Extrinsic or external aid to interpretation

When internal aids are insufficient, courts must resort to external aids. They are extremely
useful tools for interpreting or constructing statutory provisions. O. Chennappa Reddy J.
observed in B. Prabhakar Rao and others v. State of A.P. and others (1986): "Where internal
aids are not forthcoming, we can always rely on external aids to discover the object of the
legislation." External assistance is not ruled out. This is now a well-established principle
of contemporary statutory construction."

Furthermore, the Supreme Court stated in the case of District Mining Officer and others v.
Tata Iron & Steel Co. and others (2001): "It is also a cardinal principle of construction that
external aids are brought in by broadening the concept of context as including not only
other enacting provisions of the same statute, but its preamble, the existing state of law,
other statutes in pari materia, and the mischief which the statute was intended to remedy."

Where the Legislature has not chosen to define the expression, courts of law must rely on
other aids to determine the Legislature's intention, such as the context, object, and purpose
of the legislative measure in question. The court may also employ dictionaries and judicial
interpretation of this award, as is done in other statutes, although these approaches are not
as satisfactory as a precise and explicit legislative definition in the statute itself.

External Aids include:

1. History of Parliament, Historical Facts, and Surrounding Circumstances

If the wordings are confusing, the historical context, which includes parliamentary history,
historical facts, statements of objects and reasons, and expert committee reports, may be
evaluated.

a) Parliamentary history comprises the development of an idea, the writing of the bill, the
discussions held, the changes suggested, the speech made by the mover of Bill, and so on.
Papers presented to the government, which made the decision to introduce the measure, are
irrelevant because they were not presented to the parliament.

The Supreme Court stated in S.R. Chaudhuri v. State of Punjab and others (2001) that it is
a settled position that debates in the Constituent Assembly may be relied on as an aid to
interpret a Constitutional provision because it is the Court's function to determine the
intention of the Constitution's framers.
However, in Parliament, there is a distinction made between speeches of the Bill's mover
and speeches of other Members.

In K.S. Paripoornan v. State of Kerala and others (1995), it was determined that speeches
made by Members of Parliament during the discussion of a Bill are not admissible as
extrinsic aids to the interpretation of the statutory provision. Speeches, on the other hand
the statements made by the Bill's mover or Minister may be referred to in order to determine
the aim of the Bill.

b) Historical facts of the statute are the external circumstances under which it was enacted.
The goal is to determine whether the statute in question was meant to change the law or
leave it alone.

The state of law and judicial decisions preceding and at the time the statute was passed are
relevant matters to consider in determining the legislature's intention. Evidence of matters
relating to such surrounding circumstances and historical investigation, including reports
of select committees and statements of objects and reasons, can be resorted to for
ascertaining such antecedent law and determining the legislature's intention. However, the
bill and select committee reports are not legitimate sources for constructing a statute, that
is, determining the meaning of words.

Parliamentary debates on the floor of the legislature are also inadmissible since the court
is only interested in what the legislature said in the statute. Furthermore, plain words in the
statute cannot be limited by policy considerations.
An incorrect assumption about the state of the law by the legislature has no consequence
and would not constitute a substantive statute. In the formulation of a statute, the person
responsible for its drafting is the worst person to construe it. Courts sometimes distinguish
between parliamentary discussions and committee reports, treating the latter as a more
reliable or satisfactory source of help. The speeches made by members of the House during
the debate are not acceptable as External aids to interpretation.

It cannot be said that the acceptance or rejection of amendments to a Bill during

Parliamentary proceedings forms part of a statute's pre-enactment history and, as such, may
shed valuable light on the Legislature's intention when the language used in the statute
allowed for more than one interpretation. The reason why a particular amendment was
submitted, approved, or rejected is frequently a source of contention, and it cannot be
determined with any acceptable degree of certainty in the absence of the speeches relevant
to the motion.

It was held in Keats v. Lewis Merthbyr Consolidated Collieries Ltd. (1911) that external
aid in the form of historical facts and circumstances surrounding the legislation is required
and quite useful in understanding the subject matter of the statute and thus arriving at the
legislative intent.

In 1993, in the case of Pepper Vs. Hart, it was held that English Courts can consider the
parliamentary material where
1. legislation is ambiguous and obscure or leads to an absurdity;
2. to understand the statements of ministers or promoter of the Bill, if necessary;
3. such statements that are relied on are clear.

Lord Reid opines that allowing reference would increase time and expense and that
reference to parliamentary material would be of a little help in interpretation of statutes.
However, in the decision of Pepper Vs. Hart, it was opined that non availability of
parliamentary material was not shown as a problem in practice. In spite of everything, the
new trend in English courts is such that there is open usage of parliamentary material for
interpretation statutes but it should be limited.

In America, the principle is that the judge should interpret the law rather than reconstruct
the intention of legislators. They consider that the debates in Congress are not appropriate
or reliable to interpret the meaning of language of an Act. A system of judicial construction
should not be converted into a system of committee-staff prescription, by using
parliamentary material as opined by Scalia, J. His Lordship opines that placing reliance on
legislative history is not merely a waste of research time and ink; it is a false and disruptive
lesson in the law.

