LEGAL ETHICS

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Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution
Section 2. The Congress shall have the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the
various courts but may not deprive the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction over cases enumerated in
Section 5 hereof. No law shall be passed reorganizing the Judiciary when it undermines the security of
tenure of its Members.

Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

1) Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public

ministers and consuls, and over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus,

quo warranto, and habeas corpus.

(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law

or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in:

(a) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty,

international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree,

proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question.

(b) All cases involving the legality of any tax, impost, assessment, or toll,

or any penalty imposed in relation thereto.

(c) All cases in which the jurisdiction of any lower court is in issue.

(d) All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua

or higher.

(e) All cases in which only an error or question of law is involved.

(3) Assign temporarily judges of lower courts to other stations as public interest

may require. Such temporary assignment shall not exceed six months without the

consent of the judge concerned.

(4) Order a change of venue or place of trial to avoid a miscarriage of justice.

(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional

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 rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the

practice of law, the integrated bar, and legal assistance to the under-privileged.

Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy

disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall

not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special

courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the

Supreme Court.

(6) Appoint all officials and employees of the Judiciary in accordance with the

Civil Service Law.

CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT

PREAMBLE
An honorable competent and independent judiciary exists to administer justice and thus promote the
unity of the country, the stability of government, and the well-being of the people.

CANON 1
A JUDGE SHOULD UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY
AND INDEPENDENCE OF THE JUDICIARY

RULE 1.01 - A judge should be the embodiment of competence, integrity and independence.

RULE 1.02 - A judge should administer justice impartially and without delay.

RULE 1.03. - A judge should be vigilant against any attempt to subvert the independence of the
judiciary and should forthwith resist any pressure from whatever source intended to influence the
performance of official functions.

CANON 2

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 A JUDGE SHOULD AVOID IMPROPRIETY
AND THE APPEARANCE OF IMPROPRIETY
IN ALL ACTIVITIES

RULE 2.01 - A judge should so behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the integrity and
impartiality of the judiciary. robles virtual law library

RULE 2.02 - A judge should not seek publicity for personal vainglory.

RULE 2.03 - A judge shall not allow family, social, or other relationships to influence judicial conduct
or judgment. The prestige of judicial office shall not be used or lent to advance the private interests of
others, nor convey or permit others to convey the impression that they are in a special position to
influence the judge.

RULE 2.04 - A judge should refrain from influencing in any manner the outcome of litigation or
dispute pending before another court or administrative agency.

CANON 3
A JUDGE SHOULD PERFORM OFFICIAL
DUTIES HONESTLY, AND WITH IMPARTIALITY
AND DILIGENCE

ADJUDICATIVE RESPONSIBILITIES

RULE 3.01 - A judge shall be faithful to the law and maintain professional competence.

RULE 3.02 - In every case, a judge shall endeavor diligently to ascertain the facts and the applicable
law unswayed by partisan interests, public opinion or fear of criticism.

RULE 3.03 - A judge shall maintain order and proper decorum in the court.

RULE 3.04 - A judge should be patient, attentive, and courteous to lawyers, especially the
inexperienced, to litigants, witnesses, and others appearing before the court. A judge should avoid
unconsciously falling into the attitude of mind that the litigants are made for the courts, instead of the
courts for the litigants.

RULE 3.05 - A judge shall dispose of the court's business promptly and decide cases within the
required periods.

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RULE 3.06 - While a judge may, to promote justice, prevent waste of time or clear up some obscurity,
properly intervene in the presentation of evidence during the trial, it should always be borne in mind
that undue interference may prevent the proper presentation of the cause or the ascertainment of truth.
RULE 3.07 - A judge should abstain from making public comments on any pending or impending case
and should require similar restraint on the part of court personnel.

ADMINISTRATIVE RESPONSIBILITIES

RULE 3.08 - A judge should diligently discharge administrative responsibilities, maintain professional
competence in court management, and facilitate the performance of the administrative functions or
other judges and court personnel.
RULE 3.09 - A judge should organize and supervise the court personnel to ensure the prompt and
efficient dispatch of business, and require at all times the observance of high standards of public service
and fidelity.
RULE 3.10 - A judge should take or initiate appropriate disciplinary measures against lawyers or court
personnel for unprofessional conduct of which the judge may have become aware.
RULE 3.11 - A judge should appoint commissioners, receivers, trustees, guardians, administrators and
others strictly on the basis of merit and qualifications, avoiding nepotism and favoritism. Unless
otherwise allowed by law, the same criteria should be observed in recommending appointment of court
personnel. Where the payment of compensation is allowed, it should be reasonable and commensurate
with the fair value of services rendered.

DISQUALIFICATION

RULE 3.12 - A judge should take no part in a proceeding where the judge's impartiality might
reasonably be questioned. These cases include among others, proceedings where:

(a) the judge has personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding;
(b) the judge served as executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or lawyer in the case or matter in
controversy, or a former associate of the judge served as counsel during their association, or the judge
or lawyer was a material witness therein;
(c) the judge's ruling in a lower court is the subject of review;
(d) the judge is related by consanguinity or affinity to a party litigant within the sixth degree or to
counsel within the fourth degree;
(e) the judge knows the judge's spouse or child has a financial interest, as heir, legatee, creditor,
fiduciary, or otherwise, in the subject matter in controversy or in a party to the proceeding, or any other
interest that could be substantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding.

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In every instance, the judge shall indicate the legal reason for inhibition.

REMITTAL OF DISQUALIFICATION

RULE 3.13 - A judge disqualified by the terms of rule 3.12 may, instead of withdrawing from the
proceeding, disclose on the record the basis of disqualification. If, bases on such disclosure, the parties
and lawyers independently of judge's participation, all agree in writing that the reason for the inhibition
is immaterial or insubstantial, the judge may then participate in the proceeding. The agreement, signed
by all parties and lawyers, shall be incorporated in the record of the proceeding.

CANON 5
A JUDGE SHOULD REGULATE EXTRA-JUDICIAL
ACTIVITIES TO MINIMIZE THE RISK
OF CONFLICT WITH JUDICIAL DUTIES
ADVOCATIONAL, CIVIC AND CHARITABLE ACTIVITIES

RULE 5.01 - A judge may engage in the following activities provided that they do not interfere with the
performance of judicial duties or detract from the dignity of the court:

(a) write, teach and speak on non-legal subjects;

(b) engage in the arts, sports, and other special recreational activities;
(c) participate in civic and charitable activities;
(d) serve as an officer, director, trustee, or non-legal advisor of a non-profit or non-political
educational, religious, charitable, fraternal, or civic organization.

FINANCIAL ACTIVITIES

RULE 5.02 - A judge shall refrain from financial and business dealing that tend to reflect adversely on
the court's impartiality, interfere with the proper performance of judicial activities or increase
involvement with lawyers or persons likely to come before the court. A judge should so manage
investments and other financial interests as to minimize the number of cases giving grounds for
disqualifications.

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RULE 5.03 - Subject to the provisions of the proceeding rule, a judge may hold and manage
investments but should not serve as officer, director, manager or advisor, or employee of any business
except as director of a family business of the judge.

RULE 5.04 - A judge or any immediate member of the family shall not accept a gift, bequest, factor or
loan from any one except as may be allowed by law.

RULE 5.05 - No information acquired in a judicial capacity shall be sued or disclosed by a judge in any
financial dealing or for any other purpose not related to judicial activities.

FIDUCIARY ACTIVITIES

RULE 5.06 - A judge should not serve as the executor, administrator, trustee, guardian, or other
fiduciary, except for the estate, trusts, or person of a member of the immediate family, and then only if
such service will not interfere with the proper performance of judicial duties. "Member of immediate
family" shall be limited to the spouse and relatives within the second degree of consanguinity. As a
family, a judge shall not:
(a) serve in proceedings that might come before the court of said judge; or
(b) act as such contrary to rules 5.02 to 5.05.

PRACTICE OF LAW AND OTHER PROFESSION

RULE 5.07 - A judge shall not engage in the private practice of law. Unless prohibited by the
Constitution or law, a judge may engage in the practice of any other profession provided that such
practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with judicial functions.

FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE

RULE 5.08 - A judge shall make full financial disclosure as required by law.

RULE 5.09 - A judge shall not accept appointment or designation to any agency performing quasi-
judicial or administrative functions.
POLITICAL ACTIVITIES

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RULE 5.10 - A judge is entitled to entertain personal views on political questions. But to avoid
suspicion of political partisanship, a judge shall not make political speeches, contribute to party funds,
publicly endorse candidates for political office or participate in other partisan political activities.

COMPLIANCE WITH THE CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT

All judges shall strictly comply with this Code.
DATE OF EFFECTIVITY

This Code, promulgated on 5 September 1989, shall take effect on 20 October 1989
Canon 1
Independence
Judicial independence is a pre-requisite to the rule of law and a fundamental guarantee of a fair trial. A
judge shall therefore uphold and exemplify judicial independence in both its individual and institutional
aspects.
Section 1
Judges shall exercise the judicial function independently on the basis of their assessment of the facts
and in accordance with a conscientious understanding of the law, free of any extraneous influence,
inducement, pressure, threat or interference, direct or indirect, from any quarter or for any reason.
Section 2
In performing judicial duties, Judges shall be independent from judicial colleagues in respect of
decisions which the judge is obliged to make independently.
Section 3
Judges shall refrain from influencing in any manner the outcome of litigation or dispute pending before
another court or administrative agency.
Section 4
Judges shall not allow family, social, or other relationships to influence judicial conduct or judgment.
The prestige of judicial office shall not be used or lent to advance the private interests of others, nor
convey or permit others to convey the impression that they are in a special position to influence the
judge.
Section 5
Judges shall not only be free from inappropriate connections with, and influence by, the executive and
legislative branches of government, but must also appear to be free therefrom to a reasonable observer.
Section 6
Judges shall be independent in relation to society in general and in relation to the particular parties to a
dispute which he or she has to adjudicate.
Section 7
Judges shall encourage and uphold safeguards for the discharge of judicial duties in order to maintain
and enhance the institutional and operational independence of the judiciary.
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Section 8
Judges shall exhibit and promote high standards of judicial conduct in order to reinforce public
confidence in the judiciary which is fundamental to the maintenance of judicial independence.
Canon 2
Integrity
Integrity is essential not only to the proper discharge of the judicial office but also to the personal
demeanor of judges.
Section 1
Judges shall ensure that not only is their conduct above reproach, but that it is perceived to be so in the
view of a reasonable observer.
Section 2
The behavior and conduct of judges must reaffirm the people's faith in the integrity of the judiciary.
Justice musty not merely be done but must also be seen to be done.
Section 3
Judges should take or initiate appropriate disciplinary measures against lawyers or court personnel for
unprofessional conduct of which the judge may have become aware.
Canon 3
Impartiality
Impartiality is essential to the proper discharge of the judicial office. It applies not only to the decision
itself but also to the process by which the decision to made.
Section 1
Judges shall perform their judicial duties without favor, bias or prejudice.
Section 2
Judges shall ensure that his or her conduct, both in and out of court, maintains and enhances the
confidence of the public, the legal profession and litigants in the impartiality of the judge and of the
judiciary.
Section 3
Judges shall, so far as is reasonable, so conduct themselves as to minimize the occasions on which it
will be necessary for them to be disqualified from hearing or deciding cases.
Section 4
Judges shall not knowingly, while a proceeding is before, or could come before, them make any
comment that might reasonably be expected to affect the outcome of such proceeding or impair the
manifest fairness of the process. Nor shall judges make any comment in public or otherwise that might
affect the fair trial of any person or issue.
Section 5
Judges shall disqualify themselves from participating in any proceedings in which they are unable to
decide the matter impartially or in which it may appear to a reasonable observer that they are unable to
decide the matter impartially. Such proceedings include, but are not limited to, instances where

