http://JUDIS.NIC.

IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 24

Vs.

RESPONDENT:
A.SANYASI RAO & ORS., ETC. ETC.

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 13/02/1996

BENCH:
PARIPOORNAN, K.S.(J)
BENCH:
PARIPOORNAN, K.S.(J)
AHMADI A.M. (CJ)
SEN, S.C. (J)

CITATION:
1996 AIR 1219 1996 SCC (3) 465
JT 1996 (2) 425 1996 SCALE (2)280

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT:
WITH
(SLP (C) Nos. 3944-4087/92. Civil Appeal Nos. 2849/89.
4198/89. SLP (C) Nos. 13148/89, 2222-26/91, Writ Petition
(C) Nos. 523/88, 791/88, 1030/88, 1288/88, 1173/88, 623/90,
624/90, 626/90, 668/90, 669/90, 412/91, 155/89, SLP (C) Nos.
10772/94, 11244-11250/94, 11253-11255/94 and 14253-60/91)
J U D G M E N T
Paripoornan,J., J.
In this batch of cases - writ petitions filed under
Article 32 of the Constitution of India and civil appeals
and special leave petitions filed under Article 136 of the
Constitution of India - substantially similar questions
arise for consideration. The matter arises under the Income
Tax Act, 1961. The validity of Sections 44AC and 206C of the
Income Tax Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’)
is posed for consideration. Various assesses challenged the
aforesaid provisions as ultra vires and beyond legislative
competence and also violative of Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) of
the Constitution of India in a few High Courts.
Substantially, the challenge was not accepted by all the
High Courts. A few High Courts have read down the provisions
of Section 44AC of the Act. Dissatisfied by the same, the
assesses have come up in appeal. Feeling aggrieved by the
reading down of Section 44AC of the Act, the Union of India
has come up in appeals. Those are covered by civil appeals.
Certain other assesses have challenged the aforesaid
provisions directly under Article 32 of the Constitution of
India. Those are covered by writ petitions. A few assesses,
feeling aggrieved by the decisions of the High Courts, have
filed special leave petitions seeking leave of this Court to
file appeals. Since all these three classes of cases
involved consideration of the validity or otherwise of
Sections 44AC and 206C of the Act, they were heard together.
2. Section 44AC of the Act was inserted by the Direct Tax
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Laws (Amendment) Act, 1989 with effect from 1.4.1989.
Section 206C of the Act was inserted by the Finance Act,
1988 with effect from 1.6.1988. The above sections are re-
produced herein below:-
"44AC. Special provision for
computing profits and gains from
the business of trading in certain
goods:- (1) Notwithstanding
anything to the contrary contained
in Sections 28 to 43C, in the case
of an assessee, being a person
other than a public sector company
(hereafter in this section referred
to as the buyer), obtaining in any
sale by way of auction, tender or
any other mode, conducted by any
other person or his agent
(hereafter in this section referred
to as the seller).--
(a) any goods in the nature
of alcoholic liquor for human
consumption (other than
Indian-made foreign liquor), a
sum equal to forty per cent of
the amount paid or payable by
the buyer as the purchase
price in respect of such goods
shall be deemed to be the
profits and gains of the buyer
from the business of trading
in such goods chargeable to
tax under the head "Profits
and gains of business or
profession":
Provided that nothing
contained in this clause shall
apply to a buyer where the
goods are not obtained by him
by way of auction and where
the sale price of such goods
to be sold by the buyer is
fixed by or under any State
Act;
The following explanation
is being inserted by the
Finance Act, 1990 with effect
from 1 April, 1991:
Explanation:- For the
purpose of this clause,
‘purchase price’ means any
amount (by whatever name
called) paid or payable by the
buyer to obtain the goods
referred to in this clause,
but shall not include the
amount paid or payable by him
towards the bid money in an
auction, or, as the case may
be, the highest accepted offer
in case of tender or any other
mode;
(b) the right to receive any
goods of the nature specified
in column (2) of the Table
below, or such goods, as the
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case may be, a sum equal to
the percentage, specified in
the corresponding entry in
column (3) of the said Table,
of the amount paid or payable
by the buyer in respect of the
sale of such right or as the
purchase price in respect of
such goods shall be deemed to
be the profits and gains of
the buyer from the business of
trading in such goods
chargeable to tax under the
head "Profits and gains of
business or profession".
TABLE
----------------------------------------
S.No. Nature of goods percentage
----------------------------------------
(1) (2) (3)
----------------------------------------
i) Timber obtained under Thirty-five
a forest lease per cent
ii) Timber obtained by Fifteen
any mode other per cent
than under a forest
lease
iii)Any other forest Thirty-five
produce not being per cent
timber
----------------------------------------
(2) For the removal of doubts, it
is hereby declared that the
provisions of sub-section (1) shall
not apply to a buyer (other than a
buyer who obtains any goods, from
any seller which is a public sector
company) in the further sale of any
goods obtained under or in
pursuance of the sale under sub-
section (1).
(3) In a case where the business
carried on by the assessee does not
consist exclusively of trading in
goods to which this section applies
and where separate accounts are not
maintained or are not available,
the amount of expenses attributable
to such other business shall be an
amount which bears to the total
expenses of the business carried on
by the assessee the same proportion
as the turnover of such other
business bears to the total
turnover of the business carried on
by the assessee.
Explanation:- For the purposes of
this section, "seller" means the
Central Government, a State
Government or any local authority
or corporation or authority
established by or under a Central,
State or Provincial Act, or any
company or firm (or co-operative
society)".
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"206C. Profits and gains from
the business of trading in
alcoholic liquor, forest produce,
scrap, etc.:- (1) Every person,
being a seller referred to in
Section 44AC, shall, at the time of
debiting of the amount payable by
the buyer referred to in that
section to the account of the buyer
or at the time of receipt of such
amount from the said buyer in cash
or by the issue of a cheque or
draft or by any other mode,
whichever is earlier, collect from
the buyer of any goods of the
nature specified in column (2) of
the table below, a sum equal to the
percentage, specified in the
corresponding entry in column (3)
of the said table, of such amount
as income-tax on income comprised
therein.
TABLE
_____________________________________________________
S.No. Nature of goods percentage
------------------------------------------------------
(1) (2) (3)
-------------------------------------------------------
i) Alcoholic liquor for human Fifteen
consumption (other than per cent
Indian made foreign liquor)
ii) Timber obtained under a Fifteen
forest lease per cent
iii) Timber obtained by any Five
mode other than under per cent
a forest lease
iv) Any other forest produce Fifteen
not being timber per cent
_______________________________________________________
Provided that where the
Assessing Officer, on an
application made by the buyer,
gives a certificate in the
prescribed form that to the best of
his belief any of the goods
referred to in the aforesaid Table
are to be utilized for the purposes
of manufacturing, processing or
producing articles or things and
not for trading purposes, the
provisions of this sub-section
shall not apply so long as the
certificate is in force.
