Republic V

REPUBLIC v.
CAPITAL RESOURCES CORPORATION

G.R. No. 217210. November 7, 2016, First Division (Caguioa, J.)
DOCTRINE
Section 121 of the Public Land Act pertains to acquisitions of public land by a
corporation from a grantee. In this case, the original grantee was Dumuk and he
subsequently transferred the subject property to spouses Milo. In turn, the spouses
were the ones who sold the subject property to Capital Resources and Romeo Roxas.
Evidently, Capital Resources did not acquire the subject property from the original
grantee.
As to the provision of the 1973 Constitution proscribing corporations from acquiring
"alienable lands" of the public domain, the consistent ruling of the Supreme Court is that
the prohibition will not apply if the property acquired by the corporation is private
property and not alienable lands of the public domain. The rule is that once a patent is
registered and the corresponding certificate of title is issued, the land covered by it
ceases to be part of the public domain and becomes private property.
HEIRS OF TOMAKIN v. HERIS OF NAVARES
G.R. No. 223624, July 17, 2019, Second Division (Caguioa, J.)
DOCTRINE
It is well-settled that a party may not change his theory of the case on appeal and this is expressly
adopted in Section 15, Rule 44 of the Rules. Defenses not pleaded in the answer may not be raised
for the first time on appeal. It is also well-settled that issues raised for the first time on appeal and
not raised in the proceedings in the lower court are barred by estoppel.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. POTENCIANO A. LARRAZABAL, SR., VICTORIA
LARRAZABAL LOCSIN and BETTY LARRAZABAL MACATUAL
G.R. No. 204530, July 26, 2017, First Division (Caguioa, J.)
DOCTRINE
Just compensation is to be ascertained as of the time of the taking, which usually coincides with the
commencement of the expropriation proceedings. Where the institution of the action precedes entry
into the property, the just compensation is to be ascertained as of the time of the filing of the
complaint.
AMA LAND, INC., vs. WACK WACK RESIDENTS' ASSOCIATION, INC.
G.R. No. 202342. July 19, 2017, First Division (Caguioa, J.)
DOCTRINE
The temporary easement of right of way under Article 656 of the Civil Code, similar to the
permanent easement of right of way pursuant to its Articles 649 and 650, can only be granted after
proof of compliance with the prerequisites set forth in the articles duly adduced during a full-blown
trial.
The question of whether or not AMALI, as owner of the dominant estate, may validly claim against
WWRAI a compulsory permanent right of way under Articles 649 and 650 of the Civil Code, will
depend on a finding that AMALI has established the existence of the following requisites, namely:
(1) the dominant estate is surrounded by other immovables; (2) it is without adequate outlet to a
public highway; (3) after the proper indemnity has been paid; (4) the isolation was not due to the
proprietor of the dominant estate's own acts; and (5) the right of way claimed is at a point least
prejudicial to the servient estate. A sixth requisite is that the right of way must be absolutely
necessary for the normal enjoyment of the dominant estate by its owner. There must be a real, not
fictitious or artificial, necessity for the right of way, and the right cannot be claimed merely for the
convenience of the owner of the enclosed estate.
In turn, as regards the question of whether AMALI is entitled to a temporary easement of right of
way, Article 656 of the Civil Code provides that this can be granted only after the payment of the
proper indemnity by AMALI, the owner of the dominant estate; and only if AMALI has established
that the easement is indispensable for the construction of its AMA Tower Project.
G. HOLDINGS, INC vs. CEPALCO
G.R. No. 226213. September 27, 2017, Second Division (Caguioa, J.)
DOCTRINE
Under Article 1345 of the Civil Code, simulation of a contract may be absolute, when the parties do
not intend to be bound at all, or relative, when the parties conceal their true agreement. The
characteristic of simulation is the fact that the apparent contract is not really desired or intended to
produce legal effects or in any way alter the juridical situation of the parties. Thus, where a person,
in order to place his property beyond the reach of his creditors, simulates a transfer of it to another,
he does not really intend to divest himself of his title and control of the property; hence, the deed of
transfer is but a sham. Further, rescissible contracts and void or inexistent contracts belong to two
mutually exclusive groups.