It is well accepted is that ‘legislative material can be cited to support almost any
proposition, and frequently is.’ Even the French Government make efforts to disseminate
parliamentary material, for the reason that such material is not accessible to majority of
advocates. Prof. Peter Strauss opines that Acts ought to be interpreted on the basis of what
they say, not what their legislative history might appear to reveal. Further, it is curious to
note that Legislative history is a product of evolution and so it is not to be disregarded.
Henri Capitant believes that parliamentary debates lead to the expression of the personal
views, rather than a general sense of the spirit of the law.

In State Of West Bengal vs M/S. B. K. Mondal And Sons, the Hon’ble Supreme Court of
India held as follows: ‘The question as to whether mandatory provisions contained in
statutes should be considered merely as directory or obligatory has often been considered
in judicial decisions. In dealing with the question no general or inflexible rule can be laid
down. It is always a matter of trying to determine the real intention of the Legislature in
using the imperative or mandatory words, and such intention can be gathered by a careful
examination of the whole scope of the statute and the object intended to be achieved by the
particular provision containing the mandatory clause.‘
Recently, in 2019, in Pioneer Urban Land And … vs Union Of India, relying on the dicta
in Mardia Chemicals Ltd. Etc. Etc vs U.O.I. & Ors , held that parliamentary intent cannot
be thwarted even if it operates a bit harshly on a small section of the public, if otherwise
made in the larger public interest. In in Cellular Operators Association of India v. TRAI
(2016) 7 SCC 703, the Apex Court of India held that when a provision is cast in definite
and unambiguous language, it is not permissible either to mend or bend it, even if such
recasting is in accord with good reason and conscience. It was further held that the
expression “means and includes” would indicate that that the definition section is
exhaustive.”what is an exhaustive definition is exhaustive for purposes of interpretation of
a statute by the Courts, which cannot bind the legislature when it adds something to the
statute by way of amendment”.
In `Principles of Statutory Interpretation‘, states as follows:
“As approved by the Supreme Court: “The question as to whether a statute is mandatory
of directory depends upon the intent of the Legislature and not upon the language in which
the intent is clothed.

In M/S Delhi Airtech Services Pvt. … vs State Of U.P. & Anr, observed as infra: ”The
meaning and intention of the legislation must govern, and these are to be ascertained not
only from the phraseology of the provision, but also by considering its nature, its design
and the consequences which would follow from construing it the one way or the other”
“For ascertaining the real intention of the Legislature”, points out Subbarao, J, “the court
may consider inter alia, the nature and design of the statute, and the consequences which
would follow from construing it the one way or the other;the impact of the other provisions
whereby the necessity of complying with the provisions in question is avoided; the
circumstances, namely, that the statute provides for a contingency of the non-compliance
with the provisions; the fact that the non-compliance with the provisions is or is not visited
by some penalty; the serious or the trivial consequences, that flow therefrom; and above
all, whether the object of the legislation will be defeated or furthered”. If object of the
enactment will be defeated by holding the same directory, it will be construed as
mandatory, whereas if by holding it mandatory, serious general inconvenience will be
created to innocent persons without very much furthering the object of enactment, the same
will be construed as directory. But all this does not mean that the language used is to be
ignored, but only that the prima facie inference of the intention of the Legislature arising
from the words used may be displaced by considering the nature of the enactment, its
design and the consequences flowing from alternative construction. Thus, the use of the
words `as nearly as may be’ in contrast to the words `at least’ will prima facie indicate a
directory requirement, negative words a mandatory requirement `may’ a directory
requirement and `shall’ a mandatory requirement.”

The external circumstances under which the statute was enacted are the historical facts of
the statute. The goal is to determine whether the statute in question was meant to change
the law or leave it alone.

The state of law and judicial decisions preceding and at the time the statute was passed are
relevant matters to consider in determining the legislature's intention. Evidence of matters
relating to such surrounding circumstances and historical investigation, including reports
of select committees and statements of objects and reasons, can be resorted to for
ascertaining such antecedent law and determining the legislature's intention. However, the
bill and select committee reports are not valid sources for constructing a statute, that is,
determining the meaning of words.

Parliamentary debates on the floor of the legislature are also inadmissible since the court
is only interested in what the legislature said in the statute. Furthermore, plain words in the
statute cannot be limited by policy considerations.
An incorrect assumption about the state of the law by the legislature has no consequence
and would not constitute a substantive statute. In the formulation of a statute, the person
responsible for its drafting is the worst person to construe it. Courts sometimes distinguish
between parliamentary discussions and committee reports, treating the latter as a more
reliable or satisfactory source of help. Members of the House's speeches during the
discussion are not admissible as extrinsic aid to the interpretation of statutory requirements.
It cannot be said that the acceptance or rejection of amendments to a Bill during
Parliamentary proceedings forms part of a statute's pre-enactment history and, as such, may
shed valuable light on the Legislature's intention when the language used in the statute
allowed for more than one interpretation. The reasons why a particular amendment was
submitted, accepted, or rejected are frequently contested.
The reason why a particular amendment was submitted, approved, or rejected is frequently
an issue of contention, and it cannot be determined with any acceptable degree of certainty
in the absence of the speeches relevant to the motion.

© Social, Political, Economic Developments and Scientific Inventions

A statute must be interpreted to incorporate circumstances or situations that were unknown

or did not exist when the statute was enacted. Any significant changes in social conditions
and technology should be given significant consideration. All of these developments
should be considered by courts when interpreting statutory provisions.

