G.R. No.

175578 August 11, 2010

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
ZENAIDA GUINTO-ALDANA, in her own behalf as Attorney-in-fact of MA. AURORA
GUINTO-COMISO, MA. LUISA GUINTO-DIONISIO, ALFREDO GUINTO, JR., PACITA R.
GUINTO, ERNESTO R. GUINTO, NATIVIDAD R. GUINTO and ALBERTO R.
GUINTO, Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
In this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the Republic of the Philippines,
through the Office of the Solicitor General, assails the March 30, 2006 Decision1 and the
November 20, 2006 Resolution,2 both of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. CV No. 80500. The
assailed decision reversed and set aside the July 10, 2003 judgment 3 of the Regional Trial Court
of Las Piñas City, Branch 199 in LRC Case No. 02-0036, one for original registration of title,
whereas the assailed Resolution denied reconsideration.
The facts follow.
On April 3, 2002, respondents Zenaida Guinto-Aldana4 (Zenaida), Ma. Aurora Guinto-Comiso,
Ma. Luisa Guinto-Dionisio, Alfredo Guinto, Jr., Pacita R. Guinto, Ernesto R. Guinto, Natividad R.
Guinto and Alberto R. Guinto, filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Las Piñas City, Branch
199 an Application for Registration of Title 5 over two pieces of land in Talango, Pamplona Uno,
Las Piñas City. These lands, identified as Lot No. 4 and Lot No. 5 in Conversion Consolidation
Subdivision Plan Ccs-007601-000040-D,6 measure 1,509 square meters and 4,640 square
meters, respectively.7 Respondents professed themselves to be co-owners of these lots, having
acquired them by succession from their predecessors Sergio Guinto (Sergio) and Lucia Rivera-
Guinto (Lucia)—Zenaida’s parents—who, in turn, had acquired the property under a 1969
document denominated as "Kasulatan sa Paghahati ng Lupa na Labas sa Hukuman na may
Pagpaparaya at Bilihan." Under this document, Sergio and Lucia Guinto acquired for a
consideration the respective shares on the property of Pastor Guinto, Dionisio Guinto, Potenciana
Guinto and Marcelina Bernardo who, together with Luisa, had derived the same from Romulado
Guinto.8 Respondents also alleged that until the time of the application, they and their
predecessors-in-interest have been in actual, open, peaceful, adverse, exclusive and continuous
possession of these lots in the concept of owner and that they had consistently declared the
property in their name for purposes of real estate taxation.9
In support of their application, respondents submitted to the court the blueprint of Plan Ccs-
007601-000040-D,10 as well as copies of the technical descriptions of each lot, 11 a certification
from the geodetic engineer12 and the pertinent tax declarations,13 together with the receipts of
payment therefor.14 Expressly, they averred that the property’s original tracing cloth plan had
previously been submitted to the RTC of Las Piñas City, Branch 255 (Las Piñas RTC) in
connection with the proceedings in LRC Case No. LP-128—a previous registration case involving
the subject property which, however, had been dismissed without prejudice.15
The trial court found the application to be sufficient in form and substance; hence, it gave due
course thereto and ordered compliance with the publication and notification requirements of the
law.16
Opposing the application, petitioner, through the Office of the City Prosecutor of Las Piñas City,
advanced that the lots sought to be registered were inalienable lands of the public domain; that
neither respondents nor their predecessors-in-interest had been in prior possession thereof; and
that the muniment of title and the tax declaration submitted to the court did not constitute
competent and sufficient evidence of bona fide acquisition or of prior possession in the concept
of owner.17
At the hearing, Zenaida identified her herein co-respondents to be her siblings, nephews and
nieces. She likewise identified the adjoining lot owners named in the application and the
supporting documents attached to the application as well. She testified that the subject lots had
been surveyed at the instance of her family sometime between 1994 and 1995, and that said
survey was documented in Plan Ccs-007601-000040-D and in the geodetic engineer’s technical
description of the lots. She implied that they did obtain the original tracing cloth plan of the
property, but it was forwarded to the Land Registration Authority (LRA) by the Las Piñas RTC in
connection with the proceedings in LRC Case No. LP-128. Notwithstanding this admission, and
without objection from the oppositor, the blueprint of Plan Ccs-007601-000040-D and the
technical description of the property were provisionally marked in evidence. 18
Furthermore, Zenaida—61 years old at the time of her testimony—declared that she has known
that the subject lots were owned by her family since she was 5 years old and from her earliest
recollection, she narrated that her grandparents had lived in the subject lots until the death of her
grandmother in 1961. She implied that aside from her predecessors there were other persons,
caretakers supposedly, who had tilled the land and who had lived until sometime between 1980
and 1990. She remembered her grandmother having constructed a house on the property, but
the same had already been destroyed. Also, sometime in 1970, her family built an adobe fence
around the perimeter of the lots and later, in the 1990s, they reinforced it with hollow blocks and
concrete after an inundation caused by the flood.19 She claimed that she and her father, Sergio,
had been religious in the payment of real estate taxes as shown by the tax declarations and tax
receipts which she submitted to the court and which, following identification, were forthwith
marked in evidence.20
Zenaida’s claim of prior, open, exclusive and continuous possession of the land was corroborated
by Josefina Luna (Josefina), one of the adjoining lot owners. Josefina, then 73 years old, strongly
declared that the subject lots were owned by Zenaida’s parents, Sergio Guinto and Lucia Rivera,
since she reached the age of understanding, and that she had not come to know of any instance
where a third party had placed a claim on the property. When asked whether there was anyone
residing in the property and whether there were improvements made thereon, she said there was
no one residing therein and that there was nothing standing thereon except for a nipa hut. 21
At the close of Josefina’s testimony, respondents formally offered their exhibits without the
oppositor placing any objection thereto.22 After weighing the evidence, the trial court, on July 10,
2003, rendered its Decision denying the application for registration. It found that respondents
were unable to establish with certainty the identity of the lots applied for registration, because of
failure to submit to the court the original tracing cloth plan as mandated by Presidential Decree
(P.D.) No. 1529. It likewise noted that the fact of adverse, continuous, open, public and peaceful
possession in the concept of owner has not been proved by the evidence as Zenaida’s and
Josefina’s respective testimonies did not establish the nature of the possession of respondents’
predecessors.23 The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, for failure of the applicants to comply with the requirements of Presidential Decree
No. 1529, the Application for Original Registration of Title is hereby DENIED.
ORDERED.24
Aggrieved, respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals which, on March 30, 2006, issued the
assailed Decision reversing the trial court as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed decision is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Accordingly, the instant appeal is hereby GRANTED.
SO ORDERED.25
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied.26 Hence, it filed the instant petition which
attributes error to the Court of Appeals in reversing the trial court’s July 10, 2003 decision.
Petitioner principally posits that under Section 17 of P.D. No. 1529, the submission in court of the
original tracing cloth plan of the property sought to be registered is a mandatory requirement in
registration proceedings in order to establish the exact identity of the property. While respondents
admitted that the original tracing cloth plan of Lot Nos. 4 and 5 in this case was in the custody of
the LRA as a consequence of their first attempt to have the property registered, petitioner,
invoking Del Rosario v. Republic of the Philippines, 27 believes that respondents, on that score
alone, are not relieved of their procedural obligation to adduce in evidence the original copy of
the plan, because they could have easily retrieved it from the LRA and presented it in court. 28
Furthermore, petitioner suggests that the blueprint of the subdivision plan submitted by
respondents cannot approximate substantial compliance with the requirement of Section 17 of
P.D. No. 1529. Again, relying on the aforementioned Del Rosario case, petitioner observes that
the blueprint in this case, allegedly illegible and unreadable, does not even bear the certification
of the Lands Management Bureau.29 Lastly, petitioner attacks respondents’ claim of prior
possession. It notes that there is no clear and convincing evidence that respondents and their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, adverse, public and exclusive
possession of Lot Nos. 4 and 5 for 30 years.30
Commenting on the petition, respondents observe that petitioner’s arguments are mere reiterative
theses on the issues that have already been addressed by the Court of Appeals in the assailed
Decision and Resolution, and that there are no new matters raised which have not yet been
previously passed upon. Accordingly, they prayed that the petition be denied. 31
We find the petition to be unmeritorious.
Section 17 of P.D. No. 1529, otherwise known as The Property Registration Decree of 1978,
materially provides:
Section 17. What and where to file.–The application for land registration shall be filed with the
Court of First Instance of the province or city where the land is situated. The applicant shall file,
together with the application, all original muniments of titles or copies thereof and a survey plan
of the land approved by the Bureau of Lands.
The clerk of court shall not accept any application unless it is shown that the applicant has
furnished the Director of Lands with a copy of the application and all annexes.
The provision denotes that it is imperative in an application for original registration that the
applicant submit to the court, aside from the original or duplicate copies of the muniments of title,
a copy of a duly approved survey plan of the land sought to be registered. The survey plan is
indispensable as it provides a reference on the exact identity of the property. This begs the
question in the instant case: Does the blueprint copy of the survey plan suffice for compliance
with the requirement? In not so many cases,32 it was held that the non-submission, for any reason,
of the original tracing cloth plan is fatal to the registration application, since the same is mandatory
in original registration of title. For instance, in the Del Rosario case relied on by petitioner, the
Court ruled that the submission of the original copy of the duly approved tracing cloth plan is a
mandatory condition for land registration as it supplies the means by which to determine the exact
metes and bounds of the property. The applicant in that case was unable to submit the original
tracing cloth plan of the land he was claiming because apparently, as in the present case, it was
previously transmitted by the clerk of court to the LRA. Yet the Court, deeming it the applicant’s
obligation to retrieve the plan himself and present it in evidence, denied the application, to wit:
The submission in evidence of the original tracing cloth plan, duly approved by the Bureau of
Lands, in cases for application of original registration of land is a mandatory requirement. The
reason for this rule is to establish the true identity of the land to ensure that it does not overlap a
parcel of land or a portion thereof already covered by a previous land registration, and to forestall
the possibility that it will be overlapped by a subsequent registration of any adjoining
land.1avvphi1 The failure to comply with this requirement is fatal to petitioner’s application for
registration.
Petitioner contends, however, that he had submitted the original tracing cloth plan to the branch
clerk of court, but the latter submitted the same to the LRA. This claim has no merit. Petitioner is
duty bound to retrieve the tracing cloth plan from the LRA and to present it in evidence in the trial
court. x x x33
Yet if the reason for requiring an applicant to adduce in evidence the original tracing cloth plan is
merely to provide a convenient and necessary means to afford certainty as to the exact identity
of the property applied for registration and to ensure that the same does not overlap with the
boundaries of the adjoining lots, there stands to be no reason why a registration application must
be denied for failure to present the original tracing cloth plan, especially where it is accompanied
by pieces of evidence—such as a duly executed blueprint of the survey plan and a duly executed
technical description of the property—which may likewise substantially and with as much certainty
prove the limits and extent of the property sought to be registered.
Thus, sound is the doctrinal precept laid down in Republic of the Philippines v. Court of
Appeals,34 and in the later cases of Spouses Recto v. Republic of the Philippines 35 and Republic
of the Philippines v. Hubilla,36 that while the best evidence to identify a piece of land for registration
purposes is the original tracing cloth plan issued by the Bureau of Lands (now the Lands
Management Services of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources [DENR]),
blueprint copies and other evidence could also provide sufficient identification. Pertinently, the
Court in Hubilla, citing Recto, pronounced:
While the petitioner correctly asserts that the submission in evidence of the original tracing cloth
plan, duly approved by the Bureau of Lands, is a mandatory requirement, this Court has
recognized instances of substantial compliance with this rule. In previous cases, this Court ruled
that blueprint copies of the original tracing cloth plan from the Bureau of Lands and other evidence
could also provide sufficient identification to identify a piece of land for registration purposes. x x
x37
In the case at bar, we find that the submission of the blueprint of Plan Ccs-007601-000040-D,
together with the technical description of the property, operates as substantial compliance with
the legal requirement of ascertaining the identity of Lot Nos. 4 and 5 applied for registration. The
blueprint, which is shown to have been duly executed by Geodetic Engineer Rolando Roxas
(Roxas), attached to the application and subsequently identified, marked, and offered in evidence,
shows that it proceeded officially from the Lands Management Services and, in fact, bears the
approval of Surveys Division Chief Ernesto Erive. It also shows on its face that the survey of the
property was endorsed by the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office of the
DENR.38 This, compounded by the accompanying technical description of Lot Nos. 4 and 5 duly
executed and verified also by Roxas,39 should substantially supply as it did the means by which
the identity of Lot Nos. 4 and 5 may be ascertained.
Verily, no error can be attributed to the Court of Appeals when it ruled that respondents were able
to approximate compliance with Section 17 of P.D. No. 1529. Also telling is the observation made
by the Court of Appeals that there was no objection raised by the oppositor or by the LRA to the
admission of the blueprint of Plan Ccs-007601-000040-D despite the fact that they were well-
informed of the present proceedings, to wit:
In the instant case, the plaintiffs-appellants do not deny that only the blueprint copy of the plan of
the subject lands (Exh. "J") and not the original tracing cloth plan thereof was submitted to the
court a quo since they had previously submitted the original tracing cloth plan to the Land
Registration Authority. However, despite the failure of the plaintiffs-appellants to present the
original tracing cloth plan, neither the Land Registration Authority nor the oppositor-appellee
question[ed] this deficiency. Likewise, when the blueprint copy of the plan (Exh. "J") was offered
in evidence, the oppositor-apellee did not raise any objection thereto. Such silence on the part of
the Land Registration [Authority] and the oppositor-appellee can be deemed as an implied
admission that the original tracing cloth plan and the blueprint copy thereof (Exh. "J") are one and
the same, free from all defects and clearly identify the lands sought to be registered. In this regard
x x x, the blueprint copy of the plan (Exh. "J"), together with its technical descriptions (Exhs. "K"
and "L"), is deemed tantamount to substantial compliance with the requirements of law.40
We now proceed to the issue of possession. Petitioner theorizes that not only were respondents
unable to identify the lots applied for registration; it also claims that they have no credible evidence
tending to establish that for at least 30 years they and their predecessors-in-interest have
occupied and possessed the property openly, continuously, exclusively and notoriously under a
bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier. 41 We do not agree.
In an original registration of title under Section 14(1)42 P.D. No. 1529, the applicant for registration
must be able to establish by evidence that he and his predecessor-in-interest have exercised acts
of dominion over the lot under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier.43 He
must prove that for at least 30 years, he and his predecessor have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the land. Republic v. Alconaba 44 well
explains possession and occupation of this character, thus:
The law speaks of possession and occupation. Since these words are separated by the
conjunction and, the clear intention of the law is not to make one synonymous with the other.
Possession is broader than occupation because it includes constructive possession. When,
therefore, the law adds the word occupation, it seeks to delimit the all-encompassing effect of
constructive possession. Taken together with the words open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious, the word occupation serves to highlight the fact that for an applicant to qualify,
his possession must not be a mere fiction. Actual possession of a land consists in the
manifestation of acts of dominion over it of such a nature as a party would naturally
exercise over his own property.45
Proceeding from this fundamental principle, we find that indeed respondents have been in
possession and occupation of Lot Nos. 4 and 5 under a bona fide claim of ownership for the
duration required by law. This conclusion is primarily factual.
From the records, it is clear that respondents’ possession through their predecessor-in-interest
dates back to as early as 1937. In that year, the subject property had already been declared for
taxation by Zenaida’s father, Sergio, jointly with a certain Toribia Miranda (Toribia). 46 Yet, it also
can be safely inferred that Sergio and Toribia had declared the land for taxation even earlier
because the 1937 tax declaration shows that it offsets a previous tax number. 47 The property was
again declared in 1979,48 198549 and 199450 by Sergio, Toribia and by Romualdo.
Certainly, respondents could have produced more proof of this kind had it not been for the fact
that, as certified by the Office of the Rizal Provincial Assessor, the relevant portions of the tax
records on file with it had been burned when the assessor’s office was razed by fire in 1997. 51 Of
equal relevance is the fact that with these tax assessments, there came next tax payments.
Respondents’ receipts for tax expenditures on Lot Nos. 4 and 5 between 1977 and 2001 are
likewise fleshed out in the records and in these documents, Sergio, Toribia and Romualdo are
the named owners of the property with Zenaida being identified as the one who delivered the
payment in the 1994 receipts.52
The foregoing evidentiary matters and muniments clearly show that Zenaida’s testimony in this
respect is no less believable. And the unbroken chain of positive acts exercised by respondents’
predecessors, as demonstrated by these pieces of evidence, yields no other conclusion than that
as early as 1937, they had already demonstrated an unmistakable claim to the property. Not only
do they show that they had excluded all others in their claim but also, that such claim is in all good
faith.
Land registration proceedings are governed by the rule that while tax declarations and realty tax
payment are not conclusive evidence of ownership, nevertheless, they are a good indication of
possession in the concept of owner. These documents constitute at least proof that the holder
has a claim of title over the property, for no one in his right mind would be paying taxes for a
property that is not in his actual or at least constructive possession. The voluntary declaration of
a piece of property for taxation purposes manifests not only one’s sincere and honest desire to
obtain title to the property. It also announces his adverse claim against the state and all other
parties who may be in conflict with his interest. More importantly, it signifies an unfeigned intention
to contribute to government revenues—an act that strengthens one’s bona fide claim of
acquisition of ownership.53
Indeed, that respondents herein have been in possession of the land in the concept of owner—
open, continuous, peaceful and without interference and opposition from the government or from
any private individual—itself makes their right thereto unquestionably settled and, hence,
deserving of protection under the law.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The March 30, 2006 Decision and the November 20, 2006
Resolution of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. CV No. 80500, are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 76371 January 20, 2000

