CASE PROGRAM 2004-16.

The 2003 Canberra Fires (A)

In the first week of 2003, the Chief Fire Control Officer of the Australian Capital
Territory (ACT), Peter Lucas-Smith, confronted an outlook of high bushfire risk. A
drought in the region over the previous two years had dried out the trees, grasses and
undergrowth in the abundant bushland of the area. This meant there would be sufficient
combustible matter to fuel a major bushfire if a lightning storm or accidental ignition
due to human activity occurred in the forests. Wednesday 8 January was hot and windy,
and the ACT Bushfire Service declared a Total Fire Ban, the second day in a row in
which it was officially illegal to light barbeques, bonfires and other open flame
activities in the ACT.

At 3.30 pm a lightning storm passed through the region. Lightning strikes ignited two
fires in the bushland in western ACT and several fires in forest just beyond the ACT’s
western border with New South Wales (NSW). Over the next week, firefighting
services from the ACT and from NSW took various approaches to combating the fires.
By 14 January, the fires had not been put out and had burnt several thousand hectares.
There were now three distinct fire fronts on the western perimeter of the ACT, about
30km from the suburbs of Canberra, the ACT’s capital city. The forecast for the
weekend was for high temperatures and for strong north-westerly winds which could
potentially drive the fire towards Canberra. Lucas-Smith had responsibility for directing
the firefighting effort and briefing the Chief Minister of the ACT on the situation.

Canberra: a city in bushland

Canberra, the national capital of Australia, is located within southern NSW, in a

separate jurisdiction called the Australian Capital Territory (ACT). The city of 300,000
people occupies the north-eastern corner of the ACT, with the remainder of the territory

This case was written by Tim Watts, Australia and New Zealand School of Government, for Professor John
Alford, ANZSOG and Professor Dutch Leonard, Kennedy School of Government, as a basis for class
discussion rather than to illustrate either effective or ineffective handling of a managerial situation. All
quotes and descriptions are attributable to the Transcript of Proceedings, Inquiry into the Deaths of
Dorothy McGrath, Alison Mary Tenner, Peter Brooke, Douglas John Fraser, and the Fires of January
2003, Coroner’s Court of the Australian Capital Territory and McLeod, R., “Inquiry into the Operational
Response to the January 2003 Bushfires”, Australian Capital Territory, August 2003, except where
indicated.
© 2005 Australia and New Zealand School of Government, www.casestudies.anzsog.edu.au.
Version 5-01-05.Distributed by the Case Program, Australia and New Zealand School of Government.
Further reproduction prohibited without express permission.
consisting of mountainous bush country in national parks and other, mainly public lands
(see map, Exhibit 2). Some 70 percent of the ACT is bushland or lumber plantations. 1
Many of the suburbs of Canberra are tightly integrated with bushland, which has given
the city a reputation for being a leafy and desirable place to live.

Bushfires occur regularly in the ACT, especially during the hot and dry summer months
(January-February). Major fires were fought in 1903, 1926, 1927, 1939, 1952, and 2001
(see Exhibit 1) This history has led to the creation of a substantial bushfire management
infrastructure. In 2003, the ACT Bushfire Service within the Emergency Services
Bureau of the ACT government comprised 120 staff and 450 active bushfire
volunteers. 2 There was a separate fire service – the ACT Fire Brigade – for the urban
areas of Canberra (see Exhibit 5).

2003: a continuing drought

At the beginning of 2003 a severe drought with rainfall significantly below the regional
average had been affecting southern NSW, including the ACT, for over two years. NSW
Rural Fire Commissioner Phil Koperberg said that his organisation viewed conditions
across the state at the time as extremely high risk due to the dryness of the countryside
and the resultant combustibility of the underbrush and fallen logs in the area: “(F)ires
had already been burning in the northern part of the state for some months, commencing
on the Queensland/NSW border around Tenterfield and Glen Innes… That did not
augur well for the forthcoming season.” 3

Koperberg said there were many reports of unusual fire behaviour in southern NSW in
late 2002. Few fires were self-extinguishing, as was normally expected with drops in
temperature or wind shifts. The drought had drawn moisture out of the ground and the
trees and bushes, making the bush particularly prone to fire and slow to extinguish once
alight.

Peter Lucas-Smith, the ACT’s Chief Fire Control Officer, said by the first week of
January 2003 that ACT Bushfire Service had already responded to 92 fires since the
beginning of November 2002.

“From a bushfire perspective, the quantity of available fine fuels obviously varies
considerably depending on vegetation type, aspect, diurnal variation and moisture content.
Heavy fuels such as logs are not normally available to contribute to the spread of a fire as
they retain more moisture than the finer fuels. However in January 2003 the ACT was at
the stage where heavy fuels were also dry enough to contribute to the overall fire
behaviour and spread. This meant that in January 2003 the ACT forest and grasslands
were in a volatile state.” 4

1
Submission of the ACT Emergency Services Bureau to the McLeod Inquiry into the Operational
Response to the January 2003 Bushfires, Page 65.
2
Ibid, page 24.
3
Transcript of Proceedings, Inquiry into the Deaths of Dorothy McGrath, Alison Mary Tenner, Peter
Brooke, Douglas John Fraser, and the Fires of January 2003, Coroner’s Court of the Australian Capital
Territory, Day 23, Page 2076.
4
Ibid, Day 10, Page 785.
Wednesday, 8 January, 2003

At daybreak on 8 January, the ACT Bushfire Service announced that the fire danger
index was 45 (extreme is 50+), and declared a Total Fire Ban. 5 All barbeques, bonfires
and other open flames were officially illegal for the day in the ACT. The temperature
was expected to peak in the mid-30s and the Bureau of Meteorology predicted an
electrical storm would sweep through the territory in the mid-afternoon.

