Planning for Metropolitan Development: Calcutta's Basic Development Plan, 1966-86: A

Post-Mortem
Author(s): Amaresh Bagchi
Source: Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 22, No. 14 (Apr. 4, 1987), pp. 597-601
Published by: Economic and Political Weekly
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4376875
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 SPECIAL ARTICLES

Planning for Metropolitan Development

Calcutta's Basic Development Plan, 1966-86: A Post-Mortem
Amaresh Bagchi
With a 20-year perspective, the Basic Development Plan (BDP) for Calcutta suggested a strategy of developing
not only Calcutta but also the wider region covering West Bengal and the neighbouring states, especially "a fcw
economically conspicuous centres" stressing strongly that Calcutta being the primate city in eastern India, its
problems could not be solved unless its hinterland was also developed. What distinguished the BDP from a 'Master
Plan' was its approach to planning for urban development as a positive, integrated package designed to strengthen
not only the civic infrastructure but also the economic base of the city rather than viewing the task as a 'single
shot exercise' confined to working out the contours of future land use with only a regulatory role for the local
government.
With the ending of the 20-year period which formed the perspective of the BDPR it is time to ask whether the
elaborate and painstaking exercise of the BDP has made any real difference to the quality of civic life in the Calcutta
Metropolitan District. Have the aims of the BDP been realised? If not, what went wrong? The answers to these
questions would provide important lessons for metropolitan and urban planning for the future, and not for Calcutta
alone.
IT may appear a little odd, if not ir.credi- something to save the city of Calcutta from eventually gave shape to the basic develop-
ble, to present-day planners that problems the chaos which had been overtaking the ment plan in December 1966. The blueprint
of urban development received no attention city's civic life since independence. In the was the product of the joint effort of the
at all in the Indian five-year plans until the wake of the disastrous cholera epidemic in Ford Foundation team and the Calcutta
formulation of the Third Plan. Recognition 1958, B C Roy invited the World Health Metropolitan Planning Organisation
of urbanisation as an important aspect of Organisation to look into the insanitary con- (CMPO) which was set up at their instance
the process of economic and social develop- ditions in which millions in the great and was meant to cover an area called the
ment found place for the first time in the metropolis were forced to live and suggest Calcutta Metropolitan District (CMD) com-
Third Five-Year Plan 1961-66. Even in the solutions. Appalled at the situation then prising not only the Calcutta corporation
Third Plan the concern for urban develop- prevailing in Calcutta and the lack of even but also the thirty and odd adjoining
ment and the need for thinking on the elementary sanitary facilities in many parts municipalities. Important components of
strategy to meet problems associated with of the city, the WHO team suggested a the BDP were two comprehensive plars
urbanisation did not go beyond a few general number of measures both immediate and prepared at about the same time, viz, the
statements and exhortation for drawing up long term for the improvement of water master plan for water supply, sewerage,
'Master Plans' for the major cities. The task supply, sewerage, drainage and garbage drainage and sanitation (1966-2001) prepared
of overseeing urban growth and tackling the disposal. for WHO by consultants from UN Special
problems arising from urbanisation re- The team recommended several measures Fund and the Traffic and Transportation
mained almost exclusively a responsibility to deal with the insanitary environmental Plan for the CMD 1966-86 prepared by the
of local governments. condition which had made Calcutta, CMPO in collaboration with another
Early attempts to involve state agencies in especially its slums (called 'bustees'), a consultant.
influencing the pattern of urban develop- nucleus for endemic cholera. Some of the With a 20-year perspective the BDP sug-
ment saw the creation of the Delhi Develop- important measures suggested by the team gested a strategy of developing not only
ment Authority (DDA) in 1955 and the for- were (i) augmenting continuous filtered Calcutta but also the wider region covering
mulation of the first master plan for Delhi water supply; (ii) stopping the supply of West Bengal and neighbouring states,
by DDA in 1962. The master plan however unfiltered water; (iii) saving the river esp'ecially " a few economically conspicuous
was no more than a blueprint for land use Hooghly, the main source of water supply centres", stressing strongly that Calcutta
along with some prescriptions for 'zoning from pollution; and (iv) extension of the being the primate city in eastern India, its
and sub-division regulation' to control land main sewerage collection upto the points of problems could not be solved unless its
use. Thq credit for approaching for the firstfinal treatment and disposal. For this pur- hinterland was also developed. What distin-
time in In1A--the task of metropolitan plan- pose, the team pointed to the need for a guished the BDP from a 'master plan' was
ning on a comprehensive basis in a given master plan for water supply, sewerage and its approach to planning for urban develop-
time frame, taking into account the signi- drainage on a priority basis. The urgency of ment as a positive, integrated package
ficance of the metropolis for the region in doing something for Calcutta was also designed to strengthen not only the civic
which it is located, the demands on civic underlined by the World Bank Mission infrastructure but also the economic base of
services which its growth is likely to throw which visited India in 1960. Drawing atten- the city rather than viewing the task as a'
up and the existing state of its delivery tion to the damage caused by the physical "single shot exercise" confined to working
system for services like water supply, and economic decline of Calcutta to the out the contours of future land use with only
sewerage, transport and shelter, must go to economic growth of the eastern region, the a regulatory role for the local government.