Rescission and nullity can be distinguished in the following manner: (a) by reason of the basis —
rescission is based on prejudice, while nullity is based on a vice or defect of one of the essential
elements of a contract; (2) by reason of purpose — rescission is a reparation of damages, while
nullity is a sanction; (3) by reason of effects — rescission affects private interest while nullity affects
public interest; (4) by reason of nature of action — rescission is subsidiary while nullity is a principal
action; (5) by reason of the party who can bring action — rescission can be brought by a third
person while nullity can only be brought by a party; and (6) by reason of susceptibility to ratification
— rescissible contracts need not be ratified while void contracts cannot be ratified.
They can likewise be distinguished as follows: (1) as to defect: In rescissible contracts, there is
damage or injury either to one of the contracting parties or to third persons; while in void or
inexistent contracts, one or some of the essential requisites of a valid contract are lacking in fact or
in law; (2) As to effect: The first are considered valid and enforceable until they are rescinded by a
competent court; while the latter do not, as a general rule, produce any legal effect; (3) As to
prescriptibility of action or defense: In the first, the action for rescission may prescribe; while in the
latter, the action for declaration of nullity or inexistence or the defense of nullity or inexistence
does not prescribe; (4) As to susceptibility of ratification: The first are not susceptible of ratification,
but are susceptible of convalidation; while the latter are not susceptible of ratification; (5) As to
who may assail contracts: The first may be assailed not only by a contracting party but even by a
third person who is prejudiced or damaged by the contract; while the latter may be assailed not
only by a contracting party but even by a third party whose interest is directly affected; (6) As to
how contracts may be assailed: the first may be assailed directly, and not collaterally; while the
latter may be assailed directly or collaterally.
PRIVATIZATION AND MANAGEMENT OFFICE vs. EDGARDO V. QUESADA, et. al.
G.R. No. 224507, September 20, 2017, Second Division (Caguioa, J.)
DOCTRINE
Section 107 contemplates ONLY two situations when a petition for surrender of withheld duplicate
certificate of title may be availed of. These are: (1) where it is necessary to issue a new certificate of
title pursuant to any involuntary instrument which divests the title of the registered owner against
his consent, and (2) where a voluntary instrument cannot be registered by reason of the refusal or
failure of the holder to surrender the owner's duplicate certificate of title.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. THE HEIRS OF MEYNARDO CABRERA
G.R. No. 218418. November 8, 2017, Second Division (Caguioa, J.)
DOCTRINE
The classification and reclassification of public lands into alienable or disposable, mineral or forest
land is the exclusive prerogative of the Executive Department, and is exercised by the latter through
the President. Furhter, owing to the nature of reversion proceedings and the outcome which a
favorable decision therein entails, the State bears the burden to prove that the land previously
decreed or adjudicated in favor of the defendant constitutes land which cannot be owned by private
individuals.
In turn, the classification of unclassified lands of the public domain, and the reclassification of
those previously classified under any of the categories set forth in the 1987 Constitution (such
as the Roxas Properties), are governed by Commonwealth Act No. 141 otherwise known as the
Public Land Act.
The provisions thereof are clear and leave no room for interpretation — the classification and
reclassification of public lands into alienable or disposable, mineral or forest land is the exclusive
prerogative of the Executive Department, and is exercised by the latter through the President, or
such other persons vested with authority to exercise the same on his behalf. Since the power to
classify and reclassify land are executive in nature, such acts, effected without executive authority,
are void, and essentially ultra vires.
In reversion proceedings, the State bears the burden of proving that the property in question was
inalienable at the time it was decreed or adjudicated in favor of the defendant.
PADAYHAG vs. DIRECTOR OF LANDS
SOUTHERN MINDANAO COLLEGES, vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 202872, G.R. No. 206062, November 22, 2017, Second Division (Caguioa, J.)
DOCTRINE
Anent the publication requirement in reconstitution proceedings under Section 13, RA 26, mere
submission of the subject Official Gazette issues would evidence only the first element — publication
in two consecutive issues of the Official Gazette, and what must be proved is not the content of the
Order published in the Official Gazette but the fact of two-time publication in successive issues at
least 30 days before the hearing date. Further, the probative value of certifications of the Director of
the National Printing Office in reconstitution cases. The Court even quoted therein the lower court's
observation that the Official Gazette is an official publication of the government and consequently,
the Court can take judicial notice of its contents.
COCA-COLA BOTTLERS PHILS., INC., vs. ERNANI GUINGONA MEÑEZ
G.R. No. 209906. November 22, 2017, Second Division (Caguioa, J.)