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 a. The judge has actual bias or prejudice concerning a party or personal knowledge of disputed
evidentiary facts concerning the proceedings;
b. The judge previously served as a lawyer or was a material witness in the matter in controversy;
c. The judge, or a member of his or her family, has an economic interest in the outcome of the
matter in controversy;
d. The judge served as executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or lawyer in the case or matter in
controversy, or a former associate of the judge served as counsel during their association, or the
judge or lawyer was a material witness therein;
e. The judge's ruling in a lower court is the subject of review;
f. The judge is related by consanguinity or affinity to a party litigant within the sixth civil degree or
to counsel within the fourth civil degree; or
g. The judge knows that his or her spouse or child has a financial interest, as heir, legatee, creditor,
fiduciary, or otherwise, in the subject matter in controversy or in a party to the proceeding, or any
other interest that could be substantially affected by the outcome of the proceedings;
Section 6
A judge disqualified as stated above may, instead of withdrawing from the proceeding, disclose on the
records the basis of disqualification. If, based on such disclosure, the parties and lawyers independently
of the judge's participation, all agree in writing that the reason for the inhibition is immaterial or
unsubstantial, the judge may then participate in the proceeding. The agreement, signed by all parties
and lawyers, shall be incorporated in the record of the proceedings.
Canon 4
Propriety
Propriety and the appearance of propriety are essential to the performance of all the activities of a
judge.
Section 1
Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their activities.
Section 2
As a subject of constant public scrutiny, judges must accept personal restrictions that might be viewed
as burdensome by the ordinary citizen and should do so freely and willingly. In particular, judges
conduct themselves in a way that is consistent with the dignity of the judicial office.
Section 3
Judges shall, in their personal relations with individual members of the legal profession who practice
regularly in their court, avoid situations which might reasonably give rise to the suspicion or
appearance of favoritism or partiality.
Section 4
Judges shall not participate in the determination of a case in which any member of their family
represents a litigant or is associated in any manner with the case.
Section 5

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Judges shall not allow the use of their residence by a member of the legal profession to receive clients
of the latter or of other members of the legal profession.
Section 6
Judges, like any other citizen, are entitled to freedom of expression, belief, association and assembly,
but in exercising such rights, they shall always conduct themselves in such a manner as to preserve the
dignity of the judicial office and the impartiality and independence of the judiciary.
Section 7
Judges shall inform themselves about their personal fiduciary financial interests and shall make
reasonable efforts to be informed about the financial interests of members of their family.
Section 8
Judges shall not use or lend the prestige of the judicial office to advance their private interests, or those
of a member of their family or of anyone else, nor shall they convey or permit others to convey the
impression that anyone is in a special position improperly to influence them in the performance of
judicial duties.
Section 9 as last updated by OCA Cir. 103-06 (2006)
Confidential information acquired by judges in their judicial capacity shall not be used or disclosed for
any other purpose NOT related to their judicial duties.
Section 10
Subject to the proper performance of judicial duties, judges may:
a. Write, lecture, teach and participate in activities concerning the law, the legal system, the
administration of justice or related matters;
b. Appear at a public hearing before an official body concerned with matters relating to the law, the
legal system, the administration of justice or related matters;
c. Engage in other activities if such activities do not detract from the dignity of the judicial office or
otherwise interfere with the performance of judicial duties.
Section 11
Judges shall not practice law whilst the holder of judicial office.
Section 12
Judges may form or join associations of judges or participate in other organizations representing the
interests of judges.
Section 13
Judges and members of their families shall neither ask for, nor accept, any gift, bequest, loan or favor in
relation to anything done or to be done or omitted to be done by him or her in connection with the
performance of judicial duties.
Section 14
Judges shall not knowingly permit court staff or others subject to their influence, direction or authority,
to ask for, or accept, any gift, bequest, loan or favor in relation to anything done or to be done or
omitted to be done in connection with their duties or functions.

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Section 15
Subject to law and to any legal requirements of public disclosure, judges may receive a token gift,
award or benefit as appropriate to the occasion on which it is made provided that such gift, award or
benefit might not reasonably be perceived as intended to influence the judge in the performance of
judicial duties or otherwise give rise to an appearance of partiality.
Canon 5
Equality
Ensuring equality of treatment to all before the courts is essential to the due performance of the judicial
office.
Section 1
Judges shall be aware of, and understand, diversity in society and differences arising from various
sources, including but not limited to race, color, sex, religion, national origin, caste, disability, age,
marital status, sexual orientation, social and economic status and other like causes.
Section 2
Judges shall not, in the performance of judicial duties, by words or conduct, manifest bias or prejudice
towards any person or group on irrelevant grounds.
Section 3
Judges shall carry out judicial duties with appropriate consideration for all persons, such as the parties,
witnesses, lawyers, court staff and judicial colleagues, without differentiation on any irrelevant ground,
immaterial to the proper performance of such duties.
Section 4
Judges shall not knowingly permit court staff or others subject to his or her influence, direction or
control to differentiate between persons concerned, in a matter before the judge on any irrelevant
ground.
Section 5
Judges shall require lawyers in proceedings before the court to refrain from manifesting, by words or
conduct, bias or prejudice based on irrelevant grounds, except such as are legally relevant to an issue in
proceedings and may be the subject of legitimate advocacy.
Canon 6
Competence and Diligence
Competence and diligence are prerequisites to the due performance of judicial office.
Section 1
The judicial duties of a judge take precedence over all other activities.
Section 2
Judges shall devote their professional activity to judicial duties, which include not only the performance
of judicial functions and responsibilities in court and the making of decisions, but also other tasks
relevant to the judicial office or the court's operations.
Section 3

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Judges shall take reasonable steps to maintain and enhance their knowledge, skills and personal
qualities necessary for the proper performance of judicial duties, taking advantage for this purpose of
the training and other facilities which should be made available, under judicial control, to judges.
Section 4
Judges shall keep themselves informed about relevant developments of international law, including
international conventions and other instruments establishing human rights norms.
Section 5
Judges shall perform all judicial duties, including the delivery of reserved decisions, efficiently, fairly
and with reasonable promptness.
Section 6
Judges shall maintain order and decorum in all proceedings before the court and be patient, dignified
and courteous in relation to litigants, witnesses, lawyers and others with whom the judge deals in an
official capacity. Judges shall require similar conduct of legal representatives, court staff and others
subject to their influence, direction or control.
Section 7
Judges shall not engage in conduct incompatible with the diligent discharge of judicial duties.
Definitions
In this Code, unless the context otherwise permits or requires, the following meanings shall be
attributed to the words used:
"Court staff" includes the personal staff of the judge including law clerks.
"Judge" means any person exercising judicial power, however designated.
"Judge's family" includes a judge's spouse, son, daughter, son-in-law, daughter-in-law, and any other
relative by consanguinity or affinity within the sixth civil degree, or person who is a companion or
employee of the judge and who lives in the judge's household.
This Code, which shall hereafter be referred to as the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine
Judiciary, supersedes the Canons of Judicial Ethics and the Code of Judicial Conduct heretofore applied
in the Philippines to the extent that the provisions or concepts therein are embodied in this Code:
Provided, however, that in case of deficiency or absence of specific provisions in this New Code, the
Canons of Judicial Ethics and the Code of Judicial Conduct shall be applicable in a suppletory
character.
This New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary shall take effect on the first day of June
2004, following its publication not later than 15 May 2004 in two newspapers of large circulation in the
Philippines to ensure its widest publicity.
Promulgated this 27 day of April 2004.

A.M. No. RTJ-10-2217 April 8, 2013

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SONIA C. DECENA and REY C. DECENA, Petitioners,
vs.
JUDGE NILO A. MALANYAON, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 32, IN
PILI, CAMARINES SUR, Respondent.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

A judge may not involve himself in any activity that is an aspect of the private practice of law.
His acceptance of an appointment to the Bench inhibits him from engaging in the private
practice of law, regardless of the beneficiary of the activity being a member of his immediate
family. He is guilty of conduct unbecoming of a judge otherwise.

Antecedents

The complainants have lodged an administrative complaint for conduct unbecoming a judge
against Hon. Nilo A. Malanyaon, the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 32,
in Pili, Camarines Sur.1

In their joint complaint-affidavit dated April 10, 2007,2 the complainants averred that
complainant Rey C. Decena had brought an administrative case in Regional Office No. V of
the Civil Service Commission in Legaspi City, Albay against Judge Malanyaon’s wife, Dr.
Amelita C. Malanyaon (Dr. Amelita), then the Assistant Provincial Health Officer of the
Province of Camarines Sur; that during the hearing of the administrative case on May 4, 2006,
Judge Malanyaon sat beside his daughter, Atty. Ma. Kristina C. Malanyaon, the counsel of Dr.
Amelita in the case; and that the events that then transpired were as recounted in the joint
complaint-affidavit, to wit:

3. During the early stage of the hearing when the hearing officer, Atty. Dennis Masinas
Nieves, brought up the matter regarding Dr. Malanyaon’s manifestation or motion (to dismiss
the case for lack of jurisdiction), Judge Malanyaon coached her daughter in making
manifestations/motions before the hearing officer, by scribbling on some piece of paper and
giving the same to the former, thus prompting her daughter to rise from her seat and/or ask
permission from the officer to speak, and then make some manifestations while reading or
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glancing on the paper given by Judge Malanyaon. At one point, Judge Malanyaon even
prompted her daughter to demand that Atty. Eduardo Loria, the collaborating counsel of our
principal counsel, Atty. Mary Ailyne Zamora, be required to produce his PTR number.

4. When our principal counsel, Atty. Zamora, arrived and took over from Atty. Loria, she
inquired regarding the personality of Judge Malanyaon, being seated at the lawyer’s bench
beside Atty. Malanyaon, Judge Malanyaon then proudly introduced himself and manifested
that he was the "counsel of the respondent’s counsel". Atty. Zamora proceeded to raise the
propriety of Judge Malanyaon’s sitting with and assisting his daughter in that hearing, being a
member of the judiciary, to which Judge Malanyaon loudly retorted that he be shown any
particular rule that prohibits him from sitting with his daughter at the lawyers’ bench. He
insisted that he was merely "assisting" her daughter, who "just passed the bar", defend the
respondent, and was likewise helping the latter defend herself. Pertinent portion of the records
of the proceedings are as follows:

xxxx

Atty. Nieves : First, she has to enter her appearance. Okay?

Atty. Zamora : Anyway, … I don’t think, I do not memorize my PTR number, I don’t remember
my PTR number, but aside from that Your Honor, I think this Honorable Hearing Officer could
take judicial notice that Atty. Ed Loria is indeed a lawyer in good standing in IBP. And
moreover, Your Honor, I would like to inquire as to the personality of the gentleman next to
the lawyer of the defendant or respondent, Your Honor?

Judge Malanyaon: I am the counsel of the complainant, ah, of the respondent’s counsel, I am
Judge Malanyaon. I am assisting her. And so what?!!

Atty. Zamora : Ah, you are the counsel of the … (interrupted)

Atty. Nieves : There’s no need to be belligerent… let’s calm down…

Atty. Zamora : Your Honor, Your Honor, we all do not know each other, and with due respect
to the judge, there is also a hearing officer here Your Honor, and I think Your Honor the
Hearing Officer here deserves due respect. I mean, the word "So what?!", I don’t think that
would be proper Your Honor in this Court.
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Judge Malanyaon : I am sorry your Honor, because the … is out of turn, out of turn.

Atty. Nieves : This is not necessary, actually, this is not necessary. So we might as well
proceed with our hearing today. I’ve already made a ruling regarding the, the query regarding
PTR. Okay, at this stage it is not proper considering that Atty. Loria only entered his
appearance during the start of the hearing. Okay. So, we have to proceed now.

Atty. Zamora : I am accepting Your Honor the delegation again of Atty. Loria. I am entering my
appearance as the lead counsel for this case, Your Honor, as counsel for the complainant.

