filed with the Court of Appeals a Motion for Extension of Time to

RULE 42: PETETION FOR REVIEW FROM File a Petition for Review. However, instead of filing a petition for
THE RTC IN ITS APPELATE JURISDICTION review within the 15-day period allowed by the CA, petitioner filed a
second Motion for Extension of Time asking for another 15 days
TO THE CA within which to file his petition for review. The CA, dismissed the
petition for failure to pay the full amount of the docket fees
RODGING REYES, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND
pursuant to Sec. 1, Rule 42 of the Rules of Court. His second motion
SALUD M. GEGATO, Respondents. G.R. No. 193034, July 20, 2015.
for extension is likewise DENIED as no further extension may be
Ponente: PERALTA
granted except for most compelling reason. He then filed a Second
Digested by: Kimberly Gargoles and Third Motion for Reconsideration but was denied also. Hence
this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
DOCTRINE: The grant of any extensions for the filing of the petition Court.
is discretionary and subject to the condition that the full amount of
the docket and lawful fees are paid before the expiration of the ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing the case on the
reglementary period to file the petition. ground of failure of Reyes to pay the full amount of the docket fees.

FACTS: Sometime in 2001, Rodging Reyes, moved by personal HELD: NO, the CA is correct in dismissing the case. The rule is that
resentment and hatred, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and payment in full of the docket fees within the prescribed period is
feloniously threatened the life of Mrs. Salud Gegato. So, a complaint mandatory. In Manchester v. Court of Appeals, it was held that a
was filed by Gegato and charged Reyes with Grave Threats before court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of
the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Agusan del Sur. Before the prescribed docket fee. The strict application of this rule was,
arraignment, Reyes filed a Motion to Quash based on the ground of however, relaxed in the case of Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. v.
jurisdiction and that the crime is not Grave Threats but Other Light Asuncion, wherein the Court decreed that where the initiatory
Threats, but it was denied. Then Reyes filed a Motion to Inhibit the pleading is not accompanied by the payment of the docket fee, the
presiding judge on the ground that Gegato is the Court Interpreter court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable period of
of the same court, but it was denied. MCTC, in a Decision, found time, but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or
Reyes guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. On reglementary period. Here,this requirement was not met by Reyes
appeal, the RTC, denied Reyes’ appeal but found him guilty beyond as the docket fees he had paid are actually deficient.
reasonable doubt of the crime of Other Light Threats. Then, Reyes
filed a Motion for Reconsideration but was denied. Thus, petitioner
Therefore, the grant of any extensions for the filing of the petition is for ejectment and squatting against petitioner's mother, Linglingay
discretionary and subject to the condition that the full amount of Corpuz, and several others (Linglingay, et al.) involving the subject
the docket and lawful fees are paid before the expiration of the property. On May 1, 1985, the parties executed an Amicable
reglementary period to file the petition. Settlement,8 wherein Linglingay, et al. would pay Quintin the total
amount of P146,000.00. The pertinent portions of the agreement
read:
LILAH GAIL CORPUZ ALFILER,1 PETITIONER, VS. SPS. JOHN 1. That it is hereby agreed that the aforesaid property will be sold
CAYABYAB AND GERALDINE CAYABYAB, REPRESENTED BY by the owner to the respondents in the amount of P550.00 per
ATTORNEY-IN-FACT, JOSE VASALLO, RESPONDENTS. square meter totalling to P146,000.00.
DECISION 2. That it shall be paid in cash by the respondents upon the delivery
GESMUNDO, C.J.: of the certificate of Title and the final Deed of Sale by the
This is an Appeal by Certiorari2 seeking to reverse and set aside the complainant.
Resolutions dated December 13, 20133 and February 17, 20154 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 132787. The CA 3. That the respondents hereby agree that all fees and expenses
dismissed the Petition for Certiorari filed by Lilah Gail Corpuz Alfiler incidental to the transfer of ownership of the aforementioned
(petitioner) for being the wrong mode of appeal in assailing the property including but not limited to registration fees, revenues
January 9, 2013 Decision5 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon stamps, transfer tax, and assurance fee, shall be for the account of
City, Branch 97 (RTC), which, in turn, affirmed the January 3, 2011 the respondents, and that the capital [gains] tax shall be shouldered
Decision6 of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 43 by the complainant.
(MeTC), in an ejectment case filed against petitioner.
Antecedents 4. That the respondents shall put-up monthly deposit to a bank of
The present controversy involves a parcel of land located at 186 their own choice representing one fourth (1/4) of the total amount
Pajo Street, Barangay Quirino 2-C, Quezon City, with an area of or about P36,500.00, wherein which a xerox [copy] of their bank
266.9 square meters (subject property). The subject property is book shall be shown to the Barangay Captain.
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-115646 (324155) and
registered with the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City in the name of 5. That the respondents shall purchase the said lot starting May up
Quintin Santiago, Jr. (Quintin), married to Violeta E. Santiago.7 to August 23, 1985.9

Sometime in March 1985, Quintin lodged before the Lupon

Tagapamayapa of Barangay Quirino 2-C, Quezon City, a complaint
Pursuant to their agreement, Linglingay, et al. allegedly made five Norman to sell the subject property to respondents. Second, the
partial payments to Quintin, which only amounted to a total of DOAS is null and void because assuming that there indeed was an
P72,425.00; the last payment of which was in June 1986.10 SPA between Norman and Quintin, such contract of agency was
extinguished by the latter's death on March 12, 1997, or five
On March 12, 1997, Quintin died.11 months prior to the execution of the DOAS.20 Third, Garduce, et al.
have a better right to possess the subject property by virtue of the
On March 18, 2010, spouses John and Geraldine Cayabyab amicable settlement entered into between their predecessors-in-
(respondents), represented by their attorney-in-fact, Jose Vasallo, interest, Linglingay, et al., and Quintin which embodied a contract
filed before the MeTC a Complaint for Ejectment12 against of sale. Fourth, the contract of sale was already consummated after
petitioner, her sister, Meda Delza Armamento13 (Meda), Spouses their predecessors-in-interest made payments to Quintin in the
Alfredo and Lolita Garduce, Romeo Magdaluyo, Gina Villanueva, amount of P72,425.00.21 Fifth, the MeTC has no jurisdiction over
A.B. Morato,14 and all persons claiming rights under them the case as the complaint was filed only on March 18, 2010, which is
(collectively, Garduce, et al.). more than one year from the time respondents were dispossessed
of the subject property in 1997. Thus, respondents' cause of action
In their Complaint, respondents alleged that they are the owners of should be one for accion publiciana, which is within the jurisdiction
the subject property, having acquired the same under a Deed of of the RTC.22
Absolute Sale15 (DOAS) dated August 20, 1997, which was
purportedly executed by Quintin through his attorney-in-fact, The MeTC Ruling
Norman Santiago (Norman). Respondents further alleged that
Garduce et al. have been in possession of the subject property, On January 3, 2011, the MeTC rendered a Decision in favor of
illegally building their houses without paying rent since 1997.16 respondents. The dispositive portion of which, reads:
Respondents issued a final demand letter dated May 8, 2009 to
Garduce, et al. to vacate the premises, but, despite such demand, WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in
Garduce, et al. continued to refuse to vacate the property.17 favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants x x x and LILIA
GAIL C. ALFILER, ordering the latter and all persons claiming rights
In their Answer18 and Position Paper,19 petitioner and Meda raised under them to immediately vacate the subject premises located at
the same principal defenses and arguments. Firstly, they denied No. 186 Pajo St., Barangay Quirino, 2-C, Project 2, Quezon City
respondents' claim of ownership and possession over the subject covered by TCT No. RT-115646 (324155) and to peacefully surrender
property and argued that the DOAS is null and void as Quintin did the same to the plaintiffs.
not truly execute a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) authorizing
Defendants are likewise ordered jointly and severally pay plaintiffs WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision dated January 3, 2011 of the
the following: Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 43, entitled Sps.
Cayabyab vs. Armamento, et al., is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
(1) The amount of Php1,000.00 per month for every defendant from
May 8, 2009, (date of the demand) and every month thereafter until The assailed Decision having been affirmed, let the corresponding
the subject premises is vacated; writ of execution be issued pursuant to Section 21, Rule 70 of the
Rules of Court.
(2) The amount of Php20,000.00 as and by way of attorney's fees;
No costs.
(3) The cost of suit.
SO ORDERED.25
SO ORDERED.23
The RTC ruled that petitioner and Meda must anchor the legality of
The MeTC ruled that Garduce, et. al. were not able to prove their their material possession of the property on a claim of title in order
right over the subject property, and thus, did not acquire a better for the court to determine who has the better right of possession.
right than that of respondents. Further, Garduce, et. al. were not However, petitioner and Meda were only able to prove the
able to prove their claim that the DOAS executed by Quintin and occupation of the subject property as a consequence of the
respondents was void, while respondents were able to prove their amicable settlement's compromise instead of on a claim of
ownership of the subject property by preponderance of evidence.24 ownership. The RTC also agreed with the MeTC's findings that
respondents were able to establish their case by a preponderance
Aggrieved, petitioner and Meda appealed the MeTC judgment of evidence, and thus, saw no reason to disturb the conclusions
before the RTC under Rule 40 of the Rules of Court. reached by the MeTC.26

The RTC Ruling Petitioner and Meda filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the
same was denied by the RTC in its Order27 dated October 17, 2013.
On January 9, 2013, the RTC rendered a Decision affirming in toto
the MeTC Decision. The dispositive portion of which, reads: On November 22, 2013, only petitioner filed, before the CA, a
Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, assailing
the Decision and Order of the RTC.
The CA Ruling and compelling reasons to apply the liberal construction of the rules
in the interest of substantial justice; and
On December 13, 2013, the CA issued a Resolution dismissing the
Petition for Certiorari on the ground that petitioner adopted the (2) Whether the CA deviated from the settled jurisprudence in not
wrong mode of judicial review over the Decision of the RTC. giving due course to the petition for certiorari notwithstanding the
presence of matters that require resolution on the merits of the
The CA held that the proper course of action for petitioner was to case to effect substantial justice.30
assail the judgment of the RTC by appeal via a Petition for Review
under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court. Since the remedy of appeal was Petitioner argues that the DOAS dated August 20, 1997, upon which
available to petitioner, the special civil action for certiorari could not respondents base their right over the subject property, is null and
be entertained – the aforesaid remedies being mutually exclusive, void and could not confer any right or title in their favor as it was
and not alternative or successive.28 executed after the death of Quintin.31 Further, petitioner points
out that no SPA was presented in favor of Norman, even when such
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution of SPA was claimed to have been attached to the DOAS. Even
the CA. However, such motion was denied by the CA in its assuming arguendo that there existed an SPA, the death of Quintin
Resolution dated February 17, 2015. The CA rejected petitioner's which occurred prior to the execution of the DOAS, extinguished the
invocation of substantial justice to exempt herself from the rigid SPA to Norman.32 Finally, petitioner argues that the MeTC does not
application of technical rules on giving due course to her petition for have jurisdiction over the subject ejectment suit as it was filed after
certiorari. The CA also remarked that petitioner posited errors of more than a year from the dispossession of the realty.33
judgment, which were the proper subjects of an appeal, and not
errors in jurisdiction, which are the office of a petition for In their Comment,34 respondents state that there was nothing to
certiorari.29 add or detract from anything that was decided by the CA, further
reminding that the MeTC and RTC found no merit in petitioner's
Hence, petitioner filed the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari cause. Respondents also argue that petitioner's continued
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, raising the following issues: occupation of the subject property without paying rent is enough
ground to end their possession.35
(1) Whether the CA deviated from the settled jurisprudence when it
dismissed her petition for certiorari on the ground of being the In her Reply,36 petitioner stresses the need to set aside
wrong mode of appeal, notwithstanding the presence of persuasive technicalities to ensure resolution on the merits of the case.37 She
reiterates the arguments in her petition as reasons to warrant a
review of the findings of the lower courts which she alleges to be sought to be reviewed or of the denial of petitioner's motion for
based on speculation and misapprehension of facts that are new trial or reconsideration filed in due time after judgment. x x x.
glaringly erroneous as to constitute abuse of discretion.38
Additionally, petitioner states that the lower courts erred in not However, instead of resorting to a petition for review under Rule
considering Article 131739 and 187440 of the New Civil Code in 42, which should have been filed within 15 days from petitioner's
resolving the matters of the case.41 receipt of the order denying her motion reconsideration, petitioner
filed a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
The Court's Ruling Court with the CA. Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari on
November 22, 2013,43 or 31 days from the notice of the order
The petition has merit. denying her motion for reconsideration. Consequently, the period
to file an appeal had already lapsed due to her negligence.
Procedural Matters
A petition for certiorari is a remedy focused on resolving the issue of
Evidently, petitioner availed of the wrong remedy before the CA by whether a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-
filing a special civil action for certiorari under Sec. 1, Rule 6542 of judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or
the Rules of Court against the judgment of the RTC. When the RTC with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
issued its January 9, 2013 Decision and denied petitioner's Motion jurisdiction.44 It is only available when the following essential
for Reconsideration in its October 17, 2013 Order, it did so in the requisites concur: (a) the petition must be directed against a
exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. In this case, the remedy of tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi--judicial
appeal under Sec. 1, Rule 42 was available to petitioner. Thus, the functions; (b) the tribunal, board, or officer must have acted
proper remedy would have been to file a petition for review from without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
the RTC to the CA under Sec. 1, Rule 42 of the Rules of Court, which amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (c) there is no
states: appeal, nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law.45 On the last requisite, it is clear that a petition for
Section 1. How appeal taken; time for filing. — A party desiring to certiorari cannot be made a substitute for an appeal when the latter
appeal from a decision of the Regional Trial Court rendered in the remedy is available but was lost through fault or negligence.46 The
exercise of its appellate jurisdiction may file a verified petition for Court has consistently emphasized that a special civil action for
review with the Court of Appeals, x x x. The petition shall be filed certiorari and an appeal are "mutually exclusive, not alternative or
and served within fifteen (15) days from notice of the decision successive."47
Further, a petition for certiorari has an entirely different purpose possession de jure. It does not even matter if a party's title to the
than that of a regular appeal. While the latter is concerned with the property is questionable. In an unlawful detainer case, the only
correctness of the judgment of the lower courts on the merits, the issue for resolution is physical or material possession of the
former's primary concern is resolving whether the courts, in the property involved, independent of any claim of ownership by any of
exercise of its judgment, acted whimsically, capriciously, or even the parties. Where the issue of ownership is raised by any of the
arbitrarily.48 The proper remedy to obtain a reversal of judgment parties, the courts may pass upon the same in order to determine
on the merits, final order, or resolution is an appeal. This holds true who has the right to possess the property. However, the
even when the error attributed to the court rendering the judgment adjudication is merely provisional and would not bar or prejudice an
is its lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, or the exercise of action between the same parties involving title to the property.51
power in excess thereof, or grave abuse of discretion in the findings
of fact or of law set out in the decision, order, or resolution.49 Accordingly, when an ejectment case is filed, the trial court must
determine whether plaintiff has the better right of possession de
Nevertheless, jurisprudence has laid down exceptions to the strict facto over the disputed property. Further, if any of the parties raises
application of the rules. The Court allows the filing of a petition for the issue of ownership, the trial court should have provisional
certiorari under Rule 65 even if appeal is an available remedy (a) determination on such issue, only for the purpose of resolving the
when public welfare and the advancement of public policy dictate; issue of de facto possession.
(b) when the broader interests of justice so requires; (c) when the
writs issued are null and void; or (d) when the questioned order In this case, the MeTC did not discuss said matters required in an
amounts to an oppressive exercise of judicial authority.50 ejectment case. The January 3, 2011 Decision merely stated the
following:
This Court finds that petitioner's case falls under the second and
fourth exceptions as patent errors on the assailed Decisions and x x x Plaintiff[s], through their Attorney-in-fact, claims to be the
Resolutions are extant. owner of subject lot by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale executed
by Quintin Santiago, Jr., through the latter's Attorney-in-fact
Ejectment cases — forcible entry and unlawful detainer — are Norman Santiago and inked in plaintiff's favor. The answering
summary proceedings designed to provide expeditious means to defendants, on the other hand, assert ownership of the same land
protect actual possession or the right to possession of the property in question on the strength of the Amicable Settlement entered
involved. The sole question that the courts resolve in ejectment between the [defendants'] predecessors-in--interest and the
proceedings is: who is entitled to the physical possession of the registered owner Quintin Santiago, Jr. on April 14, 1985 and claimed
property, that is, to the possession de facto and not to the that the amount of P72,425.00 was already paid in consideration of
the subject property as evidenced by copy of receipts. Defendants It can be gleaned from the decision that the supporting facts,
merely [rely] on such matter, however, said fact has not been discussion on probative value of the evidence, and the legal basis of
established. By virtue of the deed of absolute sale, the plaintiffs the MeTC's conclusions above are clearly absent. The MeTC merely
[demanded] the defendants and all persons claiming rights under stated that respondents were able to prove ownership, and hence,
them to vacate the property and to deliver the same to the they are entitled to the possession of the subject property, without
plaintiffs; however defendants failed and refused to vacate the substantially discussing the rationale behind it. A discussion on the
subject premises despite demands. Under the circumstances, validity of the DOAS is particularly important, even provisionally,
defendants whose right over the property has not been shown did given that respondents anchored their assertion of ownership and
not acquire a better right than that of the plaintiffs. [Defendants'] possession upon the same. In fact, such issue was particularly
claim that the plaintiffs' allegation of ownership over the subject identified during the preliminary conference and mentioned by the
property is bereft of merit and the Deed of Absolute Sale executed trial court in its decision, viz.:
by the previous owner is void has not been proven.
On preliminary conference, the parties failed to stipulate on any
The Court finds that the [plaintiffs were] able to prove [their] factual matter. The issues to be resolved by the Court as defined
ownership of the subject premises by preponderance of evidence it and delimited during the preliminary conference are as follows:
being the owners thereof. As the lawful owners, plaintiffs are
entitled to the use and possession of the properties and have the xxxx
right of action against a holder and possessor in order to recover
the same (Art. 428 of the New Civil Code). 3. Whether or not the Deed of Absolute Sale attached to the
complaint is valid;
Basic is the rule that one who alleges a fact has the burden of proof.
The Court finds that defendants failed to present convincing proof xxxx
showing their lawful possession by ownership of the [property].
Neither was it substantiated that the plaintiff did not present any 6. Whether [or] not the alleged Attorney-in-Fact in the Deed of
documentary evidence to support how it was able to secure the Absolute Sale has authority to sell the parcel of land.53 (Emphases
Deed of Absolute [Sale]. Allegations must be proven by sufficient supplied)
evidence – mere allegation is not evidence.52 (Emphasis in the
original; citations omitted) However, such issues, which would have established the basis of
respondents' de facto right of possession, were not discussed by the
MeTC.
 Additionally, the lower courts' decisions are infirm for being in
Worse, on appeal with the RTC, the issues raised by the parties contravention to the constitutional mandate of the courts in
remained unsettled. In its January 9, 2013 Decision, the RTC merely rendering a decision, to wit:
enumerated the evidence submitted by the parties and thereafter,
concurred with the findings of the MeTC, summarily concluding that Article VIII, Section 14. No decision shall be rendered by any court
respondents had established their case by preponderance of without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the
evidence. The RTC also made a rudimentary discussion on the law on which it is based.
nature of an action for forcible entry and unlawful detainer but
failed to apply and discuss how it was applied to the present case. No petition for review or motion for reconsideration of a decision of
Verily, there was no discussion at all on the legality of the DOAS and the court shall be refused due course or denied without stating the
the SPA, even provisionally, which were so clearly brought forth by legal basis therefor.60
defendants in their Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim and
Position Paper.54 In conclusion, the RTC summarized its decision by As stressed in San Jose v. NLRC,61 this Court has previously held
stating that defendants failed to establish the legality of their that judges and arbiters should draw up their decisions and
material possession of the subject property by not complying with resolutions with due care and make certain that they truly and
the terms and conditions of the amicable settlement; hence, accurately reflect their conclusions and their final dispositions.62
respondents had a better right thereto.55 Accordingly, this Court will not hesitate to strike down decisions
rendered not hewing to this Constitutional directive63 when it is
In Yao v. Court of Appeals,56 the Court emphasized that the parties clearly shown that they were arrived at arbitrarily or in disregard of
to a litigation should be informed of how it was decided, with an the evidence on record or when there is showing of fraud or error of
explanation of the factual and legal reasons that led to the law.64 Thus, this Court cannot agree with the CA on the outright
conclusions of the court.57 This is a requirement of due process and dismissal of the petition for certiorari. To do so would, in effect,
fair play.58 A decision that does not clearly and distinctly state the sanction the otherwise defective decisions of the MeTC and the
facts and the law on which it is based leaves the parties in the dark RTC.
as to how it was reached and is especially prejudicial to the losing
party, who is unable to pinpoint the possible errors of the court for The foregoing considered, this Court rules that the ends of justice
review by a higher tribunal.59 would be better served if substantial issues are squarely addressed,
especially since petitioner stands to lose a family home.65 The
broader interests of substantial justice, as well as the circumstances
of the case, clearly show a justification for the relaxation of the rule
on technical procedures. If a strict adherence to the application of In Sarmienta v. Manalite Homeowners Association, Inc.,67 the Court
the rules would result in a grave miscarriage of justice, this Court explained the two causes of action under Sec. I, Rule 70 of the
will not hesitate to relax the same in favor of substantial justice, Rules, to wit:
which is after all the avowed purpose of all law and
jurisprudence.66 Accordingly, even though petitioner filed the There are two entirely distinct and different causes of action under
wrong remedy before the CA, such procedural error may be set the aforequoted rule, to wit: (1) a case for forcible entry, which is an
aside in the interest of substantial justice. action to recover possession of a property from the defendant
whose occupation thereof is illegal from the beginning as he
Ejectment suits; cause of action; burden of proof acquired possession by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or
stealth; and (2) a case for unlawful detainer, which is an action for
In ejectment cases, the complaint must allege such statement of recovery of possession from the defendant whose possession of the
facts in order to bring the party clearly within the class of cases property was inceptively lawful by virtue of a contract (express or
under Sec. 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. Sec. 1 provides: implied) with the plaintiff, but became illegal when he continued his
possession despite the termination of his right thereunder.
Section 1. Who may inst flute proceedings, and when. — Subject to
the provisions of the next succeeding section, a person deprived of In forcible entry, the plaintiff must allege in the complaint, and
the possession of any land or building by force, intimidation, threat, prove, that he was in prior physical possession of the property in
strategy, or stealth, or a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person dispute until he was deprived thereof by the defendant by any of
against whom the possession of any land or building is unlawfully the means provided in Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules either by
withheld after the expiration or termination of the right to hold force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth. In unlawful detainer,
possession, by virtue of any contract, express or implied, or the there must be an allegation in the complaint of how the possession
legal representatives or assigns of any such lessor, vendor, vendee, of defendant started or continued, that is, by virtue of lease or any
or other person, may, at any time within one (1) year after such contract, and that defendant holds possession of the land or
unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession, bring an action in building "after the expiration or termination of the right to hold
the proper Municipal Trial Court against the person or persons possession by virtue of any contract, express or implied."68
unlawfully withholding or depriving of possession, or any person or
persons claiming under them, for the restitution of such possession, It must be emphasized that unlawful detainer and forcible entry
together with damages and costs. suits, under Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, are designed to provide
expeditious means to restore physical possession of a piece of land
or building to one who has been illegally or forcibly deprived
thereof, without prejudice to the settlement of the parties' sought to be recovered. Unless established, the defendant will
opposing claims of juridical possession in appropriate proceedings. prevail. Plaintiffs in ejectment must show their right to possession
Unlawful detainer and forcibly entry suits are intended to avoid at the time the suit was instituted. Ejectment can be maintained
disruption of public order by those who would take the law in their only by one having a present exclusive right to possession.73
hands supposedly to enforce their claimed right of possession. The
issue in both cases is pure physical or de facto possession, and In this case, it was respondents who filed a complaint for unlawful
pronouncements made on questions of ownership are provisional in detainer before the MeTC. Accordingly, they have the burden to
nature. Thus, the provisional determination of ownership in the establish that they have a right of possession, even merely de facto,
ejectment case cannot be clothed with finality.69 over the subject property.

