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Groupthink: A triple fiasco in social psychology

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 Groupthink: A triple fiasco 1

Running head: GROUPTHINK: A TRIPLE FIASCO IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY

. In C. W. Tolman, F. Cherry, R. van Hezewijk, I. Lubek (Eds.). Problems of theoretical

psychology. Captus Press

Groupthink: A triple fiasco in social psychology.

Victor Wekselberg

University of Southern Mississippi

Abstract

This paper shows how psychology can produce weak concepts that receive weak empirical support, but that are

widely disseminated and accepted. The story is about Janis' (1972, 1982) groupthink (GT). GT is about bad

decisions (called fiascoes, e.g. the Bay of Pigs invasion) of "good" (because cohesive) groups. GT is discussed as

culpable of the following fiascoes: (1) serious conceptual and methodological problems, (2) weak empirical support,

and (3) wide acceptance. The support for each GT fiasco is based, respectively, on: (1) a conceptual analysis, (2) a

summary of research findings, and (3) the content analysis of social psychology textbooks.

Finally, GT is discussed as a distortion of social reality that has been committed by social scientists.
 Groupthink: A triple fiasco 2

The crisis in social psychology is not obvious to everyone. There are very few signs of it in most American

social psychology textbooks, or in the most prestigious social psychology journals such as Journal of Personality and

Social Psychology, Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, and

European Journal of Social Psychology. At the same time, critical social psychology has produced various analyses

of the crisis. The positivistic foundations of social psychology have been challenged by Gergen's (1973) idea of

psychology as a historical science. Other critiques have challenged the assumption of possessive individualism in

social psychology (e.g., Sampson, 1988; Shotter, 1990), and its disregard for the cultural embeddedness of the

generated knowledge (e.g., Howitt et al., 1989; Sampson, 1991). Rhetorical analyses of social psychology (e.g.,

Billig, 1990) and the examination of power and ideology as factors that shape social psychology (e.g., Wexler, 1983;

Parker, 1990), have provided new directions for change in social psychology.

Instead of addressing the whole field of social psychology, or even any of its subfields, this paper examines

the story of just one concept--Irving Janis' (1972, 1982) "groupthink." The concept of groupthink is ideal for the

analysis of how social psychology works as science for a number of reasons. Although we can link the concept of

groupthink with earlier social psychology concepts and paradigms (such as cohesion, conformity, or compliance) we

know exactly when this specific concept was first formulated and published. Furthermore, we know the author of this

concept. All references to it in the professional publications and popular media can be located with great accuracy

because of the unique (and artificial) name that Janis (1982) conceived using Orwellian language. It adequately

represents other constructs used in social psychology that are dominated by the general paradigm of social influence

(Wekselberg, 1995). Like many other social psychology concepts, it was created by psychologists, and absorbed

very eagerly by the popular culture. Finally, the concept of groupthink was also incorporated enthusiastically by

other fields, such as organizational science, political science, and sociology. Its popularity is evident in the 700

citations of Janis' work from January 1989 through June 1992 (Aldag & Fuller, 1993).

Groupthink was originally conceptualized to explain a case of faulty decisions made by groups that consist

of highly competent individuals (Janis, 1982). The full model included five elements that are assumed to be causally

related. The causal chain starts with the antecedent conditions (group cohesion, structural organizational faults, and

provocative situational context) that result in concurrence-seeking that is also called groupthink tendency. The

concurrence seeking influences the following three symptoms of groupthink: overestimation of the group, closed-
 Groupthink: A triple fiasco 3

mindedness, and pressures toward uniformity. In turn, the symptoms of groupthink cause seven different symptoms

of defective decision-making. In the final stage of this causal chain, the symptoms of defective decision making

result in a low probability of successful outcomes. The essence of this model can be summarized as follows: a

"good" group (highly cohesive) under unfavorable organizational and situational conditions, engages in 'bad' social

processes (symptoms of groupthink) that lead to "bad" decision-making process, thus making "good" decisions

unlikely.