In S.P. Gupta v Union of India, AIR 1982 SC 149, it was stated - “The interpretation of
every statutory provision must keep pace with changing concepts and values and it must,
to the extent to which its language permits or rather does not prohibit, suffer adjustments
through judicial interpretation so as to accord with the requirement of the fast changing
society which is undergoing rapid social and economic transformation … It is elementary
that law does not operate in a vacuum. It is, therefore, intended to serve a social purpose
and it cannot be interpreted without taking into account the social, economic and political
setting in which it is intended to operate. It is here that the Judge is called upon to perform
a creative function. He has to inject flesh and blood in the dry skeleton provided by the
legislature and by a process of dynamic interpretation, invest it with a meaning which will
harmonise the law with the prevailing concepts and values and make it an effective
instrument for delivery of justice.”
Therefore, court has to take into account social, political and economic developments and
scientific inventions which take place after enactment of a statute for proper construction
of its provision.
Reference to Other Statutes:

If two Acts must be read together, each part of each Act must be construed as if it were
contained in a single composite Act. However, if there is a clear difference, the latter Act
will modify the former. When a single provision of one Act must be read or inserted in
another, it must be read in the same way that it was originally construed in the first Act. In
this way, even if only a provision of the first Act was accepted, the entire first Act can be
mentioned or stated in the second Act. When an old Act is repealed, it no longer has any
legal authority. However, such a repealed part may still be considered when construing the
unrepealed part.
Courts may refer to or consult with other statutes in order to interpret or build a legislative
provision. Statutory aids are another name for it. Statutory aids can be seen in the General
Clauses Act of 1897.
The use of this interpretation rule has the advantage of preventing any contradiction
between a sequence of statutes dealing with the same subject; it permits the use of an earlier
act to provide light on the meaning of a phrase used in a later statute in the same context.On
the same logic, if words in an earlier statute have been authoritatively interpreted by a
superior court, the use of the same words in a similar context in a later statute will give rise
to a presumption that the legislature intends that the same interpretation be followed for
construction of those words in the later statute.

2. Objects and Reasons Statement

The statement of objectives and reasons explains why the Act is being proposed for
enactment. It is permitted to consult it in order to comprehend the context, the preceding
condition of events, the surrounding circumstances in connection to the statute, and the evil
that the statute aimed to address. The Statement of Objects and Reasons tries solely to
explain why the mover introduced the bill in the House and what goals he hoped to achieve.
However, those objects and reasons may or may not correspond to the goal that the majority
of members had in mind when it was passed into law. The Bill may have undergone radical
changes during its passage through the House or Houses, and there is no guarantee that the
reasons for its introduction and the goals sought by the Bill have remained consistent until
the Bill emerges from the House as an Act of the Legislature, because they do not form
part of the Bill and are not voted on by the members. The Statements of Objects and
Reasons annexed to the Bill should be rejected as a tool for drafting legislation.

3. Commission Reports

Reports of Commissions including the Law Commission, or Committees, including

Parliamentary Committees, preceding the introduction of a Bill can also be used in Court
as evidence of historical facts or of surrounding circumstances, or mischief or evil intended
to be addressed.
In Rosy and others v. State of Kerala and others (2000), the Supreme Court evaluated the
Law Commission of India's 41st Report for interpretation of Section 200 (2) of the Code
of Criminal Procedure, 1898.

Previously, when interpreting a provision in a statute, courts would look to legislative

history to determine its clear and complete meaning. The Traditional English Courts used
to refer the report of a Committee as an external aid which was offered to the
Parliament/Legislature. However, as per modern trend, it appears that legislative history is
no longer permitted as a tool for interpretation.
The Supreme Court stated in A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras (1950) that debates in
Parliament on a bill are not acceptable for the interpretation of an act. However, it became
incompatible for the Supreme Court to use legislative history as an aid in interpreting a
statute provision.

4. Dictionary
The meaning of specific words in an Indian statute can be determined in the subject or
occasion on which they are used, rather than in precise etymological propriety of language.
However, it is well understood that words are generally used in their ordinary sense, and
thus, while dictionaries should not be regarded as authoritative in regard to the meanings
of words used in statutes, they may be consulted. The Supreme Court ruled in Voltas Ltd.
v. Rolta India Ltd. (2014) that "dictionaries can hardly be taken as authoritative exponents
of the meanings of the words used in legislative enactments for the plainest words may be
controlled by a reference to the context."

As a result, dictionaries are referred to/consulted by courts whenever the need arises to
determine the ordinary meaning of words. However, courts must exercise extreme caution
when referring to dictionaries because the dictionary definition of a word may not always
be correct in a specific context. There is no need to consult a dictionary to determine the
broad meaning of a word or expression defined in an Act. One of the primary goals of any
English dictionary is to provide an acceptable and complete definition of every term
contained within it. Dictionaries are used not just to determine the definition of a word, but
also to determine its general usage.
In Ramavtar v. Assistant Sales Tax officer,{2) the question before the court was whether
betel leaves are vegetables and, therefore, exempt from imposition of sales tax under the
central Provinces and Berar Sales Tax Act, 1947 as amended by Act 16 of 1948. The
dictionary meaning of ‘vegetable’ was sought to be relied on wherein it has been defined
as pertaining to, comprised or consisting of or derived or obtained from plants or their parts.