Nevertheless, in ejectment cases, it is the plaintiff who has the Here, respondents anchor their claim of de facto right of possession
burden of proof to establish by preponderance of evidence that he over the subject property based on their alleged right of ownership
or she is entitled to the de facto possession. Actori incumbit onus – by virtue of the DOAS. As stated earlier, where the issue of
probandi. This is a well-known postulate echoed by Sec. 1 of Rule ownership is raised by any of the parties, the courts may pass upon
131 of the Rules of Court. In civil cases, the plaintiff, who is the the same in order to determine who has the right to possess the
party asse1ting the affirmative of an issue, has the burden of proof property. Said adjudication is merely provisional and would not bar
to establish by preponderance of evidence his or her allegations. He or prejudice an action between the same parties involving title to
or she has the burden of presenting evidence required to obtain a the property.74
favorable judgment, and he or she, having the burden of proof, will
be defeated if no evidence were given on either side.70 However, it is notoriously apparent that there are severe legal
infirmities that plague such claim. A cursory reading of the DOAS
In C & S Fishfarm Corporation v. Court of Appeals,71 this Court shows that it was executed on August 20, 1997 by respondents and
stressed that the plaintiff in an ejectment suit has the burden of Quintin, through an SPA with his attorney-in-fact, Norman.75
showing that the defendants entered the subject property by force, Glaringly, Quintin already died on March 12, 1997,76 or five months
intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, or that it is the landlord, prior to the execution of the DOAS. It is settled that that the death
vendor, vendee or other person whose possession of the property of a person terminates contractual capacity.77 Thus, Quintin does
had been unlawfully withheld by the defendants.72 not have any legal personality to transfer any property rights after
his death.1âшphi1
Since ejectment is a possessory action, the plaintiff must show a
right of possession that is present or immediate in the property
In Arakor Construction and Development Corporation v. Sta.
Maria,78 the Court declared that "[i]f any one party to a supposed From these provisions, it is clear that under Article 1878, a special
contract was already dead at the time of its execution, such power of attorney is necessary for an agent to enter into any
contract is undoubtedly simulated and false, and, therefore, null contract for the sale of real property. Not only that, Art. 1874
and void by reason of its having been made after the death of the explicitly states that such authority for the sale of land through an
party who appears as one of the contracting parties therein." agent, should be in writing, otherwise the sale shall be void. In
Dizon v. Court of Appeals,82 the Court held:
In addition, Norman's authority to sell the subject property of
Quintin stems from an alleged SPA that was never submitted in When the sale of a piece of land or any interest thereon is through
evidence. Basic are the following Civil Code provisions: an agent, the authority of the latter shall be in writing; otherwise,
the sale shall be void. Thus the authority of an agent to execute a
Article 1874. When a sale of a piece of land or any interest therein is contract for the sale of real estate must be conferred in writing and
through an agent, the authority of the latter shall be in writing; must give him specific authority, either to conduct the general
otherwise, the sale shall be void.79 business of the principal or to execute a binding contract containing
terms and conditions which are in the contract he did execute. A
Article 1878. Special powers of attorney are necessary in the special power of attorney is necessary to enter into any contract by
following cases: which the ownership of an immovable is transmitted or acquired
either gratuitously or for a valuable consideration. The express
xxxx mandate required by law to enable an appointee of an agency
(couched) in general terms to sell must be one that expressly
(5)To enter into any contract by which the ownership of an mentions a sale or that includes a sale as a necessary ingredient of
immovable is transmitted or acquired either gratuitously or for a the act mentioned. For the principal to confer the right upon an
valuable consideration[.]80 agent to sell real estate, a power of attorney must so express the
powers of the agent in clear and unmistakable language. When
Article 1919. Agency is extinguished: there is any reasonable doubt that the language so used conveys
such power, no such construction shall be given the document.83
xxxx
Verily, not only was the seller, Quintin, already deceased at the time
(3) By the death, civil interdiction, insanity or insolvency of the of the sale on August 20, 1997, respondents also could not produce
principal or of the agent[.]81 the mandatory requirement of a written SPA that would have
authorized Norman to sell the land of Quintin. These are significant landlord, vendor, vendee, or other person against whom the
defects in the sale that renders the claim of ownership, including de possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after the
facto possession, of respondents highly doubtful.£A⩊phi£ expiration or termination of his right to hold possession, by virtue of
a contract, express or implied.92 In other words, the plaintiff should
Respondents are then mistaken in their belief that the DOAS would have a right of possession over the property.
confer to them any right whatsoever to the subject property.
Settled is the rule that an agency is extinguished by the death of the Not having acquired any right over the property in question, no
principal.84 It is by reason of the very nature of the relationship right of respondents' could have been violated. Thus, respondents'
between a principal and an agent that any act of an agent after the evidence failed to prove their cause of action alleged in their
death of his principal is void ab initio, except as explicitly provided pleadings. Due to the insufficiency of factual or legal basis to grant
for in the New Civil Code: (1) Art. 193085 when the agency is the complaint and the failure to establish their burden of proof,
coupled with an interest, and (2) Art. 193186 when the agent respondents' complaint should be dismissed.
performed an act for the principal without knowledge of the
principal's death and the third person who contracted with him As respondents failed to establish their burden of proof by
acted in good faith.87 Neither of which are alleged or applicable in preponderance of evidence regarding their de facto right of
this case. Additionally, it is not enough that the existence of an SPA possession over the subject property, it is no longer necessary to
be merely referred to in a deed of sale. It must be offered in discuss the evidence presented by petitioner, who is currently
evidence. If no evidence is offered, it only gives rise to the residing over the subject property.
presumption that no such written authority exists.88
It must be reiterated that in giving recognition to ejectment suits,
Thus, absent a written SPA and for want of authority, as the seller the purpose of the law is to protect the person who in fact has
was already deceased at the time of sale,89 the DOAS is void ab actual possession, and in case of a controverted proprietary right,
initio.90 Respondents do not have any interest, rights, or claim over the law requires the parties to preserve the status quo until one or
the subject property. Accordingly, they have not established their the other sees fit to invoke the decision of a court of competent
de facto right of possession because there is no right of ownership jurisdiction upon the question of ownership.93 It is obviously only
to speak of, even in the provisional sense. just that the person who first acquired possession should remain in
possession pending this decision. To permit the contrary would be
The cause of action for an action for unlawful detainer is the act or highly dangerous to individual security and disturbing to social
omission by which a party violates the legal right of the other.91 order.94
Meanwhile, the real party in interest as a complainant thereto is the
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions dated
December 13, 2013 and February 17, 2015 of the Court of Appeals
in CA--G.R. SP No. 132787 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
complaint filed before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 43, in Civil Case No. 40058 is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED."
SPOUSES MARIANO CORDERO AND RAQUEL CORDERO, On December 19, 2017, the CA dismissed Spouses Cordero's
PETITIONERS, V. LEONILA M. OCTAVIANO, RESPONDENT. petition because of the following defects, to wit:
A cursory reading of the petition reveals the following infirmities:
DECISION (i) Petitioners failed to state the material date showing when the 7
December 2016 Decision was received, in violation of Section 2 (b).
LOPEZ, J.: Rule 42 of the Rules of Court;

There are times when strict adherence to the rules of procedure (ii) Petitioners failed to append to the petition clearly legible
must yield to the search for truth and the demands of substantial duplicate original or true copy of the assailed 7 December 2016
justice. One such instance is present in this Petition for Review on Decision, as well as other pertinent portions of the records necessary
Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Court of for a thorough evaluation of the case by this Court, in violation of
Appeals' (CA) Resolution1 dated December 19, 2017 in CA-G.R. SP Section 2 (d). Rule 42 of the Rules of Court.
No. 11086.
WHEREFORE. in view of the foregoing and pursuant to Section 3,
Rule 42 of the Rules of Court, the petition is DISMISSED.
ANTECEDENTS
SO ORDERED.10 (Emphasis in the original.)
In 2011, Leonila Octaviano, the registered owner of a land Spouses Cordero sought reconsideration invoking substantial
registered under Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-184403,2 filed a compliance with rules requiring statement of material dates. They
complaint3 for ejectment against Spouses Mariano and Raquel claimed that the failure to state the date of receipt of the RTC
Cordero before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) docketed as Decision dated December 7, 2016 is inadvertent and does not
Civil Case No. C-538. On May 22, 2013, the MCTC ruled in favor of warrant the outright dismissal of their petition for review.
Leonila and ordered Spouses Cordero to vacate the premises.4 The Nevertheless, the petition indicated the date of receipt of the RTC
Spouses Cordero appealed to the Regional Trial Court (RTC).5 On Order dated June 22, 2017 denying their motion for
December 7, 2016, the RTC affirmed the MCTC's findings.6 The reconsideration. This is sufficient to determine the timeliness of the
Spouses Cordero moved for a reconsideration.7 On June 22, 2017, petition.11 As to the material records of the ease, Spouses Cordero
the RTC denied the motion for lack of merit.8 Aggrieved, the alleged that the CA overlooked the copy of the RTC Decision dated
Spouses Cordero elevated the case to the CA through a petition for December 7, 2016 which was attached as Annex "C" in the petition
review docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 11086.9 for review. Also appended in the petition are the RTC Order dated
June 22, 2017 and the MCTC Decision dated May 22, 2013 which
will enable the CA to evaluate the merits of the case. Furthermore, Decision dated December 7, 2016 is not fatal. Also, material records
Spouses Cordero subsequently submitted additional records such as of the case were attached in the petition for review and additional
the complaint, answer, memoranda and motion for documents were submitted together with their motion for
reconsideration.12 reconsideration. Lastly, the Spouses Cordero maintain that a rigid
application of technicalities cannot prevail at the expense of a just
On June 29, 2018, the CA denied Spouses Cordero's motion for resolution of the case.17cralawred
reconsideration on the ground that it was filed one clay late, thus:
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary RULING
On 19 December 2017. We rendered a Decision dismissing
petitioners' appeal and affirming the Decision rendered by the We cannot overemphasize that courts have always tried to maintain
Regional Trial Court x x x in Civil Case C-538. A copy thereof was a healthy balance between the strict enforcement of procedural
received by petitioners' counsel on 17 January 2018, x x x. Under laws and the guarantee that every litigant be given the full
the circumstances, petitioner|s| had until 1 February 2018, to file a opportunity for the just disposition of his cause.18 Indeed, the
motion for reconsideration. Court has allowed several cases to proceed in the broader interest
of justice despite procedural defects and lapses.19 This is in keeping
Petitioner[s], however, did not file such Motion within the period with the principle that rules of procedure are mere tools designed
prescribed. Instead, the petitioners filed their Motion for to facilitate the attainment of justice.20 Here, there exists a clear
Reconsideration on 2 February 2018. need to prevent the commission of a grave injustice to Spouses
Cordero which is not commensurate with their failure to comply
XXXX with the prescribed procedure. The circumstances obtaining in this
case merit the liberal application of the rule in the interest of fair
ACCORDINGLY, petitioners' motion for reconsideration is hereby play.
DENIED.
The rationale for requiring a complete statement of material dates
SO ORDERED.13cralawlawlibrary is to determine whether the petition is timely filed.21 Accordingly,
Hence, this recourse. The Spouses Cordero argued that their motion the petition must show when notice of the assailed judgment or
for reconsideration was timely filed on February 1, 2018 as order or resolution was received; when the motion for
evidenced by the affidavit of the clerk who caused the mailing,14 reconsideration was filed; and, when notice of its denial was
the registry receipt15 and the postmaster's certification.16 They received. However, this Court may relax strict observance of the
reiterate that the failure to state the date of receipt of the RTC rules to advance substantial justice. In Security Bank Corporation v.
Aerospace University,22 the CA denied due course to the petition Trial Court, the requisite number of plain copies thereof and of the
for failure to state the dates when the assailed order was received pleadings and other material portions of the record as would
and the motion for reconsideration was filed. Yet, we held that support the allegations of the petition.''
"[t]he more material date for purposes of appeal to the Court of
Appeals is the date of receipt of the trial court's order denying the A perusal of the petition for review, however, reveals that copies of
motion for reconsideration" The case was remanded to the CA for the RTC Order dated June 22, 2017, the MCTC Decision dated May
resolution on the merits. 22, 2013, and the RTC Decision dated December 7, 2016 were in
fact attached as Annexes "A," "B," and "C,'"1 respectively. Hence,
The doctrine was reiterated in Acaylar, Jr. v. Harayo23Barroga v. Spouses Cordero complied with the requirement of attaching copies
Data Center College of the Philippines,24Barra v. Civil Service of the judgments and orders of the trial courts. Moreover, these
Commission,25Sara Lee Philippines, Inc. v. Macatlang26Capin-Cadiz attachments are already sufficient to enable the CA to pass upon
v. Brent Hospital and Colleges, Inc;27 and Victoriano v. the assigned errors and to resolve the appeal even without the
Dominguez,28 In this case, the Spouses Cordero clearly stated in the pleadings and other portions of the records. To be sure, the assailed
petition for review before the CA the date they received the RTC decisions of the trial courts substantially summarized the contents
Order dated June 22, 2017 denying their motion for of the omitted records.31 Likewise, the CA can resolve the issues by
reconsideration. Specifically, the Spouses Cordero received the relying on the principle that the factual findings of the lower courts
Order on July 11, 2017 and timely filed the petition for review to the are entitled to great weight. It can also direct Spouses Cordero to
CA on July 26, 2017 or within 15-day reglementary period.29 As submit additional documents or the clerk of court of the RTC and
such, the Spouses MCTC to elevate the original records of the case. Notably, the
Spouses Cordero appended the pertinent pleadings and documents
Cordero are deemed to have substantially complied with the rules. in their motion for reconsideration before the CA. On this point, we
The failure to indicate the date when they received the other orders reiterate that there is ample jurisprudence32 holding that the
and resolutions may be dispensed with in the interest of justice.30 subsequent and substantial compliance of a party may call for the
relaxation of the rules of procedure.33 Yet, the CA failed to do so
Similarly, the CA found that Spouses Cordero violated Section 2(d) and insisted on the outright dismissal of the petition.
Rule 42 of the Rules of Court because they did not submit material
records of the case. The rule requires that the petition for review Lastly, it is undisputed that Spouses Cordero received on January
before the CA shall "be accompanied by dearly legible duplicate 17, 2018, a copy of the CA Resolution dated December 19, 2017 and
originals or true copies of the judgments or final orders of both they had 15 days from notice or until February 1, 2018 to file a
lower courts, certified correct by the clerk of court of the Regional motion for reconsideration. Corollarily, Spouses Cordero moved for
a reconsideration. However, the CA denied the motion because it
was filed on February 2, 2018 or one day late. Quite the contrary,
we find that the motion was filed within the prescribed period. The
affidavit of the clerk who caused the mailing, the registry receipt
and the postmaster's certification all established that Spouses
Cordero filed the motion through registered mail on February 1,
2018 and not on February 2, 2018. Applying Section 3, Rule 1334 of
the Rules of Court, the date of mailing shall be considered as the
date of filing when a pleading is filed by registered mail. It does not
matter when the court actually receives the mailed pleading.35

In all, the CA's outright dismissal of the petition for review

constitutes a gross error and contravenes Spouses Cordero's right to
be heard on appeal. The ends of justice will be better served if the
case is determined on the merits, after full opportunity is given to
ail parties for ventilation of their causes and defenses, rather than
on some procedural imperfections. It is far better to dispose of the
case on the merits, which is a primordial end, rather than on a
technicality that may result in injustice.36

FOR THESE REASONS, the petition is GRANTED. The case is

REMANDED to the Court of Appeals which is DIRECTED to reinstate
and give due course to the petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 11086 for a
proper resolution on the merits with dispatch.