It was may be a bad sign that the first publication on groupthink appeared in Psychology Today (Janis,

1971). At the time of this publication, Janis was a well-established authority in the field of decision-making and

stress. For example, he previously published several books and chapters (Janis, 1958; Janis, 1968; Janis, 1971). In

1972 the book Victims of groupthink was published and it initially described the model, and provided support with

the analyses of four political decisions that were classified as fiascoes because of groupthink (the Bay of Pigs,

invasion of North Korea, Pearl Harbor, and the escalation of war in Vietnam) and two classified as non-groupthink

decisions (Cuban missile crisis, and making of the Marshall Plan). The second edition of the book (1982) elaborated

on the model of groupthink, and an analysis of the Watergate fiasco was added. In both editions Janis (1972, 1982)

clearly described groupthink as a hypothesis:

Ultimately, the psychological explanation inferred from the imperfect historical materials will have to be

checked carefully in the same way that social scientists check any other type of explanation--rechecked as

new evidence comes to light. For purposes of hypothesis construction--which is the stage of inquiry with

which this book is concerned... (p. ix, 1982)

Nevertheless, in 1973 Katten produced a film popularizing groupthink, in which Janis was interviewed. The same

year, English dictionaries started to include definitions of groupthink (e.g., Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary,

1973, 9th. ed.).

Over the years, some psychologists have argued that the concept of groupthink was inconsistent with

common sense, and that it provided society with a tool to understand an important social phenomenon. For example,

Moorehead (1982) concluded that Janis' conclusions about the causes of the fiascoes "represent a major departure

from well-established concepts of the performance of highly cohesive groups, and have far reaching implications for

policy-making groups" (p. 430). After a decade of disappointing research (see below), Aldag and Fuller (1993)
 Groupthink: A triple fiasco 4

observed that "whatever its actual validity, the groupthink phenomenon has been accepted more because of its

intuitive appeal than because of solid evidence. ... It may also be the case that the groupthink perspective is

consistent with our implicit theories of groups" (p. 547). In my opinion, the concept of groupthink supported a

cultural bias against groups in an individualistic society.

The main argument of this paper about a triple fiasco is that: (a) the model of groupthink has major

theoretical flaws, which resulted in (b) no empirical support for the crucial aspects of the model, and which in turn

has not prevented (c) groupthink from achieving the status of well-established knowledge and a useful explanation of

social behavior.

Weak theory and concepts

My goal here was not to comprehensively analyze the whole model. This task has been previously done

elsewhere (Longley & Pruitt, 1980; Whyte, 1989; Park, 1990; Turner, Pratkanis, Probasco, & Leve, 1992; Aldag &

Fuller, 1993) but my goal was, instead, to show the major flaws that challenge its overall usefulness. These previous

analyses pointed out a number of conceptual problems that were not discussed here. For example, Longley and Pruitt

(1980) discussed potential problems with the value-laden terms, and with a lack of psychological explanation of the

nature of proposed interactions among variables in the model. Aldag and Fuller (1993) criticized the groupthink

model for its relatively narrow focus and its need to be revised to incorporate empirical findings.

Definition of Groupthink

Groupthink was originally defined as "a mode of thinking that people engage when they are deeply involved

in a cohesive ingroup, when members' strivings for unanimity override their motivation to realistically appraise

alternative courses of action. ... Groupthink refers to a deterioration of mental efficiency, reality testing, and moral

judgment that result from in-group pressures" (Janis, 1972, p. 9). Although groupthink is supposed to describe a

group phenomenon, the main focus is on individuals (and not groups) who can only think, deteriorate in mental

efficiency, and make moral judgments. In the long tradition of the group influence paradigm (for reviews see

McGrath & Kravitz, 1982; Paulus, 1989; Bettenhausen, 1991), the focus is on what groups do to individuals.

Longley and Pruitt (1980) criticized the above definition for a lack of clarity by "referring to variables at

three points in the causal chain" (p. 75). They believed that the presentation of the groupthink model, that appeared

later in Janis' publications, clarified the definition. Janis (1982) kept the same definition in the second edition of his
 Groupthink: A triple fiasco 5

book, and I believe that its lack of clarity has continued to cause problems. One such example, discussed below, is

difficulty in determining if the phenomenon of groupthink occurred or not.

