SECOND DIVISION

.G.R. No. 2577~3 - JAMES BILLOSO y OBLIGAR, Petitioner, v.

PEOPLE OF TIJE PIJILIPPINES, Respondent.
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Promulgated:

SEPARATE CONCURRING OPINION

LEONEN,J.:

I concur w~th the ponencia :S denial of the Petition and would like to
offer the followinlg as additional basis for the ponencia :S ruling.

As aptly p4rased by my esteemed colleague Associate Justice Antonio

T. Kho Jr., the plea-bargaining process is "an interplay of the powers of the
Judiciary and thef Executive," 1 with the prosecutor representing the State in
the prosecution pf the criminal case and the trial court overseeing the
criminal proceedings. In light of the different functions at play, it is crucial
to identify the p6wers exercised by the branch of government involved to
ensure that no ov¢rreaching or encroaching occurs.

Plea barg31-ning is the process where both the accused and the
prosecution agree to "a mutually satisfactory disposition of the case subject
to court approval.1" 2 As a rule of procedure, plea bargaining falls within this
Court's exclusivi rule-making power and is provided for in Rule 116,
Section 2 of the I{u!es 6f Court:
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SECTION 2: Plea of guilty to a lesser offense. - At arraignment, the

accused, witliI the consent of the offended party and the prosecutor, may be
allowed by 1µ:le trial court to plead guilty to a lesser offense which is
necessarily in.eluded in the offense charged. After arraignment but before
trial, the acctlsed may still be allowed to plead guilty to said lesser offense
after withdrawing his plea of not guilty. No amendment of the complaint
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or m1ormat10n 1s necessary.

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Rule 118, Section l(a) of the Rules of Court also mandates the courts
co~id~ plea braining dwcing p,e-trial,
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J. Kho, Jr., Co~currihg and Dissenting Opinion, in Billoso v. People, G.R. No. 257733, p. 2.
2
People v. Villilrama,I
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Jr., 285 Phil. 723, 730 (I 992) [Per J. Medialdea, First Division], citing BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY, ] ©37, (5'" ed.1979).
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Separate Concurring Opinion 2 G.R. No. 257733

SECTION 1. Pre-trial; mandatory in criminal cases. - In all

criminal cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, Regional Trial Court,
Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Municipal Trial
Court and Municipal Circuit Trial Court, the court shall[,] after
arraignment and within thirty (30) days from the date the court acquires
jurisdiction over the person of the accused, unless a shorter period is
provided for in special laws or circulars of the Supreme Court, order a pre-
trial conference to consider the following:

(a) plea bargaining;

(b) stipulation of facts;
(c) marking for identification of evidence of the parties;
(d) waiver of objections to admissibility of evidence;
(e) modification of the order of trial if the accused admits the
charge but interposes a lawful defense; and
(f) such matters as will promote a fair and expeditious trial of the
criminal and civil aspects of the case. (Emphasis supplied)

However, the Rules of Court do not direct the prosecutor to consent to

a plea deal. Neither is the court empowered to override the parties' mutual
agreement or impose a plea bargain deal, despite the prosecutor's objections.
This tacit recognition of the separation of powers between the Executive and
the Judiciary was explained in a separate opinion in Sayre v. Xenos: 3

A plain reading of [Rule I 16, Section 2 of the Rules of Court]

shows only one (1) part of the plea bargaining process: the plea of the
lesser offense before the court. This presupposes that the courts only
participate in the plea bargaining process once the accused has presented
[theirJ offer and the prosecution and the private offended party has
consented to the offer.

The mandate to consider plea bargaining after arraignment does

not necessarily mean that the accused must always plead guilty to the
lesser offense in all criminal cases. It simply means that if the accused and
the prosecution come to court with a plea bargain deal during pre-trial, the
court must consider the plea bargain deal.

There is, thus, a part of the plea bargaining process that is solely
within the realm ofprosecutorial discretion. 4 (Emphasis supplied)

The power to prosecute is purely an Executive function, and the

prosecutor, as the State's representative, has a wide discretion of "whether,
what[,] and whom to charge" 5 due to the range of variables present when
pursuing a criminal case. 6 While jurisdiction over a criminal case is
transferred to the Judiciary once a prosecutor files information with a trial
court, court action is generally limited to remedial measures that may occur J
G.R. Nos. 244413, 244415-16, February 18, 2020, [Per. J. Carandang, En Banc].
4
J. Leanen, Concurring Opinion in Sayre v. Xenos, G.R. Nos. 244413, 244415-16, February 18, 2020,
[Per. J. Carandang, En Banc].
Webb v. De Leon, 317 Phil 758, 800 (1995) [Per J. Puno, Second Division].
6
Id.
, Separate Concurring Opinion 3 G.R. No. 257733

during trial. 7 The prosecutor is still the one who directly steers the criminal
case. 8

Judicial deference of prosecutorial discretion in the plea bargaining

process was also emphasized in Estipona Jr. v. Lobrigo,9 where this Court
stated:

Yet a defendant has no constitutional right to plea bargain. No

basic rights are infringed by trying him rather than accepting a plea of
guilty; the prosecutor need not do so if he prefers to go to trial. Under the
present Rules, the acceptance of an offer to plead guilty is not a
demandable right but depends on the consent of the offended party and the
prosecutor, whlch is a condition precedent to a valid plea of guilty to a
lesser offense that is necessarily included in the offense charged. The
reason for this is that the prosecutor has full control of the prosecution of
criminal actions, his duty is to always prosecute the proper offense, not
any lesser or graver one, based on what the evidence on hand can sustain.