SO ORDERED.
BOARDWALK BUSINESS VENTURES v. ELVIRA A. VILLAREAL the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila and was assigned to
SUBSTITUTED BY REYNALDO P. VILLAREAL + Branch 27 thereof.
DECISION
G.R. No. 181182 Ruling of the Metropolitan Trial Court

DEL CASTILLO, J.: On May 30, 2005, the MeTC rendered its Decision[6] favoring
Boardwalk, as follows:
"[T]he right to appeal is neither a natural right nor [is it a
component] of due process[. I]t is a mere statutory privilege, and WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in
may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant adjudging that the
provisions of law."[1] former has the right to the possession of the subject motor vehicle
and for the latter to pay the costs of the suit.
This Petition for Review on Certiorari[2] seeks a review of the Court
of Appeals' (CA) April 25, 2007 Resolution[3] in CA-G.R. SP No. UDK SO ORDERED.[7]
5711 which dismissed outright petitioner's Petition. Also assailed is
the December 21, 2007 Resolution[4] which denied the Motion for Villareal moved for reconsideration,[8] but failed.[9]
Reconsideration.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
Factual Antecedents
She thus appealed[10] to the Manila RTC, which court[11] issued a
Petitioner Boardwalk Business Ventures, Inc. (Boardwalk) is a duly Decision[12] reversing the MeTC Decision, thus:
organized and existing domestic corporation engaged in the selling
of ready-to-wear (RTW) merchandise. Respondent Elvira A. Villareal WHEREFORE, the appeal is granted. The assailed judgment of the
(Villareal), on the other hand, is one of Boardwalk's distributors of lower court is reversed and set aside. Defendant Villareal has the
RTW merchandise. right of possession to and the value of subject vehicle described in
the complaint. Hence, plaintiff is directed to deliver the subject
On October 20, 2005, Boardwalk filed an Amended Complaint[5] for vehicle to defendant or its value in case delivery cannot be made.
replevin against Villareal covering a 1995 Toyota Tamaraw FX, for The complaint and counterclaim are both dismissed.
the latter's alleged failure to pay a car loan obtained from the
former. The case, docketed as Civil Case No. 160116, was filed with SO ORDERED.[13]
 docket fees, it was as if no Motion for Extension was filed, and the
Boardwalk filed a Motion for Reconsideration,[14] but the same was subsequent March 7, 2007 filing of its Petition with the appellate
denied by the RTC in a December 14, 2006 Order,[15] which court was thus late and beyond the reglementary 15-day period
Boardwalk received on January 19, 2007.[16] On February 5, provided for under Rule 42.
2007,[17] Boardwalk through counsel filed with the Manila RTC a
Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition for Review,[18] praying The CA added that Boardwalk's prayer for a 30-day extension in its
that it be granted 30 days, or until March 7, 2007, to file its Petition Motion for Extension was irregular, because the maximum period
for Review. It paid the docket and other legal fees therefor at the that may be granted is only 15 days pursuant to Section 1 of Rule
Office of the Clerk of Court of the Manila RTC.[19] On even date, 42. A further extension of 15 days should only be granted for the
Boardwalk also filed a Notice of Appeal[20] with the RTC which the most compelling reason which is not obtaining in the present case.
said court denied for being a wrong mode of appeal.[21] Moreover, it held that Boardwalk's Petition for Review failed to
include a board resolution or secretary's certificate showing that its
On March 7, 2007, Boardwalk filed through mail[22] its Petition for claimed representative, Ma. Victoria M. Lo (Lo), was authorized to
Review[23] with the CA. sign the Petition or represent Boardwalk in the proceedings, which
thus rendered defective the Verification and Certification against
Ruling of the Court of Appeals forum-shopping. Finally, the CA faulted Boardwalk for its failure to
attach to its Petition copies of the Complaint, Answer, position
On April 25, 2007, the CA issued the first assailed Resolution, the papers, memoranda and other relevant pleadings, as required in
dispositive portion of which reads as follows: Sections 2 and 3[26] of Rule 42, thus meriting the outright dismissal
of its Petition for Review.
ACCORDINGLY, the Petition for Review is hereby DISMISSED
OUTRIGHT. Boardwalk filed a Motion for Reconsideration[27] and Supplemental
Motion for Reconsideration,[28] invoking a liberal construction of
SO ORDERED.[24] the Rules in its favor. It further informed the CA that it had paid the
docket fees with the CA Cashier, and submitted the required
In dismissing the Petition for Review, the CA held that Boardwalk secretary's certificate and additional pleadings in support of its
erred in filing its Motion for Extension and paying the docket fees Petition.
therefor with the RTC. It should have done so with the CA as
required by Section 1[25] of Rule 42 of the Rules of Court. It held In the second assailed December 21, 2007 Resolution subsequently
that as a result of Boardwalk's erroneous filing and payment of issued, the CA denied the Motion for Reconsideration and its
supplement. It held that despite curative action, the fact remains of technicalities. It claims that it should not be faulted for the error
that Boardwalk's Petition was filed beyond the reglementary 15-day committed by its counsel's clerk in wrongly filing the Motion for
period. Even if technicality were to be set aside and Boardwalk were Extension and paying the docket fees with the RTC Clerk of Court. It
to be allowed an extension of 15 days from the filing of the Motion prays that the Court review the merits of its case.
for Extension on February 5, 2007, or until February 20, 2007, within
which to file its Petition, its actual filing on March 7, 2007 would still As for the defective Verification and Certification of non-forum
be tardy. shopping, Boardwalk contends that these are formal, not
jurisdictional, requisites which could as well be treated with
Issues leniency. Its subsequent submission of the proper secretary's
certificate should thus have cured the defect. It adds that the same
Boardwalk thus filed the instant Petition, raising the following issues treatment should be accorded its subsequent payment of the
for resolution: docket fees with the CA Cashier and submission of the required
annexes and pleadings in support of its Petition. It prays the Court
PETITIONER IS INVOKING THE LIBERAL CONSTRUCTION OF THE to consider these as substantial compliance with the Rules.
RULES TO EFFECT SUBSTANTIAL JUSTICE IN ACCORDANCE WITH
RULE 1, SECTION 6 OF THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE. Respondent's Arguments

SPECIFICALLY, THE ASSAILED RESOLUTIONS X X X ORDERING THE In her Comment,[31] respondent simply echoes the CA ruling. She
OUTRIGHT DISMISSAL OF THE PETITION FOR REVIEW X X X DUE TO insists that Boardwalk's reasons for erroneously filing the Motion
PROCEDURAL LAPSES, IN TOTAL DISREGARD OF THE SUBSTANTIAL for Extension and paying the docket fees in the RTC are flimsy and
ISSUES CLEARLY RAISED THEREAT, [ARE] CONTRARY TO EXISTING should not be considered.
RULES, LAW, JURISPRUDENCE AND THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUITY AND
SUBSTANTIAL JUSTICE.[29] Respondent adds that Boardwalk's Petition raised factual issues
relative to the merits of the case, which may not be the subject of
Petitioner's Arguments review at this stage.

In its Petition and Reply,[30] Boardwalk invokes the principle that Our Ruling
litigations should be decided on the merits and not on technicalities;
that litigants should be afforded the amplest opportunity for the The Court denies the Petition.
proper and just disposition of their causes, free from the constraints
Petitioner's case is not unique, and there is no compelling reason to Appeals may grant an additional period of fifteen (15) days only
accord it the privilege it now seeks. within which to file the petition for review. No further extension
shall be granted except for the most compelling reason and in no
"[T]he right to appeal is neither a natural right nor [is it a case to exceed fifteen (15) days.
component] of due process[. I]t is a mere statutory privilege, and
may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the Sec. 2. Form and contents.
provisions of law."[32] This being so,
The petition shall be x x x accompanied by x x x copies x x x of the
x x x an appealing party must strictly comply with the requisites laid pleadings and other material portions of the record as would
down in the Rules of Court. Deviations from the Rules cannot be support the allegations of the petition.
tolerated. The rationale for this strict attitude is not difficult to
appreciate as the Rules are designed to facilitate the orderly The petitioner shall also submit together with the petition a
disposition of appealed cases. In an age where courts are bedeviled certification under oath that he has not theretofore commenced
by clogged dockets, the Rules need to be followed by appellants any other action involving the same issues in the Supreme Court,
with greater fidelity. Their observance cannot be left to the whims the Court of Appeals or different divisions thereof, or any other
and caprices of appellants. x x x[33] tribunal or agency; if there is such other action or proceeding, he
must state the status of the same; and if he should thereafter learn
In this case, petitioner must comply with the following that a similar action or proceeding has been filed or is pending
requirements laid down in Rule 42 of the Rules of Court: before the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or different
divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or agency, he undertakes to
Section 1. How appeal taken; time for filing. promptly inform the aforesaid courts and other tribunal or agency
thereof within five (5) days therefrom.
A party desiring to appeal from a decision of the Regional Trial Court
rendered in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction may file a In addition, the Rules also require that the Petition must be verified
verified petition for review with the Court of Appeals, paying at the or accompanied by an affidavit by which the affiant attests under
same time to the clerk of said court the corresponding docket and oath that he "has read the pleading and that the allegations therein
other lawful fees, x x x. The petition shall be filed and served within are true and correct of his personal knowledge or based on
fifteen (15) days from notice of the decision sought to be reviewed authentic records."[34]
or of the denial of petitioner's motion for new trial or
reconsideration x x x. Upon proper motion x x x, the Court of
And finally, Section 3 of Rule 42 provides that non-compliance "with that the Court consider these as substantial compliance with the
any of the foregoing requirements regarding the payment of the Rules.
docket and other lawful fees, x x x and the contents of and the
documents which should accompany the petition shall be sufficient Concededly, this Court in several cases exercised leniency and
ground for the dismissal thereof." relaxed the Rules. However, in this case, petitioner committed
multiple violations of the Rules which should sufficiently militate
Records show that petitioner failed to comply with the foregoing against its plea for leniency. As will be shown below, petitioner
rules. failed to perfect its appeal by not filing the Petition within the
reglementary period and paying the docket and other lawful fees
The Petition must be accompanied by a Verification and before the proper court. These requirements are mandatory and
Certification against forum shopping. Copies of the relevant jurisdictional.
pleadings and other material portions of the record must likewise
be attached to the Petition. Petitioner erroneously paid the docket fees and other lawful fees
with the RTC.

The Rules require that the Petition must be accompanied by a Section 1, Rule 42 of the Rules of Court specifically states that
Verification and Certification against forum shopping. If the payment of the docket fees and other lawful fees should be made
petitioner is a juridical entity, as in this case, it must be shown that to the clerk of the CA. A plain reading of the Rules leaves no room
the person signing in behalf of the corporation is duly authorized to for interpretation; it is categorical and explicit. It was thus grave
represent said corporation. In this case, no special power of error on the part of the petitioner to have misinterpreted the same
attorney or board resolution was attached to the Petition showing and consequently mistakenly remitted its payment to the RTC clerk.
that Lo was authorized to sign the Petition or represent Boardwalk Petitioner's subsequent payment to the clerk of the CA of the
in the proceedings. In addition, petitioner failed to attach to the docket fees and other lawful fees did not cure the defect. The
Petition copies of the relevant pleadings and other material payment to the CA was late; it was done long after the
portions of the record. reglementary period to file an appeal had lapsed. It must be
stressed that the payment of the docket fees and other lawful fees
Petitioner tried to cure these lapses by subsequently submitting a must be done within 15 days from receipt of notice of decision
board resolution showing Lo's authority to sign and act on behalf of sought to be reviewed or denial of the motion for reconsideration.
Boardwalk, as well as copies of the relevant pleadings. Now, it prays In this case, petitioner remitted the payment to the CA clerk long
after the lapse of the reglementary period.
The CA may grant an extension of 15 days only. The grant of To stress, the right to appeal is statutory and one who seeks to avail
another 15-days extension, or a total of 30-days extension is of it must comply with the statute or rules. The requirements for
allowed only for the most compelling reason. perfecting an appeal within the reglementary period specified in the
law must be strictly followed as they are considered indispensable
Petitioner sought an extension of 30 days within which to file its interdictions against needless delays. Moreover, the perfection of
Petition for Review with the CA. This is not allowed. Section 1 of an appeal in the manner and within the period set by law is not only
Rule 42 allows an extension of only 15 days. "No further extension mandatory but jurisdictional as well, hence failure to perfect the
shall be granted except for the most compelling reason x x x."[35] same renders the judgment final and executory. And, just as a losing
Petitioner never cited any compelling reason. party has the privilege to file an appeal within the prescribed
period, so also does the prevailing party have the correlative right to
Thus, even on the assumption that the CA granted Boardwalk a 15- enjoy the finality of a decision in his favor.
day reprieve from February 3, 2007, or the expiration of its original
reglementary period,[36] it still failed to file its Petition for Review True it is that in a number of instances, the Court has relaxed the
on or before the February 19, 2007[37] due date. Records show that governing periods of appeal in order to serve substantial justice. But
the Petition was actually filed only on March 7, 2007, or way this we have done only in exceptional cases. Sadly, the instant case
beyond the allowable February 19, 2007 deadline. The appellate is definitely not one of them.[38]
court thus correctly ruled that this may not simply be brushed aside.
At this point, it must be emphasized that since petitioner's right of
Petitioner's appeal is not deemed perfected. appeal is a mere statutory privilege, it was bound to a strict
observance of the periods of appeal, which requirements are not
More significantly, Section 8 of Rule 42 provides that the appeal is merely mandatory, but jurisdictional.
deemed perfected as to the petitioner "[u]pon the timely filing of a
petition for review and the payment of the corresponding docket Nor may the negligence of Boardwalk's former counsel be invoked
and other lawful fees." Undisputably, petitioner's appeal was not to excuse it from the adverse effects of the appellate court's
perfected because of its failure to timely file the Petition and to pay pronouncement. His negligence or mistake proceeded from
the docket and other lawful fees before the proper court which is carelessness and ignorance of the basic rules of procedure. This
the CA. Consequently, the CA properly dismissed outright the does not constitute excusable negligence that would extricate and
Petition because it never acquired jurisdiction over the same. As a excuse Boardwalk from compliance with the Rules.
result, the RTC's Decision had long become final and executory.
Boardwalk's request for the Court to review its case on the merits
should be denied as well. The import of the Court's foregoing
pronouncements necessarily renders the RTC judgment final and
unassailable; it became final and executory after the period to
appeal expired without Boardwalk perfecting an appeal. As such,
the Court may no longer review it.

In light of the above conclusions, the Court finds no need to further

discuss the other issues raised by the parties.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals' April

25,2007 and December 21,2007 Resolutions in CA-G.R. SP No. UDK
5711 are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
HEIRS OF ARTURO GARCIA I vs. MUNICIPALITY OF IBA, was assigned to Branch 69which ultimately granted the petition for
ZAMBALES certiorari.
G.R. No. 162217 July 22, 2015For review are the resolutions 5
promulgated on October 28, 2003 The petitioners, who meanwhile substituted Bueno upon his death,
moved for the reconsideration of the judgmentgranting the petition
1
for certiorari, but the RTC denied their motion for reconsideration.
and February 10, 2004,
6
2
Aggrieved, the petitioners appealed to the CA by petition for
whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) respectively "dismissed" the
review under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court. As earlier mentioned,
petitioners' petition for review under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court,
the CA "dismissed" the petitioners' petition for review on October
anddenied their motion for reconsideration. At issue is the correct
28, 2003 for not being theproper mode of appeal, observing that
remedy of a party aggrieved by the decision rendered by the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) inthe special civil action for certiorari the assailed orders had been issued by the RTC in the exercise of
itsoriginal jurisdiction.
brought by the defendant in an ejectment suit to assail the refusal
7
of theMunicipal Trial Court (MTC) to give due course to the latter's
notice of appeal vis-a-vis the judgment in favor of theplaintiff. The motion for reconsideration of the petitioners was ultimately
denied by the CA.
AntecedentsThe late Melecio R. Bueno was the tenant-farmer
8
beneficiary of an agricultural land located in Poblacion, Iba,
Issue Although admitting that their petition for review under Rule
andZambales. On October 18, 1999, he brought an ejectment suit in
42 was inappropriate, the petitioners maintain that
the MTC of Iba against the Municipality of Iba,Province of Zambales,
theysubstantially complied with the requirements of an ordinary
3
appeal under Rule 41, and pray that the Courtexercise its equity
claiming that in 1983, the Municipality of Iba had constructed the
jurisdiction because a stringent application of the Rules of Court
public market on asubstantial portion of his land without his
would not serve the demandsof substantial justice.Ruling of the
consent; and that his repeated demands for the Municipality of Iba
tovacate the property had remained unheeded. After due CourtWe affirm. An appeal brings up for review any error of
judgment committed by a court with jurisdiction over the subject of
proceedings, the MTC ruled in favor of Bueno.
thesuit and over the persons of the parties, or any error committed
4
by the court in the exercise of its jurisdictionamounting to nothing
Thence, the Municipality of Iba filed its notice of appeal,but the
more than an error of judgment.
MTC denied due course to the notice of appeal. Thus, the
9
Municipality of Iba filed its petition for certiorariin the R TC in Iba,
Zambales to assail the denial of due course by the MTC. The case
 It was, therefore, very crucial for the petitioners and theircounsel to the clerk of the RTC the full amount of the appellate court docket
to have been cognizant of the different modes to appeal the and other lawful fees. The filing of thenotice of appeal within the
adverse decision of the R TC in the specialcivil action for certiorari period allowed by Section 3 sets in motion the remedy of ordinary
brought by the Municipality of Iba. Such modes of appeal were well appeal because theappeal is deemed perfected as to the appealing
delineated in theRules of Court, and have been expressly stated in party upon his timely filing of the notice of appeal. It is upon
Section 2, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court since July 1, 1997,'0to wit: theperfection of the appeal filed in due time, and the expiration of
Section 2.Modes of appeal. the time to appeal of the other parties that the RTCshall lose
jurisdiction over the case.
a) Ordinary appeal.- The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases 13
decided by the Regional Trial Court inthe exercise of its original On the other hand, the non-payment of the appellate court docket
jurisdiction shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal with the court fee withinthe reglementary period as required by Section 4, is both
whichrendered the judgment or final order appealed from and mandatory and jurisdictional, the non compliance withwhich is fatal
serving a copy thereof upon the adverse party.No record on appeal to the appeal, and is a ground to dismiss the appeal under Section 1,
shall be required except in special proceedings and other cases of 14
multiple orseparate appeals where the law or these Rules so ( c), Rule 50 of the Rules ofCourt. The compliance with these
require. In such cases, the record on appeal shall befiled and served requirements was the only way by which they could have perfected
in like manner.(b) Petition for review.- The appeal to the Court of their appeal from the adverse judgment of the RTC.In contrast, an
Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial Courtin the exercise appeal filed under Rule 42 is deemed perfected as to the petitioner
of its appellate jurisdiction shall be by petition for review in upon the timely filing of the petition for review before the CA, while
accordance with Rule 42.(c) Appeal by certiorari.-In all cases where the RTC shall lose jurisdiction upon perfection thereof and the
only questions of law are raised or involved, the appeal shallbe to expiration of the time to appeal of the other parties.
the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari in 15
accordance with Rule 45. (n)Pursuant to this rule, in conjunction The distinctions between the various modes of appeal cannot be
with Section 3 taken for granted, or easily dismissed, or lightly treated. The appeal
11 by notice of appeal under Rule 41 is a matter or right, but the
and Section 4 appeal by petition for review under Rule 42 is a matter of discretion.
12 An appeal as a matter of right, which refers to the right to seek the
of Rule 41, the petitioners should have filed a notice of appeal in review by a superior court of the judgment rendered by the trial
the RTC within the period of 15 days from their notice of the court, exists after the trial in the first instance. In contrast,the
judgment of the RTC, and within the same period should have paid discretionary appeal, which is taken from the decision or final order
rendered by a court in the exercise of itsprimary appellate liberality in the application of the rules of procedure may be
jurisdiction, may be disallowed by the superior court in its properly invoked only in cases
discretion.
16
Verily, the CA has the discretion whetherto due course to the of some excusable formal deficiency or error in a pleading, but
petition for review or not. definitely not in cases like now where a liberalapplicationwould
17 directly subvert the essence of the proceedings or results in the
The procedure taken after the perfection of an appeal under Rule utter disregard of the Rules of Court.
41 also significantly differs from that takenunder Rule 42. Under 20
Section 10 of Rule 41, the clerk of court of the RTC is burdened to Moreover, the petitioners did not give any good reason or cause
immediately undertakethe transmittal of the records by verifying that could warrant the relaxation of the rules intheir favor. Their
the correctness and completeness of the records of the case; bare plea for substantial justice was not enough ground to suspend
thetransmittal to the CA must be made within 30 days from the the rules. Acceding to theirplea would conceal their shortcomings in
perfection of the appeal. procedure, and thereby belittle the lofty objectives of instituting
18 rules of procedure. We cannot allow that to happen, for doing so
This requirement of transmittal of the records does not arise under would sacrifice the smooth administration of justice guaranteed to
Rule 42, except upon order of the CA when deemed necessary. every litigant. We have allowed exceptions only for the most
19 persuasive of reasons, like relieving he litigant of an injustice not
As borne out in the foregoing, the petitioners' resort to the commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not
petition for review under Rule 42 was wrong. Hence,the CA did not complying with the procedure prescribed.
err in denying due course to the petition for review.Yet, the 21
petitioners plead for liberality, insisting that their petition for WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the resolutions of the Court of
review, albeit the wrong mode, was as ubstantial compliance with Appeals promulgated on October 28, 2003 andFebruary 10, 2004 in
the proper mode of appeal. The plea for liberality is unworthy of C.A. G.R.SP No. 78706; and ORDERS the petitioners to pay the costs
any sympathy from the Court. We have' always looked at appeal as of suit.SO ORDERED.
not a matter of right but a mere statutory privilege.
1âwphi1
As the· parties invoking the privilege, the petitioners shouldhave
faithfully complied with the requirements of the Rules of Court.
Their failure to do so forfeited their privilegeto appeal. Indeed, any
43: PETETION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARY = August 25, 1997. PHILEC undertook to pay Lipio training allowance
as provided in the memorandum:... n September 17, 1997, PHILEC
APPEALS FROM THE COURT OF TAX APPEALS and PWU entered into a new collective bargaining agreement,
AND QUASI-JUDICUAL AGENCIES TO THE effective retroactively on June 1, 1997 and expiring on May 31,
1999.[15] Under Article X, Section 4 of the June 1, 1997 collective
COURT OF APPEALS bargaining agreement, a... rank-and-file employee promoted shall
be entitled to the following step increases in his or her basic
PHILIPPINE ELECTRIC CORPORATION v. CA, GR No. 168612, 2014-12- salary:[16]
10
To be promoted, a rank-and-file employee shall undergo training or
Facts: observation and shall receive training allowance as provided in
Article IX, Section 1(f) of the June 1, 1997 collective bargaining
Philippine Electric Corporation (PHILEC) is a domestic corporation agreement:[17]
"engaged in the manufacture and repairs of high voltage
transformers."[3] Among its rank-and-file employees were Eleodoro (f) Allowance for employees under Training or Observation shall be
V. Lipio (Lipio) and Emerlito C. Ignacio, Sr. (Ignacio, Sr.), former... on a graduated basis as follows:
members of the PHILEC Workers' Union (PWU).[4] PWU is a
legitimate labor organization and the exclusive bargaining For the first month of training, the allowance should be equivalent
representative of PHILEC's rank-and-file employees.[5] to one step increase of the next higher grade. Every month
thereafter the corresponding increase shall be equivalent to the
From June 1, 1989 to May 31, 1997, PHILEC and its rank-and-file next higher grade until the allowance for the grade applied for is
employees were governed by collective bargaining agreements attained.
providing for the following step increases in an employee's basic
salary in case of promotion:[6] As an example, if a Grade I employee qualifies for a Grade III
position, he will receive the training allowance for Grade I to Grade
On August 18, 1997 and with the previous collective bargaining II for the first month. On the second month, he will receive the
agreements already expired, PHILEC selected Lipio for promotion training allowance for Grade I to Grade II plus the allowance for
from Machinist under Pay Grade VIII[7] to Foreman I under Pay
Grade B.[8] PHILEC served Lipio a... memorandum,[9] instructing Claiming that the schedule of training allowance stated in the
him to undergo training for the position of Foreman I beginning on memoranda served on Lipio and Ignacio, Sr. did not conform to
Article X, Section 4 of the June 1, 1997 collective bargaining Grades IX and X enjoying higher step increases than supervisory
agreement, PWU submitted the grievance to the grievance employees under Pay Grades A and B:[33]
machinery.[19]
To preserve the hierarchical wage structure within PHILEC's
PWU and PHILEC failed to amicably settle their grievance. Thus, on enterprise, PHILEC and PWU allegedly agreed to implement the
December 21, 1998, the parties filed a submission agreement[20] uniform pay grade scale under the "Modified SGV" pay grade
with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board, submitting the system, thus:[34]
following issues to voluntary arbitration:... or PHILEC's failure to
apply the schedule of step increases under Article X of the June 1, Pay grade bracket I IX covered rank-and-file employees, while pay
1997 collective bargaining agreement, PWU argued that PHILEC grade bracket A F covered supervisory employees.[35]
committed an unfair labor practice under Article 248[27] of the
Labor Code.[28]... n its position paper,[29] PHILEC emphasized that PHILEC disputed PWU's claim of unfair labor practice. According to
it promoted Lipio and Ignacio, Sr. while it was still negotiating a new PHILEC, it did not violate its collective bargaining agreement with
collective bargaining agreement with PWU. Since PHILEC and PWU PWU when it implemented the "Modified SGV" scale. Even
had not yet negotiated a new collective bargaining agreement when assuming that it violated the collective bargaining agreement,
PHILEC... selected Lipio and Ignacio, Sr. for training, PHILEC applied PHILEC argued that its... violation was not "gross" or a "flagrant
the "Modified SGV" pay grade scale in computing Lipio's and and/or malicious refusal to comply with the economic provisions of
Ignacio, Sr.'s training allowance.[30] [the collective bargaining agreement]."[37] PHILEC, therefore, was
not guilty of unfair labor practice.[38]
This "Modified SGV" pay grade scale, which PHILEC and PWU
allegedly agreed to implement beginning on May 9, 1997, covered Voluntary Arbitrator Jimenez held in the decision[39] dated August
both rank-and-file and supervisory employees.[31] According to 13, 1999, that PHILEC violated its collective bargaining agreement
PHILEC, its past collective bargaining agreements with the rank-and- with PWU.[40] According to Voluntary Arbitrator Jimenez, the June
file... and supervisory unions resulted in an overlap of union 1, 1997 collective bargaining... agreement governed when PHILEC
membership in Pay Grade IX of the rank-and-file employees and Pay selected Lipio and Ignacio, Sr. for promotion on August 18 and 21,
Grade A of the supervisory employees.[32] Worse, past collective 1997.[41] The provisions of the collective bargaining agreement
bargaining agreements resulted in rank-and-file employees under being the law between the parties, PHILEC should have computed
Pay Lipio's and Ignacio, Sr.'s... training allowance based on Article X,
Section 4 of the June 1, 1997 collective bargaining agreement.[42]
As to PHILEC's claim that applying Article X, Section 4 would result in PWU in computing Lipio's and Ignacio, Sr.'s training... allowance.[57]
salary distortion within PHILEC's enterprise, Voluntary Arbitrator In its decision, the Court of Appeals denied due course and
Jimenez ruled that this was "a concern that PHILEC could have dismissed PHILEC's petition for certiorari for lack of merit.[58]
anticipated and could have taken corrective action"[43]... before
signing the collective bargaining agreement. On August 3, 2005, PHILEC filed its petition for review on certiorari
before this court,[60] insisting that it did not violate its collective
Voluntary Arbitrator Jimenez dismissed PWU's claim of unfair labor bargaining agreement with PWU.[61] PHILEC maintains that Lipio
practice.[44] According to him, PHILEC's acts "cannot be considered and Ignacio, Sr. were promoted... to a position covered by the pay
a gross violation of the [collective bargaining agreement] nor . . . [a] grade scale for supervisory employees.[62] Consequently, the
flagrant and/or malicious refusal to comply with... the economic provisions of PHILEC's collective bargaining agreement with its
provisions of the [agreement]."[45] supervisory employees should apply, not its collective bargaining
agreement with PWU.[63] To insist on applying the pay grade scale
On August 29, 2000, PHILEC filed a petition[51] for certiorari before in Article X, Section 4, PHILEC argues, would result in a salary
the Court of Appeals, alleging that Voluntary Arbitrator Jimenez distortion within PHILEC.[64]... s an exception to the rule, this court
gravely abused his discretion in rendering his decision.[52] PHILEC has allowed petitions for certiorari to be filed in lieu of an appeal
maintained that it did not... violate the June 1, 1997 collective "(a) when the public welfare and the advancement of public policy
bargaining agreement.[53] It applied the "Modified SGV" pay grade dictate; (b) when the broader interests of justice so require; (c)
rates to avoid salary distortion within its enterprise.[54] when the writs issued are null; and