It was held that the dictionary meaning could not be said to reflect the true intention of the
framers of the sales tax law and betel leaves should be understood in the same sense in
which they are commonly understood. Therefore, sales tax could be levied on the sale of
betel leaves. In Motipur Zaminday Company private Limited v. State of Bihar,{3) the
question was whether sales tax could be levied under the Bihar Sales Tax Act 1947 on the
sale of sugarcane. The applicant argued that sugarcane being green vegetable was exempt
from imposition of tax.

The dictionary meaning of vegetable was quoted in Support of the argument. The Supreme
Court rejected the contention and held that in the context of the Act vegetables mean only
such vegetables as can be grown in a kitchen garden and used during lunch and dinner as
articles of food. This was the common parlance meaning of the term and the legislature
intended the word to be under stood only in such sense and consequently, the dictionary
meaning was not of much consequence under the circumstances of the case.
In Kanwar Singh v. Delhi Administration, {4) the appellants beat up the officers of the
respondents while the latter were pounding up stray cattle. The appellants were charged
under section 332, Indian Penal Code but they pleaded the right of private defense of
property. The question was whether the cattle being pounded up were abandoned within
the meaning of section 418, Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957.

The appellants emphasised the dictionary definition of the phrase, which means 'complete
abandoning of a thing as a final rejection of one's responsibilities so that it becomes
ownerless'. Observing that accepting dictionary meaning would destroy the principal aim
of the Act itself, which could never be the legislature's goal, the court decided that
abandoned implies unattended or left loose in the current context of the act.

In Balram Kumawat v. Union of India, {5) the supreme court remarked that where the
object of the Parliament was to stop not only trade in imported elephant ivory but ivory of
every description under the wildlife protection Act, 1972 as amended by Act 44-of 1991
vide Section 49-C, the word ivory will include ivory of every description imbedding
mammoth ivory as is clear from the dictionary meaning of the word Ivory.

In Peyare lal v/s Mahadeo Ramachandra, {6) the appellant was charged under the
Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 for selling supari sweetened with a lamed
artificial sweetener. The question was whether such a supari was an adulterated food within
the meaning of the Act.

The appellant claimed that he had committed no crime by relying on the dictionary
definition of the word food. The Supreme Court rejected the argument, holding that
dictionary definition is meaningless when the word is defined in the Act itself. The term
"food" has been broadly defined under the Act to include all articles used as food as well
as every component that goes into it, including flavouring, colouring, and preservatives.
5. Legal Decisions

Court decisions in the same manner serve as precedents for interpreting statutes. When
issued by a higher court, Indian judicial declarations may have binding force, but when
issued by a lower court, they may have persuasive force. These foreign judgments from
countries with the same legal system have merely persuasive value and cannot be used to
dispute binding Indian rulings.
According to this rule, a legal concept established through a series of decisions is generally
binding on courts and should be followed in comparable instances. The regulation is
motivated by convenience and public policy. It is not, however, uniformly applicable. For
example, if a grave injustice may arise, a court will not follow past judgements that they
believe are incorrect. In the case of Ramkrishna Bus Transport and Ors v. State of Gujarat
and Ors, (1995), Hon'ble Mr. Justice C.K. Thakkar held that whether a particular provision
is mandatory or directory depends on the intention of the Legislature and not only on the
language in which it is used. The Legislature's meaning and intention must be recognised
as decisive, and they must be determined not just by the phraseology used, but also by
evaluating the nature, design, and consequences that would result from construing it one
way or the other. It is also true that in some cases, the word ‘may' might be interpreted as
'shall' or vice versa. At the same time, it must be overlooked that 'may' should normally be
understood as 'may,' which is permissive rather than mandatory. 'May' can be construed as
'shall' or 'must' to give effect to the plain intention of the legislature.

The Supreme Court was concerned with the retrospectivity of law passed by the West
Bengal Legislature concerning the rights of tenants in Mahadeolal Kanodia v.
Administrator General of W.B., (1960), and stated in para 8 of the judgement: "The
principles that have to be applied for interpretation of statutory provisions of this nature
are well established." The first is that statutory provisions creating or removing substantive
rights are typically prospective; they are retrospective only if expressly stated or implied
to be so..."

In Amireddi Raja Gopala Rao v. Amireddi Sitharamamma,(1965), a Constitution bench

considered whether the introduction of Sections 4, 21, and 22 of the Hindu Adoptions and
Maintenance Act, 1956 affected the rights of maintenance of illegitimate sons of a Sudra
as available under the Mitakshara School of Hindu law. The Court determined that they
were not and stated as follows:

"If possible, a statute should be interpreted to respect vested rights, and if the words are
open to another interpretation, such a construction should never be adopted."

The Supreme Court stated in Narmada Bachao Andolan v. State of Madhya Pradesh &
Anr., (2011) that "the Court should not place reliance upon a judgement without first
discussing how the factual situation of the decision on which reliance is placed, as it has to
be ascertained by analysing all the material facts and the issues involved in the case and
argued on both sides." If a judgement contains some distinctive traits, it may not be
followed in a given case. A minor difference in facts or the addition of new facts may create
a significant difference in the worth of a decision. A Court judgement should not be
interpreted as a statute because judicial pronouncements are issued in the context of a
specific case. One additional or different fact can mean the difference between two
conclusions. It is not proper to dispose of a case by simply relying on a ruling."