Atty. Nieves : Okay.

Atty. Zamora : And may I be clear that the judge will be the collaborating counsel for the
respondent or the counsel of record of the respondent?

Atty. Nieves : … of the judge is … I’m sorry?

Atty. Zamora : He manifested Your Honor that he is the counsel of the respondent.

Atty. Malanyaon : No, the counsel of the counsel of the respondent.

Atty. Nieves : He has not, he has not entered his appearance in this case.

Atty. Zamora : Would that be proper for him Your Honor, considering that he is a judge Your
Honor? Would that, ah, there will be undue influence, or whatever, Your Honor? We are just
trying to avoid any bias or undue influence in this court, Your Honor.

Atty. Nieves : Okay, it will not, considering the fact that he has not entered his appearance for
the respondent.

Judge Malanyaon : If Your Honor, please, the respondent is my wife. Counsel for the
respondent is my daughter. She just passed the bar! I’m assisting her. Is it not my right, my
duty to assist my daughter? And to assist my wife defend herself? I am only sitting with my
daughter! I’m not acting for the respondent!

Atty. Zamora : I don’t think Your Honor under the rule, the counsel needs a counsel. Only the
one charged or the one being charged needs a counsel.

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Atty. Nieves : Okay, let’s settle this now. Judge Malanyaon has not entered his appearance. It
will not in any way …

xxxx

The complainants averred that the actuations of Judge Malanyaon during the hearing of his
wife’s administrative case in the Civil Service Commission constituted violations of the New
Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippines Judiciary.

On June 21, 2007, then Court Administrator Christopher O. Lock required Judge Malanyaon
to comment on the complaint.3

On July 15, 2007, Judge Malanyaon filed his comment, refuting the allegations of the
complaint thusly:

1. Complainants are the sister and nephew of my wife, Amelita C. Malanyaon, there is bad
blood between them arising from divergent political loyalties and family differences;

2. There is no reason for complainants to take offense at my sitting beside my daughter Ma.
Kristina, when she appeared for my wife in the first hearing of the administrative case Rey C.
Decena filed against my wife; the hearing officer himself could cite no rule disallowing me
from sitting beside my daughter, in the counsel’s table, and he did not ask me to vacate where
I sat beside my daughter; the transcript does not support complainants’ claim;

3. It is true I snapped at Atty. Zamora, when she asked about my personality – but she was
speaking out of turn as all I was doing was sitting beside my daughter when she came as the
transcript will show, I apologized to the hearing officer, who graciously let the matter pass;

4. My daughter is a new practitioner; her law partner and lead counsel could not make it on
time, and as her consultant, I did not speak, nor enter my appearance for my wife – to lend a
helping hand to a neophyte lawyer, defending her mother in an administrative case, is not
unethical, nor does it constitute the proscribed practice of law;

5. It is petty for my sister-in-law and for my nephew to complain of my presence during the
hearing; it is my filial duty to lend my wife and daughter, moral and legal support in their time
of need; indeed, it is strange for complainants to take offense at my presence and accuse me

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of practicing law during my stint as a judge when before the bad blood between my wife and
her sibling and nephew erupted, I helped them out with their legal problems gratis et amore
and they did not complain of my practicing law on their behalf, indeed, one of the crosses a
judge must carry is the cross of base ingratitude.4

On March 27, 2008, then Court Administrator Zenaida N. Elepaño recommended to the Court
that: (a) the complaint be re-docketed as a regular administrative matter; (b) Judge
Malanyaon be found guilty of gross misconduct; and (c) Judge Malanyaon be fined
₱50,000.00.5

On September 16, 2009, the Court required the parties to manifest within 10 days from notice
if they were willing to submit the case for resolution on the basis of the records or pleadings
filed.6

The complainants complied on November 13, 2009, stating their willingness to submit the
case for resolution after a formal investigation or hearing was conducted, and after they were
given time to file their respective position papers or memoranda.7

On January 11, 2010, the Court resolved: (a) to re-docket the administrative case as a regular
administrative matter; (b) to await Judge Malanyaon’s compliance with the September 16,
2009 resolution; and (c) to refer the administrative matter to the OCA for evaluation, report
and recommendation.8

After Judge Malanyaon did not submit any compliance with the September 16, 2009
resolution, the Court ordered him on February 10, 2010 to show cause why he should not be
disciplinarily dealt with or held in contempt for such failure, and further directed him to still
comply with the resolution.9

On February 15, 2010, Judge Malanyaon’s counsel informed the Court that Judge Malanyaon
had meanwhile suffered a massive stroke on September 2, 2009 that had affected his mental
faculties and made him unfit to defend himself here; and prayed for the suspension of the
proceedings until Judge Malanyaon would have been found competent to comprehend and
stand the rigors of the investigation.10

19
On April 12, 2010, the Court deferred action on the case, and required Judge Malanyaon to
submit a medical certificate.11

Judge Malanyaon submitted a medical certificate dated May 27, 2010, issued by the
Philippine General Hospital, certifying that he had been confined thereaft from September 2,
2009 to October 19, 2009 for the following reason, to wit:

Cerebro Vascular disease, Hypertension Intra Cerebral Hematoma Left Thalamus with
obstructive Hydrocephalus; DM type II, Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary disease; Pneumonia;
lleus (resolved); Neurogenic bladder, Benign Prostatic Hypertrophy; Grave’s disease; Arthritis.

OPERATION PERFORMED:

Bilateral tube ventriculostomy12

Judge Malanyaon submitted two more medical certificates, the first dated October 5,
2010,13 certifying that, among others, he was undergoing regular check-up, and the other,
dated January 24, 2011,14 certifying that his functional and mental status had been assessed
as follows:

The severity and location of the hemorrage in the brain resulted in residual epoliptogenic
focus (Post-gliotic seizures) and significant impairment of cognition, memory judgment
behavior (Vascular Dementia). He has problems with memory recall, analysis of information,
events and situations which may make defending himself difficult, if necessary. Although he is
independent on ambulation, he requires assistance even in basic activities of daily living.15

The Court required the complainants to comment on Judge Malanyaon’s medical certification
dated October 5, 2010.

On July 18, 2011, however, Dr. Amelita submitted a manifestation and urgent motion to
dismiss, seeking the dismissal of the administrative case against Judge Malanyaon upon the
following grounds, to wit:

xxxx

20
2. Unfortunately, in a "Medical Certification" dated June 15, 2011 the original of which is
attached hereto as Annex "1", the attending neurologist of my husband has pronounced him
permanently mentally impaired. x x x.

xxxx

3. As a consequence, my husband has permanently lost the capacity to understand the nature
and object of the administrative proceedings against him. He cannot intelligently appoint his
counsel or communicate coherently with him. He cannot testify in his own behalf, and confront
and cross-examine opposing witnesses. Indeed, he cannot properly avail himself of his rights
in an adversarial administrative investigation;

4. Given the progressive mental impairment afflicting my husband, he has permanently lost
the capacity to defend himself. Thus, to continue the administrative investigation against my
husband who is no longer in any position to defend himself would constitute a denial of his
right to be heard (Baikong Akang Camsa vs. Judge Aurelio Rendon, A.M. No. MTJ-02-1395
dated 19 February 2002).16

Even so, on September 26, 2011, we required the complainants to comment on the
manifestation and motion of Dr. Amelita.17

Subsequently, Dr. Amelita submitted another motion dated January 23, 2012,18 praying for the
dismissal of the case against Judge Malanyaon.

On February 6, 2012, Court Administrator Jose Midas P. Marquez reiterated the

recommendation made on March 27, 2008 by then Court Administrator Elepaño by
recommending that: (a) the administrative case be re-docketed as a regular administrative
matter; and (b) Judge Malanyaon be found guilty of gross misconduct and fined ₱50,000.00.19

On May 3, 2012, the Court received the complainants’ compliance dated February 1,
2012,20 as their response to the show cause order issued in relation to their failure to submit
the comment the Court had required on September 26, 2011.21

On September 4, 2012, the Court received from Dr. Amelita an urgent ex parte motion for
immediate resolution, praying that the motion to dismiss dated July 18, 2011 be already
resolved.22
21
Issues

For consideration and resolution are the following issues, namely: (a) whether or not Judge
Malanyaon would be denied due process if the administrative case was not dismissed; (b)
whether the actuations of Judge Malanyaon complained of constituted conduct unbecoming of
a judge; and (c) if Judge Malanyaon was guilty of conduct unbecoming of a judge, what
should be the correct sanction.

Ruling

We now discuss and resolve the issues accordingly.

1.

Respondent’s right to due process

is not violated by resolution of the case

In her manifestation with urgent motion to dismiss,23 Dr. Amelita stressed that proceeding
against Judge Malanyaon despite his present medical state would violate his right to due
process. She stated:

3. As a consequence, my husband has permanently lost the capacity to understand the nature
and object of the administrative proceedings against him. He cannot intelligently appoint his
counsel or communicate coherently with him. He cannot testify in his own behalf, and confront
and cross-examine opposing witnesses. Indeed, he cannot properly avail himself of his rights
in an adversarial administrative investigation.24

Opposing, the complainants argued that Dr. Amelita’s concern was unfounded considering
that Judge Malanyaon had not only been given the opportunity to be heard, but had been
actually heard on their complaint.

The complainants’ argument is well taken.

On August 3, 2007, or prior to his suffering the massive stroke that impaired his mental
faculty, Judge Malanyaon already submitted his comment containing his explanations and
refutations of the charge against him. His comment asserted that during the hearing of the

22
administrative case of his wife in the Regional Office of the Civil Service Commission, the
hearing officer did not even cite any rule that prohibited him from sitting beside his daughter
who was then acting as the counsel of Dr. Amelita therein, or that inhibited him from assisting
his daughter in the defense of his wife. He pointed out that although he had then lost his
temper after the opposing counsel had inquired about his personality in that hearing, he had
ultimately apologized to the hearing officer, who had in turn graciously let the matter pass.

Under the circumstances, Judge Malanyaon was accorded due process. In administrative
cases, the requirement of due process is satisfied whenever the parties are afforded the fair
and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the controversy,25 either through oral
arguments or through pleadings.26 That is what happened herein. Accordingly, Dr. Amelita’s
motion was bereft of basis, and should be denied.

2.

Actuations of Judge Malanyaon

rendered him guilty of

conduct unbecoming of a judge

The following actuations of Judge Malanyaon constituted conduct unbecoming of a judge.

First was Judge Malanyaon’s occupying a seat beside his daughter that was reserved for the
lawyers during the hearing. Such act displayed his presumptuousness, and probably even his
clear intention to thereby exert his influence as a judge of the Regional Trial Court on the
hearing officer in order for the latter to favor his wife’s cause. That impression was definitely
adverse against the Judiciary, whose every judicial officer was presumed to be a subject of
strict scrutiny by the public. Being an incumbent RTC Judge, he always represented the
Judiciary, and should have acted with greater circumspection and self-restraint, simply
because the administrative hearing was unavoidably one in which he could not but be
partisan. Simple prudence should have counselled him to avoid any form of suspicion of his
motives, or to suppress any impression of impropriety on his part as an RTC judge by not
going to the hearing himself.

23
Second was Judge Malanyaon’s admission that his presence in that hearing was to advise his
daughter on what to do and say during the hearing, to the point of coaching his daughter. In
the process, he unabashedly introduced himself as the "counsel of the respondent’s counsel"
upon his presence being challenged by the adverse counsel, stating that his daughter was still
inexperienced for having just passed her Bar Examinations. Such excuse, seemingly
grounded on a "filial" duty towards his wife and his daughter, did not furnish enough reason
for him to forsake the ethical conduct expected of him as a sitting judge. He ought to have
restrained himself from sitting at that hearing, being all too aware that his sitting would have
him cross the line beyond which was the private practice of law.