Janis (1982) used the label of groupthink interchangeably with concurrence-seeking, which was not clearly

described as a group-level variable. He described the behavior of groups that were 'infected' with groupthink in the

following way: "the members were amiable, reasserted their warm feelings of solidarity, and sought complete

concurrence on every important topic" (p. 8). There is not enough description of group processes in saying that

individuals have a tendency to give in to pressures toward conformity.

Weakness of the Central Concept--Group Cohesiveness

Group cohesiveness (GC) is the central variable in the concept of groupthink. Without it this model would

describe groups that under an unfavorable situational context, and with structural faults of the organization, will have

a strong tendency towards premature concurrence. GC was considered by Janis (1982) as a necessary, but not a

sufficient, condition for groupthink to occur.

Social psychologists have struggled for a long time to make group cohesion a useful construct that describes

the quality of groups (Drescher, Burlingame, & Fuhriman, 1985; Beeber & Schmitt, 1986; Mudrack, 1989; Keyton

& Springton, 1990). After over fifty years of research (it originated with Lewin's group dynamics research), there is

still no acceptable definition of group cohesiveness (Mudrack, 1989). Some psychologists gave up and concluded

that "cohesiveness is ... beyond the grasp of our understanding and measurement" (Mudrack, 1989; p. 38). Others

tried hard to salvage the concept by redefining it (Keyton, 1990) or by introducing different types of cohesion such

as social and task cohesion (e.g., Carron, Widmeyer, & Brawley, 1985; Bernthal & Insko, 1993). These efforts have

not improved conceptual clarity because they do not place these group characteristics in the context of a theory of

social groups. This problem may be illustrated by using social and task cohesion as examples. Carron et al. (1985)

assumed that these two types of cohesion are independent, and that "task cohesion exists when the group coheres

around the task it was organized to perform while social cohesion exists when the group coheres around social

(nontask) functions" (pp. 247-8). This distinction, although seemingly an improvement in the conceptualization of

group cohesion by answering the question "cohesion around what?", still does not answer another basic question,

"cohesion in what?" (e.g., action, goals, attitudes). Furthermore, this makes an implicit assumption that social

functions are non-task related, and that they do not involve group goals.
 Groupthink: A triple fiasco 6

Leaving aside all conceptual problems with group cohesiveness, the measurement perspective is enough to

notice that cohesiveness cannot accurately describe groups. In a typical procedure, individual scores on a cohesion

measure are averaged for every group. This group score cannot be treated as a group-level variable because the

averaging does not make the individual-level variable into a group-level variable. Galtung (1967) described such

operations as a "fallacy of the wrong level", which happens when direct translations are made from one level of

analysis to another without theoretical justification for them (see also Whitley, 1992; James, Demaree, & Wolf,

1984).

In my opinion, the conceptual problems of the cohesion literature originated in its reliance on common

sense notions such as "bonding" or "group spirit" that were never systematically translated into psychological

theories of group maturity. After failures to link group cohesiveness empirically with other elements of the

groupthink model, some researchers proposed to eliminate cohesiveness from the model (Flowers, 1977), or reduce

its importance (Aldag & Fuller, 1993). Aldag and Fuller (1993) developed a general model of group decision-

making that did not have much resemblance to the original model of groupthink, and the label of 'groupthink' was

dropped.

Operationalization of the Group Cohesiveness Variable

The lack of a clear concept of group cohesiveness produced difficulties in the operationalization of this

variable (Turner et al., 1992). This showed up in operational definitions that clearly suggested that totally different

variables were measured under the same label of group cohesiveness. Flowers (1977) manipulated cohesiveness by

contrasting groups of acquaintances with groups of strangers. Callaway and Esser (1984) took a totally different

approach, and manipulated GC by telling subjects in the high cohesiveness condition that "they were members of a

select, congenial, and effective group [italics added] whose members had been matched based on personality and

demographic information obtained in the initial phase of the study" (p. 159). Yet another approach was taken by

Leana (1985), who operationalized cohesiveness by "comparing on-going task groups with groups that had no

previous experience together" (p. 7).

