PERSONS

1. Yes, X is entitled to recover the P1,000,000.00. Under the New Civil Code, the personality of a child shall
commence from the time of its conception for all purposes that are favorable to it, provided, it be born
later.

A fetus with an intrauterine life of less than 7 months is not considered born if it dies within 24 hours after
its complete delivery from the maternal womb.
In this case, the fetus with intrauterine life of 6 months, is not considered born because it did not live for
24 hours, hence, did not become a person. Not being a person, the fetus has no juridical capacity to be a
donee. The donation is not effective since the donee never became a person, the amount donated may
be recovered. To retain it will be unjust enrichment.

2. No, X cannot invoke the presumption of survivorship. Under the NCC, if there is doubt, as between two
or more persons who are called to succeed each other, as to which of them died first, whoever alleges the
death of one prior to the other, shall prove the same. In the absence of proof, it is presumed that they died
at the same time and there shall be no transmission of rights from one to the other.

3. Yes, X can invoke presumption of survivorship. Under the Rules of Court, when two persons perish in
the same calamity, and it is not shown who died first, and there are no particular circumstances from
which it can be inferred, the survivorship is determined from the probabilities resulting from the strength
and the age of the sexes. Under this presumption, persons between the ages of 15 and 60 years is deemed
to have survived one whose ages was over 60 years old. Willy, 25 is deemed to have survived his father, 65.
Therefore, X, his wife can claim the one-half of the proceeds which belongs to the estate of Willy.

4. No, the claim of both set of parents is not valid. The parents are not entitled to equal shares. Under the
NCC, when Mr. X died, his intestate heirs are his wife and parents who will share his estate equally. The
estate of Mr. X is P500,000 or one-half of his share in the absolute community of property. Therefore, his
wife is entitled to P250,000 and his parents is entitled to P250,000.
Thus, the parents will inherit P250,000 and the wife will inherit P750,000.

5. No, my answer would not be the same. Under the NCC, if there is doubt, as between two persons are
called to succeed each other, as to which of them died first, whoever alleges the death of one prior to the
other shall prove the same. In the absence of proof, it is presumed that they died at the same time and
there shall be no transmission of rights of from one to the other. Hence, the parents are entitled to the
estate from their respective child as the sole heirs.

6. The spouses cannot recover actual damages in the form of indemnity for the loss of life of the unborn
child. Under NCC, birth determine personality, but the conceived child is considered born, for all purposes
favorable to it, provided it be born later. The law only allows indemnity for the loss of life of a person, in
this case, the fetus is not considered a person. However, the mother may recover damages for the bodily
injury she suffered from the loss fetus which is considered part of her internal organ. The parents can also
recover moral damages inflicted upon them for mental anguish attended by the loss of the unborn child.
Exemplary damages can also be recovered since there is gross negligence.

7. The proceeds of the life insurance will go to the estate of X. Under the Rules of Court, except in cases of
succession, when two persons perish in the same calamity, and it is not shown as to who died first, the
baby who is under 15 years old and X who was 18 years old, X is presumed to have survived.
The baby never acquired any right under the insurance policy. The proceeds of the insurance will then go
to the estate of X.
Since the baby did not acquire any rights under the insurance contract, there is nothing for Y (father) to
inherit.
8. The widow of Roberto is not entitled to a share in the estate of Dr. Lopez.
Under the NCC, for purposes of succession, if there is doubt, as between two persons who are called to
succeed each other, as to who died first, the one who alleges the death of one prior to the other, shall
prove the same. In the absence of proof, they are presumed to have died at the same time and there can
be no transmission of rights from one to the other. In this case, Dr. Lopez and Roberto are presumed to
have died at the same time and there is no transmission of rights between them. Hence, Roberto inherited
nothing from his father that Marilyn would in turn inherit from Roberto. However, the children of Marilyn
will inherit from their grandfather, Dr. Lopez, in representation of their deceased father, Roberto.
Marilyn, the surviving wife is not accorded by law with the right to represent his husband.

As to the proceeds of the life insurance. Since succession is not involved in the insurance contract, the
provisions of the Rules of Court on survivorship shall apply. Under the Rules, Dr. Lopez, who was 70 years
old, is presumed to have died ahead of Roberto, who is presumed to be under 60 years. Having survived
the insured, Roberto's right as a beneficiary is vested upon the death of Dr. Lopez. When Roberto died,
his right to receive the insurance proceeds became part of his hereditary estate, which in turn was
inherited in equal shares by his legal heirs, namely, his spouse and children. Therefore, the surviving
spouse of Roberto and his children are entitled to on-third share in the insurance proceeds.

MARRIAGE

1. I will grant the petition for judicial declaration of nullity of A and B on the ground of lack of marriage
license. Under the Family Code, the absence of a formal requisite shall render the marriage void.

The absence of marriage license was certified by the Civil Registrar of Manila, who is the official custodian
of these documents and who is in the best position to certify as to the existence of these records. Hence,
the lack of marriage license, being a formal requirement, will render the marriage void.

2. No, before the effectivity of the Family Code, it is not required that a judicial declaration be filed to
declare the marriage null and void. The old rule is that, where a marriage is void, no judicial declaration of
nullity is necessary to establish its invalidity.

2. The marriage is void due to the absence of an essential and formal requisite. Under the FC, one of the
essential requisites of a valid marriage is that consent of the parties must be given in the presence of the
solemnizing officer. In this case, the Mayor, who is the solemnizing officer is not present. Further, the
Code provides that marriage ceremony is a formal requisite, where the man and the woman take each as
husband and wife before a solemnizing officer. In this case, no marriage ceremony took place. Hence, the
marriage is void due to the absence of both the essential and formal requisites of marriage.

3. The marriage is not void but merely voidable. Under the FC, marriage between persons who are over 18
years old but less than 21 years old without parental consent is merely voidable.

Absence of marriage license did not make the marriage void ab initio. Under the FC, marriage solemnized
in articulo mortis is exempt from the marriage license requirement.

