Attention and Creativity
Attention and Creativity
Attention and Creativity
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162
and in laboratory settings (Guilford, 1950; that creative people are more likely to pay atten-
Torrance, 1974). Although DT tests modestly tion to the fine-grained details, and thus have
predict real-world creativity (Runco & Acar, more focused attention than less creative people
2012; Torrance, 1969), it is not clear whether the (Nusbaum & Silvia, 2011). Finally, evidence
type of attention required to perform well on DT exists that creative people do not necessarily dif-
tests is the same type of attention employed by fer in their predominant mode of attention, but
people who are creative in the real world. Indeed, can switch between various modes of attention
considering that DT tests are time-limited (typi- more easily, and therefore have flexible attention
cally 2–3 minutes per task), and often emphasize (Vartanian, Martindale, & Kwiatkowski, 2007;
the number of responses (i.e., fluency as opposed Zabelina & Robinson, 2010). Here I review evi-
to originality), they may require a different type dence for each view, and suggest that these views
of attention than does real-life creativity. need not compete. Rather, they may all operate,
While some consensus exists regarding how but on different types or measures of creativity,
attention is associated with creativity, find- with different factors of attention at work.
ings often seem to contradict one another.
Here I briefly describe prior theories of the link Creativity and Broad or “Leaky”
between attention and creativity, and present Attention
three seemingly contradictory views: creativ- Some empirical evidence suggests that creative
ity through diffused or “leaky” attention, cre- people may have particularly diffused or leaky
ativity through focused attention, and creativity attention, or the propensity to notice informa-
through flexible attention. Indeed, all three tion that other people may dismiss as irrelevant.
forms of attention may contribute to the creative Historical evidence suggests that there may
process. I highlight, however, that what mat- indeed be an association between high levels of
ters is the operational definition of creativity – creativity and leaky attention. For example, in
that is, how we measure it. I present behavioral 1981 Gabriel Marcia Marquez was interviewed
and neurophysiological evidence suggesting for the winter issue of The Paris Review, and
that creativity assessed with divergent thinking when asked to conclude with what his next pro-
tests is linked with selective, yet flexible atten- ject would be, he noted: “I’m absolutely con-
tion. Alternately, creativity assessed with a more vinced that I’m going to write the greatest book
ecologically valid survey of people’s real-world of my life, but I don’t know which one it will be
creative accomplishments is linked with “leaky” or when. When I feel something like this – which
attention. I discuss this evidence in the context I have been feeling for a while – I stay very quiet,
of a newly developed Model of Creativity and so that if it passes, I can capture it,” highlighting
Attention (MOCA), and conclude with sugges- the distracting nature of extraneous stimuli for
tions for future research. the creative process. Numerous other eminent
creators, including Richard Wagner, Marcel
The Role of Attention in Proust, Charles Darwin, Edgar Allen Poe, Anton
Creativity: A Review Chekhov, and Johann Goethe lamented about
A large body of literature suggests that creative noise as a source of intrusion or distraction (see
people have diffused or leaky attention; that is, Kasof, 1997).
creative people show the propensity to notice As a consequence of such leaky attention,
information that may not be particularly relevant creative people are prone to errors on typical
to the task at hand (Carson, Peterson, & Higgins, attention tasks. For example, one study simul-
2003; Mendelsohn & Griswold, 1964; Rawlings, taneously presented participants with pairs of
1985). On the other hand, some have suggested words under the instructions to repeat or shadow
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163
words presented to one ear, while attempting They also show larger skin potential responses
to remember words presented to the other ear to moderately intense tones, and take twice as
(divided attention condition; Rawlings, 1985). long to habituate to the tones than less-crea-
Creative participants of the Wallach and Kogan tive participants (creativity assessed by RAT ×
(1965) test (Pattern Meanings: viewing abstract DT fluency; Martindale, Anderson, Moore, &
designs and suggesting interpretations of the West, 1996). These findings suggest that creative
patterns, and Similarities: generating ways in people may indeed have shown signs of leaky
which pairs of objects were similar for 10 object attention, making it more difficult to block out
pairs) experienced more intrusion errors from irrelevant stimuli, and/or increasing their physi-
the non-shadowed ear than less-creative partici- ological sensitivity.