Consistency in the interpretation of existence or non-existence of cohesiveness in case studies also caused

great difficulty. For example, the interpretation of the cohesiveness of Nixon's advisers (Watergate fiasco) has been

disputed. Raven (1974) claimed that his analysis revealed that Nixon's advisers did not form a cohesive group in the
 Groupthink: A triple fiasco 7

sense of esprit de corps, but all members had the desire to maintain membership at all costs. The latter would not fit

Janis' definition of group cohesiveness. Janis (1982) disagreed with Raven's (1974) claim, and argued that this group

was cohesive until the cover-up was unraveled. Another illustration of the same problem of disagreement in

interpretations of group cohesiveness was the fiasco of the Space Shuttle Challenger disaster. Esser and Lindoerfer

(1989) used a quantitative analysis that was based on the recorded conversations among decision-makers, and

concluded that there were no statements that provided information about cohesiveness. Moorehead, Ference, and

Neck (1991) concluded, based on the same source of information, that the decision group was highly cohesive, and

provided the following support for their statement:

Cohesive group. The people who made the decision to launch had worked together for many years. They

were familiar with each other and had grown through the ranks of the space program. A high degree of

esprit de corps existed between members. (p. 541)

Problems with Identifying the Occurrence of Groupthink

The major problem of the groupthink model has been the lack of clarity about what criteria should be used

to identify whether or not this phenomenon has occurred. If, by definition, groupthink is equated with premature

concurrence-seeking, then the existence of such behaviors should be the major criterion for detecting the

phenomenon. Several experimental studies on groupthink clearly ignored this criterion and did not include it as a

variable (e.g., Flowers, 1977; Turner, Pratkanis, Probasco, & Leve, 1992; Bernthal & Insko, 1993). Also, several

case studies claimed the existence of groupthink even though the concurrence-seeking was not even considered (e.g.,

Raven, 1974; Esser & Lindoerfer, 1989; Moorhead et al., 1991).

Lack of Clear Rationale for Ordering of the Variables in the Model

The model had two main groups of variables (antecedent conditions and observable consequences) and the

concurrence-seeking that linked both groups. Janis never presented a clear theoretical rationale for treating some

variables as antecedents (i.e., group cohesiveness, structural faults of organization, and situational context), and other

variables as consequences (i.e., symptoms of groupthink and symptoms of defective decision making). Longley &

Pruitt (1980) noticed this theoretical weakness, and argued, for example, that some variables that were classified in

the model as consequences (illusion of invulnerability and illusion of unanimity) "appear to be antecedents rather

than consequences of a desire for concurrence" (p. 79). Unfortunately, to my knowledge, neither Janis nor any other
 Groupthink: A triple fiasco 8

researcher has provided theoretical justifications for treating some variables as antecedents and other variables as

consequences. The origin of this theoretical weakness could be traced to Janis' (1982) position that we can detect the

existence of the phenomenon called groupthink but we cannot explain it well. He described this situation in the

following way:

The problem of groupthink is more difficult to investigate than the problem of who is vulnerable and when.

But why is the heart of the matter if we want to explain the observed phenomena of concurrence-seeking. ...

The search for an explanation forces us to tread through a morass of complicated theoretical issues in still

largely uncharted areas of human motivation. (p. 254)

Characteristically, Janis (1982) seeks an explanation of the processes that are involved in groupthink, within

individual motivation. Such an approach further obscures the rationale for ordering variables in the model that

supposedly describe group processes. Furthermore, the order of variables in the groupthink model has not yet, to my

knowledge, been tested empirically.