At about 3.30 pm the electrical storm arrived and several lightning strikes were recorded
by ACT Bushfire Service staff monitoring conditions from four observation towers in
the west of the territory. Smoke from fires was visible from a number of ignition points
along the Brindabella Range which runs along the western border of the ACT and
NSW. There were five major fires, labelled the McIntyre’s Hut, Bendora, Stockyard
Spur, Gingera and Mt Morgan fires. The McIntyre’s Hut, Mt Morgan and Gingera fires
were thought to be in NSW territory and the rest in the ACT. All were in national parks,
both the Kosciusko National Park in NSW and the Namadgi National Park in the ACT. 6

The ACT Emergency Services Bureau, situated in the Canberra suburb of Curtin, sent a
helicopter to fly over the fires to gather more information and notified the NSW Rural
Fire Service (RFS) operations centre about the fires it had seen break out in NSW
territory. The NSW RFS was being flooded with reports of new fires. Throughout the
state, a total of 72 fires were ignited by storms on that day.

Once the helicopter reconnaissance had confirmed the precise location of the fires this
information was relayed to the ACT Emergency Services Bureau, and it dispatched two
response teams out to the fires. Each team comprised two tankers and three light trucks,
with twelve staff. The size of these groups was determined by the standard operating
procedures of the ACT Bushfire Service for high-risk fire danger days. One team went
to the Bendora fire and the other to Stockyard Spur.

Both teams reached the fires by about 6pm, with approximately two hours of daylight
remaining. The Bendora fire was close to a dirt access road but there was a steep
embankment and 100 metres of dense undergrowth between the track and the fire edge.
The team walked up to the fire edge and estimated it was around 25 metres by 20 metres
in size (500 square metres). The terrain was rocky and uncertain with many ledges and
fallen trees. In a report back to the Emergency Services Bureau, the team leader (known
as the “incident controller”) said: “[the fire ] is drawing into its[self], it’s not moving
very fast. We can access the eastern side of it from Warks Road with tankers and light
trucks but we will need to rake hoe lines around the top section and water-bombing on
the top section as well. The fuel loads are fairly heavy…” 7 The team began laying out
water hoses from the road up to the fire edge. An ACT Bushfire Service helicopter
above had begun dropping water on the fire. However after radio consultation with the
incident controller, the ESB directed him to return with his crew to Canberra. The
incident controller had concerns about continuing to fight the fire overnight, fearing
injuries to his crew in the fading light from falling trees and slips in the steep terrain.

5
McLeod, R., “Inquiry into the Operational Response to the January 2003 Bushfires”, Australian Capital
Territory, August 2003, page 16. The fire danger index is determined by an assessment of air temperature,
humidity, and wind speed.
6
Ibid, page 17.
7
Ibid, page 17.

3
At the Stockyard Spur fire, there was no access road close to the fire edge. The incident
controller halted his team at the Mount Ginini gate and searched for an access trail,
which was thought to be overgrown, running down Stockyard Spur. After speaking with
an observer in a helicopter above, the incident controller assessed the walk into the fire
edge would take about an hour. He relayed this information to the Emergency Services
Bureau and was advised to return with his crew to Canberra and take up fighting the fire
in the morning. The helicopter dropping water on the Bendora fire also dropped several
loads on the Stockyard Spur fire before returning to Canberra around 10.00pm.

The NSW Rural Fire Service and NSW Parks and Wildlife Service combined their
resources and sent a team of one tanker and two light units to the McIntyre’s Hut fire.
This fire had spread to about 200 hectares by the late afternoon when the team arrived in
the vicinity. It was assessed that direct attack 8 on the fire would not be appropriate
because of the steepness of the terrain in the region, and the amount of time it would
take to deploy resources from access tracks to the fire edge. The crew focused on
indirect attack which involved clearing lines in the bush to create fire breaks. The crew
withdrew at dusk.

No crews were sent to the Gingera or Mt Morgan fires. Both were considered lower
risk.

Thursday, 9 January

Thursday’s weather outlook was relatively benign with cooler temperatures, light winds
from the east and south-east and high humidity forecast for the next three days. The fire
danger index was set at 18.

Helicopters were sent up to assess the fires at first light and reported that all fires had
spread overnight. ACT Bushfire Service’s management team met and agreed that the
objectives for the day would be to use direct firefighting to keep the fires contained to
the smallest possible size and to keep fire away from the Mt Franklin road, because it
provided the only access route to the Stockyard Spur and Gingera fires and because it
served as an effective ridge line control line.

By contrast, NSW Rural Fire Service and its partner the NSW Parks and Wildlife
Service elected to pursue an indirect attack on the McIntyre Hut fire, due to the “steep
terrain, difficult access and unpredictable fire behaviour”.9 They identified trails and
clearings they could use as containment lines and brought in earthmoving equipment to
widen and remove undergrowth from these breaks in the scrub, to halt or delay the
spread of the fire.

ACT Bushfire Service crews at the Stockyard Spur and Bendora fires were directed by
new incident controllers who had been rostered on that day. They found direct attack on
the fires ineffective and the fires’ size increased fairly steadily throughout the day. Two
helicopters were used during the day to water-bomb the fires. Some ACT personnel and

8
“Indirect attack” refers to fighting the fire through back-burning to reduce available fuel, as opposed to
attacking the flanks or the head of the fire directly with water. “Back-burning” refers to an indirect
method of firefighting where fuel ahead or to the flank of a fire is deliberately burnt in an effort to control
the fire’s spread and reduce the available fuel. Back-burning requires a mineral earth break.
9
NSW Rural Fire Service Submission to the McLeod Inquiry, page 5.