The Supreme Court stated in the matter of Sakshi v. Union of India & Others (2004):

"Stare decisis is a well-known legal jurisprudence doctrine. The doctrine of stare decisis,
which means "to stand by decided cases," is based on the principle that the law that governs
men should be fixed, definite, and known, and that when the law is declared by a court of
competent jurisdiction authorised to interpret it, such declaration, in the absence of
palpable mistake or error, is evidence of the law until changed by competent authority. It
requires that principles of law, when publicly stated and established by a court of last resort,
be adhered to and followed rather than simply rejected and put aside. What it forbids is that
if a legal principle has been established via a series of rulings, it is legally binding and
should be followed in similar instances. It is a good theory that offers legal certainty and
leads individuals in shaping their future affairs."
6. Foreign decisions and judgements, as well as foreign statutes-

The majority of Indian legislation is based on prior English statutes. Similarly, the concepts
established in numerous common law court decisions in England have been codified.

Indian courts have accepted and followed it. As a result, the Indian legal system is the
replica of English law. Although references to English and American decisions may be
made because they have the same legal system as ours, they do not take precedence when
the language of the Indian statute or enactment is clear. They aid in the clarification of
broad principles and the interpretation of Acts in pari materia. However, Indian statutes
must be interpreted in light of the realities of Indian life.

Appeals from Indian High Courts were heard by the Privy Council prior to independence,
i.e. before the foundation of the supreme court in India, and were followed and
implemented in Indian Courts even after independence until now. It should be mentioned
that the British Parliament drafted a variety of statutes in India, both substantive and
procedural, such as the Indian Penal Code, 1860, and the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, which
are used in Indian courts.

The landmark case of Justice K S Puttaswami and Others v. Union of India and Others
reaffirmed the right to privacy as a basic constitutional right. In this decision, the Court
ruled that the right to privacy is a basic right guaranteed by the Constitution. The Court
also conducted a comparative legal review of the idea of privacy in other jurisdictions,
focusing on the United Kingdoms, the United States, South Africa, and Canada.

It then examined the judicial decisions of the European Court of Human Rights, the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights, and so on. This investigation of the Court was
symptomatic of the Apex Court's desire to be thorough with the way the notion of right to
privacy was pursued in many places across the world based on the history of the
communities they govern and the issues they face.
Some major legal decisions adopted from the United Kingdom include Semayne's Case[8,
9], Entrick v. Carrington[10], and a multiplicity of cases dealing with the right to privacy
from the 17th century to the present day. Boyd v. United States[11], Griswold v.
Connecticut[12], United States v. Miller[13], and other United States cases from 1886 to
the present were investigated.While studying the right to privacy in South Africa, the
Supreme Court of India thought it appropriate to refer to cases such as National Media Ltd.
v. Jooste[14], in which the Court observed that the right to privacy is an individual
condition of life; Bernstein v. Bester and Ors[15], in which the Court held that the scope
of privacy can be closely associated or related to the concept of identity; and NM and Ors.
v. Smith and Ors. Her Majesty, The Queen v. Brandon Roy Dyment[17], R v. Spencer[18],
and other landmark Canadian cases are mentioned.

This decision can essentially function as a comprehensive document that archives historical
landmark decisions from other countries, international bodies, doctrines, and privacy laws.
The essence of this judgement is that the Indian Court was willing to resort to international
decisions in order to steer the Court in the right direction.
Union of India v. Navtej Singh Johar and Others[19]

The Supreme Court decriminalised homosexuality in this case, ruling that the LGBTQ
population has the same rights as any other citizen and that sexual orientation is an
important part of privacy. The Apex Court evaluated the International viewpoint of this
matter and studied the laws of the United States, Canada, South Africa, the United
Kingdom, and other Courts and Jurisdictions in issuing this judgement. The Court
specifically considered the decisions of foreign Courts in Law v. Canada[20], James Egan
and John Norris Nesbit v. Her Majesty The Queen in Right of Canada and Anr.[21], Paris
Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, A.R. Coriel v. The Netherlands[22], and others, where the cases
upheld individuals' right to privacy and reiterated that their sexual identity is a very
personal matter.

Furthermore, in cases such as Ashok Kumar Thakur v. Union of India and Others[23], the
Court on record reiterated the importance of foreign decisions for interpretation, as well as
the relevance and applicability of such foreign decisions to the facts and circumstances of
the domestic case, before applying such foreign decision. The Honourable Judge in this
case stated that, in every case, the judges must look into the heart of things and regard the
facts of every case concretely much as a jury would do; and yet, not quite as a jury would
do, because we are considering here a matter of law and not just one of fact; Do these
"laws" (foreign judicial decisions) which have been called into question offend a still
greater law before which even they must bow?�[24]

In Forasol v. ONGC[25], General Electric Company v. Renusagar Power Company[26],

and many other major judgements, the Court regarded foreign rulings as persuasive and
used such decisions as a guiding light while stepping in new or existing areas of law.

Suggestions and observations

When employing foreign judgements to interpret statutes or legal elements, the judiciary
must ensure that the facts of the judgement being used are similar to or relevant to the facts
of the judgement being used. The goal of interpretation will be harmed if a foreign judicial
ruling is applied arbitrarily.

