems to be reasonable; it is enforced according to the regular
methods of procedure prescribed; and it applies alike to all of a class.

10. Ichong v. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155 (1957) dulfo

Inciong vs. Hernandez

G.R. No. L-7995 May 31, 1957

Facts: Petitioner, for and on his own behalf and on behalf of other alien
residents’ corporations and partnerships adversely affected by the provisions of
Republic Act. No. 1180, “An Act to Regulate the Retail Business,” filed to obtain
a judicial declaration that said the Act is unconstitutional contending that it
denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws and deprives them of
their liberty and property without due process of law.

Issue: Does RA 1180 denies alien residents the equal protection of the laws?
Ruling:
No.
The law is a valid exercise of police power, and it does not deny the aliens the
equal protection of the laws. There are real and actual, positive, and
fundamental differences between an alien and a citizen, which fully justify the
legislative classification adopted. The equal protection clause does not demand
absolute equality among residents. It merely requires that all persons shall be
treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges
conferred and liabilities enforced.
The classification is actual, real, and reasonable, and all persons of one class
are treated alike. The difference in status between citizens and aliens
constitutes a basis for reasonable classification in the exercise of police power.
Official statistics point out to the ever-increasing dominance and control by
alien of the retail trade. It is this domination and control that is the
legislature’s target in the enactment of the Act. The mere fact of alienage is the
root cause of the distinction between the alien and the national as a trader.
The aliens do not naturally possess the sympathetic consideration and regard
for the customers with whom they come in daily contact, nor the patriotic
desire to help bolster the nation's economy, except in so far as it enhances
their profit, nor the loyalty and allegiance which the national owes to the land.
These limitations on the qualifications of the aliens have been shown on many
occasions and instances, especially in times of crisis and emergency.
 11. Garcia vs. Drilon G.R. No. 179267 (2013) gonzales

G.R. No. 179267 June 25, 2013

JESUS C. GARCIA, Petitioner,

vs.

THE HONORABLE RAY ALAN T. DRILON, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial

Court-Branch 41, Bacolod City, and ROSALIE JAYPE-GARCIA, for herself
and in behalf of minor children, namely: JO-ANN, JOSEPH EDUARD,
JESSE ANTHONE, all surnamed GARCIA, Respondents.

FACTS:

On March 23, 2006, Rosalie Jaype-Garcia (private respondent) filed, for herself
and in behalf of her minor children, a verified petition(Civil Case No. 06-797)
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City for the issuance of a
Temporary Protection Order (TPO) against her husband, Jesus C. Garcia
(petitioner), pursuant to R.A. 9262. She claimed to be a victim of physical
abuse; emotional, psychological, and economic violence as a result of marital
infidelity on the part of petitioner, with threats of deprivation of custody of her
children and of financial support.

Private respondent married petitioner in 2002 when she was 34 years old and
the former was eleven years her senior. They have three (3) children, namely:
Jo-Ann J. Garcia, 17 years old, who is the natural child of petitioner but whom
private respondent adopted; Jessie Anthone J. Garcia, 6 years old; and Joseph
Eduard J. Garcia, 3 years old.

Finding reasonable ground to believe that an imminent danger of violence

against the private respondent and her children exists or is about to recur, the
RTC issued a TPOon March 24, 2006 effective for thirty (30) days,

Two days later, or on April 26, 2006, petitioner filed an Opposition to the
Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Renewal of the TPOseeking the denial of the
renewal of the TPO. Subsequently, on May 23, 2006, petitioner movedfor the
modification of the TPO to allow him visitation rights to his children.

On May 24, 2006, the TPO was renewed and extended yet again, but subject
only to the following modifications prayed for by private respondent:
Claiming that petitioner continued to deprive them of financial support; failed
to faithfully comply with the TPO; and committed new acts of harassment
against her and their children, private respondent filed another application for
the issuance of a TPO ex parte.

On August 23, 2006, the RTC issued a TPO,effective for thirty (30) days, which
reads as follows:

In its Orderdated September 26, 2006, the trial court extended the aforequoted
TPO for another ten (10) days, and gave petitioner a period of five (5) days
within which to show cause why the TPO should not be renewed, extended, or
modified. Upon petitioner's manifestation,however, that he has not received a
copy of private respondent's motion to modify/renew the TPO, the trial court
directed in its Orderdated October 6, 2006 that petitioner be furnished a copy
of said motion. Nonetheless, an Orderdated a day earlier, October 5, had
already been issued renewing the TPO dated August 23, 2006. The pertinent
portion is quoted hereunder:

it appearing further that the hearing could not yet be finally terminated, the
Temporary Protection Order issued on August 23, 2006 is hereby renewed and
extended for thirty (30) days and continuously extended and renewed for thirty
(30) days, after each expiration, until further orders, and subject to such
modifications as may be ordered by the court.

After having received a copy of the foregoing Order, petitioner no longer

submitted the required comment to private respondent's motion for renewal of
the TPO arguing that it would only be an "exercise in futility."

During the pendency of Civil Case No. 06-797, petitioner filed before the Court
of Appeals (CA) a petition for prohibition (CA-G.R. CEB-SP. No. 01698), with
prayer for injunction and temporary restraining order, challenging (1) the
constitutionality of R.A. 9262 for being violative of the due process and the
equal protection clauses, and (2) the validity of the modified TPO issued in the
civil case for being "an unwanted product of an invalid law."

On May 26, 2006, the appellate court issued a 60-day Temporary Restraining
Order(TRO) against the enforcement of the TPO, the amended TPOs and other
orders pursuant thereto.

Subsequently, however, on January 24, 2007, the appellate court dismissed

the petition for failure of petitioner to raise the constitutional issue in his
pleadings before the trial court in the civil case, which is clothed with
jurisdiction to resolve the same. Secondly, the challenge to the validity of R.A.
9262 through a petition for prohibition seeking to annul the protection orders
issued by the trial court constituted a collateral attack on said law.

His motion for reconsideration of the foregoing Decision having been denied in
the Resolution Dated August 14, 2007, petitioner is now the Supreme Court.

ISSUES:

1. WON RA 9262 is violative of the equal protection clause?

2. WON RA 9262 is violative of the due process clause of the

constitution?

3. WON the law is an undue delegation of judicial power to the barangay

officials?

HELD;

PETITION DENIED FOR LACK OF MERIT.

1. EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS IN RELATION TO RA 9262

Equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly

situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities
imposed. The oft-repeated disquisition in the early case of Victoriano v. Elizalde
Rope Workers' Unionis instructive:

The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of equality

in the application of the laws upon all citizens of the state. It is not, therefore, a
requirement, in order to avoid the constitutional prohibition against inequality,
that every man, woman and child should be affected alike by a statute.
Equality of operation of statutes does not mean indiscriminate operation on
persons merely as such, but on persons according to the circumstances
surrounding them. It guarantees equality, not identity of rights. The
Constitution does not require that things which are different in fact be treated
in law as though they were the same. The equal protection clause does not
forbid discrimination as to things that are different. It does not prohibit
legislation which is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by the
territory within which it is to operate.

The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows

classification. Classification in law, as in the other departments of knowledge
or practice, is the grouping of things in speculation or practice because they
agree with one another in certain particulars. A law is not invalid because of
simple inequality. The very idea of classification is that of inequality, so that it
goes without saying that the mere fact of inequality in no manner determines
the matter of constitutionality. All that is required of a valid classification is
that it be reasonable, which means that the classification should be based on
substantial distinctions which make for real differences; that it must be
germane to the purpose of the law; that it must not be limited to existing
conditions only; and that it must apply equally to each member of the class.
This Court has held that the standard is satisfied if the classification or
distinction is based on a reasonable foundation or rational basis and is not
palpably arbitrary.

Measured against the foregoing jurisprudential yardstick, we find that

R.A. 9262 is based on a valid classification as shall hereinafter be discussed
and, as such, did not violate the equal protection clause by favoring women
over men as victims of violence and abuse to whom the State extends its
protection.

I. R.A. 9262 rests on substantial distinctions.

The unequal power relationship between women and men; the fact that
women are more likely than men to be victims of violence; and the widespread
gender bias and prejudice against women all make for real differences
justifying the classification under the law. As Justice McIntyre succinctly
states, "the accommodation of differences ... is the essence of true equality."

II. The classification is germane to the purpose of the law.

The distinction between men and women is germane to the purpose of

R.A. 9262, which is to address violence committed against women and
children, spelled out in its Declaration of Policy, as follows:

SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby declared that the State values

the dignity of women and children and guarantees full respect for human
rights. The State also recognizes the need to protect the family and its members
particularly women and children, from violence and threats to their personal
safety and security.
 Towards this end, the State shall exert efforts to address violence
committed against women and children in keeping with the fundamental
freedoms guaranteed under the Constitution and the provisions of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Convention on the Elimination of
All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Convention on the Rights of the
Child and other international human rights instruments of which the
Philippines is a party.

In 1979, the U.N. General Assembly adopted the CEDAW, which the
Philippines ratified on August 5, 1981. Subsequently, the Optional Protocol to
the CEDAW was also ratified by the Philippines on October 6, 2003.This
Convention mandates that State parties shall accord to women equality with
men before the lawand shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate
discrimination against women in all matters relating to marriage and family
relations on the basis of equality of men and women.The Philippines likewise
ratified the Convention on the Rights of the Child and its two protocols.It is,
thus, bound by said Conventions and their respective protocols.

III. The classification is not limited to existing conditions only, and

apply equally to all members

Moreover, the application of R.A. 9262 is not limited to the existing

conditions when it was promulgated, but to future conditions as well, for as
long as the safety and security of women and their children are threatened by
violence and abuse.

R.A. 9262 applies equally to all women and children who suffer violence and
abuse. Section 3 thereof defines VAWC as:

x x x any act or a series of acts committed by any person against a

woman who is his wife, former wife, or against a woman with whom the person
has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom he has a common
child, or against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or without
the family abode, which result in or is likely to result in physical, sexual,
psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse including threats of such
acts, battery, assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty.
It includes, but is not limited to, the following acts:

A. "Physical Violence" refers to acts that include bodily or physical harm;

B. "Sexual violence" refers to an act which is sexual in nature, committed

against a woman or her child. It includes, but is not limited to:
 a) rape, sexual harassment, acts of lasciviousness, treating a woman or
her child as a sex object, making demeaning and sexually suggestive
remarks, physically attacking the sexual parts of the victim's body,
forcing her/him to watch obscene publications and indecent shows or
forcing the woman or her child to do indecent acts and/or make films
thereof, forcing the wife and mistress/lover to live in the conjugal
home or sleep together in the same room with the abuser;

b) acts causing or attempting to cause the victim to engage in any sexual

activity by force, threat of force, physical or other harm or threat of
physical or other harm or coercion;

c) Prostituting the woman or child.

C. "Psychological violence" refers to acts or omissions causing or likely to cause

mental or emotional suffering of the victim such as but not limited to
intimidation, harassment, stalking, damage to property, public ridicule or
humiliation, repeated verbal abuse and marital infidelity. It includes causing or
allowing the victim to witness the physical, sexual or psychological abuse of a
member of the family to which the victim belongs, or to witness pornography in
any form or to witness abusive injury to pets or to unlawful or unwanted
deprivation of the right to custody and/or visitation of common children.

D. "Economic abuse" refers to acts that make or attempt to make a woman

financially dependent which includes, but is not limited to the following:

1. withdrawal of financial support or preventing the victim from engaging in

any legitimate profession, occupation, business or activity, except in cases
wherein the other spouse/partner objects on valid, serious and moral
grounds as defined in Article 73 of the Family Code;

2. deprivation or threat of deprivation of financial resources and the right to

the use and enjoyment of the conjugal, community or property owned in
common;

3. destroying household property;

4. controlling the victims' own money or properties or solely controlling the

conjugal money or properties.

It should be stressed that the acts enumerated in the aforequoted

provision are attributable to research that has exposed the dimensions and
dynamics of battery. The acts described here are also found in the U.N.
Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women.Hence, the
argument advanced by petitioner that the definition of what constitutes abuse
removes the difference between violent action and simple marital tiffs is
tenuous.

There is nothing in the definition of VAWC that is vague and ambiguous

that will confuse petitioner in his defense. The acts enumerated above are
easily understood and provide adequate contrast between the innocent and the
prohibited acts. They are worded with sufficient definiteness that persons of
ordinary intelligence can understand what conduct is prohibited, and need not
guess at its meaning nor differ in its application.Yet, petitioner insiststhat
phrases like "depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her child of a
legal right," "solely controlling the conjugal or common money or properties,"
"marital infidelity," and "causing mental or emotional anguish" are so vague
that they make every quarrel a case of spousal abuse. However, we have
stressed that the "vagueness" doctrine merely requires a reasonable degree of
certainty for the statute to be upheld not absolute precision or mathematical
exactitude, as petitioner seems to suggest. Flexibility, rather than meticulous
specificity, is permissible as long as the metes and bounds of the statute are
clearly delineated. An act will not be held invalid merely because it might have
been more explicit in its wordings or detailed in its provisions.

There is likewise no merit to the contention that R.A. 9262 singles out
the husband or father as the culprit. As defined above, VAWC may likewise be
committed "against a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or
dating relationship." Clearly, the use of the gender-neutral word "person" who
has or had a sexual or dating relationship with the woman encompasses even
lesbian relationships. Moreover, while the law provides that the offender be
related or connected to the victim by marriage, former marriage, or a sexual or
dating relationship, it does not preclude the application of the principle of
conspiracy under the Revised Penal Code.

2. DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION IN RELATION TO

RA 9262; CHARACTERISTICS OF A TEMPORARY PROTECTION ORDER

Petitioner bewails the disregard of R.A. 9262, specifically in the issuance

of POs, of all protections afforded by the due process clause of the
Constitution. Says he: "On the basis of unsubstantiated allegations, and
practically no opportunity to respond, the husband is stripped of family,
property, guns, money, children, job, future employment and reputation, all in
a matter of seconds, without an inkling of what happened."

A protection order is an order issued to prevent further acts of violence

against women and their children, their family or household members, and to
grant other necessary reliefs. Its purpose is to safeguard the offended parties
from further harm, minimize any disruption in their daily life and facilitate the
opportunity and ability to regain control of their life.

"The scope of reliefs in protection orders is broadened to ensure that the

victim or offended party is afforded all the remedies necessary to curtail access
by a perpetrator to the victim. This serves to safeguard the victim from greater
risk of violence; to accord the victim and any designated family or household
member safety in the family residence, and to prevent the perpetrator from
committing acts that jeopardize the employment and support of the victim. It
also enables the court to award temporary custody of minor children to protect
the children from violence, to prevent their abduction by the perpetrator and to
ensure their financial support."