In addition, PHILEC argued that Article X, Section 4 of the collective (d) when the questioned order amounts to an oppressive exercise
bargaining agreement did not apply to Lipio and Ignacio, Sr. of judicial authority."[101]
Considering that Lipio and Ignacio, Sr. were promoted to a
supervisory position, their training allowance should be computed In
based on the... provisions of PHILEC's collective bargaining
agreement with ASSET, the exclusive bargaining representative of Issues:
PHILEC's supervisory employees.[55]
WHETHER OR NOT PHILEC VIOLATED SECTION 4 (Step Increases)
The Court of Appeals affirmed Voluntary Arbitrator Jimenez's ARTICLE X (Wage and Position Standardization) OF THE EXISTING
decision.[56] It agreed that PHILEC was bound to apply Article X, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT (CBA) IN IMPLEMENTING
Section 4 of its June 1, 1997 collective bargaining agreement with
THE STEP INCREASES RELATIVE TO THE PROMOTION OF INDIVIDUAL agreements. Should the parties agree, a Voluntary Arbitrator or a
COMPLAINANTS. panel of Voluntary

II Arbitrators shall also resolve the parties' other labor disputes,

including unfair labor practices and bargaining deadlocks.
WHETHER OR NOT PHILEC's MANNER OF IMPLEMENTING THE STEP
INCREASES IN CONNECTION WITH THE PROMOTION OF INDIVIDUAL Articles 261 and 262 of the Labor Code provide:... n Luzon
COMPLAINANTS IN RELATION TO THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 4, Development Bank v. Association of Luzon Development Bank
ARTICLE X OF THE CBA CONSTITUTES UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE.[21] Employees,[70] this court ruled that the proper remedy against the
award or decision of the Voluntary Arbitrator is an appeal before
Ruling: the Court of Appeals. This court first... characterized the office of a
Voluntary Arbitrator or a panel of Voluntary Arbitrators as a quasi-
We note that PHILEC filed before the Court of Appeals a petition for judicial agency, citing Volkschel Labor Union, et al. v. NLRC[71] and
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court against Voluntary Oceanic Bic Division (FFW) v. Romero:[72]
Arbitrator Jimenez's decision.[69]
This court then stated that the office of a Voluntary Arbitrator or a
This was not the proper remedy. panel of Voluntary Arbitrators, even assuming that the office is not
strictly a quasi-judicial agency, may be considered an
Instead, the proper remedy to reverse or modify a Voluntary instrumentality, thus:
Arbitrator's or a panel of Voluntary Arbitrators' decision or award is
to appeal the award or decision before the Court of Appeals. Rule An "instrumentality" is anything used as a means or agency. Thus,
43, Sections 1 and 3 of the Rules of Court provide:... n appeal under the terms governmental "agency" or "instrumentality" are
this Rule may be taken to the Court of Appeals within the period synonymous in the sense that either of them is a means by which a
and in the manner herein provided, whether the appeal involves government acts, or by which a certain government act or function
questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and law. is performed. The word
(Emphasis supplied)
"instrumentality," with respect to a state, contemplates an
A Voluntary Arbitrator or a panel of Voluntary Arbitrators has the authority to which the state delegates governmental power for the
exclusive original jurisdiction over grievances arising from the performance of a state function. An individual person, like an
interpretation or implementation of collective bargaining administrator or executor, is a judicial instrumentality in the settling
of an estate, in... the same manner that a sub-agent appointed by a final and executory because it was appealed beyond... the 10-day
bankruptcy court is an instrumentality of the court, and a trustee in reglementary period under Article 262-A of the Labor Code.
bankruptcy of a defunct corporation is an instrumentality of the
state. It is true that Rule 43, Section 4 of the Rules of Court provides for a
15-day reglementary period for filing an appeal:
Since the office of a Voluntary Arbitrator or a panel of Voluntary
Arbitrators is considered a quasi-judicial agency, this court The 15-day reglementary period has been upheld by this court in a
concluded that a decision or award rendered by a Voluntary long line of cases.[80] In AMA Computer College-Santiago City, Inc.
Arbitrator is appealable before the Court of Appeals. Under Section v. Nacino,[81] Nippon Paint Employees Union-OLALIA v. Court of
9 of the Judiciary Appeals,[82] Manila Midtown Hotel v. Borromeo,[83] and Sevilla
Trading Company v. Semana,[84] this court denied petitioners'
Reorganization Act of 1980, the Court of Appeals has the exclusive petitions for review on certiorari since petitioners failed to appeal
original jurisdiction over decisions or awards of quasi-judicial the Voluntary
agencies and instrumentalities:
Arbitrator's decision within the 15-day reglementary period under
Luzon Development Bank was decided in 1995 but remains "good Rule 43. In these cases, the Court of Appeals had no jurisdiction to
law."[75] In the 2002 case of Alcantara, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,[76] entertain the appeal assailing the Voluntary Arbitrator's decision.
this court rejected petitioner Santiago Alcantara, Jr.'s argument that
the Rules of Court,... specifically Rule 43, Section 2, superseded the Despite Rule 43 providing for a 15-day period to appeal, we rule
Luzon Development Bank ruling: that the Voluntary Arbitrator's decision must be appealed before
the Court of Appeals within 10 calendar days from receipt of the
Article 262-A of the Labor Code provides that the award or decision decision as provided in the Labor Code.
of the Voluntary Arbitrator "shall be final and executory after ten
(10) calendar days from receipt of the copy of the award or decision Appeal is a "statutory privilege,"[85] which may be exercised "only
by the parties": in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of the
law."[86] "Perfection of an appeal within the reglementary period is
Thus, in Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc. Sales Force Union- not only mandatory but also... jurisdictional so that failure to do so
PTGWO-BALAIS v. Coca Cola-Bottlers Philippines, Inc.,[79] this court rendered the decision final and executory, and deprives the
declared that the decision of the Voluntary Arbitrator had become appellate court of jurisdiction to alter the final judgment much less
to entertain the appeal."[87]
 partial reconsideration on August 11, 2000.[107] PHILEC filed... its
We ruled that Article 262-A of the Labor Code allows the appeal of petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals on August 29,
decisions rendered by Voluntary Arbitrators.[88] Statute provides 2000,[108] which was 18 days after its receipt of Voluntary
that the Voluntary Arbitrator's decision "shall be final and executory Arbitrator Jimenez's resolution. The petition for certiorari was filed
after ten (10) calendar days from receipt of the copy... of the award beyond the 10-day reglementary period for filing an... appeal. We
or decision by the parties." Being provided in the statute, this 10- cannot consider PHILEC's petition for certiorari as an appeal.
day period must be complied with; otherwise, no appellate court
will have jurisdiction over the appeal. This absurd situation occurs There being no appeal seasonably filed in this case, Voluntary
when the decision is appealed on the 11th to 15th day from... Arbitrator Jimenez's decision became final and executory after 10
receipt as allowed under the Rules, but which decision, under the calendar days from PHILEC's receipt of the resolution denying its
law, has already become final and executory. motion for partial reconsideration.[109] Voluntary Arbitrator

In Shioji v. Harvey,[91] this court held that the "rules of court, Jimenez's decision is already "beyond the purview of this Court to
promulgated by authority of law, have the force and effect of law, if act upon."[110]
not in conflict with positive law."[92] Rules of Court are
"subordinate to the... statute."[93] In case of conflict between the A collective bargaining agreement is "a contract executed upon the
law and the Rules of Court, "the statute will prevail."[94] request of either the employer or the exclusive bargaining
representative of the employees incorporating the agreement
A petition for certiorari is a special civil action "adopted to correct reached after negotiations with respect to wages, hours of work and
errors of jurisdiction committed by the lower court or quasi-judicial all other terms and... conditions of employment, including proposals
agency, or when there is grave abuse of discretion on the part of for adjusting any grievances or questions arising under such
such court or agency amounting to lack or excess of... agreement."[111] A collective bargaining agreement being a
jurisdiction."[97] An extraordinary remedy,[98] a petition for contract, its provisions "constitute the law between the
certiorari may be filed only if appeal is not available.[99] If appeal is parties"[112] and must be complied with in good faith.[113]
available, an appeal must be taken even if the ground relied upon is
grave... abuse of discretion.[100] PHILEC, as employer, and PWU, as the exclusive bargaining
representative of PHILEC's rank-and-file employees, entered into a
None of the circumstances similar to Unicraft, Leyte IV Electric collective bargaining agreement, which the parties agreed to make
Cooperative, and Mora are present in this case. PHILEC received effective from June 1, 1997 to May 31, 1999. Being the law between
Voluntary Arbitrator Jimenez's resolution denying its motion for the parties, the June
 not appear in PHILEC's collective bargaining agreement with PWU,
1, 1997 collective bargaining agreement must govern PHILEC and its PHILEC cannot insist on the "Modified SGV" pay grade scale's
rank-and-file employees within the agreed period. application. We reiterate Voluntary Arbitrator Jimenez's... decision
dated August 13, 1999 where he said that:
Contrary to PHILEC's claim, Lipio and Ignacio, Sr. were not
transferred out of the bargaining unit when they were selected for We note that PHILEC did not dispute PWU's contention that it
training. Lipio and Ignacio, Sr. remained rank-and-file employees selected several rank-and-file employees for training and paid them
while they trained for the position of Foreman I. Under Article IX, training allowance based on the schedule provided in the collective
Section 1(e) of... the June 1, 1997 collective bargaining bargaining agreement effective at the time of the trainees'
agreement,[114] a trainee who is "unable to demonstrate his ability selection.[124] PHILEC cannot choose when and to whom to apply
to perform the work . . . shall be reverted to his previous the provisions of its collective bargaining agreement. The provisions
assignment. . . ."[115] According to the same provision, the trainee of a collective bargaining agreement must be applied uniformly and
complied with in good faith.
"shall hold that job on a trial or observation basis and . . . subject to
prior approval of the authorized management official, be appointed Given the foregoing, Lipio's and Ignacio, Sr.'s training allowance
to the position in a regular capacity."[116] should be computed based on Article X, Section 4 in relation to
Article IX, Section 1(f) of the June 1, 1997 rank-and-file collective
Thus, training is a condition precedent for promotion. Selection for bargaining agreement. Lipio, who held the position of Machinist
training does not mean automatic transfer out of the bargaining before... selection for training as Foreman I, should receive training
unit of rank-and-file employees. allowance based on the following schedule:

Had PHILEC wanted the "Modified SGV" pay grade scale applied Considering that Voluntary Arbitrator Jimenez's decision awarded
within its enterprise, "it could have requested or demanded that sums of money, Lipio and Ignacio, Sr. are entitled to legal interest
[the 'Modified SGV' scale] be incorporated in the [collective on their training allowances. Voluntary Arbitrator Jimenez's decision
bargaining agreement]."[120] PHILEC had "the means under the law having become final and executory on August 22, 2000, PHILEC is
to... compel [PWU] to incorporate this specific economic proposal in liable for... legal interest equal to 12% per annum from finality of
the [collective bargaining agreement]."[121] It "could have invoked the decision until full payment as this court ruled in Eastern
Article 252 of the Labor Code"[122] to incorporate the "Modified Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals:[125]
SGV" pay grade scale in its collective... bargaining agreement with
PWU. But it did not. Since this "Modified SGV" pay grade scale does
The 6% legal interest under Circular No. 799, Series of 2013, of the
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas Monetary Board shall not apply,
Voluntary Arbitrator Jimenez's decision having become final and
executory prior to the effectivity of the circular on July 1, 2013. In
Nacar v.

Gallery Frames,[127] we held that:

Principles:

An appeal to reverse or modify a Voluntary Arbitrator's award or

decision must be filed before the Court of Appeals within 10
calendar days from receipt of the award or decision.

spite Rule 43 providing for a 15-day period to appeal, we rule that

the Voluntary Arbitrator's decision must be appealed before the
Court of Appeals within 10 calendar days from receipt of the
decision as provided in the Labor Code.
FELIX T. BAUTISTA, petitioner, vs. MARLOW NAVIGATION PHILS., immediate treatment, where he was recommended for medical
INC., MARLOW NAVIGATION NETHERLANDS B.V., and ANTONIO repatriation. On January 9, 2014, Bautista was repatriated to the
M. GALVEZ, respondents. Philippines. The company-designated physicians ordered Bautista's
x-ray test, which showed that he was suffering from a "fracture with
NOTICE lateral displacement at the base of the metacarpal bone of the
second digit."
Sirs/Mesdames :
Bautista underwent medical treatment and a series of physical
Please take notice that the Court, Third Division, issued a Resolution therapy sessions with the company-designated physician. On the
dated June 17, 2020, which reads as follows: 104th day from repatriation or on April 23, 2014, the company-
designated physician issued an interim assessment at Grade 11.
"G.R. No. 238348 (Felix T. Bautista v. Marlow Navigation Phils., Inc., While still undergoing medical therapy with the company-
Marlow Navigation Netherlands B.V., and Antonio M. Galvez). designated physicians, Bautista sought for a second opinion from
Challenged in this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of another physician, where he was found "not fit for sea duty."
the Rules of Court is the Decision dated November 7, 2017 and the
Resolution dated March 27, 2018 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. On July 30, 2014 or the 202nd day from Bautista's repatriation, the
SP No. 142472, awarding partial disability benefits to petitioner company-designated physician issued a disability assessment at
Felix Bautista (Bautista) amounting to US$20,896.00. Grade 10. It was estimated that Bautista would need to undergo
another month of "aggressive" therapy. On August 27, 2014, the
Facts of the Case company-designated physician stated that Bautista's conditions
have reached the "maximum medical improvement." Bautista was
On April 10, 2013, Bautista began working as an able seafarer on found to tolerate at least an eight-pound dumbbell exercised on his
board MV Veersedijk for Marlow Navigation Philippines, Inc. and its left upper extremities.
foreign principal, Marlow Navigation Netherlands B.V. (MARLOW).
His employment contract is covered by a collective bargaining Bautista then sought a second medical opinion from another
agreement (CBA). physician. In a medical report dated October 18, 2014, Bautista was
found by his physician as unfit to resume his duties as a seafarer.
On January 7, 2014, Bautista injured his left hand after accidentally Through the help of the labor union, Associated Marine Officer's
getting caught and pulled by a large rope during a mooring and Seamen's Union of the Philippines, Bautista appeared before
operation. He was then brought to a hospital in Valencia, Spain for the National Conciliation and Mediation Board presenting the
contradicting assessments of the company-designated physician fees. As to the assessment of the third physician, the VA held that
and his physician. The parties agreed to secure the services of a the third physician did not conduct an independent and unbiased
third physician, where Bautista's condition was classified under examination and evaluation of a seafarer's actual physical condition
Disability Grade 9. The medical certificate of the third physician also because the assessment was based on the patient's perception.
stated that Bautista's condition is assessed at 80% disability under
from the Disability of Arm, Shoulder & Hand (DASH) form. MARLOW Section 7, Rule VII of the Revised Guidelines on the Conduct of
refused to pay 80% disability benefits pursuant to the DASH form Voluntary Arbitration Proceedings of the NCMB prohibits the filing
because it is only the patient's self-assessment of his ability to do of a motion for reconsideration to the award or decision of the VA.
certain activities, but MARLOW is amenable to payment of disability For this reason, MARLOW filed a Petition for Review under Rule 43
benefits at Grade 9 because it was issued following the disability of the Rules of Court with the CA. In a Decision dated November 7,
grading in the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration- 2017, the CA modified the VA's decision awarding partial disability
Standard Employment Contract (POEA-SEC). benefits corresponding to the Grade 9 disability assessment issued
by the third physician. Following Article 22.4.2 of the CBA, the third
In a Decision dated August 25, 2015, the Panel of Voluntary doctor's decision shall be final and binding on both parties. Thus,
Arbitrators (VA) awarded payment of permanent and total disability instead of US$80,000.00, Bautista is awarded. US$20,896.00 in
benefits to Bautista. The VA held that when MARLOW issued a accordance with the Grade 9 disability rating under the CBA. The CA
Grade 10 assessment, such fact is an admission that the disability deleted the award of sickness allowance finding that MARLOW
caused by the injury is already permanent. The VA held that presented proof of payment to Bautista. The award of attorney's
disabilities with a disability grading from 2 to 14 are partial and fees was also deleted because there was no proof of unlawful
permanent. The condition will be "under legal contemplation" withholding from Bautista's wages. In fact, payment of sickness
permanent and total when the seafarer is incapacitated from allowance and wages during Bautista's medical treatment was duly
performing his usual sea duties for a period of more than 120 or 240 proven.
days. It has not been shown that Bautista was able to resume his
seafaring duties in said period. As a result, his disability was deemed On reconsideration, Bautista argues that MARLOW filed its Petition
permanent and total. He was awarded US$80,000.00 in accordance for Review beyond the reglementary period. Bautista argues that it
with the CBA. He was also awarded US$2,348.00 as sickness has been settled that the award or decision of the VA shall be
allowance. Although the company presented wages account appealed with the CA within 10 days. Otherwise, the decision of the
receipts, the VA held that there was no way to identify if said VA will be final and executory. Bautista points out that MARLOW, in
documents were Bautista's pay during the medical treatment. Ten its petition, manifests filing of its pleading five days after the 10-day
percent of the money award was also given to Bautista as attorney's
reglementary period, without a reasonable explanation for the late treatment, then he is, under legal contemplation, totally and
filing. permanently disabled.