[Courts] normally must defer to prosecutorial decisions as

to whom to prosecute. The reasons for judicial deference
are well known. Prosecutorial charging decisions are rarely
simple. In addition to assessing the strength and importance
of a case, prosecutors also must consider other tangible and
intangible factors, such as government enforcement
priorities. Finally, they also must decide how best to
allocate the scarce resources of a criminal justice system
that simply cannot accommodate the litigation of every
serious criminal charge. Because these decisions "are not
readily susceptible to the kind of analysis the courts are
competent to undertake," we have been "properly hesitant
to examine the decision whether to prosecute." 10 (Citations
omitted)

In People v. Montierro, 11 this Court stressed its power to promulgate

the rules on plea bargaining but still nonetheless recognized the
prosecution's exclusive mandate of steering the criminal proceeding:

Furthermore, and lest it be mistaken, the exclusivity of the power

to promulgate rules on plea bargaining only recognizes the role of the
judiciary under our Constitutional framework as the impartial tribunals I
7 Rural Bank of Mabitac, Laguna, Inc. v. Canicon, 834 Phil. 346, 365 (2018) [Per J. Jardeleza, First
Division].
RULES OF COURT, Rule 110, sec. 5 provides:
SECTION 5. Who must prosecute criminal action. - All criminal actions either commenced by
complaint or by information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of a public prosecutor.
In case Of heavy work schedule of the public prosecutor or in the event of lack of public prosecutors,
the private prosecutor may be authorized in writing by the Chief of the Prosecution Office or the
Regional State Prosecutor to prosecute the case subject to the approval of the court. Once so authorized
to prosecute the criminal action, the private prosecutor shall continue to prosecute the case up to end of
the trial even in the absence of a public prosecutor, unless the authority is revoked or otherwise
withdrawn.
9
816 Phil 789 (2017) [Per J. Peralta, En Banc].
10
' Id. at 814-815.
11
G.R. No. 254564, July 26, 2022 [Per J. Caguioa, En Banc].
Separate Concurring Opinion 4 G.R. No. 257733

that try to balance the right of the State to prosecute offenders of its laws,
on the one hand, and the right of individuals to be presumed innocent until
proven guilty, on the other. This in no way undermines the prosecutorial
power of the DOJ, which !J,as the mandate to prosecute suspected criminals
to the full extent of the law. In discharging this role, the prosecutor,
representing one of the parties to the negotiation, cannot thus be expected
to fully see the "middle ground." It is here where the courts are therefore
in the best position to determine what is fair and reasonable under the
circumstances. Ultimately, it is the Court which has the power to
promulgate the rules on plea bargaining. 12 (Emphasis in the original)

Thus, the trial court's participation in the plea bargaining process only
comes about after the parti~s have agreed to a plea deal, with the court
ensuring the mutual agreemei;it of the parties and that all legal requirements
are met. 13

The mutual acceptance of the plea deal by the parties as a condition

precedent, but subject to i:he court's sound discretion, was likewise
emphasized in Montierro where this Court stated:

Indeed, Section 2 [Rule 116 of the Rules of Court] ~equires the

mutuality of agreement of ,the parties because consent of the 'prosecution
and the offended party must be obtained in order for the; accused to
successfully plead guilty to a lesser offense. However, it should not be
overlooked Lliat Section 2 also uses the word "may," which signifies
discretion on the part of the trial court on whether to allow the accused to
make such plea. As such, vyhile plea bargaining requires the consent of the
parties, the approval of a plea bargaining proposal is ultimately subject to
the sound discretion of the court.

To be sure, jurisprudence had since emphasized the extent of the

trial court's discretion in approving a plea bargain.

In the case of People v. Villarama, Jr. (Villarama), while it was

expressed that the consent of the Fiscal and the offended party is a
condition precedent for a valid plea of guilty to a lesser offense because
"[t]he Fiscal has full control of the prosecution of criminal actions," the
Court also underscored that acceptance of an offer to plead guilty to a
lesser offense is a matter addressed entirely to the sound discretion of
the trial court. Underscoring the trial court's duty to review the
circumstances of a case before it may act on an application to plea
bargain[.]1 4 (Emphasis in the original, citations omitted)

Here, the prosecution's objection to the accused's plea bargaining

proposal was based on: (1) the directive in Department of Justice Circular
No. 027-18 only to consider a plea bargain involving a violation of Section 5
in relation to Section 26 of Republic Act No. 9165; and (2) sufficiency of
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12
People v. Montierro, G.R. No. 254564, July 26, 2022 [Per J. Caguioa, En Banc].
13
J. Leonen Separate Concurring Opini,on in People of the Philippines v. Montierro, G.R. No. 254564,
July 26, 2022 [Per J. Caguioa, En Ban,c].
14
People of the Philippines v. Montierro, G.R. No. 254564, July 26, 2022 [Per J. Caguioa, En Banc].
 Separate Concurring Opinion 5 G.R. No. 257733

evidence to convict accused of violation of Section 5 in relation to Section

:26 and Section 11 of Republic Act No. 9165. 15

The ponencia correctly pointed out that any objection based on

Department of Justice Circular No. 027-18 has effectively been withdrawn
with the issuance of Department of Justice Circular No. 018-22. 16 However,
the second objection based on the supposed sufficiency of evidence still
needs to be proven, with the trial court obligated to look into and weigh the
prosecution's evidence and decide if the accused is qualified to enter a plea
bargain. 17

Considering the foregoing, I concur with the ponencia :S remand of the

case _to the court of origin to resolve the plea bargaining proposal based on
. evidence.

ACCORDINGLY, I vote to DENY the Petition for lack of merit and

to REMAND the case to the court of origin.

15
· Ponencia, p. 5.
16
· Id. at 6.
17 Id. at 7-8.