(2) The power to recover tax by a
collection under sub-section (1)
shall be without prejudice to any
other mode of recovery.
(3) Any person collecting any
amount under sub-section (1) shall
pay within seven days the amount so
collected to the credit of the
Central Government or as the Board
directs.
(4) Any amount collected in
accordance with the provisions of
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this section and paid under sub-
section (3) shall be deemed as
payment of tax on behalf of the
person from whom the amount has
been collected and credit shall be
given to him for the amount so
collected on the production of the
certificate furnished under sub-
section (5) in the assessment made
under this Act for the assessment
year for which such income is
assessable.
(5) Every person collecting tax in
accordance with the provisions of
this section shall within ten days
from the date of debit or receipt
of the amount furnish to the buyer
to whose account such amount is
debited or from whom such payment
is received, a certificate to the
effect that tax has been collected
and specifying the sum so
collected, the rate at which the
tax has been collected and such
other particulars as may be
prescribed.
(5A) Every person collecting tax in
accordance with the provisions of
this section shall prepare half
yearly returns for the period
ending on 30th September and 31st
March in each financial year, and
deliver or cause to be delivered to
the prescribed income-tax authority
such returns in such form and
verified in such manner and setting
forth such particulars and within
such time as may be prescribed.
(6) Any person responsible for
collecting the tax who fails to
collect the tax in accordance with
the provisions of this section,
shall, notwithstanding such
failure, be liable to pay the tax
to the credit of the Central
Government in accordance with the
provisions of sub-section (3).
(7) Without prejudice to the
provisions of sub-section (6), if
the seller does not collect the tax
or after collecting the tax fails
to pay it as required under this
section, he shall be liable to pay
simple interest at the rate of two
per cent per month or part thereof
on the amount of such tax from the
date on which such tax was
collectible to the date on which
the tax was actually paid.
(8) Where the tax has not been
paid as aforesaid, after it is
collected, the amount of the tax
together with the amount of simple
interest thereon referred to in
sub-section (7) shall be a charge
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upon all the assets of the seller."
3. The above new provisions enable the Revenue to
estimate the profits on a "presumptive basis". It appears
that Government wanted to get over the problems in assessing
income and recovering tax in the case of persons dealing in
country liquor, timber, forest produce, etc. Experience
revealed that a large number of persons dealing in the said
commodities did not maintain any books of account or the
books of account maintained by such persons are incomplete.
The business of the above mentioned persons existed only for
a short period -- a year or two. After the period of
contract or agreement, it was impossible to trace them in
many cases. Many of them were found to be dealing in benami
names. There was evasion on a large scale. Government found
it difficult to collect the tax due from such persons.
Section 44AC occurs in Chapter VI of the Act dealing with
computation of total income. Sub-section (d) deals with
computation of profits and gains of business or profession.
Section 44AC(1) determines the profits and gains of the year
from the business of trading in certain specified goods like
liquor (other than Indian made foreign liquor, timber and
forest produce) at a particular percentage specified
therein. Section 44AC(2) states that the above provisions
shall not apply to second or subsequent sale of such goods.
Section 44AC(3) is only a classificatory provision. The
explanation to the section specifies the seller as Central
Government, State Government, Local Authority, Corporation,
etc. Section 206-C deals with collection and recovery of
tax. Section 206C(1) obliges the seller of the specified
goods to collect from the purchaser an amount equal to the
percentage mentioned in the Table as income tax. The goods
mentioned in the Table are the very same goods mentioned in
Section 44AC. Sub-sections (2) to (5) of Section 206C of the
Act are further machinery provisions. In particular, sub-
section (4) provides that any amount collected under the
section shall be deemed to be payment of tax on behalf of
the purchaser and provides for the issuance of a certificate
evidencing such payments. Section 44AC came into force from
1.4.1989. Section 206C came into effect from 1.6.1988.
4. The scope of the aforesaid provisions was explained in
a memorandum to Finance Bill, 1988 (see 170 ITR Statutes, p.
187-88). It is to the following effect:-
"New provisions to counteract tax
evasion by liquor contractors,
scrap dealers, dealers in products,
etc.
Considerable difficulty has
been felt in the past in making
assessment of incomes in the case
of persons who take contracts for
sale of liquor, scrap, forest
products, etc. It has been the
Department’s experience that for
taking such contracts, firms or
associations of persons are
specifically constituted and very
often no trace is left regarding
them or their members after the
contract has been executed. Persons
have also been found to have taken
contracts in benami names by
floating undertakings or
associations for short periods.
Since tax is payable in the
assessment years in respect of the
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incomes of the previous years, the
time by which the incomes from such
sources become assessable, such
persons are not traceable. At the
time of assessment in these cases,
either the accounts are not
available or they are grossly
incorrect or incomplete. Thus, even
if assessments could be made on ex
parte basis, it becomes almost
impossible to collect the tax found
due, either because it becomes
difficult to establish the identity
of the persons and trace them or
because of the fact that the
persons in whose names contracts
are taken are men of no means.
With a view to combat large-
scale tax evasion by persons
deriving income from such
businesses, the Bill seeks to
insert a new section 44AC to
provide for determination of income
in such cases. Taking into account
the experience gained in the past
regarding the ratio of profit to
the sale consideration the proposal
is to provide that sixty per cent
of the amount paid or payable by
such persons on sale would
constitute income of the tax
payers, i.e., the buyer.
The provisions of this section
will apply only to an assessee,
being a buyer of any goods in the
nature of alcoholic liquor for
human consumption (other than
Indian-made foreign liquor) or any
forest produce, scrap or waste,
whether industrial or non-
industrial, or such other goods, as
may be notified by the Central
Government, at the point of first
sale. The word "seller" connotes
the Central Government, State
Government or any local authority
or corporation or authority
established by or under a Central
Act or any company. The provisions
of this section shall not apply to
any buyer in the second or
subsequent sale of such goods.
This amendment will take
effect from 1st April, 1989, and
will, accordingly, apply to
assessment year 1989-90 and
subsequent years.
Further, with a view to
facilitate collection of taxes from
such assessees, it is proposed to
introduce a new section 206C to
provide that any person, being a
seller, referred to in section
44AC, shall collect income-tax of a
sum equal to twenty per cent of the
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amount paid or payable by the
buyer, as increased by a surcharge
for purposes of the Union
calculated on the income-tax at the
rates in force. Such sum is
required to be collected either
from the buyer at the time of
debiting the said amount to the
account of the buyer or at the time
of the receipt of that amount from
the buyer, whichever is earlier.