4
light trucks were deployed to assist the NSW Rural Fire Service at the McIntyre Hut
fire. The ACT Emergency Services Bureau contacted the NSW Rural Fire Service
operations centre in Sydney to request additional helicopter assistance to fight the
McIntyre’s Hut fire but was not successful. There were a large number of other fires
burning in NSW which required resources at the time.

The ACT Bushfire Service and the NSW Rural Fire Service had a good working
relationship, said Peter Lucas-Smith. “Our co-operation and liaison with NSW was very
good and very cordial. And this had been [the case] for many years beforehand, over
many incidents.” 10

Some at the ACT Bushfire Service were not satisfied by the NSW response on 8 and 9
January. Neil Cooper, the Emergency Services Bureau’s liaison officer with NSW, said
he was “frustrated” by the approach at the McIntyre’s Hut fire.

“Conditions were cooler and so were conducive to achieving good results from back-
burning. Back-burning operations were commenced but the NSW authorities were
concerned about the southerly winds pushing the fire north toward Yass before northerly
containment lines were established. Therefore all burning out operations were halted
while the trails (to the north) were upgraded. In my role as liaison officer I vigorously
voiced my concerns and strongly opposed the decision to halt this back-burning, pointing
out at one of the incident management team meetings that there was considerable distance
between the northern boundary and the southern edge where the fire front was located.
And based on the distance the fire had already travelled you did not have to be Einstein to
see that even under severe conditions the fire would not reach the northern edges for at
least two or three days before control lines would need to be reinforced. I also clearly
enunciated that we should be taking advantage of the cool south-easterly conditions
forecast for the next three or four days.” 11

Overnight, one light unit was left at each fire to monitor conditions.

Friday, 10 January

At 9.30 am, Peter Lucas-Smith attended a planning meeting at the NSW Rural Fire
Services office in Queanbeyan to discuss the approach to the McIntyre’s Hut fire. Eight
ACT firefighting units were presently directed to the McIntyre’s Hut fire where they
were under the command of the NSW Rural Fire Service.

Lucas-Smith said his objective was to ensure that the focus of efforts continued to be on
the southern and eastern edges of the fire – i.e. the parts closest to the ACT. He said
some consideration was given to shifting resources to the northern edge of the fire but
that was not decided.

“I advised the meeting that I would continue to provide resources at this stage as agreed
but I would not be providing any additional resources for fighting the McIntyre’s Hut fire
as my own fires were building in momentum and the threat to Mt Franklin Road was
increasing.” 12

10
Coroner’s Court of the Australian Capital Territory, Day 11, page 931
11
Coroner’s Court of the Australian Capital Territory, Day 11, page 953
12
Coroner’s Court of the Australian Capital Territory, Day 11, page 929

5
Apart from some limited water bombing from helicopters, no firefighters were deployed
to the Stockyard Spur fire during the day because it was considered a lower priority than
the Bendora fire. One monitoring unit was deployed to the Gingera fire. All remaining
resources were deployed to the Bendora fire. A total of 110 personnel were deployed at
the fires.

At 2.00pm, a press release was issued by the Emergency Services Bureau:

“The three bushfires in the ACT have grown in the past 24 hours,” Chief Fire Control
Officer of the ACT Peter Lucas-Smith said today. “Crews are working on containing the
three ACT fires, but we expect these to continue burning for the next few days. We are
focusing the majority of our resources on the fire at Bendora but we are continuing to
monitor and attend the other fires. We are also keeping informed about the fires that are
close to the ACT borders, one at McIntyre’s Hut and one at Mt Morgan.”

By the end of the day the Bendora fire had spread to cover 200 hectares, the Gingera
fire was about 40 hectares, and the Stockyard Spur fire had burnt 84 hectares.

Saturday, 11 January

On Saturday there was a continuation of mild weather conditions with low temperatures
and light wind. The fire danger index was 14.

Neil Cooper, an incident control officer at the Emergency Services Bureau in Curtin
said he was concerned by the apparently chaotic manner in which earthmoving
equipment, brought in from the Department of Defence and from a range of private
contractors to assist with building containment lines, was being deployed.

“It was obvious to me the numerous requests for heavy machinery had been fulfilled.
However, there was an overall lack of any system to track these resources and ensure that
they were being allocated strategically. In my opinion, it was obvious that there was a
lack of realisation that these resources needed to be managed the same way as any other
resource such as tankers and light units.”

Press releases issued throughout the day reported that:

• The three bushfires in the ACT had continued to expand during the last 24 hours
with the Bendora fire now at 320 hectares, Gingera at 100 hectares, and Stockyard
Spur at 160 hectares.
• Crews were focused on Bendora and Gingera and monitoring Stockyard Spur.
• Mountain trails in the Tidbinbilla Nature Reserve were closed and motorists were
advised to avoid the Brindabella Road.

Several staff including Neil Cooper expressed concern at the lack of a clarity in the
process:

“I was not given any maps to take into Bendora when I was nominated as the incident
controller for the night of January 11, nor was I given any incident action plan which
normally sets out the strategies and tasks for the next shift. I independently developed the
strategies for overall control of the fire and the tactics that were implemented overnight to
achieve those strategies in consultation with the previous controller, Tony Bartlett. …I

6
 had no support in the form of an incident management team. …I had no idea where the
Bendora fire fitted in relation to all the other fires and whether any actions that I may have
implemented would affect those other fires.” 13

Lucas-Smith said: “The incident management team in the field is generally the team
responsible for the development of incident action plans. That occurs in the field and is
exactly the right place for it to occur. That’s where the day-time tactics and strategies
are relayed to the night-time teams to be implemented and put in place.” 14 Lucas-Smith
did not leave the Emergency Services Bureau headquarters in Curtin until 10.00pm.

At around 1.00 am on 12 January, Neil Cooper contacted Simon Katz, the NSW Rural
Fire Service representative managing the team combating the McIntyre’s Hut fire.