On the assumption that the assistant pilot was acting for and on behalf of the airplane chief who was
under disability, the marriage was solemnized by an authorized officer. Under the FC, the airplane chief is
authorized to solemnize marriage in cases of articulo mortis between passengers while in flight.

Failure of the solemnizing officer to file the affidavit of marriage did not affect the validity of the
marriage. It is a mere irregularity which may subject the solemnizing officer to administrative or civil
liability.
4. The marriage is void because it lacks a formal requisite, that is a marriage license. Under the FC, no
marriage license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together as
husband and wife for a period of at least five years and without any legal impediment to marry each
other. In a case decided by the SC, it held that the absence of legal impediment shall be for the entire 5-
year period of cohabitation. In this case, Y's minority is the legal impediment during the first 2 years of
cohabitation and the lack of legal capacity during the succeeding years since Y is already married. Hence, Y
and X marriage is void for lack of marriage license.

5. Prior to the enactment of the FC which took effect on August 3, 1988, municipal mayors are authorized
to solemnized marriage under the Civil Code of 1950.

The marriage is void ab initio. Consuls are only authorized to solemnize marriages abroad between
Filipino citizens. Consuls have no authority to solemnize a marriage in the Philippines. Hence, the
marriage is void due to lack of authority of the solemnizing officer. However, if either or both of the
parties believed in good faith that the consul is authorized to solemnize, their marriage is valid.

6. I will grant the petition, if Juliet at the time she obtained the divorce decree, is already an American
citizen. However, if she is still a Filipino citizen at the time she obtained the divorce decree, then I will deny
the petition.
Under Article 26 of the Family Code, where a divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating
him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have the capacity to remarry under the Philippine
law. The SC held that the reckoning point is not their citizenship at the time of the marriage, but their
citizenship at the time the divorce decree is obtained abroad.

7. The marriage of A and B, who celebrated their marriage in Tokyo is valid if it is in accordance with the
Japanese law. Under the NCC, marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in
force in the country where they are solemnized and valid there as such, are also valid in the Philippines.
Their marriage no longer subsists because it has been dissolved by the absolute divorce validly obtained
by B which capacitated A to remarry.

The marriage of A and C are valid. The divorced decree obtained by B, capacitated A to remarry. Hence, the
subsequent marriage of A and C are valid.

The marriage of A and D is void ab initio. Under the FC, a second marriage contracted during the
subsistence of a former marriage is bigamous and is void ab initio. In this case, A is still validly married C.

Under the NCC, the family right and duties, status, condition, and legal capacity are governed by the
national law, even if the citizen is living abroad. In this case, the divorce decree obtained by both Filipino
citizens living abroad, even if it is obtained and valid abroad is void.

8. No, is not necessary for Ted to file a petition for judicial recognition of the decree of divorce he obtained
in Canada before he can contract a second marriage in the Philippines. In the case of Garcia v. Recio, (2001)
the Supreme Court ruled that the legal capacity to contract marriage is determined by the national law
of the party concerned. Here, Ted is already a Canadian citizen, and a divorcee. Therefore, he is not
required to file that petition to contract a subsequent marriage in the Philippines.

The reckoning point is the citizenship of parties at the time the divorce was obtained and not the
citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of marriage.

9. Yes, A can validly marry. Under the Article 26 of the FC, where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and
a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse,
capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have the capacity to remarry under
the Philippine laws.

In case decided by the SC, Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the
time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes
naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree.
A, shall file a petition for the recognition and enforcement of the foreign judgment of divorce.

10. Yes, the legal effects of the divorce decree may be recognized in the Philippines, and consequently,
capacitate A to remarry.

In the landmark case of Republic vs Manalo, the SC held that under second paragraph of Article 26, a
Filipino citizen has the capacity to remarry under the Philippine law after initiating a divorce proceeding
abroad and obtaining a favorable judgement against her alien spouse who is also capacitated to remarry.

In this case, A who is a Filipino citizen initiated the divorce proceeding in Japan and obtained a favorable
judgment which capacitated her Japanese spouse to remarry. Hence, the divorce obtained may be
recognized in the Philippines which capacitates A to remarry.

11. No, the petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage under psychological incapacity of the Family
Code will not prosper. The SC held (Santos vs CA) that psychological incapacity must be characterized by
gravity, judicial antecedence, and incurability. In this case, the pieces of evidence presented are not
sufficient to conclude that indeed Linda is suffering from psychological incapacity existing before the
marriage, incurable and serious enough to prevent her from performing her essential marital obligations.
Psychological incapacity must not a mere refusal but an outright incapacity to perform marital
obligations which does not appear to be present in this case.

NB: Santos vs CA - PI is a mental disorder of the most serious type showing the incapability of one or both
spouses to comply with the essential marital obligations of love, respect, cohabitation and mutual trust
and support. It must be characterized by gravity, judicial antecedence, incurability and its root causes must
be clinically identified.
No psychological incapacity - habitual drunkenness, blatant display of infidelity and irresponsibility or being
hooked to gambling and drugs. It must be shown that such PI, as manifested in those acts or that behavior.

NB: Article 50 of the FC (liquidation, partition & distribution) does not apply to marriages which are
declared void ab initio under Article 36 of the FC which should be declared void without waiting for the
liquidation of the properties of the parties.

12. Silverio (sex re-assignment) to Shelly. Male to female.

Sharon to Sheriff. Female to male. CAH.

Silverio: No, there is no legal bases for the court to approve Silverio's petition. In a case with similar facts,
the SC held that our laws do not sanction change of name and correction of gender in entry in the civil
register on the ground of sex re-assignment. Sex re-assignment is not one of the grounds for which change
of first name may be allowed under the Clerical Error Act. Considering that there is no law recognizing sex
re-assignment, the determination of a person's sex is made at the time of his or her birth, if not attended
by error, is immutable.

