P. Pascua v. People

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Pascua v.

People
G.R. No. 250578, September 7, 2020

Facts:
During arraignment, Bert Pascua pleaded not guilty to the crime of selling and possessing shabu
that was charged against him. However, he later filed a Motion to Allow Accused to Enter into
Plea Bargaining Agreement wherein he offered to enter a plea of "guilty" to the lesser offense of
violation of Section 12, Article II of RA 9165 for both criminal cases. The prosecution filed its
Comment and Opposition thereto, stressing that, per Department of Justice Department Circular
No. 027-18, the State's consent is necessary before the accused can plead to a lesser offense.
The RTC issued separate Orders allowing Pascua to enter a plea of guilty to the lesser offense of
violation of Section 12, Article II of RA 9165 in both Criminal Case Nos. 18805 and 18806.
However, it was expressly stated in the dispositive portion of the Order pertaining to Criminal
Case No. 18805 that Pascua was "ineligible to apply for probation."
The RTC denied Pascua’s motion for reconsideration ruling that probation is not a matter of right
but a special privilege which is discretionary upon the court. It held that the framers of A.M. No.
18-03-16-SC clearly intended that persons charged with sale of illegal drugs would not be
qualified for probation if they choose to plead guilty to a lesser offense.
The CA affirmed the RTC ruling. The CA held that a reasonable interpretation of A.M. No. 18-
03-16-SC would lead to the conclusion that the Supreme Court intended for drug trafficking and
pushing (Section 5) to still be covered by the "no probation rule" under Section 24, Article II of
RA 9165.

Issue:
Whether or not the CA correctly ruled that the RTC did not gravely abuse its discretion in
holding that Pascua is ineligible for probation.

Held:
The petition has partial merit.
In this case, the CA construed the aforementioned remark in A.M. No. 18-03-16-SC as
disqualifying persons originally charged with violation of Section 5, Article II of RA 9165 but
were convicted of the lesser offense of violation of Section 12, Article II of the same law from
applying for probation. However, the CA is mistaken as the said remark should be simply
regarded as a recognition and reminder of the general rule provided in Section 24 that "any
person convicted for drug trafficking or pushing under this Act" shall be ineligible for probation.
Moreover, the CA's view is not supported neither by the very wording of Section 24, Article II of
RA 9165 nor the provisions of the Probation Law. It likewise disregards the legal consequences
of plea bargaining. It bears stressing that it is only after the trial court arrives at a judgment of
conviction can the provisions of the Probation Law apply.
It is clear from both Section 24, Article II of RA 9165 and the provisions of the Probation
Law that in applying for probation, what is essential is not the offense charged but the offense to
which the accused is ultimately found guilty of.
In this regard, it is worth emphasizing that upon acceptance of a plea bargain, the accused
is actually found guilty of the lesser offense subject of the plea. According to jurisprudence,
"plea bargaining in criminal cases is a process whereby the accused and the prosecution work out
a mutually satisfactory disposition of the case subject to court approval. It usually involves the
defendant's pleading guilty to a lesser offense or to only one or some of the counts of a multi-
count indictment in return for a lighter sentence than that for the graver charge."
Thus, regardless of what the original charge was in the Information, the judgment would
be for the lesser offense to which the accused pled guilty. This means that the penalty to be
meted out, as well as all the attendant accessory penalties, and other consequences under the law,
including eligibility for probation and parole, would be based on such lesser offense.
Necessarily, even if Pascua was originally charged with violation of Section 5, Article II of RA
9165 in Criminal Case No. 18805, he was ultimately convicted of the lower offense of violation
of Section 12, Article II of the same law. Since the foregoing effectively removed Pascua's case
from the coverage of Section 24, Article II of RA 9165, he should, at the very least, be allowed
to apply for probation.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, it is well to clarify that this ruling does not, per se make
Pascua eligible for probation. This ruling is limited to the deletion of the RTC's pronouncement
that Pascua is "ineligible to apply for probation", thereby allowing him to file such an
application. If he files for the same, the grant or denial thereof will then lie in the sound
discretion of the RTC after due consideration of the criteria laid down in the Probation Law.

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