the authors of the Basic Development Plan World Bank Mission had observed that the The plan of action suggested by the BDP
(BDP) for Calcutta (1966-86). continued neglect of the problems of Calcut- focused on three critical tasks, viz, (a) to stop
Not many would perhaps be aware that ta "was one of the most dangerous weak- the deterioration of civic services in the
the initial impulse for planning effort which nesses of the Third Plan". Following the Calcutta metropolitan district; (b) securing
led to the formulation of the BDP for observations of the two international better use of existing capacity; and (c) invest-
Calcutta came not so much from any widely agencies, the Ford Foundation was finally ing for massive new growth. The plan sug-
shared perception of the need for urban requested by the government of West Bengal gested urgent action to provide adequate and
planning as the urgency felt by the then chief to draw up a blueprint for Calcutta's safe potable water, sewerage, drainage and
minister of West Bengal B C Roy for doing development.1 It was this blueprint refuse which disposal. Wide ranging plans of
Economic and Political Weekly
Vol XXII, No 14, April 4, 1987 597

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action were drawn up also for providing failing outbreak of gastro-enterities in grammes envisaged to tackle the problem of
shelter to pavement dwellers, improvement summer, squalor engulfing almost the en- transport-construction of the second
of slums, for arresting deterioration in traffic tire city-the contrast with what Calcutta Hooghly bridge, the Metro and circular
and transportation, better use of existing was even in 1966 is too stark to be missed railway-has so far been completed. The
capacity in manufacturing, metropolitan or dismissed as the product of 'casual partial completion of the Metro after a
street traffic and water supply systems. A empiricism' or statistically insignificant devastating construction period spanning
massive housing programme was also sug- impressions. Mention to an ordinary Calcut- more than a decade of course has been a
gested for accommodating the projected tan the name of CMDA, the initials for the blessing. Congestion compels traffic on
population in 1986. In order to arrest Calcutta Metropolitan Development Autho- Calcutta's roads to move at a snail's pace,
deterioration, by removing the deficiencies rity, the state agency which was created in while the rickety (often cannibalised)
and inducing better use of existing capacity 1970 to give shape to the vision enshrined coaches of the suburban rail continue to
it recommended an action programme to be in the BDP-apd see nhis reaction! The state carry loads many times more than what they
implemented in the Fourth Plan (which was of municipalities adjoining Calcutta is were made for.
then scheduled to commence fromn 1966). To scarcely better. One has only to take a round Development of new areas and execution
bring about some balance in the urban of Howrah maidan to know what squalor of urban renewal projects have also fallen
growth in West Bengal while attending to can mean. far behind targets. The 'bi-polar growth
problem areas the the BDP suggested that To be fair, it would be wrong to dismiss strategy' of BDP also did not take off. In
the action plan should concentrate on four the achievements of BDP as of no con- 1981, after all the talk and effort, Kalyani
urban concentrations, viz, the CMD, the new sequence to the city. The infrastructure for had a population of only 38,000 as against
port of Haldia, Asansol-Durgapur complex utilities has certainly received a big push. an expected 1.5 million. The background
and the emerging marketing centre in North Here is one account:2 paper for the retrospect ends on the sombre
Bengal, viz, Siliguri. Government action was -water supply, despite lowering of stan- note that "progress has not been in con-
envisaged for setting up appropriate dards, augmented more than three-fold formity with the targeted programme".