Sharon: I will allow the change of name and gender of Sharon. In a case with similar facts, the SC held that
where the person is biologically intersex, the determining factor of his or her gender classification would
be what the individual, having reached the age of maturity, with good reason thinks of his/her sex.
Sharon is biologically intersex because he has CAH, which means that she has the biological characteristics
of both male and female. The petition should be granted considering that it merely recognizes Sharon's
preferred gender.

The marriage of Silverio and Sharon is void. Under the NCC, laws relating to the status, condition and legal
capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines even though living abroad. One of the
requisites of a marriage under the FC, is that the contracting parties must be a male and a female. Since
Silverio and Sharon are Filipino citizens their legal capacity is determined by Philippine law, their marriage
abroad is not a valid marriage under Philippine law, because both contracting parties are males.

13. A void marriage may be questioned by any interested party in any proceeding where the resolution of
the issue is material. Being a compulsory heir, Soterro has the personality to question the validity of the
marriage of his father and stepmother. Otherwise, his participation in the estate of Facundo would be
affected.

14. Parties are Catholics. Minister who solemnized is a Baptist. Void because the minister has not authority
to solemnize a marriage between contracting parties who were both not members of the minister's
religious sect. Under the FC, a minister or priest has authority to solemnize a marriage but only if one or
both contracting parties is a member of his religious sect. Since A and B are not members of his religious
sect, the minister does not have the authority to solemnize their marriage.

A and B cannot claim that they believed in good faith that the Baptist minister had the authority to
solemnize their marriage. The provision under the FC pertains to mistake of fact and not mistake of law.
Hence, the fact that the minister had an expire license will not affect the validity of their marriage if
either or both of them believed in good faith that he had the authority to do so. That is a mistake of fact.
However, believing that the Baptist minister had the authority to solemnize their marriage even if none
of them was a member of the minister's religious sect is a mistake of law. Hence, good faith will not be
considered to render the marriage valid.

15. A person in the AFP who has taken part in war and had been missing for four years shall be presumed
dead for all purposes, except for contracting a subsequent marriage. Thus, there is no need for a
declaration of presumptive death in order to claim the death benefits of the deceased spouse. Under the
FC, for the purpose of contracting a subsequent marriage contracted by a person who had a well-founded
belief that his or her spouse who had been absent for four consecutive years was already dead, the spouse
present must institute a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee.

16. The wife may file an action for annulment on the ground of AIDS, which is a serious and incurable STD
regardless of whether such fact was concealed or not from the wife, provided that the disease was present
at the time of the marriage. The marriage is voidable even though the husband was not aware that he had
the disease at the time of the marriage since good faith is not a defense.

17. A may file an action for judicial separation of property if the wife refuses to come home after 3
months from the expiration of her contract, she is presumed to have abandoned B. If the refusal continues
for more than one year from the expiration of her contract, the husband may file an action for legal
separation on the ground of abandonment without justifiable cause for more than 1 year. Under the FC,
the A is deemed to have abandoned B when she leaves the conjugal dwelling without any intention of
returning.

18. If A discovered that B was a prostitute before they got married, he has no remedy. The SC held that no
misrepresentation or deceit as to character, health, fortune or chastity shall constitute fraud as legal
ground for an action for the annulment of marriage.
19. A may file an action for legal separation. B's sexual infidelity is a ground for legal separation. A may
also file an action for judicial separation of property for B's failure to comply with his marital duty or
fidelity.

20. The marriage of A to B is void for reasons of public policy. Under the FC, marriage between parties
where one, with the intention to marry the other, killed that person's spouse or his or her own spouse is
void from the beginning for reasons of public policy.

21. Under Article 51 and 52 of the FC, in case of legal separation, annulment of marriage or declaration of
nullity of marriage and the automatic termination of a subsequent marriage by the reappearance of the
absent spouse, the common or community property of the spouses shall be dissolved and liquidated.

22. A and B can marry again after complying with the provision of Article 52 of the FC, namely, there must
be partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses, and the delivery of their children's
presumptive legitimes, which should be recorded in the appropriate civil registry and registries of
properties.

The children born from the union of A and B would be legitimate if conceived or born before the decree of
the annulment of their marriage has become final and executory. The children born of the subsequent
marriage are likewise legitimate even if the marriage of A and C be null and void for failure to comply with
the requisites of Article 52 of the FC (partition, distribution and delivery).

23. As A's lawyer, I would interpose the defense that the attempt against the life of B was without criminal
intent but was impelled solely by passion and obfuscation. This is the reason why under RPC, even killing B
when caught in flagrante delicto would be justified. To be a ground for legal separation, the attempt must
be intentional and wrongful.

As the judge, I will deny the petition of B. Under the FC, petition for legal separation may be filed only by
the aggrieved spouse. Since B was unfaithful and was in fact caught in the act by his wife, he is not an
aggrieved spouse entitled to relief. He who comes to court must come with clean hands. And even
assuming that the attempt on his life by the wife is a ground for legal separation, he is still not entitled to
the relief because of his infidelity. The law does not allow legal separation if both parties have given
grounds for legal separation.

24. Article 147 of the FC provides in part that, when a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry
each other, live exclusively as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage, their property relation is
governed by co-ownership. Properties acquired while they lived together shall be presumed to have been
obtained by their joint efforts or industry and shall be owned by them in equal shares. This is true even
though the efforts of one of them consisted merely of his or her care and maintenance of the family and
household.

Under this provision, neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in the
property acquired during cohabitation and owned in common, without the consent of the other, until
after the termination of their cohabitation. Thus, A may not validly dispose of the lot without the consent
of B as the lot was acquired through their work during their cohabitation.