DOCTRINE
The cases when moral damages may be awarded are specific. Unless the case falls under the
enumeration as provided in Article 2219, which is exclusive, and Article 2220 of the Civil Code, moral
damages may not be awarded. As to exemplary or corrective damages, these may be granted in
quasi-delicts if the defendant acted with gross negligence pursuant to Article 2231 of the Civil Code.
ART. 2187. Manufacturers and processors of foodstuffs, drinks, toilet articles and similar goods
shall be liable for death or injuries caused by any noxious or harmful substances used, although
no contractual relation exists between them and the consumers.
Quasi-delict being the source of obligation upon which Meñez bases his cause of action for damages
against CCBPI, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is not applicable. Such is not a
condition precedent required in a complaint for damages with respect to obligations arising from
quasi-delicts.
The statements of the doctors who tended to the medical needs of Meñez were equivocal.
"Physical effects on the body" and "adverse effect on his body" are not very clear and definite as to
whether or not Meñez suffered physical injuries and if these statements indicate that he did, what
their nature was or how extensive they were. Consequently, in the absence of sufficient evidence
on physical injuries that Meñez sustained, he is not entitled to moral damages.
As to exemplary or corrective damages, these may be granted in quasi-delicts if the defendant
acted with gross negligence pursuant to Article 2231 of the Civil Code.
The CA justified its award of exemplary damages in the following manner: “On the liability of
manufacturers, the principle of strict liability applies. It means that proof of negligence is not
necessary. It applies even if the defendant manufacturer or processor has exercised all the possible
care in the preparation and sale of his product. Extra-ordinary diligence is required of them because
the life of the consuming public is involved in the consumption of the foodstuffs or processed
products. “
Meñez has failed to establish that CCBPI acted with gross negligence. Other than the opened
"Sprite" bottle containing pure kerosene allegedly served to him at the Rosante, Meñez has not
presented any evidence that would show CCBPI's purported gross negligence. There was failure on
the part of Meñez to categorically establish the chain of custody of the "Sprite" bottle which was
the very core of the evidence in his complaint for damages and that, considering that the "Sprite"
bottle allegedly contained pure kerosene, it was quite surprising why the employees of Rosante did
not notice its distinct, characteristic smell. Thus, Meñez is not entitled to exemplary damages
absent the required evidence. The only evidence presented by Meñez is the opened "Sprite" bottle
containing pure kerosene. Nothing more.
Regarding attorney's fees, the CA Decision did not even provide the basis for the award of
P50,000.00 as attorney's fees and cost of suit. The award is found only in the dispositive portion
and, unlike the award of moral and exemplary damages, there was no explanation provided in the
body of the Decision. It can only be surmised that the CA awarded attorney's fees only because it
awarded exemplary damages. In any event, based on Article 2208 of the Civil Code, Meñez is not
entitled to attorney's fees and expenses of litigation because, as with his claim for exemplary
damages, he has not established any other ground that would justify this award.
ARACELI MAYUGA, vs. ANTONIO ATIENZA
G.R. No. 208197. January 10, 2018, Second Division (Caguioa, J.)
DOCTRINE
Assuming that Perfecto owned the disputed lots and the Confirmation Affidavit was a deed of
partition, Perfecto could have legally partitioned his estate during his lifetime. Under Article 1080 of
the Civil Code: "should a person make a partition of his estate by an act inter vivos, or by will, such
partition shall be respected, insofar as it does not prejudice the legitime of the compulsory heirs."
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. FILEMON SAROMO
G.R. No. 189803. March 14, 2018, Second Division (Caguioa, J.)
DOCTRINE
Testimonial evidence on the physical layout or condition of the subject land — that it was planted
with coconut trees and beach houses had been constructed thereon — are not conclusive on the
classification of the subject land as alienable agricultural land. Rather, it is the official proclamation
releasing the land classified as public forest land to form part of disposable agricultural lands of the
public domain that is definitive. Such official proclamation, if there is any, is conspicuously missing in
the instant case.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. NORTHERN CEMENT CORPORATION
G.R. No. 200256, April 11, 2018, Second Division (Caguioa, J.)
DOCTRINE
The phrase "adverse, continuous, open, public, and in concept of owner," is a conclusion of law.
Burden of proof is on the person seeking original registration of land to prove by clear, positive and
convincing evidence that his possession and that of his predecessors-in-interest was of the nature
and duration required by law.