machinery for planning and plan imple- and distribution improved, as a result of Recalling that the BDP programme airned
mentation, development of public sector in- which access to water in Calcutta is better at providing immediate relief by removing
dustries and the development of essential ur- than in most large cities; deficiencies in infrastructures and promo-
ban infrastructure. -the sewage system improved with the con- ting and guiding new growth, the paper
Did this elaborate and painstaking exercise
struction of new sewerage treatment plants concludes,
make any real difference to the quality of and implementation of many sewerage The analysis of the implementation indicated
civic life in Calcutta metropolitan district? projects, the beneficiaries now covering that the progress in achieving the first
Were the aims of the BDP realised? If not, about one-half of the population as com- objective has been slow and inadequate;
what went wrong? Quite appropriately, with pared to one-third in the sixties; implementation of the second objective has
the ending of the 20-year period which -the drainage system upgraded with the almost gone by default.
formed the perspective of the BDP, these improvement of more than 70 drainage It is a sad irony that Calcutta acquired its
questions were addressed by scholars of and outfall schemes; image as an urban disaster mainly during
urban affairs along with the administrators -capacity for collection and disposal of the two decades which coincided with the
and experts who had taken part in drawing solid waste augmented; time frame adopted by the authors of the
up the BDP in a seminar held in Calcutta -upgradation of 50,000 privies; BDP to set their perspective.
last December. (Curiously, few of those -cholera almost eliminated with improve- What really went wrong? Was the plan-
currently concerned with the city's civic ment brought about through the CMDA's ning strategy underlying the BDP itself
administration or local government and programme for environmental sanitation; inherently deficient? Or did the plan
urban development in state's secretariat -increase in the number and new location flounder because of poor implementation?
were seen at the seminar!) the answers of health centres and dispensaries; Or did the assumptions underpinning the
which, not surprisingly, were varied provide -implementation of massive programmes BDP's projections and programmes go over-
important lessons for metropolitan and of slum improvement. Out of about 2.6 board because of factors which could not
urban planning for the future, and not for million people residing in overcrowded be foreseen or controlled? The papers
Calcutta alone. settlements such as bustees, squatter presented at the retrospect attempted to go
settlements and refugee colonies, about 1.7 into these questions and came out with some
II
million persons have benefited from these illuminating answers. While opinions varied
The question which had to be addressed programmes, consisting of paved internal on the relative importance of the factors
first was what, if any, have been the achieve- roads, provision of electricity, internal identified as responsible for the BDP's poor
ments of the BDP? If one were to visit supply of potable water and conversion of results, depending on the perception of the
Calcutta in 1986 after a gap of twenty years, privies into sanitary latrines. authors, it clearly comes through that there
one would scarcely believe that any one ever "Along with physical improvements"' the were deficiencies in the preparation of the
cared for the city or its environ, much less NIUA's background paper for the seminar BDP itself.
that there was a plan for its development. on BDP retrospect sums up, "the concerted
Poverty and decay writ large everywhere, III
and integrated implementation efforts led to
almost all major streets overflowing with the emergence of new institutions, a new A serious deficiency seems to have been
hawkers and their stalls or wares, some like thestyle and culture of project management and that while advocating a dynamic planning
ancient Bowbazar completely choked with fiscal reforms which became instrumental in approach, the BDP adopted a specific struc
garbage, endless traffic snarls, arterial roads providing the much needed support to ture plan without presenting and evaluating
dug up but never restored, the dilapidated, implementation and sustenance of physical alternatives and offered only 'single solu-
unkempt look of structures lining the improvement programmes". tions' pre-empting any scope for discussion
famous thoroughfares like Dharamtalla, This is an impressive account. However, and debate on the relative merits of the
College Street, Baghbazar and Ashutosh as the background paper recognises, there possible alternatives.3 This left no option
Mukherjee Road, the sprawling slums are some sectors where progress has been for the decision-makers but to adopt an 'all-
showing no signs of shrinking, busy city slow and somewhere the programme could or-nothing' approach. This, according to one
centres like the Dalhousie square turned into not get off the ground. For instance, in author, greatly affected the sewerage and
a vast eating place, even the once resplendent transport, despite substantial additions to sanitation plan as no attempt was made to
Esplanade and the surrounding maidan road mileage, and special IDA dispensation, investigate the viability of low cost alter-
reduced to a slum, the frequent plunge of it has not been possible to cope with the natives and solutions. The transportation
vast areas into total darkness, the agony of volume of passenger demand which has planning exercise did offer alternatives and
the rainy season, an hour's rain being suffi- grown to almost 7 million while a total was more sophisticated but this was confined
cient to submerge most parts of the city, the capacity of public transport is no more to the design of a highway street network
deadly pollution of air and water, the never than about 2.8 million. None of the pro- linked with future trip assignments. Even

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the objectives were not properly defined the local authorities. The investment development and as channelliser of bor-
otherwise mass transportation would not required to clear the backlog of infra- rowed funds and government assistance
have been neglected in the way it was. structure development and maintenance was to various development agencies within
An even more serious deficiency seems to simply beyond the capacity of the munici- the CMD.