NB: Under Article 148 of the FC, when the parties to the cohabitation could not marry each other because
a legal impediment, only those properties acquired by them through their actual joint contribution of
money, property or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective
contributions.
25. The sale made by Marco is considered void. The parties were married in 1989 and no mention was
made whether they executed a marriage settlement. In the absence of a marriage settlement, the parties
shall be governed by ACP whereby all the properties owned by the spouses at the time of the celebration of
the marriage as well as whatever they may acquired during the marriage shall form part of the ACP. Under
the FC, in ACP, neither spouse can sell or encumber any property belonging to the ACP without the
consent of the other. Any sale in violation thereof is void.

26. While A, a foreigner is disqualified to own any part of the properties, his subsequent transfer of all his
interest therein to C, a Filipino, was valid as it removed the disqualification. In such case, the properties are
owned by C and B (A's ex spouse) in equal shares.

27. If the value of the building is more than the value of the land (inheritance), the building is conjugal and
the land becomes conjugal property. If on the other hand, the value of the land is more than the value of
the building, then the ordinary rule of accession applies where the land becomes paraphernal property.
NB: Applies only in CPG in both the FC and the NCC.

NB: ACP be the property regime for all marriages, unless the parties entered into a prenuptial agreement.
For marriages which took place however prior to the effectivity of the Family Code in 1988, the default
property regime shall be the conjugal partnership of gains.

28. Since the marriage settlement was entered into without the consent and participation of the parents of
A, the marriage settlement is invalid. Under the FC, a minor who according to the law may contract
marriage may also enter into marriage settlements, but they shall be valid only if the person who may
give consent to the marriage are made parties to the agreement. In this case, A was still a minor at the
time she entered (Sept 1988 - 21 is still a minor) into the marriage settlement (RA 6809 took effect on Dec
18 1989 minor is less than 18). The marriage settlement being void, the property regime is, therefore, ACP.

29. Since A and B were married before the effectivity of the FC (Aug 3, 1988), their property relation is
governed by CPG. Under the CC, the share of the hidden treasure which the law awards to the finder
belongs to the CPG. One-half pertaining to A as owner of the land and one-half share pertaining to B as
finder of the treasure, belong to the CPG.

30. To be valid, the modification in the marriage settlement must be executed before the celebration of
the marriage. The subsequent agreement of the parties did not effect a dissolution of their CPG and a
separation of their properties because it was not approved by the court. To be valid, an agreement to
dissolve the CP and to separate their properties during the marriage, has to be approved by the court.

Under the regime of CPG, all properties acquired by the spouses during their marriage, jointly or by either
of them, through their work or industry are conjugal. Therefore, the house and lot and the condominium
unit having been jointly acquired during their marriage is conjugal property.

Same rule for ACP and CPG. The debt contracted by one spouse without the consent of the other, the
community or partnership shall be liable but only to the extent that it redounded to the benefit of the
family.

31. The parcel of land is ACP having been acquired during the marriage even if only through A's industry
and despite it being registered only in A's name. The land being a community property, its sale to C without
the consent of B is void. However, since the land is registered in the name of A as widow, there is nothing
in the title which would raise a suspicion for C to make inquiry. Therefore, C, being an innocent purchaser
for value, the land may no longer be recovered by B.
32. The property relations between A and B, their marriage having been celebrated 35 years ago (under
the CC) shall be governed by the CPG, under which the husband and the wife place in a common fund the
proceeds, fruits, income from their separate properties and those acquired by them through their efforts
by chance (hidden treasure, lotto) and upon dissolution of the marriage, the net gains obtained shall be
equally divided between them.

33. Since the marriage was declared void ab initio under Article 36 of the FC, no absolute or conjugal
partnership was established between A and B. Their property relation is governed by a special co-
ownership under Article 147 of the FC. Therefore, if the house was acquired by A before he got married,
he shall remain owner of such house but must reimburse B for all the amount she advanced to pay the
purchase price.

PROPERTY

Immovable - Machinery, receptacles, instruments or implements intended by the owner of the tenement
for an industry or works which may be carried on in a building or on a piece of land, and which tend
directly to meet the needs of the said industry or works.

1. The machinery is a personal property. Under the NCC, the machinery must be installed by the owner of
the tenement in order to becomes an immovable.

2. The machinery is an immovable because it is deemed to have been installed by the owner of the
tenement. Where there is a provision in the lease contract making the lessor, at the end of the lease
owner of the machinery installed by the lessee, the said machinery is considered to have been installed
by the lessor through the lessee who acted merely as his agent. Having been installed by the owner of the
tenement, the machinery became an immovable under the NCC.
a.k. confiscatory clause.

3. Immovable - docks and structures which, though floating, are intended by their nature and object to
remain at a fixed place on a river, lake or coast. Since the floating platform is a petroleum operation
facility, it is intended to remain permanently where it is situated, even if it is tethered to a ship which is
anchored to the seabed.

The equipment and living quarters of the crew are immovable. NCC classifies as an immovable everything
attached to an immovable in a fixed manner, in such a way that it cannot be separated therefrom
without breaking the material of the object. Both the equipment and the living quarters are attached to
the platform which is an immovable.

OWNERSHIP

1. Registration of a land under the Torrens System does not create or vest title, because registration is
not a mode of acquiring ownership. Certificate of title is merely an evidence of ownership or title over the
particular property described therein.

The right to recover possession is equally imprescriptible since possession is a mere consequence of
ownership. The right of A to recover is not barred by laches. Laches deals with unreasonable delay in the
filing of the action. In this case, the delay is due to the coercion of B and the threat that if A returned, he
would be killed.

2. LO - bad faith. BPS - bad faith.

A's claim that he is a builder in good faith is without merit. Under the NCC, a builder in good faith is
someone who occupies the property in the concept of an owner. A as a lessee, he knows that he does not
occupy the property in the concept of an owner. However, if the lessee makes, in good faith, useful
improvements which are suitable to the use for which the lease was intended without altering the form
or substance of the property leased, the lessor upon termination of the lease shall pay the lessee one-half
value of the improvements at that time. Should the lessor refuse to reimburse, the lessee may remove the
improvement even though the principal thing may suffer damage thereby.