Lack of Understanding of the Relationships between Variables in the Model

Some researchers (e.g., Longley & Pruitt, 1980; Park, 1990) criticized the model of groupthink for the lack

of a clear description of the relationships between variables. Park (1990) stated that "even with the variables used in

the model, Janis' broad hypotheses only link categories of variables with one another, leaving specific relationships

among the variables up to the imagination of the readers" (p. 229). Longley and Pruitt (1980), after a very detailed

analysis of the groupthink model concluded that "the eight 'symptoms of groupthink' appear to be a loose bag of

partially related phenomena" (p. 80). The problem discussed by Longley and Pruitt was, in my opinion, caused by

Janis' (1982) strategy of grouping variables that are hypothesized to have the same antecedents and the same

outcomes. In the following way, Janis (1982) justified the classification of variables into a category called symptoms

of groupthink:

...a mutual effort to maintain emotional equanimity in the face of external and internal sources of stress

arising when they share responsibility for making vital decisions that pose threats of failure, social

disapproval, and self-disapproval. The eight symptoms of groupthink form a coherent pattern if viewed in

the context of this explanatory hypothesis. The symptoms may function in somewhat different ways to

produce the same result (p. 256).

 Groupthink: A triple fiasco 9

The serious problem of Janis' approach to the categorization of variables is the exclusive reliance, in

building the model, on the presumed coincidence of variables in a few case analyses of political decision-making.

Lack of Empirical Support

Summary of the Validation Research

To obtain a summary of the empirical validity, I used three articles (Park, 1990; Turner, Pratkanis,

Probasco, & Leve, 1992; Aldag & Fuller, 1993) that reviewed the research on groupthink. In the first comprehensive

review, Park (1990) identified only 16 empirical studies on groupthink, which included seven experimental studies,

eight case studies, and one content-analysis. He focused on the following four antecedents: group cohesiveness,

group insulation, leadership style, and methodical procedures. The analysis revealed that "group cohesiveness, either

alone or in interaction with other variables, does not affect groupthink in most cases" (p. 236). Only one study tested

the role of group insulation and obtained partial support. The results about the role of leadership style were mixed.

He concluded that "more results are against Janis' hypothesis than for it" (p. 237), and proposed further research to

alleviate severe problems of empirical studies such as limited inclusion of variables, and inappropriate measurement.

Turner, Pratkanis, Probasco, and Leve (1992) reviewed both case studies and experimental studies. They

concluded that both types of studies provided only partial support for the groupthink hypothesis but also noticed

inconsistent findings regarding the role of group cohesiveness.

Aldag and Fuller's (1993) latest and comprehensive review resulted in the following evaluation of the

groupthink model:

it seems clear that there is little support for the full model. In fact, to our knowledge, no study has fully

tested the model, and in no study were all results consistent with the model. McCauley's (1989) review

raised doubts about Janis' (1982) conclusion regarding the prevalence of the antecedents conditions in his

initial scenarios. Furthermore, the central variable of cohesiveness has not been found to play a consistent

role" (p. 539).

Taken together, these reviews arrived at the same overall evaluation that there is mixed support for the

empirical validity of the groupthink model. They all seemed to share Baron and Byrne's (1994) opinion (see below

for more details) that the label "groupthink" represents some important group phenomenon of a rather unclear nature.
 Groupthink: A triple fiasco 10

For the reasons mentioned earlier, I next reviewed in more detail the research evidence regarding group

cohesiveness.

Lack of support for the role of group cohesiveness

McCauley (1989) re-analyzed all cases of decisions that Janis (1982) classified as groupthink fiascoes and

non-groupthink decisions. His analysis did not support Janis' hypothesis that high cohesiveness increases

internalization and decreases compliance. He further concluded that cohesion did not predict occurrence or

nonoccurrence of groupthink.

Tetlock, Peterson, McGuire, Chang, and Feld (1992) used structural equation models, based on Q-sort

ratings of 10 decisions that were based on historical studies, to test two models of groupthink. A simpler model that

excluded cohesiveness and situational context fit the data better. The role of cohesiveness as the antecedent of

concurrence-seeking tendency was not supported. Instead, procedural and structural faults of the organization

(antecedent) were related to symptoms of defective decision-making, which were related to symptoms of groupthink,

which in turn influenced symptoms of defective decision making.