The rules require that petitions for protection order be in writing, signed
and verified by the petitionerthereby undertaking full responsibility, criminal or
civil, for every allegation therein. Since "time is of the essence in cases of VAWC
if further violence is to be prevented,"the court is authorized to issue ex parte a
TPO after raffle but before notice and hearing when the life, limb or property of
the victim is in jeopardy and there is reasonable ground to believe that the
order is necessary to protect the victim from the immediate and imminent
danger of VAWC or to prevent such violence, which is about to recur.

There need not be any fear that the judge may have no rational basis to
issue an ex parte order. The victim is required not only to verify the allegations
in the petition, but also to attach her witnesses' affidavits to the petition.

The grant of a TPO ex parte cannot, therefore, be challenged as violative

of the right to due process. Just like a writ of preliminary attachment which is
issued without notice and hearing because the time in which the hearing will
take could be enough to enable the defendant to abscond or dispose of his
property,in the same way, the victim of VAWC may already have suffered
harrowing experiences in the hands of her tormentor, and possibly even death,
if notice and hearing were required before such acts could be prevented. It is a
constitutional commonplace that the ordinary requirements of procedural due
process must yield to the necessities of protecting vital public interests,among
which is protection of women and children from violence and threats to their
personal safety and security.

It should be pointed out that when the TPO is issued ex parte, the court
shall likewise order that notice be immediately given to the respondent
directing him to file an opposition within five (5) days from service. Moreover,
the court shall order that notice, copies of the petition and TPO be served
immediately on the respondent by the court sheriffs. The TPOs are initially
effective for thirty (30) days from service on the respondent.
 Where no TPO is issued ex parte, the court will nonetheless order the
immediate issuance and service of the notice upon the respondent requiring
him to file an opposition to the petition within five (5) days from service. The
date of the preliminary conference and hearing on the merits shall likewise be
indicated on the notice.

The opposition to the petition which the respondent himself shall verify,
must be accompanied by the affidavits of witnesses and shall show cause why
a temporary or permanent protection order should not be issued.

It is clear from the foregoing rules that the respondent of a petition for
protection order should be apprised of the charges imputed to him and
afforded an opportunity to present his side. Thus, the fear of petitioner of being
"stripped of family, property, guns, money, children, job, future employment
and reputation, all in a matter of seconds, without an inkling of what
happened" is a mere product of an overactive imagination. The essence of due
process is to be found in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit
any evidence one may have in support of one's defense. "To be heard" does not
only mean verbal arguments in court; one may be heard also through
pleadings. Where opportunity to be heard, either through oral arguments or
pleadings, is accorded, there is no denial of procedural due process.

It should be recalled that petitioner filed on April 26, 2006 an Opposition

to the Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Renewal of the TPO that was granted only
two days earlier on April 24, 2006. Likewise, on May 23, 2006, petitioner filed a
motion for the modification of the TPO to allow him visitation rights to his
children. Still, the trial court in its Order dated September 26, 2006, gave him
five days (5) within which to show cause why the TPO should not be renewed or
extended. Yet, he chose not to file the required comment arguing that it would
just be an "exercise in futility," conveniently forgetting that the renewal of the
questioned TPO was only for a limited period (30 days) each time, and that he
could prevent the continued renewal of said order if he can show sufficient
cause therefor. Having failed to do so, petitioner may not now be heard to
complain that he was denied due process of law.

Petitioner next laments that the removal and exclusion of the respondent
in the VAWC case from the residence of the victim, regardless of ownership of
the residence, is virtually a "blank check" issued to the wife to claim any
property as her conjugal home.

The wording of the pertinent rule, however, does not by any stretch of the
imagination suggest that this is so. It states:
 SEC. 11. Reliefs available to the offended party. -- The protection order
shall include any, some or all of the following reliefs:

(c) Removing and excluding the respondent from the residence of the
offended party, regardless of ownership of the residence, either temporarily for
the purpose of protecting the offended party, or permanently where no property
rights are violated. If the respondent must remove personal effects from the
residence, the court shall direct a law enforcement agent to accompany the
respondent to the residence, remain there until the respondent has gathered
his things and escort him from the residence;

Indubitably, petitioner may be removed and excluded from private

respondent's residence, regardless of ownership, only temporarily for the
purpose of protecting the latter. Such removal and exclusion may be
permanent only where no property rights are violated. How then can the private
respondent just claim any property and appropriate it for herself, as petitioner
seems to suggest?

The non-referral of a VAWC case to a mediator is justified.

Petitioner argues that "by criminalizing run-of-the-mill arguments,

instead of encouraging mediation and counseling, the law has done violence to
the avowed policy of the State to "protect and strengthen the family as a basic
autonomous social institution."

Under Section 23(c) of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, the court shall not refer
the case or any issue thereof to a mediator. The reason behind this provision is
well-explained by the Commentary on Section 311 of the Model Code on
Domestic and Family Violence as follows:

This section prohibits a court from ordering or referring parties to

mediation in a proceeding for an order for protection. Mediation is a process by
which parties in equivalent bargaining positions voluntarily reach consensual
agreement about the issue at hand. Violence, however, is not a subject for
compromise. A process which involves parties mediating the issue of violence
implies that the victim is somehow at fault. In addition, mediation of issues in
a proceeding for an order of protection is problematic because the petitioner is
frequently unable to participate equally with the person against whom the
protection order has been sought.

3. UNDUE DELEGATION OF JUDICIAL POWER TO BARANGAY

OFFICIALS IN RELATION TO RA 9262
 Petitioner contends that protection orders involve the exercise of judicial
power which, under the Constitution, is placed upon the "Supreme Court and
such other lower courts as may be established by law" and, thus, protests the
delegation of power to barangay officials to issue protection orders. The
pertinent provision reads, as follows:

SEC. 14. Barangay Protection Orders (BPOs); Who May Issue and How.
Barangay Protection Orders (BPOs) refer to the protection order issued by the
Punong Barangay ordering the perpetrator to desist from committing acts
under Section 5 (a) and (b) of this Act.A Punong Barangay who receives
applications for a BPO shall issue the protection order to the applicant on the
date of filing after ex parte determination of the basis of the application. If the
Punong Barangay is unavailable to act on the application for a BPO, the
application shall be acted upon by any available Barangay Kagawad. If the BPO
is issued by a Barangay Kagawad, the order must be accompanied by an
attestation by the Barangay Kagawad that the Punong Barangay was
unavailable at the time of the issuance of the BPO. BPOs shall be effective for
fifteen (15) days. Immediately after the issuance of an ex parte BPO, the
Punong Barangay or Barangay Kagawad shall personally serve a copy of the
same on the respondent, or direct any barangay official to effect its personal
service.

The parties may be accompanied by a non-lawyer advocate in any

proceeding before the Punong Barangay.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable,
and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government. On the other hand, executive power "is
generally defined as the power to enforce and administer the laws. It is the
power of carrying the laws into practical operation and enforcing their due
observance."

As clearly delimited by the aforequoted provision, the BPO issued by the

Punong Barangay or, in his unavailability, by any available Barangay Kagawad,
merely orders the perpetrator to desist from (a) causing physical harm to the
woman or her child; and (2) threatening to cause the woman or her child
physical harm. Such function of the Punong Barangay is, thus, purely
executive in nature, in pursuance of his duty under the Local Government
Code to "enforce all laws and ordinances," and to "maintain public order in the
barangay."
 We have held that "(t)he mere fact that an officer is required by law to
inquire into the existence of certain facts and to apply the law thereto in order
to determine what his official conduct shall be and the fact that these acts may
affect private rights do not constitute an exercise of judicial powers."

In the same manner as the public prosecutor ascertains through a

preliminary inquiry or proceeding "whether there is reasonable ground to
believe that an offense has been committed and the accused is probably guilty
thereof," the Punong Barangay must determine reasonable ground to believe
that an imminent danger of violence against the woman and her children exists
or is about to recur that would necessitate the issuance of a BPO. The
preliminary investigation conducted by the prosecutor is, concededly, an
executive, not a judicial, function. The same holds true with the issuance of a
BPO.

We need not even belabor the issue raised by petitioner that since
barangay officials and other law enforcement agencies are required to extend
assistance to victims of violence and abuse, it would be very unlikely that they
would remain objective and impartial, and that the chances of acquittal are nil.
As already stated, assistance by barangay officials and other law enforcement
agencies is consistent with their duty to enforce the law and to maintain peace
and order.

Before a statute or its provisions duly challenged are voided, an

unequivocal breach of, or a clear conflict with the Constitution, not merely a
doubtful or argumentative one, must be demonstrated in such a manner as to
leave no doubt in the mind of the Court. In other words, the grounds for nullity
must be beyond reasonable doubt.In the instant case, however, no concrete
evidence and convincing arguments were presented by petitioner to warrant a
declaration of the unconstitutionality of R.A. 9262, which is an act of Congress
and signed into law by the highest officer of the co-equal executive department.
As we said in Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, courts must assume that the
legislature is ever conscious of the borders and edges of its plenary powers, and
passed laws with full knowledge of the facts and for the purpose of promoting
what is right and advancing the welfare of the majority.

12. Cruz vs. NCIP, G.R. No. 135385. (December 6, 2000) guinto

Cruz vs NCIP
G.R. No. 135385 December 6, 2000
Facts:

This case involves RA 8371 otherwise known as the Indigenous Peoples Rights
Act of 1997 (IPRA) and its implementing Rules and Regulations. Herein
petitioners assail the constitutionality of the same Act.

Arguments of petitioners:

· provisions of the IPRA and its Implementing Rules amount to an unlawful

deprivation of the State’s ownership over lands of the public domain as well as
minerals and other natural resources therein, in violation of the regalian
doctrine embodied in Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution

· by providing for an all-encompassing definition of "ancestral domains"

and "ancestral lands" which might even include private lands found within said
areas, Sections 3(a) and 3(b) violate the rights of private landowners

· provisions of the IPRA defining the powers and jurisdiction of the NCIP
and making customary law applicable to the settlement of disputes involving
ancestral domains and ancestral lands violate the due process clause of the
Constitution

· Rule VII, Part II, Section 1 of the NCIP Administrative Order No. 1, series
of 1998, which provides that "the administrative relationship of the NCIP to the
Office of the President is characterized as a lateral but autonomous
relationship for purposes of policy and program coordination." infringes upon
the President’s power of control over executive departments under Section 17,
Article VII of the Constitution

Issue: WoN RA 8371 is constitutional.

Ruling: YES. RA 8371 is constitutional.

Seven (7) voted to dismiss the petition. Seven (7) other members of
the Court voted to grant the petition. As the votes were equally divided (7 to 7)
and the necessary majority was not obtained, the case was redeliberated upon.
However, after redeliberation, the voting remained the same. Accordingly,
pursuant to Rule 56, Section 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the petition is
DISMISSED.

13. Ilagan vs. Enrile, G.R. No. 70748 October 21, 1985 josol
G.R. No. 70748 October 21, 1985 LAURENTE C. ILAGAN et al. vs. HON. JUAN
PONCE ENRILE et al. MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:

FACTS:

Attorney Ilagan was arrested in Davao City on May 10, 1985 by elements of
the PC-INP and detained at Camp Catitipan on the basis of a Mission Order
allegedly issued by the Ministry of National Defense. On that same day, fifteen
lawyers from the IBP Davao Chapter visited Atty. Ilagan. Thereafter, two other
petitioners were arrested for the same cause (Atty. Arellano and Atty. Risonar).

This petition for habeas corpus was then filed on behalf of the three arrested
lawyers on the ground that their arrests were illegal and violative of the
Constitution since arrests cannot be made on the basis of Mission Orders
issued.

On May 16, 1985, the Court issued the Writ, required a Return, and set the
petition for hearing on May 23, 1985. Respondents contend that the lawyers
were arrested due to basis of a Preventive Detention Action (PDA) issued by the
President on January 25, 1985 and that the lawyers played active roles in
organizing mass actions of the Communist Party of the Philippines and the
National Democratic Front.

For lack of evidence to link petitioners to the subversive actions, the Court
ordered their temporary release. But the respondents filed an Urgent Motion
that Information for Rebellion was filed against the lawyers before the RTC of
Davao.

Petitioners filed their Opposition alleging there was no preliminary investigation

conducted, thus, it is a violation of their constitutional right to due process.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not the petition for habeas corpus should be granted

2. Whether or not the information was void and the RTC had no jurisdiction
for lack of preliminary investigation

HELD:
1. NO. If the detained attorneys question their detention because of
improper arrest, or that no preliminary investigation has been conducted, the
remedy is not a petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus but a Motion before the
trial court to quash the Warrant of Arrest, and /or the Information on grounds
provided by the Rules or to ask for an investigation / reinvestigation of the
case. Habeas corpus would not lie after the Warrant of commitment was issued
by the Court based on the Information filed against the accused. It is explicitly
provided for by Section. 14, Rule of 102 of the Rules of Court.

2. NO. The right to a preliminary investigation, being waivable, does not

argue against the validity of the proceedings, the most that could have been
done was to remand the case in order that such investigation could be
conducted.

Section 7, Rule 112, of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure above referred to
provides:

SEC. 7. When accused lawfully arrested without warrant.- When a person is

lawfully arrested without a warrant for an offense cognizable by the Regional
Trial Court the complaint or information may be filed by the offended party,
peace officer or fiscal without preliminary investigation having been first
conducted on the basis of the affidavit of the offended party or arrested officer
or person.

However, before the filing of such complaint or information, the person arrested
may ask for a preliminary investigation by a proper officer in accordance with
this Rule, but he must sign a waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, with the assistance of a lawyer and in case of
non-availability of a lawyer, a responsible person of his choice.

14. Enrile vs. Sandiganbayan GR 213847 (August 18, 2015) jueves

Facts:

On June 5, 2014, the Office of the Ombudsman charged Enrile and several
others with plunder in the Sandiganbayan on the basis of their purported
involvement in the diversion and misuse of appropriations under the Priority
Development Assistance Fund (PDAF).
On June 10, 2014 and June 16, 2014, Enrile respectively filed his Omnibus
Motion and Supplemental Opposition, praying, among others, that he be
allowed to post bail should probable cause be found against him.

On July 3, 2014, the Sandiganbaya n issued its resolution denying Enrile’s

motion, particularly on the matter of bail, on the ground of its prematurity
considering that Enrile had not yet then voluntarily surrendered or been placed
under the custody of the law. Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan ordered the
arrest of Enrile. On the same day that the warrant for his arrest was issued,
Enrile voluntarily surrendered to Director Benjamin Magalong of the Criminal
Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG) in Camp Crame, Quezon City, and
was later on confined at the Philippine National Police (PNP) General Hospital
following his medical examination.

Thereafter, Enrile filed his Motion for Detention at the PNP General Hospital ,11
and his Motion to Fix Bail. Enrile argued that he should be allowed to post bail
because: (a) the Prosecution had not yet established that the evidence of his
guilt was strong; (b) although he was charged with plunder, the penalty as to
him would only be reclusion temporal , not reclusion perpetua ; and (c) he was
not a flight risk, and his age and physical condition must further be seriously
considered.