Section 3527 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court expressly prohibits sitting judges like Judge
Malanyaon from engaging in the private practice of law or giving professional advice to clients.
Section 11,28 Canon 4 (Propriety),29 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct and Rule 5.0730 of
the Code of Judicial Conduct reiterate the prohibition from engaging in the private practice of
law or giving professional advice to clients. The prohibition is based on sound reasons of
public policy, considering that the rights, duties, privileges and functions of the office of an
attorney are inherently incompatible with the high official functions, duties, powers, discretion
and privileges of a sitting judge. It also aims to ensure that judges give their full time and
attention to their judicial duties, prevent them from extending favors to their own private
interests, and assure the public of their impartiality in the performance of their functions.
These objectives are dictated by a sense of moral decency and desire to promote the public
interest.31

Thus, an attorney who accepts an appointment to the Bench must accept that his right to
practice law as a member of the Philippine Bar is thereby suspended, and it shall continue to
be so suspended for the entire period of his incumbency as a judge. The term practice of law
is not limited to the conduct of cases in court or to participation in court proceedings, but
extends to the preparation of pleadings or papers in anticipation of a litigation, the giving of
legal advice to clients or persons needing the same, the preparation of legal instruments and
contracts by which legal rights are secured, and the preparation of papers incident to actions
and special proceedings.32

To the Court, then, Judge Malanyaon engaged in the private practice of law by assisting his
daughter at his wife’s administrative case, coaching his daughter in making manifestations or
24
posing motions to the hearing officer, and preparing the questions that he prompted to his
daughter in order to demand that Atty. Eduardo Loria, collaborating counsel of the
complainants’ principal counsel, should produce his privilege tax receipt. Judge Malanyaon
did so voluntarily and knowingly, in light of his unhesitating announcement during the hearing
that he was the counsel for Atty. Katrina Malanyaon, the counsel of the respondent, as his
response to the query by the opposing counsel why he was seated next to Atty. Malanyaon
thereat.

Third was Judge Malanyaon’s admission that he had already engaged in the private practice
of law even before the incident now the subject of this case by his statement in his comment
that "it is strange for complainants to take offense at my presence and accuse me of
practicing law during my stint as a judge when before the bad blood between my wife and her
sibling and nephew erupted, I helped them out with their legal problems gratis et amore and
they did not complain of my practicing law on their behalf."33 He thereby manifested his
tendencies to disregard the prohibition against the private practice of law during his
incumbency on the Bench.

Any propensity on the part of a magistrate to ignore the ethical injunction to conduct himself in
a manner that would give no ground for reproach is always worthy of condemnation.34 We
should abhor any impropriety on the part of judges, whether committed in or out of their
courthouses, for they are not judges only occasionally. The Court has fittingly emphasized in
Castillo v. Calanog, Jr.:35

The Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that the conduct of a judge must be free of a whiff of
impropriety not only with respect to his performance of his judicial duties, but also to his
behavior outside his sala and as a private individual. There is no dichotomy of morality; a
public official is also judged by his private morals. The Code dictates that a judge, in order to
promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary, must behave with
propriety at all times. As we have very recently explained, a judge’s official life cannot simply
be detached or separated from his personal existence. Thus:

Being a subject of constant public scrutiny, a judge should freely and willingly accept
restrictions on conduct that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen.

25
A judge should personify judicial integrity and exemplify honest public service. The personal
behavior of a judge, both in the performance of official duties and in private life should be
above suspicion.

Fourth was Judge Malanyaon’s display of arrogance during the hearing, as reflected by his
reaction to the opposing counsel’s query on his personality to sit at the counsel table at the
hearing, to wit:

I am the counsel of the complainant, ah, of the respondent’s counsel, I am Judge Malanyaon.
I am assisting her. And so what?!!

Judge Malanyaon’s uttering "And so what?" towards the opposing counsel evinced his instant
resentment towards the adverse parties’ counsel for rightly challenging his right to be sitting
on a place reserved for counsel of the parties. The utterance, for being made in an arrogant
tone just after he had introduced himself as a judge, was unbecoming of the judge that he
was, and tainted the good image of the Judiciary that he should uphold at all times.36 It is true
that the challenge of the opposing counsel might have slighted him, but that was not enough
to cause him to forget that he was still a judge expected to act with utmost sobriety and to
speak with self-restraint. He thereby ignored the presence of the hearing officer, appearing to
project that he could forsake the decorum that the time and the occasion rightly called for from
him and the others just because he was a judge and the other side was not. He should not
forget that a judge like himself should be the last person to be perceived by others as a petty
and sharp-tongued tyrant.

Judge Malanyaon has insisted that his actuations were excused by his filial obligation to assist
his daughter, then only a neophyte in the Legal Profession. We would easily understand his
insistence in the light of our culture to be always solicitous of the wellbeing of our family
members and other close kin, even risking our own safety and lives in their defense. But the
situation of Judge Malanyaon was different, for he was a judicial officer who came under the
stricture that uniformly applied to all judges of all levels of the judicial hierarchy, forbidding him
from engaging in the private practice of law during his incumbency, regardless of whether the
beneficiary was his wife or daughter or other members of his own family.

3.

26
What is the proper penalty?

Judge Malanyaon had been previously sanctioned by the Court on the following three
occasions, namely: (a) A.M. No. RTJ-93-1090, with admonition for gross ignorance of the law
and unreasonable delay in resolving motions;37 (b) A.M. No. RTJ-99-1444, with reprimand for
failure to resolve motions;38 and (c) A.M. No. RTJ-02-1669, with a fine of ₱20,000.00 (coupled
with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar act would be dealt with more
severely) for conduct unbecoming of a judge.39 He had other administrative cases that were
dismissed.40 Of the three administrative cases that merited sanctions, however, only the third
should be considered as aggravating herein because it involved the similar offense of conduct
unbecoming of a judge for which he had been given the stern warning of a more severe
penalty upon a repetition.

However, our uniform treatment of administrative sanctions as having the nature of liabilities
akin to those in criminal cases now brings us to offset such aggravating circumstance with the
apparent fact that the actuations of Judge Malanyaon complained of had not been motivated
by bad faith, or by any malice towards another. Indeed, he did not intend to thereby cause any
prejudice to another, having so acted from a sincere, albeit misplaced, desire to go to the help
of his wife and daughter.

Accordingly, the Court deems it condign and proper to mitigate the fine of ₱50,000.00
recommended by the Court Administrator by imposing on Judge Malanyaon a fine of
₱40,000.00. With his disability retirement from the Judiciary having been earlier granted by
the Court, the fine shall be deducted from his remaining retirement benefits.

WHEREFORE, the Court finds and pronounces JUDGE NILO A. MALANYAON, Presiding
Judge of Branch 32 of the Regional Trial Court in Pili, Camarines Sur, administratively liable
for conduct unbecoming of a Judge, and penalizes him with a fine of ₱40,000.00.

SO ORDERED.

27
Office of the Court Administrator vs Floro Jr
[Case Digest]
AM NO 99 -7 - 273-RTC
March 31, 2006

Facts:
 Atty. Floro graduated in ALS and placed 13th in the 1983 bar exams.
 He applied for judgeship in 1995 and 1998.
 In both applications, he failed the psychological exams.
 But due to his impressive academic record, JBC allowed his appointed after a favorable
second opinion from private practitioners
 Upon Judge Floro’s request, OCA conducted an audit on his sala.
 The audit team recommended that its report be considered as an administrative
complaint against Judge Floro and that he be subjected to an appropriate psychological
and mental exam.

Issue:
(1) WON Judge Floro is guilty of simple misconduct and unbecoming conduct
(2) WON Judge Floro is fit to be a judge

Held:
(1) YES.
 Simple Misconduct – circulates calling cards with his name as an RTC Judge,
indicating that he is a bar topnotcher in 1983 bar exams with full second honors from
Ateneo Law School
 Before the start of the session, he is introduced with the same qualifications
 He violated Canon 2, Rule 2.02 of Code of Judicial Conduct because there is no
evidence of corrupt motivation, but of thirst of recognition Unbecoming Conduct
 Judge Floro is charged with partiality in criminal cases where he declared he is pro-
accused
 He admitted to Atty. Dizon and her staff, including the PAO that he is pro-accused
because his brother and sis-in law has been accused of so many unfounded offenses
 He is also charged of openly criticizing the ROC and the PH judicial system and
using highly improper language during court proceedings “Kabulukan ng hustisya”;
“ROC has no use” “Luka-luka yang babaeng yan” against a witness
(2) NO! Judge Floro cannot remain as RTC Judge bec of the findings of mental impairment
that renders him unable to perform the functions of his office.
 Judge Floro admitted that he believes in “psychic visions” of foreseeing the future bec
of his power in “psychic phenomenon”
 He believes in dwendes and the power of his dwarf friends
 He has likened himself as an “angel of death” who can inflict pains on people.
 He wears blue robes during court sessions, only wearing black on Fridays to
recharge his powers
 He conducts healing sessions during break time.

28
As such he does not meet the requirement of objectivity and his competence for judicial tasks
leaves much to be desired. His belief system indubitably shows his inability to function with
cold neutrality of an impartial judge.

EN BANC

A.M. No. RTJ-99-1431 January 23, 2002

JUDGE FLORENTINO M. ALUMBRES, complainant,

vs.
JUDGE JOSE F. CAOIBES, JR., RTC, Branch 253, Las Piñas City, respondent.

DECISION

MELO, J:

Upon his assumption to office, a judge ceases to be an ordinary citizen. He becomes the
visible representation of the law, and more importantly, of justice. From him, the people draw
their will and awareness to obey the law. Thus, a magistrate of the law must comport himself
at all times in such a manner that his conduct, official or otherwise, can bear the most
searching scrutiny of the public that looks up to him as the epitome of integrity and justice. He
must be the first to abide by the law and weave an example for others to follow. He must
studiously avoid even the slightest infraction of the law. Sadly, the actions in the instant case
of complainant and respondent, both of whom are members of the Judiciary, fall far short of
this exacting standard.

Judge Jose F. Caoibes Jr., the Presiding Judge of Branch 253 of the Regional Trial Court of
Las Piñas City, stands charged with Grave Misconduct/Conduct Unbecoming to a Judicial
Officer for allegedly inflicting fistic blows — one to the right forehead and another to the left
side of the jaw — on Judge Florentino M. Alumbres, Presiding Judge of Branch 255 of the
Regional Trial Court of Las Piñas City on May 20, 1997 outside the Staff Room of Branch 253,
in plain view of several lawyers and litigants.

The facts, as culled from the records, are as follows:

29
Branch 253 was a newly-created branch of the Regional Trial Court of Las Piñas City. Thus,
when respondent Caoibes was appointed presiding judge thereof, he had the privilege of
recommending to the Supreme Court the appointment of employees of his own choice.
Complainant Alumbres, who was then the executive judge of the court, saw in this a golden
opportunity to secure employment for his son. Learning that Caoibes’ office furniture had yet
to be delivered by the Supreme Court, Alumbres lent an executive table to the former for his
temporary use.

When Caoibes assumed office on September 16, 1996, Alumbres invited the former to lunch,
during which he proposed that Caoibes recommend his son for appointment as utility man for
Branch 253. Caoibes agreed. The next day, however, Alumbres proposed that instead of
utility man, Caoibes should recommend his son for appointment as process server of Branch
253. Again, Caoibes agreed. Alumbres, as executive judge, favorably endorsed the
appointment of his son, as recommended by Caoibes. However, his son was not appointed as
process server because the Court Administrator found it inappropriate for Alumbres to
endorse the appointment of his own son, rendering therefore such recommendation nepotistic
in character.

When Alumbres was replaced as executive judge by Judge Bonifacio Sanz Maceda, he asked
his replacement to favorably endorse his son’s appointment as process server of Branch 253.
Judge Maceda did so. This time, however, Caoibes reneged on his agreement with Alumbres.
Caoibes withdrew his earlier recommendation of Alumbres’ son and, instead, recommended
David Cariño for process server of Branch 253.