In a Resolution dated March 27, 2018, the CA held that judgements MARLOW, on the other hand, admits to the late filing of the petition
or final orders of the VA which are declared final are not exempt with the CA, but argues that the rules regarding the reglementary
from judicial review when so warranted, as in this case. The CA period "should be harmonized in order not to cause injustice
found that the VA gravely abused their discretion, which warrants between the parties." MARLOW argues that a decision can become
the exercise of the CA's appellate jurisdiction. The CA also ordered final and executory and even fully executed prior to the filing of an
Bautista to return the excess amount that he received from the available remedy provided under the rules. By way of example,
execution of the arbitrators' decision. MARLOW emphasizes that the decision of the National Labor
Relations Commission becomes final and executory after 10 days.
Bautista filed the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari under Yet, parties are sanctioned under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. He restates that MARLOW filed its file a petition for certiorari within 60 days from receipt of the
Petition for Review with the CA beyond the reglementary period of decision, or final order. In the same way, the fact that the decision
10 days. For failure of MARLOW to follow the rules, the decision of of the VA becomes final and executory within 10 days in accordance
the VA already attained finality. Even if the petition for review filed with the Labor Code, will not prevent a party to file an appeal under
with the CA was timely filed, the same should have still been Rule 43 of the Rules of Court within 15 days after receipt of the
dismissed on the merits. Contrary to the findings of the CA, decision or final order. Moreover, judicial review is warranted in this
Bautista's injury is permanent and total. His inability to substantially case because Bautista is not entitled to full disability benefits. The
do all material acts to perform his occupation without serious assessment of Grade 9 by the third physician was properly upheld
discomfort or pain may be construed as total and permanent by the CA. The POEA-SEC and the CBA explicitly provide that the
disability. Further, a comparison of the assessments issued by the findings of the third doctor, chosen by the parties, shall be final and
company doctor, his physician, and the third physician consistently binding. Bautista's incapacity to perform his usual sea duties for a
shows that he was suffering from weakness in grip. Clearly, there is period of more than 120 or 240 days has no bearing on the amount
an inability to perform his previous tasks. Disability grading is not of benefits to which he is entitled. It is only after the lapse of the
the sole basis for determining the seafarer's rights in the event of 240 days of treatment that a seafarer can be considered as
work-related injury. The injuries or disabilities with a disability permanently disabled, if the company-designated physician failed to
grading from 2 to 14, are considered partial and permanent. If one make or issue an assessment or disability grading. Here, Bautista
is incapacitated to perform his usual sea duties for a period of more was issued a final disability assessment of Grade 10 on July 30, 2014
than 120 or 240 days, depending on the need for further medical or 202 days from his repatriation, which is still within the 240-day
period of medical treatment. Finally, MARLOW argues that it has Appeal is a "statutory privilege," which may be exercised "only in
sufficiently proven payment of accrued salaries, including sickness the manner and in accordance with the provisions of the law."
allowances to Bautista. "Perfection of an appeal within the reglementary period is not only
mandatory but also jurisdictional so that failure to do so rendered
Ruling of the Court the decision final and executory, and deprives the appellate court of
jurisdiction to alter the final judgment much less to entertain the
Article 262-A (renumbered as Article 276) of the Labor Code appeal."
provides that the award or decision of the VA or Panel of VA shall be
final and executory after 10 calendar days from receipt of the copy We ruled that Article 262-A of the Labor Code allows the appeal of
of the award or decision by the parties. An appeal under Rule 43 of decisions rendered by Voluntary Arbitrators. Statute provides that
the Rules of Court may be filed to reverse or modify the VA's or the Voluntary Arbitrator's decision "shall be final and executory
panel of VA's decision or award. Section 4 of the same rule provides after ten (10) calendar days from receipt of the copy of the award or
for a 15-day reglementary period for filing an appeal. In this case, decision by the parties." Being provided in the statute, this 10-day
Marlow argues that it had timely filed its Petition for Review with period must be complied with; otherwise, no appellate court will
the VA within the 15-day period under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. have jurisdiction over the appeal. This absurd situation occurs when
the decision is appealed on the 11th to 15th day from receipt as
We cannot agree. allowed under the Rules, but which decision, under the law, has
already become final and executory.
The VA's decision or award must be appealed to the CA within 10
calendar days from receipt of the decision as provided in the Labor Furthermore, under Article VIII, Section 5(5) of the Constitution, this
Code. To settle the conflict between which period, under the Rules court "shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights" in
of Court or the Labor Code, to follow in filing an appeal to reverse or promulgating rules of procedure in courts. The 10-day period to
modify the voluntary arbitrator's decision or award, We ruled in the appeal under the Labor Code being a substantive right, this period
case of NYK-FIL Ship Management, Incorporated v. Dabu that: cannot be diminished, increased, or modified through the Rules of
Court.
Despite Rule 43 providing for a 15-day period to appeal, we rule
that the Voluntary Arbitrator's decision must be appealed before In Shioji v. Harvey, this court held that the "rules of court,
the Court of Appeals within 10 calendar days from receipt of the promulgated by authority of law, have the force and effect of law, if
decision as provided in the Labor Code. not in conflict with positive law." Rules of Court are "subordinate to
the statute." In case of conflict between the law and the Rules of This is erroneous as the two remedies are entirely different in
Court, "the statute will prevail." nature and cannot be likened with each other.

The rule, therefore, is that a Voluntary Arbitrator's award or To reiterate, an appeal is a statutory privilege. "The perfection of an
decision shall be appealed before the Court of Appeals within 10 appeal within the reglementary period is not only mandatory but
days from receipt of the award or decision. x x x. (Citations and also jurisdictional so that failure to do so rendered the decision final
emphasis omitted) and executory, and deprives the appellate court of jurisdiction to
alter the final judgment much less to entertain the appeal."
MARLOW, in its petition with the CA, stated that it received the VA's
decision on September 21, 2015 and had 15 days from said date, or A Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65, on the other hand, is an
until October 6, 2015 to file its petition. However, and as discussed extraordinary remedy, a special civil action "adopted to correct
above, what is governing is the reglementary period of 10 days errors of jurisdiction committed by the lower court or quasi-judicial
under the Labor Code. Therefore, MARLOW only had until October agency, or when there is grave abuse of discretion on the part of
1, 2015 to file the Petition for Review under Rule 43 of the Rules of such court or agency amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction." It
Court. On record, the Petition for Review filed with the CA was cannot be a substitute for an appeal under Rule 43, even if the
dated October 5, 2015. Notably, appended to the petition was an latter petition cites grave abuse of discretion.
Affidavit of Service dated October 6, 2015 for the NCMB and
counsel of Bautista. As proof of service is required in filing a Petition As discussed, an appeal under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court is the
for Review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. We conclude that proper recourse to reverse or modify the decision of the VA's
the petition was filed with the CA on October 6, 2015 in view of the decision or award. The reglementary period of 10 days provided
appended proof of service or Affidavit of Service dated October 6, under the Labor Code is mandatory and jurisdictional. Further,
2015. Clearly, the petition was filed beyond the 10-day failure to observe the period will render the decision final and
reglementary period. MARLOW did not present any proof or executory.
allegation that would show otherwise. Hence, the Decision dated
August 25, 2015 of the Panel of VA has attained finality for failure of Since the timely perfection of an appeal is jurisdictional, the CA
MARLOW to timely file its Petition for Review with the CA. should have dismissed the Petition for Review under Rule 43 of the
Rules of Court filed by MARLOW because it no longer had any
MARLOW argues that while the VA's decision becomes final and appellate jurisdiction to alter or nullify the decision of the VA. The
executory in 10 days, an appeal under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court decision of the VA attained finality and the same may no longer be
can still be availed similar to a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65. modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct
what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law, and
whether made by the highest court of the land. The doctrine of
finality of judgment is grounded on the fundamental considerations
of public policy and sound practice that, at the risk of occasional
error, the judgments or orders of courts must be final at some
definite date fixed by law. Corollary, other issues raised need not be
discussed.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated

November 7, 2017 and the Resolution dated March 27, 2018 of the
Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 142472 are hereby SET ASIDE.
The Decision dated August 25, 2015 of the Panel of Voluntary
Arbitrators is REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED."
 BONPACK CORPORATION, PETITIONER, VS. On compensable working hours and payment of overtime
NAGKAKAISANG MANGGAGAWA SA BONPACK- work, Sections 1 and 2 of Article VII of the CBA essentially states
SOLIDARITY OF UNIONS IN THE PHILIPPINES FOR that the working hours shall be eight hours a day including meal
EMPOWERMENT AND REFORMS (NMB-SUPER), break of 30 minutes and two 15-minute coffee
REPRESENTED BY ITS UNION PRESIDENT, breaks.8 Regarding overtime, it provides that any employee who
ZOSIMA** BUCIO, RESPONDENT. works in excess of eight hours in any regular working day shall be
entitled to an additional 25% of the daily hour basic rate as
DECISION overtime premium.9

GESMUNDO, C.J.: On the exercise of management prerogatives, Sec. 3 of Art.

VI of the CBA provides that "[t]he COMPANY shall discuss with
This Appeal by Certiorari1 seeks to reverse and set aside the the UNION matters that may involve decisions or policies that
Decision2 dated July 29, 2016 and the Resolution3 dated may adversely affect the general welfare of the members."10 The
February 14, 2017 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP parties likewise agreed to establish a labor-management
No. 141529. In that case, the CA modified the Decision4 dated committee, per Art. XXIV of the CBA, a forum in which the parties
July 13, 2015 of the Office of the Voluntary Arbitrator (VA) of the are compelled to meet at least once a month to tackle matters of
National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) in AC-820- "mutual interest particularly those affecting labor-management
RCMB-NCR-LVA-008-02-2015. The VA found the complaint for relations" and/or even resolve "any dispute, controversy, problem,
violation of the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) filed by complaint or disagreement between the COMPANY and the
Nagkakaisang Manggagawa sa Bonpack – Solidarity of Unions in UNION or its members on matters arising out of employer-
the Philippines for Empowerment and Reforms (respondent) employee relationship" with the end goal of "promoting and
against Bonpack Corporation (petitioner) partly meritorious. maintaining harmonious labor-management relationship."11

The Antecedents Petitioner then unilaterally revised its old Company Rules and
Regulations (CRR),12 purportedly to harmonize it with the new
CBA.13 According to petitioner, it rearranged the CRR's layout for
Petitioner is a domestic corporation engaged in the business
easy reference of their employees and incorporated therein the
of manufacturing flexible packaging for snack foods, breads,
120-minute grace period policy. The revised CRR14 also defined
juices, and candies.5 Respondent, on the other hand, is a
the act of committing an "over break" as an offense with a
legitimate labor organization and the sole and exclusive
corresponding disciplinary action of "final written warning," thus:
bargaining agent of all the rank-and-file employees of petitioner.6
Over break. Taking coffee or snack breaks of
From August 2, 2009 to August 1, 2014, the parties were
more than fifteen (15) minutes, lunch breaks
governed by their duly executed and registered CBA. On October
more than one (1) hour for non-straight
17, 2014, the parties executed a new CBA, which also had a term
time and more than thirty (30) minutes for
of five years.7
straight time employees.15 (Emphasis supplied)
 From January 16-17, 2014, petitioner conducted a general implemented the revised CRR "without consulting or discussing it
assembly of its employees and held a discussion about the with the officers of [respondent] union." Through the revised
revised CRR. By the end of said gathering, each employee was CRR, petitioner allegedly imposed a harsher system of punishing
handed a copy of the revised CRR. Petitioner subsequently erring employees, which matter definitely "affects the rights,
implemented the same.16 duties and welfare of its members." The revision allegedly had no
other purpose than to prejudice the tenure of the regular rank-
However, respondent unfavorably reacted to the and-file employees.23
implementation of the revised CRR without it being consulted at
all, especially on the imposition of harsher penalties in the As to its claim of underpayment of overtime pay, respondent
commission of company-defined offenses. It further lamented that contended that petitioner required the employees to consume a
the revised CRR was unfair and discriminatory for being full hour as meal break, instead of the CBA mandated 30-minute
applicable only to rank-and-file employees.17 Respondent also meal break and two 15-minute coffee breaks included in the
claimed that petitioner was underpaying the employees' overtime eight-hour workday. In treating the meal break to a complete and
pay by deducting their one-hour meal period from their total continuous one-hour meal break, petitioner essentially created a
number of working hours with overtime.18 60-minutc non-compensable meal period, contrary to the intent of
Secs. 1 and 2 of Art. VII of the CBA. Therefore, a number of
In order that its concerns may be heard and given the employees who worked for 12 hours in an eight-hour workday
appropriate response, respondent repeatedly requested petitioner were paid only for 11 hours of work rendered or merely three
to formally organize a labor-management committee. However, hours of overtime pay.24
said requests went unheeded.19
Petitioner countered that it merely exercised its management
Respondent raised its concerns during the grievance prerogative when it adopted and implemented the revised
proceedings but no settlement was reached. Thus, in February CRR.25 According to petitioner, respondent's contention that the
2015, respondent lodged a complaint before the NCMB CRR was unreasonable, unfair, and oppressive is completely
questioning the validity of the issuance and implementation of the baseless. It explained that the offenses enumerated in the revised
revised CRR on the abovementioned grounds, and asking for the CRR are all work-related; that the penalties prescribed are
correct payment of the employees' overtime pay. Thereafter, the commensurate to the degree of the infraction committed; and that
case was referred to the VA for appropriate action.20 due process shall be strictly observed in disciplinary cases.
These rules and regulations have long been in existence and
In the course of the conferences conducted by the VA, the remained substantially unaltered, and that the same are being
parties attempted to amicably settle the case on several enforced on all employees of petitioner without regard to their
instances, but all to no avail. Consequently, the parties ranks as a necessary means of enhancing their performance.26
exchanged position papers21 and replies.22
As to the claim of underpayment of overtime pay, petitioner
Respondent claimed that the relevant CBA provisions contended that it had long been observing the "statutory eight-
requiring the parties thereto to organize a labor-management hour workday with one-hour meal break and two 15-minute coffee
committee was violated by petitioner when it adopted and breaks."27 The one-hour meal break is non-compensable under
the law. Thus, as illustrated by petitioner, an employee who
renders 12 hours of work in an eight-hour workday is entitled only (30) minutes and resumed working, are entitled
to an overtime pay equivalent to three hours of overtime work. to four and half (4.5) hours of overtime work.30
Similarly, an employee who had a 30-minute meal break and who
renders 12 hours of work in an eight-hour is entitled to an As regards the revised CRR, the VA upheld its validity finding
overtime pay for three and a half hours of overtime work.28 that its implementation was in the exercise of petitioner's
management prerogative in disciplining employees. Petitioner
The VA Ruling allegedly made no substantial changes from the old CRR that
merited consultation with respondent before adopting the revised
In its Decision dated July 13, 2015, the VA partially ruled in CRR.
favor of respondent. The dispositive portion states:
Unsatisfied, petitioner filed a Motion for Partial
WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing, a Decision Reconsideration dated July 23, 2015, seeking re-examination of
is hereby rendered ordering the respondent Company to the computation of the overtime pay. The VA granted said motion
immediately comply with the express mandate of the CBA. in its Resolution31 dated January 5, 2016, and partially modified
its ruling as follows:
A decision is also hereby rendered upholding the validity of
the reformatted Company Rules and Regulations. WHEREFORE, the Decision dated 13 July 2015 is
hereby partially modified as follows:
SO ORDERED.29
1. Those employees who worked for twelve [(12)] hours and
On the issue of underpayment of overtime pay, the VA ruled finished their meal breaks within thirty (30) minutes and resumed
that, since the CBA is the law between the parties, the agreed 30- working, are entitled to four (4) hours of overtime work;
minute meal break must be viewed as included in their normal
hours of work. However, the VA also found that some employees 2. Ordering the respondent Company to immediately comply with
of petitioner were actually taking meal breaks longer than 30 the express mandate of the CBA.
minutes. The VA, thus, resolved to treat differently those
employees taking the one-hour meal break from those taking the Other portion of the DECISION is AFFIRMED.
30-minute meal break. Those employees taking the one-hour
meal break were declared as not entitled to be compensated for SO ORDERED.32
such time-off from work, following the no work, no pay policy. On
the other hand, those employees taking the 30-minute meal break Meanwhile, instead of filing a motion for reconsideration,
were deemed already compensated for such time-off, as agreed respondent opted to assail the July 13, 2015 Decision of the VA
upon in the CBA. Accordingly, the VA devised a formula in the directly before the CA via a Petition for Review33 under Rule 43
computation of the overtime pay of petitioner's employees: of the Rules of Court. The petition was filed on August 3, 2015, or
within fifteen (15) days from the date respondent received a copy
Those employees who worked for twelve (12) of the July 13, 2015 VA's Decision. In said petition, respondent
hours and finished their meal breaks within thirty appealed to the appellate court and prayed that petitioner be
ordered to implement the revised CRR on all of its employees. It c) the wage for the 8-hour workday to the employees who are
likewise prayed that petitioner be directed to pay in full the four able to prove that they took their meals in an hour equivalent to
hours overtime work of those employees who rendered 12 hours the CBA compensable meal and rest periods included in a regular
of work.34 workday;

By way of comment to respondent's petition for review before d) the four (4) hours overtime pay to the employees who are
the CA, petitioner pointed out that the July 13, 2015 Decision of able to prove that they worked for 12 hours and took their meal
the VA had already attained finality because respondent failed to and rest periods in an hour, which should be equivalent to the
file its petition within 10 calendar days from their receipt of a copy CBA compensable meal and rest periods included in an 8-hour
thereof, as provided under Sec. 6 of Rule VII of the 2005 Revised workday.
Procedural Guidelines in the Conduct of Voluntary Arbitration
Proceedings (2005 VA Procedural Guidelines) and, citing as well BONPACK is likewise ordered to immediately comply with the
the relevant ruling in Philippine Electric Corporation v. Court of provisions of the CBA on consultation with the union on the
Appeals35 (Philec). Nonetheless, petitioner contended that the interpretation and enforcement of the new CRR.
VA did not err in declaring the validity of its adoption and
implementation of the revised CRR. However, it still maintained SO ORDERED.37
that the rank-and-file employees were not entitled to four hours
overtime pay from the 12 hours of work rendered because said
The CA ruled that respondent timely filed its petition in
employees already consumed a non-compensable one-hour meal
accordance with Sec. 4 in relation to Sec. 1 of Rule 43 of the
break.36
Rules of Court, which allows the filing of an appeal within fifteen
(15) days from notice of the order, resolution or decision being
The CA Ruling elevated for review.38

In its assailed Decision dated July 29, 2016, the CA granted The CA also ruled that there were substantial changes made
respondent's petition and disposed as follows: in the revised CRR that involve questions on its interpretation and
enforcement, contrary to the claim of petitioner.39
WHEREFORE, this petition is GRANTED. BONPACK is hereby
ordered to pay: Anent the issue of underpayment of overtime pay, the CA
found that petitioner's policy of requiring its employees to observe
a) the wage for the 8-hour workday to the employees who are one-hour meal break, and to consequently deduct said time-off
able to prove that they took meal and rest periods in accordance from the employees' total number of hours of work in a day
with the CBA; because the law treats the same as non-compensable, was
clearly against the CBA-mandated compensable hours of work of
b) the four (4) hours overtime pay to the employees who are eight hours a day including meal break of 30 minutes and two 15
able to prove that they worked for 12 hours and took their meal minutes coffee breaks.40 The appellate court, thus, sustained
and rest periods in accordance with the CBA; respondent's claim to be compensated in accordance with the
CBA as follows:
 Thus, We hold that employees who took their Whether the CA seriously erred in finding that petlt10ner
meals in an hour equivalent to the CBA required its employees to observe one-hour meal break and in
compensable meal and rest periods included in a ruling that petitioner's employees were entitled to be
regular workday should be compensated for the compensated for said meal break.
8-hour workday. As to entitlement to overtime
pay, employees who worked for 12 hours and Petitioner submits that respondent filed its Petition for Review
had their meal and rest periods in an hour, which before the CA beyond the reglementary period. It asserts that
should be equivalent to the CBA compensable respondent should have first filed a motion for reconsideration of
meal and rest periods included in an 8-hour the VA's decision within ten (10) days from the date respondent
workday, must be paid four (4) hours overtime received notice thereof, citing Teng v. Pahagac43 (Teng), or filed
pay.41 the petition before the CA within the said 10-day period following
the ruling in Philec.44 Since respondent failed to file a motion for
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Motion for reconsideration and that its petition before the CA was filed
Reconsideration42 dated August 25, 2016, but the same was beyond the 10-day period, the VA's decision had therefore
denied by the CA in its assailed February 14, 2017 Resolution. attained finality and had become immutable.45