MARIANO TURQUESA, ABRAHAM LALUGAN and LAYAO, MANUEL MAGALA substituted
by his Heirs, OTILIO DAMASEN and SEGUNDINA DAMASEN, ANTONIO ESCALANTE,
METODIO TULLAS, FLORA LABUGUEN and JUANA LABUGUEN, LOURDES SINDON
BAYUBAY, MANUEL MEDRANO and JOSE MEDRANO, petitioners,
vs.
ROSARIO VALERA and the HONORABLE COURT of APPEALS, respondents.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
More than half a century ago,1 private respondent applied for the registration of two parcels of
land located in Barrio Pulot, Laguyan, Abra described in Plan PSU-119561 with a total land area
of 232,908 square meters. The first lot (hereinafter referred to as Lot 1) has an area of 210,767
square meters whereas the other lot (Lot 2) has an area of 22,141 square meters. In support of
her application, private respondent presented documents showing that when she was still single,
she bought Lot 1 during the years 1929-1932 from Cristeta Trangued and the heirs of Juan Valera
Rufino who were allegedly in possession thereof since the Spanish regime in the concept of
owners and who declared it in their name for taxation purposes. From 1929, she continued
possession of said land in the concept of owner and continued to pay the tax thereon in her name.
Notices of the application for registration were published in the Official Gazette, with copies
thereof sent to persons mentioned therein and posted in the proper places.
The Director of Lands together with petitioners and other persons 2 opposed the application of
private respondent. These oppositors were excluded from the order of general default issued by
the lower court on June 16, 1950.3 In the course of the hearing, the oppositors (except the Director
of Lands) aver that their lands were included in Lot 1 which private respondent sought to register
in her name. In support thereof, they contend that the land embraced by Lot 1 at the time it was
bought by private respondent is not the same land covered in her application for registration. To
avoid confusion, oppositors moved for an ocular inspection in order to determine the correct
boundary limits of the lands they respectively claim, however, the same was not allowed by the
court a quo. For his part, the Director of Lands' opposition was denied for failure to substantiate
his claim that the subject lands were part of the public domain. The opposition of the oppositors
other than the herein petitioners were likewise denied for various reasons including failure to
present their evidence.
After trial, in a decision dated April 23, 1956, the lower court disposed of the application for
registration as follows:
In view of all the foregoing, the applicant Rosario Valera married to Juan Valera, a resident of
Bangued, Abra, has proven that she has a registerable title to Lot 1, Psu-119561, with an area of
210,767 square meters as her exclusive property, subject to the encumbrance in favor of the
Philippine National Bank in the sum of P1,000.00; and to Lot 2 in the same plan, with an area of
22,141 square meters, without liens or encumbrances, as conjugal partnership property with her
husband, Juan Valera.
After this decision has become final, let the corresponding decree be entered and the
corresponding title issue in accordance with law.4
Oppositors appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA) insofar only as Lot 1 is concerned, arguing,
among others, that the trial court erred in not granting their motion for new trial and their demand
for ocular inspection. On March 15, 1966, the Court of Appeals set aside the appealed decision
and remanded the case to the lower court for further proceedings, and ordered the conduct of an
ocular inspection. The dispositive portion of the CA decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is reversed and set aside. This case shall be
remanded to the trial court for further proceedings which shall include an ocular inspection of the
land applied with a view to determine its identity, location and boundary limits whether the latter
have been included in Lot 1 of the applicant's plan to warrant their exclusion from the plan, or
their registration in the names of the oppositors who have presented evidence in support of their
claim. Thereafter judgment shall be accordingly rendered.5
In accordance with the CA directive, three commissioners were appointed by the trial court to
conduct the ocular inspection. The commissioners found:
That the property sought to be registered under survey plan Psu-119561 was relocated and the
extent and bounds of the portions claimed by the oppositors were pointed to by them personally
or by their supposed representative, the results of which are clearly shown in the accompanying
sketch plan marked as Annex "A" of their report by the corresponding names, area and
dimensions.
That the survey of the claims was continued the following day, January 29, 1967.
OBSERVATIONS AND FINDINGS
1. The claims of Manuel Magala, Abraham Lalugan, and Layao, Juan Medrano and Eugenio
Medrano as shown now in the sketch plan Annex "A" are not shown in the original survey plan
Psu-119561;
2. That claims of Otilio Damasen, Nicolas Bigornia, Ricardo Bersamira, Bonifacio Brangan,
Cristeta Medrano, Matias Turdil, Mariano Turqueza, Flora Labuguen, Cornelio Bayubay, Ponce
Talape, and Metodio Tullar, appeared in the original survey plan Psu-119561 and likewise in
sketch plan Annex "A" although three of these claims bear different identifying names in the sketch
Annex "A";
3. That out of the original area of 210,767 square meters in original survey plan Psu-119561, the
remaining portion not subject of opposition as appearing in sketch plan Annex "A" is 69,683
square meters;
4. That the "Calle para Collago" which according to the decision of the Court of Appeals and is
stoutly maintained until the present by the oppositors to be the extent or boundary of the property
of the applicant on the South side is existing and still is the boundary on the South and on the
Southeast side, as shown in the Sketch Plan, Exh. "A";
That the property of Francisco Santua abound also the applicant's property sought to be
registered on the South sides, at present as was the case during the original survey. 6
The oppositors filed an opposition to the commissioner's report, whereupon a second ocular
inspection was ordered by the trial court. After the second inspection, the trial court, on August
28, 1967 again rendered judgment reiterating its original decision ordering the registration of the
aforesaid Lot 1 of PSU 119561 with an area of 210,767 7 square meters in the name of private
respondent. The judge made the following observations based on the ocular inspection:
The Commissioners and the Presiding Judge, upon their ocular inspection, found out a visible
boundary on the South-east side of Lot 1 known as "Calle para Collago" which is represented in
the relocation plan Exh. HH running from the intersection to Lagayan between points 22 and 21
down to point 18. This, in the opinion of the Court, is the extension of the "Calle para Collago"
referred to by the applicant Rosario Valera as boundary exactly on the South but which was
converted into ricefields by Francisco Santua. This circumstance now could explain the presence
of Francisco Santua as boundary owner on the South which the parties stoutly maintained in the
former proceedings that the "Calle para Collago" was on the South but which oppositors now
repudiate claiming that the "Calle para Collago" is on the East. Taking a good view over Lot 1, it
could safely be concluded that the existing "Calle para Collago" is more to the South than to the
East.
With respect to the claim of the Damasens over Lot A mentioned in Exh. D which the Court
inadvertently failed to pass upon, the Court has found that it is within the property of the applicant. 8
The dispositive portion of the trial court's decision reads:
WHEREFORE, this Court reiterates its former decision ordering the registration of Lot 1 of Plan
Psu-119561, Exh. D, with an area of 210,767 square meters in the name of applicant ROSARIO
VALERA of Bangued, Abra, and a conjugal property with her husband Juan Valera of the same
municipality. The encumbrance with the Philippine National Bank in the amount of P1,000.00
having already been settled (Exh. JJ-1) same shall no longer be annotated on the title henceforth
to be issued.
Upon this decision becoming final, let the corresponding decree issue.
The applicant Rosario Valera is hereby directed to pay within seventy two hours from notice hereof
the sum of P182.00 as fees for the commissioner Santiago Alejandre who made the relocation
survey.9
The case was again appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. 40796-R) by the oppositors,
some of whom are now the petitioners in this case. 10 They argue that the lower court erred in not
excluding the areas they claimed as their own which were wrongfully included in Lot 1 but was
ordered registered in private respondent's name. Disposing of the appeal, the CA ruled:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, with the modification that the registration of Lot 1 of
appellees (private respondent herein) should be confined to the extent only as indicated in the
sketch annexed to the Commissioner's report, Exhibit HH, and excluding therefrom the
landholding of the oppositors, as indicated in the same sketch, the judgment of the trial court is
hereby AFFIRMED. Without costs.
SO ORDERED. 11
The decision became final and executory for which a corresponding entry of judgment was issued
by the Court of Appeals. 12 Later, private respondent filed with the trial court a motion for the
issuance of writ of possession over two lots respectively tenanted by Trium Donato and Rudy
Donato which were likewise respectively claimed by Santiago Partolan (not an oppositor in the
land registration case) and Crispin Baltar (one of the oppositors). 13 In an Order issued on
September 14, 1981, the court a quo denied the motion. 14 When her subsequent motion for
reconsideration was also denied in another Order dated November 25, 1981, 15 private
respondent appealed to the then Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC) which reversed the said two
orders and forthwith issued a decision with the following disposition:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES, CONSIDERED, the ORDERS appealed from are hereby
REVERSED and judgment is hereby entered ordering:
1. The issuance of a WRIT OF POSSESSION in favor of applicant-appellant covering the
landholding claimed by oppositor Crispin Baltar and tenanted by Rudy Donato;
2. Confirming the word "Landholding" in the dispositive portion of the decision in CA-G.R. No.
40796-R as singular and referring only to the landholding opposed by oppositors Segundina and
Otilio Damasen as the only landholding excluded from lot 1; and
3. Ordering the issuance of the WRIT OF POSSESSION in favor of the applicant-appellant
covering the landholdings opposed by the other oppositors who did not appeal the decision of the
lower court dated August 28, 1967.
Without any special pronouncement as to cost.
SO ORDERED. 16
Oppositors filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied by the Court of
Appeals. 17 Hence this petition for review initiated by some of the oppositors in the trial court. The
petition was initially denied by the Court. On motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners, the
case was reinstated and respondent was required to submit her comment to the petition. 18
After a painstaking review of the vintage records of this case and after deciphering the ambiguous
discussions in the petition, 19 the assailed ruling of the respondent court cannot be sustained. The
burden of proof in land registration cases is incumbent on the applicant 20 who must show that he
is the real and absolute owner in fee simple of the land applied for. 21 On him also rests the burden
to overcome the presumption that the land sought to be registered forms part of the public
domain 22 considering that the inclusion in a of the public domain nullifies the title. 23 Undoubtedly,
a land registration proceeding is one which is in rem in character, so that the default order issued
by the court binds the whole world and all persons whether known or unknown, 24 except those
who have appeared and filed their pleadings in the registration case. 25 In the case at bar, those
exempted from the order of general default are the petitioners and the other oppositors mentioned
in footnote number 2.
There is no dispute that the lands occupied and claimed by oppositors-petitioners Segundina and
Otilio Damasen were already finally adjudged excluded from Lot 1 and cannot be registered in
private respondent's name. In other words, the Damasens were declared to have a rightful and
registrable right over their claims of specific portions of Lot 1. What private respondent wants is
that she be installed in possession of the area claimed by Santiago Partolan and Crispin Baltar.
Of these two, only Baltar entered his opposition to private respondent's application for land
registration. Being a proceeding in rem, Partolan is charged with knowledge of the application of
private respondent since the notice was published in accordance with law.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, however, private respondent is not entitled to a writ of possession
of that portion of Lot 1 occupied by Partolan and Baltar. No evidence was shown that private
respondent had a rightful claim whether possessory or proprietary with respect to those areas.
Even if Partolan was excluded by the order of general default and Baltar did not appeal from the
trial court's decision of April 23, 1956, the applicant must still prove and establish that she has
registrable rights over the land which must be grounded on inconvertible evidence and based on
positive and absolute proof. The declaration by the applicant that the land applied for has been in
the possession of her predecessor-in-interest for a certain period, does not constitute the "well-
nigh inconvertible" and "conclusive" evidence required in land registration. 26 Allegations of her
predecessors' ownership of the lot during the Spanish period is self-serving 27 and the declaration
of ownership for purposes of assessment on the payment of tax is not sufficient evidence to prove
ownership. 28 It should be noted that tax declaration, by itself, is not considered conclusive
evidence of ownership in land registration cases. 29 Private respondent should have substantiated
her claim with clear and convincing evidence specifically showing the nature of her claim. Her
description of the circumstances of her own possession in relation to that of her predecessors-in-
interest are mere conclusions of law which require further factual support and substantiation. If
an applicant does not have any rightful claim over real property, the Torrens system of registration
can confirm or record nothing. 30
Private respondent, being the applicant for registration of land and one who relies on some
documents enforcing her alleged title thereto, must prove not only the genuineness of said title
but also the identity of the land therein referred to, 31 inasmuch as this is required by law. The
dispute in this case pertains to the correctness of the survey of specific areas of lands. It must be
borne in mind what defines a piece of land is not the size or area mentioned in its description, but
the boundaries therein laid down, as enclosing the land and indicating its limits. 32 Considering
that the writ of possession was sought by private respondent against persons who were in "actual
possession under claim of ownership," the latter's possession raises a disputable presumption of
ownership. 33 This unrebutted resumption militates against the claim of private respondent,
especially considering the evidentiary rule under Article 434 of the Civil Code that a claimant of a
parcel of land, such as private respondent, must rely on the strength of his title and not on the
weakness of the defendant's claim. 34
Private respondent's contention that the dispositive portion of the CA decision on April 30, 1979
in CA GR 40796-R which mentioned only "landholding" and not "landholdings", thus referring only
to that area claimed by the Damasen spouses, is too trivial. A reading of the said decision and
the foregoing discussion clearly indicates that the land to be registered in private respondent's
name is limited to a certain area stated in the sketch annexed to the Commissioner's report. It
categorically excluded those portions pertaining to the oppositors. Since private respondent failed
to show that she has a proprietary right over the excluded areas, such as the portions occupied
by those against whom the writ of possession was sought for, then the trial court was correct in
refusing to grant the writ as the same has no basis.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and
SET ASIDE and the two orders of the trial court dated September 14, 1981 and November 25,
1981 are REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED

G.R. No. 160895 October 30, 2006

JOSE R. MARTINEZ, petitioner,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

DECISION

TINGA, J.:
The central issue presented in this Petition for Review is whether an order of general default
issued by a trial court in a land registration case bars the Republic of the Philippines, through the
Office of the Solicitor General, from interposing an appeal from the trial court’s subsequent
decision in favor of the applicant.
The antecedent facts follow.
On 24 February 1999, petitioner Jose R. Martinez (Martinez) filed a petition for the registration in
his name of three (3) parcels of land included in the Cortes, Surigao del Sur Cadastre. The lots,
individually identified as Lot No. 464-A, Lot No. 464-B, and Lot No. 370, Cad No. 597, collectively
comprised around 3,700 square meters. Martinez alleged that he had purchased lots in 1952 from
his uncle, whose predecessors-in-interest were traceable up to the 1870s. It was claimed that
Martinez had remained in continuous possession of the lots; that the lots had remained
unencumbered; and that they became private property through prescription pursuant to Section
48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141. Martinez further claimed that he had been constrained to
initiate the proceedings because the Director of the Land Management Services had failed to do
so despite the completion of the cadastral survey of Cortes, Surigao del Sur. 1
The case was docketed as Land Registration Case No. N-30 and raffled to the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Surigao del Sur, Branch 27. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) was
furnished a copy of the petition. The trial court set the case for hearing and directed the publication
of the corresponding Notice of Hearing in the Official Gazette. On 30 September 1999, the OSG,
in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines, opposed the petition on the grounds that appellee’s
possession was not in accordance with Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141; that his
muniments of title were insufficient to prove bona-fide acquisition and possession of the subject
parcels; and that the properties formed part of the public domain and thus not susceptible to
private appropriation.2
Despite the opposition filed by the OSG, the RTC issued an order of general default, even against
the Republic of the Philippines, on 29 March 2000. This ensued when during the hearing of even
date, no party appeared before the Court to oppose Martinez’s petition.3
Afterwards, the trial court proceeded to receive Martinez’s oral and documentary evidence in
support of his petition. On 1 August 2000, the RTC rendered a Decision 4 concluding that Martinez
and his predecessors-in-interest had been for over 100 years in possession characterized as
continuous, open, public, and in the concept of an owner. The RTC thus decreed the registration
of the three (3) lots in the name of Martinez.
From this Decision, the OSG filed a Notice of Appeal dated 28 August 2000, 5 which was approved
by the RTC. However, after the records had been transmitted to the Court of Appeals, the RTC
received a letter dated 21 February 20016 from the Land Registration Authority (LRA) stating that
only Lot Nos. 464-A and 464-B were referred to in the Notice of Hearing published in the Official
Gazette; and that Lot No. 370, Cad No. 597 had been deliberately omitted due to the lack of an
approved survey plan for that property. Accordingly, the LRA manifested that this lot should not
have been adjudicated to Martinez for lack of jurisdiction. This letter was referred by the RTC to
the Court of Appeals for appropriate action.7
On 10 October 2003, the Court of Appeals promulgated the assailed Decision,8 reversing the RTC
and instead ordering the dismissal of the petition for registration. In light of the opposition filed by
the OSG, the appellate court found the evidence presented by Martinez as insufficient to support
the registration of the subject lots. The Court of Appeals concluded that the oral evidence
presented by Martinez merely consisted of general declarations of ownership, without alluding to
specific acts of ownership performed by him or his predecessors-in-interest. It likewise debunked
the documentary evidence presented by Martinez, adjudging the same as either inadmissible or
ineffective to establish proof of ownership.
No motion for reconsideration appears to have been filed with the Court of Appeals by Martinez,
who instead directly assailed its Decision before this Court through the present petition.
We cannot help but observe that the petition, eight (8) pages in all, was apparently prepared with
all deliberate effort to attain nothing more but the perfunctory. The arguments raised center almost
exclusively on the claim that the OSG no longer had personality to oppose the petition, or appeal
its allowance by the RTC, following the order of general default. Starkly put, "the [OSG] has no
personality to raise any issue at all under the circumstances pointed out
hereinabove."9 Otherwise, it is content in alleging that "[Martinez] presented sufficient and
persuasive proof to substantiate the fact that his title to Lot Nos. 464-A and 464-B is worth the
confirmation he seeks to be done in this registration case";10 and that the RTC had since issued
a new Order dated 1 September 2003, confirming Martinez’s title over Lot No. 370.
In its Comment dated 24 May 2004,11 the OSG raises several substantial points, including the
fact that it had duly opposed Martinez’s application for registration before the RTC; that
jurisprudence and the Rules of Court acknowledge that a party in default is not precluded from
appealing the unfavorable judgment; that the RTC had no jurisdiction over Lot No. 370 since its
technical description was not published in the Official Gazette; and that as found by the Court of
Appeals the evidence presented by Martinez is insufficient for registering the lots in his
name.12 Despite an order from the Court requiring him to file a Reply to the Comment, counsel
for Martinez declined to do so, explaining, among others, that "he felt he would only be taxing the
collective patience of this [Court] if he merely repeats x x x what petitioner had succinctly stated
x x x on pages four (4) to seven (7) of his said petition." Counsel for petitioner was accordingly
fined by the Court.13
The Court’s patience is taxed less by redundant pleadings than by insubstantial arguments. The
inability of Martinez to offer an effective rebuttal to the arguments of the OSG further debilitates
what is an already weak petition.
The central question, as posed by Martinez, is whether the OSG could have still appealed the
RTC decision after it had been declared in default. The OSG argues that a party in default is not
precluded from filing an appeal, citing Metropolitan Bank & Trust Co. v. Court of Appeals,14 and
asserts that "[t]he Rules of Court expressly provides that a party who has been declared in default
may appeal from the judgment rendered against him." 15
There is error in that latter, unequivocal averment, though one which does not deter from the
ultimate correctness of the general postulate that a party declared in default is allowed to pose an
appeal. Elaboration is in order.
We note at the onset that the OSG does not impute before this Court that the RTC acted
improperly in declaring public respondent in default, even though an opposition had been filed to
Martinez’s petition. Under Section 26 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, as amended, the order of
default may be issued "[i]f no person appears and answers within the time allowed." The RTC
appears to have issued the order of general default simply on the premise that no oppositor
appeared before it on the hearing of 29 March 2000. But it cannot be denied that the OSG had
already duly filed its Opposition to Martinez’s petition long before the said hearing. As we held
in Director of Lands v. Santiago:16
[The] opposition or answer, which is based on substantial grounds, having been formally filed, it
was improper for the respondent Judge taking cognizance of such registration case to declare
the oppositor in default simply because he failed to appear on the day set for the initial healing.
The pertinent provision of law which states: "If no person appears and answers within the time
allowed, the court may at once upon motion of the applicant, no reason to the contrary appearing,
order a general default to be recorded . . . ," cannot be interpreted to mean that the court can just
disregard the answer before it, which has long been filed, for such an interpretation would be
nothing less than illogical, unwarranted, and unjust. Had the law intended that failure of the
oppositor to appear on the date of the initial hearing would be a ground for default despite his
having filed an answer, it would have been so stated in unmistakable terms, considering the
serious consequences of an order of default. Especially in this case where the greater public
interest is involved as the land sought to be registered is alleged to be public land, the respondent
Judge should have received the applicant's evidence and set another date for the reception of the
oppositor's evidence. The oppositor in the Court below and petitioner herein should have been
accorded ample opportunity to establish the government's claim.17
Strangely, the OSG did not challenge the propriety of the default order, whether in its appeal
before the Court of Appeals or in its petition before this Court. It would thus be improper for the
Court to make a pronouncement on the validity of the default order since the same has not been
put into issue. Nonetheless, we can, with comfort, proceed from same apparent premise of the
OSG that the default order was proper or regular.
The juridical utility of a declaration of default cannot be disputed. By forgoing the need for
adversarial proceedings, it affords the opportunity for the speedy resolution of cases even as it
penalizes parties who fail to give regard or obedience to the judicial processes.
The extent to which a party in default loses standing in court has been the subject of considerable
jurisprudential debate. Way back in 1920, in Velez v. Ramas,18 we declared that the defaulting
defendant "loses his standing in court, he not being entitled to the service of notices in the case,
nor to appear in the suit in any way. He cannot adduce evidence; nor can he be heard at the final
hearing."19 These restrictions were controversially expanded in Lim Toco v. Go Fay,20 decided in
1948, where a divided Court pronounced that a defendant in default had no right to appeal the
judgment rendered by the trial court, except where a motion to set aside the order of default had
been filed. This, despite the point raised by Justice Perfecto in dissent that there was no provision
in the then Rules of Court or any law "depriving a defaulted defendant of the right to be heard on
appeal."21
The enactment of the 1964 Rules of Court incontestably countermanded the Lim Toco ruling.
Section 2, Rule 41 therein expressly stated that "[a] party who has been declared in default may
likewise appeal from the judgment rendered against him as contrary to the evidence or to the law,
even if no petition for relief to set aside the order of default has been presented by him in
accordance with Rule 38."22 By clearly specifying that the right to appeal was available even if no
petition for relief to set aside the order of default had been filed, the then fresh Rules clearly
rendered the Lim Toco ruling as moot.
Another provision in the 1964 Rules concerning the effect of an order of default acknowledged
that "a party declared in default shall not be entitled to notice of subsequent proceedings, nor to
take part in the trial."23 Though it might be argued that appellate proceedings fall part of "the trial"
since there is no final termination of the case as of then, the clear intent of the 1964 Rules was to
nonetheless allow the defaulted defendant to file an appeal from the trial court decision. Indeed,
jurisprudence applying the 1964 Rules was unhesitant to affirm a defaulted defendant’s right to
appeal, as guaranteed under Section 2 of Rule 41, even as Lim Toco was not explicitly
abandoned.
In the 1965 case of Antonio, et al. v. Jacinto,24 the Court acknowledged that the prior necessity of
a ruling setting aside the order of default "however, was changed by the Revised Rules of Court.
Under Rule 41, section 2, paragraph 3, a party who has been declared in default may likewise
appeal from the judgment rendered against him as contrary to the evidence or to the law, even if
no petition for relief to set aside the order of default has been presented by him in accordance
with Rule 38."25 It was further qualified in Matute v. Court of Appeals26 that the new availability of
a defaulted defendant’s right to appeal did not preclude "a defendant who has been illegally
declared in default from pursuing a more speedy and efficacious remedy, like a petition for
certiorari to have the judgment by default set aside as a nullity." 27
In Tanhu v. Ramolete,28 the Court cited with approval the commentaries of Chief Justice Moran,
expressing the reformulated doctrine that following Lim Toco, a defaulted defendant "cannot
adduce evidence; nor can he be heard at the final hearing, although [under Section 2, Rule 41,]
he may appeal the judgment rendered against him on the merits." 29
Thus, for around thirty-odd years, there was no cause to doubt that a defaulted defendant had
the right to appeal the adverse decision of the trial court even without seeking to set aside the
order of default. Then, in 1997, the Rules of Civil Procedure were amended, providing for a new
Section 2, Rule 41. The new provision reads:
SECTION 1. Subject of appeal.—An appeal may be taken from a judgment or final order that
completely disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein when declared by these Rules
to be appealable.
No appeal may be taken from:
(a) An order denying a motion for new trial or reconsideration;
(b) An order denying a petition for relief or any similar motion seeking relief from judgment;
(c) An interlocutory order;
(d) An order disallowing or dismissing an appeal;
(e) An order denying a motion to set aside a judgment by consent, confession or compromise on
the ground of fraud, mistake or duress, or any other ground vitiating consent;
(f) An order of execution;
(g) A judgment or final order for or against or one or more of several parties or in separate claims,