“(We) contacted them to see how they were going and were told they had ceased burning
at shift change-over that evening, around 5.00pm and had not undertaken any burning
activities since that time. This further frustrated me, as it appeared that the NSW RFS
were again wasting valuable time before the next weather change.” 15

Cooper was also unhappy about resources to be allocated to Bendora after his shift
ended:

“My message radio into the ESB communications centre that morning about 5.30am
clearly stated that I felt that they would have difficulty holding the fire that day and would
require a lot of resources. So I was very surprised when I found out that very few
resources had been allocated – a good example of the implications of not having a well-
thought out and planned incident action plan. Again, no overnight incident management
team to prepare this document.”

Sunday, 12 January

Mild conditions continued on Sunday and the fire danger index was 15. A vehicle
accident involving a NSW Rural Fire Service truck blocked traffic to the access road for
the Gingera fire for most of the day, but apart from this, the firefighting effort continued
in the same vein as the previous few days.

Peter Lucas-Smith unsuccessfully sought more helicopters for water-bombing from

NSW.

“I decided to seek more aerial support from NSW RFS. At about 1.30 pm I made a
telephone call to Phil Koperberg at Rosehill (NSW RFS headquarters), but could not get
through as he was not available. I rang Rosehill again and spoke with Alan Brinkworth,
duty officer for the day. I asked about the current status of his aerial resources and
whether we could access their resources for water bombing the remote parts of the
Bendora fire. However, Alan Brinkworth was unable to provide any rural resources at that
time, and advised that he would get Marian Carmichael, the Air Operations Officer
Manager, to give me a call back. Unfortunately I did not hear from Marian Carmichael,
which left us in an awkward position in terms of aerial resources.” 16

13
Coroner’s Court of the Australian Capital Territory, Day 11, page 951.
14
Ibid
15
Ibid, page 953
16
Coroner’s Court of the Australian Capital Territory, Day 11, page 963

7
Lucas-Smith did not make a second call to Carmichael to follow up his request.

Koperberg said: “There is no formal procedure for following up a request of this

kind.” 17 In January 2003 there was no formal memorandum of understanding between
the ACT and NSW in regard to fires. NSW had formal agreements with other states
outlining the form and process of collaborations.

At 3.00 pm, Tony Graham, an operations officer at the Emergency Services Bureau,
received a troubling report from crews at the Bendora fire.

“I received a report that the Bendora fire broke its lines requiring new fallback positions
to be identified. The fire continued expanding throughout the day and crossed the Mt
Franklin road north of Bendora Hill and into New South Wales later that day. With the
fire now on both sides of Mt Franklin road, considerable safety concerns were evident for
any crews working south of the crossover point, with access and egress routes now
compromised.” 18

There was no reference to this report in a press statement released at 6.30pm by Mike
Castle, Executive Director of ACT Emergency Services Bureau. It read as follows:

“While the three fires in Namadgi National Park have continued to grow during the day
requiring heavy resourcing, firefighters have managed to reduce the rate of
spread…While we have been successful in reducing the growth rate of the three fires, we
are still expecting all three fires to continue burning for some time. If they are not
contained, they could threaten the Cotter catchment system, and in particular there is
some risk to water quality in Bendora and Corin water storages.” 19

By the end of the day a total of four helicopters had been deployed in water-bombing
the fires and there were 110 personnel committed. Bendora had reached 590 hectares,
Gingera 480 hectares, and Stockyard Spur, 500 hectares.

Monday, 13 January and Tuesday, 14 January

Humidity slowly fell and temperatures and wind speed picked up throughout Monday
the 13th. The Gingera and Stockyard fires joined up early on Tuesday morning and
burnt into NSW under the influence of an easterly wind.

Press releases issued during Monday and Tuesday reported that the ACT’s Chief Health
Officer had issued a health alert due to the high smoke levels. Personnel deployed to
fight the fires had been doubled from the weekend to around 250. Four helicopters had
been requisitioned from the Department of Defence to assist in water-bombing
operations. Although smoke levels in the air over the ACT had reduced aircraft
visibility and made estimating fire size difficult, reports from the field suggested that
the fires were continuing to spread east.

At 9.30am on Monday 13 January, Peter Lucas-Smith briefed the Chief Minister of the
ACT, Jon Stanhope, on the situation for approximately 45 minutes. The briefing
focused on the strategies in place to construct containment lines around the fires. No

17
Ibid, Day 23, page 2083
18
Ibid, Day 11, page 973
19
Ibid, Day 11, page 969

8
mention was made of Lucas-Smith’s difficulties in obtaining additional support from
NSW authorities.

Lucas-Smith invited Stanhope to join him on a reconnaissance flight over the fires by
helicopter around noon. They took the flight, and were alighting from their helicopter,
when a nearby helicopter engaged in water-bombing crashed into the Bendora dam,
severely injuring the pilot and a passenger. Stanhope and others swam out to rescue the
injured from the dam.

On 13 January, ACT Emergency Services Bureau Executive Director Mike Castle was
interviewed by ABC Radio: 20

“Interviewer: When we have been reporting that these fires have been burning out of
control, is that a worry? I mean, when they are out of control, does that mean larger
catastrophes lie ahead?

Mike Castle: Well, not to be too alarmed, Kerry, but they are serious. They are
uncontained, so out of control sounds a little more dramatic, perhaps than the terminology
we use – uncontained. We have resources on it – we look at particular outbreaks and that
is where we use the aircraft to water bomb them. But we don’t have a continuous
containment line, nowhere near that potential yet around any of those fires….. we have
been getting winds mainly from the easterly direction… but our most prevailing wind is
from north to north-westerly, and that gives us 180 degrees, and would bring the fire back
into us and back onto us in a much wider front. So, that’s a concern that we actually have.