The judiciary is in charge of the nation's socio-legal growth. As a result, it must be

extremely watchful and aware of global socio-legal trends, and it must incorporate these
changes into its decisions. This is when international judicial rulings come into play. For
example, the LGBTQ+ movement around the world influenced the judiciary to recognise
an individual's right to associate himself/herself with a specific gender under Article 21 of
the Constitution; the Court cited many international cases in reaching this decision.

The practise of adopting foreign judgements in decisions taken by the judiciary in India is
followed by the judiciary at the upper levels of hierarchy, while the lower judiciary does
not use such rulings as much. Though the lower judiciary refers to the upper court's
judgements, its execution of such decisions would generate an open mind even at the lower
level where the scope to explore for multiple meanings in such judgements exists.
7. Textbooks-

When interpreting a statute, courts may refer to textbooks written by distinguished jurists
and eminent scholars in order to arrive at the true meaning of an enactment. However, it is
not required that the meanings of the words given in textbooks correspond to the Courts'
views/opinions. Courts have approved the use of Vedas in specific circumstances. Manu
Smriti, Agna Valkya Smriti, Jimutavahana, Vignaneswara, Kanitilya, and so on.
Kesavananda Bharati v. Kerala State (1973)

The Supreme Court cited to a huge number of textbooks in this case. The majority
conclusion was that, given the numerous opinions and counter-opinions stated by textbook
authors and jurists, it was not beneficial to follow the opinions quoted in the textbooks.

Treaties and Conventions in International Law

International law is one of the most important fields of public law. There are two types of
international law: public international law and private international law/conflict of laws.
International Law is a set of laws and principles that govern the behaviour and relationships
of members of the International Community (UNO or U.N.). The definition of convention
is "the act of convening a conference as an assembly, representatives, or delegates
assembled for a common cause." For example, the 1982 United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea. In contrast, the phrase treaty refers to an agreement entered into on a certain
subject between two or more governments (countries). For example, the Indo-Pak Treaty
refers to an agreement between India and Pakistan.

International treaties/conventions also assist the country in resolving conflicts with other
countries. Shimla Agreement 1972, agreement with Bangladesh on sharing Ganga waters,
and agreement with Nepal on utilising water resources are examples of bilateral agreements
rather than international treaties.
Countries are becoming increasingly dependent on one another as a result of globalisation,
which has been accelerated by developments in communication and information
technology. The significance of international treaties is thus self-evident. GATT/WTO
accords are prime examples.

India is a rising economic power that plays an important role in international accords.
While India should not remain isolated, it should also be wary because some international
accords and conventions may not be in the best interests of the country in the long term.
Agreements on intellectual property rights, trade, agriculture, and services may be skewed
in favour of wealthy countries while harming our interests. As a result, the executive must
exercise extreme caution when signing treaties and must trust the legislative.

•International treaties/conventions also help the country become really global.

What is the jurisprudence underlying Article 253 of the Constitution, which deals with
legislation to give effect to International Treaties?

Article 246 of the Indian Constitution, along with items 14, 15, and 16 of the Union List,
states that the parliament has the only authority to create legislation governing treaties and
agreements with foreign governments.

•According to Article 253 of the Indian Constitution, the Indian parliament has the
sovereign power to legislate on subjects listed in Lists 1 and 2 of the constitution's seventh
schedule in order to implement "any treaty, agreement, or convention with any other
country or countries for any decision made at any international conference, association, or
other body." It is worth mentioning that List 2 includes topics under the purview of the
State Legislature.
In other words, even for items on the state list, the Parliament, not the State Legislature,
has the authority to approve treaties. The Supreme Court ratified this in the Maganbhai
Ishwarbhai Patel v. Union of India case, where Justice Shah correctly stated, "The effect
of Article 253 is that if a treaty, agreement, or convention with a foreign State deals with a
subject within the competence of the State Legislature, the Parliament alone has,
notwithstanding Article 246(3), the power to make laws to implement the treaty,
agreement, or convention or any decision made at any international meeting." In terms of
legislative power, the Article confers power on the Parliament that it would not otherwise
have. However, it does not seek to limit the scope of the authority granted by Article 73.
If, as a result of the exercise of executive power, citizens' or others' rights are restricted or
infringed upon, or laws are modified, the exercise of power must be supported by
legislation; if there is no such restriction, infringement of rights, or modification of laws,
the executive is competent to exercise the power." As a result, any foreign treaty or
convention that is to become legally binding on the country must be approved by the Indian
parliament. In other words, the Indian parliament, which represents the people of India, has
the inherent authority to determine if a foreign treaty/convention/agreement is beneficial
to the country. Thus, Article 253 gives the people of India the authority to decide whether
an international treaty or convention should be followed.