counterclaims, cross-claims and third-party complaints, while the main case is pending, unless
the court allows an appeal therefrom; and
(h) An order dismissing an action without prejudice.
In all the above instances where the judgment or final order is not appealable, the aggrieved party
may file an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65.
Evidently, the prior warrant that a defaulted defendant had the right to appeal was removed from
Section 2, Rule 41. On the other hand, Section 3 of Rule 9 of the 1997 Rules incorporated the
particular effects on the parties of an order of default:
Sec. 3. Default; declaration of.—If the defending party fails to answer within the time allowed
therefor, the court shall, upon motion of the claiming party with notice to the defending party, and
proof of such failure, declare the defending party in default. Thereupon, the court shall proceed
to render judgment granting the claimant such relief as his pleading may warrant, unless the court
in its discretion requires the claimant to submit evidence. Such reception of evidence may be
delegated to the clerk of court.
(a) Effect of order of default.—A party in default shall be entitled to notice of subsequent
proceedings but shall not take part in the trial.
(b) Relief from order of default.—A party declared in default may any time after notice thereof and
before judgment file a motion under oath to set aside the order of default upon proper showing
that his failure to answer was due to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence and that
he has a meritorious defense. In such case, the order of default may be set aside on such terms
and conditions as the judge may impose in the interest of justice.
(c) Effect of partial default.—When a pleading asserting a claim states a common cause of action
against several defending parties, some of whom answer and the others fail to do so, the court
shall try the case against all upon the answers thus filed and render judgment upon the evidence
presented.
(d) Extent of relief to be awarded.—A judgment rendered against a party in default shall not
exceed the amount or be different in kind from that prayed for nor award unliquidated damages.
xxx
It cannot be escaped that the old provision expressly guaranteeing the right of a defendant
declared in default to appeal the adverse decision was not replicated in the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure. Should this be taken as a sign that under the 1997 Rules a defaulted defendant no
longer has the right to appeal the trial court decision, or that the Lim Toco doctrine has been
reinstated?
If post-1997 jurisprudence and the published commentaries to the 1997 Rules were taken as an
indication, the answer should be in the negative. The right of a defaulted defendant to appeal
remains extant.
By 1997, the doctrinal rule concerning the remedies of a party declared in default had evolved
into a fairly comprehensive restatement as offered in Lina v. Court of Appeals:30
a) The defendant in default may, at any time after discovery thereof and before judgment, file a
motion, under oath, to set aside the order of default on the ground that his failure to answer was
due to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable neglect, and that he has meritorious defenses; (Sec
3, Rule 18)
b) If the judgment has already been rendered when the defendant discovered the default, but
before the same has become final and executory, he may file a motion for new trial under Section
1(a) of Rule 37;
c) If the defendant discovered the default after the judgment has become final and executory, he
may file a petition for relief under Section 2 of Rule 38; and
d) He may also appeal from the judgment rendered against him as contrary to the evidence or to
the law, even if no petition to set aside the order of default has been presented by him. (Sec. 2,
Rule 41)31
The fourth remedy, that of appeal, is anchored on Section 2, Rule 41 of the 1964 Rules. Yet even
after that provision’s deletion under the 1997 Rules, the Court did not hesitate to expressly rely
again on the Lina doctrine, including the pronouncement that a defaulted defendant may appeal
from the judgment rendered against him. This can be seen in the cases of Indiana Aerospace
University v. Commission on Higher Education,32 Tan v. Dumarpa,33 and Crisologo v. Globe
Telecom, Inc.34
Annotated textbooks on the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure similarly acknowledge that even under
the new rules, a defaulted defendant retains the right to appeal as previously confirmed under the
old Section 2, Rule 41. In his textbook on Civil Procedure, Justice Francisco answers the question
"What are the remedies available to a defending party in default?" with a reiteration of
the Lina doctrine, including the remedy that a defaulted defendant "may also appeal from the
judgment rendered against him as contrary to the evidence or to the law, even if no petition to set
aside the order of default has been presented by him." 35 Justice Regalado also restates
the Lina rule in his textbook on Civil Procedure, opining that the remedies enumerated therein,
even if under the former Rules of Procedure, "would hold true under the present amended
Rules."36 Former Court of Appeals Justice Herrerra likewise reiterates the Lina doctrine, though
with the caveat that an appeal from an order denying a petition for relief from judgment was no
longer appealable under Section 1, Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules.37 Herrera further adds:
Section 2, paragraph [2] of the former Rule 41, which allows an appeal from a denial of a petition
for relief, was deleted from the present Rule, and confined appeals to cases from a final judgment
or final order that completely disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein, when declared
by these rules to be appealable. A judgment by default may be considered as one that
completely disposes of the case.38
We are hard-pressed to find a published view that the enactment of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure accordingly withdrew the right, previously granted under the 1964 Rules, of a defaulted
defendant to appeal the judgment by default against him. Neither is there any provision under the
1997 Rules which expressly denies the defaulted defendant such a right. If it is perplexing why
the 1997 Rules deleted the previous authorization under the old Section 2, Rule 41 (on subject of
appeal), it is perhaps worth noting that its counterpart provision in the 1997 Rules, now Section
1, Rule 41, is different in orientation even as it also covers "subject of appeal." Unlike in the old
provision, the bulk of the new provision is devoted to enumerating the various rulings from which
no appeal may be taken, and nowhere therein is a judgment by default included. A declaration
therein that a defaulted defendant may still appeal the judgment by default would have seemed
out of place.
Yet even if it were to assume the doubtful proposition that this contested right of appeal finds no
anchor in the 1997 Rules, the doctrine still exists, applying the principle of stare decisis.
Jurisprudence applying the 1997 Rules has continued to acknowledge the Lina doctrine which
embodies this right to appeal as among the remedies of a defendant, and no argument in this
petition persuades the Court to rule otherwise.
In Rural Bank of Sta. Catalina v. Land Bank of the Philippines,39 the Court, through Justice Callejo,
Sr., again provided a comprehensive restatement of the remedies of the defending party declared
in default, which we adopt for purposes of this decision:
It bears stressing that a defending party declared in default loses his standing in court and his
right to adduce evidence and to present his defense. He, however, has the right to appeal from
the judgment by default and assail said judgment on the ground, inter alia, that the amount of the
judgment is excessive or is different in kind from that prayed for, or that the plaintiff failed to prove
the material allegations of his complaint, or that the decision is contrary to law. Such party
declared in default is proscribed from seeking a modification or reversal of the assailed decision
on the basis of the evidence submitted by him in the Court of Appeals, for if it were otherwise, he
would thereby be allowed to regain his right to adduce evidence, a right which he lost in the trial
court when he was declared in default, and which he failed to have vacated. In this case, the
petitioner sought the modification of the decision of the trial court based on the evidence submitted
by it only in the Court of Appeals.40
If it cannot be made any clearer, we hold that a defendant party declared in default retains the
right to appeal from the judgment by default on the ground that the plaintiff failed to prove the
material allegations of the complaint, or that the decision is contrary to law, even without need of
the prior filing of a motion to set aside the order of default. We reaffirm that the Lim Toco doctrine,
denying such right to appeal unless the order of default has been set aside, was no longer
controlling in this jurisdiction upon the effectivity of the 1964 Rules of Court, and up to this day.
Turning to the other issues, we affirm the conclusion of the Court of Appeals that Martinez failed
to adduce the evidence needed to secure the registration of the subject lots in his name.
It should be noted that the OSG, in appealing the case to the Court of Appeals, did not introduce
any new evidence, but simply pointed to the insufficiency of the evidence presented by Martinez
before the trial court. The Court of Appeals was careful to point out that the case against Martinez
was established not by the OSG’s evidence, but by petitioner’s own insufficient evidence. We
adopt with approval the following findings arrived at by the Court of Appeals, thus:
The burden of proof in land registration cases is incumbent on the applicant who must show that
he is the real and absolute owner in fee simple of the land applied for. Unless the applicant
succeeds in showing by clear and convincing evidence that the property involved was acquired
by him or his ancestors by any of the means provided for the proper acquisition of public lands,
the rule is settled that the property must be held to be a part of the public domain. The applicant
must, therefore, present competent and persuasive proof to substantiate his claim. He may not
rely on general statements, or mere conclusions of law other than factual evidence of possession
and title.
Considered in the light of the opposition filed by the Office of the Solicitor General, we find the
evidence adduced by appellee, on the whole, insufficient to support the registration of the subject
parcels in his name. To prove the provenance of the land, for one, all that appellee proffered by
way of oral evidence is the following cursory testimony during his direct examination, viz:
xxxx
Q You mentioned that you are the owner of these three (3) parcels of land. How did you begin
the ownership of the same?
A I bought it from my uncles Julian Martinez and Juan Martinez.
xxxx
Q x x x x Who took possession of these parcels of land from then on?
A I took possession, sir
Q As owner?
A Yes, as owner.
Q Up to the present who is in possession as owner of these parcels of land?
A I took possession.
Q Before Julian Martinez and Juan Martinez sold these parcels of land before you took possession
who were the owners and in possession of these?
A Hilarion Martinez, the father of my predecessors-in-interest and also my grandfather.
xxxx
Court:
Q Of your own knowledge[,] where [sic] did your grandfather Hilarion Martinez acquire these
lands?
A According to my grandfather he bought that land from a certain Juan Casano in the year
1870’s[,] I think.
xxxx
Q By the way[,] when did your grandfather Hilarion Martinez die?
A Either in 1920 or 1921.
Q Since you said your immediate predecessors-in-interest Julian Martinez and Juan Martinez
inherited the same from your grandfather. Can you say it the same that your predecessors-in-
interest were the owners and possessors of the same since 1921 up to the time they sold the land
to you in 1952?
A Yes, sir.
xxxx
In the dreary tradition of most land registration cases, appellee has apparently taken the
absence of representation for appellant at the hearing of his petition as license to be
perfunctory in the presentation of his evidence. Actual possession of land, however,
consists in the manifestation of acts of dominion over it of such a nature as a party would
naturally exercise over his own property. It is not enough for an applicant to declare
himself or his predecessors-in-interest the possessors and owners of the land for which
registration is sought. He must present specific acts of ownership to substantiate the claim
and cannot just offer general statements which are mere conclusions of law requiring
evidentiary support and substantiation.
The record shows that appellee did not fare any better with the documentary evidence he adduced
before the trial court. The October 20, 1952 Deed of Sale by which appellee claims to have
purchased the subject parcels from his uncle, Julian Martinez, was not translated from the
vernacular in which it was executed and, by said token, was inadmissible in evidence.
Having submitted a white print copy of the survey plan for Lot Nos. 464-A and 464-B,
appellee also submitted the tracing cloth plan for Lot No. 370 which does not, however,
appear to be approved by the Director of Lands. In much the same manner that the submission
of the original tracing cloth plan is a mandatory statutory requirement which cannot be waived,
the rule is settled that a survey plan not approved by the Director of Lands is not admissible in
evidence.41
These findings of the Court of Appeals, arrived at after a sufficiently extensive evaluation of the
evidence, stand in contrast to that contained in the RTC decision, encapsulated in a one-
paragraph précis of the factual allegations of Martinez concerning how he acquired possession
of the subject properties. The Court of Appeals, of course, is an appropriate trier of facts, and a
comparison between the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals and that of the RTC clearly
demonstrates that it was the appellate court which reached a more thorough and considered
evaluation of the evidence.
As correctly held by the Court of Appeals, the burden of proof expected of the petitioner in a land
registration case has not been matched in this case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 85515 June 6, 1991