Interviewer: If that wind does swing around from the north west, could it come as far as
Canberra? Could it threaten Canberra?

Mike Castle: I wouldn’t want to be that dramatic. What we actually try to do is establish a
series of containment lines between that. But you are talking about fairly significant fires,
and at the moment, of course, while people can see them as smoke, the smoke is going
away from us. So they don’t look particularly large from down in the urban areas, but
they could present quite a significant impact, but that is a long way from where they
currently are and the urban edge.”

Phil Cheney, Senior Principal Research Scientist at the Canberra office of the
Commonwealth Science and Industry Research Organisation (CSIRO), and a noted fire
behaviour expert, called Peter Lucas-Smith on 13 January. “I rang Mr Lucas-Smith and
advised him that I was going to be asked about the fires in an interview (which was
scheduled later that day with WIN Television). I expressed my opinion to Peter that, if
they asked me, I would have to tell them that in my opinion it was a very dangerous
situation and that those fires were likely to burn into Canberra.” 21 WIN Television
ultimately decided not to interview Cheney.

Lucas-Smith says that he considered the possibility of fires burning into Canberra but
did not believe it was a “realistic prospect”.22 By sunset on 14 January, the Bendora fire
had reached 950 hectares, Stockyard, about 1360 hectares, and Gingera about 800
hectares. The forest fire index had risen to 19 on Monday and stayed at that level

20
Coroner’s Court of the Australian Capital Territory, Day 11, page 994.
21
Coroner’s Court of the Australian Capital Territory , Day 11, page 984.
22
Ibid, page 983.

9
throughout Tuesday. The weather forecast for the coming days was for higher
temperatures, lower humidity and stronger winds.

10
 Exhibit 1: A History of Fire in the ACT 23

South-eastern Australia has been a regular victim of bushfire. Throughout the

preceding century fire events have regularly affected South Australia, Victoria,
Tasmania and NSW. Fires have affected Canberra, invariably on the western side,
many times in the last 100 years, mostly during summer (January–February). Major
fires occurred in 1903, 1926, 1927 and 1939, three times in 1952, and in 2001 and
2003. The 1927 fire occurred in spring, but all the others were in summer. Most of the
fires were started by lightning strikes during dry seasons that followed a warm, dry
winter and spring and most were accompanied by very strong winds. On this basis
alone, it can be considered that the 2003 fires were not a one-in-100-year event.
Details of some of the major and inner city fires that have occurred in the ACT
follow.

1939: The summer of 1938–39 was the driest since 1918. The Black Friday
bushfires, in January, in southern NSW and the ACT resulted in the deaths of six
people. Fires also devastated the Victorian town of Noojee, where 71 lives were lost.
A thousand homes were destroyed. In heatwave conditions a fire broke out across the
border in the area behind Uriarra Station; it reached the ACT on 13 January, in three
tongues around Mount Franklin, Mount Coree and Horseshoe Bend. By early 14
January winds gusting up to 70 kilometres an hour started numerous spot fires, and by
afternoon fire had created a front of 72 kilometres along the Murrumbidgee River and
had crossed it in several places. The Mount Franklin fire burnt right across the
Territory, with serious outbreaks at Tidbinbilla, Cuppacumbalong, Booroomba and
Lanyon. The fires were put out by a cool, moist change that moved across the region
on 15 January. Although no lives were lost and stock losses were relatively small,
there was considerable loss of property: 60 750 hectares of timbered and grazing land
(including 1100 hectares of pine plantation) were destroyed.

Mount Stromlo, 1952: Fire followed a remarkably similar path to the 2003 fire on
25 January 1952. Started by a lightning strike in scrub near Walker’s Hill, it moved
quickly towards Mount Stromlo, fuelled by thick undergrowth and fallen pine needles
and driven by strong westerly winds. The fire was brought under control in Kambah
after having destroyed several observatory buildings and equipment at Mount
Stromlo, 310 hectares of mature pines, and burning 2385 hectares of grassland. Two
people died. Until the 2003 fires this event was the last time houses in the vicinity of
Canberra were destroyed by bushfire. Subsequently, between 7 February and 4
March, over 6000 hectares were burnt in the Mountain Creek area, again as a
consequence of lightning strikes.

Gudgenby, 1983: The 1982–83 fire season was among the worst in the ACT’s
history. There was a severe drought, and the winter of 1982 had been one of the driest
recorded. Firefighters attended fires as early as August and the fire danger season was
declared two months early, on 1 September. Forest fuels were extremely flammable
and there was a higher than usual number of forest fires. On 9 January fires in the
Gudgenby area burnt out 36 000 hectares of forest and grazing land.

23
Source: The McLeod Report.

11
Mount Majura, 1985: After a relatively wet spring and summer, which resulted in
prolific growth of vegetation, particularly grass, the ACT experienced one of its driest
summers on record. This meant that the fire season was unusual, with strong potential
for both grass and forest fire. There were several big fires during the season, but the
most significant were those that occurred on 2–4 March: 6000 hectares were burnt at
Mount Majura and 5500 at Tharwa. These fires started under extreme weather
conditions and burnt out of control into NSW, causing several million dollars’ worth
of damage to property. A total of 28 000 hectares of pasture and bushland (10 000
hectares in the ACT) were burnt and 7000 head of stock were lost.

Black Mountain and Pierce’s Creek, 1991: A fire started on the north-eastern
side of Black Mountain. The fire burnt in a north-easterly direction, eventually
crossing Barry Drive and threatening residential property along Dryandra Street.
Minor damage was caused to front yard properties and the Koomarri School. An area
of 135 hectares was burnt. A fire started in the Pierce’s Creek pine plantation in the
early afternoon on 21 April. Under worsening weather conditions the fire burnt in an
easterly direction, eventually reaching the crest of the Bullen Range. Spot fires ignited
grasslands east of the Murrumbidgee River. The total area burnt was about 870
hectares, which included about 457 hectares of pine plantation.