Most of the experimental studies in which cohesiveness was manipulated (Flowers, 1977; Courtright, 1978;

Fodor & Smith, 1982; Callaway & Esser; 1984; Moorhead & Montanari, 1986) did not provide support for the role

of cohesiveness in the groupthink model (also see Park, 1990). Only in Leana's (1985) study, was cohesiveness

related in the expected direction to the symptoms of defective decision-making. Unfortunately, this finding was

obtained on only one out of four decisions.

Recently, Mullen, Anthony, Salas, and Driskell (1994) conducted a meta-analysis on the relationship

between group cohesiveness and quality decision making. They concluded that "Overall there was no significant

effect of cohesiveness on the quality of group decisions" (p. 189). The most interesting finding of their study was

that "The more the operationalization of cohesion tapped into interpersonal attraction, the more cohesiveness

impaired group decision making... And, the more the operationalization tapped into commitment to task, the more

cohesiveness enhanced group decision making" (p. 198). Interestingly, the attractiveness definition was the definition

that was used by Janis (1982) but the reasons for the attractiveness were never considered. Therefore, there is no

possibility to even speculate how attractiveness to the group influenced symptoms or decision-making.
 Groupthink: A triple fiasco 11

The confusions caused by the unclear concept of group cohesiveness make all interpretations of empirical

results susceptible to the hindsight bias, the dangers of which Janis (1982) was aware. For example, Raven (1974)

used the concept of groupthink to analyze the White House decision to cover-up the Watergate affair and concluded

that "the Nixon group does not indicate the high level of esprit de corps, mutual attraction toward one another,

mutual admiration" (p. 310). Nevertheless he saw that "the Nixon group could still be considered a highly cohesive

group in some sense [italics added]--despite their personal antagonisms, all of them wanted with all their hearts and

souls to be in that group and be central to that group" (p. 310).

Groupthink is 'Sold' to Society as Solid and Useful Knowledge

The story of the concept of groupthink will be concluded with an examination of the extent to which

groupthink became one of the tools to describe the social world in American society. Such an analysis could be

based on the examination of different stages of the dissemination of knowledge. I decided to focus on American

social psychology textbooks which are the major medium through which social psychological knowledge is

disseminated into the popular culture (Stringer, 1990; Cherry, 1995). The larger issue of how this concept is actually

used in the popular culture, will require a separate study (and publication) and I will limit its discussion to two

examples. First, the various definitions of the term in dictionaries illustrate well that social psychology products can

be further transformed so much that they are only loosely related to something that was researched by social

psychology. For example, The Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary (1973) defined groupthink as "conformity to

group values and ethics," the American Heritage Illustrated Encyclopedic Dictionary (1987) defined groupthink as

"decision- and policy-making by a group, board of directors or a research team," and the second definition of The

Random House Dictionary of the English Language (1987) defined groupthink as "the lack of individual creativity,

or a sense of personal responsibility, that is sometimes characteristic of group interaction."

Second, the power of knowledge produced by a social psychology that endorses cultural biases can be

illustrated by an analysis of the popular press. In an article in the Fort Worth Star-Telegram a journalist (Mason,

1994) reported:

The second-largest carrier operating Dallas/Fort Worth Airport put the questions yesterday to 13 teams,

drawn from all levels of the company and charged with trimming $2 billion from the airline's cost structure.
 Groupthink: A triple fiasco 12

Whatever your prejudices about groupthink [italics added], committees can be quite useful if they break

through rhetoric and arrive at consensus.

Analysis of Social Psychology Textbooks

To examine the extent to which the concept of groupthink was transmitted to society as solid knowledge, I

reviewed 96 editions of social psychology textbooks that were published between 1973 and 1995. These 96 editions

represented 79 separate textbooks.