Issue: Whether or not the Enrile be granted bail.

Held: Yes. Enrile’s poor health justifies his admission to bail

This national commitment to uphold the fundamental human rights as well as

value the worth and dignity of every person has authorized the grant of bail not
only to those charged in criminal proceedings but also to extraditees upon a
clear and convincing showing: (1 ) that the detainee will not be a flight risk or a
danger to the community; and (2 ) that there exist special, humanitarian and
compelling circumstances.

In our view, his social and political standing and his having immediately
surrendered to the authorities upon his being charged in court indicate that
the risk of his flight or escape from this jurisdiction is highly unlikely. His
personal disposition from the onset of his indictment for plunder, formal or
otherwise, has demonstrated his utter respect for the legal processes of this
country. We also do not ignore that at an earlier time many years ago when he
had been charged with rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder,
he already evinced a similar personal disposition of respect for the legal
processes, and was granted bail during the pendency of his trial because he
was not seen as a flight risk. With his solid reputation in both his public and
his private lives, his long years of public service, and history’s judgment of him
being at stake, he should be granted bail.

It is relevant to observe that granting provisional liberty to Enrile will then

enable him to have his medical condition be properly addressed and better
attended to by competent physicians in the hospitals of his choice. This will not
only aid in his adequate preparation of his defense but, more importantly , will
guarantee his appearance in court for the trial.

15. In the Matter of Urgent Petition for the Release of Prisoners on

Humanitarian Grounds in the Midst of the Covid-19 Pandemic, Dionisio S.
Almonte, et al. Vs. People of the Philippines, et al.G.R. No. 252117. July 28,
2020 libarios

Facts:

On April 6, 2020 the petitioners filed a petition before this court entitled “In
the Matter of Urgent Petition for the Release of Prisoners on Humanitarian
Grounds in the Midst of the Covid-19 Pandemic”. Here, petitioners allege
that they are prisoners and are among the elderly, sick, and pregnant
population of inmates exposed to the danger of contracting COVID-19 where
social distancing and self-isolation measures are purportedly impossible. As
such, they are invoking this Court's power to exercise "equity jurisdiction"
and are seeking "temporary liberty on humanitarian grounds" either on
recognizance or on bail.

For respondents' part who are represented by the Office of the Solicitor
General, they filed their comment opposing petitioners' plea for their temporary
release and for the creation of a Prisoner Release Committee and argued that:
(a) petitioners are valuable members of the Communist Party of the Philippines
- New People's Army National Democratic Front (CPP-NPA-NDF) who have
committed heinous crimes and are merely taking advantage of the current
public health as well as the "fickle arena of public opinion" situation in seeking
for their temporary release based on humanitarian reasons; (b) the government
has adequate medical facilities, personnel and measures to address the threat
of COVID-19 in jails and other detention facilities.

Issue:
Whether or not petitioners may be given provisional liberty on the ground of
equity either on recognizance or on bail.

Ruling:
In this case, petitioners have been charged with offenses punishable by
reclusion perpetua. As such, they are not entitled to bail as a matter of right.
Consequently, there is a need to conduct summary hearings for the purpose of
weighing the strength of the prosecution's evidence as to petitioners' guilt. This
process entails a reception and an evaluation of evidence which the trial courts
are competent to handle. The foregoing holds true with respect to the motions
for other confinement arrangements which also necessitate reception and
evaluation of evidence by a trial court.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing reasons, the Court’s TREATS the

present petition as petitioners' applications for bail or recognizance as well as
their motions for other confinement arrangements, and REFERS the same to
the respective trial courts where their criminal cases are pending, which courts
are hereby DIRECTED to conduct the necessary proceedings and consequently,
resolve these incidents with utmost dispatch. Accordingly, the proceedings
before this Court are considered CLOSED and TERMINATED.

16. Stonehill v. Diokno, 20 SCRA 383 lo

DOCTRINE:

1. Requisites for issuing Search Warrants: No warrant shal issue but upon
probable cause, to be determined by the judge, and that the warrant
shall particularly describe the things to be seized.
2. Search warrants are not issued to discover new evidence but only to
verify that such evidence exists. 2 types of invalid search warrants. 1)
General warrants-fishing expedition/lack of specificity of objects to be
seized, 2)Lack of specificity of crime allegedly committed.
 3. Evidence seized in an invalid search is inadmissible for they are “Fruits
of a Poisonous Tree.” SC abandoned Mercado Doctrine which allowed
them to be admitted as evidence.
4. General warrants are outlawed to protect the sanctity of the person’s
right to be secure… and also to discourage the police and prosecutors
from abusing their power by removing the incentive to violate the right.

FACTS:

Upon application of respondents-prosecutors, several judges issued, on

different dates, 32 search warrants against petitioner and/ the Corporations of
which they were officers to search the persons above-named and/ remises of
their offices, warehouses, and/ residences, and to “seize documents and papers
showing all business transactions” as the subject of the offense in violating
“Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue Code, and the
RPC”.

“Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts,

ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other
documents and/or papers showing all business transactions including
disbursements receipts, balance sheets and profit and loss statement and
Bobbins (cigarette wrappers).”

As “the subject of the offense; stolen or embezzled and proceeds or fruits of

the offense,” or “used or intended to be used as the means of committing the
offense,” which is described in the applications adverted to above as
“violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue
Code and the Revised Penal Code.”

PETITIONERS:

• Petitioners alleged that the aforementioned search warrants are null and
void, as contravening the Constitution and the Rules of Court¬–because:

1. They do not describe with particularity the documents, books and things
to be seized

2. Cash money, not mentioned in the warrants, were actually seized

3. The warrants were issued to fish evidence against the petitioners in
deportation cases filed against them

4. The searches and seizures were made in an illegal manner

5. The documents, papers and cash money seized were not delivered to the
courts that issued the warrants

6. The aforementioned search warrants are in the nature of general

warrants and that, accordingly, the seizures effected upon the authority
thereof are null and void. (Invoked Constitutional provision regarding
unreasonable searches and seizures)

• Petitioners filed with the Supreme Court original action for certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus and injunction and prayed that a writ of preliminary
injunction be issued, restraining Respondents-Prosecutors, their agents
and/or representatives from using the effects seized, or any copies thereof in
the deportation cases, and that in due course, thereafter, decision be
rendered quashing the contested search warrants and declaring the same
null and void, and commanding the respondents to return to petitioners the
things that were seized.

RESPONDENTS:

Respondent prosecutors alleged that:

1. The contested search warrants are valid and have been issued in
accordance with law

2. The defects of said warrants, if any, were cured by petitioners’ consent

3. Relying upon Moncado vs. People’s Court, Respondent-Prosecutors

maintain that, even if the searches and seizures under consideration were
unconstitutional, the documents, papers and things thus seized are
admissible in evidence against petitioners

The Court issued the writ of preliminary injunction. However, by virtue of a

resolution, the writ was partially lifted or dissolved, insofar as the papers,
documents and things seized from the offices of the corporations above
mentioned; but the injunction was maintained as regards the papers,
documents and things found and seized in the residences of petitioners.
ISSUE:

Whether the search warrants and the searches and seizures with regard to
the documents, papers and things seized in the residence of petitioners are
valid and may be used as evidence against the petitioners?

HELD:

NO. The decision in the Mondaco case must be abandoned. Most common
law jurisdictions have already given up this approach and eventually
adopted the exclusionary rule, realizing that this is the only practical means
of enforcing the constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches
and seizures. the reason for the exclusion of evidence competent as such,
which has been unlawfully acquired, is that exclusion is the only practical
way of enforcing the constitutional privilege. Two points must be stressed in
connection with this constitutional mandate, namely: (1) that no warrant
shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge in the
manner set forth in said provision; and (2) that the warrant shall
particularly describe the things to be seized.

None of these requirements has been complied with in the contested

warrants. Indeed, the same were issued upon applications stating that the
natural and juridical persons therein named had committed a "violation of
Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and
Revised Penal Code." In other words, no specific offense had been alleged in
said applications. The averments thereof with respect to the offense
committed were abstract. As a consequence, it was impossible for the judges
who issued the warrants to have found the existence of probable cause, for
the same presupposes the introduction of competent proof that the party
against whom it is sought has performed particular acts, or committed
specific omissions, violating a given provision of our criminal laws. As a
matter of fact, the applications involved in this case do not allege any
specific acts performed by herein petitioners. It would be a legal heresy, of
the highest order, to convict anybody of a "violation of Central Bank Laws,
Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal
Code,"—as alleged in the aforementioned applications—without reference to
any determinate provision of said laws or codes.

To uphold the validity of the warrants in question would be to wipe out

completely one of the most fundamental rights guaranteed in our
Constitution, for it would place the sanctity of the domicile and the privacy
 of communication and correspondence at the mercy of the whims, caprice or
passion of peace officers. This is precisely the evil sought to be remedied by
the constitutional provision above quoted—to outlaw the so-called general
warrants.

Indeed, the non-exclusionary rule is contrary, not only to the letter, but
also, to the spirit of the constitutional injunction against unreasonable
searches and seizures. To be sure, if the applicant for a search warrant has
competent 'evidence to establish probable cause of the commission of a
given crime by the party against 'whom the warrant is intended, then there
is no reason why the applicant should not comply with the requirements of
the fundamental law. Upon the other hand, if he has no such competent
evidence, then it is not possible for the Judge to find that there is probable
cause, and, hence, no justification for the issuance of the warrant. The only
possible explanation (not 'justification) for its issuance is the necessity of
fishing evidence of the commission of a crime. But, then, this fishing
expedition is indicative of the absence of evidence to establish a probable
cause.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION:

We hold, therefore, that the doctrine adopted in the Moncado case must be,
as it is hereby, abandoned; that the warrants for the search of three (3)
residences of herein petitioners, as specified in the Resolution of June 29,
1962, are null and void; that the searches and seizures therein made are
illegal; that the writ of preliminary injunction heretofore issued, in
connection with the documents, papers and other effects thus seized in said
residences of herein petitioners is hereby made permanent; that the writs
prayed for are granted, insofar as the documents, papers and other effects
so seized in the aforementioned residences are concerned; that the
aforementioned motion for Reconsideration and Amendment should be, as
hereby, denied; and that the petition herein is dismissed and the writs
prayed for denied, as regards the documents, papers and other effects
seized in the twenty-nine (29) places, offices and other premises enumerated
in the same Resolution, without special pronouncement as to costs.

It is so ordered.

17. Burgos v. Chief of Staff, 133 SCRA 800 lucero

Facts: Two warrants were issued against petitioners for the search on the
premises of “Metropolitan Mail” and “We Forum” newspapers and the
seizure of items alleged to have been used in subversive activities.
Petitioners prayed that a writ of preliminary mandatory and prohibitory
injunction be issued for the return of the seized articles, and that
respondents be enjoined from using the articles thus seized as evidence
against petitioner.

Petitioners questioned the warrants for the lack of probable cause and that
the two warrants issued indicated only one and the same address. In
addition, the items seized subject to the warrant were real properties.

Issue: Whether or not the two warrants were valid to justify seizure of the
items.

Ruling: The defect in the indication of the same address in the two warrants
was held by the court as a typographical error and immaterial in view of the
correct determination of the place sought to be searched set forth in the
application. The purpose and intent to search two distinct premises was
evident in the issuance of the two warrant.

As to the issue that the items seized were real properties, the court applied
the principle in the case of Davao Sawmill Co. v. Castillo, ruling “that
machinery which is movable by nature becomes immobilized when placed
by the owner of the tenement, property or plant, but not so when placed by
a tenant, usufructuary, or any other person having only a temporary right,
unless such person acted as the agent of the owner.” In the case at bar,
petitioners did not claim to be the owners of the land and/or building on
which the machineries were placed. This being the case, the machineries in
question, while in fact bolted to the ground remain movable property
susceptible to seizure under a search warrant.

However, the Court declared the two warrants null and void.

Probable cause for a search is defined as such facts and circumstances

which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an
offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with
the offense are in the place sought to be searched.
The Court ruled that the affidavits submitted for the application of the
warrant did not satisfy the requirement of probable cause, the statements of
the witnesses having been mere generalizations.

18. People vs Sapla G.R. No. 244045. June 16, 2020 marasigan-daliva

Applicable Article: Section 2

Facts:

On 10 January 2014, at around 11:30 in the morning, an officer on duty

at the RPSB office received a phone call from a concerned citizen, who
informed the said office that a certain male individual [would] be
transporting marijuana from Kalinga and into the Province of Isabela. At
around 1:00 in the afternoon, the RPSB hofline received a text message
which stated that the subject male person who [would] transport marijuana
[was] wearing a collared white shirt with green stripes, red ball cap, and
[was] carrying a blue sack on board a passenger jeepney, with plate number
AYA 270 bound for Roxas, Isabela. Subsequently, a joint checkpoint was
strategically organized at the Talaca command post.

The passenger jeepney then arrived at around 1:20 in the afternoon,

wherein the police officers at the Talaca checkpoint flagged down the said
vehicle and told its driver to park on the side of the road. Officers Labbutan
and Mabiasan approached the jeepney and saw [accused-appellant Sapla]
seated at the rear side of the vehicle. The police officers asked [accused-
appellant Sapla] if he was the owner of the blue sack in front of him, which
the latter answered in the affirmative. The said officers then requested
faccused-appellant Sapla] to open the blue sack. The police officers saw saw
four (4) bricks of suspected dried marijuana leaves, wrapped in newspaper
and an old calendar. PO3 Labbutan subsequently arrested accused-
appellant Sapla, informed him of the cause of his arrest and his
constitutional rights in the Ilocano dialect. PO2 Mabiasan further searched
[accused-appellant Sapla] and found one (1) LG cellular phone unit.
Thereafter, PO2 Mabiasan seized the four (4) bricks of suspected dried
marijuana leaves and brought [them] to their office at the Talaca
detachment for proper markings.

Issue: Whether there was a valid search and seizure conducted by the
police officers? (For clarity: Can the police conduct a warrantless intrusive
search of a vehicle on the sole basis of an unverified tip relayed by an
anonymous informant?)

Ruling: No, on both issues. The police cannot conduct an intrusive search
without a warrant based on an unverified tip, hence, the search and seizure
is invalid.

As a general rule, search and seizure operation conducted by the authorities

is reasonable only when a court issues a search warrant after it has
determined the existence of probable cause through the personal
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses
presented before the court, with the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized particularly described.

One of the recognized exemption is the search of a moving vehicle. Peace

officers in such cases, however, are limited to routine checks where the
examination of the vehicle is limited to visual inspection." On the other
hand, an extensive search of a vehicle is permissible, but only when "the
officers made it upon probable cause, i.e., upon a belief. reasonably arising
out of circumstances known to the seizing officer, that an automobile or
other vehicle contains [an] item, article or object which by law is subject to
seizure and destruction."