Prescription is another mode of acquiring ownership and other real rights over immovable
property. The possession should be in the concept of an owner, public, peaceful, uninterrupted
and adverse. Possession is open when it is patent, visible, apparent, notorious and not
clandestine. It is continuous when uninterrupted, unbroken and not intermittent or occasional;
exclusive when the adverse possessor can show exclusive dominion over the land and an
appropriation of it to his own use and benefit; and notorious when it is so conspicuous that it is
generally known and talked of by the public or the people in the neighborhood.
Tax Declarations are not conclusive evidence of ownership but only a basis for inferring possession.
It is only when these tax declarations are coupled with proof of actual possession of the property
that they may become the basis of a claim of ownership.
ASTRID A. VAN DE BRUG vs. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK
G.R. No. 207004, June 6, 2018, Second Division (Caguioa, J.)
DOCTRINE
In order to be liable for damages under the abuse of rights principle, the following requisites must
concur: (a) the existence of a legal right or duty; (b) which is exercised in bad faith; and (c) for the
sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another.
M. RAGASA ENTERPRISES, INC. vs. BANCO DE ORO, INC.
DOCTRINE
Article 1170 of the Civil Code mandates that those who, in the performance of their obligations, are
guilty of fraud, negligence, or delay, and those who, in any manner, contravene the tenor thereof,
are liable for damages. Thus, having contravened the tenor of the Lease Contract regarding its term
or period, the bank should be liable for damages. However, how much in damages should the bank
be liable? Generally, if the lessor or the lessee should not comply with their obligations, the
aggrieved party may ask for either the rescission of the contract and indemnification for damages,
or only the latter, allowing the contract to remain in force.
A penal clause is an accessory obligation which the parties attach to a principal obligation for the
purpose of insuring the performance thereof by imposing on the debtor a special prestation
(generally consisting in the payment of a sum of money) in case the obligation is not fulfilled or is
irregularly or inadequately fulfilled. Evidently, the penal clause may be considered either reparation,
compensation or substitute for damages, on one hand, or as a punishment in case of breach of the
obligation, on the other. When considered as reparation or compensation, the question as to the
appropriate amount of damages is resolved once and for all because the stipulated indemnity
represents a legitimate estimate made by the contracting parties of the damages caused by the
nonfulfillment or breach of the obligation. Proof of actual damages is, consequently, not necessary
in order that the stipulated penalty may be demanded. When considered as a punishment, the
question of damages is not yet resolved inasmuch as the right to damages, besides the penalty, still
subsists. Thus, if the injured party desires to recover the damages actually suffered by him in
addition to the penalty, he must prove such damages.
BENEDICTO V. YUJUICO, vs. FAR EAST BANK AND TRUST COMPANY
G.R. No. 186196. August 15, 2018, Second Division (Caguioa, J.)
DOCTRINE
Novation is governed principally by Articles 1291 and 1292 of the Civil Code, which provide: ART.
1291. Obligations may be modified by: (1) Changing their object or principal conditions; (2)
Substituting the person of the debtor; (3) Subrogating a third person in the rights of the creditor.
Further, ART. 1292 provides that in order that an obligation may be extinguished by another which
substitutes the same, it is imperative that it be so declared in unequivocal terms, or that the old and
the new obligations be on every point incompatible with each other.
SPOUSES BELTRAN vs. SPOUSES CANGAYDA
G.R. No. 225033, August 15, 2018, Second Division (Caguioa, J.)
DOCTRINE
In a contract of sale, title passes to the vendee upon the delivery of the thing sold; whereas in a
contract to sell, by agreement the ownership is reserved in the vendor and is not to pass until the
full payment of the price. In a contract of sale, the vendor has lost and cannot recover ownership
until and unless the contract is resolved or rescinded; whereas in a contract to sell, title is retained
by the vendor until the full payment of the price.
Article 1592 in conjunction with Article 1191 suggests that in the absence of any stipulation to
the contrary, the vendor's failure to pay within the period agreed upon shall not constitute a
breach of faith, so long as payment is made before the vendor demands for rescission, either
judicially, or by notarial act.
Hence, slight delay in the payment of the purchase price does not serve as a sufficient ground for
the rescission of a sale of real property.
SPOUSES ABRAHAM AND MELCHORA ERMINO vs. GOLDEN VILLAGE HOMEOWNERS
ASSOCIATION, INC.