The first analysis involved the frequency of coverage. Out of 96 examined editions, 69 editions (72%)

covered groupthink, and similarly, out of 79 textbooks, 56 (71%) covered groupthink. A more surprising finding

came from the analysis based on the year of publication. For the period of 1973-84 (total of 53 editions) only 62% of

the editions included groupthink, whereas for the period of 1985-95 (total of 41 editions) already 85% of the editions

included groupthink. It was a surprising finding because most of the research that challenged the validity of

groupthink was published in the last ten years. It can be concluded that the majority of social psychology textbooks

included a discussion of groupthink and the frequency of coverage increased during the last ten years.

In the second analysis, the presentations of groupthink were searched for any critical comments. Only 29%

(20 out of 69) editions included any critical comments about empirical validity, methodological problems, or

conceptual problems. With regard to these three problems, only a minority of textbooks provided critical comments.

Most authors (83%) of social psychology textbooks that covered groupthink did not inform their readers that many

studies challenged the empirical validity of groupthink. They (90%) also chose not to mention that most research

publications on groupthink mentioned severe methodological problems. And finally, they were silent (87%) about

major conceptual problems. It is also worth mentioning that 34% of the editions published during the last ten years

had some critical comments. Overall, most authors of social psychology textbooks chose not to tell their readers or

did not know about the conceptual, validity, and methodological problems of the groupthink model. Instead, they

told their readers that groupthink explains at least eighteen different faulty political and managerial decisions, such as

to invade Cuba at Bay of Pigs (Kennedy Administration), to launch the Space Shuttle Challenger (NASA), and to

escalate the war in Vietnam (Johnson Administration).

The third analysis dealt with authors' comments about the prevalence of groupthink. The most encouraging

finding was that only in 13% of the editions did authors warn about the wide spread disease of groupthink.
 Groupthink: A triple fiasco 13

A better picture about how groupthink is presented in the textbooks can be obtained by presenting more

details about one social psychology textbook. I selected Baron and Byrne's (1994) Social psychology: Understanding

human interaction because it has been the most popular American textbook in social psychology. The authors

proudly announced, in their introduction to the seventh edition (Baron & Byrne, 1994), that it had sold over 1.2

million copies so far. In the first four editions (1974, 1977, 1981, 1984) groupthink was not covered. The coverage

started in 1987 (5th edition) and was present in the two most recent editions (1991, 1994). It is interesting to notice

that the first critical comments appeared in the 1994 edition, which will be presented in more detail. In that edition,

Baron and Byrne (1994) started their presentation of groupthink by classifying it as one of three negative processes

(others are polarization and inability to share expertise) of "many [italics added] decision making groups" (p. 508).

Next, they presented an abbreviated description of the groupthink model. In contrast to many other textbooks (66%)

they mentioned problems with empirical validity of the groupthink model:

Is groupthink a real effect? And does it develop under conditions proposed by Janis? Despite many efforts

to answer these questions (e.g., Flowers, 1977; Moorhead & Montanari, 1986), the issue remains somewhat

in doubt (Baron & Byrne, 1994, p. 509).

They also mentioned that Tetlock's (1992) study "provided mixed support for the theory" (p. 510). Finally, they

summarized the construct validity evidence in a frivolous way:

Together these findings, and those of several other studies (e.g., McCauley, 1989) seem to point to two

conclusions. First, something [italics added] like groupthink does exist, and it affects the decisions of

important [italics added] decision-making groups. However, the precise nature and form of groupthink may

be somewhat different from what Janis (1982) initially proposed (p. 510)

Readers can be very confused when expert social psychologists tell them that there is a phenomenon called

groupthink but they do not have a clear idea about what it is.

Groupthink as a distortion of social reality

Groupthink is an example of knowledge produced by social psychology that has certain characteristics that

allow it to support the version of reality of the dominant culture, and the view of social reality of the people who are

in power. Wexler's (1983) textual critique provided an explanation of this process through which "the denial of the

social is achieved" (p. 107). Wexler summarized his critique in the following practices: desocialization,
 Groupthink: A triple fiasco 14

deproblematization, deinstitutionalization, and dehistoricization. Next, I will show how these practices operated in

the groupthink research.