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
FLORENCIA MARASIGAN, and HON. COURT OF APPEALS, respondent
The Solicitor General for petitioner
J. Renato V. Leviste for private respondent.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

This is an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court to set aside the Decision of 29
August 19881 of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 151632 and its Resolution of 18
October 19883 which, respectively, affirmed the Order of Branch 39 of the Regional Trial Court of
Oriental Mindoro, Fourth Judicial Region, of 17 June 1987 4 granting the petition of private
respondent for the reconstitution of the original and the owner's duplicate copies of a transfer
certificate of title despite lack of service of notices to adjoining owners and the actual occupants
of the land, and denied petitioner's motion for the reconsideration of the Decision.5
The issue in this petition is whether notices to adjoining owners and the actual occupants of the
land are mandatory and jurisdictional in judicial reconstitution of certificates of title.
On 4 November 1986 private respondent, claiming to be one of the heirs of Epifania Alcano,
registered owner of a parcel of land located in Canubing, Calapan, Oriental Mindoro, containing
an area of 33,294 square meters, and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-66062 in the
Registry of Deeds of Calapan, Oriental Mindoro, filed a petition for the reconstitution of "the
original and duplicate copy (sic)" of the said Transfer Certificate of Title on the basis of the owner's
duplicate copy.6 She alleged therein that she is in possession "of the title subject matter of" the
petition but she, however, did not allege the reason why she asked for the reconstitution.
In its Order of 4 November 1986 the trial court set the petition for hearing and required its
publication in the Official Gazette, which was done. Required notices, except to the adjoining
owners and the actual occupants of the land, were given.

Upon prior authority of the trial court, reception of private respondent's evidence was made by the
OIC-Branch Clerk of Court. Thereafter, on 17 June 1987, the trial court handed down an
Order7 which made the following findings of facts:
From the evidence adduced by the petitioner, it appears that she is one of the vendees of a certain
parcel of land situated in Malamig, Calapan, Oriental Mindoro, containing an area of 33,294
square meters, embraced in and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-66062 and
registered in the name of Epifania Alcano (Exh. "B") as evidenced by a document of sale executed
by the registered owner (Exh. "I"). The original copy of said title which was usually kept in the
Office of the Register of Deeds of this province was destroyed by reason of the fire which razed
to the ground the entire Capitol Building then housing said office on August 12, 1977 (Exh. "C").
It appears further that there are no co-owner's, mortgagee's, lessee's duplicate copy of said
certificate of title which had been previously issued by the Register of Deeds of this province; that
the petitioner is in actual possession of the area of 16,647 square meters which was sold to her
and that she is benefiting from the produce of the improvements existing on the area belonging
to her.
and disquisition:
Accordingly, finding the instant petition to be well-founded and there being no opposition to its
approval, same is hereby granted. The Register of Deeds of this province is hereby directed to
reconstitute the original and the owner's duplicate copies of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-
66062 in the name of the registered owners (sic) thirty days after receipt of this Order by the
Register of Deeds of this province and the Commissioner of the Land Registration Commission,
on the basis of the existing owner's duplicate copy thereof.
Petitioner herein, through the Office of the Solicitor General, appealed from said Order to the
Court of Appeals and made the following assignment of errors:
I THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ACQUIRING JURISDICTION OVER THE INSTANT PETITION
FOR RECONSTITUTION OF THE ORIGINAL AND THE OWNER'S DUPLICATE COPIES OF
TCT NO. T-66062 WITHOUT THE REQUISITE SERVICE OF NOTICE OF HEARING TO THE
ADJOINING OWNERS AND ACTUAL OCCUPANTS OF THE LAND AS REQUIRED BY
SECTION 13 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 26.
II THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION FOR RECONSTITUTION. 8
The appeal was docketed as C.A.-G.R. CV No. 15163.
In support of the first assigned error, petitioner maintained that the requirement of Section 13 of
R.A. No. 26 is not only mandatory but jurisdictional as held in MWSS vs. Sison, et al., 124 SCRA
394.
In its Decision of 29 August 1988 9 respondent Court of Appeals brushed aside the arguments of
petitioner and held that:
1) Section 13 of R.A. No. 26 which "requires the sending out of notices to the adjoining owners
and actual occupants to vest jurisdiction," appears to have been "at least impliedly amended by
Presidential Decree No. 1529" because it is inconsistent with Section 23 of said Decree which
provides that in original registration cases publication of notices of initial hearing in the Official
Gazette is sufficient to confer jurisdiction on the court. Section 110 of said Decree provides:
Sec. 110. Reconstitution of lost or destroyed original of Torrens Title. –– Original copies of
certificates of title lost or destroyed in offices of Register of Deeds as well as liens and
encumbrances affecting such titles shall be reconstituted judicially in accordance with the
procedure prescribed in Republic Act No. 26 insofar as not inconsistent with this
Decree. (emphasis supplied)
2) The MWSS vs. Sison case is not on all fours with the instant case for in the former both the
original and the owner's duplicate copies of the certificate of title were claimed to be lost, unlike
in the instant case where the duplicate copy is intact; it was not shown that the original copy in
the custody of the Register of Deeds was destroyed; the copies of the titles alleged to have been
lost were later found intact in the names of other persons; and, more importantly, the Petition was
not published in the Official Gazette but in the Manila Daily Bulletin, unlike in the instant case.
3) The duty to send notices to adjoining owners and actual occupants is imposed upon the court,
not the party filing the petition for reconstitution (herein private respondent); any lapse in regard
thereto should not prejudice or injure the latter.
4) Finally, in the instant case, the private respondent cannot be blamed for the loss of the original
copy of the transfer certificate of title; it was lost by reason of the burning of the Capitol Building;
she should not, therefore, be put to trouble, anxiety and expenses.
Petitioner's motion to reconsider the Decision having been denied by the Court of Appeals in its
Resolution of 18 October 1988, petitioner filed the instant petition on 22 December 1988 alleging
therein that:
a. The respondent Honorable Court of Appeals acted contrary to law when it did not consider that
the trial court is without jurisdiction over the instant petition for reconstitution of the original owners
(sic) duplicate copies of TCT No. 66062 as there is no requisite service of notice of hearing to the
adjoining owners and actual occupants of the land as required by Section 13 of R.A. No. 26;
b. The respondent Honorable Court of Appeals acted contrary to law in granting the petition for
reconstitution of the original and duplicate copies of TCT No. 66062.
In Our resolution of 16 January 1989,10 We required the respondents to comment on the petition.
Private respondent filed her comment on 10 February 1989. 11 She practically copied therein the
questioned decision of respondent Court of Appeals.
In Our resolution of 15 March 1989 We gave due course to the petition and required the parties
to submit simultaneously their respective memoranda, which petitioner complied with on 3 July
198912 and private respondent on 10 June 1989.13
The petition is impressed with merit.
The questioned Decision of 29 August 1988 and the Resolution of 18 October 1988 of respondent
Court of Appeals, as well as the Order of Branch 39 of the Regional Trial Court of Oriental Mindoro
of 17 June 1987, must be set aside.
Section 13 of R.A. No. 26 has not been altered, modified or amended.1âwphi1 Since the
requirement therein of service of notice of the initial hearing to the adjoining owners and the actual
occupants of the land was not complied with in this case, the court below did not, therefore,
acquire jurisdiction over the petition for the reconstitution of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 66062.
Accordingly, the respondent Court of Appeals gravely erred in affirming the Order of the trial court
granting the petition and in holding that said Section 13 has been "at least impliedly amended" by
Section 23 in relation to Section 110 of P.D. No. 1529 which took effect on 11 June 1978.
In Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, et al.,14 We ruled that the requirements of Section 12
and Section 13 of R.A. No. 26 reading as follows:
Sec. 12. Petitions for reconstitution from sources enumerated in sections 2 (c), 2 (d), 2 (e), 2 (f),
3 (c), 3 (e) and/or 3 (f) of this Act, shall be filed with the proper Court of First Instance, by the
registered owner, his assigns, or any person having an interest in the property. The petition shall
state or contain, among other things, the following: (a) that the owner's duplicate of the certificate
of title had been lost or destroyed; (b) that no co-owner's mortgagee's or lessee's duplicate had
been issued, or, if any had been issued, the same had been lost or destroyed; (c) the location,
area and boundaries of the property; (d) the nature and description of the buildings or
improvements, if any, which do not belong to the owner of the land, and the names and addresses
of the owners of such buildings or improvements; (e) the names and addresses of the occupants
or persons in possession of the property, of the owners of the adjoining properties and of all
persons who may have any interest in the property; (f) a detailed description of the encumbrances,
if any, affecting the property; and (g) a statement that no deeds or other instruments affecting the
property have been presented for registration, or, if there be any, the registration thereof has not
been accomplished, as yet. All the documents, or authenticated copies thereof, to be introduced
in evidence in support of the petition for reconstitution shall be attached thereto and filed with the
same: Provided, That in case the reconstitution is to be made exclusively from sources
enumerated in section 2 (f) or 3 (f) of this Act, the petition shall be further accompanied with a
plan and technical description of the property duly approved by the Chief of the General Land
Registration Office, or with a certified copy of the description taken from a prior certificate of title
covering the same property.
Sec. 13. The court shall cause a notice of petition, filed under the preceding section, to be
published, at the expense of the petition, twice in successive issues of the Official Gazette, and
to be posted on the main entrance of the provincial building and of the municipal building of the
municipality or city in which the land is situated, at least thirty days prior to the date of hearing.
The court shall likewise cause a copy of the notice to be sent, by registered mail or otherwise, at
the expense of the petitioner, to every person named therein whose address is known, at least
thirty days prior to the date of hearing. Said notice shall state, among other things, the number of
the lost or destroyed certificates of title, if known, the name of the registered owner, the name of
the occupants or person in possession of the property, the owner of the adjoining properties and
all other interested parties, the location, area and boundaries of the property, and the date on
which all persons having any interest therein must appear and file their claim or objection to the
petition. The petitioner shall, at the hearing, submit proof of the publication, posting and service
of the notice as directed by the court.
are mandatory and jurisdictional and non-compliance therewith would render all proceedings
utterly null and void. We reiterated this rule in Tahanan Development Corp. vs. Court of Appeals,
et al.15 where, in respect particularly to the required notice to an adjoining owner, We categorically
declared:
The failure or omission to notify Tahanan as the owner, possessor or occupant of property
adjacent to Lot 2 or as claimant or person having interest, title or claim to a substantial portion
(about 9 hectares more or less) of Lot 2, as well as the failure or omission to post copies of the
Notice of Hearing on the main entrance of the municipality (sic) on which the land is situated, at
the provincial building and at the municipal building thereat, are fatal to the acquisition and
exercise of jurisdiction by the trial court.
In MWSS vs. Sison et al., supra., We further re-affirmed the foregoing doctrine:
The publication of the petition in two successive issues of the Official Gazette, the service of the
notice of hearing to the adjoining owners and actual occupants of the land, as well as the posting
of the notices in the main entrance of the provincial and municipal buildings where the property
lies at least 30 days prior to the date of the hearing, as prescribed by Section 13 of the law, are
mandatory and jurisdictional requisites.
This re-affirmation is clear enough as to leave no room for any convoluted logic to support a
sophistic distinction between said case and the instant case and an implausible interpretation of
the law.
We further find to be totally unfounded the view of the Court of Appeals that Section 13 of R.A.
No. 26 "appears to have been at least impliedly amended by Presidential Decree No. 1529."
There is absolutely nothing in P.D. No. 1529 which intimates or suggests, indirectly or even
remotely, an intention to amend said Section 13. The Court of Appeals either misapprehended or
read out of context that portion of Section 23 of P.D. No. 1529 reading as follows:
. . . that the publication in the Official Gazette shall be sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the
court.
Worse, it committed a serious blunder when it used this clause to support its proposition of implied
amendment of Section 13 of R.A. No. 26 by virtue of Section 110 of the Decree.
Section 23 of P.D. No. 1529 is entitled Notice of initial hearing, publication, etc. and provides, inter
alia, that:
The public shall be given notice of initial hearing of the application for land registration by means
of (1) publication; (2) mailing; and (3) posting.
As regards publication, it specifically provides:
Upon receipt of the order of the court setting the time for initial hearing, the Commissioner of Land
Registration shall cause a notice of initial hearing to be published once in the Official Gazette and
once in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines: Provided, however, that the
publication in the Official Gazette shall be sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the court . . .
This proviso was never meant to dispense with the requirement of notice by mailing and
by posting.1âwphi1 What it simply means is that in so far as publication is concerned, there is
sufficient compliance if the notice is published in the Official Gazette, although the law mandates
that it be published "once in the Official Gazette and once in a newspaper of general circulation
in the Philippines." However, publication in the latter alone would not suffice. This is to accord
primacy to the official publication.
That such proviso was never meant to dispense with the other modes of giving notice, which
remain mandatory and jurisdictional, is obvious from Section 23 itself. If the intention of the law
were otherwise, said section would not have stressed in detail the requirements of mailing of
notices to all persons named in the petition who, per Section 15 of the Decree, include owners of
adjoining properties, and occupants of the land.
The above view of the Court of Appeals negates one of the principal purposes of the Decree,
which is clearly expressed in its exordium, namely, to strengthen the Torrens System through
safeguards to prevent anomalous titling of real property. It opens wide the doors to fraud and
irregularities in land registration proceedings and in proceedings for the reconstitution of
certificates of title. Judicial notice may be taken of the fact that only very few have access to or
could read the Official Gazette, which comes out in few copies only per issue. If publication in the
Official Gazette of the notice of hearing in both proceedings would be sufficient to confer
jurisdiction upon the court, owners of both unregistered and registered lands may someday
painfully find out that others have certificates of title to their land because scheming parties had
caused their registration, or secured reconstituted certificates of title thereto and sold the property
to third parties.
The belabored argument of respondent Court of Appeals that it would be unfair to impose upon
the private respondent the duty to comply with the requirement of service of notice because it was
not through her fault that the original copy of the Transfer Certificate of Title was lost is
unacceptable since the law does not make any exception or exemptions; besides, it is, to say the
least, a ludicrous proposition. Equally unacceptable is the opinion of said Court that it was the
duty of the trial court to serve the required notices and private respondent should not be prejudiced
if it failed to do so. It suggests, quite unfortunately, and gives the wrong impression that mandatory
requirements of notices may be dispensed with if the failure to comply with them is attributable to
the court. It likewise negates the principles of responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency which
the Constitution directs public officials and employees to faithfully observe. We should stress here
that lapses on the part of courts or their personnel cannot be made a reason or justification for
non-observance of laws. By the very nature of their functions, they should be the first to obey the
laws.
IN THE LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered GRANTING the instant
petition and SETTING ASIDE the Decision of 29 August 1988 and the Resolution of 18 October
1988 of respondent Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 15163 and the Order of Branch No. 39
of the Regional Trial Court of Oriental Mindoro, Fourth Judicial Region in Petition No. 11,456.
Costs against private respondent.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-35787 April 11, 1980
FAUSTA FRANCISCO, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, ALEJANDRO F. SANTOS and RAMONA FRANCISCO (Substituted
by JOSE SAN DIEGO; CELSO GARROVILLAS, HONORIO GARROVILLAS, EDILBERTO
GARROVILLAS, AMALIA GARROVILLAS; VIRGINIA GARROVILLAS, PACITA
GARROVILLAS and LOPE GARROVILLAS), respondents.
Sumulong Law Office for petitioner.
Candido G. del Rosario & Associates for private respondents.