be that the programme for economic palities of the area. As it was, the manage- Flow of funds for the projects however
development which was planned as the key ment and financial capacity of the munici- remained sporadic and uncertain while costs
to metropolitan development was left in- palities in the region were deplorably poor. continued to escalate. Some assurance of
complete. Why, it has been asked, even Even with the best of efforts, they could not steady flow came with the sanctioning of
during a period of 5 years (1961-66) with all be expected to meet even a fraction of the IDA assistance of Rs 26 crore in 1973-74.
the resources available, was it not possible commitments that would be entailed by an This was not an additional source of funds,
for a large and resourceful planning group improved delivery system and the debt as external aid even when rneant for specific
of national and international experts to com- service. Hence, while stressing the need for projects are passed on by the centre to the
plete economic development programme for imparting local fiscal management (vigorous state as block assistance channellised
the metropolis and outline the investment property tax administration, change of pro- through the state's budget. However, central
required for a 5-year action programme? It perty tax base, etc), the BDP suggested a assistance even though meagre in relation to
is also alleged that a conscious effort possible basis of sharing the burden of the requirements, which was so long ad hoc
towards evolving a rational model for the meeting the investment requirement for in nature and so uncertain became more
planning process was lacking. The different Calcutta's development by the government assured now. Also, "a semblance of capital
group of planners appeared to have worked of India and the government of West Bengal. budget appeared on the scene" to meet the
practically in isolation. For, if, as was said, Implicitly, the BDP also visualised the need IDA requirement. A separate head-
the basic data were not available, one for revenue transfer from the state to local Calcutta Urban Development Project-was
wonders, how could the transport planning governments. Decision to implement these created in the plan budget of the state.
group obtain land use and economic data proposals however did not come about as CMD programme continued to receive
which the other groups did not use or were quickly or smoothly as was required. In fact, special central assistance in the subsequent
not aware of? Were these-data cooked up? serious efforts to implement the task of period until 1973-74 even after the launching
The project package for five-year action pro- planned development of the metropolis of the country-wide 'Integrated Urban
gramme was selected without any priority recommended by the BDP in 1966 did not Development Programme. During the Fifth
or cost benefit analysis or cost effective even begin until 1970. Plan Period, out of a total outlay of Rs 206
studies.4 The first phase 5-year immediate action crore, government of India financed about
Indeed the shortcomings of the BDP and programme formulated by the BDP for Rs 53 crore (Rs 44 crore as loan). By the time
the need for a new perspective, and revision 1966-71 envisaged an investment of Rs 100 the Sixth Plan became operational, the
of the concepts and recommendations of the crore. Providing resources to finance this IUDP was withdrawn; and with that ended
BDP was soon realised and the CMDA came programme was clearly beyond the capacity the speciality of CMD programme for
out with a new 'development perspective of either the local authorities or the statecentral assistance. Only the involvement of
plan' in 1976. This was followed by 'prespec- government. Frantic requests for assistance IDA-credit conferred a degree of speciality
tive structure plan' in 1981, drawn up at the to the government of India however went and certainty and helped to secure soft on-
instance of the West Bengal Urban Develop- unheeded. This, combined with political lending from the centre. In the subsequent
ment Strategy Committee set up in 1980. The turbulence and uncertainty prevailing in theperiod, out of a total outlay of Rs 299 crore,
accent of the new perspective plan was on central assistance was no more than Rs 17.55
state in the late sixties delayed implementa-
promoting a decentralised system for urban tion of the plan by nearly four years. The crore (the grant component in the total
development in order to lighten the pressures much awaited "response" from the govern- outlay being no more than 10 per cent).
on Calcutta. Evidently the BDP had not ment of India came only in 1970. The only By the end of 1981, the CMDA had an
visualised that such drastic changes would two notable developments on the BDP accumulated outstanding loan of Rs 191
be required in its approach or formulation recommendation in this period were the crore. The state government had to take it
once planning as contemplated by its creation of the Calcutta Metropolitan Water over as the finances of the local governments
authors was to guide action. Meanwhile the and Sanitation Authority (CMWSA) in 1966 were in an awful mess and they were not in
successive Calcutta Urban Development and Hooghly River Bridge Commission a position to bear this burden even partly.