pants. This finding suggests that people who per- Finally, there is evidence that exposure to
form well on this creativity task may have leaky arousing stimuli reduces breadth of attention
attention. (Easterbrook, 1959). Particularly, arousal is
Leaky attention, however, may be a double- increased and breadth of attention is decreased
edged sword: it may serve as a cost in some by crowding (Evans, 1979; Nagar & Pandey,
circumstances; for instance, when people are 1987), evaluation apprehension (Cottrell, Wack,
trying to focus on a conversation in a noisy Sekerak, & Rittle, 1968), time pressure (Karau
café. However, it may also serve as a benefit by & Kelly, 1992), and the presence of others
helping people introduce unusual and original (Bond & Titus, 1983). Correspondingly, creativ-
pieces of information into their cognition, result- ity is generally hindered by crowding (creativ-
ing in a creative thought. In support, creative ity assessed by DT; Aiello, De Risi, Epstein, &
people incorporate seemingly irrelevant cues Karlin, 1977), evaluation apprehension (creativ-
when solving word puzzles, such as anagrams ity assessed by subjective ratings of collages;
(creativity assessed by the Remote Associates Amabile, Goldfarb, & Brackfield, 1990), time
Test, RAT), on which participants are asked pressure (creativity assessed as a real-world five-
to come up with a word that forms a common year evaluation of innovation and productivity
compound or a phrase with the three presented in scientists and engineers, Andrews & Farris,
words (Ansburg & Hill, 2003; Mednick, 1962; 1972; creativity assessed by groups generating
Mendelsohn & Griswold, 1964), recall words or planning tasks, rated by judges for originality
phrases (creativity assessed by RAT; Russell, and creativity, Karau & Kelly, 1992), and pres-
1976), or perform auditory attention tasks (crea- ence of others (creativity assessed by generat-
tivity assessed by the Creative Achievement ing word associations, Matlin & Zajonc, 1968;
Questionnaire, CAQ; Carson et al., 2003). creativity assessed by the Wallach & Kogan
In support of leaky attention, creative people Creativity Battery, Milgram & Milgram, 1976).
often say that they are sensitive or oversensi- Neuroimaging evidence provides partial
tive. Indeed, highly creative people show sev- support for the role of leaky attention in crea-
eral physiological and behavioral correlates of tive thinking. A meta-analysis of functional
reaction to noise and efforts to block it: more- imaging data reported activations in the brain
creative participants (creativity assessed by regions associated with spontaneous imagina-
RAT × DT fluency), for example, show more tive processes, namely the precuneus (Gonen-
alpha-blocking in response to onset of a tone Yaacovi et al., 2013). The precuneus, a core
than their less-creative counterparts (Martindale hub of the default mode network (DMN) – a
& Armstrong, 1974), suggesting that more- set of midline and inferior parietal regions that
creative participants exhibit higher arousal to activate in the absence of most external task
onset of tones than less-creative participants. demands (Gusnard & Raichle, 2001), has been
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164
implicated in both structural (Fink, Koschutnig, one of the most recognized creative polymaths,
et al., 2014; Jauk, Neubauer, Dunst, Fink, & was said to have “obsessive attention to detail”
Benedek, 2015; Jung et al., 2010; Takeuchi (Lester, 2012, p. 191). Marie Currie described
et al., 2010) and functional (Benedek et al., her focus during schoolwork as “allowing no
2014; Fink, Weber, et al., 2014; Takeuchi et al., lapses of attention” (Curie & Scheean, 2001,
2011) imaging studies of creativity. Moreover, p. 72), as well as concentrating her attention
activation of the inferior parietal lobule (IPL), “without even hearing the mounting roar of chat-
another core hub of the DMN (van den Heuvel & ter” (Curie & Scheean, 2001, p. 97).