Curtin, 1994: A fire started at about 3.30 pm on 5 January on the eastern side of the
Tuggeranong Parkway near the junction of the Cotter Road. It burnt in a south-
easterly direction across the Illoura Community Horse Holding Paddocks to
eventually reach Munro Street, Munro Place and Bavin Street, threatening residential
properties and an ActewAGL substation. Gardens, backyard fences and sheds and
pergolas were affected but no houses were destroyed. About 80 hectares were burnt in
total. In addition, a fire on Mount Taylor came close to jumping Sulwood Drive and
threatened houses before it was contained.

December 2001: On Christmas Eve 2001 a series of fires threatened central

Canberra. Fire outbreaks occurred at Huntly, Stromlo, Bruce Ridge, Red Hill, Oaks
Estate and Wanniassa Hills. It is thought that an arsonist lit fires on Uriarra Road and
Coppins Crossing Road during the early afternoon, and they burnt rapidly through
areas of grassland. The Uriarra Road fire was halted just short of the Stromlo pine
forest. The Coppins Crossing fire raced across grazing land down to the Molonglo
River and very soon threatened parts of Duffy, Holder, Weston, Yarralumla and
Curtin. ESB issued the Standard Emergency Warning Signal to the community for the
first time and advised residents of the affected suburbs to take steps to ensure their
own safety. The fire crossed the Tuggeranong Parkway and burnt to the shore of Lake
Burley Griffin and the edge of Curtin. Millions of dollars’ worth of plantation pines
were destroyed and many hectares were burnt out. On Christmas Day new fires flared,
threatening major thoroughfares and suburbs and burning to the lawns of the
Australian Mint. Large areas of Stromlo forest were lost: in the event, however, this
proved a valuable firebreak for the January 2003 fires and arguably protected Black
Mountain and central Canberra.
13

12
Exhibit 2: Map of ACT Showing Ignition Points on January 8, 2003

„ Ignition Points

13
Map: Location of the ACT

14
 Exhibit 3: ACT Bush Fire Service response to the fires, 8-14 January, 2003:
Personnel Committed, by shift; flying hours by shift; plant resources committed, by shift

200

150

100 Day Shift

Night Shift
50

0
8 9 10 11 12 13 14

January

(Source: McLeod, R., “Inquiry into the Operational Response to the January 2003 Bushfires”,
Australian Capital Territory, August 2003. Pages 48-50)

Exhibit 4: NSW Rural Fire Service response to the McIntyre Hut Fire, 8-
14 January, 2003:
Personnel Committed, by shift

200

150

100 Day Shift

Night Shift
50

0
8 9 10 11 12 13 14

January

(Source: McLeod, R., “Inquiry into the Operational Response to the January 2003 Bushfires”,
Australian Capital Territory, August 2003. Page 51)

15
Exhibit 5 – ACT Emergency Services Bureau Organisational Structure
(Source: McLeod, R., “Inquiry into the Operational Response to the January 2003 Bushfires”,
Australian Capital Territory, August 2003)

16
CASE PROGRAM 2004-16.2

The 2003 Canberra Fires (B)

On Wednesday 15 January 2003, the Chief Fire Control Officer of the Australian
Capital Territory (ACT), Peter Lucas-Smith, had been fighting fires ignited by
lightning in the Brindabella Ranges on the border of the ACT and New South Wales
(NSW), to the west of the capital city Canberra, for a week. 1 Lucas-Smith’s
firefighting teams had been clearing fire-breaks in the forests and conducting aerial
water-bombing to quell the fires, but they were not considered contained.

Wednesday, 15 January

On Wednesday the fire danger index remained at 19, 2 however some westerly winds
were gusting at higher elevations and these began to move the fires east, further into
the ACT.

A Bureau of Meteorology officer began attending management meetings at the ACT

Emergency Services Bureau and issued a briefing which forecast “extreme fire
weather conditions… with strong winds, high temperatures, low humidity and a high
degree of vertical instability in the atmosphere” for the weekend, 18 and 19 January.

Around noon Peter Lucas-Smith and some members of his staff met Phil Koperberg,
NSW Rural Fire Service (RFS) Commissioner and some members of his staff at the
NSW RFS offices in Queanbeyan. Their purpose was to review the status of various
fires in the vicinity of the ACT, to make some decisions regarding the allocation of
personnel and resources to the various fires, and to discuss the weather forecast for the
coming days. Lucas Smith said Koperberg and his staff “extended to me their
confidence that [the McIntyre’s Hut fire] was going to remain contained.”

This case was written by Tim Watts, Australia and New Zealand School of Government, for Professor
John Alford, ANZSOG and Professor Dutch Leonard, Kennedy School of Government, as a basis for
class discussion rather than to illustrate either effective or ineffective handling of a managerial
situation. It is a sequel to case 2004-16.1.All quotes and descriptions are attributable to the Transcript
of Proceedings, Inquiry into the Deaths of Dorothy McGrath, Alison Mary Tenner, Peter Brooke,
Douglas John Fraser, and the Fires of January 2003, Coroner’s Court of the Australian Capital
Territory and McLeod, R., “Inquiry into the Operational Response to the January 2003 Bushfires”,
Australian Capital Territory, August 2003, except where indicated.
© 2005 Australia and New Zealand School of Government, www.casestudies.anzsog.edu.au.
Version 6-01-06. Distributed by the Case Program, Australia and New Zealand School of Government.
Further reproduction prohibited without express permission.

1
Refer to map, exhibit 2, Part A
2
Where 50 is extreme, see Part A
Koperberg disagreed with this account of the meeting.

