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Juillet/Août 1999

Argumentation and mathematical proof:


A complex, productive, unavoidable relationship
in mathematics and mathematics education
by
Paolo Boero
Dipartimento di Matematica
Università di Genova
Italia

I recognize the importance of N. Balacheff's contribution to the issue dealt with


in the last Newsletter on Proof, especially as concerns the discussion of different
conceptions about argumentation and its complex links with (mathematical)
proving.

I would like to start with some local remarks concerning the coherency between
the first and second parts of NB's contribution, and wish to consider two points in
particular.

NB says: "Argumentation in common practices is spontaneous". This statement


needs to be related to the specific kind of argumentation. Widely shared
experience in Italian classrooms situated in low-level socio-cultural environments
shows that while some Perelman-type argumentations spontaneously develop in
children, the development of Toulmin-type and Ducrot-type argumentations calls
for very strong teacher mediation.

NB speaks of "freedom that one could give oneself, as a person, in the play of
an argument". Once again it seems to me that this comment is inappropriate for
Toulmin-type argumentation (and even for Ducrot-type argumentation).
Let us now come to the main issue in the second part of NB's contribution (pages
3 and 4): the role of argumentation in the approach to mathematical proof,
particularly the fact that argumentation might be an epistemological obstacle in
approaching mathematical proof.

Here I must say that a significant difference exists between the perspective
more or less explicitly indicated by NB and our own perspective ("our" refers to
the research group I lead in Genoa). This difference may help to understand why
I do not enter the discourse about argumentation as proposed by NB, but focus on
other aspects. The difference mainly consists in the fact that, from our
perspective, the distinction between "proving" as a process and "proof" as a
product is a major factor in discussion about the role of argumentation in
mathematical activities concerning theorems. What's more, the nature of these
activities is also considered differently.

According to our perspective, the approach to mathematical proof belongs to a


more general cultural and cognitive apprenticeship &endash; i.e. entering the
culture of theorems (and mathematical theories). Here I allude to the definition of
theorem provided by Bartolini et al (1997) as "statement", "proof" and "reference
theory".

In that framework, entering the culture of theorems means developing specific


competencies inherent in producing conjectures and proving the produced
conjectures by taking elements of theoretical knowledge into account.
Epistemological and cognitive analyses are needed in order to select peculiar,
essential elements in the production and proof of conjectures and the
management of theories that students will face in their apprenticeship. In this
way, entering the culture of theorems will be accessible and meaningful (from
the mathematical point of view) for most of them. For instance, the crucial role of
dynamic exploration (cf. Boero et al, 1996; see also Simon, 1996) of the problem
situation in producing and proving conjectures must be taken into account; this
can help in selecting "fields of experience" and tasks where such dynamic
exploration is "natural" for students. In addition, the phenomenon of (possible)
continuity between the production of a conjecture and the construction of its
proof (see "Cognitive Unity of Theorems": Garuti et al, 1996, 1998) must be
considered, in order to select appropriate problem situations where this continuity
works smoothly. Another crucial issue concerns the fact that theorems (i.e.
statements, proofs and theories) belong to scientific culture (in the sense of
Vygotsky, "Thought and Language", Chapter VI). Appropriate mediation by the
teacher is called for in all those aspects where there is a significant rupture with
everyday culture: the shape of statements, the structure of mathematical proofs as
texts, the nature of allowed reasonings, the peculiar organization of mathematical
theories, etc.

In the framework outlined above, when dealing with the role of argumentation in
mathematical activities concerning theorems we must take different aspects of
those activities into account. I shall describe them as "phases" in the activities of
conjecture production and mathematical proof construction (although they cannot
be separated and put into a linear sequence in mathematicians' work - see later):

I) production of a conjecture (including: exploration of the problem


situation, identification of "regularities", identification of conditions
under which such regularities take place, identification of arguments for
the plausibility of the produced conjecture, etc.). This phase belongs to
the private side of mathematicians' work. We may remark that the
appropriation of a given statement shares some important features with
this phase (exploration of the problem situation underlying the statement,
identification of arguments for its plausibility, etc.);

II) formulation of the statement according to shared textual conventions


(this phase usually leads to a publishable text);

III) exploration of the content (and limits of validity) of the conjecture;


heuristic, semantic (or even formal) elaborations about the links between
hypotheses and thesis; identification of appropriate arguments for
validation, related to the reference theory, and envisaging of possible
links amongst them (this phase usually belongs to the private side of
mathematicians' work);