Hulshoff Pol, 2010), has been reported in several Indeed, persistence in the discovery process
neuroimaging studies of creativity (Abraham, does not come easy. There are many conflicting
Beudt, Ott, & von Cramon, 2012; Benedek demands, and creative ideas are often, by defini-
et al., 2014; Fink et al., 2009, 2010). tion, incompletely formulated or of dubious util-
Thus, it appears that leaky attention can be of ity. Even when ideas come in a flash, focus and
particular importance for some forms of creativ- persistence are required to put them to good use
ity, specifically for making connections between (Gabora, 2010). A considerable body of research
ideas, e.g., words on the RAT, and for acquir- suggests that creativity involves the ability to
ing creative accomplishments in the real world. maintain an extended focus (Feist, 1999; Richards,
Namely, leaky attention may help people be Kinney, Lunde, Benet, & Merzel, 1988). Artists,
more sensitive to and make connections between for instance, spend more time reworking their
distantly related concepts or ideas. Leaky atten- drawings than do nonartists (Kozbelt, 2008).
tion may also afford people with a larger reper- Empirical evidence suggests that working
toire of potential stimuli for production of an memory capacity in particular may benefit some
unusual or creative idea. forms of creativity by enabling an individual to
maintain attention focused on the task (Baas,
Creativity and Focused Attention De Dreu, & Nijstad, 2008). In support, working
An alternative proposal of how attention relates memory capacity predicts performance on the
to creativity suggests that creativity benefits DT test, specifically because it allows persis-
from the ability to focus attention. More gen- tent (rather than flexible) processing (De Dreu
erally, creativity may rely heavily on executive et al., 2012). Similarly, greater executive capac-
functions (De Dreu, Nijstad, Baas, Wolsink, & ity is associated with greater fluency (number
Roskes, 2012; Gilhooly, Fioratou, Anthony, & of ideas produced within a given time) on the
Wynn, 2007; Nusbaum & Silvia, 2011; Wiley DT task (Gilhoooly et al., 2007). Moreover, fluid
& Jarosz, 2012), i.e., general-purpose control cognitive abilities (Gf) predict performance on
mechanisms such as the ability of the cognitive divergent thinking tasks, and giving people a
system to configure itself for the performance helpful task strategy exaggerates the difference
of specific task goals (Botvinick, Braver, Barch, between people low and high in Gf (Nusbaum &
Carter, & Cohen, 2001; Miyake & Friedman, Silvia, 2011).
2012). Indeed, in order to create a highly origi- An increasing body of research confirms that
nal thought or product, people have to focus performance on the divergent thinking tests in
and persist in the task at hand. For instance, the particular involves task-driven top-down con-
preparation stage of creativity involves infor- trol of attention and cognition. Much of this
mation-gathering, mastering a knowledge base, evidence comes from latent variable studies
and identifying the problem (Wallas, 1926). showing effects of higher-order cognitive abili-
These behaviors surely benefit from focus and ties, such as fluid intelligence (Beaty, Silvia,
persistence. Leonardo da Vinci, for example, Nusbaum, Jauk, & Benedek, 2014; Nusbaum &
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165
Silvia, 2011), working memory capacity (Lee assessed by timed laboratory tests of DT, may
& Therriault, 2013; Süß, Oberauer, Wittman, benefit from selective attention.
Wilhelm, & Schulze, 2002), and verbal flu-
ency (Benedek, Könen, & Neubauer, 2012; Creativity and Flexible Attention
Silvia, Beaty, & Nusbaum, 2013) on DT. Such Another view of how attention relates to crea-
abilities are hypothesized to support thinking tivity poses that creative people have attentional
in a divergent manner by providing the execu- flexibility to adaptively shift between focused
tive control needed to guide memory retrieval and broad attention (Gabora, 2010; Vartanian,
and inhibit salient but unoriginal ideas (Beaty 2009; Zabelina & Robinson, 2010). Indeed,
& Silvia, 2012; Beaty et al., 2014; Benedek, creative acts may require the ability to see the
Franz, Heene, & Neubauer, 2012; Silvia, Beaty, large picture and its details, as well as the flex-
Nusbaum, Eddington, & Kwapil, 2014). ibility to switch between the two (Gabora, 2010;
Behavioral evidence for the role of execu- Martindale, 1995). Indeed, spontaneous shifts
tive processes in performance on the DT tasks between analytic and associative modes of
has received support from electroencephalo- thought have been proposed to be necessary for
gram (EEG) and functional magnetic reson- creative production (Gabora, 2010).