BARREDO, J.:
Petition for review of the judgment rendered by a vote of 3 to 2 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. No. 37818-R, entitled Alejandro F. Santos and Ramona Francisco, applicants-respondents,
vs. Fausta Francisco, petitioner-appellee, reversing the decision of the Court of First Instance of
Rizal in Land Registration Case No. N-4383, L.R.C. Record No. N-25140, wherein said trial court
granted the petition for review of the decree of registration earlier issued by it, after a virtually ex-
parte hearing and judgment, and ordered said previous decision and decree set aside and the
land in question registered instead in the name of now herein petitioner Fausta Francisco.
As recounted in the original decision of the Court of Appeals, on May 23, 1964, the
aforementioned trial court rendered a decision ordering the registration of the land in dispute
situated in Barrio Singalong, Antipolo, Rizal, in the names of herein private respondents Alejandro
F. Santos and Ramona Francisco, which decision became final and executory, and on June 27,
1964 the order was issued to the Land Registration Commission to issue the corresponding
decree, which it did, No. N-99323 on July 13, 1964, followed by the issuance of Original Certificate
of Title No. 4064 in their names.
According to the Record on APPEAL on July 31, 1964, herein petitioner Fausta Francisco, filed a
petition for review alleging under oath inter alia that:
2. She is the absolute owner in fee simple of the land applied for in this case, which is situated in
Barrio Singalong, Municipality of Antipolo, Province of Rizal and covered by Plan Psu-1992781
and now embraced in Original Certificate of Title No. 4064 of the Register of Deeds of the Province
of Rizal.
3. She and her predecessors in interest have been in continuous, open, adverse, peaceful and
uninterrupted possession of the land in dispute since time immemorial.
4. Alejandro F. Santos and Ramona Francisco obtained a Decree of Registration No. N-99332
for the parcel of land in question through fraud. In their application dated October 29, 1963, they
claimed to be the owners of this parcel of land by possession. This is not true. Alejandro F. Santos
and Ramona Francisco have never been in possession of the parcel of land in question.
5. Petitioner and her five (5) brothers and sisters namely, Anastacia, Leoncio, Paula, Perfecta, all
surnamed Francisco, with residence in Morong, Rizal and Venancia Francisco Nepomuceno,
residing in Calumpang, Marikina, Rizal, who are the adjacent registered owners of the land in
question, were not notified of any alleged survey of this land nor of the present application for
registration.
6. Neither petitioner nor her tenant was notified of the alleged survey nor of the present application
for registration as actual occupant and possession of the land in question.
7. Notice of this land registration proceedings was published in The Official Gazzette but herein
petitioner does not read it.
8. The land in question was never actually surveyed by or for the applicants for reason among
others that when petitioner caused the recent survey of the same there were no monuments found
on this land.
Herein private respondents opposed the above petition for review maintaining principally that:
4. That in her petition for review, petitioner claims to be the owner of the land covered by the
decree of registration but failed to state in said petition how she became the owner thereof and
under what color of title does she claim to be owner of the land; neither did petitioner attached
any instrument supporting her claim other than a supposed affidavit of merit signed by her alone
containing allegations amounting to the existence of intrinsic fraud only; that assuming without
admitting that there was indeed intrinsic fraud, nevertheless said allegations even if true is not
sufficient ground for reopening and review of the corresponding decree of registration;
5. That petitioner's petition is not sufficient in form and substance and therefore should be
dismissed by the Honorable Court. In support of this contention, we most respectfully quote the
following doctrine:
The essential requisite for a valid petition for the reopening and review of a decree under Sec. 38
of Act 496 is that it be made only by a person who has been deprived of land or of any interest
therein by virtue of the decree sought to be reconsidered. A mere claim of ownership is not
sufficient and the petition of any person whose interest in the land is short of absolute ownership,
lacks the essential requisite, and for that reason should not be considered. Thus in the case of
Broce vs. Apurado, 26 Phil. 581, 586, the Supreme Court clearly and unequivocably said: "In
order to obtain the benefits of section 38 the applicant (1) must have an estate or interest in the
land, and (2) must show fraud in the procurement of the decree of registration. A mere claim of
ownership is not sufficient to avoid a certificate of title obtained under the Land Registration Act.'
(Philippine Land Registration Law, Vargas, Mañalac & Manalac p. 284). (Rec. on Appeal, pp. 20-
22.)
It may be noted at this point that because the Bureau of Lands withdrew its opposition to herein
respondents' application, Judge Guillermo Torres, the trial judge, commissioned the clerk of court
to receive their evidence and subsequently rendered his original favorable decision. In contrast,
when Judge Torres gave due course to herein petitioner's petition for review, he held a trial and
heard the evidence of the parties himself, with private respondent Alejandro F. Santos and his
former witnesses Lauro Cruz and Eugenio Francisco as well as petitioners and her witnesses
testifying in open court. After such trial, on April 5, 1966, the same judge, the Honorable Guillermo
Torres, rendered the new decision now in dispute reversing that of May 23, 1964, thus setting
aside the latter, the decree of registration and original certificate of title of private respondents
issued pursuant thereto and ordering in stead that the land under litigation be registered in the
name of petitioner. When Justice Mateo Canonoy prepared the first draft of the decision, the other
two members of the Division, Justices Antonio Lucero and Eulogio Serrano disagreed with him.
Justices Juan F. Enriquez and Manuel P. Barcelona were designated to join to form the division
of five required by law, and on March 17, 1972, with Justice Canonoy as ponente and Justices
Enriquez and Barcelona concurring, the decision favorable to herein private respondents was
promulgated. Justice Serrano dissented in-art extended opinion pointing out the existence of
actual fraud committed by private respondents in securing the judgment in their favor and
sustaining, with a careful analysis of the relevant and material evidence, the contention of
petitioner that she, by herself and thru her predecessor in interest has been the one, instead of
respondents, in continuous, open, adverse possession of the land in issue, under a claim of title.
In due time, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. which was denied with the same votation.
In reversing himself in the 'light of the evidence he himself had subsequently heard, instead of his
clerk of court, unlike in the original proceeding, Judge Torres reasoned out and made 'his findings
thus:
Petitioner alleges in her petition for review that applicants Alejandro F. Santos and Ramona
Francisco obtained through fraud Decree No. N-99332; that she is the absolute owner in fee
simple of that parcel of land in question situated in Barrio Singalong, Municipality of Antipolo,
Province of Rizal described in Plan Psu-1992791 and embraced in Original Certificate of Title No.
4064 of the Registry of Deeds of the Province of Rizal; that she has been in possession of said
land, together with her father who is her predecessor in interest, openly, peacefully, adversely
and continuously since time immemorial On the other hand, applicants-respondents contend in
their application for registration that the land in question was owned by applicant Alejandro
Santos' father, Toribio Santos, and that upon the latter's death in 1922, he inherited the said parcel
of land. However in the presentation of his evidence in this petition for review, Alejandro F. Santos
testified that this land had no previous owner; that he merely occupied this land sometime in 1920
and had been in possession of the same for more than thirty years.
The main issues in this case are: (a) Whether or not the applicant secured thru fraud Decree No.
N-99332 and (b) Who is the true and absolute owner of the land in question.
It appears clearly from the evidence that since 1918, Diego Francisco, father of petitioner, had
occupied the parcel of land in question; that this land is a portion of a bigger parcel of land with
an area of fifty hectares which was occupied and possessed by Diego Francisco since 1918.
Comprising this fifty-hectare parcel of land are the land in question described in Plan Psu-199278,
Exhibit A, the land described in Plan Psu-199277, Exhibit B, and the land described in plan H-1
14240, Exhibit C, embraced in Transfer Certificate of Title No. 23434, Exhibit J, formerly the
homestead patent of Diego Francisco. The whole area of fifty hectares is fenced with barbed wire
and planted with mango trees, a portion planted to palay and a bigger portion devoted to pasturing
of carabaos. All these improvements were introduced by petitioner's father, Diego Francisco,
during his lifetime. In 1940, Diego Francisco, was able to obtain a title on a portion of this big
parcel of land, now embraced in Transfer Certificate of Title No. 23434, Exhibit J, in the names of
petitioner Fausta Francisco and her sister and brother, Anastacia, Leoncio, Venancia, Perfecta
and Paula, all surnamed Francisco.
The petitioner's father, Diego Francisco, died in the year 1941 and after his death, petitioner
continued to possess the land in question which was not embraced in Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 23434, Exhibit J, and her possession over said portion of the land is open, public, peaceful,
continuous, adverse against the whole world, and in the concept of an owner. In 1964, petitioner
had the land in question surveyed by a private land surveyor, Jose de Guzman, who, upon inquiry
from the Bureau of Lands, discovered that there was already a survey plan in the name of the
applicant in this case, Alejandro F. Santos. Petitioner likewise discovered that this land is already
titled in the name of the said Alejandro F. Santos.
It was clearly established that petitioner, as adjacent owner of the land in question was not notified
of the alleged survey. The Surveyor's Certificate, Exhibit 6, with respect to notices of adjoining
owners cannot be given any credence. It could be seen from Exhibit 6 that Jose P. Cruz, who is
no longer the adjoining owner of the land in litigation and who is admittedly dead was notified on
October 29, 1962 and that said Jose P. Cruz appeared on the date of the survey, although being
dead, it was, impossible for him to appear on the date of the survey. The Santol Creek was also
allegedly notified but that it did not appear. This is ridiculous. The Santol Creek is not a person or
entity, and the one notified should have been the proper government official or office. Similarly, it
was made to appear by applicants-respondents that Diego Francisco, petitioner's father, an
adjoining owner, was notified of the survey. Diego Francisco has been long dead, since 1941,
and neither petitioner nor any of her brother or sisters received the purported notice. By thus
avoiding the sending of actual notices to the petitioner and other interested parties, applicants
were able to have the land in question surveyed, Plan Psu-1992791. It is likewise admitted that
neither petitioner nor any of her brother or sisters as adjacent owners were notified of the
registration proceedings in this case. It was established thru the testimony of the petitioner that
she does not read the Official Gazzette, the publication where the notice of initial hearing was
published. By thus avoiding the sending of actual notice of initial hearing to petitioner as adjoining
owner and as actual owner and possessor of the land in question, the applicants were able to
obtain the decision dated May 23, 1964 in their favor. Furthermore, the Court is convinced by the
evidence that it is petitioner and her father before her, who have actually possessed and occupied
the land in question, and not the applicants Alejandro F. Santos and Ramona Francisco. It was
shown thru the testimony of Quiterio San Jose, former Mayor of Teresa, Rizal, who is an adjacent
owner across the Santol Creek, that Alejandro F. Santos was never in possession of this land in
question and that it was Diego Francisco who was the one in possession of this parcel of land
during his lifetime and after his death, his heirs. By virtue of this continuous, adverse, and open
possession of the land in question for forty-seven (47) years now, Fausta Francisco has become
the absolute owner of this parcel of land. (Pp. 26-31, Record on Appeal.)
To the foregoing, We only need to add by adoption the following well taken discussion by
distinguished counsel of petitioner in his memorandum of December 13, 1973:
The true adjoining owners at the
time of the filing of application
When the applicants, the spouses Alejandro Santos and Ramona Francisco, filed their application
for registration on October 29, 1963, they did not state the true adjoining owners at the North,
East, and West, of the land in question.
At the North, they stated that the adjoining owner was Diego Francisco, when in truth and in fact,
as they knew full well, Diego Francisco died in 1942 and his homestead patent title over the land
at the North had been cancelled and transferred to his children-heirs namely Fausta (petitioner
herein), Anastacia, Paula, Perfects, Venancia, and Leoncio, all surnamed Francisco (see TCT
No. 23434 issued to the latter and marked as Exh. 'J').
At the East, they stated that the adjoining owner was Jose P. Cruz, when in truth and in fact, as
they knew full well, Jose P. Cruz died in 1952 and his homestead patent title over the land at the
East had been cancelled and transferred to Estela Angeles to whom his children (Lauro Cruz and
two others sold on January 1, 1954 (see TCT No. 32697 issued to Estela Angeles marked as
Exh. 'L-2'). On November 7, 1957, Estela Angeles sold the land to Vicente Antonio who issued T.
C. T. No. 32697 (Exh. 'L-3'). On August 31, 1959, Vicente Antonio sold the land in favor of Antonio
Astudillo (TCT No. 96527 (Exh. 'L-4'), who in turn sold the land to Arturo Rojas (TCT No. 100145
(Exh. 'L-5') who on May 22, 1962 sold the land to Pilar v. Romack who was issued T. C. T. No.
100146 on June 7, 1962.
At the West, they stated that the adjoining owner was Eugenio Francisco, when in truth and in
fact, as they knew full well, at the time of the filing of their application, Paula Francisco (sister of
petitioner Fausta Francisco) was the actual occupant and possessor of the said parcel of land.
The application for registration of the said land filed by Eugenio Francisco in the Court of First
Instance of Rizal was opposed by Paula Francisco and is to be noted that Eugenio Francisco was
not even present during the hearing and did not continue presenting evidence. After Pauli
Francisco had presented her evidence, the Court of First Instance decided that the said land at
the West should be registered and decreed in the name of Paula Francisco, which decision
became final as Eugenio Francisco did not appeal therefrom, resulting in the issuance of decree
and OCT No. 6945 to Paula Francisco (see the said decision of the CFI Rizal attached to our
motion for reconsideration dated August 26, 1966 filed with the respondent Court of Appeals,
Annex 'B' of Petition).
Motive of the Applicants in not stating the true adjoining owners