“We talked in broad terms about the likelihood of the fires, particularly the McIntyre’s
Hut fire, remaining contained. We painted a number of scenarios, one of them being the
eventuality of the forecast for Saturday 18 January which included very high
temperatures, very strong winds and low humidities, and the probability of the
McIntyre’s Hut fire, particularly, breaching its containment lines. It was conceded that
not only was that possible but it was more than likely. It was generally conceded that
the fires were going to reach the suburbs of Canberra… So during the course of the
meeting a number of scenarios were canvassed, and it was the canvassing of those
scenarios that led me to make an open-ended offer for resources, which I would not
have done were I to have considered that there was not a potential threat.” 3

Koperberg said that he and his staff were more pessimistic than their ACT
counterparts at the meeting. One said in response to discussions about the weather
forecast and the likely impacts: “…Canberra is going to get hammered.” Koperberg
says the ACT representatives at the meeting were a little offended by this talk by
outsiders. “I formed the opinion that… Peter did not share my belief about the
potential seriousness. He had every right to do that, or not do that, as the case may
be.” 4

At the meeting, Peter Lucas-Smith requested from NSW four task forces of five units
each, with management and support personnel totalling 200 firefighters, and some
additional aerial resources. He said he believed “that our [current] resources were
insufficient to contain the fires we had, let alone if the fires escaped.” 5 Koperberg
committed to provide these resources to the ACT the next day.

Lucas-Smith said his request for extra resources was motivated by a need to bolster
the suppression efforts at the Stockyard Spur fire which had become the ACT’s
highest priority. Phil Koperberg says he believed that these extra resources were
sought by Lucas-Smith for the broader protection of the city of Canberra as a whole.
Koperberg was surprised that the ACT was not requesting more resources. “I thought
the request was light, if one was anticipating a worst-case scenario.” 6

Koperberg did an interview with ABC TV in the mid-afternoon of 15 January. During

the interview he said: “This is probably the worst threat to this part of the state in
many, many decades… The Brindabella complex of fires are certainly a potential
threat to some very valuable assets, not the least being some mature pine forests on
the border of Canberra and, indeed, the ACT itself.” 7

Media releases issued by the ACT Emergency Services Bureau throughout the day
reported that:

3
Coroner’s Court of the Australian Capital Territory, Day 23, page 2091.
4
Ibid.
5
Ibid, Day 11, page 984.
6
Ibid, Day 23, page 2101.
7
Ibid, Day 23, 2086.

2
• The Bendora fire now covered 1150 hectares and successful back-burning
overnight had provided a continuous containment line around the south-western,
southern and south-eastern flanks of the fire.
• There was a high fire danger rating but no Total Fire Ban. The public was asked to
be mindful of the dry conditions; similar conditions were expected to continue for
the next few days.
• Easterly airflows were expected in the next few days, with north to north-westerly
swings. It was also expected that rising temperatures and decreasing humidity
from Friday until early the following week would place additional pressure on
firefighting operations.

The Stockyard fire now covered about 2300 hectares. Efforts to contain the fire were
hindered by the fact that there were only two narrow access routes to the fire, and
there was difficulty deploying additional resources.

Thursday, 16 January

On Thursday the temperature rose to 33 degrees and humidity fell to 20 percent. The
forest fire danger index rose to nearly 30. Winds were predominantly from the east,
although mid-level winds were coming from the west ahead of an advancing frontal
system which the Bureau of Meteorology expected to arrive over the weekend.

In the morning, Mike Castle and Peter Lucas-Smith briefed the ACT Cabinet,
including the Chief Minister Jon Stanhope, and separately later in the day the Chief
Police Officer and head of the urban area fire brigade. The briefing notes contained
detailed summaries of the history of the fire, weather forecasts for the coming four
days and information on the firefighting effort and resource deployments.

A range of assets were listed as being “under threat”. They were the Cotter reservoir
catchment area, the ACT pine plantations, and the Tidbinbilla Nature Reserve and
Tracking Station. The “urban edge” was also listed as being “under threat”. Jon
Stanhope said:

“Mr Lucas-Smith made it clear to us [at the briefing] that the fires presented a serious
situation. He explained what was being done to contain the fires, and that the
firefighting operations were occurring on a 24-hour basis. He presented a range of
theoretical possibilities about the development of the fires, but I do not recall the
details. He explained that the fires were, at that time, west of constructed and proposed
containment lines and that firefighters were hoping to keep the fires within those lines.
Cabinet was informed of the NSW assistance and the other assistance [that] had been
sought and the disposition of the firefighting resources.

We were informed that Monday was seen to be a ‘bad day’ in terms of fire danger. We
were briefed upon how the legislation governing the declaration of a state of emergency
operated (See Exhibit 6), and consequential appointment of the Chief Police Officer as
Territory Controller. My memory is that the issue of the state of emergency arose out of
a discussion of damage to the electricity infrastructure, more notably the implications
for the power supply to Canberra if the fire caused [damage].

There was a general comment about the possibility of the fires reaching urban
Canberra. In that context, it was mentioned that the western-most suburbs, Weston

3
 Creek and Dunlop, would be the suburbs towards which fires might travel in the event
they did spread. The possibility of the fires reaching urban Canberra was not discussed
in a manner that conveyed to Cabinet any understanding that the fires were a direct
threat or that it was envisaged or anticipated that houses within the urban area were then
at risk. Comments were more to inform us of current firefighting efforts, and that if the
fire conditions deteriorated and the fires were not contained, government might need to
be involved in consequential decisions.” 8

ACT Treasurer Ted Quinlan said he left the briefing with the understanding that
Monday 20 January would likely be the danger day for Canberra. He had the
impression that Lucas-Smith was expecting a major fire but not “a 40-foot firestorm.”