ance imaging (fMRI) research. Several studies Biographical and personality studies present
report task-related activation in brain regions evidence that the problem-solving behavior of
associated with interference resolution, response eminent scientists alternates between extraor-
selection, and cognitive control in the inferior dinary levels of focus on specific concepts to
frontal gyrus (IFG) and inferior parietal cortex playful exploration of ideas (see Feist, 1999;
(Abraham et al., 2012; Benedek et al., 2014; Martindale, 2001). This suggests that problem-
Chrysikou & Thompson-Schill, 2011; Fink solving may be a function of flexible strategy
et al., 2009; Fink & Benedek, 2014). Fink and application in relation to task demands. Thus,
colleagues (2009), for example, conducted an attentional flexibility allows people to flexibly
fMRI study with a battery of DT tasks that var- switch between broad and focused levels of
ied in terms of the creativity-related demands attention. It is unclear, however, what timescale
required. Tasks with a high-creativity demand of attentional flexibility is the most conducive
required generation of novel uses for common to creative thinking. Rapid flexible attentional
objects – the classic DT task, and tasks with low- switching may be important for creativity in
creativity demands simply required the gener- the short term, such as performance on timed
ation of typical object characteristics. Compared tasks of insight problem-solving (e.g., Bowden
to tasks with low-creativity demands, perform- & Beeman, 1998) or DT tasks (e.g., Torrance,
ance on tasks with high-creativity demands was 1974), while real-life creative acts may operate
associated with increased activation of the left on a longer timescale, requiring maintaining one
angular gyrus and decreased activation in the type of attentional state for a time before switch-
right inferior parietal cortex. Moreover, regard- ing to another state.
less of the task demands, idea generation was It is also unclear what the mechanism of atten-
related to increased activation of the left IFG, tional flexibility is. There are at least two possible
the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), and the mechanisms for achieving attentional flexibility.
precentral gyrus. Fink and colleagues (2009) One potential mechanism is bottom-up leaky
interpreted their results as evidence for a role of attention. Specifically, when people attend to
controlled memory retrieval and internal atten- one stimulus, information from the other stimuli
tion in DT. Taken together, it appears that some may still “leak in,” allowing relatively easy pro-
forms of creativity, particularly creativity as cessing of the stimuli outside of one’s focus, and
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166
therefore rapid switching of attention to another which depicts the associations between creativ-
target. Alternatively, it is possible that attentional ity (divergent thinking and real-world creative
flexibility stems from a selective top-down atten- achievement) and attention (leaky, focused, and
tion on one stimulus, followed by a rapid disen- flexible). The MOCA proposes that creativity
gagement, and rapid selection of the subsequent assessed by the DT tests is associated with flexi-
stimulus. In other words, this mechanism allows ble attention, which is driven by rapid focus, inhi-
for high inhibition of attention, where attention bition, and rapid shifting of attention. This ability
capture is not as long or as lasting, allowing for is evident very early in the processing stream,
rapid shifting of attention. This would be analo- as DT is also linked with selective sensory pro-
gous to an effect found in the working memory cessing, assessed by the P50 ERP. Further in the
literature, in which both high and low work- processing stream it is additionally supported by
ing memory capacity people exhibit attentional successful upregulation of cognitive control, as
capture by distractors, but high-capacity peo- assessed by the N2 ERP. Further support comes
ple recover more quickly than their low-capac- from the genetics studies which show that DT is
ity counterparts, as indicated by behavioral and linked with dopaminergic polymorphisms asso-
event-related potential (ERP) findings (Fukuda & ciated with high cognitive flexibility and medium
Vogel, 2011). The mechanisms of flexible atten- top-down control, or with weak cognitive flex-
tion need to be elucidated in order to gain deeper ibility and strong top-down control.
understanding of the association between creativ- Creativity as defined by the people’s real-life
ity and attentional flexibility. creative accomplishments, on the other hand
(although weakly related to DT), is linked with
leaky attention, as well as with leaky sensory pro-
Different Types of Attention cessing early in the processing stream, as assessed
by the P50 ERP. Additionally, high real-world
are Associated with Different
creative achievement is linked with dopaminergic
Measures of Creativity
polymorphisms associated with weak cognitive
The hypotheses of how different types of atten- flexibility and weak top-down control, and with
tion – leaky, focused, and flexible attention – psychopathology-spectrum personality character-
relate to creativity seem to contradict one istics of psychoticism and hypomania.