However, in the Indian context, the Parliament has yet to pass any legislation governing
the procedure for entering into and executing treaties. In the lack of such law, the
administration is free to sign and ratify international treaties. In the absence of
parliamentary legislation, Article 73 of the Indian Constitution permits the executive to
make decisions on subjects over which the Parliament has authority. This is how the Indian
government has negotiated international treaties and agreements. Taking advantage of the
fact that Parliament has opted not to pass any legislation governing the treaty-making
power, the Union Government has been freely entering into treaties without consulting
Parliament under Article 73 of the Constitution. The Central Government has approached
Parliament to make laws only where legislation is required to give effect to the conditions
of a treaty, convention, or covenant. It would be helpful, for example, to consider what
happened in the instance of the TRIPs agreement. According to the HDR 1999, issued by
UNDP, the drafted Agreement (on TRIPs) was being pushed primarily by multi-national
drug firms and contradicted practically every key premise of the "Background" paper given
by India to the Negotiating Committee on July 27, 1989. The preliminary TRIPs
Agreement produced by the Conference clearly alarmed India. The government most likely
decided it was acceptable to bring the situation to the attention of Parliament. As a result,
on November 13, 1993, the Standing Committee of Parliament attached to the Commerce
Ministry, comprised of forty Members of Parliament from all political parties, reviewed
the draught Agreement and produced a Report.
The Standing Committee was opposed to every significant provision and term in the drafted
agreement. It believed that imposing a product patent system on India would result in sharp
increases in drug prices. It stated that it should be left up to the Indian state to decide
whether or not to file for a product patent. The Parliamentary Committee also criticised the
20-year patent period and a provision in the draughts agreement that allowed the patent
holder to manufacture medications and medicines outside of India while still enjoying the
benefits of a patent in India. It also imposed onerous standards for granting transition
periods to nations such as India (which was not only developing but also did not recognise
product patents at the time). What is important to note is that the Government of India
signed the TRIPs agreement in 1994, almost exactly in the shape of the draught agreement,
without going back to the Parliamentary Committee or the Parliament. The question that
emerges in such a situation is what was the point of consulting the Standing Committee of
Parliament and then signing the agreement in absolute disregard of the Parliamentary
Committee's Report and recommendations. It is evident that such a thing could not have
happened if there had been a law regulating the Government's treaty-making power and if
such law had provided for either previous approval, ratification, consideration, or
discussion of the treaty before it enters into force. It should be noted that the TRIPs
agreement is not the only one signed by the Government of India during the Final Round
of Uruguay discussions. We have signed various agreements affecting commerce, services,
agriculture, and so on, all of which have a significant impact on our economy, on our
farmers, merchants, and industrialists. The supremacy of the Parliament has been upheld
by courts. For instance “Maganbhai Ishwarbhai Patel Vs Union of India (1970) 3 SCC 400
AIR 1969 SC 783 and Bombay high court judgment in P.B. Samant vs. Union of India
(1994 Bombay 323).

9. Contemporanea Expositio or contemporaneous Exposition or Construction

'Contemporanea' means "of the same time or period," and exposition or exposition means
"explanation." As a result, the term 'contemporanea expositio' refers to interpreting a statute
or other document in light of the exposition it has acquired from contemporary authority."
Lord. Coke coined the term "Contemporanea Expositio" for the first time.
In R.S. Nayak v. A.R. Antuley (1984), the Supreme Court applied the principle of
'Contemporanea Expositio' to interpret Act 21 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, and
determined that a member of the legislative assembly is not a public servant as described
in the Act.
The rule of construction by reference to 'contemporanea expositio' is a well-established
method for interpreting a statute by reference to the interpretation it has received from
contemporary authority, albeit it must yield if the act's text is clear and unambiguous.
Crawford on Statutory Construction (1940) expresses this rule succinctly. The rule's
validity was also recognised in Baleshwar Bagarti, ILR 35 CAL 701, when Mookerjee J
expressed the rule as follows:
"It is a well-established principle of interpretation that courts will give much weight to the
interpretation put upon a statute, both at the time of its enactment and since, by those whose
duty it has been to construe, execute, and apply it," and this statement of the rule was quoted
with approval by the Supreme Court in Deshbandhu, [1979] 3 SCR 373.
"According to the doctrine of Contemporanea Expositio, words used in a statutory
provision must be understood in the same way that they are usually understood in ordinary
common parlance by the people in the area and business." According to Rohitash Kumar,
(2013) 11 SCC 451, "the doctrine of Contemporanea Expositio must be applied with
caution, and the rule must give way when the language of the statute is clear and
unambiguous."
- J.K. Lakshmi Cement Ltd. v. Commercial Tax Officer, [Civil Appeal No.102 of 2010],
Hon'ble Justice Dipak Misra.
Many statutes enacted during the pre-independence era remain intact and effective for
adjudication of issues/situations that arise today. A situation that was not contemplated by
Parliament at the time the law was enacted has been ruled to be included within the scope
of the Act if the terms are capable of comprehending it. This is known as the doctrine of
ongoing interpretation of a statute, and it differs from the doctrine of Contemporanea
Expositio Est Optima Et Fortissima In Lege, which states that a statute should be construed
as it would have to be construed a day after the statute was passed, giving effect to its
contemporary meaning.
The doctrine of Contemporanea Expositio simply states that while construing a statute,
courts will accord great weight to the interpretation placed on it. The theory is used to
interpret the statute by referring to the exposition it acquired from contemporary authorities
at the appropriate point in time when it was enacted. In a number of cases, Indian courts
have used the doctrine of Contemporanea Expositio to interpret acts issued by the
legislature[i]. The Courts are compelled by this theory to interpret the Act while giving
proper regard to the interpretation that must have prevailed at the time of its enactment. In
Ultratech Cement Ltd. and Ors. v. State of Rajasthan and Ors.[ii], the Supreme Court
concluded that the notion of Contemporanea Expositio indicates that the appropriate
method to understand a document is to read it as it would have been read at the time it was
created. It is based on the premise that when interpreting a Parliamentary Act, it is
reasonable and indeed important to consider the state of affairs that existed and was known
to Parliament to exist at the time of its enactment.
Whereas the idea of continuing interpretation fundamentally states that statutes enacted by
Parliament should be regarded as "always speaking." Using this theory, the Supreme Court
expanded the scope of the phrase "telegraph line" to encompass "wireless" lines in Senior
Electric Inspector v. Laxminarayan Chopra[iii]. The Court ruled that wires used for the
Post and Telegraph Wireless Station apparatus would be included in the definition of
"telegraph line" in the Indian Telegraph Act of 1885, and that the wire did not have to be a
continuous physical channel from point of transmission to point of reception. The
technology of wireless transmission was not considered by the legislature when the law
was enacted in 1885, but despite this, the Supreme Court expanded the meaning of the term
"telegraph line" to include "wireless" lines within its realm, essentially invoking the
doctrine of ongoing interpretation of statute. All statutes must be interpreted as "always
speaking statutes" in a modern progressive society. The doctrine is divided into two
parts[iv]. The first is that the Courts must interpret and apply a statute in light of the world
as it already exists. The second strand is that the statute must be construed in light of the
current legal system.
To avoid any confusion, the Supreme Court clarified in Senior Electric Inspector v.
Laxminarayan Chopra (supra) that the doctrine of Contemporanea Expositio is generally
applicable when the Court is construing ancient statutes, whereas the doctrine of ongoing
interpretation is applicable when the Court is interpreting relatively modern Acts.
However, the essential rule of statute construction has always been the same, which is to
determine what the legislature's explicit intention is. With the passage of time, and in a
modern progressive society, it would be exceedingly unfair to limit a Legislature's goal to
the meaning attributable to the language used at the time the legislation was created.
Frequently, the Courts are called upon to interpret a statute and its application to new
conditions that Parliament did not anticipate when the statute was adopted. In such cases,
the Courts must determine whether the circumstances come within the parliamentary
intent. In general, it would fall within the scope of parliamentary intent if there is a clear
purpose in the legislation that can only be fulfilled if the extension is made to the new
situations, or they fall within the same genus of facts as those to which the expressed policy
has been formulated. Keeping this principle in mind, the Supreme Court rejected the
argument in Dharani Sugars and Chemicals Ltd. v. Union of India[v] that section 35A of
the Banking Regulations Act, 1949, which was introduced in 1956, cannot be viewed as a
source of power for the Reserve Bank of India to issue guidelines to invoke the Insolvency
and Bankruptcy Code because the IBC was enacted in 2016.
Comments