Hence, this present petition for review on certiorari. Petitioner also asserts that the VA correctly upheld the
validity of the revised CRR. With respect to the issue of
Petitioner essentially raises the following issues: underpayment of overtime pay, petitioner denied requiring its
employees to have their meal break for one hour instead of30
I. minutes. It was allegedly the employees who opted to take either
the compensable 30-minute meal break or the routinary one-hour
meal break.46
Whether the VA's Decision had already been rendered final
and executory since respondent failed to file a motion for
reconsideration thereof and/or their petition before the CA was In its Comment,47 filed on October 17, 2018, respondent
filed beyond ten (10) days from notice of the VA's decision; argues that the CA correctly found that petitioner violated the
CBA provisions on hours of work and payment of overtime
premiums. Thus, the appellate court aptly sustained the VA's
II.
order for the payment of the employees' four hours, instead of
just three hours, of overtime pay. Respondent also asserts that,
Whether the CA seriously erred in finding that petitioner despite its insistence "to have a proper venue to discuss
violated respondent's CBA-mandated right to participate in policy company new policies and other proposed productivity
and decision-making processes on matters affecting the general incentives," petitioner still refuses to comply with its CBA-
welfare of petitioner's employees; and mandated obligation to organize a labor-management
committee.48 The appellate court, therefore, pertinently ordered
III. petitioner to comply with said obligation and to make the
necessary consultation with respondent respecting the adoption
and implementation of the revised CRR.
 In its Reply49 dated March 5, 2019, petitioner reiterates its Court requires exhaustion of available remedies as a condition
claims that respondent's CA petition should have been dismissed precedent to a petition under that Rule.54
for having been filed out of time; that it did not violate their CBA
with respondent; and that it correctly paid its employee's overtime On the other hand, Art. 276 of the Labor Code55 provides
pay.50 that the award or decision of the VA shall be "final and
executory after ten (10) calendar days from receipt of the
The Court's Ruling copy of the award or decision by the parties." This provision
was echoed in Sec. 6 of Rule VII of the 2005 VA Procedural
The petition lacks merit. Guidelines. However, Sec. 7 of Rule VII of the said
guidelines explicitly prohibited the filing of a motion for
At the outset, the Court finds that respondent substantially reconsideration against the VA's decision.
complied with the 15-day reglementary period on filing the petition
for review before the CA under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. Evidently, there appears to be a conflict between Rule 43 and
Art. 276 of the Labor Code, regarding the proper reglementary
Rule 43 of the Rules of Court governs the procedure on period of ten (10) days or fifteen (15) days to appeal to the CA,
appeals from quasi-judicial agencies which include voluntary and whether a motion for reconsideration is not required under
arbitrators. Sec. 4 thereof provides that the petition for review Sec. 7 of Rule VII of the 2005 VA Procedural Guidelines.
shall be taken within "fifteen (15) days from notice of the award,
judgment, final order or resolution" subject of the appeal. In this case, at the time respondent filed their petition before
Accordingly, once a petition for review is filed before the CA the CA on August 3, 2015, jurisprudence56 was already replete
within the 15-day reglementary period from the time the party with variable and conflicting rulings on the reglementary period to
receives the notice of the award, judgment, final order or be followed, whether ten (10) days or fifteen (15) days, in
resolution of the quasi-judicial agency, then the petition is appealing the decisions or awards of the Voluntary Arbitrators or
deemed filed on time. Panel of Arbitrators, as well as on the propriety of filing a motion
for reconsideration thereof. It was only on August 28, 2018 that
In addition, it must be noted that the principle of exhaustion of the Court finally settled these inconsistencies in the case
administrative remedies applies to Rule 43 of the Rules of of Guagua National Colleges v. Court of Appeals (Guagua).57
Court.51 The principle mandates "[t]he policy of judicial bodies to
give quasi-judicial agencies x x x an opportunity to correct its In Guagua, the Court categorically held that the petition for
mistakes by way of motions for reconsideration or other statutory review against the decision or award of the VA shall be filed
remedies before accepting appeals therefrom[.]"52 Thus, "before before the CA within 15 days pursuant to Sec. 4 of Rule 43 of the
a party is allowed to seek intervention of the courts, exhaustion of Rules of Court. On the other hand, the 10-day period under Art.
available administrative remedies, like filing a motion for 276 of the Labor Code refers to the filing of a motion for
reconsideration, is a pre-condition," and that failure to comply reconsideration vis-à-vis the VA's decision or award.58 The Court
thereto will generally lead to the dismissal of the case for lack of explained:
cause of action.53 As emphasized in Teng, "an appeal from
administrative agencies to the CA via Rule 43 of the Rules of
 Given the variable rulings of the Court, what should now be agency, every opportunity must be given to the
the period to be followed in appealing the decisions or awards of agency to resolve the matter and to exhaust all
the Voluntary Arbitrators or Panel of Arbitrators? opportunities for a resolution under the given
remedy before bringing an action in, or resorting
In the 2010 ruling in Teng v. [Pahagac], the Court clarified to, the courts of justice. Where Congress has not
that the 10-day period set in Article 276 of the Labor Code gave clearly required exhaustion, sound judicial
the aggrieved parties the opportunity to file their motion for discretion governs, guided by congressional
reconsideration, which was more in keeping with the principle of intent.
exhaustion of administrative remedies, holding thusly:
By disallowing reconsideration of the VA's
In the exercise of its power to promulgate decision, Section 7, Rule XIX of DO 40-03 and
implementing rules and regulations, an Section 7 of the 2005 Procedural Guidelines went
implementing agency, such as the Department of directly against the legislative intent behind
Labor, is restricted from going beyond the terms Article 262-A of the Labor Code. These rules
of the law it seeks to implement; it should neither deny the VA the chance to correct himself and
modify nor improve the law. The agency compel the courts of justice to prematurely
formulating the rules and guidelines cannot intervene with the action of an administrative
exceed the statutory authority granted to it by the agency entrusted with the adjudication of
legislature. controversies coming under its special
knowledge, training and specific field of
By allowing a 10-day period, the obvious expertise. In this era of clogged court dockets,
intent of Congress in amending Article 263 to the need for specialized administrative agencies
Article 262-A is to provide an opportunity for the with the special knowledge, experience and
party adversely affected by the VA's decision to capability to hear and determine promptly
seek recourse via a motion for reconsideration or disputes on technical matters or intricate
a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of questions of facts, subject to judicial review, is
Court filed with the CA. Indeed, a motion for indispensable. In Industrial Enterprises, Inc. v.
reconsideration is the more appropriate remedy Court of Appeals, we ruled that relief must first be
in line with the doctrine of exhaustion of obtained in an administrative proceeding before a
administrative remedies. For this reason, an remedy will be supplied by the courts even
appeal from administrative agencies to the though the matter is within the proper jurisdiction
CA via Rule 43 of the Rules of Court requires of a court. x x x
exhaustion of available remedies as a condition
precedent to a petition under that Rule. Hence, the 10-day period stated in Article 276 should be
understood as the period within which the party adversely
The requirement that administrative remedies affected by the ruling of the Voluntary Arbitrators or Panel of
be exhausted is based on the doctrine that in Arbitrators may file a motion for reconsideration. Only after
providing for a remedy before an administrative the resolution of the motion for reconsideration may the
aggrieved party appeal to the CA by filing the petition for Colleges was not yet in effect. Consequently, at that time,
review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court within 15 days respondent cannot be blamed for honestly relying on Sec. 7 of
from notice pursuant to Section 4 of Rule 43.59 (Emphasis Rule VII of the 2005 VA Procedural Guidelines for not filing a
supplied) motion for reconsideration and immediately resorting to a petition
for review under Rule 43 within the 15-day reglementary period.
Further, in Guagua, the Court ruled that a motion for
reconsideration should be filed with the VA before a petition for The Court, therefore, finds no reason to disturb the CA's
review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court can be filed before the ruling in favor of respondent's non-filing of a motion for
CA. The Court explained that the unchanged provision under the reconsideration of the VA's decision before elevating the same for
2005 VA Procedural Guidelines has sown confusion among the review in the CA under Rule 43. To repeat, at the time
parties, despite the clarification made in Teng that the 10-day respondent filed its CA petition, Sec. 7 of Rule VII of the 2005 VA
period under Art. 276 of the Labor Code refers to the filing of a Procedural Guidelines persisted. This provision expressly stated
motion for reconsideration before the VA as a condition precedent that a motion for reconsideration was not allowed. Respondent's
to the filing of a petition for review under Rule 43 in the CA. Thus, resort to a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court,
to put a stop to the confusion, the Court directed the Department without seeking reconsideration of the VA's decision, was due to
of Labor and Employment (DOLE) and the NCMB to "cause the its sincere reliance on the 2005 VA Procedural Guidelines.
revision or amendment of Section 7 of Rule VII of the Revised Besides, respondent timely filed its CA petition within the 15-day
Procedural Guidelines in the Conduct of Voluntary Arbitration reglementary period under Rule 43, which was still the proper
Proceedings in order to allow the filing of motions for remedy as pronounced in Guagua.
reconsideration in line with Article 276 of the Labor Code."60
Right to participate in policy and decision-making processes
Since then, the rulings in Guagua in 2018 resonated in Del on matters affecting the general welfare of the employees
Monte Fresh Produce, Inc. v. Del Monte Fresh Supervisors
Union,61 Chin v. MaerskFilipinas Crewing, lnc.,62 Bahia Shipping Petitioner claims that it is within its management prerogative
Services, Inc. v. Castillo,63 Social Housing Employees to revise the old CRR, and that the CBA does not even require
Association, Inc. v. Social Housing Finance respondent's "prior approval or conformity" thereof for its valid
Corporation,64 and DORELCO Employees Union-ALU-TUCP v. implementation.67 Nevertheless, petitioner asserts that there
Don Orestes Romualdez Electric Cooperative, Inc.65 However, it were no substantial changes made in the revised CRR from the
was only on February 5, 2021 that the NCMB reflected the old one and it suffices that, before the revised CRR was
Court's directive to allow the filing of motions for reconsideration implemented, the employees were duly apprised thereof during
in its 2021 Revised Procedural Guidelines in the Conduct of the January 16 to 17, 2014 general assembly organized by
Voluntary Arbitration Proceedings.66 petitioner.

Applying the foregoing, it is clear that on August 3, 2015, The Court disagrees.
when respondent filed its petition for review under Rule 43 before
the CA within the 15-day reglementary period but without filing a It is settled that the exercise by an employer of its
prior motion for reconsideration before the CA, the categorical management prerogative is not absolute and is subject to
ruling of the Court in the 2018 case of Guagua National
limitations imposed by "law, collective bargaining agreement, with respondent matters that involve decisions or policies that
and general principles of fair play and justice."68 may adversely affect the general welfare of its members and
labor-management relations, including any dispute arising out of
Sec. 3 of Art. VI of the CBA obligates petitioner to discuss the employer-employee relationship.71
with respondent "matters that may involve decisions or policies
that may adversely affect the general welfare of the However, petitioner did not comply with its obligation under
members."69 Art. XXIV of the CBA even demands petitioner and the CBA to consult and discuss with respondent regarding these
respondent to tackle all matters of "mutual interest particularly matters affecting labor-management relations. It failed to cite any
those affecting labor-management relations" and/or even "any instance showing that it tried to reach out to respondent to obtain
dispute, controversy, problem, complaint or disagreement and consider the latter's position on the matter. In fact, it was
between the [parties] arising out of employer-employee never disputed by petitioner that it ignored respondent's calls to
relationship."70 create a labor management committee, thus, deliberately
depriving respondent of its right to participate in policy and
The CRR, be it the old or revised one, lays down the omnibus decision-making processes on matters affecting the general
policies, rules and regulations, which petitioner demands from its welfare of the employees.72 To the Court's view, petitioner
employees to strictly observe. It defines the offenses, the severity practically conceded that it never really consulted respondent
of their commission, and the corresponding penalties to be before it implemented the revised CRR.
imposed on the erring employee. Surely, petitioner's CRR
involves matters that affect the general welfare of respondent's The mere fact that petitioner organized a general assembly
members, as well as the parties' labor-management relationship, on January 16-17, 2014 to discuss the revised CRR with its
and any changes to the same necessarily affect them. Clearly, employees cannot be considered as faithful compliance with the
petitioner is duty-bound under the CBA to discuss with relevant CBA provisions. It should be emphasized that the CBA
respondent any revision and/or modification in the CRR. requires petitioner to discuss matters that affect the general
welfare of the employees specifically with the "UNION." The
Moreover, the obligation imposed by the parties upon union referred to is herein respondent, a juridical person vested
themselves is mutual. The reason behind this policy requiring a by law with certain rights which only it may exercise, such as the
discussion between labor and management is obvious in the CBA authority to represent all the rank-and-file employees on matters
itself – to promote and maintain a harmonious labor-management concerning them. Certainly, a general assembly of employees
relationship. The objective of this shared obligation may be regardless of rank does not possess such legal personality. It
achieved through prior and bilateral consultation of the parties must also be stressed that petitioner and respondent agreed to
with each other, and certainly not through a one-sided establish a labor-management committee precisely to have a
presentation of the revisions or modifications already arrived at by forum where they can have a bilateral discussion on matters
only one party. affecting labor-management relations. However, this did not
happen because during the general assembly, petitioner merely
Evidently, while petitioner indeed had management presented to all the employees the revised CRR, which was
prerogative, such prerogative was limited or regulated by the already established without respondent's participation. In fact, the
relevant provisions of the CBA, particularly, Art. VI and Art. XXIV employees were simply handed a copy of the revised CRR.
thereof. These provisions essentially require petitioner to discuss
7!ᕼ dM ᗄ7
Subsequently, petitioner implemented the revised CRR sans the
comments of respondent.73 Indeed, the general assembly was a The Court is not persuaded.
mere farce or simulation as petitioner was already set on
implementing the onerous revised CRR regardless of Sec. 83, in relation to Sec. 85 of the Labor Code, states that
respondent's views. the compensable eight hours of work in a day does not include
the 60 minutes time-off for the regular meals of an
Likewise, petitioner's assertion that the changes it made in employee, ergo, this statutory one-hour meal break, not being
the CRR were unsubstantial is inaccurate. A cursory review of the part of the normal working hours of an employee, is non-
old and the revised CRR reveals that petitioner indeed introduced compensable. In short, the normal eight-hour work period does
changes, which affect the rights of the employees.74 As aptly not include the statutory and non-compensable one-hour meal
noted by the CA, the majority of the offenses outlined in the old break.76
CRR have a corresponding punishment depending on the
number of times of its commission. This escalating degree of Nevertheless, the hours of work of the employees may be
penalty based on the number of times of the commission of the modified or regulated in a duly signed CBA between the employer
offense was entirely deleted in the revised CRR. Accordingly, the and its employees. It is rudimentary that: "[a] collective bargaining
revised CRR imposed a harsher system of punishment, without agreement or CBA refers to the negotiated contract between a
consulting respondent. legitimate labor organization and the employer concerning
wages, hours of work and all other terms and conditions of
All of these controversies regarding the revised CRR could employment in a bargaining unit. As in all contracts, the parties in
have been avoided had petitioner genuinely and sincerely a CBA may establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and
complied with the mandate, under the CBA, to discuss and conditions as they may deem convenient provided these are not
consult with respondent on matters relating to labor-management contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public
relations and the employees' general welfare. However, petitioner policy. Thus, where the CBA is clear and unambiguous, it
did not. Hence, it cannot be gainsaid that petitioner sufficiently becomes the law between the parties and compliance therewith is
complied with the CBA in imposing the revised CRR. mandated by the express policy of the law."77

The one-hour meal break, which is divided into 3 parts, is Secs. 1 and 2 of Rule VII of the CBA regarding meal times are
compensable unambiguous, to wit:

Lastly, petitioner denies ordering their employees to have Section 1. Hours of Work. – The working hours in the
their meal break for one hour instead of 30 minutes. Petitioner COMP ANY shall be Eight (8) hours a day including meal
asserts that it just so happened that they have employees taking break of thirty (30) minutes and two (2) fifteen (15) minutes
the compensable 30-minute meal break and those still having coffee break. The regular working day shall be Six (6) days a
their routinary one-hour continuous breaktime. According to week, from Monday to Saturday. Sunday is considered the
petitioner, those who took the one-hour rest period were no general rest day of all employees in the COMPANY. All
longer entitled to be compensated following the no work, no pay employees shall be found stationed at their designated place of
policy.75 work at the start of their time of work.
 a) Grace Period – Employees who come to work late shall Thus, through petitioner's scheming policy, it authorized a
be entitled to grace period of an aggregate of One Hundred one-hour meal break that is not compensable, contrary to the 30-
Twenty (120) Minutes consumable in a month. Provided that minute meal break and two 15-minute coffee breaks under the
corresponding disciplinary actions found in the employees CBA. The obvious intent of petitioner in this policy of allowing the
handbook shall be imposed on the employee who incurred more one-hour meal break is to lessen the compensable work hours of
than three (3) of fifteen to thirty (15-30) minutes late in a month; in its employees; instead of allowing the compensable meal break of
excess of thirty (30) minutes will be subject for approval of 30-minutes and two 15-minute coffee breaks in the CBA. This is
department head. clearly a circumvention of the unequivocal provisions of the CBA
providing for compensable meal and rest periods.
Section 2. Overtime Pay – Any employee who works in
excess of Eight (8) hours in any regular working day shall be In effect, those employees rendering 12 hours of work in an
entitled to an additional Twenty Five percent (25%) of the daily eight-hour work day, were only compensated with three hours of
hour basic rate as overtime premium. The overtime work of overtime pay,79 instead of four hours. Clearly, the policy
employees shall not be used to offset absences incurred by them implemented by petitioner thwarted the provision of the CBA
on regular working hours.78 (Emphasis supplied) regarding the meal time of its employees.