This mode of recovery of tax shall
be without prejudice to any other
mode of recovery. The tax so
collected by the seller shall be
paid to the credit of the Central
Government or as the Board directs,
within seven days from the date of
collection. It will be treated as
tax paid on behalf of the person
from whom the amount has been
collected and credit shall be given
for such amount in the assessment
made under this Act on production
of a certificate.
The new section also provides
that if a seller does not collect
or after collecting fails to pay
the tax, he shall be deemed to be
an assessee in default in respect
of the tax and the amount of the
tax together with the amount of
simple interest, calculated at the
rate of two per cent per month or
part thereof, shall be a charge
upon all the assets of the seller.
These amendments will be made
effective from 1st June. 1988."
5. Circular No. 525 dated 24.11.1988 and Circular No. 528
dated 16.12.1988, issued by C.B.D.T., have explained the
scope and ambit of Section 44AC and Section 206C of the Act.
(See Law of Income Tax - Sampath Iyengar, 8th edition, Vol.
2, p. 2494 and Vol. 5, p.5139).
6. The matter at issue came up for consideration before
the High Courts of Andhra Pradesh, Kerala, Himachal Pradesh,
Orissa, Punjab and Haryana and Patna, in different forms.
The decisions therein are:
(1) A. Sanyasi Rao and another v.
Government of Andhra Pradesh and
others (178 ITR 31) - Andhra
Pradesh.
(2) P. Kunhammed Kutty Haji and
others v. Union of India and others
(176 ITR 481) - Single Bench -
Kerala.
(3) T.K. Aboobacker and others v.
Union of India and others (177 ITR
358) - Division Bench - Kerala.
(4) Gian Chand Ashok Kumar and
Company and others v. Union of
India and others (187 ITR 188) -
Himachal Pradesh.
(5) Sri Venkateswara Timber Depot
v. Union of India and others (189
ITR 741) - Orissa.
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(6) State of Bihar and another v.
Commissioner of Income Tax and
others (202 ITR 535) - Patna.
(7) Ramjee Prasad Sahu and others
v. Union of India and others (202
ITR 800) - Patna.
(8) Madan Mohan Gupta v. Union of
India and others (204 ITR 384) -
Patna.
(9) Bhagwan Singh and others v.
Union of India and others (209 ITR
824) - Patna.
(10) Sat Pal and Co. v. Excise and
Taxation Commissioner and others
(185 ITR 375) - Punjab and Haryana.
(11) K.K. Mittal and Co. v. Union
of India and others (187 ITR 208) -
Punjab & Haryana.
(12) K.K. Mittal and Co. v. Union
of India and others (203 ITR 201) -
Punjab & Haryana.
(13) Fairdeal Trading Co. and
others v. Union of India and others
(204 ITR 645) - Punjab & Haryana.
We should state that the legislative competence of
Parliament to enact Sections 44AC and 206C of the Act was
upheld by all the High Courts. In the decisions of the
Kerala High Court - 176 ITR 481 and 177 ITR 358 - the main
challenge was against the legislative competence only. The
challenge against the aforesaid statutory provisions on the
ground of legislative competence, violation of Articles 14
and 19 of the Constitution of India and the interpretation
to be placed on the provisions, directly came up before a
Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in A.
Sanyasi Rao’s case (178 ITR 31). In the said decision, the
High Court, upholding the validity of the Act, read down
Section 44AC of the Act and held that the said provision is
only an adjunct to and explains the provisions of Section
206C and does not dispense with the regular assessment in
accordance with the provisions of the Income Tax Act. The
non-obstante clause in Section 44AC was explained. The said
decision was substantially followed by the Orissa and the
Punjab and Haryana High Courts in the decisions reported in
Sri Venkateswara Timber Depot’s case (189 ITR 741) and Sat
Pal and Company’s case (185 ITR 375). In the other
decisions, the content or meaning of the relevant statutory
provisions alone came up for consideration.
7. We heard M/s. H.N. Salve, Soli Sorabjee, K. Madhava
Reddy and Vijay Bahuguna, Senior Advocates and M/s. G.
Sarangan and Ranjit Kumar, Advocates, who appeared for the
various assessees and also Dr. V. Gaurishankar, Senior
Advocate, who appeared on behalf of the Union of India.
Arguments advanced before us covered a wide range.
8. We shall immediately state, in brief, the respective
pleas put forward before us by counsel on both sides. It
should be stated that the pleas urged by counsel on both
sides were substantially with reference to the decision of
the Andhra Pradesh High Court in A. Sanyasi Rao’s case
(supra), wherein, at page 73, the Court summarised the
conclusion as hereunder:
"(i) Parliament was perfectly
competent to enact sections 44AC
and 206 C;
(ii) Section 206C does not suffer
from any constitutional infirmity
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and is perfectly valid;
(iii) Section 44AC is not an
independent provision. It does not
dispense with a regular assessment
in accordance with the provisions
of the Income-tax Act. Section 44AC
is merely an adjunct to and
explains the provisions in Section
206C. A regular assessment has to
be made in respect of an assessee
dealing in specified goods in
accordance with sections 28 to 43C.
Read down in this manner, section
44AC also does not suffer from any
constitutional infirmity;
(iv) It is competent for Parliament
to adopt the purchase price as a
measure for determining the income
tax. In this case, the purchase
price is taken as a measure for the
limited purpose of determining the
quantum of tax to be collected
under section 206C. Tax collected
on specified goods will be given
credit for in the year in which
those goods are sold;
(v) In view of the clarification
of the Central Board of Direct
Taxes, communicated by the Chief
Commissioner of Income-tax, Andhra
Pradesh, Hyderabad, and also in
view of the concession made by the
Income-tax Department, it is
directed that the expression
purchase price in section 44AC and
section 206C shall mean, in the
State of Andhra Pradesh in respect
of arrack only the ‘issue price’ as
understood in the Andhra Pradesh
Excise Act and the Rules made
thereunder, now in force in this
State. The true meaning and content
of the expression ‘purchase price’
is, however, different, as
explained hereinbefore;
(vi) The collection at source
provided by Section 206C is
relatable to the purchase price and
not to the income component of the
purchase price."
9. It is unnecessary to refer to the facts of individual
cases in this batch of cases. Indeed, we were, in
particular, referred to the broad facts in two
representative cases. The first related to a dealer in
liquor vide C.A. 4198 of 1989.