Programmes (CUDP I, II and III) were (HRBC) in 1969. However, CMWSA failed In fact even without any debt servicing, the
launched to implement projects to give shape to make any headway in raising revenue to revenue gap of all the CMD municipalities
to the sectoral components of the BDP meet the cost of its services even though had been growing rapidly. With 1965-66 as
proposals. endowed by law with powers to do so the base (= 100), the index number of the
through taxation and user charges and func- revenue gap for the Calcutta Municipal Cor-
tioned merely as a project implementing poration (CMC) went up to 1,682 in 1984-85
IV
agency of the state government initially andwhile that of its 6wn source revenue came
The binding constraint on the execution of the CMDA thereafter. The HRBC did not to only 422 (for property tax the main stay
of the BDP's proposals however was not so start functioning at all during this period. of municipal finance in West Bengal, the
much the deficiencies in the style. of index worked out to 412). For Howrah, the
It took four years-and the president's
'scenario writing' in the BDP or organisa- respective index numbers for revenue gap
rule-for the GO! to change its perception
tional shortcomings serious though these and own source revenue were 2,042 and 311
and agree to extend assistance for the Rs 100
were especially the lack of adequate admini- (property tax revenue index 195); for the
crore plan. By then the costs for the same
strative organisation and arrangement. It other municipal bodies taken together, the
projects had escalated to Rs 150 crore. Of
was, unmistakably, finance which hogged respective indices were 1,240 and 506 (416
this, Rs 43 crore were to be financed from
the progress of BDP right from its inception. for property tax). With own source revenues
the pian budget and the rest from non-plan
An illuminating account of how the efforts trailing so far behind, the CMC and the
sources including market borrowing. The
towards raising funds for Calcutta's metro- municipalities of the CMD had to depend
year 1970 also saw three important develop-
politan development floundered was given increasingly on transfers from the state. As
ments in the field of metropolitan finance
in one of the papers presented at the a proportion of the total revenue receipts,
in the CMD, viz:
retrospect.5 It is a sad story that does no dependence of CMC on revenue transfers
credit to any of the agencies whose respon- (i) decision to levy octroi (entry tax) in from the state government went up from an
sibility it was to see that living conditions the metropolitan area; average of 23 per cent in the second half of
in and around Calcutta did not sink further. (ii) authorisation for a market loan policy the sixties (1965-66 to 1969-70) to 50 per cent
Realising the enormity of the task, the for the CM?D programme; and in 1980-i81 to 1984-85. For Howrah Municipal
BDP recognised that financing metropolitan (iii) creation of the CMDA. Corpora.ion (HMC), the dependence in-
development had to be a joint effort of the The CMDA emerged as the sole authority creased from 32 to 58 per cent and for the
government at all levels, centre, the state and to mo)bilise market loans for metropolitan
other municipalities from 35 to 68 per cent.

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The transfers took place under the heads fi'nances or strengthen local fiscal admini- bodies came in for criticism from the
stration. About 25 per cent of the current
'DA subvention', share of entry tax and other municipal finance commission set up by the
grants including a share of the motor bills of property tax continued to remain West Bengal government in 1980-81. This,
vehicles tax. uncollected in the CMC even in 1984-85 it is widely felt, created a host of problems
Recognising that "the development of hardly an improvement over the situation at the later stages of the CMD's development
metropolitan areas is ultimately a public prevailing in 1965-66. Barring CMC and leading to worsening of the already poor ser-
finance problem" and that the investment HMC the municipalities continued to be run vice delivery systems and lack of proper
required for the upgradation of services by personnel with little training or motiva- operation and maintenance. This also
would be beyond the local government's tion for the jobs they were to perform. Col- accounted for the local governments'
capacity, the BDP had envisaged massive lection cost of the property tax in many reluctance to take over assets created by
support from the centre and state for the municipalities used up almost the entire the CMDA on the ground of resource
capital outlay contemplated in its recom- revenue from the tax. In the other munici- constraint.7
mendations. However, the authors of the palities, the average of current dues going Of late (since the early eighties), there has
BDP had taken pains also to emphasise the into arrears went up from 40 per cent to 50 been an attempt on the part of the state
imperative need for urgency of strengthening per cent. No new taxes were imposed and government to correct this situation and
the revenues of the local governments as the the rate structures were not revised until endeavours have been made to let the
ultimate responsibility of servicing the loans 1983-84. It was in 1985 that any user charges municipal governments do their own plan-
and maintaining and operating the capital were levied and that too came about only ning on the basis of their felt needs and
assets created under the development pro- in the CMC. As of 1983-84, Calcutta cor- priorities and implement the schemes them-
grammes would be that of the municipalities poration trailed way behind Bombay in the selves. The CMDA now retains only those
themselves. The recommendations made by matter of civic finances as the figures in the packages which affect more than one
the BDP in this regard were aimed at, table would show. municipality and cover wide areas. There is
-raising the yield of the property tax by Lack of initiative and inaction on the also a clear shift of the investments from
measures like changing the base from fiscal front aggravated the already acute Calcutta to other areas of the CMD and to
rental to capital values, improving the financial situation of the municipalities and more deprived areas within Calcutta.