Both doctrines are equally important and are crucial tools for courts to use when
interpreting the law in order to protect the real intent of the legislator in establishing the
legislation. The genuine sense of doctrine of ongoing interpretation based on the principle
of always speaking underpins the rationale that where a statue employs a term whose
content has changed with advancing society, the same should be interpreted as it is now
understood. As a result, the content changes, but the concept remains unchanged, and the
meaning of statutory language remains unchanged[vi]. However, the notion cannot be
utilised to cast doubt on the doctrine of Contemporia Expositio by interpreting the language
of an old statute to indicate something conceptually different from what contemporary
evidence shows the Parliament must have intended at the time of enactment. This is
explained by a decision in which the House of Lords[vii] chose not to interpret the verb "to
maintain" (the road) to include the removal of ice and snow, despite the fact that road users
may anticipate such services in modern times. While holding this position, the House of
Lords alluded to recent evidence that demonstrated that the idea of maintenance under the
statute was limited to keeping the fabric of the road in good repair and did not include
services such as ice and snow removal from the road.
________________________________________
The courts are tasked with the important role of interpreting statutes and are often called
upon to interpret its application to new scenarios that Parliament did not contemplate when
the statute was passed. Manisha Singh and Nisha Sharma's essay addresses two
fundamental ideas, the doctrine of continuous interpretation and the doctrine of
contemporanea expositio, as well as the conditions in which the supreme court in India
uses them.

10. Government Circulars and Publications (Commissions and Committee Reports)

Government Circulars, Publications, and Reports have been seen as extra assistance in
statute drafting. As a result, courts are used to interpret statutes. As a result, the Courts send
them for interpretation unless they contradict the spirit of the statute under which they are
issued.
The Press Commission's Report was referred to the Supreme Court in Express Newspapers
Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India (1958).

As a result, it is possible to conclude that the significance of using these assistance is

obvious. In any event, where it is impossible to determine the genuine intent of the
legislator, the Courts may make use of these materials. Of course, there is no consistent
and standard approach to the use of extrinsic resources in the sense of determining as aids
to interpretation of a specific statute in India. Without a question, they are extremely
beneficial in determining the genuine objective of the legislators, both individually and
collectively. Of course, these tools could only be used if more than one interpretation of a
given statute was possible.
Possibly Asked Questions

1. Define and discuss the significance of Extrinsic or External Aid to Interpretation.

2. Discuss the importance of Parliamentary History as a tool for interpretation.
3. Discuss briefly the various types of Extrinsic or External Aid to Interpretation.
4. Explain the significance of the following as a help to
I. Dictionary
II. Text Books
III. Judicial Decisions
IV. Foreign Judgment

Interpretation of the Constitution