In Comprado, the Court held that the search conducted "could not be
classified as a search of a moving vehicle. In this particular type of search,
the vehicle is the target and not a specific person." The Court added that "in
search of a moving vehicle, the vehicle was intentionally used as a means to
transport illegal items. It is worthy to note that the information relayed to
the police officers was that a passenger of that particular bus was carrying
marijuana such that when the police officers boarded the bus, they
searched the bag of the person matching the description given by their
informant and not the cargo or contents of the said bus."

Applying the foregoing to the instant case, it cannot be seriously

disputed that the target of the search conducted was not the passenger
jeepney boarded by accused-appellant Sapla nor the cargo or contents of
the said vehicle. The target of the search was the person who matched
the description given by the person who called the RPSB Hotline, ie, the
person wearing a collared white shirt with green stripes, red ball cap,
and carrying a blue sack. Therefore, the search of the instant vehicle
 cannot be considered under the exemption so as to be considered as a
valid warrantless search.

19. De Lima vs Guerrero G.R. No. 229781 October 10, 2017 maturan

Applicable Section: Article III, Sec 2 (Equal Protection Clause; Personal

Determination of the Judge re: Existence of Probable Cause in issuing
Warrants of Arrest)

FACTS: The Senate and the House of Representatives conducted several

inquiries on the proliferation of dangerous drugs syndicated at the New Bilibid
Prison (NBP), inviting inmates who executed affidavits in support of their
testimonies. These legislative inquiries led to the filing of four complaints with
the Department of Justice, which were subsequently consolidated. DOJ Panel
of Prosecutors was directed to conduct the requisite preliminary investigation.

De Lima filed an Omnibus Motion to Immediately Endorse the Cases to the Office
of the Ombudsman and for the Inhibition of the Panel of Prosecutors and the
Secretary of Justice (“Omnibus Motion”) on the ground that that the Office of the
Ombudsman has the exclusive authority and jurisdiction to hear the four
complaints against her. In the absence of a restraining order issued by the
Court of Appeals, the DOJ Panel proceeded with the conduct of the preliminary
investigation and, in its Joint Resolution, it recommended the filing of
Informations against petitioner De Lima. One of the Informations was docketed
to the sala of the respondent judge. This Information charged De Lima for
violation of Section 5 in relation to Section (jj), Section 26(b), and Section 28 of
Republic Act No. (RA) 9165 (conspiring and confederating with Ronnie Dayan to
commit illegal drug trading over inmates of the New Bilibid Prison; demand,
solicit and extort money from the high-profile inmates in the New Bilibid Prison to
support the senatorial bid of De Lima in the May 2016 election; trading and
trafficking dangerous drugs).

De Lima filed a motion to quash for the following grounds: the RTC lacks
jurisdiction over the offense charged against petitioner; the DOJ Panel lacks
authority to file the Information; the Information charges more than one
offense; the allegations and the recitals of facts do not allege the corpus delicti
of the charge; the Information is based on testimonies of witnesses who are not
qualified to be discharged as state witnesses; and the testimonies of these
witnesses are hearsay.
The respondent judge issued an Order finding probable cause for the issuance
of warrants of arrest against De Lima and her co-accused. The said warrant
contained no recommendation for bail. The warrant was subsequently served,
committing De Lima to the custody of the PNP Custodial Center.

ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent judge gravely abused her discretion in
finding probable cause to issue the Warrant of Arrest against petitioner.

RULING:

● The respondent judge had no positive duty to first resolve the

Motion to Quash before issuing a warrant of arrest. There is no rule
of procedure, statute, or jurisprudence to support the petitioner’s
claim. Rather, Sec. 5(a), Rule 112 of the Rules of Court required the
respondent judge to evaluate the prosecutor’s resolution and its
supporting evidence within a limited period of only ten (10) days. Had
the respondent judge waited longer and first attended to the
petitioner’s Motion to Quash, she would have exposed herself to a
possible administrative liability for failure to observe Sec. 5(a), Rule
112 of the Rules of Court.

● There is no rule or basic principle requiring a trial judge to first

resolve a motion to quash, whether grounded on lack of jurisdiction
or not, before issuing a warrant of arrest. No grave abuse of discretion
on issuing the assailed order, since there is certainly no indication as to
deviation from the usual procedure in finding probable cause to issue the
petitioner’s arrest.

● Personal determination of the existence of probable cause by the

judge is required before a warrant of arrest may issue. The
Constitution (Art. III, Sec. 2) and the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure command the judge “to refrain from making a mindless
acquiescence to the prosecutor’s findings and to conduct his own
examination of the facts and circumstances presented by both parties.”
What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal
responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself the existence of
probable cause. In satisfying himself of the existence of probable cause
for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not required to
personally examine the complainant and his witnesses.
● Following established doctrine and procedure, he shall: (1) personally
evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the
fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof,
issue a warrant of arrest; or (2) if on the basis thereof he finds no
probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal’s report and require the
submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at
a conclusion as to the existence of probable cause. In determining the
probable cause to issue the warrant of arrest against the petitioner,
respondent judge evaluated the Information and “all the evidence
presented during the preliminary investigation conducted in this case.”

● As the prosecutor’s report/resolution precisely finds support from

the evidence presented during the preliminary investigation, this
Court cannot consider the respondent judge to have evaded her
duty or refused to perform her obligation to satisfy herself that
substantial basis exists for the petitioner’s arrest. Respondent judge
performed her duty in a manner that far exceeds what is required of her
by the rules when she reviewed all the evidence, not just the supporting
documents. At the very least, she certainly discharged a judge’s duty in
finding probable cause for the issuance of a warrant.

● Obviously and understandably, the contents of the prosecutor’s report

will support his own conclusion that there is reason to charge the
accused for an offense and hold him for trial. However, the judge must
decide independently. Hence, he must have supporting evidence,
other than the prosecutor’s bare report, upon which to legally
sustain his own findings on the existence (or nonexistence) of
probable cause to issue an arrest order.

● It is not required that the complete or entire records of the case during
the preliminary investigation be submitted to and examined by the judge.
We do not intend to unduly burden trial courts by obliging them to
examine the complete records of every case all the time simply for
the purpose of ordering the arrest of an accused. What is required,
rather, is that the judge must have sufficient supporting documents
(such as the complaint, affidavits, counter-affidavits, sworn
statements of witnesses or transcript of stenographic notes, if any)
upon which to make his independent judgment or, at the very least,
upon which to verify the findings of the prosecutor as to the
existence of probable cause.
● The point is: he cannot rely solely and entirely on the prosecutor’s
recommendation, as Respondent Court did in this case. Although the
prosecutor enjoys the legal presumption of regularity in the performance
of his official duties and functions, which in turn gives his report the
presumption of accuracy, the Constitution, we repeat, commands the
judge to personally determine probable cause in the issuance of warrants
of arrest.

● Probable cause can be established with hearsay evidence, as long as

there is substantial basis for crediting the hearsay. Hearsay
evidence is admissible in determining probable cause in a
preliminary investigation because such investigation is merely
preliminary and does not finally adjudicate rights and obligations of
parties.

20. Falcis vs Civil Register General (G.R. No. 217910. September 3,

2019) nerves

FACTS:

Jesus Nicardo M. Falcis III (Falcis) filed pro se before this Court a Petition
for Certiorariand Prohibition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure dated May 18, 2015.He raised the issue on declaring article 1 and
2 of the Family Code as unconstitutional,hence Articles 46 (4) and 55(6) of
the Family Code null.

He had identified himself as a member of the LGBTQI+ community hence he

claimedthat the Family Code has a "normative impact" on the status of
same-sex relationshipsin the country. He was also allegedly injured by the
supposed "prohibition against theright to marry the same-sex which
prevents his plans to settle down in the Philippines.

He also acclaimed that the case is of transcendental importance and that

the mere passage of the Family Code, with its Articles 1 and 2, was a prima
facie case of grave abuse of discretion. Thus, procedural niceties must be
set aside.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the self-identification of petitioner Jesus Nicardo M. Falcis
III as a member of the LGBTQI+ community gives him the standing to
challenge the Family Code;

2. Whether or not the application of the doctrine of transcendental

importance is warranted; and,

3. Whether or not the right to marry and the right to choose whom to marry
are cognates of the right to life and liberty.

HELD:

1. No. Petitioner’s supposed “personal stake in the outcome of this case” is

not the direct injury contemplated by jurisprudence as that which would
endow him with standing. Mere assertions of a “law’s normative impact”;
“impairment” of his “ability to find and enter into long-term monogamous
same-sex relationships”; as well as injury to his “plans to settle down and
have a companion for life in his beloved country”; or influence over his
“decision to stay or migrate to a more LGBT friendly country” cannot be
recognized by this as sufficient interest. Petitioner’s desire “to find and enter
into long-term monogamous same-sex relationships” and “to settle down
and have a companion for life in his beloved country” does not constitute
legally demandable rights that require judicial enforcement. This Court will
not witlessly indulge petitioner in blaming the Family Code for his admitted
inability to find a partner. Petitioner presents no proof at all of the
immediate, inextricable danger that the Family Code poses to him. His
assertions of injury cannot, without sufficient proof, be directly linked to the
imputed cause, the existence of the Family Code. His fixation on how the
Family Code is the definitive cause of his inability to find a partner is plainly
non sequitur.

2. No. In cases of transcendental importance, imminent and clear threats to

constitutional rights warrant a direct resort to this Court. We explained that
the decisive factor in whether this court should permit the invocation of
transcendental importance is not merely the presence of “special and
important reasons” but the nature of the question presented by the parties.
This Court declared that there must be no disputed facts, and the issue
raised should only be questions of law.
 3. Yes. Consequently, the task of devising an arrangement where same-sex
relations will earn state recognition is better left to Congress in order that it
may thresh out the many issues that may arise. Marriage is a legal
relationship, entered into through a legal framework, and enforceable
according to legal rules. Law stands at its very core. Due to this inherent
“legalness” of marriage, the constitutional right to marry cannot be secured
simply by removing legal barriers to something that exists outside of the
law. Rather, the law itself must create the “thing” to which one has a right.
As a result, the right to marry necessarily imposes an affirmative obligation
on the state to establish this legal framework. To continue to ground the
family as a social institution on the concept of the complementarity of the
sexes is to perpetuate the discrimination faced by couples, whether
opposite-sex or same-sex, who do not fit into that mold. It renders invisible
the lived realities of families headed by single parents, families formed by
sterile couples, families formed by couples who preferred not to have
children, among many other family organizations. Furthermore, it reinforces
certain gender stereotypes within the family.

21. Obergefell vs. Hodges

http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/14pdf/14-556_3204.pdf ruelan

Facts:

Michigan, Kentucky, Ohio, and Tennessee define marriage as a union between

one man and one woman. The petitioners, 14 same-sex couples and two men
whose same-sex partners are deceased, filed suits in Federal District Courts in
their home States, claiming that respondent state officials violate the
Fourteenth Amendment by denying them the right to marry or to have
marriages lawfully performed in another State given full recognition. Each
District Court ruled in petitioners’ favor, but the Sixth Circuit consolidated the
cases and reversed.

Issues

1. The issue before the Court here is the legal ques-tion whether the
Constitution protects the right of same-sex couples to marry.
 2. These cases also present the question whether the Con-stitution
requires States to recognize same-sex marriages validly performed out of
State.

Held

1. Yes. The right of same-sex couples to marry is protected under the

Constitution.

Under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, no State shall
“deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”
The fundamental liberties protected by this Clause include most of the rights
enumerated in the Bill of Rights. Applying these established tenets, the Court
has long held the right to marry is protected by the Constitution. This analysis
compels the conclusion that same-sex couples may exercise the right to marry.
The four princi-ples and traditions to be discussed demonstrate that the
reasons marriage is fundamental under the Constitution apply with equal force
to same-sex couples.

A first premise of the Court’s relevant precedents is that the right to personal
choice regarding marriage is inherent in the concept of individual autonomy. A
second principle in this Court’s jurisprudence is that the right to marry is
fundamental because it supports a two-person union unlike any other in its
importance to the committed individuals. As this Court held in Lawrence,
same-sex couples have the same right as opposite-sex couples to enjoy intimate
association. A third basis for protecting the right to marry is that it safeguards
children and families and thus draws meaning from related rights of child
rearing, procreation, and edu-cation. Fourth and finally, this Court’s cases and
the Nation’s traditions make clear that marriage is a keystone of our social
order.

The right to marry is fundamental as a matter of history and tradition, but

rights come not from ancient sources alone. Under the Constitution, same-sex
couples seek in marriage the same legal treatment as opposite-sex couples, and
it would disparage their choices and diminish their personhood to deny them
this right. The right of same-sex couples to marry that is part of the liberty
promised by the Fourteenth Amendment is derived, too, from that
Amendment’s guarantee of the equal protection of the laws. The Due Process
Clause and the Equal Protection Clause are connected in a profound way,
though they set forth independent principles. Responding to a new awareness,
the Court invoked equal protection prin-ciples to invalidate laws imposing sex-
based inequality on marriage.

It is now clear that the challenged laws burden the liberty of same-sex couples,
and it must be further acknowledged that they abridge central precepts of
equality. Here the marriage laws enforced by the respondents are in essence
unequal: same-sex couples are denied all the benefit afforded to opposite-sex
couples and are barred from exer-cising a fundamental right. Especially
against a long history of disapproval of their relationships, this denial to same-
sex couples of the right to marry works a grave and continuing harm. The
imposition of this disability on gays and lesbians serves to disrespect and
subordinate them. And the Equal Protection Clause, like the Due Process
Clause, prohibits this unjustified infringement of the fundamental right to
marry.

These considerations lead to the conclusion that the right to marry is a

fundamental right inherent in the liberty of the person, and under the
Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment
couples of the same-sex may not be deprived of that right and that liberty. The
Court now holds that same-sex couples may exercise the fundamental
right to marry.

2. Yes. Being married in one State but having that valid mar-riage denied in
another is one of “the most perplexing and distressing complication[s]” in the
law of domestic rela-tions. As counsel for the respondents acknowledged at
argu-ment, if States are required by the Constitution to issue marriage licenses
to same-sex couples, the justifications for refusing to recognize those marriages
performed else-where are undermined. The Court, in this decision, holds same-
sex cou-ples may exercise the fundamental right to marry in all States. It
follows that the Court also must hold—and it now does hold—that there is no
lawful basis for a State to refuse to recognize a lawful same-sex marriage
performed in another State on the ground of its same-sex character.

No union is more profound than marriage, for it embod-ies the highest ideals of
love, fidelity, devotion, sacrifice, and family. In forming a marital union, two
people be-come something greater than once they were. As some of the
petitioners in these cases demonstrate, marriage embodies a love that may
endure even past death. It would misunderstand these men and women to say
they disrespect the idea of marriage. Their plea is that they do respect it,
respect it so deeply that they seek to find its fulfillment for themselves. Their
hope is not to be con-demned to live in loneliness, excluded from one of
civiliza-tion’s oldest institutions. They ask for equal dignity in the eyes of the
law. The Constitution grants them that right.