methods of valuation, setting up a Central so the standards of basic service deliveries However, even these efforts do not appear
Valuation Authority and other measures in their jurisdictions deteriorated further to have made much difference so far as the
to improve the administration and col- verging almost on total breakdown on several citizens of these municipalities know only
lection of the tax; fronts (e g, garbage clearance and refuse too well.
-imposition of service charges to make the disposal and storm water drainage). The
public utilities self-financing; and conditions in which citizefis of some of the V
-formulation of pQlicies to capture the CMD municipalities are condemned to live There can be little doubt that ultimately it
gains of property owners from public are probably the ultimate in urban squalor is economic stagnation that lies at the heart
investment programmes. and degradation of human existence. How of the civic problems of the CMD municipa-
The BDP had also listed a number of human beings survive in the conditions pre- lities and their inability to raise resources to
possible alternative revenue sources which vailing in the jurisdiction of the municipal discharge their basic responsibilities. The
could be tapped to augment the resources authority of Howrah now elevated to a cor- BDP did recognise the critical importance
of the local bodies such as a terminal tax, poration must be a medical miracle.6 And of planning for economic development as
octroi, service charges, electricity duties, all this after 20 years of BDP and nearly the key element of metropolitan planning
value-added tax, wheel tax, surcharge on Rs 800 crore of capital investment! and hence the first of the four principle
motol spirit, sales tax, urban land tax, The explanations offered at the BDP objectives set out in the BDP was "to pro-
employment tax, education cess and so on. retrospect for the poor showing of planning mote a more dynamic growth of the metro-
The notable action taken soon on these effort in the CMD in terms of visible results politan economy". Howevei; a development
recommendations was the introduction of centred mainly around two themes, viz, plan for the dynamic growth of the metro-
the entry tax in the metropolitan area in (i) that the development programmes born politan economy called for policy inter-
1970. Action to strengthen local bodies' out of the BDP and subsequent CUDPs were ventions at the national and regional and not
revenue administration did not take place till imposed from above with no attempt to merely local levels of government.8 The
the closing years of the 1970s and early involve the local bodies in tihe planning BDP recognised the crucial role of national
eighties, when new legislations were enactedprocess, and (ii) the BDP did not lay anid regional policies in the economic growth
for Calcutta and Howrah and the Bengal adequate stress on economic development of the Calcutta metropolitan area and cal-
Municipal Act was amended extensive to programmes as a result of which the stagna- led for nmassive public investment program-
bring about major changes in the tax struc-tion of the economy of Calcutta and its mes in eastern India to stimulate economic
ture and introduce some new taxes in the hinterland sapped the revenue potential of growth and employment generation in the
municipal areas. Three new institutions were the local bodies of the area and their ability ?alcutta area. But the dominant focus of the
created, viz, the Central Valuation Board, to operate and maintain the assets created BDP was on identifying gaps in the physical
the Directorate of Local Bodies and the or sustain the development impulses genera- infrastructure in the CMA and suggesting
Institute of Local Government and Urban ted by the BDP's programmes. Weaknesses measure to mitigate them. The content of
Studies. A state commission on municipal in the institutional arrangements for over- the economic development programme
finance was set up and following its recom- seeing development on the scale envisaged remained weak and the BDP took suitable
mendations, a transfer mechanism called the in the BDP especially excessive division of macro-economic and state level interventions
Revised Grants Structure (RGS)-pioneering responsibilities among rival bodies without for granted or as given.