another. They may not be mutually exclusive, MOCA also proposes that the outcome of
however – they may all operate, but on different leaky attention and leaky sensory processing may
components, measures, and stages of creativ- depend on the level of cognitive control. In the
ity, with different factors of attention at work. presence of low cognitive control, leaky attention
Specifically, performance on the DT tests may may lead to the development of attention disor-
rely on the task-driven (i.e., top-down) ability to ders, and/or some forms of psychopathology.
rapidly focus, inhibit, and switch attention, sup- High cognitive control, on the other hand, would
porting attentional flexibility. Real-world cre- serve as a protective factor, and together with
ativity, on the other hand, may benefit from the leaky attention may be precisely the mechanism
stimulus-driven (i.e., bottom-up) attention that is that supports real-world creative achievement.
broad or leaky. The MOCA notes that more than leaky attention
and high cognitive control are required for crea-
Model of Creativity and tive achievements – other factors, such as moti-
Attention (MOCA) vation, grit, and opportunity play a major role in
Here I present a newly developed Model of achieving in creative domains in the real world
Creativity and Attention (MOCA, Figure 9.1), (Amabile, 1985; Runco, 2005).
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167
High Cognitive
Low Cognitive
Control
Control
Divergent Thinking
Figure 9.1 Model of Creativity and Attention (MOCA), presenting relations between creative
achievement, divergent thinking, and attention. Solid lines denote confirmed associations, dashed lines
denote hypothesized associations.
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168
60
50
Divergent Thinking (ATTA)
40
30
20
10
Figure 9.2 A Pearson correlation between divergent thinking and validity effect (RT on invalid trials
minus RT on valid trials), demonstrating that people with higher divergent thinking scores have more
flexible attention (r(152) = −.23, p = .004).
congruency effect – how much faster people from stimuli at the uncued level. This finding
respond on congruent than on incongruent trials rules out leaky attention as the explanation
– is an index of how selective (versus how leaky) for flexible attention (i.e., overcoming invalid
the attention filter is. If divergent thinkers have cues) displayed by divergent thinkers in Study
selective attention, they should be perfectly good 1. Therefore, an alternative mechanism may
at using the cues to attend to the target level, and be responsible for divergent thinkers’ flex-
the congruency of the distractor level should ible attention in Study 1. It is possible that a
have no effect. On the other hand, if divergent rather selective attention filter is the mecha-
thinkers have leaky filters, they should respond nism for flexible attention in divergent think-
more slowly on incongruent trials. Thus, if DT ers. In this view, high divergent thinkers, when
in Study 1 was associated with better overcom- cued, focus their attention as sharply as (or
ing of invalid cues due to leaky attention, then sharper than) low divergent thinkers and are
high DT should also be associated with a large adept at rapidly processing information at the
congruency effect in Experiment 2. In contrast, if cued level, rapidly disengaging from it, and/
better overcoming of invalid cues was associated or rapidly shifting to the other level. In other
with better overcoming of invalid cues not due words, even though they are highly selective at
to leaky attention in Study 1, then in Experiment attending to cued information, their attention
2 DT should not be related to the congruency capture is not as strong or as lasting.
effect.
As expected, divergent thinking did not Neurophysiological Evidence
relate to stimulus congruency. DT was not Flexible attention supported by the mecha-
related to either interference or facilitation nism of focusing, disengaging, and switching
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169
15
10
Click-1 peak
Amplitude (µV)
Click-2 peak
5
0
100 200 300 400 600 700 800 900
–5
Click-1
trough Click-2
–10 trough
–15
Time (ms)
Figure 9.3 Grand averages of the ERPs at Cz. Vertical dashed lines at 0 ms mark onset of Click 1, and at
500 ms mark the onset of Click 2. The P50 ratio is calculated as the P50 peak to trough difference of Click
2 over the P50 peak to trough difference of Click 1. Thus, larger difference in the waveforms would result
in a smaller ratio. Smaller ratios represent more selective sensory gating, while larger ratios represent
leakier sensory gating.
attention is compatible with recent EEG data task requirements, increased sensory gating
showing that DT is linked with an increased may indicate that selective sensory processing
ability to filter out “irrelevant” sensory informa- is a general neural processing characteristic of
tion (Zabelina, O’Leary, Pornpattananangkul, divergent thinkers.