DOCTRINE
The act of replacing the steel grille gate with a concrete fence was within the legitimate exercise
of GVHAI's proprietary rights over its property. The law recognizes in the owner the right to enjoy
and dispose of a thing, without other limitations than those established by law. Article 430 of the
Civil Code provides that "(e)very owner may enclose or fence his land or tenements by means of
walls, ditches, live or dead hedges, or by any other means without detriment to servitudes
constituted thereon."
Where the waters which flow from a higher state are those which are artificially collected in man-
made lagoons, any damage occasioned thereby entitles the owner of the lower or servient estate to
compensation. Lower estates are only obliged to receive water naturally flowing from higher estates
and such should be free from any human intervention. In the instant case, what flowed from Hilltop
City Subdivision was not water that naturally flowed from a higher estate.
SAMUEL AND EDGAR BUYCO v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
DOCTRINE
A CENRO or PENRO certification is not enough to prove the alienable and disposable nature of the
property sought to be registered because the only way to prove the classification of the land is
through the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary or the President himself.
In the recent case of In Re: Application for Land Registration Suprema T. Dumo v. Republic of the
Philippines, the Court reiterated the requirement it set in Republic of the Philippines v. T.A.N.
Properties, Inc. that there are TWO documents that must be presented to prove that the
land subject of the application for registration is alienable and disposable:
(1) a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true
copy by the legal custodian of the official records, and
(2) a certificate of land classification status issued by the CENRO or the Provincial Environment and
Natural Resources Office (PENRO) based on the land classification approved by the DENR Secretary.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES REPRESENTED BY DPWH v. HEIRS OF ELIGIO CRUZ,
REPRESENTED BY CRISANTA OLIQUINO, AND HEIRS OF ELIGIO CRUZ, REPRESENTED BY
MAXIMINO AGALABIA
G.R. No. 208956, October 17, 2018, Second Division (Caguioa, J.)
DOCTRINE
Article 2028 of the Civil Code defines a compromise as a "contract whereby the parties, by making
reciprocal concessions, avoid litigation or put an end to one already commenced.” Before approving
a compromise, courts are thus bound to strictly scrutinize the same to ensure that the compromise
and its execution are compliant with the law and consistent with procedural rules.
A compromise intended to resolve a matter under litigation is referred to as a judicial compromise.

The effect of a judicial compromise is well established: “Once stamped with judicial imprimatur, a
compromise agreement becomes more than a mere contract binding upon the parties; having the
sanction of the court and entered as its determination of the controversy, it has the force and effect
of any other judgment. It has the effect and authority of res judicata, although no execution may
issue until it would have received the corresponding approval of the court where the litigation
pends and its compliance with the terms of the agreement is thereupon decreed.”
INDUSTRIAL PERSONNEL AND MANAGEMENT SERVICES, INC. v. COUNTRY BANKERS
INSURANCE CORPORATION
DOCTRINE
According to the autonomy characteristic of contracts, the contracting parties may establish
such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem convenient, provided
they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy.
Article 2199 of the Civil Code states: Except as provided by law or by stipulation, one is entitled to
an adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly proved. Such
compensation is referred to as actual or compensatory damages.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. SPS. ILDEFONSO ALEJANDRE AND ZENAIDA FERRER
ALEJANDRE
G.R. No. 217336, October 17, 2018, Second Division (Caguioa J.)
DOCTRINE
Accordingly, public lands not shown to have been classified, reclassified or released as alienable
agricultural land or alienated to a private person by the State remain part of the inalienable lands of
public domain. Therefore, the onus to overturn, by incontrovertible evidence, the presumption that
the land subject of an application for registration is alienable and disposable rests with the
applicant.
Under Section 14 of P.D. No. 1529, the following persons may file in the proper Court of First
Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their
duly authorized representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
(4) Those who have acquired ownership of land in any other manner provided for by law.
NARCISO MELENDRES, SUBSTITUTED BY HIS WIFE, OFELIA MELENDRES AND CHILDREN
JOSE MARI MELENDRES, AND NARCISO MELENDRES, JR., PETITIONERS, v. ALICIA
CATAMBAY, LORENZA BENAVIDEZ, IN SUBSTITUTION OF HER HUSBAND EDMUNDO
BENAVIDEZ, AND THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF RIZAL (MORONG BRANCH)
G.R. No. 198026, November 28, 2018, Second Division, (Caguioa J.)