in this area-was introduced in 1983-84 for any co-ordination also figured among the In the event, the two decades that span-
the CMD municipal bodies. The RGS for factors mentioned as responsible for under- ned the perspective of the BDP saw a steady
the first time, introduced a system which mining the success of the entire programme. decline of the economy of Calcutta and West
assures state government assistance for Formulation and implementation of the Bengal. Between 1965 and 1981, the share
meeting the revenue gap of the municipal CMD development programmes without any of West Bengal in industrial output of the
bodies assessed on a normative basis with effective consultation with local municipal country declined by half (from 19.7 per cent
a reward in the form of a capital grant for TABL-E (Rs per capita)
municipalities doing better than what could
be expected, keeping in view their taxable Corporation Revenue Propeity Total Tax Total
capacity and a penalty for those who do not Expenditure Tax Revenue Revenue Revenue
pull their weight in raising resources.
Calcutta 172 65 62,41 69.00 173.91
Until 1980, however, there was little
Bombay 313.50 158.46 323.66 390.68
evidence of any effort on the part of the
local bodies in the state to improve their Source: National Institute of Public Finance a

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to 9.8 per cent), accompanied by a decline state. land and property which remained untapped
in employment in the organised private It would be churlish to deny that the partly through inaptitude and failure to take
sector. The only sector that grew enormously present state government has taken steps in elementary steps and partly because of
is the tertiary sector-especially trade and many directions to correct the imbalance in shortsighted political gains and misplaced
commerce. However, the substantial segment the deployment of funds available for invest- sympathies for not so downtrodden.'2 It is
of trading activities remained confined to the ment in the municipal infrastructure and a pity that while the civic services languish
congested areas of Calcutta like Barrabazar concentration of attention to core areas of people talk of corruption on gigantic scales
and the crumps ('retail trade') was left to be Calcutta city. There has been a distinct in the CMDA, Equally depressing is to hear
shared by hordes of hawkers sprawling over improvement in the finances of several ofthat thestorm water paralyses city life in Calcut-
the city's footpath, roads, buses and trains. municipalities in recent years. A first year ta for days together while pumping stations
This surely is not what adds to the wealth review showed that 20 out of 36 municipa- fail to operate because no one reports for
of a city. In the absence of any significant lities showed revenue increases as projected. duty or repairs are not done in time.
growth in manufacturing, trading in goods Even so few of the municipalities are out of The central message that the BDP
imported from elsewhere could only have the woods and, as noted already, their retrospect offers to planners in the future li
drained the purchasing power of the popula- dependence on the state government transfer in underlying the fact that planning cannot
tion and pushed down the prospects of has kept on increasing (except for a brief possibly be superimposed from above. The
employment growth further. The result has period 1975-76 to 1979-80 when there was involvement of those for whom the plans are
been for all to see-decay and poverty writ the proportion of transfer to total revenue meant is crucial. However, it would be wrong
large all over the CMA (barring a few receipts of the municipalities showed a to presume that the rot can be stemmed
isolated pockets) and indeed over the entire downturn for a while), fast reducing them without support from outside. The art of
Calcutta metropolitan district. to a state of almost total dependence on planning for metropolitan development lies
What accounts for the economic decline funds and administrative support from in evolving a way of extending help to those
of the eastern region and thereby of the outside. The RGS, though a helpful innova- who have to help themselves. It cannot be
Calcutta region does not admit of a simple tion, has given rise to problems like accen- stressed sufficiently however that ultimately
answer. Many factors seem to have conspiredtuation of disparities among municipalities what matters is the political genius and the
to push Calcutta down the hill. Whatever the and demand has been voiced for revision of collective will of the people concerned to
causes, in the absence of economic growth the formula.'1 Among the new institutions better their lot by working together, pool-
the investment programmes for infrastruc- whose creation was envisaged by the BDP ing their resources and generating the right
ture under the BDP failed to create the as the pre-requisite for a long-term upgrada- pressures to evolve the required institutions
capacity of the metropolitan region to pick tion of civic management capabilities only and environment, and, if that fails, nothing
up the strength and maintain the assets one seems to have fulfilled the promise at perhaps can succeed. If the BDP failed to
created thereby. The dynamism of parts of least partially. It is the institute of local fulfil the expectations it had raised, it is as
the tertiary sector could obviously not com- government and urban studies. Against much a failure of the authors who had
pensate for the stagnation in the secondary many odds it is playing a valuable role in drafted it as of those for whom it was meant.