Learning that an executive table had already been delivered to Caoibes, Alumbres, in the
morning of May 20, 1997, sent his deputy sheriff to the chambers of Caoibes to take back the
table earlier lent to Caoibes. Respondent Caoibes told the deputy sheriff that he would
continue using the table until his office furniture was delivered by the Supreme Court. The
deputy sheriff left to convey this message to Alumbres. Caoibes, thereafter went to Judge
Maceda to ask that he be allowed to continue using the table lent to him by Alumbres. Judge
Maceda opined that Caoibes could continue using the table, adding that if Alumbres needed a
table, he (Judge Maceda) could lend one of his own tables to Alumbres.

30
In the meantime, Alumbres had been informed of Caoibes’ refusal to return the table.
Alumbres suspended court proceedings and, accompanied by his process server and the
deputy sheriff, went to chambers of Caoibes to reclaim the table. Informed of their purpose,
the deputy sheriff of Branch 253 informed the group to wait for the return of Caoibes since the
latter still had some official papers on the table. Since the Staff Room of Branch 253 was in
front of the chambers of Judge Maceda, Alumbres decided to wait for Caoibes in front thereof.
Several lawyers and litigants who had hearings were all along the hallway.

Informed by his utility man that Alumbres was in his staff room to recover the table, Caoibes
left Judge Maceda to see Alumbres. Caoibes saw Alumbres, with hands on his hips, standing
along the hallway. Caoibes greeted Alumbres "Hoy, ano ba ang atin?" The latter replied in an
angry tone "Joey, kukunin ko na ang table ko. Akin naman iyun, eh." In response, Caoibes put
his left arm around Alumbres’ shoulder, extended his right hand to shake the latter’s right
hand, at the same time saying "Huwag naman. Halika, pag-usapan natin dine." Despite the
cordial gesture, Alumbres held Caoibes’ right wrist and forcefully jerked it. Incensed at the
fierce reaction of Alumbres, Caoibes shouted "Tarantado ito, ah," and swung his left arm
towards Alumbres, hitting him on the right temple. Caoibes also delivered a right hook,
grazing Alumbres’ lower jaw. The latter felt dazed and the right lens of his eyeglass dropped
to the floor. Before the incident could worsen, Judge Maceda, who had just emerged from his
chambers, and one of the deputy sheriffs, placed themselves between the two. Alumbres
swung at Caoibes while the latter was being led away by Judge Maceda but the blow missed.
The incident, involving as it did members of the judiciary, was given extensive coverage by
the media.

According to the medical certificate issued by the City Health Officer, the left side of Alumbres’
chin was swollen and had a laceration about 1 cm. wide, while his right temporal region,
anterior aspect, had a pin-head sized laceration as well as slight swelling and reddening.

In his defense, Caoibes denied having dealt fistic blows to Alumbres. He claimed that when
his right wrist was jerked by Alumbres, he struggled to free himself and that, in the process,
his right palm "slightly hit the face" of Alumbres. Moreover, he asserted that when he was
being led away by Judge Maceda, Alumbres managed to extricate himself from those
pacifying him (Alumbres), and threw several punches at Caoibes, all of which missed. He

31
claimed that during this event, he instinctively "thrust" his right arm, implying that his right
hand may have hit the complainant’s jaw.

As succinctly defined by Justice Romeo J. Callejo, the Justice to whom this case was
assigned for investigation, the threshold issue to be determined is whether or not Judge
Caoibes deliberately inflicted fistic blows to complainant Judge Alumbres.

We agree with the Investigating Justice that, indeed, Caoibes threw two punches at Alumbres,
the first hitting his right temple and the second, the left side of his jaw. In the trenchant words
of Justice Callejo:

The investigating Justice is not convinced of the claim of the respondent that
he unintentionally and slightly hit the face of the complainant as the respondent struggled to
free himself from the grip of the complainant. We did find it incredible, if not preposterous,
that, as the respondent struggled to free himself from the grip of the complainant, the left hand
of the respondent would go astray and hit slightly the face of the complainant. For, in such a
situation, it would have been instinctive for the respondent to hold, with his left hand, the hand
of the complainant holding on to the right hand of the respondent to free his right hand from
the grip of the complainant. Equally implausible is respondent’s claim that he thrusted his
hand towards the complainant as the latter threw punches at the respondent as the latter was
being brought by Judge Bonifacio Sanz Maceda to his chambers. The respondent did not
specifically declare whether or not he hit any part of the body of the complainant and, if so,
what part of the body of the complainant was hit. Judge Bonifacio Sanz Maceda was equally
nebulous when he merely declared that the respondent was able to reach the complainant.

(Investigation Report, p. 10).

We also concur with Justice Callejo when he states that contrary to the claim of Alumbres, the
punches of Caoibes were not severe as the injuries sustained by Alumbres were merely
superficial, the size of a pinhead similar to a mosquito bite.

Nonetheless, the slightness of the injuries suffered by Alumbres do not detract from the
gravity of the offense committed. Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct states that "A judge
should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities. In amplification,
Rule 2.01 provides that "A judge should behave at all times as to promote public confidence in
32
the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary." Similarly, the Canon of Judicial Ethics provide
that "a judge’s official conduct should be free from the appearance of impropriety, and his
personal behavior, not only on the bench and in the performance of judicial duties, but also in
his everyday life, should be beyond reproach (Marces, Sr. vs. Arcangel, 258 SCRA 503
[1996]). Being the visible representation of the law and the embodiment of the people’s sense
of justice, he must be studiously careful himself to avoid even the slightest infraction of the
law, lest it be a demoralizing example to others (Canon 22, Canon of Judicial Ethics).

Judge Caoibes has failed to live up to the standards of morality and uprightness demanded of
a judge. As Justice Callejo observes:

In this case, the respondent used his hands and inflicted physical injuries on the complainant,
a felony in Article 266 of the Revised Penal Code and during office hours at that. And the
respondent did so in full view of lawyers and litigants who were in the vicinity of the court and
while judicial proceedings were ongoing. The respondent took the law unto his own hands and
subjected the complainant with physical injuries. By his felonious acts, the respondent
downgraded himself to an ordinary criminal, not a dispenser of justice. The respondent
ignored the law he swore to uphold and defend and hid behind the law of the jungle.

(Investigation Report, p. 11).

Caoibes’ use of physical violence against a colleague reveals a marked lack of judicial
temperament and self-restraint, traits not only desirable, but indispensable, for every judge to
possess besides the basic equipment of learning in the law. Such behavior puts the judiciary
into disrepute.

While Alumbres himself may have provoked the incident in question by his forceful reaction to
Caoibes’ attempt to settle their differences, the unruly behavior and/or violent reaction of
Alumbres may not be used to justify the felonious act of respondent. As incisively observed by
the Investigating Justice, "no judge, from the lowest to the highest, should be allowed to take
the law into his own hands. That is the law of the jungle, not the law of a civilized society to
which [Alumbres] and [Caoibes] belong."

Moreover, courts are looked upon by the people with high respect and are regarded sacred
places, where litigants are heard, rights and conflicts settled and justice solemnly dispensed.
33
Misbehavior within and around their vicinity diminishes their sanctity and dignity (Bedural vs.
Edroso, AM No. 00-1395, October 12, 2000). By fighting within court premises, the parties
have failed, not only to observe the proper decorum expected of members of the judiciary,
they have failed to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.
More contemptible, the altercation arose out of a squabble involving a mere table. In Quiroz
vs. Orfila (272 SCRA 324 [1997]), we declared:

Fighting between court employees during office hours is disgraceful behavior reflecting
adversely on the good image of the judiciary. It displays a cavalier attitude towards the
seriousness and dignity with which court business should be treated. Shouting at one another
in the workplace and during office hours is arrant discourtesy and disrespect not only towards
co-workers, but to the court as well. The behavior of the parties was totally unbecoming
members of the judicial service. Such conduct cannot be countenanced.

In fine, we find the infliction by Judge Caoibes of fistic blows on Judge Alumbres to be acts of
serious impropriety unbecoming a judge, in violation of Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct. 1âwphi1

Section 2 of Rule 140 of the Rules of Court classifies administrative charges as serious, less
serious, or light. Section 3 of Rule 140 considers violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct to
be serious charges. For a serious charge, the respondent found culpable therefor may be
imposed the sanction of either: (1) dismissal from the service and disqualification from
reinstatement or appointment to any public office; (2) suspension for three months without
salary or benefits; or (3) a fine of not less than P20,000.00 but not more than P40,000.00.

While the Court is convinced that, based on the evidence on record, Judge Caoibes is
culpable of a serious charge, it is likewise clear that he was provoked into the fracas that
ensued. This circumstance leads us to temper the penalty imposable.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we find Judge Jose F. Caoibes Jr. GUILTY of violating
the Code of Judicial Conduct and hereby impose upon him a fine of TWENTY THOUSAND
PESOS (P20,000.00), with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future
will be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.
34
EMILIE SISON-BARIAS vs. JUDGE MARINO E. RUBIA A.M. No. RTJ-14-2388,
June 10, 2014 Per Curiam

FACTS:

Complainant is involved in 3 cases pending before the sala of respondent judge. The first
case is an intestate proceeding over the intestate estate of her late husband. This was
opposed by her mother-in-law, Romelias Almeda-Barias. The second case is a
guardianship proceeding over Romelias Almeda-Barias. The third case is a civil action for
annulment of contracts and reconveyance of real properties filed by Romelias Almeda-
Barias, represented by Evelyn Tanael, against complainant, among others. Complainant
alleged that there was delay in the publication of the notice in the petition for issuance of
letters of administration filed. She was then informed by her brother, Enrique "Ike" Sison,
that respondent Eileen Pecaña, the daughter of his good friend, was a data encoder in the
Office of the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Biñan, Laguna. Complainant,
together with her two brothers met with respondent Pecaña on February 20, 2010. During
this meeting, complainant asked respondent Pecaña to check the status of the publication
of the notice. Respondent Pecaña asked for complainant’s number so that she could inform
her as soon as any development takes place in the case. Respondent Pecaña asked
complainant to meet her again at her house in Biñan, Laguna and informed her that she
could no longer assist her since respondent Judge Rubia had already given administration
of the properties to Evelyn Tanael. Complainant stated that she was not interested in the
grant of administration to Tanael because these concerned the properties of her mother-in-
law. She was only concerned with the administration of the properties of her late husband,
to which respondent Pecaña replied, "Ah ganun ba? Iba pala ung kaso mo." Complainant
alleged that respondent Pecaña sent her a text message on March 2, 2010 asking
complainant to call her. Complainant called respondent Pecaña who informed her that
respondent Judge Rubia wanted to talk to her. Complainant agreed to meet with
respondent Judge Rubia over dinner, on the condition that respondent Pecaña would be
present as well. On March 3, 2010 at around 7:00 p.m, complainant picked up respondent
35
Pecaña at 6750 Ayala Avenue in Makati City. They proceeded to Café Juanita in The Fort,
Bonifacio Global City. Respondent Pecaña said that respondent Judge Rubia would arrive
late as he would be coming from a Rotary Club meeting held at the Mandarin Hotel.
Respondent Judge Rubia arrived at Café Juanita around 8:30 p.m. During the meeting,
Rubia allegedly asked her questions not related to her pending cases, including her
supposed involvement with another man, her being connected with a leading airline (PAL)
in the country and the hospital where she brought her husband when he suffered cardiac
arrest. The impression of complainant was that respondent Judge Rubia was actively
taking a position in favor of Atty. Zarate. After dinner, complainant stayed behind to settle
the bill. Even before he left, she alleged that respondent Judge Rubia had made
insinuations that she was awaiting the company of another man. On June 15, 2010,
counsel for complainant was personally handed a copy of a motion for consolidation filed
by the oppositor, Romelias Almeda-Barias, despite the date of the hearing on such motion
being set on June 18, 2010. Complainant alleged that respondent Judge Rubia did not even
consider the comment/opposition to the motion for consolidation filed by her counsel,
which stated that since two of these cases were special proceedings, they could not be
consolidated with an ordinary civil action. Complainant enumerated occasions that alleged
manifest partiality on the part of respondent Judge Rubia. She alleged that respondent
Judge Rubia failed to require a timely filing of the pre-trial brief on the part of Evelyn
Tanael and Romelias Almeda-Barias, and despite their noncompliance on four (4) separate
pre-trials that were postponed, Tanael and Almeda-Barias were not declared in default.
She also alleged that respondent Judge Rubia stated that the burden to prove ownership of
the property was on complainant, when in fact it was the oppositor, or Tanael and Almeda-
Barias, who had the burden of proof to show that the land was fraudulently transferred to
her late husband. Complainant admitted that she did not inform her counsel of the dinner
meeting she had with respondents. It was Enrique who allegedly told complainant’s
lawyers about it when he went to the lawyer’s office to pay some bills. Complainant said
that her lawyer immediately admonished her for agreeing to meet with respondent Judge