The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit is reversed.

22. Chavez vs. Gonzalez, G.R. No. 168338 (February 15, 2008) said

FACTS:

The case originates from events that occurred a year after the 2004 national
and local elections. On June 5, 2005, Press Secretary Ignacio Bunye told
reporters that the opposition was planning to destabilize the administration by
releasing an audiotape of a mobile phone conversation allegedly between the
President of the Philippines, Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, and a high-ranking
official of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC). The conversation was
audiotaped allegedly through wire-tapping.5 Later, in a Malacañang press
briefing, Secretary Bunye produced two versions of the tape, one supposedly
the complete version, and the other, a spliced, “doctored” or altered version,
which would suggest that the President had instructed the COMELEC official
to manipulate the election results in the President’s favor. 6 It seems that
Secretary Bunye admitted that the voice was that of President Arroyo, but
subsequently made a retraction. 7

On June 7, 2005, former counsel of deposed President Joseph Estrada, Atty.

Alan Paguia, subsequently released an alleged authentic tape recording of the
wiretap. Included in the tapes were purported conversations of the President,
the First Gentleman Jose Miguel Arroyo, COMELEC Commissioner Garcillano,
and the late Senator Barbers.8

On June 8, 2005, respondent Department of Justice (DOJ) Secretary Raul

Gonzales warned reporters that those who had copies of the compact disc (CD)
and those broadcasting or publishing its contents could be held liable under
the Anti-Wiretapping Act. These persons included Secretary Bunye and Atty.
Paguia. He also stated that persons possessing or airing said tapes were
committing a continuing offense, subject to arrest by anybody who had
personal knowledge if the crime was committed or was being committed in
their presence.9

On June 9, 2005, in another press briefing, Secretary Gonzales ordered the

National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to go after media organizations “found to
have caused the spread, the playing and the printing of the contents of a tape” of
an alleged wiretapped conversation involving the President about fixing votes in
the 2004 national elections. Gonzales said that he was going to start with
Inq7.net, a joint venture between the Philippine Daily Inquirer and GMA7
television network, because by the very nature of the Internet medium, it was
able to disseminate the contents of the tape more widely. He then expressed his
intention of inviting the editors and managers of Inq7.net and GMA7 to a
probe, and supposedly declared, “I [have] asked the NBI to conduct a tactical
interrogation of all concerned.” 10

NTC gives fair warning to radio and television owners/operators to observe

anti-wiretapping law and pertinent circulars on program standards.

On June 14, 2005, NTC held a dialogue with the Board of Directors of the
Kapisanan ng mga Brodkaster sa Pilipinas (KBP). NTC allegedly assured the
KBP that the press release did not violate the constitutional freedom of speech,
of expression, and of the press, and the right to information.

Petitioner Chavez filed a petition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court against
respondents Secretary Gonzales and the NTC, “praying for the issuance of the
writs of certiorari and prohibition, as extraordinary legal remedies, to annul
void proceedings, and to prevent the unlawful, unconstitutional and oppressive
exercise of authority by the respondents.” Alleging that the acts of respondents
are violations of the freedom on expression and of the press, and the right of
the people to information on matters of public concern.

ISSUE:

whether the acts of the respondents abridge freedom of speech and of the
press.

RULING: YES

The scope of freedom of expression is so broad that it extends protection to

nearly all forms of communication. It protects speech, print and assembly
regarding secular as well as political causes, and is not confined to any
particular field of human interest. The protection covers myriad matters of
public interest or concern embracing all issues, about which information is
needed or appropriate, so as to enable members of society to cope with the
exigencies of their period. The constitutional protection assures the broadest
possible exercise of free speech and free press for religious, political, economic,
scientific, news, or informational ends, inasmuch as the Constitution’s basic
guarantee of freedom to advocate ideas is not confined to the expression of
ideas that are conventional or shared by a majority.

The constitutional protection is not limited to the exposition of ideas. The

protection afforded free speech extends to speech or publications that are
entertaining as well as instructive or informative. Specifically, in Eastern
Broadcasting Corporation (DYRE) v. Dans,41 this Court stated that all forms of
media, whether print or broadcast, are entitled to the broad protection of the
clause on freedom of speech and of expression.

While all forms of communication are entitled to the broad protection of

freedom of expression clause, the freedom of film, television and radio
broadcasting is somewhat lesser in scope than the freedom accorded to
newspapers and other print media, as will be subsequently discussed.

From the language of the specific constitutional provision, it would appear that
the right to free speech and a free press is not susceptible of any limitation.
But the realities of life in a complex society preclude a literal interpretation of
the provision prohibiting the passage of a law that would abridge such freedom.
For freedom of expression is not an absolute, 42 nor is it an “unbridled license
that gives immunity for every possible use of language and prevents the
punishment of those who abuse this freedom.”

Thus, all speech are not treated the same. Some types of speech may be
subjected to some regulation by the State under its pervasive police power, in
order that it may not be injurious to the equal right of others or those of the
community or society.43 The difference in treatment is expected because the
relevant interests of one type of speech, e.g., political speech, may vary from
those of another, e.g., obscene speech. Distinctions have therefore been made
in the treatment, analysis, and evaluation of the permissible scope of
restrictions on various categories of speech. 44 We have ruled, for example, that
in our jurisdiction slander or libel, lewd and obscene speech, as well as
“fighting words” are not entitled to constitutional protection and may be
penalized.45

Moreover, the techniques of reviewing alleged restrictions on speech

(overbreadth, vagueness, and so on) have been applied differently to each
category, either consciously or unconsciously. 46 A study of free speech
jurisprudence—whether here or abroad—will reveal that courts have developed
different tests as to specific types or categories of speech in concrete situations;
i.e., subversive speech; obscene speech; the speech of the broadcast media and
of the traditional print media; libelous speech; speech affecting associational
rights; speech before hostile audiences; symbolic speech; speech that affects
the right to a fair trial; and speech associated with rights of assembly and
petition. 47

Generally, restraints on freedom of speech and expression are evaluated by

either or a combination of three tests, i.e., (a) the dangerous tendency
doctrine which permits limitations on speech once a rational connection has
been established between the speech restrained and the danger contemplated;
48 (b) the balancing of interests tests, used as a standard when courts need

to balance conflicting social values and individual interests, and requires a

conscious and detailed consideration of the interplay of interests observable in
a given situation of type of situation; 49 and (c) the clear and present danger
rule which rests on the premise that speech may be restrained because there is
substantial danger that the speech will likely lead to an evil the government
has a right to prevent. This rule requires that the evil consequences sought to
be prevented must be substantive, “extremely serious and the degree of
imminence extremely high.” 50

As articulated in our jurisprudence, we have applied either the dangerous

tendency doctrine or clear and present danger test to resolve free speech
challenges. More recently, we have concluded that we have generally adhered
to the clear and present danger test. 51

A governmental action that restricts freedom of speech or of the press based on

content is given the strictest scrutiny, with the government having the
burden of overcoming the presumed unconstitutionality by the clear and
present danger rule. This rule applies equally to all kinds of media, including
broadcast media.

This outlines the procedural map to follow in cases like the one at bar as it
spells out the following: (a) the test; (b) the presumption; (c) the burden of
proof; (d) the party to discharge the burden; and (e) the quantum of evidence
necessary. On the basis of the records of the case at bar, respondents who
have the burden to show that these acts do not abridge freedom of speech and
of the press failed to hurdle the clear and present danger test. It appears that
the great evil which government wants to prevent is the airing of a tape
recording in alleged violation of the anti-wiretapping law. The records of the
case at bar, however, are confused and confusing, and respondents’ evidence
falls short of satisfying the clear and present danger test. Firstly, the various
statements of the Press Secretary obfuscate the identity of the voices in the
tape recording. Secondly, the integrity of the taped conversation is also
suspect. The Press Secretary showed to the public two versions, one supposed
to be a “complete” version and the other, an “altered” version. Thirdly, the
evidence of the respondents on the who’s and the how’s of the wiretapping act
is ambivalent, especially considering the tape’s different versions. The identity
of the wire-tappers, the manner of its commission and other related and
relevant proofs are some of the invisibles of this case. Fourthly, given all these
unsettled facets of the tape, it is even arguable whether its airing would violate
the anti-wiretapping law.

We rule that not every violation of a law will justify straitjacketing the
exercise of freedom of speech and of the press. Our laws are of different
kinds and doubtless, some of them provide norms of conduct which even if
violated have only an adverse effect on a person’s private comfort but does not
endanger national security. There are laws of great significance but their
violation, by itself and without more, cannot support suppression of free
speech and free press. In fine, violation of law is just a factor, a vital one to
be sure, which should be weighed in adjudging whether to restrain freedom of
speech and of the press. The totality of the injurious effects of the violation
to private and public interest must be calibrated in light of the preferred status
accorded by the Constitution and by related international covenants protecting
freedom of speech and of the press. In calling for a careful and calibrated
measurement of the circumference of all these factors to determine compliance
with the clear and present danger test, the Court should not be
misinterpreted as devaluing violations of law. By all means, violations of law
should be vigorously prosecuted by the State for they breed their own evil
consequence. But to repeat, the need to prevent their violation cannot per
se trump the exercise of free speech and free press, a preferred right
whose breach can lead to greater evils. For this failure of the respondents
alone to offer proof to satisfy the clear and present danger test, the Court has
no option but to uphold the exercise of free speech and free press. There is no
showing that the feared violation of the anti-wiretapping law clearly endangers
the national security of the State.

This is not all the faultline in the stance of the respondents. We slide to the
issue of whether the mere press statements of the Secretary of Justice and of
the NTC in question constitute a form of content-based prior restraint that has
transgressed the Constitution. In resolving this issue, we hold that it is not
decisive that the press statements made by respondents were not reduced
in or followed up with formal orders or circulars. It is sufficient that the
press statements were made by respondents while in the exercise of their
official functions. Undoubtedly, respondent Gonzales made his statements as
Secretary of Justice, while the NTC issued its statement as the regulatory body
of media. Any act done, such as a speech uttered, for and on behalf of the
government in an official capacity is covered by the rule on prior
restraint. The concept of an “act” does not limit itself to acts already
converted to a formal order or official circular. Otherwise, the non
formalization of an act into an official order or circular will result in the
easy circumvention of the prohibition on prior restraint. The press
statements at bar are acts that should be struck down as they constitute
impermissible forms of prior restraints on the right to free speech and press.

There is enough evidence of chilling effect of the complained acts on record.

The warnings given to media came from no less the NTC, a regulatory agency
that can cancel the Certificate of Authority of the radio and broadcast media.
They also came from the Secretary of Justice, the alter ego of the Executive,
who wields the awesome power to prosecute those perceived to be violating the
laws of the land. After the warnings, the KBP inexplicably joined the NTC in
issuing an ambivalent Joint Press Statement. After the warnings, petitioner
Chavez was left alone to fight this battle for freedom of speech and of the press.
This silence on the sidelines on the part of some media practitioners is too
deafening to be the subject of misinterpretation.

The constitutional imperative for us to strike down unconstitutional acts

should always be exercised with care and in light of the distinct facts of each
case. For there are no hard and fast rules when it comes to slippery
constitutional questions, and the limits and construct of relative freedoms are
never set in stone. Issues revolving on their construct must be decided on a
case to case basis, always based on the peculiar shapes and shadows of each
case. But in cases where the challenged acts are patent invasions of a
constitutionally protected right, we should be swift in striking them down as
nullities per se. A blow too soon struck for freedom is preferred than a blow
too late.

23. David vs. Arroyo, 489 SCRA 160 sedillo

RANDOLF DAVID, ET AL. VS. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, ET AL. G.R. No.

171396
Gist: Constitutionality of Presidential Proclamation No. 1017

Facts:

On February 24, 2006, as the nation celebrated the 20th Anniversary of the Edsa
People Power I, President Arroyo issued PP 1017 declaring a state of national
emergency and call upon the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the
Philippine National Police (PNP), to prevent and suppress acts of terrorism and
lawless violence in the country. The Office of the President announced the
cancellation of all programs and activities related to the 20th anniversary
celebration of Edsa People Power I; and revoked the permits to hold rallies issued
earlier by the local governments and dispersal of the rallyists along EDSA. The
police arrested (without warrant) petitioner Randolf S. David, a professor at the
University of the Philippines and newspaper columnist. Also arrested was his
companion, Ronald Llamas, president of party-list Akbayan.

In the early morning of February 25, 2006, operatives of the Criminal Investigation
and Detection Group (CIDG) of the PNP, on the basis of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5,
raided the Daily Tribune offices in Manila and attempt to arrest was made against
representatives of ANAKPAWIS, GABRIELA and BAYAN MUNA whom suspected of
inciting to sedition and rebellion. On March 3, 2006, President Arroyo issued PP
1021 declaring that the state of national emergency has ceased to exist.
Petitioners filed seven (7) certiorari with the Supreme Court and three (3) of those
petitions impleaded President Arroyo as respondent questioning the legality of the
proclamation, alleging that it encroaches the emergency powers of Congress and it
violates the constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press, of speech and
assembly.

Feb. 24, 2006: On the 20th anniv. of EDSA revolution, PGMA issued Presidential
Proclamation No. 1017 1 (PP 1017) declaring a state of national emergency. She
also issued General Order No. 52 (G.O. No. 5) implementing PP 1017.

• They were issued allegedly to suppress the lawlessness of certain elements and
the conspiracy between the opposition, the NDF-CPP-NPA (Extreme Left) and the
military adventurists (Extreme Right) to assassinate her and take over the
government. The claims of said elements have been magnified by the national
media.
• Some Madgalo members who were indicted in the Oakwood mutiny escaped
their detention cell and issued public statements calling the people to go to the
streets and protest. One of their members, a Lt. San Juan, was recaptured and in
his possession were flash disks which contained recordings of meetings bet. NPA
and Magdalo. He also said thru DZRH that Magdalo’s D-Day was on Feb. 24.

• They also discovered a document (Oplan Hackle I) which contained plans for
bombings during the PMA Alumni Homecoming and a plot to assassinate some
cabinet members and PGMA. A bomb was allegedly found during the celebration.

• Military heads (B/Gen. Lim & Col. Querubin) also confided to the Chief of Staff
of the AFP, that a huge number of soldiers would join the rallies to provide a
critical mass and armed component to the Anti-Arroyo protests.

• Head of Leftists groups (CPP-NPA and NDF) proclaimed that the end of Arroyo’s
regime was drawing near.

• There was also a bombing of telecommunication towers and cell sites in

Bulacan and Bataan and a raid of an army outpost in Benguet resulting to the
death of 3 soldiers.

• Art. 2, Sec. 4 of the Const. makes the defense and preservation of the
democratic institutions and the State the primary duty of Government. Said
activities and collateral effects constitute a clear and present danger to the safety
and the integrity of the State and of the Filipino people.