Desocialization. Desocialization was described by Wexler (1983) as the practice of explaining human

interactions by the drives and motives of individuals. The concept of groupthink fits this paradigm well as was seen

in the discussion of the definition. Groupthink was defined as individuals' mode of thinking or individuals' tendency

to concur. After admitting a great difficulty in explaining why groupthink occurs, Janis (1982) stated:

The central explanatory concept I have in mind involves viewing concurrence-seeking as a form of striving

for mutual support based on powerful motivation in all group members to cope with external or internal

stresses of decision making (p. 255)

Desocialization was achieved here by explaining a social phenomenon by focusing on the motivation of

individuals. Additionally, it is worth noting that the decision groups were treated as de facto isolated from their

social environment. In the groupthink model the social environment was reduced to threats. As a consequence, the

outcomes of interactions in groups were not examined from the point of view of the broader social environment.

Analyses of specific fiascoes provided devastating examples of this practice. The Space Shuttle Challenger

disaster was classified as a groupthink case based on two independent analyses (Esser & Lindoerfer, 1989;

Moorhead et al., 1991). To make this possible, both analyses assumed that the decision to launch the Shuttle was

made by one group that was not related to its social environment. In fact, the decision process involved the following

four levels: Level IV--contractors, Level III--project managers at two different NASA centers, Level II program

manager, and Level I--a conference that involved representatives from all other levels. Furthermore, both analyses

(Esser & Lindoerfer, 1989; Moorhead et al., 1991) ignored the fact that the decision to launch was made after three

or four postponements, and public promises that were made by the President. Moorhead et al. (1991) even misstated

the facts and mentioned only one delay. Although the authors of both articles were aware of this enormous external

pressure to launch the Shuttle, they could not adequately incorporate this information because of the limiting nature

of the groupthink model.

Deproblematization. Deproblematization of social relationships is achieved by treating society as a

"personified entity which acts with a single will, mirroring the rational, fair, self-seeking individual" (Wexler, 1983,

p. 110). In the case of groupthink, the (socially) real relationships between different groups and layers of society
 Groupthink: A triple fiasco 15

were completely removed from the analysis that explained the problem in terms of obscure and faulty internal group

process.

Escalation of the war in Vietnam is a good example of how the groupthink idea could be used to substitute

pathological internal group process for real social conflicts. It totally ignores the fact that the war in Vietnam was

one of the biggest social conflicts that American society has ever experienced. In the current debate that was spurred

by recent publication of McNamara's (1995) memoirs, some historians pointed out that the escalation decisions could

have been more motivated by concerns about the elections at home than the domino theory. Ironically, groupthink

interpretations of political and organizational decisions conveniently substitute pathological group process for

personal responsibility.

Deinstitutionalization. Wexler (1983) labeled deinstitutionalization as a practice of neglecting interactions

between the person and the institutions of corporate capitalism, such that "society or state appear on the theoretical

scene as deux ex machina, while individuals remain the self-constituted 'possessors of their own capacities, owing

nothing to society for them'" (p. 111). By reducing social process to the influence of the group on individuals, the

groupthink model pretends that political, social, and economic institutions have nothing to do with such decisions as

the Philadelphia police's decision to bomb a neighborhood in 1985, or the decisions to escalate the war in Vietnam.

Dehistoricization. Wexler (1983) described dehistoricization as a practice of "presenting social reality as

the result of natural, individual motives" (p. 113). Furthermore, he observed that "naturalizing historical

developments buttresses the status quo" (p. 113). When interpreted as groupthink, the decision to escalate the war in

Vietnam by the Johnson administration was successfully removed from its historical context.

In summary, this paper argued that social psychology's concept of groupthink provided society with a tool

to obscure social problems rather than to help solve them. An important question social psychology faces whether

the concepts with a long history of failures should be salvaged or altogether abandoned. One could argue that weak

concepts never die in psychology but rather seem to thrive.

 Groupthink: A triple fiasco 16

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Author note:

I would like to thank Joseph Augustine, Terence Gornet, Timothy Rollier, and Wendy Wittner for their help in

researching the groupthink concept.

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