36
Rubia. Complainant then texted respondent Pecaña on August 8, 2010 on her lawyer’s
reaction concerning the March 3, 2010 meeting. On September 15, 2010, complainant
moved for respondent Judge Rubia’s inhibition. This was denied on October 6, 2010.
Complainant then filed a motion for reconsideration denied in an order dated November
15, 2010. On November 11, 2010, complainant filed a complaint affidavit before the
Office of the Court Administrator charging respondent Pecaña for gross misconduct and
respondent Judge Rubia for conduct unbecoming of a judge, partiality, gross ignorance of
the law or procedure, incompetence, and gross misconduct. The Office of the Court
Administrator referred the complaint to respondents for comment. In her comment,
respondent Pecaña did not deny meeting complainant on February 20, 2010 through the
introduction of Enrique Sison. However, she claimed that the alleged meeting between
complainant and respondent Judge Rubia was merely a chance encounter and that
complainant allegedly asked her help regarding the cases filed in court and inquired as to
what she could give to respondent Judge Rubia because her lawyers instructed her to bribe
him. Respondent Pecaña only said that respondent Judge Rubia does not accept money and
that he is financially stable. Respondent Judge Rubia claimed that the alleged meeting
between him and his co-respondent Pecaña together with complainant was a mere chance
encounter. He denied any pre-arranged dinner meeting, stating that after the brief
encounter with complainant, he had to rush home to attend to his ailing wife. He stated
that he was only introduced to complainant because she was an employee of Philippine
Airlines where he was a former executive. Respondent Judge Rubia argued that if the
alleged meeting with complainant did take place, it should have been mentioned in the
first motion for inhibition. Further, he emphasized that it took complainant eight (8)
months since the alleged dinner meeting to file a motion for inhibition and an
administrative case. Due to the gravity of the charges and the conflicting facts presented
by the parties, the Office of the Court Administrator recommended the referral of the
administrative complaint to a Court of Appeals Justice for investigation, report, and
recommendation. The complaint was assigned to Court of Appeals Associate Justice

37
Samuel H. Gaerlan. On December 5, 2011, Atty. Noe Zarate filed a motion for
Intervention allegedly due to the implication of his name in the administrative complaint.
Atty. Zarate argued that the complaint should be dismissed on the ground of forum
shopping because the orders issued by respondent Judge Rubia and mentioned in the
complaint were assailed in a petition for certiorari. Further, Atty. Zarate alleged that he did
not know respondents personally, and he was not closely associated with them.81 He
asserted that the records were replete with incidents where he and respondent Judge Rubia
engaged in heated discussions on legal matters. He maintained that he did not foster any
closeness or personal affinity with respondent Judge Rubia that would substantiate
complainant’s allegations. The motion for intervention was noted without action by Justice
Gaerlan. During the hearing, complainant identified a document containing a list of phone
calls showing that she called respondent Pecaña on March 2 and 3, 2010. Counsel for
respondent Pecaña stipulated that these calls were made to her. Respondent Pecaña
testified to the allegations in her comment and judicial affidavit. She alleged for the first
time that the dinner meeting with complainant happened on March 10, not March 3, 2010.
Mr. Rodel Cortez, secretariat of the Rotary Club of Makati Southwest Chapter, was
presented as witness for respondent Judge Rubia. Rodel testified that after the meeting, he,
Billy Francisco, and respondent Judge Rubia walked together toward the parking area.
When they were nearing Burgos Circle where their cars were parked, Rodel allegedly saw
complainant and respondent Pecaña approaching them. He then saw respondent Pecaña
introduce complainant to respondent Judge Rubia. After the introduction, he saw
respondent Judge Rubia go to his car and drive away. In his investigation report, Gaerlan
recommended that the respondents Rubia and Pecana should not be held administratively
liable as he was convinced that the meeting of complainant and respondents at Burgos
Circle in Global City was “just a chance encounter” and that Barias had failed to present
substantial evidence to prove her allegations. Gaerlan also stressed the fact that it had
taken Barias eight months before she filed the administrative complaint. The issue in this

38
case is whether respondents Judge Rubia and Pecaña should be held administratively
liable.

ISSUE:

W/N the mere presence of Judge Rubia in the dinner meeting provides a ground for
administrative liability.

W/N the eight-month delay in the filing of the administrative complaint is of no

consequence.

HELD:

This court must set aside the findings of fact and reject the report of Justice Samuel
Gaerlan. Respondents Judge Rubia and Pecaña should be held administratively liable for
their actions. The findings of fact of an investigating justice must be accorded great weight
and finality similar with the weight given to a trial court judge’s since an investigating
justice personally assessed the witnesses’ credibility. However, this rule admits of
exceptions. In J. King & Sons Company, Inc. v. Judge Hontanosas, Jr., this court held:
Such findings may be reviewed if there appears in the record some fact or circumstance of
weight which the lower court may have overlooked, misunderstood or misappreciated, and
which, if properly considered, would alter the result of the case. Among the circumstances
which had been held to be justifiable reasons for the Court to re-examine the trial court or
appellate court’s findings of facts are, when the interference made is manifestly mistaken;
when the judgment is based on misapprehension of facts; and when the finding of fact of
the trial court or appellate court is premised on the supposed absence of evidence and is
contradicted by evidence on record. Justice Gaerlan placed too much importance on the
testimony of Rodel Cortez, the Secretariat of the Rotary Club of Makati, Southwest
Chapter, and qualified him as a "disinterested" witness. A disinterested witness’ testimony
is afforded evidentiary weight by his or her lack of interest in the outcome of the case.
This lack of stake makes the disinterested witness’ testimony more believable. To actively
take part in litigation as a party or a witness entails willingness to commit to the arduous
39
and exacting nature of most judicial proceedings. The disinterested witness’ candor and
submission to the proceedings before the court add credibility and believability to the
content of his or her testimony. Complainant alleged that the dinner meeting set among
her, respondent Pecaña, and respondent Judge Rubia took place on March 3, 2010, as
indicated in the investigation report of Justice Gaerlan. The record shows that the
Investigating Justice accepted the formal offer of Exhibit A, which was complainant’s
judicial affidavit establishing the date of the dinner as March 3, 2010 in Café Juanita.
Complainant also alleged in her complaint that respondent Judge Rubia came from
Mandarin Hotel in Makati from the Rotary Club of Makati, Southwest Chapter meeting.
The testimony of Rodel and the evidence submitted by respondents alleged that the chance
meeting of respondent Judge Rubia with complainant and respondent Pecaña took place on
March 10, 2010 on the side street of Burgos Circle in Bonifacio Global City, after the
Rotary Club of Makati, Southwest Chapter meeting and dinner at Numa Restaurant, on
their way to the parking lot. This means that the testimony of and the evidence presented
by Rodel do not disprove the occurrence of the dinner meeting as alleged by complainant,
since the meeting of the Rotary Club and the dinner meeting alleged by complainant took
place on different dates. Assuming that the alleged chance meeting between complainant
and respondent Judge Rubia took place on March 10, 2010 as alleged by respondents, this
does not discount the veracity of complainant’s allegations. Both the Rotary Club of
Makati, Southwest Chapter dinner and the dinner meeting alleged by complainant took
place in the vicinity of Bonifacio Global City. This could have allowed respondent Judge
Rubia ample time to travel to the dinner meeting after the meeting of the Rotary Club of
Makati. The totality of these circumstances places doubt on the alibi of respondent Judge
Rubia and Rodel’s narration of events. The differing accounts on the dates and the venues
were not addressed in the investigation report of Justice Gaerlan. The report failed to
mention that complainant alleged that respondent Judge Rubia arrived late precisely
because he came from a meeting of the Rotary Club of Makati. These glaring
inconsistencies did not add evidentiary weight to respondents’ claims. They only put into

40
question the veracity of the exculpatory evidence. Also, there was clearly no reason for
respondent Pecaña to go out of her way to greet respondent Judge Rubia. In fact, after
allegedly being repeatedly reminded that court employees should not have any dealings
with litigants, respondent Pecaña should not have gone out to greet respondent Judge
Rubia since she was dining with a litigant. The odds that complainant and respondent
Pecaña would meet respondent Judge Rubia by pure coincidence are highly improbable.
Granted, chance meetings between persons may take place, but a chance meeting between
a litigant in the company of a court employee who acceded to assisting the litigant in a
case and the judge deciding that case is outside the realm of common experience. The odds
of such an occurrence are, indeed, one in a million. The sheer improbability of such an
occurrence already puts into question the truth of respondents’ allegations. Based on these
considerations, the narrative of complainant is more believable and must be afforded
greater evidentiary weight.

FIRST ISSUE

YES. Respondent Judge Rubia’s mere presence in the dinner meeting provides a ground
for administrative liability. In Gandeza Jr. v. Tabin, this court reminded judges: Canon 2
of the Code of Judicial Conduct requires a judge to avoid not only impropriety but also the
mere appearance of impropriety in all activities. To stress how the law frowns upon even
any appearance of impropriety in a magistrate’s activities, it has often been held that a
judge must be like Caesar’s wife - above suspicion and beyond reproach. Respondent’s act
discloses a deficiency in prudence and discretion that a member of the Judiciary must
exercise in the performance of his official functions and of his activities as a private
individual. It is never trite to caution respondent to be prudent and circumspect in both
speech and action, keeping in mind that her conduct in and outside the courtroom is
always under constant observation.143 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted) Respondent
Judge Rubia clearly failed to live up to the standards of his office. By participating in the
dinner meeting and by failing to admonish respondent Pecaña for her admitted
impropriety, respondent Judge Rubia violated Canons 1 and 2 of the New Code of Judicial
41
Conduct. In De la Cruz v. Judge Bersamira, this court explained the necessity of a judge’s
integrity: By the very nature of the bench, judges, more than the average man, are required
to observe an exacting standard of morality and decency. The character of a judge is
perceived by the people not only through his official acts but also through his private
morals as reflected in his external behavior. It is therefore paramount that a judge’s
personal behavior both in the performance of his duties and his daily life, be free from the
appearance of impropriety as to be beyond reproach. Only recently, in Magarang v. Judge
Galdino B. Jardin, Sr., the Court pointedly stated that: While every public office in the
government is a public trust, no position exacts a greater demand on moral righteousness
and uprightness of an individual than a seat in the judiciary. Hence, judges are strictly
mandated to abide by the law, the Code of Judicial Conduct and with existing
administrative policies in order to maintain the faith of the people in the administration of
justice. In Castillo v. Judge Calanog, Jr., this court held: The Code of Judicial Ethics
mandates that the conduct of a judge must be free of a whiff of impropriety not only with
respect to his performance of his judicial duties, but also to his behavior outside his sala as
a private individual. There is no dichotomy of morality: a public official is also judged by
his private morals. The Code dictates that a judge, in order to promote public confidence
in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary, must behave with propriety at all times.
As we have recently explained, a judge’s official life cannot simply be detached or
separated from his personal existence. Thus: Being the subject of constant public scrutiny,
a judge should freely and willingly accept restrictions on conduct that might be viewed as
burdensome by the ordinary citizen. A judge should personify judicial integrity and
exemplify honest public service. The personal behavior of a judge, both in the
performance of official duties and in private life should be above suspicion.147 (Citations
omitted) In De la Cruz, this court emphasized the need for impartiality of judges: . . . [A]
judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all his activities. A
judge is not only required to be impartial; he must also appear to be impartial. x x x Public
confidence in the judiciary is eroded by irresponsible or improper conduct of judges. . . . In