IV) selection and enchaining of coherent, theoretical arguments into a


deductive chain, frequently under the guidance of analogy or in
appropriate, specific cases, etc. (this phase is frequently resumed when
mathematicians present their work to colleagues in an informal way
&endash; or even in public presentations such as seminars: cf Thurston,
1994);

V) organization of the enchained arguments into a proof that is


acceptable according to current mathematical standards. This phase leads
to the production of a text for publication. We may observe that
mathematical standards for this phase are not absolute &endash; they
differ when we compare a paper published today with one from the
eighteenth century, or a chapter from a mathematical textbook for high
school with one for university level;
VI) approaching a formal proof. This phase may be lacking in
mathematicians' theorems (although most of them are aware of the fact
that formal proof can be reached and some of them might reach it in
some cases). Sometimes this phase concerns only some parts of the proof
(where formal treatment is easy, or subtle bugs must be identified).
However, Thurston (1994) claims that it is practically impossible (and
meaningless for working mathematicians) to produce a completely
formal proof for most current theorems in mathematics. He writes: "We
should recognize that the humanly understandable and humanly
checkable proofs that we actually do are what is most important to us,
and that they are quite different from formal proof. For the present,
formal proofs are out of reach and mostly irrelevant: we have good
human processes for checking mathematical validity."

We may note that these six phases are usually interconnected in non-linear ways
in mathematicians' normal work. For instance, in the fifth phase a bug may be
discovered in the enchaining of arguments, and this may call for renewed
exploration of the problem situation and strengthening of hypotheses (first phase)
with a new statement (second phase).

I would also like to stress the importance of the distinction (which emerges
from the preceding description of the six "phases") between the statement of a
theorem as a product and conjecturing as a process, and between mathematical
proof as a product and (mathematical) proving as a process.

Now let us come back to argumentation. In order to deal with argumentation in


mathematical activities, especially in conjecturing and proving, I think that it
would be useful to elaborate a specific framework for argumentation. Indeed,
both Toulmin's and Ducrot's conceptions should be taken into account, but
neither of them seem to be satisfactory for the purpose of dealing with the
peculiarities of argumentation in mathematical activities: the problem of
reference knowledge is not relevant in Ducrot's conception, while the linguistic
structure of the sequence of arguments is not considered in depth by Toulmin. In
mathematical activities, both reference knowledge and the structure of the
sequence of arguments are relevant.

The Webster Dictionary hints at a possible, comprehensive framework for


argumentation as "The act of forming reasons, making inductions, drawing
conclusions, and applying them to the case under discussion" and "Writing or
speaking that argues". We may note that this distinction between argumentation
as a process and argumentation as a product may help interfacing argumentation
as a process with (mathjematical) proving, on the one hand, and argumentation as
a product with mathematical proof, on the other (see later). The Webster
Dictionary defines "argument" as "A reason or reasons offered for or against a
proposition, opinion or measure". This definition could be developed into a
comprehensive discourse on "reference knowledge" in arguing (and proving).
Douek (1998, 1999) exploits these definitions in order to analyse argumentative
aspects of (mathematical) proving. Taking her analyses into account, we may
consider multiple roles of argumentation in mathematical activities concerning
theorems.

In the first two phases, argumentation concerns inner (and eventually public)
analysis of the problem situation, questioning the validity and meaningfulness of
the discovered regularity, refining hypotheses, discussing possible
formulation(s). In the third phase, argumentation plays three important roles:
producing (or resuming from the first phase &endash; "Cognitive Unity of
Theorems", Garuti et al, 1996, 1998) arguments for validation, discussing their
acceptability according to requirements about their nature (for instance, although
empirical arguments may be relevant in the first phase and even in the approach
to validation, they must be progressively excluded from this phase on), and
finding possible links leading from one to another. I could add that the nature of
the whole third phase is argumentative, and the fourth phase is also largely
argumentative (especially as concerns the control of argument enchaining). In the
fifth phase, argumentation may play a role when comparing the text under
production with current standards of "rigour", textual organisation, etc.

The preceding analysis can help when dealing with the problem of approaching
mathematical proof in school. In our opinion, two main problems must be faced:

• the nature of arguments taken into account by students as reliable


arguments for validation. Students can use empirical arguments
(measurements, etc.), visual evidence, body references, etc.; most of
these arguments are useful and even necessary in the first, third and (with
a different, specific function) the fourth phases of the activity concerning
theorems, but must be rejected from the fourth phase on. However, in the
last four phases students should also necessarily refer to "theoretical"
arguments belonging to reference theory (these arguments become
exclusive in the fifth phase);

• the nature of the reasoning produced by students. Frequently, they find


analogies, examples, etc. sufficient in order to be sure of the validity of a
statement. While these are very useful and perfectly acceptable in some
activities concerning theorems (particularly in the first and in third phases
and, with a different function, in the fourth phase), they are no longer
acceptable in the fifth phase.