DOCTRINE
If the land in question is proven to be of private ownership and, therefore, beyond the jurisdiction
of the Director of Lands, the free patent and subsequent title issued pursuant thereto are null and
void. The indefeasibility and imprescriptibility of a Torrens title issued pursuant to a patent may
be invoked only, when the land involved originally formed part of the public domain. If it was a
private land, the patent and certificate of title issued upon the patent are a nullity.
Section 44, Chapter VI of Commonwealth Act No. 141 or the Public Land Act, states that a free
patent may issue in favor of an applicant only if (1) the applicant has continuously occupied and
cultivated, either by himself or through his predecessors-in-interest, a tract or tracts of agricultural
public lands subject to disposition, or (2) who shall have paid the real estate tax thereon while the
same has not been occupied by any person.
JUN MIRANDA v. SPS. ENGR. ERNESTO AND AIDA MALLARI AND SPS. DOMICIANO C. REYES
AND CARMELITA PANGAN
G.R. No. 218343, November 28, 2018, Second Division (Caguioa, J.)
DOCTRINE
Accion publiciana is a plenary action to recover the better right of possession (possession de jure),
which should be brought in the proper inferior court or Regional Trial Court (depending upon the
value of the property) when the dispossession has lasted for more than one year (or for less than a
year in cases other than those mentioned in Rule 70 of the Rules). The issue in an accion publiciana
is the "better right of possession" of real property independently of title. This "better right of
possession" may or may not proceed from a Torrens Title.
Despite the lack of an express Rule, however, there is ample jurisprudential support for upholding
the power of a court hearing an accion publiciana to also rule provisionally on the issue of
ownership.
VDM TRADING, INC. AND SPOUSES LUIS AND NENA DOMINGO, REPRESENTED BY THEIR
ATTORNEY-IN-FACT, ATTY. F. WILLIAM L. VILLAREAL v. LEONITA CARUNGCONG AND
WACK WACK TWIN TOWERS CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION, INC.
G.R. No. 206709, February 06, 2019, Second Division (Caguioa J.)
DOCTRINE
According to Article 2176 of the Civil Code, whoever by act or omission causes damage to another,
there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if
there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict. A quasi-
delict has the following elements: a) the damage suffered by the plaintiff; b) the act or omission of
the defendant supposedly constituting fault or negligence; and c) the causal connection between the
act and the damage sustained by the plaintiff, or proximate cause.
The Court has held that in a cause of action based on quasi-delict, the negligence or fault should be
clearly established as it is the basis of the action. The burden of proof is thus placed on the plaintiff,
as it is the duty of a party to present evidence on the facts in issue necessary to establish his claim
or defense by the amount of evidence required by law.
To constitute quasi-delict, the alleged fault or negligence committed by the defendant must be
the proximate cause of the damage or injury suffered by the plaintiff.
D.M. CONSUNJI, INC. v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES AND THE HEIRS OF JULIAN CRUZ,
REPRESENTED BY MACARIA CRUZ ESTACIO
G.R. No. 233339, February 13, 2019, Second Division (Caguioa J.)
DOCTRINE
Mere notations appearing in survey plans are inadequate proof of the covered properties'
alienable and disposable character. The applicant, however, must also present a copy of the
original classification of the land into alienable and disposable land, as declared by the DENR
Secretary or as proclaimed by the President.
ANACLETO ALDEN MENESES v. JUNG SOON LINDA LEE-MENESES
G.R. No. 200182, March 13, 2019, Second Division (Caguioa J.)
DOCTRINE
In a long line of cases, the Court has ruled that psychological incapacity under Article 36 must be
characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability. The incapacity must be grave or
serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in
marriage; it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage although the overt
manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and it must be incurable or even if it were
otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved.
HEIR OF PASTORA T. CARDENAS AND EUSTAQUIO CARDENAS, NAMELY REMEDIOS
CARDENAS-TUMLOS, REPRESENTED BY HER ATTORNEY-IN-FACT JANET TUMLOS-
QUIZON v. THE CHRISTIAN AND MISSIONARY ALLIANCE CHURCHES OF THE PHILIPPINES,
INC., REPRESENTED BY REO REPOLLO AND LEOCADIO DUQUE, JR.
DOCTRINE
As a general rule, a certificate of title serves as evidence of an indefeasible and incontrovertible
title to the property in favor of the person whose name appears therein.