42
this connection, the Court pointed out in Joselito Rallos, et al. v. Judge Ireneo Lee Gako
Jr., RTC Branch 5, Cebu City, that: Well-known is the judicial norm that "judges should
not only be impartial but should also appear impartial." Jurisprudence repeatedly teaches
that litigants are entitled to nothing less than the cold neutrality of an impartial judge. The
other elements of due process, like notice and hearing, would become meaningless if the
ultimate decision is rendered by a partial or biased judge. Judges must not only render just,
correct and impartial decisions, but must do so in a manner free of any suspicion as to their
fairness, impartiality and integrity. This reminder applies all the more sternly to municipal,
metropolitan and regional trial court judges like herein respondent, because they are
judicial front-liners who have direct contact with the litigating parties. They are the
intermediaries between conflicting interests and the embodiments of the people’s sense of
justice. Thus, their official conduct should be beyond reproach.148 (Citations omitted,
emphasis supplied) In the motion for intervention filed by Atty. Zarate before Justice
Gaerlan, Atty. Zarate stated that even if respondent Judge Rubia was present at the dinner
meeting, it was merely an attempt to reconcile the parties and reach an extrajudicial
solution. This is telling of a culture of tolerance that has led to the decay of the exacting
nature of judicial propriety. Instead of being outraged by respondent Judge Rubia’s
meeting an opposing party, Atty. Zarate defended respondent Judge Rubia’s actions. Had
it been true that a settlement was being brokered by respondent Judge Rubia, it should
have been done in open court with the record reflecting such an initiative.

SECOND ISSUE

Delay in filing of administrative complaint is not a defense The investigation report placed
particular emphasis on the eight-month period between the alleged dinner meeting and the
filing of the administrative complaint. The eight-month delay in the filing of the
administrative complaint is of no consequence. Delay in filing an administrative complaint
should not be construed as basis to question its veracity or credibility. There are
considerations that a litigant must think about before filing an administrative case against
judges and court personnel. This is more so for lawyers where the possibility of appearing
43
before the judge where an administrative complaint has been filed is high. Here,
respondent Judge Rubia presided over three cases that involved complainant and her late
husband’s estate. He wielded an unmistakable amount of control over the proceedings.
Filing an administrative case against respondents is a time-consuming ordeal, and it would
require additional time and resources that litigants would rather not expend in the interest
of preserving their rights in the suit. Complainant might have decided to tread with caution
so as not to incur the ire of respondent Judge Rubia for fear of the reprisal that could take
place after the filing of an administrative complaint. Judges and court personnel wield
extraordinary control over court proceedings of cases filed. Thus, litigants are always
cautious in filing administrative cases against judges and court personnel. In any case,
administrative offenses, including those committed by members of the bench and bar, are
not subject to a fixed period within which they must be reported. In Heck v. Judge Santos,
this court held that: Pursuant to the foregoing, there can be no other conclusion than that
an administrative complaint against an erring lawyer who was thereafter appointed as a
judge, albeit filed only after twenty-four years after the offending act was committed, is
not barred by prescription. If the rule were otherwise, members of the bar would be
emboldened to disregard the very oath they took as lawyers, prescinding from the fact that
as long as no private complainant would immediately come forward, they stand a chance
of being completely exonerated from whatever administrative liability they ought to
answer for. It is the duty of this Court to protect the integrity of the practice of law as well
as the administration of justice. No matter how much time has elapsed from the time of the
commission of the act complained of and the time of the institution of the complaint,
erring members of the bench and bar cannot escape the disciplining arm of the Court. This
categorical pronouncement is aimed at unscrupulous members of the bench and bar, to
deter them from committing acts which violate the Code of Professional Responsibility,
the Code of Judicial Conduct, or the Lawyer’s Oath. If this court saw fit to penalize a
member of the bench for an offense committed more than twenty years prior to the filing
of the complaint, then the eight-month period cannot prejudice the complainant. The

44
interval between the time when the offense was committed and the time when the offense
was officially reported cannot serve as a basis to doubt the veracity of complainant’s
allegations. This court’s mandate to discipline members of the judiciary and its personnel
is implemented by pertinent rules and statutes. Judges are disciplined based on whether
their actions violated the New Code of Judicial Conduct. Court personnel are also
governed by the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel136 and are appointed in accordance
with the Civil Service Law, as provided for in Section 5, Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution. None of these rules for administrative discipline mandates a period within
which a complaint must be filed after the commission or discovery of the offense. This
court determines with finality the liability of erring members of the judiciary and its
employees. The gravity of an administrative offense cannot be diminished by a delay in
the filing of a complaint. To dismiss the commission of the offense based on this eight-
month period is to ignore the distinct and tangible possibility that the offense was actually
committed. The commission of the offense is not contingent on the period of revelation or
disclosure. To dismiss the complaint on this ground is tantamount to attaching a period of
prescription to the offense, which does not apply in administrative charges.

SECOND DIVISION

[A.M. No. RTJ-97-1395. December 22, 1997]

PEDRO SAN JUAN, Complainant, v. JUDGE LORE V. BAGALACSA, Regional

Trial Court, Branch 23, Naga City, Respondent.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

This is a complaint alleging a conduct by respondent judge of the Regional Trial

Court, Branch 23, at Naga City in violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct.
Complainant is one of the oppositors in Special Proceedings No. R-22 (1144),
then pending before respondent Judge Lore V. Bagalacsa's court. It appears that

45
one of the properties involved in the intestate proceedings was a parcel of land,
consisting of 15,141 square meters, which was tenanted by Sergia Pontillas; that
on November 27, 1995, the administrator of the intestate estate sold the property
under an emancipation patent to Pontillas for P75,705.00, over the objection of
the oppositors; and that, on April 10, 1996, Pontillas in turn sold the land to the
Newreach Corporation for P1,514,000.00.

Complainant alleges that on June 6, 1996, respondent judge presented for

registration to the register of deeds of Camarines Sur the deed of sale executed
by Sergia Pontillas in favor of the Newreach Corp.. On the same day, respondent
judge wrote the following note to the register of deeds:

6 June 96

Makikiolay sina Mr. And Mrs. Salvador Motos kung puede tabi makua ngonian na
aga ang title. Kaipuhan daa nindang maray sa hapon. Sana naman matapos na
ngonian na aga.

I'll be in Libmanan kaya kung puede irelease na nindo sainda. midbid mo man
sinda.

Thanks so much and God Bless.

[Translation: Mr. and Mrs. Salvador Motos are requesting that if it is possible,
they would like to get the title this morning, as they need it in the afternoon. I
hope the title will be finished this morning.

[I'll be in Libmanan, so please release it to them. You know them anyway.

[Thanks so much and God Bless.]

Complainant accuses respondent judge of showing interest in the sale of property

which was subject of litigation in her sala.

46
In her comment, respondent judge explains that she did not know that the
property was involved in the intestate proceeding before her, as title was in the
name of Pontillas; that she merely assisted the attorney-in-fact of Pontillas,
Victoria Pontillas-Motos, because the latter was her personal friend; that it was
Motos who actually presented the title to the register of deeds for registration and
respondent judge merely helped her since she (respondent) happened to be there
on another business. Respondent claims that the clerk of the register of deeds
probably thought that the documents were hers. Respondent explains that she
went to see the register of deeds, Atty. Teresita B. Aquino, to check the
authenticity of certain bailbonds which had been filed in her court; that on the
way to the Office of the Register of Deeds, she saw Motos, who asked for her help
in registering the emancipation patent; that she then went to see the register of
deeds to ask about the bailbonds which she suspected might be spurious and only
incidentally about requirements for the registration of emancipation patents; that
as she was about to leave the Office of the Register of Deeds, Motos pleaded with
her to intercede in her behalf so that she (Motos) could get the title on the same
day. It appears that the new title was issued the next day, June 7, 1996.

In an affidavit submitted in this case, the register of deeds, Atty. Theresita B.

Aquino, corroborates respondent judge and claims that, even without the judge's
intercession, title to the land would have been issued after one day because all
the papers were in order. She denies that release of the title was facilitated by
the intercession of the judge.

It appears that respondent subsequently inhibited herself from the consideration

of the case so that, according to her, there would be no suspicion of bias.

On the basis of the foregoing facts, the Office of the Court Administrator
recommends that respondent judge be reprimanded for impropriety and warned
that repetition of the same conduct in the future will be dealt with more severely.

47
The recommendation is well taken. Respondent claims that she did not know that
the land (whose transfer was sought to be registered) was involved in the
intestate proceedings before her court. But although the evidence may not be
sufficient to prove that respondent judge took interest in a matter before her
court, it does indicate that she took charge of registering the transfer in the Office
of the Register of Deeds, contrary to her claim that she merely helped Victoria
Pontillas-Motos whom she happened to meet there. Respondent claims that her
main reason for going to the Office of the Register of Deeds was to check the
authenticity of bailbonds, which she said she suspected to be spurious. She has
not explained, however, why she had to go to the register of deeds' office
personally and why she could not simply have issued an order to the parties to
secure a certification from the register of deeds. The fact is that even the clerk of
the register of deeds believed respondent judge to be the party registering the
sale.

This, plus the fact that respondent judge wrote the note in question, in which she
asked that the title be released to Motos because respondent was going to
Libmanan that day, suggests that it was really she who had presented the
documents for registration. It does not seem that respondent judge merely
happened to be in the Office of the Register of Deeds, met a friend who asked for
help and only did the friend a good turn. Indeed, if this had been the case,
respondent judge could have just introduced friend, Victoria Pontillas-Motos, to
the register of deeds and that would have ended the matter. But respondent
judge even had to write the note in question obviously to insure the early release
of the title. She thus used her office to facilitate the registration of the sale.
Although expectedly the register of deeds denies that because of respondent's
intercession the early release of the tile was facilitated, the impression cannot be
avoided that, at the very least, respondent's intercession nonetheless helped.

Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct enjoins judges to avoid not just
impropriety in their conduct but even the mere appearance of impropriety. This is
true not only in the performance of their judicial duties but in all their activities,
48
including their private life. They must conduct themselves in such a manner that
they give no ground for reproach.

In this case, as Deputy Court Administrator Reynaldo L. Suarez correctly

observes, respondent judge's note to the register of deeds, requesting that the
issuance of the TCT be expedited, "gives ground for suspicion that she is utilizing
the power or prestige of her office to promote the interest of others." Indeed, the
clerk of the register of deeds thought it was respondent judge who was the one
who was causing the transfer of the emancipation patent.

ACCORDINGLY, respondent judge is hereby REPRIMANDED and WARNED that a

repetition of the same will be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.

THIRD DIVISION

A.M. No. RTJ-09-2190 April 23, 2010

(Formerly OCA IPI No. 08-2909-RTJ)

HADJA SOHURAH DIPATUAN, Complainant,

vs.
JUDGE MAMINDIARA P. MANGOTARA, Respondent.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Before this Court is an Affidavit-Complaint1 dated May 12, 2008, filed by complainant Hadja
Sohurah Dipatuan against respondent Judge Mamindiara P. Mangotara, Presiding Judge,
Regional Trial Court (Regional Trial Court) of Iligan City, Branch 1, for Gross Ignorance of the
Law and Grave Abuse of Authority.