The appellant herein was the petitioner in Civil Writ
Petition No. 3947/89 in the High Court of Punjab and
Haryana. The said petition was heard along with a number of
other similar petitions and the High Court rendered a common
judgment dated 2.8.1989. The appellant (petitioner in the
writ petition) is running the business of liquor contractor
in the State of Haryana. Respondent No. 1 auctioned the
vending of country liquor for the year 1989-90 in the Camp
area of Yamuna Nagar, Damra and Harmal. The appellant was
the highest bidder. The purchaser of country liquor is
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required to deposit the excise duty payable in respect of
the quota of liquor purchased by him in the State of
Haryana. On production of the vouchers showing the deposit
of excise duty the Excise authority authorises the appellant
to make a purchase of the country liquor from the
distillery. The permit is issued to the appellant contractor
thereafter. That entitles him to purchase the country
liquor, transport and sell it for human consumption. The
price charged by the distillery includes the price of liquor
and other charges on bottling, labelling, etc. In view of
Section 44AC and Section 206C of the Income Tax Act, 1961
the first respondent, on 30th of May, 1988, issued a
circular No. 3442-BA-2 to all the distilleries in Haryana
directing them to recover income-tax from the buyers (like
the appellant) 15% of the profit or gains as envisaged by
Section 44AC. Thereafter, the appellant and others assailed
the above circular as also the basis on which the circular
aforesaid was issued, viz., Section 44AC and Section 206C of
the Income Tax Act. The High Court upheld the validity of
Section 44AC and Section 206C and read down Section 44AC
holding that it is only an adjunct to Section 206C and so
read, the relief under Section 28 to Section 43C will be
available.
The facts highlighted in the second case is writ
petition (civil) No. 155 of 1989. There are five petitioners
therein. The first petitioner is a firm and petitioners 2 to
5 are its partners. The firm is carrying on business as
tobacco and bari leaves merchant. It is regularly assessed
to income tax. Bari leaves are also known as ‘Kendu/Tendu
leaves’. It is a natural forest produce. All the State
Governments have nationalised the trade in this commodity.
Respective Governments sell the commodity by auction or by
inviting tenders. The petitioners purchase Tendu leaves from
the forest departments of respective Governments and sell
them to retailers or manufacturers who number to several
thousands. Their plea is that they are not making any profit
by the very act of purchasing the goods. The petitioners
pray for quashing Sections 44AC and 206C of the Act and to
quash the various assessment orders or demands made by the
income-tax authorities. They also pray for a direction, in
the nature of prohibition, from levying or collecting
income-tax from the petitioners under Sections 44AC and 206C
of the Act.
10. The submissions made before us by counsel for the
assessees can be summarised thus; (1) Sections 44AC and 206C
of the Act lack legislative competence. Section 44AC levies
a tax on purchase and by deeming provisions, 40% of the
purchase price shall be deemed to be the income. The section
is a camouflage. The section proceeds on the assumption that
persons in particular trades are evaders or do not keep
accounts. Income tax is a tax on income and not on
expenditure or purchase. Levy under Section 44AC is one on
"purchase" and no income accrues or is received at that
stage. Moreover, tax is levied on hypothetical income and
not on real income. Ordinarily, in taxation statutes,
legislative fiction is adopted to prevent evasion where
devices are employed. In those cases, there is income, but
the person to be taxed is shifted. The imposition of charge
and the measure of levy are different in taxing statutes.
Here, the said principle has been totally ignored; and (ii)
the levy under Section 44AC read with Section 206C is highly
arbitrary and discriminatory. Wholesale dealers of country
liquor alone are picked up. The retailers, processors and
manufacturers are left out. Similarly, persons dealing in
Indian made foreign liquor are excluded. Under the provide
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to Section 44AC, auction purchasers are excluded. The same
persons are conducting trade in country liquor, both
wholesale and retail. There is no rationale for the
discrimination. The exclusion of a buyer from a non-public
sector undertaking under Section 44AC is equally
unjustified. In the case of auction purchasers, as soon as
the hammer falls, income is said to accrue. This is too
artificial. The above aspect will highlight that the
relevant provisions are wholly arbitrary in nature. They are
discriminatory also. Further, there is no material available
for adopting the percentage fixed in Sections 44AC and 206C
of the Act. The material relied on in A. Sanyasi Rao’s case
(supra) is too fragile to sustain the levy as valid, and so,
the Court was constrained to read down the section.
Similarly, there is no material to rope in traders in Tendu
leaves. The provide to Section 206C applies only to traders
and not to manufacturers, which again is discriminatory.
Regarding persons who deal in timber, it is only at the end
of the year, income or net profits can be arrived at and to
assume that an anterior point of time income accrues or is
received is a far cry and is based on no material. It is the
plea of the petitioners, who purchase Bari leaves (Kendu or
Tendu leaves), that the trade in the aforesaid commodity is
a hazardous one. The leaves are sold in bags weighing 60 Kg.
and the intending purchasers are allowed to inspect the
goods. Thereafter, offer is made on the basis of the weight
noticed before inspection. The tendu leaves are highly
perishable and cannot be stocked for long. After delivery,
at the time of physical weighment, underweight is often
noticed. The hazards in selling the leaves to retailers are
very many and in the overall picture, the gross profits may
vary from 5 to 9% and the net profits may vary from 3 to 5%.
Net profits cannot be said to be made by the mere act of
purchasing the goods. The goods purchased may be lost or
destroyed or may perish by lapse of time. The relevant
aspects were never borne in mind before effecting the levy.
A few decisions, to support the submissions, were also
brought to our notice.
11. Dr. Gaurishankar, senior counsel, who appeared for the
Revenue, sought to defend the competence and validity of
Sections 44AC and 206C thus: (i) Sections 4 and 5 of the Act
are the charging sections. It is fallacious to contend that
Section 44AC levies a charge. Section 44AC read with Section
206C is only a machinery provision. It is evident that
income or profit, is embedded even at the point of purchase.
On this basis, Section 44AC read with Section 206C only
provides a machinery or mechanism to tap the income which
accrues and is charged under Sections 4 and 5 of the Act.
Since the legislative measure is only a machinery provision,
it is open to the legislature in its wisdom to specify the
stage at which it is to be levied, the rate at which it is
to be levied and other details. The wisdom of the
legislature in these regions will not be scrutinized by the
court. The power of the legislature in enacting a taxation
statute is of very wide import. Though many more items were
included in the original bill, at the time of final
enactment, the statutory provisions were made applicable
only to few items and the percentage fixed for the
computation was lower. The attack against the legislative
competence is without substance. The impugned levy of income
tax is not open to objection. The assumption that Sections
44AC and 206C are charging provisions is unsustainable. The
legislation will fall within Schedule VII, List 1 Entry 82.