Pursuant to the issuances, PGMA cancelled all plans to celebrate the 20 th anniv.
of EDSA and revoked permits earlier issued by the local gov’t to hold rallies,
banned all rallies and canceled all permits for public assemblies.

• Despite this, KMU & NAFLU-KMU marched from various parts of Metro Manila
with the intention of converging at the EDSA shrine. However, they were violently
dispersed by huge clusters of anti-riot police who cited PP 1017 as the ground for
the dispersal of their assemblies.

• Among those arrested (without warrant) were Randy David and his companion,
Ronald Llamas, president of Akbayan.

Feb. 25, 2006 (12:20 AM): Operatives of the PNP-CIDG, on the basis of PP 1017
and G.O. No. 5, also raided the Daily Tribune offices, of which Cacho-Olivares is
the editor, confiscating news stories etc. The police also surrounded the premises
of another pro-opposition paper, Malaya, and its sister publication, the tabloid
Abante.

• PNP warned that it would take over any media organization that would not
follow “standards set by the government during the state of national emergency.”

• On the same day, the police arrested Cong. Beltran of Anakpawis and
Chairman of KMU while leaving his farmhouse in Bulacan. His warrant was
allegedly dated on 1985, a remnant of the Marcos regime. When his members
visited him, they were not admitted bec. of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5.

• Bayan Muna Rep. Satur Ocampo eluded arrest at the Sulo Hotel in QC but his
2 drivers were taken into custody while Retired Major Gen. Montaño, former head
of the Phil. Const., was arrested while at a golf club. Attempts were also made to
arrest Rep. Mariano, Bayan Muna’s Ted Casiño & Gabriela’s Liza Maza. The
“Batasan 5” were subsequently under the custody of HoR.

• 7 consolidated petitions for certiorari and prohibition were filed alleging that in
issuing PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5, PGMA committed grave abuse of discretion and
the issuances are void for being unconstitutional.

• 3 of these petitions impleaded PGMA as respondent (G.R. No. 171396 – David,

G.R. No. 171483 – KMU, G.R. No. 171424 – Legarda)

• Mar. 3, 2006: However, PGMA subsequently lifted PP 1017 and issued Proc.
No. 1021 declaring that the state of national emergency has ceased to exist
because the AFP and PNP have effectively quelled the said activities.

PETITIONERS’ ARGUMENTS

G.R. No. 171396: Prof. Randolf David, Lorenzo Tanada III, Ronald Llamas, H.
Harry Roque, Joel Butuyan, Roger R. Rayer, Gary S. Mallari, Romel Regalado
Bagares, Christopher Bolastig vs. Gloria Macapagal – Arroyo as President and
Commander in Chief, Exec. Sec. Eduardo Ermita, Hon. Avelino Cruz II, Sec. of
Nat’l Defense, Gen. Generoso Senga, Chief of Staff, AFP, Dir. Gen. Arturo Lomibao,
Chief, PNP .

• Assailed PP 1017 on the grounds that (1) it encroaches on the emergency

powers of Congress; (2) it is a subterfuge to avoid the constitutional requirements
for the imposition of martial law; and (3) it violates the constitutional guarantees
of freedom of the press, of speech and of assembly.
G.R. No. 171409: Ninez Cacho-Olivares and Tribune Publishing Co., Inc. vs. Exec.
Sec. Ermita and Lomibao o Challenged the CIDG’s act of raiding the Daily Tribune
offices: (1) Such raid is a clear case of “censorship” or “prior restraint.” (2)
“Emergency” refers only to tsunami, typhoon, hurricane and similar occurrences,
hence, there is “absolutely no emergency” that warrants the issuance of PP 1017.

1 xxx as President of the Republic of the Philippines, and Commander-in-Chief of

the Republic of the Philippines and by virtue of the powers vested upon me by Sec.
18, Art. 7 of the Phil. Const. which states that: “The President. . . whenever it
becomes necessary, . . . may call out (the) armed forces to prevent or suppress. .
.rebellion. . .,” and in my capacity as their Commander-in-Chief, do hereby
command the AFP, to maintain law and order throughout the Philippines, prevent
or suppress all forms of lawless violence as well as any act of insurrection or
rebellion and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and
regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction; and as provided
in Sec. 17, Article 12 of the Const. do hereby declare a State of National
Emergency

2 I hereby direct the Chief of Staff of the AFP and the Chief of the PNP, as well as
the officers and men of the AFP and PNP, to immediately carry out the necessary
and appropriate actions and measures to suppress and prevent acts of terrorism
and lawless violence.

G.R. No. 171485: Rep. Escudero, and 21 other members of the HoR vs. Ermita,
Cruz, Senga, Puno, Lomibao o PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 constitute “usurpation of
legislative powers”; “violation of freedom of expression” and “a declaration of
martial law and PGMA “gravely abused her discretion in calling out the armed
forces without clear and verifiable factual basis of the possibility of lawless
violence and a showing that there is necessity to do so.”

G.R. No. 171483: KMU, NAFLU-KMU, and their members vs. Her excellency, Pres.
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, Ermita, Senga, Lomibao o PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 are
unconstitutional because: (1) they arrogate unto PGMA the power to enact laws
and decrees; (2) their issuance was without factual basis; and (3) they violate
freedom of expression and the right of the people to peaceably assemble to redress
their grievances.
G.R. No. 171400: Alternative Law Groups, Inc. vs. Ermita, Lomibao, Senga o PP
1017 and G.O. No. 5 are unconstitutional because they violate: (a) Sec. 4 of Art. II
(prime duty of the Government is to serve and protect the people); (b) Sec. 1 (due
process), Sec. 2 (unlawful search and seizure) and Sec. 4 (freedom of speech,
expression, press, assembly, petition for grievances) of Article III; (c) Sec. 23 of Art.
VI (Congress has sole power to declare existence of a state of war and President
must be authorized by Congress by law to exercise powers necessary to carry out
policy in times of war or other national emergency); (d) Sec. 17 of Art. XII (State
may during emergency temporarily direct operation of any privately owned public
utility in times of national emergency, when the public interest so requires)

G.R. No. 171489: Cadiz et al. and IBP vs. Ermita, Lomibao, Senga o PP 1017 is an
“arbitrary and unlawful exercise by the President of her Martial Law powers.”
Assuming that PP 1017 is not really a declaration of Martial Law, “it amounts to
an exercise by the President of emergency powers without congressional approval”
and “goes beyond the nature and function of a proclamation as defined under the
Revised Administrative Code.”

G.R. No. 171424: Loren Legarda vs. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, in her capacity as
President and Commander-in-Chief, Lomibao, Senga, Ermita o PP 1017 and G.O.
No. 5 are “unconstitutional for being violative of the freedom of expression,
including its cognate rights such as freedom of the press and the right to access to
information on matters of public concern and such issuances prevented her from
fully prosecuting her election protest pending before the PET.

RESPONDENTS’ COMMENTS

• The intent of the Constitution is to give full discretionary powers to the

President in determining the necessity of calling out the armed forces. None of the
petitioners has shown that PP 1017 was without factual bases.

• OSG countered that:

(1) Petitions should be dismissed for being moot;

(2) Petitioners in G.R. Nos. 171400 (ALGI), 171424 (Legarda), 171483 (KMU et al.),
171485 (Escudero et al.) and 171489 (Cadiz et al.) have no legal standing;

(3) It is not necessary for petitioners to implead President Arroyo as respondent;

(4) PP 1017 has constitutional and legal basis; and

(5) PP 1017 does not violate the people’s right to free expression and redress of
grievances

ISSUE:

Whether or not the PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 is constitutional.

RULING:

The operative portion of PP 1017 may be divided into three important provisions,
thus:

First provision: “by virtue of the power vested upon me by Section 18, Artilce VII
… do hereby command the Armed Forces of the Philippines, to maintain law and
order throughout the Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence
as well any act of insurrection or rebellion”

Second provision: “and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees,
orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction;”

Third provision: “as provided in Section 17, Article XII of the Constitution do
hereby declare a State of National Emergency.”

PP 1017 is partially constitutional insofar as provided by the first provision of the

decree.

First Provision: Calling Out Power.

The only criterion for the exercise of the calling-out power is that “whenever it
becomes necessary,” the President may call the armed forces “to prevent or
suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.” (Integrated Bar of the Philippines
v. Zamora)

President Arroyo’s declaration of a “state of rebellion” was merely an act declaring

a status or condition of public moment or interest, a declaration allowed under
Section 4, Chap 2, Bk II of the Revised Administration Code. Such declaration, in
the words of Sanlakas, is harmless, without legal significance, and deemed not
written. In these cases, PP 1017 is more than that. In declaring a state of
national emergency, President Arroyo did not only rely on Section 18, Article VII of
the Constitution, a provision calling on the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless
violence, invasion or rebellion. She also relied on Section 17, Article XII, a
provision on the State’s extraordinary power to take over privately-owned public
utility and business affected with public interest. Indeed, PP 1017 calls for the
exercise of an awesome power. Obviously, such Proclamation cannot be deemed
harmless.

To clarify, PP 1017 is not a declaration of Martial Law. It is merely an exercise of

President Arroyo’s calling-out power for the armed forces to assist her in
preventing or suppressing lawless violence.

Second Provision: The "Take Care" Power.

The second provision pertains to the power of the President to ensure that the
laws be faithfully executed. This is based on Section 17, Article VII which reads:

SEC. 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments,
bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.

This Court rules that the assailed PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants
President Arroyo the authority to promulgate “decrees.” Legislative power is
peculiarly within the province of the Legislature. Section 1, Article VI categorically
states that “[t]he legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the
Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives.” To
be sure, neither Martial Law nor a state of rebellion nor a state of emergency can
justify President Arroyo’s exercise of legislative power by issuing decrees.

Third Provision: The Power to Take Over

Distinction must be drawn between the President’s authority to declare “a state of

national emergency” and to exercise emergency powers. To the first, Section 18,
Article VII grants the President such power, hence, no legitimate constitutional
objection can be raised. But to the second, manifold constitutional issues arise.

Generally, Congress is the repository of emergency powers. This is evident in the

tenor of Section 23 (2), Article VI authorizing it to delegate such powers to the
President. Certainly, a body cannot delegate a power not reposed upon it.
However, knowing that during grave emergencies, it may not be possible or
practicable for Congress to meet and exercise its powers, the Framers of our
Constitution deemed it wise to allow Congress to grant emergency powers to the
President, subject to certain conditions, thus:

(1) There must be a war or other emergency.

(2) The delegation must be for a limited period only.

(3) The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the Congress may
prescribe.

(4) The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a national policy
declared by Congress.

Section 17, Article XII must be understood as an aspect of the emergency powers
clause. The taking over of private business affected with public interest is just
another facet of the emergency powers generally reposed upon Congress. Thus,
when Section 17 states that the “the State may, during the emergency and under
reasonable terms prescribed by it, temporarily take over or direct the operation of
any privately owned public utility or business affected with public interest,” it
refers to Congress, not the President. Now, whether or not the President may
exercise such power is dependent on whether Congress may delegate it to him
pursuant to a law prescribing the reasonable terms thereof.

Following our interpretation of Section 17, Article XII, invoked by President Arroyo
in issuing PP 1017, this Court rules that such Proclamation does not authorize
her during the emergency to temporarily take over or direct the operation of any
privately owned public utility or business affected with public interest without
authority from Congress.

Let it be emphasized that while the President alone can declare a state of
national emergency, however, without legislation, he has no power to take over
privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest. Nor can he
determine when such exceptional circumstances have ceased. Likewise, without
legislation, the President has no power to point out the types of businesses
affected with public interest that should be taken over. In short, the President
has no absolute authority to exercise all the powers of the State under Section 17,
Article VII in the absence of an emergency powers act passed by Congress.
As of G.O. No. 5, it is constitutional since it provides a standard by which
the AFP and the PNP should implement PP 1017, i.e. whatever is “necessary
and appropriate actions and measures to suppress and prevent acts of
lawless violence.” Considering that “acts of terrorism” have not yet been
defined and made punishable by the Legislature, such portion of G.O. No. 5 is
declared unconstitutional.

24. Diocese of Bacolod vs. Comelec. GR No. 205728 (Jan. 21, 2015) serrano

FACTS:

On February 21, 2013, petitioners posted two (2) tarpaulins within a private
compound housing the San Sebastian Cathedral of Bacolod. Each tarpaulin was
approximately six feet (6′) by ten feet (10′) in size. They were posted on the front
walls of the cathedral within public view. The first tarpaulin contains the message
“IBASURA RH Law” referring to the Reproductive Health Law of 2012 or Republic
Act No. 10354. The second tarpaulin is the subject of the present case. This
tarpaulin contains the heading “Conscience Vote” and lists candidates as either
“(Anti-RH) Team Buhay” with a check mark, or “(Pro-RH) Team Patay” with an “X”
mark. The electoral candidates were classified according to their vote on the
adoption of Republic Act No. 10354, otherwise known as the RH Law. Those who
voted for the passing of the law were classified by petitioners as comprising “Team
Patay,” while those who voted against it form “Team Buhay.”

Respondents conceded that the tarpaulin was neither sponsored nor paid for by
any candidate. Petitioners also conceded that the tarpaulin contains names
ofcandidates for the 2013 elections, but not of politicians who helped in the
passage of the RH Law but were not candidates for that election.

The election officer ordered the tarpaulin’s removal within three (3) days from
receipt for being oversized. COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 provides for the size
requirement of two feet (2’) by three feet (3’).

Petitioners replied requesting, among others, that (1) petitioner Bishop be given a
definite ruling by COMELEC Law Department regarding the tarpaulin; and (2)
pending this opinion and the availment of legal remedies, the tarpaulin be allowed
to remain.

COMELEC Law Department issued a letter ordering the immediate removal of the
tarpaulin; otherwise, it will be constrained to file an election offense against
 petitioners. The letter of COMELEC Law Department was silenton the remedies
available to petitioners.

Concerned about the imminent threatof prosecution for their exercise of free
speech, petitioners initiated this case through this petition for certiorari and
prohibition with application for preliminary injunction and temporary restraining
order.

The court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining respondents from

enforcing the assailed notice and letter.

Respondents filed their comment arguing that the tarpaulin is an election

propaganda subject to regulation by COMELEC pursuant to its mandate under
Article IX-C, Section 4 of the Constitution. Hence, respondents claim that the
issuances ordering its removal for being oversized are valid and constitutional.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the COMELEC violated the constitutional right to freedom of

expression.

HELD:

YES. COMELEC violated the right of the petitioners to freedom of expression.

COMELEC had no legal basis to regulate expressions made by private citizens.