According to Section 47 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, "no title to registered land in derogation of
the title of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession." There can
be no acquisitive prescription with respect to a titled parcel of land. The Court has explained that, by
express provision of Section 47 of P.D. 1529, no title to registered land in derogation to that of the
registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession.
ROGELIO LOGROSA v. SPOUSES CLEOFE AND CESAR AZARES, SPOUSES ABUNDIO, JR. AND
ANTONIETA TORRES, SPOUSES NELSON SALA AND ARLENE ANG, AND SPOUSES
BONIFACIO, JR., AND WELHELMINA BARUIZ
DOCTRINE
It is a fundamental principle in land registration that the certificate of title serves as evidence of an
indefeasible and incontrovertible title to the property in favor of the person whose name appears
therein. It becomes the best proof of ownership of a parcel of land. Such principle of indefeasibility
has long been well-settled in this jurisdiction and it is only when the acquisition of the title is
attended with fraud or bad faith that the doctrine finds no application.
A person may exercise the right to compel the partition of real estate if he/she sets forth in his/her
complaint the nature and extent of his title and subsequently proves the same. The law does not
make a distinction as to how the co-owner derived his/her title, may it be through gratuity or
through onerous consideration. In other words, a person who derived his title and was granted co-
ownership rights through gratuity may compel partition.
HUN HYUNG PARK v. EUNG WON CHOI
DOCTRINE
In accordance with Article 1956 of the Civil Code, no interest shall be due unless it has been
expressly stipulated in writing. Here, without further proof of any express agreement that
P375,000.00 of the P1,875,000.00 pertains to interest, the Court is predisposed, based on the facts
of the case, to rule that the entire principal amount owed by Choi to Park is the face value of the
check, or P1,875,000.00.
FIL-ESTATE MANAGEMENT, INC., MEGATOP REALTY DEVELOPMENT, INC., PEAKSUN
ENTERPRISES AND EXPORT CORPORATION, ARTURO E. DY AND ELENA DY JAO v.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES AND SPOUSES SANTIAGO T. GO, AND NORMA C. GO,
REPRESENTED BY THEIR SON AND ATTORNEY-IN-FACT KENDRICK C. GO
DOCTRINE
To the mind of the Court, the RTC acted conformably with Section 25 of PD 1529, which provides
that "if the opposition or the adverse claim of any person covers only a portion of the lot and said
portion is not properly delimited on the plan attached to the application, conflicting claims of
ownership or possession, or overlapping of boundaries, the court may require the parties to
submit a subdivision plan duly approved by the Director of Lands."
As worded, it is discretionary on the part of the land registration court to require the parties to
submit a subdivision plan duly approved by the appropriate government agency. Regardless of how
the said court exercises its discretion, the burden remains with the oppositor or adverse claimant to
convince by preponderance of evidence the land registration court that there is an overlapping of
boundaries. In this case, petitioners failed.
VIVENCIO DALIT v. SPOUSES ROLANDO E. BALAGTAS, SR. AND CARMELITA G. BALAGTAS,
ROLANDO G. BALAGTAS, JR., CLARINA G. BALAGTAS, CARLOTA G. BALAGTAS, CARMELA G.
BALAGTAS, SOFRONIO SARIENTE AND METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST COMPANY
DOCTRINE
One of the modes by which DAR implements the distribution of agricultural lands under the CARP is
through the issuance of a CLOA. A CLOA is a document evidencing ownership of the land granted or
awarded to the qualified ARB, and contains the restrictions and conditions of such grant. The
issuance of CLOA No. T-2165 in Dalit's favor thus confirms his right to retain possession over the
portion of the Disputed Lot identified thereunder, such possession being an attribute of ownership
granted in his favor. the State recognizes the indefeasibility of CLOAs issued in accordance with
applicable law. Under DAR Administrative Order No. 07-14, the cancellation of erroneously issued
CLOAs may be allowed only in the manner and under the conditions prescribed thereunder. Until
duly cancelled in accordance with the prescribed procedure, CLOAs issued by the DAR shall remain
valid and subsisting and enjoy the same respect accorded to those issued through other modes of
acquisition of title.
KAREN NUÑEZ VITO, LYNETTE NUÑEZ MASINDA, WARREN NUÑEZ, AND ALDEN NUÑEZ v.
NORMA MOISES-PALMA
G.R. No. 224466 (Formerly UDK-15574), March 27, 2019, Second Division (Caguioa J.)