The relevant entry therein (taxes on income other than
agricultural income) should be liberally construed. There
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were sufficient materials before Parliament to hold that due
to very many causes, income from certain trades could not be
brought to tax and there was large scale evasion. The
sufficiency of the material in that regard is not open to
scrutiny by Court. All that is envisaged in the impugned
statutory provisions is only an estimated (income tax)
"advance tax"; (ii) since it came to light that the income
from certain trades could not be properly brought to tax,
the legislature enacted the instant machinery provisions.
The provisions are reasonable and have sufficient nexus to
the objects that are sought to be achieved. The statutory
provisions were intended to operate in all trades where the
evasion and chances of evasion were greater than others and
due to practical experience over the years, it was felt that
the particular trades or businesses necessitated speedier
provision for recovery or collection. It is in this
perspective only, trades in particular commodities, wherein
evasion was pre-dominant and called for appropriate
machinery to secure the payment of tax, the legislation was
enacted. In the case of taxation laws, the legislature has
got a wide discretion to pick and choose persons, objects,
districts, etc. for legislating. The power of the
legislature to classify or select certain objects or persons
to which the law will apply is of great magnitude. The Court
permits a greater latitude to the discretion of the
legislature. It has been invariably held by this Court that
in tax matters, the State is allowed to pick and choose
districts, objects, persons, methods and even rates for
taxation, if it does so reasonably. The provisions attacked
in this case are reasonable, as could be seen from the
legislative history on the object and the objects sought to
be achieved.
12. Briefly, the rival pleas urged before us involve
consideration of two main points:-
(A) Legislative Competence of
Parliament to enact Sections 44AC
and 206C of the Act.
(B) Whether the aforesaid
provisions are arbitrary and
irrational violating Article 14 of
the Constitution of India. (The
plea based on Article 19(1)(g) was
not urged)
We should also bear in mind the principles of law laid down
by this Court regarding the following aspects:-
1. The principles to be borne-in-
mind in construing legislative
lists;
2. The true import of the word
income occurring in Schedule VII
List 1 Entry 82; and
3. The extent of applicability of
Article 14 of the Constitution to
tax laws.
We will take up the first point regarding legislative
competence. As per Schedule VII List 1 Entry 82, Parliament
can legislate on the following subject:-
"Taxes on income other than
agricultural income".
As held by a Constitution Bench of this Court in Sri Ram Ram
Narain Medhi vs. State of Bombay (AIR 1959 SC 459), the
heads of legislation in the lists should not be construed in
a narrow and pedantic sense, but should be given a large and
liberal interpretation. To similar effect are the decisions
of this Court in Calcutta Gas Company (Proprietary) Ltd. vs.
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State of West Bengal and others (AIR 1962 SC 1044 at p.
1049) and Banarasi Das and others vs. The Wealth Tax Officer
and others (AIR 1965 SC 1387). In Union of India vs. Shri
Harbhajan Singh Dhillon (1971 (2) SCC 779 at p.792), the
Court quoted its earlier decision in Harakchand Ratanchand
Banthia and others vs. Union of India and others (1969 (2)
SCC 166), wherein it was held thus:-
".... The entries in the three
Lists are only legislative heads or
fields of legislation, they
demarcate the area over which the
appropriate Legislatures can
operate."
(emphasis supplied)
Again in Baldeo Singh vs. Commissioner of Income-Tax (AIR
1961 SC 736), the Court held thus:-
"....Under entry 54 a law
could of course be passed imposing
a tax on a person on his own
income. It is not disputed that
under that entry a law could also
be passed to prevent a person from
evading the tax payable on his own
income. As is well known the
legislative entries have to be read
in a very wide manner and so as to
include all subsidiary and
ancillary matters. So entry 54
should be read not only as
authorising the imposition of a tax
but also as authorising an
enactment which prevents the tax
imposed being evaded. If it were
not to be so read, then the
admitted power to tax a person on
his own income might often be made
infructuous by ingenious
contrivances. Experience has shown
that attempts to evade the tax are
often made." (paragraph 20)
(emphasis supplied)
In Khyerbari Tea Co. Ltd. and another vs. State of Assam and
others (AIR 1964 SC 925 at p. 935) the Constitution Bench
observed thus:
"..... It is hardly necessary
to emphasise that Entries in three
Lists in the Seventh Schedule which
confer legislative competence on
the respective Legislatures to deal
with the topics covered by them
must receive the widest possible
interpretation; and so it would be
unreasonable to read in the Entry
any limitation of the kind which
Mr. Pathak’s argument seems to
postulate. Besides, it is well
settled that when a power is
conferred on the Legislature to
levy a tax, that power itself must
be widely construed; it must
include the power to impose a tax
and select the articles or
commodities for the exercise of
such power; it must likewise
include the power to fix the rate
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and prescribe the machinery for the
recovery of the tax. This power
also gives jurisdiction to the
Legislature to make such provision
as, in its opinion, would be
necessary to prevent the evasion of
the tax. In imposing taxes, the
legislature can also appoint
authorities for collecting taxes
and may prescribe the procedure for
determining the amount of taxes
payable by any individual; all
these provisions are subsidiary to
the main power to levy a
tax........" (paragraph 19)
(emphasis supplied)
The above decisions establish that the word ’income’
occurring in Entry 82 in List I of the Seventh Schedule
should be construed liberally and in a very wide manner and
the power to legislate will take in all incidental and
ancillary matters including the authorization to make
provision to prevent evasion of tax, in any suitable manner.
Bearing the above principles in mind, we have to examine
further whether collecting ’tax’ as enjoined in Sections
44AC and 206C of the Act at the time of purchase of goods
can be justified as income tax?