3. Hidden treasure is a money, jewelry or other precious objects the ownership of which does not
appear. Since the notes and coins have historical value, the government may acquire them at their just
price which in turn will be equally divided between A and B.

Under the NCC, when the discovery of a hidden treasure is made on the property of another by chance,
one-half thereof shall belong to the owner of the land and one-half shall belong to the finder, provided
that the latter is not a trespasser. In this case, A did not find the treasure by chance because he knew that
it is located in the land of B, hence, he is not entitled to a share.

RIGHT OF ACCESSION

1. LO - good faith. BSP - good faith.

Under the NCC, LO can right to appropriate as his own the house after payment of indemnity for the
necessary and useful expenses. LO can also compel BSP to buy the land unless the value of the land is
considerably more than the value of the house. In such case, if LO does not choose to appropriate the
house after payment of indemnity, BSP shall pay a reasonable rent. It is the owner of the land who is
authorized to exercise the options provided for under the NCC pursuant to the principle of accession,
where the accessory follows the principal.

LO have the following rights:

Appropriate as his own the works after payment of indemnity.
Oblige the BSP to pay the price of the land, provided that the value of the land is not considerably more
than the value of the house/building. In such case, he shall pay a reasonable rent if the owner of the land
does not choose to appropriate the building, after proper indemnity.

The house built by BSP is considered as a useful expense, since it increased the value of the lot. Hence,
BSP may remove it if it can be removed without damage to the land. Unless, the LO choose to
appropriate the house, then BSP is entitled to the right of retention pending reimbursement of the
expenses they incurred.

Price: The builder is entitled to a refund of the expenses incurred and NOT the market value of the
improvement.

LO - bad faith. BSP - good faith.

BSP may:
Remove the house and demand indemnification for damages.
Demand payment for the value of the house plus reparation for damages.

LO - good faith. BSP - bad faith.

LO has 3 options.
Appropriate the improvements without indemnity.
Demand the demolition of the house in order to place things under their former condition at the expense
of BSP.
Compel BSP to pay the value of the land. In all these options, LO is entitled to damages from BSP.
2. A is builder in good faith. In this case, there is no showing that when he built his house, he knew that a
portion thereof encroached on B's lot. Unless one is versed in the science of surveying, he cannot
determine the precise boundaries of his property by merely examining his title. In the absence of
contrary proof, the law presumes that the encroachment was done in good faith.

A's contention to buy the land is without merit, under the law, it is the LO who has the option to sell the
land. On the other hand, B's contention to remove or destroy the building is not one of the options
granted by law to the LO. The LO may choose between appropriation or to compel the BSP to pay the land.

3. A is entitled to the rentals of the building. As the owner of the land, A is also the owner of the building
being an accession thereto. However, B who is entitled to retain the building is also entitled to retain the
rentals. However, he shall apply the rentals to the indemnity payable to him after deducting reasonable
cost of repair and maintenance.

4. I will decide the case in favor of A and dismiss the action to quiet title filed by B. Under the NCC, the
accretion, which the gradual increase of the land from the effects of the current of the waters, belongs to
the owner of the land adjoining the banks of the river. The accretion, however, does not automatically
become part of the registered land. It must be brought under the Torrens System of registration by B, the
riparian owner. Since he did not, then the increment, not being a registered land, was open to acquisition
through prescription by third person, in this case, by A.

5. A's claim should prevail. The disputed area, which is an alluvion, belongs by the right of accretion to A,
the riparian owner. When, as given in this case, the very same area was transferred by flood waters to the
opposite bank, it became an avulsion and ownership thereof is retained by A, who has two years to
remove it. B's claim based on prescription is without merit since his possession was by mere tolerance of A,
and, therefore, did not adversely affect A's possession and ownership. In as much as his possession is
merely that of a holder, he cannot acquire the disputed area by prescription.

6. A constructed the cement barrier two meters in from of her property towards the river not to protect
her land from the destructive forces of the water but to trap the alluvium. In order that the riparian owner
will be entitled to the alluvium, the deposit must occur naturally and with the intervention of the riparian
owner.

7. Although B and his children live in the unregistered land owned by A, they are farm workers, therefore,
they are possessors not in the concept of owners but by mere holders. Even if they possess the land for
more than 30 years, they cannot become the owners thereof through extraordinary acquisitive
prescription because the law requires possession in the concept of an owner.

However, B may ask for reimbursement of the taxes he has paid, as these are charged on the land owned
by A.

8. B, who is not a trespasser, may be entitled to 1/2 as a just recompense for his effort and in assuming
some risks. Notwithstanding the tip, the finding can still be considered by chance, because they do not
preclude a finder who purposely hunts for hidden treasure. In the case at bar, there was an element of
uncertainty in the discovery because there was no assurance that B would find a treasure on the land of
A.

9. Under the NCC, only fruits naturally falling upon adjacent land shall belong to the owner of the said
land.
Under the NC, if the branches of any tree should extend over a neighboring estate, the owner of the latter
shall have the right to demand that they be cut off insofar as they may spread over his property. If it be
the roots of the neighboring tree which should penetrate into the lands of another, the latter may cut
them off himself within his property.

CO-OWNERSHIP:

1. Repair - Repair which is in the nature of preservation should be shared. Each co-owner has the right to
compel the other co-owners to contribute to the expense of preservation of the things owned in common
in proportion to their respective interests.

Mortgaged - the mortgage shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to the mortgagee.

Concrete fence is an act of administration over the thing co-owned hence, it should be decided by
majority of the co-owners. Consent is required in order to be binding upon them.

Groto - Not binding upon the co-owners if not decided upon by a majority of the co-owners who represent
the controlling interests.

Sale - The co-owner can transfer his undivided interest therein, but it shall be limited to the portion
which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership.

Law does not allow compensation for voluntary administrator. Merely entitled to a reimbursement for
such actual and necessary expenditures in taking care and preserving the property.