The intent and motive of applicants in not stating that the true adjoining co-owners at the North
were Fausta Francisco and her sisters and brother, was because they knew that Fausta was the
one occupying the land in question or at least that Fausta was claiming the land in question to be
hers, so if notice of their application for registration were sent to her as an adjoining co-owner at
the North, she would surely oppose their application for registration.
The intent and motive of the applicants in making it appear that the adjoining owner at the East
was still Jose P. Cruz, when in truth it was already Estela Angeles, was because they were
intending to utilize Lauro Cruz (son of Jose P. Cruz) as their witness to testify, as he did testify,
before the Deputy Clerk of Court that he was the boundary owner at the East and as such knew
that applicant Alejandro Santos had been in possession of the land in question since 1929 when
the latter's father died.
The intent and motive of the applicants in not stating the true fact that both Eugenio Francisco
and Paula Francisco were claiming to be the owners of the land at the West, was because they
knew that Paula was the sister of petitioner Fausta Francisco, so if notice of their application for
registration were sent to Paula as one of the claimants to the land at the West, Paula would surely
tell her sister Fausta about it, and the latter would surely oppose their application for registration.
Moreover, applicants were intending to utilize Eugenio Francisco as their witness to testify, as he
did testify, before the Deputy Clerk of Court that he was the boundary owner at the West and as
such knew that the applicant Alejandro Santos had been in possession of the land in question
since 1929 when the latter's father died.
It will thus be seen that the applicants did not state the true adjoining owners with the deliberate
intention of preventing notices of their application for registration to be sent to petitioner Fausta
Francisco and to her sister Paula Francisco, and in that way prevent petitioner from appearing in
the land registration case and file an opposition to their application for registration. (Pp. 198-201,
Record.)
Indeed, how could two dead persons and a creek be legally upheld as having been separately
properly notified of the application here under discussion? It is high time, the Court made it
patently clear and emphasized that it is the inescapable duty of surveyors to find out by
themselves who are the occupants and boundary owners of any land being surveyed by them for
purposes of registration. Beyond doubt, had the surveyors of respondents complied with this
simple and logical obligation imposed by the very nature of their professional undertaking, the
obvious anomalies extant in the instant case would not have happened. No dead persons nor a
creek could have been certified as duly notified by the Land Registration Office of the application!
Besides, as pointed out in the above-quoted portions of petitioner's memorandum, the boundary
owner at the north in 1963 when the application of respondents was filed could not have been
Diego Francisco, for the simple reason that said person had died twenty-one years before or in
1942. Factually, under ordinary circumstances, if respondents were indeed in possession of the
land in dispute, it stands to reason they would have known of their neighbor's long demise. More,
legally speaking, Diego Francisco had a Torrens Title which was duly transferred subsequently in
TCT 23434 (Exh. J) to the name of his children. Registration under the Torrens System
constitutes, at the very least, constructive notice to any boundary owner of who is his neighbor.
The same observations may be made insofar as Jose P. Cruz, the alleged former boundary owner
in the east. He had died in 1952, eleven years before the application, and the title he had acquired
over his land had been transferred several times in the Office of the Register of Deeds to Estela
Angeles, T. C. T. 32697, Exh. L-2; to Vicente Antonio, T. C. T. No. 32697 (sic) Exh. L-3; to Antonio
Astudillo, T. C. T. 96527, Exh. L-4; to Arturo Rojas, T. C. T. 100145, E Exh. L-5; to Pilar V.
Romack, T. C. T. 100146 on June 7, 1962. (See Petitioner's memo pp. 1-2.) These facts have
never been denied in any pleading of respondents.
Again, respondents knew or ought to have known that the boundary owner in the west could not
have been Eugenio Francisco, because it is judicial record that OCT No. 6945 was actually issued
to Paula Francisco who had opposed Eugenio's attempt to have the land registered in his name.
(See Annex B of the petition.)
In addition, it is admitted that petitioner was never notified of the application, let alone her not
having had any chance to read or perhaps even know the Official Gazzette.
In the light of the foregoing, the matters that require Our resolution in the instant case may be
said to be one of mixed fact and law, but apparently more legal than factual. Did respondents
commit fraud of the nature contemplated in Section 38 of the Land Registration Act, (Act 496) that
would warrant the cancellation of the decree of registration and Torrens Title already issued to
them? The pole star jurisprudential pronouncements in this respect are found, as every student
of Land Registration knows, in Grey Alba vs. De la Cruz, 17 Phil. 49, by Justice Trent. Therein, it
was declared definitely that a land registration proceeding is one in rem and notice thereof by
publication binds the whole world, inclusive of those who may be adversely affected thereby,
innocent factually as they might have been of such publication. Understandably, such a rule could
be the only way to give meaning to the finality and indisputability of the Torrens title to be issued.
It may be said that to a certain degree such a strict rule could result in actual injustice, considering
not only the rather irregular publication of the Official Gazzette and other publications, and, of
course, the illiteracy, not to speak, of the inaccessability to those concerned of such publications.
Thus, Grey Alba should not be read, as the majority in the Court of Appeals decision under review,
did as entirely depriving victims of obvious fraudulent intent of the remedy of having a decree
reopened. This is clear in that decision itself. As the present Chief Justice, Hon. Enrique M.
Fernando, pointed out in Minlay vs. Sandoval 53 SCRA 1, "all that is required is a showing
according to this leading Grey Alba decision" of intention to deprive another of (his) just rights,
which constitutes the essential characteristic of actual fraud." And in this connection, the Chief
Justice went on thus: "It is to be stressed likewise that the Land Registration Act commands that
the applicant 'shall also state the name in full and the address of the applicant, and also the names
and addresses of all occupants of the land and of all adjoining owners, if known; and, if not known,
it shall state what search has been made to find them (Section 21 of Act No. 496 [1902].) What
can be clearer, therefore, than that the lower court was not sufficiently mindful of what the law
ordains when it refused to hear petition petitioner on his claim that appellee Sandoval was guilty
of fraud in including in his application the disputed lot." The pertinent statutory provision reads
thus:
SEC. 21. The application shall be in writing, signed and sworn to by the applicant, or by some
person duly authorized in his behalf. All oaths required by this Act may be administered by any
officer authorized to administer oaths in the Philippine Islands. If there is more than one applicant,
the application shall be signed and sworn to by and in behalf of each. It shall contain a description
of the land and shall state whether the applicant is married; and, if married, the name of the wife
or husband; and, if unmarried, whether he or she has been married, and, if so, when and how the
married relation terminated. If by divorce, when, where, and by what court the divorce was
granted. It shall also state the name in full and the address of the applicant, and also the names
and addresses of all occupants of the land and of all adjoining owners, if known; and, if not known,
it shall state what search has been made to find them. It may be in form as follows:
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA PHILIPPINE ISLANDS
To the Honorable Judge of the Court of Land Registration:
I (or we) the undersigned, hereby apply to have the land hereinafter described brought under the
operation of the Land Registration Act, and to have my (or our) title therein registered and
confirmed. And I (or we) declare: (1) That I am (or we are) the owner (or owners) in fee simple (or
by possessory information title) of a certain parcel of land with the buildings (if any, if not, strike
out the words 'with the buildings'), situated in (here insert accurate description). (2) That said land
at the last assessment for taxation was assessed at ... dollars. (3) That I (or we) do not know of
any mortgage or encumbrance affecting said land, or that any other person has any estate or
interest therein, legal or equitable in possession remainder, reversion, or expectancy (if any, add
'other than as follows,' and set forth each clearly). (4) That I (or we) obtained title (if by deed, state
name of grantor, date and place of record, and file the deed or state reason for not filing. If any
other way, state it (5) That said land is ... occupied (if occupied, state name in full and place of
residence and post office address of occupant and the nature of this occupancy. If unoccupied,
insert 'not'). (6) That the names and addresses so far as known to me (or us) of the owners of all
lands adjoining the above land are as follows (same directions as above.) (7) That I am (or we
are) married. (Follows literally the directions given in the prior portions of this section.) (8) That
my (or our) full name (or names), residence, and post office address is (or are) as follows:
.......................…………Dated this day ......... of ................... in the year nineteen hundred and
.........................
(Signature).............................
(SCHEDULE OF DOCUMENTS)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA PHILIPPINE ISLANDS
Province (or city) of.................................. ...........................(date.
There personally appeared the above-named....................... known to me to be the signer (or
signers) of the foregoing application, and made oath that the statements therein, so far as made
of his (or their) own knowledge, are true and so far as made upon information and belief, that he
(or they) believe them to be true. The residence certificate................ of the applicant (or
applicants, or representative) was exhibited (or applicants, or representative) was exhibited to me
being No. ............... issued at.................. dated....................., 19 ....
BEFORE ME:
(Notary Public or other official authorized to administer oaths)