13. The Constitution does not define the expression
’income’. In K.N. Singh vs. CIT (11 ITR 513 PC), it was
observed that the word ’income’, it is true, is a word
difficult and perhaps impossible to define in any precise
general formula. It is a word of broadest connotation. In
Navinchandra Mafatlal vs. Commissioner of Income Tax (AIR
1955 SC 58), the question that arose for consideration was
whether capital gains constituted ’income’. This Court
considered the ordinary, natural and grammatical meaning of
the word ’income’ which means, "a thing that comes in" and
in the English speaking countries, United States of America
and Australia, the word ’income’ is understood in a wide
sense to include capital gains and held that capital gains
constituted ’income’. It was observed that the entries in
the Seventh Schedule should be given widest possible
construction according to their ordinary meaning. Similarly,
in Bhagwan Das Jain vs. Union of India and others (AIR 1981
SC 907), this Court held that the word ’income’ in Schedule
VII List I Entry 82 should be interpreted in its widest
amplitude. It was further observed that even in its ordinary
economic sense, the expression income includes not merely
what is received or what comes in by exploiting the use of a
property, but also what one saves by using it oneself. That
which can be converted into income can be reasonably
regarded as giving rise to income. See also Commissioner of
Income Tax vs. Bhogilal (25 ITR 50). The entry will take
within its fold any profits or gains not only actually
received, but also income which is supposed by the
legislature to have nationally accrued. What can be
converted into income will also come within its fold. In
Baldeo Singh vs. CIT (40 ITR 605), this Court held that
Entry 54 should be read not only as authorising the
imposition of tax, but also as authorising an enactment
which prevents the tax imposed being evaded. If it were not
to be so read, then the authorized power to tax a person on
his own income might often be made infructuous by ingenious
contrivances. The Court upheld the validity of Section 23A
of the Income Tax Act, 1922 holding that it dealt with a
situation where share holders of a company did not
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 16 of 24
deliberately distribute the accumulated profits as dividend
amongst themselves and in order to prevent such evasion, the
accumulated profits were deemed to be dividend to the
shareholders and brought to tax. Later, in Balaji vs. ITO
(1961 (43) ITR 393), upholding the validity of Section 16(3)
of the Income Tax Act, 1922, the Court held that an
individual can be taxed on the income of his wife or minor
children. In other words, the income of A can be taxed in
the hand of B. Similarly, in Navnit Lal Javeri vs. K.K. Sen
(56 ITR 198), Section 12B of the Income Tax Act, 1922 was
upheld which provided that a loan made to a share holder by
a private controlled company is taxable as dividend
(income). We have seen that the object in enacting Sections
44AC and 206C was to enable the Revenue to collect the
legitimate dues of the State from the persons carrying on
particular trades in view of the peculiar difficulties
experienced in the past and the measure was so enacted to
check evasion of substantial revenue due to the State. It is
a matter of common knowledge that trade or business produces
or results in income which can be brought to tax. In order
to prevent evasion of tax legitimately due on such ’income’,
Section 44AC and Section 206C were enacted, so as to
facilitate the collection of tax on that income which is
bound to arise or accrue, at the very inception itself or at
an anterior stage and considered in the said perspective, it
is idle to contend that the aforesaid statutory provisions
lack legislative competence. After all, the statutory
provisions obliging to pay "advance tax" is not anything new
and the impugned provisions are akin to that, Counsel for
the Revenue brought to our notice Sections 44B, 44BB, 44BBA
and 44D and contended that there are other similar
provisions in the Act. We should state that they relate to
non-residents carrying on business in India and are not much
relevant in construing Sections 44AC and 206C of the Act. In
this context, we should bear in mind that there is a clear
distinction between the subject matter of a tax and the
standard by which the amount of tax is measured. Having
regard to the past difficulties in making a normal
assessment and collection in the case of certain categories
of assessees, for convenience sake, the legislature has
chosen to make appropriate provision for collection of tax
at an anterior stage by adopting the purchase price as the
measure of tax. In our view, this is permissible and the
standard by which the amount of tax is measured, being the
purchase price, will not in any way alter the nature and
basis of levy viz, that the tax imposed is a tax on income.
It cannot be labelled as a tax on purchase of goods.
14. We are further of the view that the basis of a charge
relating to income tax is laid down in Sections 4 to 9 of
the Income Tax Act, 1961. Section 4 is the charging section.
Income tax is levied in respect of the total income of the
previous year of every person. Section 5 deals with the
scope of total income. Section 6 deals with the residence in
India. Section 7 deals with the income deemed to be
received. Section 8 deals with dividend income. Section 9
deals with the income deemed to accrue or arise in India.
Section 9(1) is to the following effect:-
"Income deemed to accrue or
arise in India -- (1) The following
income shall be deemed to accrue or
arise in India
i) all income accruing or arising,
whether directly or indirectly,
through or from any business
connection in India, or through or
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from any property in India, or
through or from any asset or source
of income in India, or through the
transfer of a capital asset situate
in India. which are confined to the
shooting of any cinematograph film
in India."
(emphasis supplied)
The crucial words in Section 9(1) to the effect "that
all income accruing or arising, whether directly or
indirectly through or from any business connection" occurred
in Section 42 of the Income Tax Act, 1922 as well. The said
section came up for consideration before this Court in
Anglo-French Textile Co. Ltd. vs. CIT (23 ITR 101 = 1953 SCR
454). The facts in that case are as follows : The assessee,
a company incorporated in the United Kingdom, owned a
spinning and weaving factory at Pondicherry in French India.
The assessee had appointed another limited company in Madras
as its constituted agent for the purpose of its business in
British India. During the relevant year of account, no sales
of yarn or cloth manufactured by the assessee-company were
effected in British India, but all the purchases of cotton
required for the factory at Pondicherry were made by the
agents in British India and no purchases were made through
any other agency. The Court held that the assessee company
had a business connection in British India, within the
meaning of Section 42 and a portion of the profits of the
non-resident attributable to the purchase of cotton in
British India could be apportioned
Explanation :- For the purposes of this clause --
(a) in the case of a business of
which all the operations are not
carried out in India, the income of
the business deemed under this
clause to accrue or arise In India
shall be only such part of the
income as is reasonably
attributable to the operations
carried out in India;
(b) in the case of a non-resident,
no income shall be deemed to accrue
or arise in India to him through or
from operations which are confined
to the purchase of goods in India
for the purpose of export;
(c) in the case of a non-resident,
being a person engaged in the
business of running a news agency
or of publishing newspapers,
magazines or journals, no income
shall be deemed to accrue or arise
in India to him through or from
activities which are confined to
the collection of news and views in
India for transmission out of
India;
(d) in the case of a non-resident
being:-
(1) an individual who is not a
citizen of India; or
(2) a firm which does not have any
partner who is a citizen of India
or who is resident in India; or
(3) a company which does not have
any shareholder who is a citizen of
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India or who is resident in India,
no income shall be deemed to accrue
or arise in India to such
individual, firm or company through
or from operations
under Section 42(3). The receipt of income or realization of
profits should not be confused with the idea of actual of
profits. The factual sale fixes the time and place of
receipt only. Several places commencing from the buying of
raw materials and ending with the production of finished
products and the sale thereof will in different proportions
point out where the income accrued or arose. It is in this
perspective, the Court held that income accrued where the
raw material is systematically purchased which contributes
substantially to the ultimate profit which is realized on
the sale of the end product. We understand the ratio of the
decision, as highlighting the principle that even operations
which are confined to the purchase of goods might constitute
a business connection and the profits on sales might be
deemed to accrue even at the point of purchase. In other
words, in such cases, income (profit) is embedded even at
the time of purchase. Viewed in this perspective also, we
have no doubt that even at the time of purchase, income can
be said to have accrued to strict imposition of tax.