The antecedent facts of the case, as culled from the records, are as follows:

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On September 5, 2001, a criminal case for murder, docketed as Criminal Case No. 3620-01
was filed against Ishak M. Abdul and Paisal Dipatuan, complainant’s husband, before the
Regional Trial Court of Marawi City, Branch 10, then presided by Judge Yusoph Pangadapun,
for the killing of Elias Ali Taher. Judge Pangadapun died during the pendency of the case. The
case was transferred to different judges designated by the Supreme Court to act as Presiding
Judge of Branch 10, namely, Judge Amer Ibrahim, Judge Rasad Balindog, Judge Macaundas
Hadjirasul, Judge Moslemen Macarambon, respondent Judge Mamindiara Mangotara, and
Judge Lacsaman Busran.

Before Judge Macarambon could render a decision on the case, he was appointed as
COMELEC Commissioner. By virtue of Administrative Order No. 201-20072 dated November
16, 2007, the Supreme Court designated respondent Judge Mamindiara Mangotara, Presiding
Judge of the RTC of Iligan City, Branch 1, Lanao Del Norte, as Acting Presiding Judge of the
RTC of Marawi City, Branch 10. Later on, Mangotara suffered a mild stroke; hence, the
Supreme Court, in a Resolution dated December 26, 2007, revoked the earlier designation of
Judge Mangotara and designated Judge Lacsaman M. Busran as the new Acting Presiding
Judge of Branch 10, by virtue of Administrative Order No. 220-2007.

On December 28, 2007, Mangotara issued the disputed Decision3 in Criminal Case No. 3620-
01 and found both accused Abdul and Dipatuan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of murder and sentenced them to imprisonment of reclusion perpetua. The trial court ruled
that the prosecution was able to establish that Abdul and co-accused Dipatuan acted in
conspiracy in shooting and killing the victim Elias Ali Taher. The court, likewise, increased the
accused’s bail bond from ₱75,000.00 to ₱200,000.00.

On January 21, 2008, the accused filed a motion for reconsideration of the Decision. In an
Order dated February 1, 2008, Mangotara denied the motion for lack of merit.4 In another
Order of the same date, Mangotara applied the same increased bail bond with regard to
accused Ishak M. Abdul.5 However, again on the same date, Mangotara issued another Order
recalling the foregoing Orders.6

Thus, on May 14, 2008, complainant filed the instant complaint. Complainant alleged that
Judge Mangotara displayed bias and prejudice against her husband Dipatuan when he did not
inhibit himself from the case, considering that he is a relative by affinity and consanguinity of

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the victim Elias Ali Taher and that he also came from Maguing, Lanao Del Sur where Taher
also used to reside. Complainant also pointed out that despite the designation of Judge
Busran as Acting Presiding Judge of Branch 10 on December 26, 2007, Judge Mangotara,
acting with grave abuse of authority, illegally and maliciously rendered the December 28,
2007 Decision as well as the two Orders dated February 1, 2008.

On May 26, 2008, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) directed Mangotara to file his
Comment on the instant complaint.7

In his Comment8 dated June 24, 2008, Mangotara averred that he decided the case on
December 28, 2007 as it had been pending for almost seven (7) years. He clarified that his
relationship to the victim is distant and not a basis for disqualification of judges under Rule
137 of the Rules of Court. Mangotara explained that he received notice of Judge Busran’s
designation as the new Presiding Judge only on January 26, 2008 and that when he issued
the two Orders dated February 1, 2008, Judge Busran had not yet assumed office; and in the
honest belief that Abdul was also entitled to the benefits of the bail bond fixed by the court for
Dipatuan. Mangotara added that, upon realizing the irregularity of the two Orders issued on
February 1, 2008, he immediately rectified the same and recalled the Orders on the same
day. Finally, Mangotara maintained that his decision was supported by the evidence on record
and that the instant administrative complaint was only meant to embarrass him and destroy
his honor and reputation.

Subsequently, in its Memorandum9 dated May 18, 2009, the OCA found Mangotara guilty of
gross ignorance of the law and abuse of authority. The OCA, likewise, recommended that the
instant complaint against Mangotara be re-docketed as a regular administrative matter.

However, in its Resolution10 dated July 22, 2009, the Court resolved to re-docket the instant
complaint as a regular administrative matter and refer the complaint to Court of Appeals
Associate Justice Portia Aliño-Hormachuelos for investigation, report and recommendation.

We adopt the recommendation of the Investigating Justice.

On the charge of bias and partiality resulting to grave abuse of authority

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We rule in the negative. As correctly observed by the Investigating Justice, complainant
indeed failed to specify the degree of relationship of respondent Judge to a party in the
subject case. She failed to present any clear and convincing proof that respondent Judge was
related within the prohibited degree with the victim. Section 1, Rule 137 of the Revised Rules
of Court states:

Sec. 1. Disqualification of Judges. - No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in which
he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in
which he is related to either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to
counsel within the fourth degree, computed according to the rules of the civil law, or in which
he has been executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which he has presided
in any inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject of review, without the written
consent of all parties in interest, signed by them and entered upon the record.

A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a case,
for just or valid reasons other than those mentioned above. 1avvphi1

This being the case, the inhibition was indeed discretionary or voluntary as the same was
primarily a matter of conscience and sound discretion on the part of the respondent Judge.
When Mangotara chose not to inhibit and proceed with the promulgation of the disputed
decision, he cannot be faulted by doing so. Significantly, complainant while asserting that
Mangotara should have inhibited in the said case, she nonetheless failed to institute any
motion for inhibition.

Moreover, complainant failed to cite any specific act that would indicate bias, prejudice or
vengeance warranting respondent’s voluntary inhibition from the case. Complainant merely
pointed on the alleged adverse and erroneous rulings of respondent Judge to their prejudice.
By themselves, however, they do not sufficiently prove bias and prejudice.

To be disqualifying, the bias and prejudice must be shown to have stemmed from an
extrajudicial source and result in an opinion on the merits on some basis other than what the
judge learned from his participation in the case. Opinions formed in the course of judicial
proceedings, although erroneous, as long as they are based on the evidence presented and
conduct observed by the judge, do not prove personal bias or prejudice on the part of the

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judge. As a general rule, repeated rulings against a litigant, no matter how erroneous and
vigorously and consistently expressed, are not a basis for disqualification of a judge on
grounds of bias and prejudice. Extrinsic evidence is required to establish bias, bad faith,
malice or corrupt purpose, in addition to the palpable error which may be inferred from the
decision or order itself. Although the decision may seem so erroneous as to raise doubts
concerning a judge's integrity, absent extrinsic evidence, the decision itself would be
insufficient to establish a case against the judge.11

Mere suspicion of partiality is not enough. There must be sufficient evidence to prove the
same, as well as a manifest showing of bias and partiality stemming from an extrajudicial
source or some other basis. A judge's conduct must be clearly indicative of arbitrariness and
prejudice before it can be stigmatized as biased and partial. As there was no substantial
evidence to hold Mangotara liable on this point, the Investigating Justice correctly
recommended the dismissal of this charge against him.

Moreover, we likewise found no basis to hold respondent Judge administratively liable anent
his issuance of the Decision dated December 28, 2007. As aptly observed by the Investigating
Justice, Mangotara acted in good faith when he issued the subject decision, since he received
notice of his replacement by Judge Busran, dated December 26, 2007, only on January 26,
2008. It must be stressed that not every error or mistake that a judge commits in the
performance of his duties renders him liable, unless he is shown to have acted in bad faith or
with deliberate intent to do an injustice. Good faith and absence of malice, corrupt motives or
improper considerations are sufficient defenses in which a judge can find refuge. In this case,
complainant adduced no evidence that Mangotara was moved by bad faith when he issued
the disputed order.

As to the charge of gross ignorance of the law

As to the charge of gross ignorance of the law in so far as his act of increasing the bail bond
of the accused instead of cancelling it, Mangotara did not deny his issuance of said Order.
However, he claims that the issuance thereof was merely an error of judgment.

Indeed, as a matter of public policy, not every error or mistake of a judge in the performance
of his official duties renders him liable. In the absence of fraud, dishonesty or corruption, the

53
acts of a judge in his official capacity do not always constitute misconduct although the same
acts may be erroneous. True, a judge may not be disciplined for error of judgment absent
proof that such error was made with a conscious and deliberate intent to cause an injustice.
This does not mean, however, that a judge need not observe propriety, discreetness and due
care in the performance of his official functions.

Section 5, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure is clear on the issue. It
provides:

SEC. 5. Bail, when discretionary. – Upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense
not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, admission to bail is
discretionary. The application for bail may be filed and acted upon by the trial court despite
the filing of a notice of appeal, provided it has not transmitted the original record to the
appellate court. However, if the decision of the trial court convicting the accused changed the
nature of the offense from non-bailable to bailable, the application for bail can only be filed
with and resolved by the appellate court.

xxx xxx xxx

The rule is very explicit as to when admission to bail is discretionary on the part of the
respondent Judge. It is imperative that judges be conversant with basic legal principles and
possessed sufficient proficiency in the law. In offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua or
death, the accused has no right to bail when the evidence of guilt is strong.12 Thus, as the
accused in Criminal Case No. 3620-01 had been sentenced to reclusion perpetua, the bail
should have been cancelled, instead of increasing it as respondent Judge did.

While a judge may not be held liable for gross ignorance of the law for every erroneous order
that he renders, it is also axiomatic that when the legal principle involved is sufficiently basic,
lack of conversance with it constitutes gross ignorance of the law. Indeed, even though a
judge may not always be subjected to disciplinary action for every erroneous order or decision
he renders, that relative immunity is not a license to be negligent or abusive and arbitrary in
performing his adjudicatory prerogatives. It does not mean that a judge need not observe
propriety, discreetness and due care in the performance of his official functions. This is
because if judges wantonly misuse the powers vested on them by the law, there will not only

54
be confusion in the administration of justice but also oppressive disregard of the basic
requirements of due process.13

Clearly, in the instant case, the act of Mangotara in increasing the bail bond of the accused
instead of cancelling it is not a mere deficiency in prudence, discretion and judgment on the
part of respondent Judge, but a patent disregard of well-known rules. When an error is so
gross and patent, such error produces an inference of bad faith, making the judge liable for
gross ignorance of the law.14 It is a pressing responsibility of judges to keep abreast with the
law and changes therein, as well as with the latest decisions of the Supreme Court. One
cannot seek refuge in a mere cursory acquaintance with the statute and procedural rules.
Ignorance of the law, which everyone is bound to know, excuses no one – not even
judges. IGNORANTIA JURIS QUOD QUISQUE SCIRE TENETUR NON EXCUSAT. 15

We come to the imposable penalty.

Under Section 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC, gross
ignorance of the law or procedure is classified as a serious charge. Under Section 11(A) of
the same Rule, as amended, if the respondent is found guilty of a serious charge, any of the
following sanctions may be imposed:

1. Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may
determine, and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office,
including government-owned or controlled corporations; Provided, however, that the
forfeiture of benefits shall in no case include accrued leave credits;

2. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three (3) but
not exceeding six (6) months; or

3. A fine of more than ₱20,000.00 but not exceeding ₱40,000.00.

In this case, a fine of ₱20,000.00, as recommended by the Investigating Justice, would thus
appear to be an appropriate sanction to impose on respondent Judge, considering that this is
his first infraction in his 13 years of service; his admission of his mistake; and his prompt
correction of such mistake.

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WHEREFORE, the Court finds JUDGE MAMINDIARA P. MANGOTARA, retired Presiding
Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Iligan City, Branch 1, GUILTY of GROSS IGNORANCE
OF THE LAW for which he is FINED in the amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos
(₱20,000,00), to be deducted from his retirement benefits.

SO ORDERED.

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