So, when it comes to activities concerning theorems, we may state that there is an
important difference between working mathematicians and students: working
mathematicians are able to play not only the game of a rich and free
argumentation (especially in Phases I and III) but also the game of argumentation
under the increasing constraint of the strict rules inherent in the acceptability of
final products (especially in Phases II and V); by contrast, students face serious
difficulties in learning the rules of the latter game and passing from one game to
the other (but we must recognize that they also experience difficulties in free
argumentation in mathematics!).

I feel that both problems must be considered and tackled from the educational
point of view.

The nature of arguments (empirical or theoretical, etc) which students refer to not
only depends on the culture of theorems developed in the classroom, but also
relies strongly on the nature of the task. By their very nature, some tasks induce
children to produce and/or exploit empirical arguments (measurements, visual
evidence, etc). For instance, the plane geometry tasks that school students are
usually set enhance spontaneous recourse to measurements and visual evidence,
while appropriate space geometry tasks might prevent it. From these tasks,
students could learn (under the teacher's guidance) to exploit arguments
belonging to a set of reliable statements ("germ theory") concerning space. An
example is presented in Bartolini Bussi (1996): the problem situation concerns a
rectangular table with a small ball lying in the center; students have to draw the
ball on a perspective drawing of the table and validate their construction by
making reference to a "table of invariants" concerning plane representation of
space situations. Another example is presented in Boero et al (1996): in this case
students have to find out whether (and under what conditions) two non-parallel
sticks produce parallel shadows on the ground and validate their solutions by
making reference to geometrical properties of sun shadows (particularly, the
property by which vertical, parallel sticks produce parallel shadows on the
ground).

As concerns the nature of reasoning, the role of the teacher here becomes even
more significant. By making reference to appropriate "models" (or "voices",
according to Boero et al, 1997), the teacher should progressively emphasise
specific kinds of reasonings. Here again the choice of the task may help: in both
of the examples alluded to above, reasoning by examples, considering specific
cases, etc. clearly appears to be insufficient to students, and deductively
organised reasoning can prove powerful. In such situations, the teacher's task
becomes that of helping students to organise the only possible performant
reasoning according to some prescriptions and modes defined in the mathematics
community.

References

Bartolini Bussi, M. (1996): 'Mathematical Discussion and Perspective Drawing


in Primary School', Educational Studies in Mathematics, 31, 11-41

Bartolini Bussi, M.; Boero,P.; Ferri, F.; Garuti, R. and Mariotti, M.A.: 1997,
'Approaching geometry theorems in contexts', Proceedings of PME-XXI, Lahti,
vol.1, pp. 180-195

Boero, P.; Garuti, R. and Mariotti, M.A.: 1996, 'Some dynamic mental processes
underlying producing and proving conjectures', Proceedings of PME-XX,
Valencia, vol. 2, pp. 121-128

Boero,P.; Pedemonte, B. & Robotti, E.: 1997, 'Approaching Theoretical


Knowledge Through Voices and Echoes: a Vygotskian Perspective', Proc. of
PME-XXI, Lahti, vol. 2, pp. 81-88

Douek, N.: 1998, 'Some Remarks about Argumentation and Mathematical Proof
and their Educational Implications', Proceedings of the CERME-I Conference,
Osnabrueck (to appear)

Douek, N.: 1999, 'Argumentative Aspects of Proving: Analysis of Some


Undergraduate Mathematics Students' Performances', Proceedings of PME-
XXIII, Haifa (to appear)

Garuti, R.; Boero, P.; Lemut, E.& Mariotti, M. A.:1996, 'Challenging the
traditional school approach to theorems: a hypothesis about the cognitive unity of
theorems', Proc. of PME-XX, Valencia, vol. 2, pp. 113-120

Garuti, R.; Boero,P. & Lemut, E.: 1998, 'Cognitive Unity of Theorems and
Difficulties of Proof', Proceedings of PME-XXII, vol. 2, pp. 345-352

Simon, M.: 1996, 'Beyond Inductive and Deductive Reasoning: The Search for a
Sense of Knowing', Educational Studies in Mathematics, 30, 197-210

Thurston, W.P: 1994, 'On Proof and Progress in Mathematics', Bull. of the
A.M.S., 30, 161-177

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