COMELEC does not have the authority to regulate the enjoyment of the preferred
right to freedom of expression exercised by a non-candidate. Every citizen's
expression with political consequences enjoys a high degree of protection. Moreover,
the COMELEC's argument that the tarpaulin is election propaganda, being the
Diocese's way of endorsing candidates who voted against the RH Law and rejecting
those who voted for it, holds no water. The Court held that while the tarpaulin may
influence the success or failure of the named candidates and political parties, this
does not necessarily mean it is election propaganda. The tarpaulin was not paid for
or posted “in return for consideration” by any candidate, political party, or party-list
group.
 25. Reyes vs. Bagatsing, 125 SCRA 553 valdevieso

Facts: Petitioner sought a permit from the City of Manila to hold a peaceful
march and rally on October 26, 1983, from 2:00 to 5:00 in the afternoon,
starting from the Luneta to the gates of the United States Embassy. Once
there, and in an open space of public property, a short program would be held.
The march would be attended by the local and foreign participants of such
conference. That would be followed by the handing over of a petition based on
the resolution adopted at the closing session of the Anti-Bases Coalition. There
was likewise an assurance in the petition that in the exercise of the
constitutional rights to free speech and assembly, all the necessary steps
would be taken by it "to ensure a peaceful march and rally. However, the
request was denied. Reference was made to persistent intelligence reports
affirming the plans of subversive/criminal elements to infiltrate or disrupt any
assembly or congregations where a large number of people is expected to
attend. Respondent suggested that a permit may be issued if it is to be held at
the Rizal Coliseum or any other enclosed area where the safety of the
participants themselves and the general public may be ensured. An oral
argument was heard, and the mandatory injunction was granted on the ground
that there was no showing of the existence of a clear and present danger of a
substantive evil that could justify the denial of a permit. However, Justice
Aquino dissented that the rally is violative of Ordinance No. 7295 of the City of
Manila prohibiting the holding of rallies within a radius of five hundred (500)
feet from any foreign mission or chancery and for other purposes. Hence the
Court resolves.

Issue: Whether or not the freedom of expression and the right to peaceably
assemble violated.

Held: Yes. The invocation of the right to freedom of peaceable assembly carries
with it the implication that the right to free speech has likewise been
disregarded. It is settled law that as to public places, especially so as to parks
and streets, there is freedom of access. Nor is their use dependent on who is
the applicant for the permit, whether an individual or a group. There can be no
legal objection, absent the existence of a clear and present danger of a
substantive evil, on the choice of Luneta as the place where the peace rally
would start. Time immemorial Luneta has been used for purposes of assembly,
communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions.

Such use of the public places has from ancient times, been a part of the
privileges, immunities, rights, and liberties of citizens.

With regard to the ordinance, there was no showing that there was violation
and even if it could be shown that such a condition is satisfied it does not
follow that respondent could legally act the way he did. The validity of his
denial of the permit sought could still be challenged.

A summary of the application for permit for rally: The applicants for a permit to
hold an assembly should inform the licensing authority of the date, the public
place where and the time when it will take place. If it were a private place, only
the consent of the owner or the one entitled to its legal possession is required.
Such application should be filed well ahead in time to enable the public official
concerned to appraise whether there may be valid objections to the grant of the
permit or to its grant but at another public place. It is an indispensable
condition to such refusal or modification that the clear and present danger test
be the standard for the decision reached. Notice is given to applicants for the
denial.

26. Bayan vs. Ermita, GR. no. 169838 (April 25, 2006)Mangub

Facts: The petitioners, Bayan, et al., alleged that they are citizens and
taxpayers of the Philippines and that their right as organizations and
individuals were violated when the rally they participated in on October 6,
2005 was violently dispersed by policemen implementing Batas Pambansa No.
880.

Petitioners contended that Batas Pambansa No. 880 is clearly a violation of the
Constitution and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and
other human rights treaties of which the Philippines is a signatory. They argue
that B.P. No. 880 requires a permit before one can stage a public assembly
regardless of the presence or absence of a clear and present danger.
Furthermore, it is not content-neutral as it does not apply to mass actions in
support of the government. The words “lawful cause,” “opinion,” “protesting or
influencing” suggest the exposition of some cause not espoused by the
government.

Issue: On the constitutionality of Batas Pambansa No. 880, specifically

Sections 4, 5, 6, 12 13(a) and 14(a) thereof, and Republic Act No. 7160: Are
these content-neutral or content-based regulations?

Held: Content-neutral! It is a restriction that simply regulates the time, place

and manner of the assemblies.

BP 880 refers to all kinds of public assemblies that would use public places.
The reference to lawful cause does not make it content-based because
assemblies really have to be for lawful causes, otherwise they would not be
peaceable and entitled to protection. Neither are the words opinion, protesting
and influencing in the definition of public assembly content based, since they
can refer to any subject. The words petitioning the government for redress of
grievances come from the wording of the Constitution, so its use cannot be
avoided. Finally, maximum tolerance is for the protection and benefit of all
rallyists and is independent of the content of the expressions in the rally.

Furthermore, the permit can only be denied on the ground of clear and
present danger to public order, public safety, public convenience, public
morals or public health. This is a recognized exception to the exercise of the
right even under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

27. Estrada v. Escritor, AM No. P-02-1651, June 22, 2006 eliab

The Facts

Complainant Alejandro Estrada filed with Judge Jose F. Caoibes Jr., presiding
judge of Branch 253 of the Regional Trial Court of Las Piñas City, a sworn
Letter Complaint dated July 27, 2000. Estrada requested an investigation of
Respondent Soledad Escritor, the court interpreter, for living in with a man not
her husband, with whom she had a child. Complainant believed that she was
committing an immoral act that tarnished the image of the court. He contended
that she should therefore not be allowed to remain employed in the court, as it
might appear to be condoning her act.

Consequently, respondent was charged with committing “disgraceful and

immoral conduct” under Book V, Title I, Chapter VI, Section 46(b)(5) of the
Revised Administrative Code. During the trial, she testified that when she
entered the judiciary in 1999, she was already a widow; her husband had died
in 1998. Admittedly, more than twenty years ago, she started to have a live-in
arrangement with Luciano Quilapio Jr., with whom she had a son. At the time,
she alleged, her husband who was then still alive was himself living with
another woman.

As a member of the religious sect known as Jehovah’s Witnesses and the

Watch Tower and Bible Tract Society, however, respondent asserted that her
conjugal arrangement with Quilapio was in conformity with their religious
beliefs and had the approval of their congregation. In fact, after ten years of
living with him, she executed a “Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness” on July
28, 1991. The declaration allowed Jehovah’s Witnesses like her, who had been
abandoned by their spouses, to enter into marital relations with someone else.
It thus made the resulting union moral and binding within the congregation all
over the world, except in countries where divorce was allowed.

As laid down by the tenets of their faith, the members required that at the time
of the declaration, the couple could not secure the civil authorities’ approval of
the marital relationship because of legal impediments. Only couples who had
been baptized and in good standing could execute the declaration, which
required the approval of the elders of the congregation. As a matter of practice,
the marital status of the declarants and their respective spouses’ commission
of adultery were investigated before the declarations were executed.

Escritor and Quilapio made their declarations in the usual and approved form
prescribed by Jehovah’s Witnesses, approved by the elders of the congregation
where the declarations were executed, and recorded in the Watch Tower
Central Office. Moreover, the congregation believed that once all legal
impediments for the couple were lifted, the validity of the declarations ceased,
and the couple were obliged to legalize their union. In this case, although
Escritor was widowed in 1998 -- a fact that, on her part, lifted the legal
impediment to marry -- her mate was still not capacitated to remarry. Thus,
their declarations remained valid.

In sum, therefore, insofar as the congregation was concerned, there was

nothing immoral about the conjugal arrangement between the couple, and they
remained members in good standing in the congregation.

The Issue

The issue was whether Soledad Escritor could be held administratively liable
for committing an act that was within the ambit of her right under the religion
clauses (Article III, Section 5) of the Constitution.
The first Decision dated August 4, 2003, remanded the Complaint to the Office
of the Court Administrator (OCA). It also ordered the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) to intervene in the case, so that the OSG could (1) examine the
sincerity and centrality of the claimed religious belief and practice of
respondent; (2) present evidence of the State’s “compelling interest” to override
her religious belief and practice; and (3) show that the means the State adopted
in pursuing its interest was the least restrictive of her religious freedom.

The Court’s Ruling

The Court found Escritor not administratively liable.

At the outset, it was clarified that the Decision dated August 4, 2003,
constituted the law of the case. Thus, the only issue left to be resolved was the
factual basis of the Complaint, specifically the sincerity and centrality of the
religious belief and practice claimed by respondent. The resolution of this issue
would allow the government to present evidence on the State’s compelling
interest to override her religious belief and practice.

The Court reiterated the fact that, upon its finality, the Decision had to settle
the question of what approach should be taken in construing the religion
clauses; that is, the proper test applicable in determining claims of exemption
based on freedom of religion. With respect to the intent and framework
underlying those clauses in our Constitution, applicable was the benevolent
neutrality or accommodation test, whether mandatory or permissive. In
deciding respondent’s plea for exemption based on the “Free Exercise Clause,”
however, the compelling-state-interest test was applicable.

The Court nevertheless revisited the highlights of the earlier Decision; in

particular the Old World antecedents and the development of the religion
clauses in the context of American jurisprudence.

Two Opposing Strains in Two Opposing Strains in U.S. Jurisprudence

Jurisprudence

There are two opposing strains with regard to the religion clauses in U.S.
jurisprudence. The first is the rule of strict neutrality/strict separation. It is
anchored on the Jeffersonian premise that a “wall of separation” must exist to
protect the State from the Church. This approach is rigidly read. From the
State, religious institutions cannot receive aid, whether direct or indirect.
Neither can it adjust its secular programs to alleviate the burdens they have
placed on believers.

A milder version of this view has been adopted in Everson v. Board of

Education, whose emphasis is on the State’s neutrality in its relations with
groups of religious believers and nonbelievers. This view does not espouse any
hostility to religion, but simply holds that religion may not be used as basis for
classification for purposes of governmental action, whether the action confers
rights or privileges or imposes duties or obligations. In other words, only
secular criteria may be the basis of the government’s action. The only dilemma
arising from this view however is that, while ideal, Church and State cannot be
totally separate.

The benevolent neutrality rule, on the other hand, recognizes that religion
plays an important role in public life. Hence, the accommodation of religion
may be allowed, not to promote any of its favored forms, but to allow
individuals and groups to exercise their respective religions without hindrance.
The purpose is to remove a burden from, or facilitate a persons or an
institution’s exercise of, religion.

The Court also discussed three seminal cases reflecting U.S. jurisprudence on
Free Exercise: Sherbert, Yoder, and Smith. Sherbert held that when a law of
general application infringed religious exercise, albeit incidentally, the State
interest sought to be promoted must be so paramount and compelling as to
override the free exercise claim. Otherwise, the Court itself would carve out the
exemption. In Yoder, on the other hand, the U.S. Court again ruled that
religious exemption was in order, notwithstanding any criminal penalty
imposed by the law of general application.

The two cases laid out the following doctrines: (a) Free Exercise Clause claims
were subject to the heightened scrutiny or compelling interest test, if the
government substantially burdened the exercise of religion; (b) this test
governed cases, whether the burden was direct (the exercise of religion
triggered a criminal or civil penalty) or indirect (as when the exercise of religion
resulted in the forfeiture of a government benefit).

These doctrines were supplemented by Smith. The case involved a challenge by

native Americans to an Oregon law prohibiting the use of peyote, a
hallucinogenic substance. Specifically, certain individuals challenged the
State’s determination that their religious use of peyote, which had resulted in
their dismissal from employment, was a misconduct disqualifying them from
receipt of unemployment compensation benefits.

Thus, Smith changed the test for the Free Exercise Clause. The
strict/heightened scrutiny and the compelling justification approaches were
abandoned in the evaluation of laws burdening religion; no matter how much
they burdened religion, neutral laws of general applicability only had to meet
the rational basis test.

Types of Accommodation Under Types of Accommodation Under the Free

Exercise Clause the Free Exercise Clause

A Free Exercise claim may result in three kinds of accommodation: (a) that
which is found to be constitutionally compelled or required by the Free
Exercise Clause; (b) that which is discretionary or legislative, or not required by
the Free Exercise Clause but nonetheless permitted by the Establishment
Clause; and (c) that which is prohibited by the religion clauses.

In a nutshell, mandatory accommodation results when the court finds that

accommodation is required by the Free Exercise Clause; that is, when the court
itself carves out an exemption. This accommodation occurs when all three
conditions of the compelling interest test are met: a statute or government
action has burdened the claimant’s free exercise of religion, and there is no
doubt as to the sincerity of the religious belief; the State has failed to
demonstrate a particularly important or compelling governmental goal in
preventing an exemption; and the State has failed to demonstrate that it used
the least restrictive means.

In these cases, the court finds that the injury to religious conscience is so great
and the advancement of public purposes incomparable, that only indifference
or hostility can explain a refusal to make exemptions. Thus, if the State’s
objective can be served as well, or almost as well, by granting an exemption to
those whose religious beliefs are burdened by the regulation, the court must
grant the exemption.

In permissive accommodation, the court finds that the State may, but is not
required to, accommodate religious interests.

Lastly, there is prohibited accommodation when the court finds no basis for a
mandatory accommodation, or it determines that legislative accommodation
runs afoul of the Establishment or the Free Exercise Clause. In this case, the
court finds that establishment concerns prevail over potential accommodation
interests.

Religion Clauses in Religion Clauses in the Philippine Context the Philippine

Context

After a survey of illustrative cases, the Court concluded that the Philippine
Constitution mandated that the test be construed in the following manner:

First, while the religion clauses of the U.S. are the precursors to those of the
Philippines, the benevolent neutrality/accommodation approach in the latter
jurisdiction was more pronounced and given more leeway.

Second, the whole purpose of the accommodation theory, including the notion
of mandatory accommodation, was to address the “inadvertent burdensome
effect” that an otherwise facially neutral law would have on religious exercise.
Just because the law was criminal in nature should not bring it out of the
ambit of the Free Exercise Clause.

Third, the Court deemed that there was wisdom in accommodation, which was
the recourse of minority religions likewise protected by the Free Exercise
Clause. Mandatory accommodations were considered particularly necessary to
protect their adherents from the inevitable effects of majoritarianism, which
included ignorance and indifference, as well as overt hostility to the minority.

Fourth, exemption from penal laws on account of religion was not entirely an
alien concept. Neither would it be applied for the first time, as an exemption of
that nature -- albeit by a legislative act -- had already been granted to Moslem
polygamy and the criminal law on bigamy.

Finally, the Court considered the language of the religion clauses vis-à-vis the
other elements of the Bill of Rights. It noted that, unlike other fundamental
rights -- like those pertaining to life, liberty or property -- the religion clauses
were stated in absolute terms, unqualified by the requirement of “due process,”
“unreasonableness,” or “lawful order.” Only the right to free speech was
comparable in its absolute grant. Given the unequivocal and unqualified grant
couched in that language, a claim of exemption based on the Free Exercise
Clause could not be simply dismissed by the Court, solely on the premise that
the law in question was a general criminal law.