2. A's possession as co-owner did not give rise to acquisitive prescription. Possession by a co-owner is
deemed not adverse to the co-owners but it, on the contrary, deemed beneficial to them. A's possession
will become adverse only when he has repudiated the co-ownership and such repudiation was made
known to B. Even assuming that the sale in 1985 where A claimed he was the sole heir or his parents
amounted to repudiation of the co-ownership, the prescriptive period began to run only from that time.
Not more than 30 years having lapsed since then, the claim of B has not yet prescribed. Mere delay in
vindicating the right, standing alone, does not constitute laches.

3. An IPV can acquire the untitled land by ordinary prescription which requires just title and good faith.
There was just title because the deed of sale was issued in favor of A even though it was forged, a fact
which he is not aware of. He needs to possess the land in good faith and in the concept of an owner for at
least 10 years in order to acquire ownership.

A, a possessor in good faith is entitled to the fruits before he was served with summons. A possessor in
good faith is entitled to the fruits before the possession was legally interrupted by the service of summons.

4. Under the NCC, redemption by one co-owner inures to the benefit of all. When A redeemed the entire
property, she exercised such right on their behalf.

EASEMENT - is an encumbrance imposed upon an immovable for the benefit of another immovable
belonging to a different owner.
Continuous and apparent - by title or by prescription (10 years).
Continuous are those the use of which, is incessant, or may be incessant, without the intervention of any
act of man.
Discontinuous - they are used at intervals and depend upon the acts of man. i.e. Right of Way.
Apparent - those made known and continually kept in view by external signs that reveal the use and
enjoyment of the same. i.e Right of Way with a concrete road
Non-apparent - they show no external indication of their existence. i.e Right of Way where the pathway is
not visible.
Positive - Servitudes of intrusion and/or service. The owner of the servient estate must allow something to
be done in his property.
Negative - The owner of the servient estate must refrain from doing something which he could lawfully
do if the easement did not exist. i.e. Light and view where the window is opened in one's own wall.

Compulsory requirement of an easement of right of way:

a. Dominant estate is surrounded by other immovables and is without an adequate outlet to a public
highway.
b. proper indemnity must be applied.
c. the isolation must not be due to the acts of the owner of the dominant estate.
d. the right of way claimed is at a point least prejudicial to the servient estate and where the distance to
the street or highway is the shortest.

1. I will decide in favor of B. The easement of right of way should be established at a point least prejudicial
to the servient estate where the distance from the dominant estate to the public highway may be the
shortest.

If the two conditions do not concur in one estate, the criterion of least prejudice prevails over the
shortest distance. The convenience of the dominant estate has never been gauge for the establishment
of the easement rather, the adequacy of the easement.

2. Failure to annotate the easement upon the title of the servient estate is not one of the grounds to
extinguish easement. Under the Doctrine of Apparent Sign, easements are inseparable from the estate
to which they actively or passively pertain. Its existence is equivalent to a title. It is as if there is an implied
contract between the two new owners that the easement should be constituted since no one objected to
the continued existence of the windows.

3. Yes, A can demand from B the activation of the right of way. Under the NCC, easement of the right of
way is a real right that attaches to and is inseparable from the estate to which it belongs. Hence, the sale
of the property includes the easement, even if the deed of sale is silent on the matter.
A's working abroad for more than 10 years should not be construed as non-use, because it cannot be
implied that she will no longer use the right of way. Under the NCC, renunciation of an easement must be
specific, clear, express and made in a public instrument.

4. A may not be legally required to afford B a right of way through his property. B already has an adequate
outlet to the public highway through C's lot. Under the NCC, one of the requisites for a compulsory grant
of right of way is that the estate of the claimant must be without adequate outlet to a public highway.
The true standard for the grant of compulsory right of way is adequacy of outlet going to a public highway
and not the convenience of the dominant estate.

In this case, there is already an existing adequate outlet from the dominant estate to a public highway.

5. Easement of Light and View. The distance for direct view is 2 meters, hence, A's window does not
comply with the requirement. The easement of light and view is a negative easement. Hence, the
prescriptive period will commence to run only from the time a notarial prohibition is made.

NUISANCE - is any act, omission, business, establishment, or condition of property, or anything which
injures or endangers the health and safety of others, annoys, or offends the senses, shocks, defies or
disregard decency or morality, obstructs or interferes with the free passage of any public highway or
street or any body of water or hinders or impairs the use of property.
Nuisance per se - always a nuisance because of its nature regardless of location or surroundings. May be
summarily abated.
Nuisance per accidens - nuisance by reason of location, surrounding or in the manner it is conducted or
managed. A reasonable notice to the person allegedly maintaining the same is required.

Doctrine of attractive nuisance - Under the rule, an owner is liable if he maintains in his premises
dangerous instrumentalities or appliances of a character likely to attract children in play, and he failed to
exercise ordinary care to prevent children from playing therewith or resorting thereto. Remains liable
even if the child was a trespasser.
Attractive nuisance doctrine generally is not applicable to bodies of water, artificial as well as natural, in
the absence of some unusual condition or artificial feature other than the mere water and its location.

1. Squatter's hut is nuisance per se, if it poses problems of health and sanitation. If it is built on a private
land and hinders the owner's use, then it would constitute as a private nuisance.
2. A house of prostitution is a public nuisance because it shocks or disregards the decency of the
community.

OBLIGATIONS

1. A promise is not an actionable wrong that allows a party to recover especially when he or she has not
suffered damages resulting from such promise. Under the NCC, obligation arises from law, contracts,
quasi-contracts, quasi-delict or acts and omissions punishable by law. Since a promise is not considered
as any of the aforementioned, it does not amount to an obligation.

2. Under the NCC, A's promise to B is void because it is conditional obligation which depends upon the
sole will of the obligor. However, since the document is an express acknowledgment of a debt, and the
promise to pay what he owes her when he feels like it is equivalent to a promise to pay when his means
permits him to do so, and is deemed to be one with indefinite period. The amount is recoverable after B
asks the court to set the period.