15. Counsel for the Revenue, Dr. Gaurishankar, vehemently
contended before us that Section 44AC read with Section 206C
are only machinery provisions and not charging sections. We
see force in this plea. The charge for the levy of the
income that accrued or arose is laid by the charging
sections viz. Sections 5 to 9 and not by virtue of Section
44AC or Section 206C. The fact that the income is levied at
a flat rate or at an earlier stage will not in any way alter
the nature or character of the levy since such matters are
completely in the realm of legislative wisdom. We hold that
what is brought to tax, though levied with reference to the
purchase price and at an earlier point is nonetheless income
liable to be taxed under the Income Tax Act. We repel the
plea by the assessees to the contrary.
16. The only other question that remains for consideration
is, whether Sections 44AC and 206C are in any way hit by
Article 14 of the Constitution of India. The whole section
is attacked as discriminatory in having selected certain
businesses or trades for hostile treatment. Among others, it
was urged that the fixing of specified percentage of the
purchase price of the income without allowing normal
business expenditure is also arbitrary and irrational. In
other words, the non-obstante clause in Section 44AC is
attacked as irrational and persons doing business in
particular trade or business alone have been arbitrarily
dealt with and denied the relief, for no ostensible reason.
There is no material to show as to why particular trades or
businesses alone were chosen for such discriminatory
treatment.
17. It is true that Article 14 of the Constitution of India
applies to tax laws as well. The off doubted decision of
this Court in Ram Krishna Dalmia vs. Justice S.R. Tendolkar
(AIR 1958 SC 538) has laid down the content of Article 14
and the circumstances in which a law may be hit by Article
14 of the Constitution of India. As stated in Khandige Sham
Bhat vs. Agri Income-tax Officer and another (AIR 1963 SC
591) --
"..... in the application of
the principles, the courts, in view
of the inherent complexity of
fiscal adjustment of diverse
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 19 of 24
elements, permit a larger
discretion to the Legislature in
the matter of classification, so
long it adheres to the fundamental
principles underlying the said
doctrine. The power of the
Legislature to classify is of "wide
range and flexibility" so that it
can adjust its system of taxation
in all proper and reasonable ways."
Similarly, in Khyerbari Tea Co. s case (AIR 1964 SC 925 at
p.941). the Court held thus:-
"..... the legislature which is
competent to levy a tax must
inevitably be given full freedom to
determine which articles should be
taxed, in what manner and at what
rate; vide Raja Jagannath Baksh
Singh v. State of U.P. (1963-1 SCR
220: AIR 1962 SC 1563). It would be
idle to contend that a State must
tax everything in order to tax
something. In tax matters, the
"State is allowed to pick and
choose districts, objects, persons,
methods and even rates for taxation
if it does so reasonably. The
Supreme Court of the United States
of America has been practical and
has permitted a very wide latitude
in classification for taxation".
Willis on Constitutional Law p.587.
This approach has been approved by
this Court in the case of East
India Tobacco Co. vs. State of A.P.
(1963-1 SCR 404 at p.409 : AIR 1962
SC 1733 at p. 1735).
It is, of course, true that the
validity of tax laws can be
questioned in the light of the
provisions of Articles 14, 19 and
Article 301 if the said tax
directly and immediately imposes a
restriction on the freedom of
trade; but the power conferred on
this Court to strike down a taxing
statute if it contravenes the
provisions of Articles 14, 19 or
301 has to be exercised with
circumspection, bearing in mind
that the power of the State to levy
taxes for the purpose of governance
and for carrying out its welfare
activities is a necessary attribute
of sovereignty and in that sense it
is a power of paramount character.
In what cases a taxing statute can
be struck down as being
unconstitutional is illustrated by
the decision of this Court in K.T.
Moopil Nair v. State of Kerala
(1961-3 SCR 77: AIR 1961 SC 552).
In that case, a careful examination
of the scheme of the relevant
provisions of the Travancore-Cochin
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Land Tax Act (No. 15 of 1955)
satisfied this Court that the said
Act imposed unreasonable
restrictions on the fundamental
rights of the citizens, conferred
unbridled power on the appropriate
authorities, introduced
unconstitutional discrimination and
in consequence, amounted to a
colorable exercise of legislative
power. It is in regard to such a
taxing statute which can properly
be regarded as purely confiscatory
that the power of the Court can be
legitimately invoked and
exercised........"
(emphasis supplied)
The above principle has been re-stated by a Constitution
Bench in The Twyford Tea Co. Ltd. and another vs. The State
of Kerala and another (AIR 1970 SC 1133) thus:-
"...... These principles have
been stated earlier but are often
ignored when the question of the
application of Article 14 arises.
One principle on which our Courts
(as indeed the Supreme Court in the
United States) have always acted,
is however better stated than by
Willis in his "Constitutional Law"
page 587. This is how he put it :
"A State does not have to tax
everything in order to tax
something. It is allowed to pick
and choose districts, objects,
persons, methods and even rates for
taxation if it does so
reasonably.... The Supreme Court
has been practical and has
permitted a very wide latitude in
classification for taxation."
This principle was approved by this
Court in East Indian Tobacco Co. v.
State of A.P. (1963 (1) SCR 404 at
p. 410 = AIR 1962 SC 1733 at p.
1735). Applying it, the Court
observed :
"If a State can validly pick and
choose one commodity for taxation
and that is not open to attack
under Article 14, the same result
must follow when the State picks
out one category of goods and
subjects it to taxation."
This indicates a wide range of
selection and freedom in appraisal
not only in the objects of taxation
and the manner of taxation, but
also in the determination of the
rate or rates applicable....."
(emphasis supplied)
We should also bear in mind the principles laid down in a
more recent decision in Ganga Sugar Corporation Ltd. vs.
State of U.P. and others (AIR 1980 SC 286), wherein it was
held thus:-
"Article 14, a great right by
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any canon, by its promiscuous
forensic misuse, despite the Dalmia
decision has given the impression
of being the last sanctuary of
losing litigants. In the present
case, the levy which is uniform on
all sugarcane purchases, is
attacked as ultra vires, on the
score that the sucrose content of
various consignments may vary from
place to place, the range of
variation being of the order of 8
to 10 per cent and yet a uniform
levy by weight on these unequals is
sanctioned by the Act. Price of
cane is commanded as the only
permissible criterion for purchase
tax. The whole case is given away
by the very circumstance that,
substantially, the sucrose content
is the same for sugarcane in the
State, the marginal difference
being too inconsequential to build
a case of discrimination or is
blamable on the old machinery.