Mike Castle said the briefing that he and Lucas-Smith delivered did not address in
detail their plans or recommendations for informing the public about the advance of
the fire or any process for encouraging evacuations in the case of the fire appearing
likely to enter the suburbs of Canberra.

ACT Emergency Services Bureau media releases issued during 16 January said that:
• The Bureau of Meteorology forecast that the wind would shift to the north-west
and pick up considerably over the weekend.
• The Stockyard fire had now burnt 3500 hectares, Bendora 2100 hectares,
McIntyre Hut 5600 hectares.
• Two hundred volunteer firefighters arrived at 6pm from elsewhere in NSW – the
Hunter, Great Lakes, Coffs Harbour and Lismore areas – and were deployed to the
Stockyard fire. They joined around 250 ACT firefighters and Department of
Defence personnel already engaged in containing the fires.
• The northern area of Namadji National Park was closed.

Phil Koperberg of the NSW Rural Fire Service said in a media interview that day:
“The current weather forecast and the fact that vegetation in the southern part of NSW
and the ACT is extremely dry means the potential for fire to impact on increasingly
more populated areas is very high.” 9

Members of the ACT Fire Brigade (urban) spoke with Peter Lucas-Smith later in the
day. He said that the fires could get out of control and be as big as the wildfires of
1939, 1952, and 1985 but the information was not to leave the room because he did
not want to alarm the media or public. 10 They said Mr Lucas-Smith had said he would
deny the comments if they got to the media.

As the day drew to a close, a Total Fire Ban was declared for the five days from
midnight on 16 January to midnight on 21 January. This had never before occurred in
the ACT, with most fire bans declared for one or two days.

8
Coroner’s Court of the Australian Capital Territory, Day 37, page 3608.
9
Ibid, Day 24, page 2178.
10
Doherty, M,. “Cabinet Told of Threat”, The Canberra Times, 19 February 2004.

4
Friday, 17 January

Westerly winds picked up during Friday and peaked at around 35 kilometres per hour
in the afternoon, with temperatures in the mid-30s. The fire danger index reached 50,
the extreme zone.

All three fires travelled east during the afternoon, covering about 10 kilometres before
the wind died down in the evening. Seventeen aircraft continued water-bombing
throughout the day. Firefighters at the three fires unsuccessfully sought to establish
new containment lines as winds moved them in an easterly direction, past previously
constructed breaks. Crews eventually withdrew from the Stockyard Spur and Bendora
fire fronts as the fires moved rapidly to the east. Later in the day as the wind died
down new containment lines were established in front of the McIntyre’s Hut fire and
it was reported to be at “contained” status.

Approximately 450 staff were working around the clock on suppressing the fires. The
ACT Fire Brigade (urban) put its entire staff complement on standby. The Brigade
added more staff to its communications centre and prepared its vehicles and radios for
the advance of the fires in the coming days.

The ACT Fire Brigade Commissioner requested additional resources on standby from
the NSW Fire Brigade, and in this request nominated Monday 20 January as the day
when these resources would likely be needed.

At 6.00 pm a planning meeting took place at the Emergency Services Bureau

headquarters. Peter Lucas-Smith said the meeting focused on a strategy of using
grasslands to the east of the Murrumbidgee River as a control line to delay the
advance of the fires. There was also significant planning discussion regarding
property protection for rural landholders east of Canberra and approaches to
protecting the Uriarra pine plantation. That night 42 rural landholders were advised
that their properties were under threat.

The following scenarios were discussed:

• The potential for the fires to reach the Uriarra pine plantation by midday the next
day
• The potential for the fires to reach the Cotter pub and reserve by 4.00 pm
• The potential for the fires to reach Narrabundah Hill in the Canberra suburb of
Duffy by 8.00pm.

At 6.15 pm Mike Castle told reporters that the ACT had sufficient trained personnel
to cope with the emergency. 11 The Emergency Services Bureau had been flooded with
offers of assistance from members of the public for the firefighting effort. In the 2002
fires, the ACT police had been engaged to doorknock neighbourhoods and provide
warnings about the risk of the approaching fire. One resident said that the fact that
police were not doorknocking neighbourhoods in 2003 led them to think that the fires
were less serious than the previous year.

11
McLeod, page 40

5
By 8.50 pm winds picked up again and the Emergency Services Bureau issued a
media release indicating that spot fires were occurring over containment lines at all
three fires.

Peter Lucas-Smith had worked from early in the morning till beyond 9.00 pm every
day since 8 January. The weather forecast for the weekend was for almost impossible
conditions for combating fires.

6
 Exhibit 6: Extract from section 20 of the Emergency Management Act
(ACT)

(1) Where the Chief Minister is satisfied that:

(a) an emergency has occurred, is occurring or is likely to occur;

(b) the emergency is, or would be, of such a scale, or of such a nature:

(i) to constitute a significant danger to the health or safety to persons in

Territory, property of the Territory or the environment of the Territory; or

(ii) as to cause significant disruption to the essential services in the Territory;

the Chief Minister may, by writing, declare that a state of emergency exists.

7
SHAYAD ACT PART 3: On Saturday 18 January 2003 bushfires, which had been burning in the hills to the
west and south-west of Canberra for more than a week, reached the perimeter of the city. The advance
of the fire was driven by strong winds gus ng from the west up to 70 kilometres an hour. The
temperature peaked at 37 degrees near midday. Chief Minister Jon Stanhope declared a State of
Emergency at 2.45pm on 18 January as the fires began to enter the city and police sought to enforce
evacua ons by residents.

The result was widespread damage to rural proper es, parks and forests, houses and urban
infrastructure, es mated at $300 million. Tragically, four people died. The Mt Stromlo pine planta on
and its historic observatory were burnt to the ground. Over 500 houses were lost. 160,000 hectares were
burnt in the ACT, 70 percent of land area of the territor