The NCC provides that when a debtor binds himself to pay when his means permits him to do so, the
obligation shall be deemed to be one with a period (suspensive). The law further provides that the courts
may fix a period if such was intended from the nature of the obligation and may also fix the duration of the
period when such depends on the will of the debtor.

3. A is liable for breach of contract. Under the NCC, those who in the performance of their obligations
who in any manner contravene to the tenor thereof are liable for damages.
B, a third person is not bound by the contract between A and Z. However, under the law on quasi-contract,
a third party who induces another to violate his or her contract shall be liable for damages to the other
contracting party.

4. Mechanical defects of a motor vehicle does not constitute fortuitous event, since the presence of such
defects would have been readily detected by diligent maintenance check. Failure to maintain the vehicle
in a safe running condition constitutes negligence.

5. Labor unrest is not a fortuitous event that will excuse AB Corporation from complying with its obligation
of constructing the research facility of B. Labor unrest which may be attributed in part to the AB Corp.
itself, is not the direct cause of non-compliance. It is independent of its obligation.

6. The obligation to pay when he likes is void. Under the NCC, a suspensive condition the fulfillment of
which is subject to the sole will of the debtor is void.
7. The obligation is valid. Under the NCC, an obligation subject to a suspensive condition the fulfillment of
which is not subject to the sole will of the debtor is valid. Hence, a suspensive condition that is, becoming
a lawyer, is valid.

8. Yes, the sale to C is valid. However, the buyer acquired the property subject to a resolutory condition
of A passing the 2021 bar exam. Hence, upon A's passing the 2021 bar, the rights of the other buyer
terminated, and A acquired ownership of the property.

9. I would deny the action for specific performance filed by A. Under the NCC, if a period has not been
fixed although contemplated by the parties, the parties themselves should fixed that period, failing in
which, the Court may be asked to fix the period. Before the period is fixed, an action for specific
performance is premature.

10. The contention of B is untenable. Under the NCC, the creditor may proceed against any one of the
solidary debtors. The demand against one does not preclude further demand against the others so long
as the debt is not fully paid.

B's contention is untenable. The chattel mortgage executed by A is only given as security in case of failure
to pay and not as payment for the debt. B as a solidary co-maker is not relieved of further liability on the
promissory note because of the chattel mortgage. A surety may co-exist with a mortgage.

11. The contention of D is correct. Under the NCC, there is solidary liability only when the obligation
expressly so states or when the law or nature of the obligation requires solidarity. In this case, the
contract of lease does not, in any way, stipulate solidary liability, hence, D's liability is pro rata.

12. Under the NCC, when one of the solidary debtors cannot, because of insolvency, reimburse his share
to the debtor paying the obligation, such shall be borne by all his co-debtors, in proportion to the debt of
each. Since the insolvent debtor's share which A paid was P100,000 and there are only two remaining
debtors, namely A and B, they shall share equally the burden of reimbursement. B may thus be compelled
by A to contribute P50,000.

13. No, A's obligation is not extinguished. Under the NCC, Dacion en pago is a special form of payment,
whereby the debtor offers another thing to the creditor who accepts it as an equivalent payment of the
outstanding debt. It is governed by the law on sales. As such, the essential elements of a contract of sale
are consent, object certain and consideration. In this case, there was no mention that B has given his
consent to accept the SUV's as equivalent payment. Hence, the obligation is not extinguished.

14. I will decide the case in favor of A. Under the law, novation is never presumed and may only take
place when the following are present, namely: (a) a previous valid obligation, (b) the agreement of all the
parties to the new contract, (c) the extinguishment of the old contract, and (d) validity of the new one. In
this case, the revision of the work schedule of B and the subcontractors is not shown to be so substantial
as to extinguish the old contract. Surety may only be relieved of his undertaking if there is a material
change in the principal contract and such would make the obligation of the surety onerous.

15. B - minor. C - condoned. D - insolvent. E - extension. 10K each.

A may avail the minority of B as a defense but only for B's share of P10K. Under the NCC, a solidary debtor
may avail himself of any defense which personally belongs to a solidary co-debtor, but only as to the
share of that co-debtor.

A may avail of the condonation by X of C's share of P10K. Under the NCC, a solidary debtor may, in actions
filed by the creditor, avail himself of all defenses with respect to those which personally belong to his or
her co-debtors. He may avail himself only as regards to that part of the debt for which the other are
responsible for.

A may avail the extension of six months given to E. Under the NCC,

A may not interpose D's insolvency as a defense. Under the Principle of Mutual Guaranty among solidary
debtors, A guaranteed the payment of D's share and of all the other co-debtors. Hence, A cannot avail of
the defense of D's insolvency.

16. Dacion en pago. Under the NCC, a co-owner may renounce his share in the co-owned property in lieu
of paying for his share in the taxes and expenses for the preservation of the co-owned property. The fact
that he is giving up his entire interest simply means that he is accepting the value of his interest as
equivalent to his share in the taxes and expenses of preservation.

17. Y Bank is correct. Under the NCC, compensation shall take place when two persons are reciprocally
creditor and debtor of each other. It has been held that the relation existing between a depositor and
bank is that of creditor and debtor. Consequently, the bank has a right to set off the deposits in its hands
for the payment of any indebtedness to it on the part of a depositor.

18. The action will prosper. Under the NCC, the obligation is extinguished by novation, by substituting the
debtor with a third party, to take effect it must be with the consent of the creditor. In this case, A
assigned its right under the contract, without the consent of B. Hence, B may annul such assignment for
not having his consent thereto.