Nusslock, & Beeman, 2015), as measured by the Additional evidence for the link between
P50 ERP – a neurophysiological response to a divergent thinking and selective attention
stimulus that occurs 50 ms after stimulus onset comes from the study examining performance
(for review, see Patterson et al., 2008). In this on the oddball paradigm (Zabelina & Ganis,
paradigm, two auditory clicks are presented to 2017). Here, participants performed a stand-
a participant, and the extent to which the second ard oddball paradigm, in which they saw
click is inhibited compared to the first click is and responded to frequent and rare stimuli,
seen as a marker of sensory gating (see Figure and their behavioral and neurophysiological
9.3). P50 is a very early, automatic, form of responses were measured. More concretely, on
sensory gating, influencing which stimuli cap- each trial participants had to look for a spe-
ture attention (Banich, 2004; Gjini, Burroughs, cific letter. Within each run most of the time
& Boutros, 2011). Some view the P50 marker the stimulus of interest (frequent stimulus)
of sensory gating as a marker of some forms was at one level of attention (e.g., global), but
of psychopathology, particularly schizophrenia on 10% of the trials the stimulus (rare stimu-
(Olincy et al., 2010). lus) was at the other level of attention (e.g.,
Data reveal that DT is associated with selec- local), requiring selective attention.
tive sensory processing very early in the pro- Thus, if divergent thinkers have selective atten-
cessing stream. Only 50 ms after stimulus tion, they should not slow down as much on the rare
onset high divergent thinkers are more likely compared to the frequent trials. They should also
to inhibit “irrelevant” sensory information than show a larger N2 difference between rare and the
low divergent thinkers (Figure 9.4). Given that frequent trials, as larger N2 serves as an indicator
the stimuli are meaningless and there are no of upregulation of cognitive control (Folstein &
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170
3.00
2.50
P50 Sensory Gating Ratios
2.00
1.50
1.00
.50
.00
10 20 30 40 50
Divergent Thinking (ATTA)
Figure 9.4 Partial regression plot depicting partial correlations between divergent thinking (centered)
and P50 sensory gating. This plot demonstrates that higher divergent thinking scores are associated with
smaller P50 ratios, i.e., more selective sensory gating (r(80) = –.30, p = 006; controlling for academic
achievement, p = .03).
van Petten, 2008; see Figure 9.5a). As expected, performance on the DT test was linked with
evidence from two experiments suggests that dopaminergic polymorphisms associated with
higher divergent thinking is not linked with slow- good cognitive flexibility and medium top-down
ing down on rare trials compared to the frequent control, or with weak cognitive flexibility and
trials. Additionally, it is associated with larger strong top-down control (Zabelina, Colzato,
N2 differences between the rare and the frequent Beeman, & Hommel, 2016; Figure 9.6).
trials, suggesting that divergent thinkers are par- Considering previous observations that the
ticularly good at upregulating their cognitive con- nine-repeat allele is related to various indica-
trol on rare targets, resulting in faster responses tions of good cognitive flexibility (Garcia-Garcia,
to the rare targets compared to people with lower Barceló, Clemente, & Escera, 2010), while the
DT scores (Figure 9.5b). 10-repeat allele is related to low learning abili-
ties and ADHD (Cornishet al., 2005), this pat-
Biological Evidence tern makes sense. DT tests require individuals to
Finally, supporting evidence for the link between find new solutions and original answers, requir-
DT and selective attention comes from a genet- ing some top-down guidance. DT also consid-
ics study investigating the involvement of the ers the role of flexibility, which fits rather well
dopaminergic system (DA) in divergent think- with the observation that the performance of
ing. It was revealed that DT can be predicted individuals with a genetic makeup that supports
from interactions between genetic polymor- cognitive flexibility (the 9/-carriers) benefit most
phisms related to frontal (COMT) and striatal from frontal top-down control that is effective,
(DAT) DA pathways. Importantly, successful but not overly strong. Individuals with a less
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171
(a)
Rare - Frequent
Frequent
Rare 6
Cz
μV
N2
–6
14 P3
50
40
30
20
10
0
–4 –2 0 2 4 6
N2 (rare – freq) at Cz
Figure 9.5 (a) Neuropshysiological response to rare and frequent targets on an oddball paradigm,
showing a larger N2 ERP on rare compared to frequent targets, particularly at parietal sites, indicating that
more cognitive control is required on rare compared to frequent targets. For a color version of this figure,
see the color plate section. (b) A Pearson correlation between divergent thinking and N2 difference (rare
targets minus frequent targets), demonstrating that people with higher divergent thinking scores upregulate
their cognitive control to a larger degree on the rare compared to the frequent targets compared to people
with lower divergent thinking scores (r(26) = .50, p = .004).