As maybe readily noted, No. (6) of the suggested sufficient form says: "That the names and
addresses so far as known to me (or us) of the owners of all lands adjoining the above land are
as follows (same directions as above But more importantly, it should be borne in mind, the text of
the law requires not mere statement of the lack of knowledge of the names of the occupants and
adjoining owners by also "what search has been made to find them." As earlier indicated,
respondents could not have escaped, if they had "search(es)" as the law definitely mandates, the
names of their "colindantes.", it being a fact that the latter's lands were duly registered. Surely,
they would have known, as it can be presumed they did, that Diego Francisco and Jose P. Cruz,
whom they would name as boundary owners in their application in 1963 had already been long
dead and buried. In Grey Alba, the reason found by the Court for the failure of the applicant to
notify the acknowledged occupant of the land applied for was because, from the circumstances
known to them, it was evident that they were no more than their lessees and could have had no
registerable interest at all in the property, which is far from what happened in the instant case.
Here, We cannot bring Ourselves to believe that the naming of Diego Francisco and Jose P. Cruz,
two persons long dead, as boundary owners in their application, not to speak of the "creek", (who
was also "proven" to have been notified) does not constitute actual fraud. Petitioner's evidence of
her own occupancy, considering it is contradicted by respondents' evidence, need not be
mentioned anymore. Anyway, the unrebuttable proof alone is to Us sufficient by and large, to
uphold not only the dissenters in the Court of Appeals but also the trial judge who had heard the
respondent Alejandro Santos and his witness Lauro Cruz somehow deviate substantially and
materially from their testimonies given before the clerk of court in the original proceeding.
In Grey Alba itself, We find the following significant pronouncements at p. 50, (Vol. 17, Phil.) "By
fraud is meant actual fraud, dishonesty of some sort. This meaning should be given to the word
'fraud' in section 38 of the Land Registration Act. Proof of constructive fraud is not sufficient to
authorize the Court of Land Registration to reopen a case and modify its decree. Specific acts
intended to deceive and deprive another of his right, or to in some manner injure him must be
alleged and prove'.
We hold that as above discussed, the majority decision of the Court of Appeals under review,
cannot be reconciled even with Grey Alba. The emphasis given in that decision to the in rem
character of land registration proceedings and the broad legal significance of such kind of
proceeding could not have by any degree minimized the paramouncy of truth and justice itself in
any actual case before the court. As Our Chief Justice quoted from Justice Torres "The
registration of (land) cannot serve as a protecting mantle to cover and shelter bad faith" (p. 12,
53 SCRA), just as it is reiterated therein what We said in Estiva v. Alvero, 37 Phil. 498, "it is fraud
to knowingly omit or conceal a fact, upon which benefit is obtained to the prejudice of a third
person." (taken from Nicolas vs. Director of Lands, 9 SCRA 934, at p. 938.) Accordingly, it is Our
considered opinion that in law, the better view is that of the distinguished dissenters in the Court
of Appeals, and We find no alternative but to uphold the same. Incidentally, the binding force of a
finding of fact of the Court of Appeals, assuming the instant case were in any degree factual in
nature, diminishes correspondingly according to the number and content of the dissent, when
there is or are any. In the case at bar, it is Our conclusion that the majority's bases, much more
its reliance in their purely literal understanding of Grey Alba do not conform with the dictates of
truth and justice.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals under review is reversed, and the second
decision of Judge Guillermo Torres of April 5, 1966 is affirmed, without prejudice to petitioner and
the trial court complying with the additional requirements for the issuance of the corresponding
title in favor of petitioner. Costs against private respondents.

G.R. No. 102858 July 28, 1997

THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and TEODORO ABISTADO, substituted by MARGARITA, MARISSA,
MARIBEL, ARNOLD and MARY ANN, all surnamed ABISTO, respondents.

PANGANIBAN, J.:
Is newspaper publication of the notice of initial hearing in an original land registration case
mandatory or directory?
Statement of the Case

The Court of Appeals ruled that it was merely procedural and that the failure to cause such
publication did not deprive the trial court of its authority to grant the application. But the Solicitor
General disagreed and thus filed this petition to set aside the Decision 1 promulgated on July 3,
1991 and the subsequent Resolution2 promulgated on November 19, 1991 by Respondent Court
of Appeals3 in CA-G.R. CV No. 23719. The dispositive portion of the challenged Decision reads: 4
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the judgment of dismissal appealed from is hereby set
aside, and a new one entered confirming the registration and title of applicant, Teodoro Abistado,
Filipino, a resident of Barangay 7, Poblacion Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro, now deceased and
substituted by Margarita, Marissa, Maribel, Arnold and Mary Ann, all surnamed Abistado,
represented by their aunt, Miss Josefa Abistado, Filipinos, residents of Poblacion Mamburao,
Occidental Mindoro, to the parcel of land covered under MSI (IV-A-8) 315-D located in Poblacion
Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro.
The oppositions filed by the Republic of the Philippines and private oppositor are hereby
dismissed for want of evidence.
Upon the finality of this decision and payment of the corresponding taxes due on this land, let an
order for the issuance of a decree be issued.
The Facts
On December 8, 1986, Private Respondent Teodoro Abistado filed a petition for original
registration of his title over 648 square meters of land under Presidential Decree (PD) No.
1529.5 The application was docketed as Land Registration Case (LRC) No. 86 and assigned to
Branch 44 of the Regional Trial Court of Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro. 6 However, during the
pendency of his petition, applicant died. Hence, his heirs — Margarita, Marissa, Maribel, Arnold
and Mary Ann, all surnamed Abistado — represented by their aunt Josefa Abistado, who was
appointed their guardian ad litem, were substituted as applicants.
The land registration court in its decision dated June 13, 1989 dismissed the petition "for want of
jurisdiction." However, it found that the applicants through their predecessors-in-interest had been
in open, continuous, exclusive and peaceful possession of the subject land since 1938.
In dismissing the petition, the trial court reasoned:7
. . . However, the Court noted that applicants failed to comply with the provisions of Section 23
(1) of PD 1529, requiring the Applicants to publish the notice of Initial Hearing (Exh. "E") in a
newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines. Exhibit "E" was only published in the Official
Gazette (Exhibits "F" and "G"). Consequently, the Court is of the well considered view that it has
not legally acquired jurisdiction over the instant application for want of compliance with the
mandatory provision requiring publication of the notice of initial hearing in a newspaper of general
circulation.
The trial court also cited Ministry of Justice Opinion No. 48, Series of 1982, which in its pertinent
portion provides:8
It bears emphasis that the publication requirement under Section 23 [of PD 1529] has a two-fold
purpose; the first, which is mentioned in the provision of the aforequoted provision refers to
publication in the Official Gazette, and is jurisdictional; while the second, which is mentioned in
the opening clause of the same paragraph, refers to publication not only in the Official Gazette
but also in a newspaper of general circulation, and is procedural. Neither one nor the other is
dispensable. As to the first, publication in the Official Gazette is indispensably necessary because
without it, the court would be powerless to assume jurisdiction over a particular land registration
case. As to the second, publication of the notice of initial hearing also in a newspaper of general
circulation is indispensably necessary as a requirement of procedural due process; otherwise,
any decision that the court may promulgate in the case would be legally infirm.
Unsatisfied, private respondents appealed to Respondent Court of Appeals which, as earlier
explained, set aside the decision of the trial court and ordered the registration of the title in the
name of Teodoro Abistado.
The subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied in the challenged CA Resolution dared
November 19, 1991.
The Director of Lands represented by the Solicitor General thus elevated this recourse to us. This
Court notes that the petitioner's counsel anchored his petition on Rule 65. This is an error. His
remedy should be based on Rule 45 because he is appealing a final disposition of the Court of
Appeals. Hence, we shall treat his petition as one for review under Rule 45, and not
for certiorari under Rule 65.9
The Issue
Petitioner alleges that Respondent Court of Appeals committed "grave abuse of discretion" 10 in
holding —
. . . that publication of the petition for registration of title in LRC Case No. 86 need not be published
in a newspaper of general circulation, and in not dismissing LRC Case No. 86 for want of such
publication.
Petitioner points out that under Section 23 of PD 1529, the notice of initial hearing shall be
"published both in the Official Gazette and in a newspaper of general circulation." According to
petitioner, publication in the Official Gazette is "necessary to confer jurisdiction upon the trial court,
and . . . in . . . a newspaper of general circulation to comply with the notice requirement of due
process."11
Private respondents, on the other hand, contend that failure to comply with the requirement of
publication in a newspaper of general circulation is a mere "procedural defect." They add that
publication in the Official Gazette is sufficient to confer jurisdiction. 12
In reversing the decision of the trial court, Respondent Court of Appeals ruled: 13
. . . although the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette and in a newspaper of general
circulation is couched in mandatory terms, it cannot be gainsaid that the law also mandates with
equal force that publication in the Official Gazette shall be sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the
court.
Further, Respondent Court found that the oppositors were afforded the opportunity "to explain
matters fully and present their side." Thus, it justified its disposition in this wise: 14
. . . We do not see how the lack of compliance with the required procedure prejudiced them in any
way. Moreover, the other requirements of: publication in the Official Gazette, personal notice by
mailing, and posting at the site and other conspicuous places, were complied with and these are
sufficient to notify any party who is minded to make any objection of the application for registration.
The Court's Ruling
We find for petitioner.
Newspaper Publication Mandatory
The pertinent part of Section 23 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 requiring publication of the notice
of initial hearing reads as follows:
Sec. 23. Notice of initial hearing, publication, etc. — The court shall, within five days from filing of
the application, issue an order setting the date and hour of the initial hearing which shall not be
earlier than forty-five days nor later than ninety days from the date of the order.
The public shall be given notice of initial hearing of the application for land registration by means
of (1) publication; (2) mailing; and (3) posting.
1. By publication. —
Upon receipt of the order of the court setting the time for initial hearing, the Commissioner of Land
Registration shall cause a notice of initial hearing to be published once in the Official Gazette and
once in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines: Provided, however, that the
publication in the Official Gazette shall be sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the court. Said
notice shall be addressed to all persons appearing to have an interest in the land involved
including the adjoining owners so far as known, and "to all whom it may concern." Said notice
shall also require all persons concerned to appear in court at a certain date and time to show
cause why the prayer of said application shall not be granted.
xxx xxx xxx
Admittedly, the above provision provides in clear and categorical terms that publication in the
Official Gazette suffices to confer jurisdiction upon the land registration court. However, the
question boils down to whether, absent any publication in a newspaper of general circulation, the
land registration court can validly confirm and register the title of private respondents.
We answer this query in the negative. This answer is impelled by the demands of statutory
construction and the due process rationale behind the publication requirement.
The law used the term "shall" in prescribing the work to be done by the Commissioner of Land
Registration upon the latter's receipt of the court order setting the time for initial hearing. The said
word denotes an imperative and thus indicates the mandatory character of a statute. 15 While
concededly such literal mandate is not an absolute rule in statutory construction, as its import
ultimately depends upon its context in the entire provision, we hold that in the present case the
term must be understood in its normal mandatory meaning. In Republic vs. Marasigan,16 the
Court through Mr. Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. held that Section 23 of PD 1529 requires notice
of the initial hearing by means of (1) publication, (2) mailing and (3) posting, all of which must be
complied with. "If the intention of the law were otherwise, said section would not have stressed in
detail the requirements of mailing of notices to all persons named in the petition who, per Section
15 of the Decree, include owners of adjoining properties, and occupants of the land." Indeed, if
mailing of notices is essential, then by parity of reasoning, publication in a newspaper of general
circulation is likewise imperative since the law included such requirement in its detailed provision.
It should be noted further that land registration is a proceeding in rem. 17 Being in rem, such
proceeding requires constructive seizure of the land as against all persons, including the state,
who have rights to or interests in the property. An in rem proceeding is validated essentially
through publication. This being so, the process must strictly be complied with. Otherwise, persons
who may be interested or whose rights may be adversely affected would be barred from
contesting an application which they had no knowledge of. As has been ruled, a party as an owner
seeking the inscription of realty in the land registration court must prove by satisfactory and
conclusive evidence not only his ownership thereof but the identity of the same, for he is in the
same situation as one who institutes an action for recovery of realty. 18 He must prove his title
against the whole world. This task, which rests upon the applicant, can best be achieved when all
persons concerned — nay, "the whole world" — who have rights to or interests in the subject
property are notified and effectively invited to come to court and show cause why the application
should not be granted. The elementary norms of due process require that before the claimed
property is taken from concerned parties and registered in the name of the applicant, said parties
must be given notice and opportunity to oppose.
It may be asked why publication in a newspaper of general circulation should be deemed
mandatory when the law already requires notice by publication in the Official Gazette as well as
by mailing and posting, all of which have already been complied with in the case at hand. The
reason is due process and the reality that the Official Gazette is not as widely read and circulated
as newspapers and is oftentimes delayed in its circulation, such that the notices published therein
may not reach the interested parties on time, if at all. Additionally, such parties may not be owners
of neighboring properties, and may in fact not own any other real estate. In sum, the all-
encompassing in rem nature of land registration cases, the consequences of default orders
issued against the whole world and the objective of disseminating the notice in as wide a manner
as possible demand a mandatory construction of the requirements for publication, mailing and
posting.
Admittedly, there was failure to comply with the explicit publication requirement of the law. Private
respondents did not proffer any excuse; even if they had, it would not have mattered because the
statute itself allows no excuses. Ineludibly, this Court has no authority to dispense with such
mandatory requirement. The law is unambiguous and its rationale clear. Time and again, this
Court has declared that where the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no room
for interpretation, vacillation or equivocation; there is room only for application. 19 There is no
alternative. Thus, the application for land registration filed by private respondents must be
dismissed without prejudice to reapplication in the future, after all the legal requisites shall have
been duly complied with.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision and Resolution are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The application of private respondent for land registration is
DISMISSED without prejudice. No costs.
SO ORDERED.