The point was that if the burden was great and the sincerity of the religious
belief was not in question, adherence to the benevolent
neutrality/accommodation approach required that the Court make an
individual determination and not dismiss the claim outright. The Decision
emphasized, however, that the adoption of the benevolent neutrality/
accommodation approach did not mean that exemptions ought to be granted
every time a Free Exercise claim came up.

Although benevolent neutrality was the lens through which religion clause
cases had to be viewed, the Court held that the interest of the State should also
be afforded utmost protection. Thus, under this framework, the Court could
not dismiss a claim under the Free Exercise Clause, simply because the
conduct in question offended a law or the orthodox view. This, precisely, was
the protection afforded by the religion clauses of the Constitution.

The Compelling State Interest Test

The Compelling State Interest Test The compelling state interest test involves a
three-step process. First, has the statute created a burden on the free exercise
of religion? Second, is there a sufficiently compelling state interest to justify
this infringement of religious liberty? Third, has the State, in achieving its
legitimate purposes, used the least intrusive means possible, so that free
exercise has not been infringed any more than necessary to achieve its
legitimate goal?

Applying this test to resolve the ultimate issue in question, the solicitor general
categorically conceded that the sincerity and centrality of respondent’s claimed
religious belief and practice were beyond serious doubt. Thus, the burden
shifted to the government to demonstrate that the law or practice justified a
compelling secular objective and was the least restrictive means of achieving
that objective.

This burden the government failed to discharge. The Office of the Solicitor
General failed to present sufficient evidence to demonstrate the gravest abuses
that could endanger “paramount interests” and limit or override respondent’s
fundamental right to religious freedom. Neither was the government able to
show that the means it sought to achieve a legitimate State objective was the
least intrusive.

The government argued for the stability and sanctity of the avowed social
institutions of marriage and family, arguing that the so-called “Declaration of
Pledging Faithfulness” should not be recognized or given effect. The Court,
however, affirmed that the free exercise of religion as a fundamental right
enjoyed a preferred position in the hierarchy of rights.

Hence, it was not enough to contend that the State’s interest was important,
because the Constitution itself held the right to religious freedom sacred. The
government should have articulated in specific terms the compelling nature of
the State interest involved in preventing the exemption. As the government had
failed to do so, the Court held that for it to rule otherwise would be to
emasculate the Free Exercise Clause as a source of right in itself.

Finally, even assuming that the government had proved a compelling State
interest, it had to demonstrate further that the State had used the least
intrusive means possible. In that way, free exercise would not be infringed any
more than necessary to achieve the legitimate goal of the State, which which
had to be achieved in a way that imposed as little as possible on religious
liberties. Again, the solicitor general utterly failed to prove this element of the
test. No iota of evidence was offered, other than the two documents that
established the sincerity of the religious belief of respondent and the fact that
the agreement was an internal arrangement within her congregation.

Thus, the Court found, in this particular case and under these distinct
circumstances, that Respondent Escritor’s conjugal arrangement could not be
penalized. She had successfully made out a case for exemption from the law,
based on her fundamental right to freedom of religion.

28. Zabal vs Duterte G.R. No. 238467, February 12, 2019 YU

Facts: Petitioners herein are residents of Boracay and earn a living from
tourist activities. They claim to be injured by Proclamation No. 475 ordering
the closure of the island for rehabilitation purposes. Petitioners argue that
the proclamation is unconstitutional for infringing on the constitutional
rights to travel and to due process.

Right to travel: The impairment of the right to travel, two conditions,

however, must concur to wit: (1) there is a law restricting the said right, and
(2) the restriction is based on national security, public safety or public
health. For petitioners, neither of these conditions have been complied with.
For one, Proclamation No. 475 does not refer to any specific law restricting
the right to travel. Second, it has not been shown that the presence of
tourists in the island poses any threat or danger to national security, public
safety or public health.

Due process: petitioners aver that the same covers property rights and these
include the right to work and earn a living. Since the government, through
Proclamation No. 475, restricted the entry of tourists and non-residents into
the island, petitioners claim that they, as well as all others who work, do
business, or earn a living in the island, were deprived of the source of their
livelihood as a result thereof. Their right to work and earn a living was
curtailed by the proclamation.

Respondents dispute petitioners' allegation that Proclamation No. 475

infringes upon the rights to travel and to due process. They emphasize that
the right to travel is not an absolute right. It may be impaired or restricted
in the interest of national security, public safety, or public health. Anent the
alleged violation of the right to due process, respondents challenge
petitioners' claim that they were deprived of their livelihood without due
process. Respondents call attention to the fact that Zabal as sandcastle
maker and Jacosalem as driver are freelancers and thus belong to the
informal economy sector. This means that their source of livelihood is never
guaranteed and is susceptible to changes in regulations and the overall
business climate.

Issue: Whether or not Proclamation No. 475 is unconstitutional.

Ruling: The Court answers in the negative.

On the right to travel: The activities proposed to be undertaken to

rehabilitate Boracay involved inspection, testing, demolition, relocation, and
construction. These could not have been implemented freely and smoothly
with tourists coming in and out of the island not only because of the
possible disruption that they may cause to the works being undertaken, but
primarily because their safety and convenience might be compromised.

This case does not actually involve the right to travel in its essential sense
contrary to what petitioners want to portray. Any bearing that Proclamation
No. 475 may have on the right to travel is merely corollary to the closure of
Boracay and the ban of tourists and non-residents therefrom which were
necessary incidents of the island's rehabilitation. There is certainly no
showing that Proclamation No. 475 deliberately meant to impair the right to
travel. The questioned proclamation is clearly focused on its purpose of
rehabilitating Boracay and any intention to directly restrict the right cannot,
in any manner, be deduced from its import. Also significant to note is that
the closure of Boracay was only temporary considering the categorical
pronouncement that it was only for a definite period of six months. Hence, if
at all, the impact of Proclamation No. 475 on the right to travel is not direct
but merely consequential; and, the same is only for a reasonably short
period of time or merely temporary.

Even if it is otherwise, Proclamation No. 475 must be upheld for being in the
nature of a valid police power measure. That the assailed governmental
measure in this case is within the scope of police power cannot be disputed.
Verily, the statutes from which the said measure draws authority and the
constitutional provisions51 which serve as its framework are primarily
concerned with the environment and health, safety, and well-being of the
people, the promotion and securing of which are clearly legitimate objectives
of governmental efforts and regulations. The motivating factor in the
issuance of Proclamation No. 475 is without a doubt the interest of the
public in general. The only question now is whether the means employed are
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not
unduly oppressive upon individuals.

On the right to due process: Petitioners have no vested rights on their

sources of income as to be entitled to due process. Zabal and Jacosalem,
cannot be said to have already acquired vested rights to their sources of
income in Boracay. As heretofore mentioned, they are part of the informal
sector of the economy where earnings are not guaranteed. Here, Zabal and
Jacosalem 's asserted right to whatever they may earn from tourist arrivals
in Boracay is merely an inchoate right or one that has not fully developed
and therefore cannot be claimed as one's own. An inchoate right is a mere
expectation, which may or may not come into fruition. "It is contingent as it
only comes 'into existence on an event or condition which may not happen
or be performed until some other event may prevent their vesting.’’’’62
Clearly, said petitioners' earnings are contingent in that, even assuming
tourists are still allowed in the island, the will still earn nothing if no one
avails of their services. Certainly, they do not possess any vested right on
their sources of income, and under this context, their claim of lack of due
process collapses. To stress, only rights which have completely and
definitely accrued and settled are entitled protection under the due process
clause. Besides, Proclamation No. 475 does not strip Zabal and Jacosalem
of their right to work and earn a living. They are free to work and practice
 their trade elsewhere. That they were not able to do so in Boracay, at least
for the duration of its closure, is a necessary consequence of the police
power measure to close and rehabilitate the island.

All told, the Court sustains the constitutionality and validity of Proclamation
No. 475.

29. Oposa vs Factoran G.R. NO. 101083. 224 SCRA 792 July 30, 1993
cajegas

Facts:

The controversy has its genesis in Civil Case No. 90-777 which was filed before
Branch 66 (Makati, Metro Manila) of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), National
Capital Judicial Region. The principal plaintiffs therein, now the principal
petitioners, are all minors duly represented and joined by their respective
parents. The original defendant was the Honorable Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr.,
then Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR). His substitution in this petition by the new Secretary, the Honorable
Angel C. Alcala, was subsequently ordered upon proper motion by the
petitioners.The complaint was instituted as a taxpayers’ class suit and alleges
that the plaintiffs "are all citizens of the Republic of the Philippines, taxpayers,
and entitled to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural resource
treasure that is the country's virgin tropical rainforests." The same was filed for
themselves and others who are equally concerned about the preservation of
said resource but are "so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all
before the Court." On 22 June 1990, the original defendant, Secretary
Factoran, Jr., filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint based on two (2)
grounds, namely: (1) the plaintiffs have no cause of action against him and (2)
the issue raised by the plaintiffs is a political question which properly pertains
to the legislative or executive branches of Government. In their 12 July 1990
Opposition to the Motion, the petitioners maintain that (1) the complaint shows
a clear and unmistakable cause of action, (2) the motion is dilatory and (3) the
action presents a justiciable question as it involves the defendant's abuse of
discretion.

On 18 July 1991, respondent Judge issued an order granting the

aforementioned motion to dismiss. In the said order, not only was the
defendant's claim -- that the complaint states no cause of action against him
and that it raises a political question --sustained, the respondent Judge further
ruled that the granting of the reliefs prayed for would result in the impairment
of contracts which is prohibited by the fundamental law of the land. Plaintiffs
thus filed the instant special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Revised Rules of Court and ask this Court to rescind and set aside the
dismissal order on the ground that the respondent Judge gravely abused his
discretion in dismissing the action.

Issue:

1. Whether or not it was proper to file a

class suit - Yes

2. Whether or not plaintiff stated a cause

of action - Yes

3. Whether or not there was a political

question that courts cannot review - No

Ruling:

YES.

We hereby rule that the said civil case is indeed a class suit. The subject
matter of the complaint is of common and general interest not just to several,
but to all citizens of the Philippines. Consequently, since the parties are so
numerous, it becomes impracticable, if not totally impossible, to bring all of
them before the court. We likewise declare that the plaintiffs therein are
numerous and representative enough to ensure the full protection of all
concerned interests. Hence, all the requisites for the filing of a valid class suit
under Section 12, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court are present both in the
said civil case and in the instant petition, the latter being but an incident to the
former.

This case, however, has a special and novel element. Petitioners minors assert
that they represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn. We find
no difficulty in ruling that they can, for themselves, for others of their
generation and for the succeeding generations, file class suit. Their personality
to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based on the concept
of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and
healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right, as hereinafter expounded,
considers the "rhythm and harmony of nature." Nature means the created
world in its entirety. Such rhythm and harmony indispensably include, inter
alia, the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and
conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife,
off-shore areas and other natural resources to the end that their exploration,
development and utilization be equitably accessible to the present as well as
future generations. Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the
next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced
and healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the minors' assertion of their right
to a sound environment constitutes, at the same time, the performance of their
obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the generations to come.

YES.

We do not agree with the trial court's conclusion that the plaintiffs failed to
allege with sufficient definiteness a specific legal right involved or a specific
legal wrong committed, and that the complaint is replete with vague
assumptions and conclusions based on unverified data. A reading of the
complaint itself belies these conclusions.

The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right -- the right to a
balanced and healthful ecology which, for the first time in our nation's
constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the fundamental law.
Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides:

"SEC. 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a
balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of
nature."

This right unites with the right to health which is provided for in the preceding
section of the same article:

"SEC. 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people
and instill health consciousness among them."

While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the
Declaration of Principles and State Policies and not under the Bill of Rights, it
does not follow that it is less important than any of the civil and political rights
enumerated in the latter. Such a right belongs to a different category of rights
altogether for it concerns nothing less than self-preservation and self-
perpetuation -- aptly and fittingly stressed by the petitioners -- the
advancement of which may even be said to predate all governments and
constitutions. As a matter of fact, these basic rights need not even be written in
the Constitution for they are assumed to exist from the inception of
humankind. If they are now explicitly mentioned in the fundamental charter, it
is because of the well-founded fear of its framers that unless the rights to a
balanced and healthful ecology and to health are mandated as state policies by
the Constitution itself, thereby highlighting their continuing importance and
imposing upon the state a solemn obligation to preserve the first and protect
and advance the second, the day would not be too far when all else would be
lost not only for the present generation, but also for those to come --
generations which stand to inherit nothing but parched earth incapable of
sustaining life.

The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative duty
to refrain from impairing the environment.

NO.

The foregoing considered, Civil Case No. 90-777 cannot be said to raise a
political question. Policy formulation or determination by the executive or
legislative branches of Government is not squarely put in issue. What is
principally involved is the enforcement of a right vis-a-vis policies already
formulated and expressed in legislation. It must, nonetheless, be emphasized
that the political question doctrine is no longer the insurmountable obstacle to
the exercise of judicial power or the impenetrable shield that protects executive
and legislative actions from judicial inquiry or review. The second paragraph of
section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution states that:

"Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable,
and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government."

30. Republic vs. Rosemoor Mining 426 SCRA 517 atup

Facts:

•RMDC had been granted License No. 33 by the Bureau of Mines to allow them
to mine in the mountains (Mt. Mabio) of Biak na Bato, San Miguel, Bulacan,
after they had discovered high quality marble deposits.

•After Ernesto Maceda was appointed as DENR Minister, he cancelled License

No. 33 through a letter addressed to RMDC.

• Maceda said that the issuance of License No. 33 was illegal since it violated
section 69 of PD 463 and that there is no more public interest served by the
continued existence or renewal of the license. Also, according to Proclamation
No. 84, public interest would be served by reverting back the excluded land
and making it part of Biak na Bato National Park.

•RMDC claimed that in the cancellation of the license, their right to due
process was violated and that Proclamation No. 84 was invalid because: - It
violates the clause on non-impairment of contracts and - It is an ex post facto
law/bill of attainder - It was issued by the President after the effectively of the
1987 Constitution

• Court ruled in favor of the petitioners, reversed the ruling of CA

Issue: Whether or not Proclamation No. 84 was valid.

Ruling/Ratio: Yes Proclamation No. 84 was valid. It did not violate the clause
on non-impairment of contract since the respondents license is not a contract
to which the protection of the clause can extend to. It is not a bill of attainder
because the cancellation of the license was not a punishment within the
constitutional proscription against the bill of attainder. It is also not an ex post
facto law because Proclamation 84 was not penal in character. Ex post facto
laws are limited to matters criminal in nature. Also, the President during the
time when she issued the Proclamation still validly have the legislative power
under the Provisional Constitution.

A mining license that contravenes a mandatory provision of the law under

which it is granted is void. Being a mere privilege, a license does not vest
absolute rights in the holder. Thus, without offending the due process and the
non-impairment clauses of the Constitution, it can be revoked by the State in
the public interest.