The short rest periods of meal time, or those periods shorter In sum, the CA correctly ruled that petitioner's employees
than one-hour, have been purposely integrated by the parties in who worked for 12 hours in an eight-hour workday, and took the
the normal eight-hour workday. The intent of the parties is
1a ⍵⍴ h!1 30-minute and two 15-minute rest breaks as their meal time in
readily ascertainable. The CBA divided the meal time of the accordance with the CBA, must be compensated for four hours of
employees into three parts, i.e., the 30-minute lunch break and overtime pay.80
two 15-minute coffee breaks. Evidently, the meal time was
divided into shorter rest periods so that these periods can be WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated
considered as compensable. July 29, 2016 and the Resolution dated February 14, 2017 of the
Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. SP No. 141529, are
Petitioner, however, essentially admitted that it wittingly hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
allowed the employees to consume one whole hour of continuous
meal break instead of strictly implementing the CBA mandated SO ORDERED.
30-minute meal break and two 15-minute rest periods. In defining
the commission of the offense of "over break" in the revised CRR,
petitioner even classified those consuming the one-hour meal
break as "straight time" employees and those consuming the 30-
minute meal break as "non-straight time" employees. Evidently,
petitioner had established two policies on hours of work and meal
period. As the Court sees it, petitioner cunningly permitted the
"straight time" employees to lump the short meal breaks into one-
hour, which is against the CBA.
RODOLFO R. MAHINAY v. CA Administrative Code of 1987 in relation to Sec. 22 (i), Rule XIV of
the Omnibus Civil Service Rules and Regulations.[3]
AZCUNA, J.:
In his Answer, petitioner admitted receiving the fees from
This is a petition for certiorari[1] alleging that the Court of Fritz Logistics Phils., Inc., thus:
Appeals (CA) acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to xxx
lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the Resolutions dated That respondent hereby states that the very purpose on why
October 30, 2000, April 6, 2001 he, or any other special PEZA Police Officer for that matter, is
escorting freight trucks from Baguio City to their point of
and March 6, 2002, dismissing petitioner's petition for destination is to ensure that the goods will be intact and safely
certiorari, which in effect sustained the Decision of the Civil and completely delivered to their destinations; that it would
Service Commission (CSC) dismissing petitioner from the therefore be inaccurate to state that their rendering escort duty is
service. purposely to "lessen delay in the scheduled trip xxx by police
checkpoints and unscrupulous traffic enforcers encountered
The facts are as follows: along the way, particularly during the implementation of the truck
ban policy in Metro Manila," that the latter act would just be
On June 10, 1998, the Philippine Economic Zone Authority incidental and relative to their main task above-mentioned;
(PEZA), through Officer-in-charge Jesus S. Sirios, charged its
employee, petitioner Rodolfo R. Mahinay, for receiving unofficial That anent the charge, respondent hereby admits that before
fees from FRITZ Logistics Phils. Inc. by reason of his office and in the directive by SPL. P/MAJOR JOSE C. PANOPIO dated
consideration of the latter's rendering escort service to FRITZ' February 19, 1998, ALL police officers stationed at the Baguio
trucks from Baguio City to Manila and vice-versa. The formal City Economic Zone (BCEZ) were receiving and amount of P300
charge reads: VOLUNTARILY GIVEN by the FRITZ LOGISTICS PHILS., INC.
That from 1996 to receipt by the BCEZ Police Station (FRITZ, for brevity) as and by way of traveling and meal
Command of P/Major JOSE C. PANOPIO's February 19, 1998 allowance of an escort in proceeding back to Baguio City after
directive prohibiting all BCEZ Policemen from accepting unofficial coming from NAIA; that hereto attached and made an integral
fees from FRITZ Logistics Phils. Inc., respondent P/Capt. part hereof as Annex "I" is a copy of a confirmation letter by
RODOLDO R. MAHINAY of the BCEZ Station Command JERRY H. STEHMEIER, Managing Director of FRITZ;
received unofficial fees from FRITZ Logistics Phils. Inc. by reason
of his office and in consideration of the latter's rendering escort That herein respondent declares that his, as well as the other
service to FRITZ' trucks . . . from Baguio City to Manila and vice- police officers' receipt of the aforesaid amount of PhP 300.00 was
versa, and whose presence during such escort service is to help done in all good faith with no intention whatsoever of enriching
lessen delay in the scheduled trip of FRITZ' cargo by police themselves therefrom;
checkpoints and unscrupulous traffic enforcers encountered
along the way, particularly during implementation of the truck ban That, concededly, there is remitted by FRITZ to the BCEZ an
policy in Metro Manila.[2] amount of P500 for the escorts as escort fee resulting into receipt
The said conduct of petitioner was alleged to be in violation of by the escort in the amount of P400 NET; that is, however,
Sec. 46 (b) (9), Chapter 6, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of the indisputable that the same will be received by the particular police
officer who went on escort duty after he shall have arrived from
Manila and upon presentation of the Certificate of Appearance That on another point, herein respondent feels that this
secured from the Security Services Department of the Philippine charge against him was only maliciously hurled by some officers
Economic Zone Authority x x x; who take in slight the prudent and conscientious acts of the
respondent in protecting foremost the interest of PEZA;
That, at first, there was no such thing as additional allowance
from FRITZ but after the transportation fare from Manila/Pasay That more particularly, BCEZ Officer-in-Charge Digna D.
City to Baguio City increased substantially by half, as well as the Torres maliciously imputed these things to malign my reputation
costs of other incidental expenses ballooned, FRITZ voluntarily and personality after having learned that herein respondent filed
offered the additional allowance after understanding very well that several criminal charges against her before the Office of the City
the P400 escort fee is not reasonably sufficient; simple Prosecutor, Baguio City solely for the purpose of redressing a
mathematics applied; wrong committed against his person and honor by Mrs. Torres.[4]
At the hearing of September 30, 1998, petitioner appeared
That, without being repetitive, it must be straightened for the with two counsels who manifested that they were reiterating the
record, that the giving of the P300 by FRITZ was on its own defenses stated in petitioner's Answer. The Hearing Committee
volition without any demand from the escorts; required petitioner to put the manifestation in writing because it
was, in effect, a waiver of his right to be present and to be heard.
That after receipt of the DIRECTIVE from SPL. P/MAJOR Petitioner and his counsels left after submitting the written waiver.
PANOPIO, herein respondent no longer received the P300.00
tendered by FRITZ through its drivers whenever he does escort Thereafter, the Special Prosecutor presented his lone
duty, that in fact, herein respondent directed all his men to stop witness, Mr. Jerry H. Stehmeier, managing director of FRITZ, who
receiving the P300 allowance from FRITZ in compliance with the affirmed the contents
directive of their superior, SPL. P/MAJOR PANOPIO;
of his Affidavit[5] dated September 9, 1998. He testified that
That, like himself, respondent could very well say that all of the "extra amount" of P300 was in fact actually received by
the other Police Officers in the BCEZ Force never received the petitioner, who exacted the same from FRITZ, for escorting their
additional allowance from FRITZ thereafter, that almost every "trucks all the way to the airport or all the way to our FRITZ office
after an escort duty by a Police Officer, he silently complains that in Manila." The testimony was a recantation of his earlier
the P400 escort duty received from the Financial Services statement contained in a letter dated February 10, 1998 that the
Division as remitted officially by FRITZ to BCEZ was not sufficient extra amount was voluntarily given by FRITZ.
in covering all the incidental expenses he incurred in escorting;
On January 8, 1999, the PEZA rendered a decision finding
That it would not be amiss to state even that considering that petitioner guilty of the offense charged. The dispositive portion of
these FRITZ closed trucks being escorted leave Baguio City at the Decision reads:
2:00 o'clock in the morning, more or less; that considering the VIEWED IN THE LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, the Authority
time, the escorts could not make cash advances for their finds the Respondent guilty of the offense as charged and is
expenses and really have to shell out their personal money in the hereby meted out the penalty of forced resignation without
meantime to be reimbursed only after the duty; prejudice to the grant of monetary and other fringe benefits, as
allowed by existing law and the Civil Service Rules and filed out of time. The CA stated that since the assailed Resolution
Regulations.[6] was rendered by a quasi-judicial body, the proper mode of appeal
The PEZA held that all the elements of the offense charged is a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, which
were present in the case. The testimony of Jerry H. Stehmeier petition should be filed within 15 days from notice of the
proved that the amount of P300 per escort was received by resolution.
petitioner, and that the receipt of the money was done in the
course of official duties. Petitioner's receipt of P300 per escort On November 9, 2000, petitioner filed the petition for
from FRITZ was over and above what was officially paid by PEZA certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seeking the
to petitioner for escort services rendered. nullification of the CSC Resolution dismissing him from the
service.
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied by the
PEZA in a Resolution dated March 11, 1999. On April 6, 2001, the CA issued a Resolution stating that it
had promulgated the Resolution dated October 30, 2000
Petitioner appealed to the CSC. In Resolution No. 000878 dismissing the petition for certiorari, and that the Judicial Records
dated March 30, 2000, the CSC upheld the PEZA's decision, but Division Report showed that neither a motion for reconsideration
modified the penalty of forced resignation to dismissal from the nor a Supreme Court petition on the resolution had been filed.
service in accordance with Sec. 52 (A.9), Rule IV, Uniform Rules Consequently, the CA ordered the issuance of the corresponding
on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service and Sec. 22 (i),[7] entry of judgment, and noted without action the petition for
Rule XIV of the Omnibus Civil Service Rules and Regulations. certiorari filed on November 9, 2000.
The dispositive portion of the CSC Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the appeal of Rodolfo Mahinay is hereby Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied by the CA
dismissed. Accordingly, the decision dated January 8, 1999 of of Appeals in a Resolution dated March 6, 2002.
PEZA finding Mahinay guilty of violating Sec. 46 (b) No. 9, Book
V of E.O. 292 is affirmed. However the penalty of Forced Hence, this petition.
Resignation is modified to Dismissal pursuant to section 52, Rule
IV of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil The issue in this case is whether or not the CA acted with
Service.[8] grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied by the jurisdiction in dismissing petitioner's appeal by way of special civil
CSC in Resolution No. 001698 dated July 21, 2000. Petitioner action for certiorari on the ground that it was the wrong mode of
received a copy of the resolution on August 11, 2000. appeal and that the appeal was filed out of time.

On September 12, 2000, petitioner filed with the CA a Motion Petitioner contends that the CA erred in ruling that the petition
for Extension of Time to File a Petition for Certiorari, requesting for certiorari was made to substitute a lost appeal because while
for a period of up to November 10, 2000 within which to file his a petition for review under Rule 43 was available, it was not an
petition. adequate remedy for petitioner considering that he was dismissed
from the service on June 9, 1999 by PEZA even before the case
On October 30, 2000, the CA issued a Resolution denying was appealed to the Civil Service on June 22, 1999.
the said motion for being the wrong mode of appeal and for being
 The contention is without merit. The CA, therefore, properly denied petitioner's Motion for
Extension of Time to File a Petition for Certiorari, which in effect
As provided by Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, the proper dismissed his Petition for Certiorari.
mode of appeal from the decision of a quasi-judicial agency, like
the CSC, is a petition for review filed with the CA. There have been instances when a petition for certiorari
would be treated as a petition for review if filed within the
The special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 of the reglementary period. In this case, the petition was filed beyond
Rules of Court may be resorted to only when any tribunal, board the reglementary period for filing an appeal under Rule 43, which
or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted period is within 15 days from notice of the judgment. Petitioner
without or in excess of its/his jurisdiction or with grave abuse of received a copy of the CSC Resolution dated July 21, 2000 on
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is August 11, 2000, so his last day to file an appeal would be
no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the August 26, 2000. However, petitioner filed his Motion for
ordinary course of law. Extension of Time to File a Petition for Certiorari on September
12, 2000, while the petition was actually filed on November 9,
In this case, petitioner clearly had the remedy of appeal 2000. Thus, the Court of Appeals correctly held that the appeal
provided by Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. Madrigal Transport, was filed out of time.
Inc. v. Lapanday Holdings Corporation[9] held:
Where appeal is available to the aggrieved party, the action Consequently, the decision of the CSC dismissing petitioner
for certiorari will not be entertained. Remedies of appeal from the service stands. The Court deems it proper to reiterate
(including petitions for review) and certiorari are mutually that dismissal from the service carries with it disqualification for
exclusive, not alternative or successive. Hence, certiorari is not reemployment in the government service, and forfeiture of
and cannot be a substitute for an appeal, especially if one's own retirement benefits except leave credits. Petitioner is, therefore,
negligence or error in one's choice of remedy occasioned such entitled to receive the monetary equivalent of his accrued leave
loss or lapse. One of the requisites of certiorari is that there be no credits.[11]
available appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy.
Where an appeal is available, certiorari will not prosper, even if WHEREFORE, the Petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
the ground therefor is grave abuse of discretion.
The Court is aware of instances when the special civil action No costs.
of certiorari may be resorted to despite the availability of an
appeal, such as when public welfare and the advancement of SO ORDERED.
public policy dictate; when the broader interests of justice so
require; when the writs issued are null; and when the questioned
order amounts to an oppressive exercise of judicial authority.[10]
However, the circumstances in this case do not warrant the
application of the exception to the general rule provided by Rule
43 of the Rules of Court.
VIRGILIO S. SUELO v. MST MARINE SERVICES
On November 7, 2016, he reported to respondent's branch office in
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.: Iloilo. He alleged that respondent did not allow him to report to its
Manila office and refused to refer him to a company-designated
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari[1] filed by physician. Instead, respondent allegedly asked him to seek medical
petitioner Virgilio S. Suelo, Jr. (petitioner) assailing the treatment subject to reimbursement. However, he averred that
Resolutions[2] dated September 3, 2019 and March 6, 2020 of the when he submitted his request for reimbursement, respondent
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA -G.R. SP No. 161699, which dismissed denied the same.[5] Accordingly, he filed a complaint for permanent
his petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court (Rules) and total disability benefits, damages, and attorney's fees before
due to several procedural infirmities. the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB).

The Facts For their part, respondent argued that it was petitioner who refused
to undergo treatment with the company-designated physician,
On May I 0, 2016, petitioner was hired by respondent MST Marine thereby forfeiting his right to claim disability benefits and sick
Services (Phils.), Inc. (respondent) as Second Engineer for a six (6)- wages. Moreover, petitioner was not entitled to sickness allowance,
month contract on board the vessel "Janesia Asphalt V," with a basic damages, and attorney's fees in the absence of bad faith from
monthly package of $1,551.00 as salary, $1,155.00 as overtime pay, respondent's end.[6]
and $466.00 vacation leave pay, among others. On May 28, 2016,
he boarded the vessel and commenced his duties as Second The VA Ruling
Engineer.[3]
In a Decision[7] dated February 18, 2019, the Panel of Voluntary
On October 29, 2016, he was brought to Singapore General Hospital Arbitrators (VA) denied petitioner's claim, rejecting his allegation
due to severe headache, slurring of speech, neck pain, and a recent that respondent asked him to seek medical treatment subject to
history of loss of consciousness. Upon evaluation, he was diagnosed reimbursement. The VA found that the medical abstract he
with uncontrolled hypertension. His X-ray results revealed submitted, which was dated two (2) years from the time of his
degenerative change at C5-6 and C6-7 levels. Subsequently, he was disembarkation from the vessel, revealed that he sought medical
given medications, declared unfit for all marine duties, and signed treatment almost a year after such disembarkation, or around
off in Singapore on medical grounds. He arrived in the Philippines August 2017. Moreover, the VA ruled that petitioner cannot claim
on November 4, 2016 and immediately flew to his hometown in medical reimbursement since he failed to submit any evidence of
Iloilo.[4] his medical expenses. On the other hand, it found that respondent
was able to prove through substantial evidence that it was the affidavit of service was in violation of Section 13, Rule 13 of the
petitioner who actually refused to be referred to a company- same Rules.[14]
designated physician because he believed that his condition was
already cured.[8] Dissatisfied, petitioner moved for reconsideration.[15] He admitted
that he had only fifteen (15) days from July 12, 2019, or until July
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration,[9] which 27, 2019, within which to file the Rule 43 Petition before the CA.
was denied in a Resolution[10] dated June 28, 2019. Petitioner, However, believing that he had only ten (10) days to do so, he opted
through counsel, received the copy of the order of the denial of the to file a motion for extension of the period to file the Rule 43
MR on July 12, 2019. On July 22, 2019, petitioner moved for a Petition, thus asking for an additional twenty (20) days or until
twenty (20)-day extension within which to file a petition for review August 11, 2019, to file the same. He likewise admitted that he
before the CA, or until August 11, 2019.[11] On August 9, 2019, inadvertently stated in his explanation that the copy of the petition
petitioner filed a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules was served to the adverse party through personal service.[16]
(Rule 43 Petition) before the CA.[12]
In a Resolution[17] dated March 6, 2020, the CA denied petitioner's
The CA Ruling motion for reconsideration, holding that the right to appeal is not a
natural right as it is merely a statutory privilege to be exercised only
In a Resolution[13] dated September 3, 2019, the CA dismissed the in accordance with the law. Although the law admits exceptions, as
Rule 43 Petition outright citing the following procedural infirmities: the Rules may be relaxed to save litigants from injustice
(a) it was filed two (2) days late, and (b) the affidavit of service was commensurate with his failure to comply with the prescribed rules,
inaccurate, since it stated that the service of the copy of the petition the CA found said exception to be wanting in this case.
upon the adverse parties was done personally, when in fact it was Consequently, the VA's Decision became final and executory, and
served through registered mail. With respect to the first ground, the thus, immutable and unalterable.[18]
CA explained that since petitioner received the VA's June 28, 2019
Decision denying his motion for reconsideration on July 12, 2019, he Hence, the present petition.
only had until August 7, 2019, reckoned from July 22, 2019 (or ten
[10] days from July 12, 2019), within which to file the Rule 43 The Issue Before the Court
Petition before the CA. However, he belatedly filed the same on
August 9, 2019 in violation of Section 4, Rule 43 of the Rules of The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA erred in
Court. Anent the second ground, the CA ruled that the inaccuracy in dismissing the Rule 43 Petition on procedural grounds.
The Court's Ruling In this case, records reveal that petitioner received a copy of the
VA's Decision denying his motion for reconsideration on July 12,
The appeal is meritorious. 2019. Thus, he had fifteen (15) days therefrom or until July 27, 2019
within which to file the petition, or to move for a 15-day extension
In the recent case of Chin v. Maersk-Filipinas Crewing, Inc.,[19] of time to file the same. Assuming that an extension is granted, he
(Chin) citing Guagua National Colleges v. CA,[20] (Guagua National had until August 11, 2019, reckoned from the expiration of the
Colleges) the Court categorically declared that the correct period to reglementary period on July 27, 2019, within which to file his
appeal the decision or award of the Voluntary Arbitrators or Panel petition.
of Arbitrators to the CA via a Rule 43 petition for review is the
fifteen (15)-day period set forth in Section 4[21] thereof reckoned Indeed, petitioner filed a motion for extension of time to file his
from the notice or receipt of the VA's resolution on the motion for Rule 43 Petition within the allowable period or on July 22, 2019.
reconsideration, and that the ten (10)-day period provided in Article Although the Rules allow only for a 15-day extension or until August
276 of the Labor Code refers to the period within which an 11, 2019, he was able to file his petition on August 9, 2019, also
aggrieved party may file said motion for reconsideration, viz.: clearly within the allowable extended period. Hence, in both
Hence, the 10-day period stated in Article 276 should be instances, petitioner filed his pleadings on time. Moreover,
understood as the period within which the party adversely affected petitioner's error in the affidavit of service stating that he served
by the ruling of the Voluntary Arbitrators or Panel of Arbitrators copies of the Rule 43 Petition to the adverse parties through
may file a motion for reconsideration. Only after the resolution of personal service instead of registered mail appears to have been an
the motion for reconsideration may the aggrieved party appeal to honest mistake. In any case, the inaccuracy in the statement of the
the CA by filing the petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of manner of service appears inconsequential considering that, after
Court within 15 days from notice pursuant to Section 4 of Rule all, he was able to serve copies of the petition to the adverse
43.[22] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) parties.
Moreover, under Section 4, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, upon
proper motion and the payment of the full amount of the docket In sum, the Court finds that the CA erred in dismissing outright the
fees before the expiration of the reglementary period, the CA may Rule 43 Petition based solely on procedural grounds; therefore, a
grant an additional period of fifteen (15) days only within which to remand of the case for a resolution on the merits is warranted.
file the petition for review, and no further extension shall be Finally, following the Court's recent disposition in Chin, the
granted except for the most compelling reason and in no case shall reminder to the Department of Labor and Employment and the
it exceed fifteen (15) days. NCMB to revise or amend the Revised Procedural Guidelines in the
Conduct of Voluntary Arbitration Proceedings to reflect the ruling in rights under the Contract to Sell. [Petitioner] was notified of the
the Guagua National Colleges case is hereby reiterated. execution of such deed. Later on, the Contract to Sell in
[respondent’s] name was cancelled, and [petitioner] issued a new
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions dated one in favor of Yu although it was also denominated as "Contract to
September 3, 2019 and March 6, 2020 of the Court of Appeals in Sell No. 867".
CA-G.R. SP No. 161699 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Accordingly, the present case is REMANDED to the Court of Appeals On November 11, 1996, [respondent] filed a Manifestation in GR
for resolution on the merits. No. 109078 informing the Supreme Court that [petitioner], on three
(3) occasions, refused to accept [her] payment of the balance in the
SO ORDERED. amount of ₧187,380.00. On January 29, 1997, a Resolution was
issued by the Supreme Court referring the case to the court of origin
TOPIC: Tender of Payment and Consignation G.R. No. 169501 for appropriate action, on account of [respondent’s] manifestation.
On October 21, 1997, [respondent’s] counsel wrote a letter to
On all these dates, however, [petitioner] allegedly refused to accept [petitioner] citing the latter’s refusal to accept her payment on
payment from [respondent]. several occasions. It was also mentioned therein that due to its
refusal, [respondent] would just consign the balance due to
June 8, 2007 [petitioner] before the proper judicial authority. Thinking that an
action for consignation alone would not be sufficient to allow for
B.E. SAN DIEGO, INC., petitioner, vs. ROSARIO T. the execution of a final judgment in her favor, [respondent] decided
to file an action for consignation and specific performance against
ALZUL, respondent.
[petitioner] before the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board on
March 12, 1998.
FACTS: On February 10, 1975, respondent purchased from
petitioner four (4) subdivision lots with an aggregate area of 1,275
On July 4, 1979, [respondent] informed [petitioner] about Yu’s
square meters located at Aurora Subdivision, Maysilo, Malabon.
failure and refusal to pay the amounts due under the conditional
(bought through installment under Contract to Sell No. 867 at
deed. She also manifested that she would be the one to pay the
(₧100.00) per square meter--interest was (12%) per annum until
installments due to respondent on account of Yu’s default.
fully paid--total purchase price was (₧237,660.00). On July 25,
1977, [respondent] signed a "Conditional Deed of Assignment and
HLURB through Housing and Land Use Arbiter Dunstan T. San
Transfer of Rights" which assigned to a certain Wilson P. Yu her
Vicente: "The purported "consignation" in this case is thus of no
moment, inasmuch as the amount allegedly due was not even On May 8, 1990, the Ventura spouses filed an action for Quieting of
deposited or placed at the disposal of this Office by the Title with Prayer for Cancellation of Annotation and Damages (RTC:
complainant. in favor of spouses--CA: reversed--SC: affirmed) SC: Private
respondent Rosario T. Alzul is given a nonextendible period of thirty
On August 25, 1980, [respondent] commenced an action for (30) days from entry of judgment, within which to make full
rescission of the conditional deed of assignment against Yu before payment for the properties in question. On July 12, 1996, an Entry
the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City. (Trial Court & CA in favor of Judgment was issued. In an attempt to comply with the Supreme
of respondent) Subsequently, on September 30, 1985, [respondent] Court’s directive, herein [respondent] tried to serve payment upon
caused the annotation of notices of lis pendens on the titles [petitioner] on August 29, 1996, August 30, 1996 and September 28,
covering the subject lots. 1996.