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172
weak
10/10
CA DT
Cognitive Flexibility
(Striatum)
DAT
9/10
9/9
strong DT
COMT
(PFC)
weak strong
Top-down Control
Figure 9.6 Putative associations between COMT (tied to DA availability in the prefrontal DA pathways)
and top-down cognitive control; and DAT (tied to DA availability in striatal pathways) and cognitive
flexibility. Data presented in the figure suggest that divergent thinking is linked with DA polymorphisms
associated with good cognitive flexibility and medium top-down control, or with weak cognitive flexibility
and strong top-down control, while creative achievement is linked with DA polymorphisms associated
with weak cognitive flexibility and weak top-down control.
real-world creative achievements. For example, stimulus onset). Again, because the task is pas-
whereas the congruency effect – how much faster sive and involves meaningless stimuli with no
people respond on congruent than on incongru- task requirements, reduced sensory gating sug-
ent trials – does not relate to DT (see above), gests that leaky sensory processing is the general
people with more real-world creative achieve- characteristic of real-life creative achievers.
ments exhibit a larger congruency effect – they Additionally, unlike divergent thinkers, real-
respond slower on the incongruent compared world creative achievers do not upregulate their
to congruent trials, indicating leaky attention cognitive control on rare compared to frequent
(Zabelina et al., 2016; Figure 9.7). targets on the oddball paradigm, as reflected
in the N2 differences (see above, Zabelina &
Neurophysiological Evidence Ganis, 2016), indicating that people with real-
Neurophysiological evidence provides further life creative achievements may not be particu-
support for the link between creative accom- larly good at engaging cognitive control on
plishments and leaky attention. In the study using this task. It is possible that creative achievers
the same P50 ERP paradigm as described above, exhibit poor self-control on laboratory tasks of
where participants passively listen to auditory attention, which are typically quite long and not
clicks, it was revealed that the more real-world very engaging. Were creative achievers to work
creative achievements people had, the less likely on their own creative project, or something they
they were to filter out the second click (Zabelina found particularly interesting and worth invest-
et al., 2015; Figure 9.8). This result indicates ing in, they would be just as good, if not better,
that people with real-life creative achievements than divergent thinkers to engage their cognitive
have “leaky” sensory processing very early in control. Further studies are needed to examine
the processing stream (as early as 50 ms after whether the link between creative achievement
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173
50
30
20
10
Figure 9.7 A Pearson correlation between creative achievement and congruency effect (RT on
incongruent trials minus RT on congruent trials), demonstrating that people with higher real-world
creative achievements have more “leaky” attention (r(94) = .22, p < .03).
3.00
2.50
P50 Sensory Gating Ratios
2.00
1.50
1.00
.50
.00
0 10 20 30 40 50
Real-World Creative Achievement
Figure 9.8 Partial regression plot depicting partial correlations between creative achievement (centered)
and P50 sensory gating. This plot demonstrates that higher creative achievement is associated with
larger P50 ratios, i.e., leakier sensory gating (r(81) = .20, p = 07); controlling for academic achievement,
p = .001).