sector of the metropolis and its surrounding getting the municipal bodies to get together
Notes
areas. and have their men trained. The other one,
I For a succinct account of the events leading-upto
VI the Central Valuation Board, seemed to be
the formulaion of the BDP for Calcutta, see the
Economic stagnation by itself howei a non-starter. It is only now after more than background paper prepared by the National Insti-
cannot explain fully why BDP and the six years that it seems to be stirring with tute of Urban Affairs (NIUA), New Delhi for the
massive investments that followed in its wake some life. International Seminar held at Calcutta in
The fact remains that civic institutions in December 1986, organised by the Calcutta
failed to make any visible irnpact though
Metropolitan Development Authority and the
there can be no doubt that it was a crucial West Bengal more than perhaps in any other
NIUA. The chronicle of events preceding and
factor underlying poor showing. The social state in India have been and continue to be
following the BDP and its appraisal presented here
and political environment contributed no used as political rather than administrative draw heavily on this and the other excellent papers
less to the situation that thwarted the bodies with extremely important social presented at the seminar.

progress for which the BDP had laid down responsibility. In running these bodies nar- 2 NIUA, Calcutta's Basic Development Plan: A
row political gains have often been the Background Paper (1986, mimeo).
a blueprint. At one level, it looks as if the
3 S K Roy, 'Metropolitan Planning in Calcutta: A
shortcomings which held back if not guiding factor. The instability in the Calcutta
Study of the Basic Development Plan and Its Im-
frustrated the metropolitan developmental corporation after the introduction of the
pact' (paper presented at the BDP retrospect).
efforts in Calcutta were institutional-lack mayor-in-council system (witness the recent 4 S K Roy, op cit.
of involvement of local bodies in planning events) the state of the municipal manage- 5 Tapan K Banerjee, 'Resource Mobilisation in
and implementation, splintering of admini- ment even after all the reform, and the grow- Retrospect: An Historical Account of Calcutta's

strative authority and resp'onsibility and so ing gap between the needs and revenue Metropolitan Development Finance' (paper
presented at the BDP retrospect).
on.9 However, one wonders whether theserealised makes one despair of any break-
6 For a graphic account of the hell-hole existence
are the causes or the symptoms of a malaise through in the foreseeable future. The fact
to which of the inhabitants of Howrah are con-
with its roots lying deeper in the social and that at the end of 1986 almost the entire demned, see, Paribartan (Bengali weekly),
political milieu of the state and of the town of Howrah looks like a vast open February 4-10, 1987, cover stsOry 'Hell that Is
country as a whole. The last few years have public drain is indeed a sad commentary on Howrah: Monument to the Failure of the

seen new initiatives to correct many of the the BDP. If responsibility is to be appor- Municipal Corporators'.
tioned it must be shared by all concerned 7 Tapan K Banerjee, op cit.
institutional deficiencies. Indeed, as some
8 For perspective analysis of the BDP's economic
observers comment, these last twelve years with the economic development of the city
development plan see N Vijay Jaganathan,
have been the most active in Calcutta's and its hinterland, as also those in control
'Economic Aspects of Calcutta's Basic Develop-
history insofar as infrastructure and orga- of the local bodies whose task it is to ad- ment Plan' (presented at the BDP retrospect.
nisatioral developments are concerned. 10 minister the civic services and manage their 9 K C Sivaramakrishnan and Leslie Green, 'Metro-

Legislations like the Calcutta Municipal finances. politan Management: The Asian Experience' (ex-
tracts circulated at the BDP retrospect).
Corporation Act, Howrah Municipal The CMD was no doubt beset with pro-
10 Ibid.
Corporation Act, the amendment to the blems not of its own creation-the partition, 11 At the State Level Conference of Municipal Bodies
Bengal Municipal Act, aim at radical reform the 1971 war, successive refugee influx, of West Bengal held in February 1987.
of municipal administration on all fronts. pressure of job-seekers from neighbouring 12 For an account of the factors which inhibited the
The introduction of mayor-in-council system states and so on. But can it be said that the growth of the property tax in Calcutta and West
of local governance in the corporation and local authorities did not hesitate to pull their Bengal see, "The Property Tax Reform in West
Bengal' (National Institute of Public Finance and
the attempts to facilitate induction of exper- weight and did what they could under the
Policy, New Delhi, 1981, since published as Sup-
tise and talent in municipal management circumstances? Despite stagnation, the
plementary Volume II to the Report of the West
should surely go some way to cure many of Calcutta area offers vast potential for Bengal Municipal Finance Commission, govern-
the ills besetting the municipalities in the resources in the form of very valuable urban
ment of West Bengal).

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