Neither in intent nor in effect is
there any discriminatory treatment
discernible to the constitutional
eye. Price is surely a safe guide
but other methods are not
necessarily vocational. It depends.
Practical considerations of the
Administration, traditional
practices in the Trade, other
economic pros and cons enter the
verdict but, after a judicial
generosity is extended to the
legislative wisdom, if there is
writ on the statute perversity,
madness in the method or gross
disparity, judicial credulity may
shape and the measure may meet with
its funeral.
Even so, taxing statutes have
enjoyed more judicial indulgence.
This Court has uniformly held that
the classification for taxation and
the application of Article 14, in
that context, must be viewed
liberally not meticulously. We must
always remember that while the
executive and legislative branches
are subject to judicial restraint,
"the only check upon our exercise
of power is our own sense of self-
restraint"."
(emphasis supplied)
The Court also quoted the following observations contained
in the earlier case - Murthy Match Works Case:
"....Even so, a large latitude
is allowed to the State for
classification upon a reasonable
basis and what is reasonable is a
question of practical details and a
variety of factors which the court
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will be reluctant and perhaps ill-
equipped to investigate. In this
imperfect world perfection even in
grouping is an ambition hardly even
accomplished. In this context, we
have to remember the relationship
between the legislative and
judicial departments of government
in the determination of the
validity of classification. Of
course, in the last analysis courts
possess the power to pronounce on
the constitutionality of the acts
of the other branches whether a
classification is based upon
substantial differences or is
arbitrary, fanciful and
consequently illegal. At the same
time, the question of
classification is primarily for
legislative judgment and ordinarily
does not become a judicial
question. A power to classify being
extremely broad and based on
diverse considerations of executive
pragmatism, the judicature cannot
rush in where even the legislature
warily treads."
Considered in the light of the practical difficulties
envisaged by the Revenue to locate the persons and to
collect the tax due in certain trades, if the legislature in
its wisdom thought that it will facilitate, the collection
of the tax due from such specified traders on a "presumptive
basis", there is nothing in the said legislative measure to
offend Article 14 of the Constitution. In the light of the
legal principles stated above, we are unable to hold that
Section 44AC read with Section 206C is wholly hit by Article
14 of the Constitution of India.
18. However, the denial of relief provided by Sections 28
to 43C to the particular businesses or trades dealt with in
Section 44AC calls for a different consideration. Even
according to Revenue, the provisions (Sections 44AC and
206C) are only "machinery provisions". If so, why should the
normal reliefs afforded to all assessees be denied to such
traders? Prima facie, all assesses similarly placed under
the Income Tax Act are entitled to equal treatment. In the
matter of granting various reliefs provided under Sections
28 to 43C, the assessees carrying on business are similarly
placed and should there be a law, negativing such valuable
reliefs to a particular trade or business, it should be
shown to have some basis and fair and rational. It has not
been shown as to why the persons carrying on business in the
particular goods specified in Section 44AC are denied the
reliefs available to others. No plea is put forward by
Revenue that these trades are distinct and different even
for the grant of reliefs under Sections 28 to 43C of the
Act. The denial of such reliefs to trades specified in
Section 44AC, available to other assessees, has no nexus to
the object sought to be achieved by the legislature. To this
extent it appears to us that the non-obstante clause in
Section 44AC denying such reliefs has no basis and so unfair
and arbitrary and equality of treatment is denied to such
persons, necessitating grant of appropriate relief (see
Royappa vs. State of Tamil Nadu : AIR 1974 SC 555, Maneka
Gandhi vs. Union of India : AIR 1978 SC 597, Ajay vs. Khalid
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 23 of 24
: AIR 1981 SC 487 and other cases).
19. When the matter came up before the Andhra Pradesh High
Court in Sanyasi Rao’s case (178 ITR 31), it was sought to
be contended that selection of particular trades or business
for differential treatment by denying reliefs provided by
Sections 28 to 43C is based on material. This aspect was
dealt with by the Andhra Pradesh High Court in 178 ITR 31 at
pp. 59 to 67. The Court referred to in detail to the rival
pleas advanced on this score and the materials placed before
it by the Revenue to sustain the measure as a reasonable one
and felt that the remedy formulated to undo the mischief or
harm is not proportionate to the evil that came to light and
in this view, discrimination is writ large on the very face
of Section 44AC. The Court concluded thus:-
".... The non-obstante clause
in Section 44AC(1),
"notwithstanding anything to the
contrary contained in Sections 28
to 43C" would be confined to the
limited purpose of sustaining the
deductions provided for in Section
206C. The level of profits and
gains would be relevant only for
explaining and justifying the level
of deductions provided for in
Section 206C. Collections will be
made at the rates specified in
Section 206C and then a regular
assessment will be made like in the
case of any other assessee."
(emphasis supplied)
The Court further held thus:
"On this aspect, we may as well
refer to the words "in the
assessment made under this Act" in
sub-section (4) of Section 206C.
These words show that an assessment
under the Act is still to be made
even where tax is collected under
Section 206C. This, in our opinion,
is a strong indication supporting
our construction of Section 44AC.
xxx xxx xxx
.....we uphold the validity of
section 206C. We also hold that
section 44AC is a valid piece of
legislation, read in the manner
indicated by us. Section 44AC is
not to be read as an independent
provision but as an adjunct to and
as explanatory to section 206C. It
does not dispense with a regular
assessment altogether. After the
tax is collected in the manner
provided by section 206C, a regular
assessment will be made where the
profits and gains of business in
specified goods will be ascertained
in accordance with sections 28 to
43C."
(emphasis supplied)
20. We perused the aforesaid judgment of the Andhra Pradesh
High Court with care and we hold that in view of the absence
of materials, the Court was justified in its view that the
remedy specified by section 44AC is disproportionate to the
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evil that prevailed and so to the extent the non-obstante
clause in Section 44AC excluded the provisions of Sections
28 to 43C (applicable to all assessees), the provisions are
unreasonable. We concur with the aforesaid conclusion of the
Andhra Pradesh High Court on this aspect and hold that
Section 44AC is a valid piece of legislation and is an
adjunct to and explanatory to Section 206C. It does not
dispense with the regular assessment, as provided in
accordance with Sections 28 to 43C of the Act. A direction
will issue to that effect and to this limited extent the
writ petitions, civil appeals and the special leave
petitions filed by the assessees shall stand partly allowed.
In all other respects, the batch of cases shall stand
dismissed. In the circumstances of the case, there shall be
no order as to costs.