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174
and cognitive control varies depending on the creativity and attention (see Dietrich & Kanso,
level of interest in the task at hand, as well on 2010; Sawyer, 2011; but see Nijstad et al., 2010).
the stage of the creative process (e.g., creative The Model of Creativity and Attention
achievers may show low levels of cognitive (MOCA) suggests that creativity as measured
control during uninteresting tasks, as well as at by two different measures – via laboratory tests
the early stages of the creative process, while of divergent thinking and via a survey of peo-
engaging tasks, as well as later stages of the ple’s real-life creative accomplishments – relates
creative process may be linked with higher lev- to different forms of attention: divergent think-
els of cognitive control in creative achievers). ing is linked with flexible attention, potentially
driven by the ability to focus, inhibit, and switch
Biological Evidence attention, while creative achievement is linked
Finally, results from the study investigating with leaky attention. What is the source of
involvement of the DA system in creative these differences, considering that measures of
achievement reveal a particular benefit of divergent thinking and creative achievement are
the 10-repeat carriers associated with weak weakly, but consistently correlated? It appears
cognitive flexibility, in combination with that divergent thinking tests with their focus on
the ValVal polymorphism associated with generation of as many creative uses for a com-
particularly weak frontal top-down control mon object as possible within a limited amount
(Zabelina, Colzato, et al., 2016; Figure 9.6). of time may rely on selective attention and good
Although the link between creative achieve- cognitive control more than previously thought.
ment and DA transmission has not been pre- In fact, DT scores show consistent association
viously investigated (but it has been proposed with successful academic performance, specifi-
[Carson, 2011]), this observation fits well cally with enhanced performance on academic
with previous reports that excellent perfor- achievement tests (SAT and ACT; see Zabelina,
mance on the CAQ is associated with “leaky” Condon & Beeman, 2014).
attention (Zabelina, Saporta, & Beeman, Creativity as measured by surveying peo-
2016), with electrophysiological indications ple’s real-life creative accomplishments, on
of reduced sensory gating (Zabelina et al., the other hand, is linked with leaky attention.
2015), and with low latent inhibition (Carson Such perceptual openness, or “open-minded-
et al., 2003). As pointed out above, leaky ness” as the literature suggests (Feist, 1999),
attention may help individuals to take into may help creative achievers notice informa-
consideration nominally irrelevant informa- tion which others may disregard as irrelevant,
tion, and integrate it with relevant informa- thus leading to a creative idea. However,
tion to create new ideas and insights. such leaky attention can also serve as a dou-
ble-edged sword, and lead to heightened
distractibility, as well as to predisposition
to attention disorders and various forms of
Conclusion
psychopathology.
Recent convergent evidence suggests that differ- Numerous open questions remain. Future
ent aspects or measures of creativity are asso- investigations need to consider how attention
ciated with different types of attention. Thus relates to creativity within different stages of the
conflating different types or measures of crea- creative process. For example, leaky attention
tivity into a monolithic “creativity” may hinder may be associated with the initial stages of the
our understanding of the sources of the apparent creative process, such as idea generation, while
variability in the literature on the link between more focused attention may be beneficial during
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175
the later stages of the creative process, such as Beaty, R. E., & Silvia, P. J. (2012). Why do ideas
idea implementation. Neuroimaging studies can get more creative across time? An executive
help determine neural mechanisms associated interpretation of the serial order effect in
with various forms of attention and how they divergent thinking tasks. Psychology of
Aesthetics, Creativity, and the Arts, 6, 309–319.
relate to creativity. Additionally, future inves-
Beaty, R. E., Silvia, P. J., Nusbaum, E. C., Jauk, E.,
tigations need to explore temporal dynamics
& Benedek, M. (2014). The role of associative
within the resting state connectivity to determine
and executive processes in creative cognition.
how it changes with attentional engagement. Memory & Cognition, 42, 1186–1197.
Finally, the involvement of external versus inter- Benedek, M., Franz, F., Heene, M., & Neubauer,
nal attention in creativity, although previously A. C. (2012). Differential effects of cognitive
discussed (Zabelina & Andrews-Hanna, 2016), inhibition and intelligence on creativity.
needs further examination. Personality and Individual Differences, 53,
480–485.
Benedek, M., Jauk, E., Fink, A., Koschutnig,
K., Reishofer, G., Ebner, F., & Neubauer,
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