19. The payment by A without the knowledge of B resulted in the extinguishment of the obligation of B to
the utility company and A was legally subrogated to the utility company. Under the NCC, there is legal
novation when even without the knowledge of the debtor, a person interested in the fulfillment of the
obligation pays, without prejudice to the effects of confusion as to the latter's share. In this case, A is an
interested person since he was the business successor-in-interest of B and cannot conduct his business
without paying B's debtor. As a result of the subrogation, there can be a valid legal compensation of the
two credits between A and B who are principally debtors and creditors of each other up to the concurrent
amount of P50K.

In this case, B is guilty of mora accipiendi. Under the law, when the debtor offers the performance of his
obligation, but the creditor refuses to accept the performance without just cause, there is mora
accipiendi or delay on the part of the creditor.

CONTRACTS: in general, loans, mortgages, interest

1. Yes, PAL breached its contract of carriage by upgrading the seat accommodation of A and B without their
consent. The object of their contract was the transportation of A and B from Manila to HK and back to
Manila, with seats in the business class section of the aircraft. By upgrading their seat accommodation
without their consent, PAL breached its contract of carriage.

Moral damages predicated upon breach of contract of carriage may only be recoverable in instances
where the carriage is guilty of fraud or bad faith. An overbooking that does not exceed 10% is not
considered deliberate and therefore, does not amount to bad faith. Hence, A and B are not entitled to
recover moral damages.
Absent bad faith or fraud, the liability is limited to the natural and probable consequences of the breach.
2. A may validly withdraw his offer because there was no consideration paid for the option. Under the NCC,
an option is separate contract and if founded on consideration is a perfected option contract. Thus, A
may withdraw the offer at any time before acceptance of the offer.

3. Remedy of rescission - if the same property is sold to a buyer in bad faith, the sale violates the right of
first refusal and may be rescinded.

4. Inexistent contracts are considered as not having entered into and, therefore, void ab initio. They do not
create any obligation and cannot be ratified. On the other hand, voidable contracts are valid until annulled
by the court and subject to ratification.

5. A person may sell something which does not belong to him. Under the law, the seller is not required to
be the owner of the property at the time of the sale. If the seller cannot transfer ownership over the thing
sold at the time of delivery because he was not the owner thereof, he shall be liable for breach of contract.

6. The sale of land in violation of the homestead patent is void (Public Land Act - must not be sold within
5 years from the grant). An action which seeks to declare the nullity of a contact does not prescribe.
Parties who are in pari delicto have no recourse against each other on the principle that a transgressor
cannot profit from his own wrongdoing. However, this rule does not apply to Homestead Patent because
of the underlying public policy to conserve the land which a homesteader has acquired by gratuitous title
from the government. In keeping with this policy, the Court held that the purchaser can only recover the
purchase price which he has paid by filing a claim against the estate of the deceased seller.

TORTS and QUASI-CONTRACT

Torts - Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to
pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between
the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
a. There must be an act or omission constituting fault or negligence.
b. Damage caused by the said act or omission.
c. Causal relation between the damage and the act or omission.
d. no pre-existing contract.

1. Yes, a general rule, a public officer is not liable for acts performed in discharge of his duties. Unless he
acted with malice, bad faith, or gross negligence in the performance of his duty.

2. A liability of tort may arise even under a contract, where tort is that which breaches the contract.
The plaintiff cannot recover twice for the same act or omission of the defendant.

3. It depends. If the civil action is based on quasi-delict, the taxicab owners may raise the defense of
DOAGFOAF in the selection and supervision of the driver. If the action is based on civil liability arising from
a crime, that defense will not prosper.

4. A's cannot raise the defense that the vehicle is not registered in his name. Under the NCC, his liability
is based on his vicarious liability as the father of a minor who caused damage due to negligence. While
the suit will prosper against the registered owner, it is the actual owner of the private vehicle who is
ultimately liable.

5. No one is liable. Under the NCC, a possessor of an animal is responsible for the damage it may cause
although it may escape or be lost. However, this responsibility shall cease only in case the damage is
caused by force majure or from the fault of the person who has suffered damage.
6. Er of the DH who slapped a fish vendor is liable. Under the NCC, ERs shall be liable for the damages
caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even
though the former are not engaged in any business.

7. The school, its administrators and teachers shall be liable for the acts of minor A because of the special
parental authority and responsibility that they exercise over him. The authority applies to all authorized
activities, whether inside or outside the premises of the school.

8. The SC held that the hospital is liable, not under the principle of respondeat superior for the lack of
evidence of an Er-Ee relationship with Dr. A, but under the principle of ostensible agency for the
negligence of Dr. A. There is ample evidence that BCD Hospital held out to patient X, that Dr. A was its
agent.

Quasi-Contract - A juridical relation that arises through lawful, voluntary and unilateral acts to the end
that no one shall be unjustly enriched or benefitted at the expense of another.
Negotiorum Gestio – It is a juridical relation that arises when a person voluntarily takes charge of the
management or agency of another’s abandoned or neglected business or property without owner’s
authority.
Solutio indebiti – It is a quasi-contract that arises if something is received when there is NO right to
demand it, and it was unduly delivered through mistake, the obligation to return it arises.

DAMAGES
Actual or compensatory – Adequate compensation for pecuniary loss suffered.
Moral- Reparation for non-pecuniary losses: injury to feelings, physical suffering, besmirched reputation,
mental anguish, fright, moral shock, wounded feelings, social humiliation, serious anxiety or similar injury.
Nominal- May be awarded to plaintiff whose right has been violated or invaded by the defendant, for the
purpose of vindicating or recognizing that right, and not for indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered
by him.
Temperate or moderate - Damages which are more than nominal but less than compensatory, and may
be recovered when the court finds that some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount cannot be
provided with certainty.
Liquidated – are those agreed upon by the parties to a contract, to be paid in case of breach thereof,
without the necessity of proving the damages.
Exemplary or corrective – Corrective or punitive damages are imposed, by way of example or correction
for the public good. It is intended to serve as deterrent to serious wrong doings. Must be attended by bad
faith or committed in a fraudulent manner.