In any event, we agree with [petitioner] that even if the "From the foregoing, it is evident that there was no valid
complainant had actually made the consignation of the amount, consignation of the balance of the purchase price. The 30day non-
such consignation is still ineffective and void for having been done extendible period set forth in the 17 June 1996 resolution had
long after the expiration of the nonextendible period set forth in the already expired on 20 September 1996. The HLURB is therefore
17 June 1996 Supreme Court Resolution that expired on 20 justified in refusing the consignation, otherwise it would be accused
September 1996. of extending the period beyond that provided by the Supreme
Court. A valid consignation is effected when there is an actual
On February 17, 1989, [petitioner] notified [respondent] that consignation of the amount due within the prescribed period, CA:
Contract to Sell No. 867 was declared rescinded and cancelled. On agreed with the HLURB that no valid consignation was made by
April 28, 1989, the subject lots were sold to spouses Carlos and respondent but found that justice would be better served by
Sandra Ventura who were allegedly surprised to find the annotation allowing respondent Alzul to effect the consignation, albeit
of lis pendens in their owner’s duplicate title. belatedly. It cited the respondent’s right over the disputed lots as
confirmed by this Court in G.R. No.
[Respondent] then filed an appeal to the Office of the President.
The single question resolved was whether or not [respondent’s] 109078, which, if taken away on account of the delay in completing
offer of consignation was correctly denied by the HLURB. Said office the payment, would amount to a grave injustice. ISSUE: Now we will
ruled in the affirmative, and We quote: address the main issue—whether respondent Alzul is still entitled to
consignation despite the lapse of the period provided by the Court
in G.R. No. 109078 entitled Yu v. Court of Appeals. Petitioner
stresses the fact that respondent Alzul did not comply with this lis pendens annotated on them in favor of respondent until such
Court’s June 17, 1996 Resolution20which gave a non-extendible time that ownership of the subject parcels of land is transferred to
period of thirty (30) days from entry of judgment within which to respondent Rosario Alzul. It is thus clear that we accorded
make full payment for the subject properties. The entry of judgment respondent Alzul expectant rights over the disputed lots, but such is
shows that the December 26, 1995 Resolution21 in G.R. No. 109078 conditioned on the payment of the balance of the purchase price.
became final and executory on July 2, 1996. Respondent Alzul Having beenconceded such rights, respondent had the obligation to
received through counsel a copy of the entry of judgment on August pay the remaining balance to vest absolute title and rights of
21, 1996. Thus, respondent had until September 20, 1996 within ownership in his name over the subject properties. In our June 17,
which to make the full payment. After three (3) unsuccessful 1996 Resolution, we clearly specified thirty (30) days from entry of
tenders of payment, respondent Alzul made no consignation of the judgment for respondent to promptly effect the full payment of the
amount to the court of origin. Moreover, petitioner argues that balance of the purchase price for the subject properties. The non-
respondent’s delay of a year and a half to pursue full payment must compliance with our June 17, 1996 Resolution is fatal to respondent
be regarded as a waiver on her part to claim whatever residual Alzul’s action for consignation and specific
remedies she might still have for the enforcement of the June 17, performance.Unfortunately, respondent failed to effect such full
1996 Resolution in G.R. No. 109078. Petitioner further contends payment of the balance of the purchase price for the subject
that even if the action before the HLURB was made on time, that is, properties. No consignation within the 30-day period or at a
within the 30-day period, still it is fatally defective as respondent did reasonable time thereafter It is clear as day that respondent did not
not deposit any amount with the HLURB which violated the rules for attempt nor pursue consignation within the 30-day period given to
consignment which require actual deposit of the amount allegedly her in accordance with the prescribed legal procedure. It must be
due with the proper judicial authority. HELD: After a careful study of borne in mind however that a mere tender of payment is not
the factual milieu, applicable laws, and jurisprudence, we find the enough to extinguish an obligation. There is no dispute that a valid
petition meritorious. Respondent Alzul was accorded legal rights tender of payment had been made by respondent. Absent however
over subject properties. In G.R. No. 109078, finding no reversible a valid consignation, mere tender will not suffice to extinguish her
error on the part of the CA, we denied Wilson P. Yu’s petition and obligation and consummate the acquisition of the subject
affirmed the appellate court’s ruling that as between Wilson P. Yu, properties. The records also reveal that respondent failed to effect
the Ventura spouses, petitioner B.E. San Diego, Inc., and respondent consignation within a reasonable time after the 30-day period which
Alzul, respondent has inchoate proprietary rights over the disputed expired on September 20, 1996. Indeed, we have accorded
lots. We upheld the CA ruling declaring as "null and void" the titles respondent, through said Resolution, all the opportunity to pursue
issued in the name of the Ventura spouses and reinstating them in consignation with the court of origin and yet, respondent failed to
the name of B.E. San Diego, Inc., with the corresponding notices of make a valid consignation. This is already inexcusable neglect on the
part of respondent. No valid consignation made.We agree with responsibility, shall extinguish the corresponding obligation.
petitioner’s assertion that even granting arguendo that the instant Moreover, in order that consignation may be effective, the debtor
case for consignation was instituted within the 30-day period or must show that:
within a reasonable time thereafter, it would still not accord (1) there was a debt due;
respondent relief as no valid consignation was made. Certainly, the (2) the consignation of the obligation had been made because the
records show that there was no valid consignation made by creditor to whom tender of payment was made refused to accept it,
respondent before the HLURB as she did not deposit the amount or because s/he was absent or incapacitated, or because several
with the quasi-judicial body as required by law and the rules. REFER persons claimed to be entitled to receive the amount due or
TO: Article 1258 of the Civil Code It is true enough that respondent because the title to the obligation had been lost;
tendered payment to petitioner three (3) times through a Solidbank (3) previous notice of the consignation had been given to the person
Manager’s Check No. 1146 in the amount of PhP 187,38028 on interested in the performance of the obligation;
August 29 and 30, 1996 and September 28, 1996. It is true likewise (4) the amount due was placed at the disposal of the court; and
that petitioner refused to accept it but not without good reasons. (5) after the consignation had been made, the person interested
Petitioner was not impleaded as a party by the Ventura spouses in was notified of the action.30 Respondent did not comply with the
the Malabon City RTC case for quieting of title against Wilson Yu nor provisions of law particularly with the fourth and fifth requirements
in the appealed case to the CA nor in G.R. No. 109078. As cited specified above for a valid consignation.
earlier, consignation is the act of depositing the thing due with the
court or judicial authorities whenever the creditor cannot accept or In her complaint for consignation and specific performance,
refuses to accept payment and it generally requires a prior tender of respondent only prayed that she be allowed to make the
payment. 29 It is of no moment if the refusal to accept payment be consignation without placing or depositing the amount due at the
reasonable or not. Indeed, consignation is the remedy for an unjust disposal of the court of origin. Verily, respondent made no valid
refusal to accept payment. consignation. The question is—can the Court, the CA, or the
Malabon City RTC order petitioner B.E. San Diego, Inc. to accept the
The first paragraph of Art. 1256 of the Civil Code precisely provides tender of payment made by respondent Alzul? Definitely, they
that "[i]f the creditor to whom tender of payment has been made cannot. The reason is that petitioner was not impleaded as a party
refuses without just cause to accept it, the debtor shall be released in the Malabon City RTC civil case, CAG.R. CV No. 33619, nor in G.R.
from responsibility by the consignation of the thing or sum due. The No. 109078 and hence is not under the jurisdiction of said courts.
proper and valid consignation of the amount due with the court of What were determined and decided in the CA Decision in CA-G.R.
origin, which shall judicially pronounce the validity of the CV No. 33619 were the annulment of the titles of spouses Carlos
consignation and declare the debtor to be released from his/her and Sandra Ventura, the reinstatement of said titles to the name of
petitioner, and the declaration that the ownership of the lots disputed lots have been forfeited, lost, and extinguished. While we
subject of said titles will be transferred to respondent. There is no commiserate with the plight of respondent, the CA ruling will not
directive to respondent granting her the right to pay the balance of prevail over the established axiom that equity is applied only in the
the price to petitioner and, more importantly,there is no order for absence of and never against statutory law or judicial rules of
petitioner to accept the payment. procedure.39 For all its conceded merits, equity is available only in
the absence of law and not as its replacement.40 Equity as an
The dispositive or fallo of the decision is what actually constitutes exceptional extenuating circumstance does not favor, nor may it be
the judgment or resolution of the court that can be the subject of used to reward, the indolent. This Court will not allow a party, in
execution. Where there is a conflict between the dispositive portion guise of equity, to benefit from respondent’s own negligence. 41 In
of the decision and its body, the dispositive portion controls the light of the foregoing considerations, we find that the grant of
irrespective of what appears in the body of the decision.34 Such respondent’s petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 81341 and the recognition
being the case, petitioner is not duty bound to accept any tender of of the belated consignation of the amount find no support nor basis
payment from respondent precisely because such diktat is absent in in law, rule, or jurisprudence. However, respondent had made
the fallo of the CA Decision which was affirmed by this Court in its payments over the subject properties based on her agreement with
December 26, 1995 Resolution in G.R. No. 109078. It is for this petitioner. So as not to enrich itself at the expense of respondent,
reason that respondent cannot ask for a writ of execution from the petitioner is obliged to reimburse respondent whatever amount
trial court where the complaint was originally instituted as said was paid by her in form of monthly amortizations. On the other
court has no jurisdiction over the person of petitioner. Even if a writ hand, if respondent is in possession of the subject properties, she
is issued, it should conform to the judgment, and the fallo of the CA and all persons claiming under her should surrender the possession
Decision does not impose the duty or obligation on the part of to petitioner
petitioner to accept the payment from respondent. It is the settled
doctrine that a writ of execution must conform to the judgment and
if it is different from or exceeds the terms of the judgment, then it is
a nullity.36 The cause of action available to respondent is to file an
action for consignation against petitioner which she did by
registering a complaint for consignation before the HLURB on March
12, 1998. Unfortunately, it was filed way beyond the 30-day period
which lapsed on September 20, 1996 or immediately thereafter.
Because of the failure of respondent to effect payment to petitioner
within the 30-day period or soon thereafter, her rights to buy the
Office of the Ombudsman v. Valencerina submitted Ecobel's Guarantee Payment Bond application for
PERLAS-BERNABE, J p: evaluation and endorsement of the GSIS Investment Committee
(INCOM). In the said Memorandum, Valencerina made it appear
Assailed in this petition for certiorari are the Resolutions dated June that Ecobel's application was fully secured by reinsurance and real
15, 2006 and April 24, 2007 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. estate collaterals, and that its approval was urgent considering
SP No. 91977 which enjoined the execution of the Order dated June Ecobel's limited time to avail of the loan from the funder. Such
8, 2005 of Ombudsman Simeon V. Marcelo in OMB-ADM-0-00-0547, memorandum was coursed through GIG Senior Vice-President,
pending appeal. Amalio A. Mallari (Mallari), who scribbled thereon his own
endorsement, stating "Strongly reco. based on info and collaterals
The Facts herein stated".

Sometime in October 1997, Ecobel Land, Inc. (Ecobel) through its On March 10, 1998, the INCOM approved Ecobel's application and
Chairman, Josephine Boright (Boright), applied for a medium term GSIS Surety Bond G (16) GIF Bond 029132 dated March 11, 1998
loan financial facility with the Government Service Insurance System (subject bond) was correspondingly issued indicating the following
(GSIS) Investment Management Group (or Finance Group) to parties: Ecobel, represented by its Chairman, Boright, as principal
finance the construction of its condominium project in Ermita, (obligor), PVB as obligee, and Mallari, in representation of the GSIS
Manila (project). The loan application was denied due to the General Insurance Fund, the purpose of which was to guarantee the
following grounds: (a) the collateral was insufficient; (b) Ecobel did repayment of the principal and interest on the loan granted to the
not have the needed track record in property development; and (c) principal through the obligee to be used for the construction of the
the loan was sought during the Asian financial crisis. project. ISHaTA

Intent on pursuing the project, Ecobel, this time, applied for a surety Later, however, or on November 19, 1998, GSIS President and
bond with the GSIS to guarantee the re-payment of the principal General Manager Federico Pascual issued a memorandum
loan obligation to be procured with the Philippine Veterans Bank suspending the processing and issuance of guaranty payment
(PVB). Ecobel's application was "APPROVED in principle subject to bonds. Accordingly, Valencerina prepared a cancellation notice to
analysis/evaluation of the project and the offered collaterals". Ecobel for Mallari's signature, but was told that the subject bond
could no longer be cancelled because it was already a "done deal."
In a Memorandum dated January 27, 1998, respondent Alex M. Thus, upon the request of Mallari, Valencerina signed a Certification
Valencerina (Valencerina), then Vice-President for Marketing and dated January 14, 1999, stating that the subject bond: (a) was
Support Services of the GSIS General Insurance Group (GIG), genuine and authentic; (b) constituted a valid and binding obligation
on the part of GSIS; and (c) may eventually be transferred to Bear, Ecobel defaulted in the payment of its loan, prompting BSIL to serve
Stearns International, Ltd. (BSIL), Aon Financial Products, Inc. or any upon it a notice of default and its intention to recover the
of their assignees, subject to the prior written or fascsimile repayment amount under the terms of their loan agreement and
notification to the GSIS by the current obligee, PVB, and that the subject bond. The GSIS was similarly advised.
confirmation or approval from GSIS is not required. Said
certification further stated that GSIS had no counterclaim, defense In a Certification dated March 20, 2000, PVB Executive President
or right of set-off with respect to the subject bond, provided that and Chief Operating Officer Florencio Z. Sioson declared that PVB
drawing conditions (covered in a separate certification) have been did not accept the proposal for it to be named obligee under the
satisfied. subject bond and that there was no contract between Ecobel and
PVB.
Notwithstanding the issuance of the subject bond on March 11,
1998, Ecobel paid its yearly premium only on February 9, 1999 In view of the foregoing events, the GSIS conducted an investigation
through a postdated check dated February 26, 1999, and thereon on the circumstances surrounding the processing and issuance of
submitted the certificates of title for the collaterals required the subject bond and forwarded its report to the Fact-Finding and
therefor. However, the certificate of title of the major collateral Intelligence Bureau (FFIB) of the On May 31, 2000, the FFIB issued a
(situated in Lipa City, Batangas), i.e., Transfer Certificate of Title No. Fact Finding Report, recommending the filing of appropriate
66289, was eventually found to be spurious. criminal and administrative charges against the concerned GSIS
officials including Valencerina. Accordingly, an administrative case
Consequently, Valencerina, in the letters dated February 12 and 24, was filed against the said officials for Gross Neglect of Duty, and
1999 informed Boright that the subject bond was "invalid and Inefficiency and Incompetence in the Performance of Official Duties
unenforceable" and that Ecobel's check payment was disregarded before the OMB, docketed as OMB-ADM-0-00-0547.
by the GSIS. Despite the bond cancellation notices, Ecobel was still
able to secure a US$10,000,000.00 loan from BSIL using the subject The OMB Proceedings
bond. Thereafter, it offered to pay the bond premiums to the GSIS
London Representative Office, which was accepted by Vice- In a Decision dated January 27, 2005, the OMB Preliminary
President for International Operations of the GIG, Fernando U. Investigation and Administrative Adjudication Bureau-B (PIAB-B)
Campa a (Campa a), who was neither furnished copies nor informed found Valencerina, among others, guilty of gross neglect of duty,
of the cancellation of the subject bond. and inefficiency and incompetence in the performance of official
duties, and ordered his dismissal from service with the accessory
penalties provided for under Sections 57 and 58 of the CTAIHc
In an Order dated June 8, 2005 (June 8, 2005 Order), Ombudsman At odds with the return directive, the OMB filed a motion for
Simeon V. Marcelo modified the PIAB-B decision, among others, reconsideration of the June 15, 2006 Resolution which was denied
finding Valencerina guilty, instead, of grave misconduct, but in a Resolution dated April 24, 2007. The CA pointed out that "under
imposing the same penalties. and that it has resolved to stay the assailed judgment and orders
during the pendency of the case.
Valencerina moved for reconsideration but was, however, denied in
an Order dated September 1, 2005. Dissatisfied, he filed before the Unperturbed, the OMB filed the instant petition for certiorari.
CA a petition for review under
The Issue Before the Court
The CA Proceedings
The essential issue in this case is whether or not the CA committed
On November 22, 2005, the CA issued a 60-day TRO which expired grave abuse of discretion in issuing the writ of preliminary
on January 21, 2006. injunction.

Subsequently, in an Order dated April 25, 2006, Ombudsman Ma. The Court's Ruling
Merceditas N. Gutierrez directed GSIS President and General
Manager Winston F. Garcia to execute the June 8, 2005 Order. Thus, There is merit in the petition.
in a Memorandum dated June 8, 2006, the GSIS informed
Valencerina that he is "deemed dismissed from the service as of the Section 7, (Section 7, ted September 15, 2003, provides that the
close of office hours" that day. office's decision imposing the penalty of removal, among others,
shall be executed as a matter of course and shall not be stopped by
Aggrieved, Valencerina filed an Urgent Motion for Issuance of Writ an appeal thereto, viz.:
of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction with the CA, which, finding the
necessity to preserve the status quo between the parties, granted Section 7. Finality and execution of decision. Where the respondent
the same in a Resolution dated June 15, 2006 (June 15, 2006 is absolved of the charge, and in case of conviction where the
Resolution). Consequently, the corresponding writ of preliminary penalty imposed is public censure or reprimand, suspension of not
injunction was issued on June 20, 2006, and in a Memorandum more than one month, or a fine equivalent to one month salary, the
dated June 21, 2006, the GSIS directed Valencerina to return to decision shall be final, executory and unappealable. In all other
work. cases, the decision may be appealed to the Court of Appeals on a
verified petition for review under the requirements and conditions
set forth in les of Court, within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the Third, the OMB is constitutionally authorized to promulgate its own
written Notice of the Decision or Order denying the Motion for rules of procedure. This is fleshed out in Sections 18 and 27 of
Reconsideration. otherwise known as "es of procedure for the effective exercise or
performance of its powers, functions, and duties" and to
An appeal shall not stop the decision from being executory. In case accordingly amend or modify its rules as the interest of justice may
the penalty is suspension or removal and the respondent wins such require. As such, the CA cannot stay the execution of decisions
appeal, he shall be considered as having been under preventive rendered by the said office when the
suspension and shall be paid the salary and such other emoluments
that he did not receive by reason of the suspension or removal. Fourth, the previous ruling in (as quoted in and ) wherein the Court,
relying on the old i.e., cannot be successfully invoked by Valencerina
A decision of the . The HTSIEa in this case for the reason that the said pronouncement had already
been superseded by the more recent ruling in (. In , the Court
Based on the afore-quoted provision, it is clear that the OMB's June applied the current i.e., ruling are hereunder quoted for ready
8, 2005 Order imposing the penalty of removal on Valencerina was reference:
immediately executory, notwithstanding the pendency of his
appeal. The general In interpreting the above provision, this Court held in Laja, citing
Lopez that "only orders, directives or decisions of the sman Act
First, Section 3, gives parties the right to appeal from its decisions should generally
carry with it the stay of these decisions pending appeal. Otherwise,
Second, it is a fundamental legal principle that when two while the essential nature of these judgments as being appealable would
Section 12, in general, including the OMB. Thus, as between the two be rendered nugatory".
rules, Section 7, :
However, as aptly stated by the istrative Order No. 07 has been
Section 7, les of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman amended by Administrative Order No. 17, thus: ACIDSc
supersedes the discretion given to the CA in Section 12, les of Court
when a decision of the Ombudsman in an administrative case is Sec. 7. Finality and execution of decision. Where the respondent is
appealed to the CA. The provision in the Rules of Procedure of the absolved of the charge, and in case of conviction where the penalty
Office of the Ombudsman that a decision is immediately executory imposed is public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more
is a special Specialis derogat generali. When two than one month, or a fine not equivalent to one month salary, the
decision shall be final, executory and unappealable. In all other as regards salary and tenure, no one can be said to have any vested
cases, the decision may be appealed to the Court of Appeals on a right in an office.
verified petition for review under the requirements and conditions
set forth in les of Court, within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the Based on the foregoing reasons, the CA's Resolutions granting
written Notice of the Decision or Order denying the Motion for Valencerina's prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction staying the
Reconsideration. execution of the Ombudsman's June 8, 2005 Order are therefore
patently erroneous and, thus, tainted with grave abuse of
An appeal shall not stop the decision from being executory. In case discretion. As jurisprudence dictates, grave abuse of discretion
the penalty is suspension or removal and the respondent wins such arises when a lower court or tribunal patently violates the as in this
appeal, he shall be considered as having been under preventive case. IAETSC
suspension and shall be paid the salary and such other emoluments
that he did not receive by reason of the suspension or removal. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions dated June
15, 2006 and April 24, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
A decision of the . The No. 91977 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Writ of
Preliminary Injunction dated June 20, 2006 issued in the said case is
Clearly, considering that an appeal under Administrative Order No. LIFTED.
17, the amendatory . (Emphases and underscoring supplied, with
those in the original omitted) SO ORDERED.

Lastly, it must be emphasized that the :

The Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman are clearly

procedural and no vested right of the petitioner is violated as he is
considered preventively suspended while his case is on appeal.
Moreover, in the event he wins on appeal, he shall be paid the
salary and such other emoluments that he did not receive by reason
of the suspension or removal. Besides, there is no such thing as a
vested interest in an office, or even an absolute right to hold office.
Excepting constitutional offices which provide for special immunity