DOCTRINE
Under Article 1245 of the Civil Code, there is dation in payment when property is alienated to the
creditor in satisfaction of a debt in money and is governed by the law of sales.
To summarize, the remedies of the unpaid seller, after ownership of the real property not covered
by Republic Act No. 6552 or the Maceda Law, has been vested to the buyer, are:
1. To compel specific performance by filing an action against the buyer for the agreed purchase
price; or
2. To rescind or resolve the contract of sale either judicially or by a notarial act; and
3. In either (1) or (2), to recover damages for the breach of the contract.
DOMESTIC PETROLEUM RETAILER CORP. v. MANILA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT
AUTHORITY
G.R. No. 210641, March 27, 2019, En Banc (Caguioa, J.)
DOCTRINE
In order to establish the application of solutio indebiti in a given situation, two conditions must
concur: (1) a payment is made when there exists no binding relation between the payor who has no
duty to pay, and the person who received the payment, and (2) the payment is made through
mistake, and not through liberality or some other cause.18 In the instant case, the Court finds that
the essential requisites of solutio indebiti are not present.
VICTORIA T. FAJARDO v. BELEN CUA-MALATE
DOCTRINE
Independent and in spite of the statute of frauds, courts of equity have enforced oral partition when
it has been completely or partly performed. In the instant case, there is no refutation on the part of
petitioner Victoria as to respondent Belen's assertion that the terms of the Compromise Agreement
have already been partially performed by the parties.
FILIPINAS ESLON MANUFACTURING CORP. v. HEIRS OF BASILIO LLANES, NAMELY:
CASIANO LLANES, DOMINGO LLANES, FABIAN LLANES, VICTORINA L. TAGALIMOT,
PACENCIA L. MANALES, NORMA L. BACALARES, LOURDES L. PAJARDO, JOSEPHINE
LLANES, JOSEFA LLANES AND JOVENCITA LLANES; ROLYNWIN Q. LAMSON; PHILIPPINE
AMANAH BANK, ALSO KNOWN AS AL-AMANAH ISLAMIC INVESTMENT BANK OF THE
PHILIPPINES; SPOUSES MEDEL AND CARMEN JUSTINIANO A.K.A. CARMEN & MEDEL
JUSTINIANO; RUFINO V. GENILO; MARIA SOL A. SEVESES; SPOUSES SALVADOR AND
CHEQUETHELMA GERONA; CRESOGONO R. SEVESES, MONERA M. LALANTO; CLAUDIO M.
CLOSAS; SPOUSES SERAFIN AND ELSA FERRAREN; EDILBERTO V. PAZA* AND GENEROSO
EMPUESTO
DOCTRINE
Raising the invalidity of a certificate of title in an action for quieting of title is NOT a collateral attack
because it is central, imperative, and essential in such an action that the complainant shows the
invalidity of the deed which casts cloud on his title. In other words, at the heart of the Complaint for
Quieting of Title instituted by petitioner FEMCO is the nullification of OCT No. 0- 1040 in order to
remove the cloud besetting its own title. This is manifestly a direct attack.
An action or proceeding is deemed an attack on a title when its objective is to nullify the title,
thereby challenging the judgment pursuant to which the title was decreed. The attack is direct
when the objective is to annul or set aside such judgment, or enjoin its enforcement. On the other
hand, the attack is indirect or collateral when, in an action to obtain a different relief, an attack on
the judgment is nevertheless made as an incident thereof.
For an action to quiet title to prosper, two indispensable requisites must concur, namely: (1) the
plaintiff or complainant has a legal or an equitable title to or interest in the real property subject of
the action; and (2) the deed, claim, encumbrance, or proceeding claimed to be casting cloud on his
title must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of validity
or legal efficacy.
An action or proceeding is deemed an attack on a title when its objective is to nullify the title,
thereby challenging the judgment pursuant to which the title was decreed. The attack is direct
when the objective is to annul or set aside such judgment, or enjoin its enforcement. On the other
hand, the attack is indirect or collateral when, in an action to obtain a different relief, an attack on
the judgment is nevertheless made as an incident thereof.
HIPOLITO AGUSTIN AND IMELDA AGUSTIN v. ROMANA DE VERA
G.R. No. 233455, April 03, 2019, En Banc (Caguioa, J.)
DOCTRINE
While a stipulation or promise to the effect that a seller shall execute a deed of sale upon the
completion of payment of the purchase price by the buyer may be considered a factor or a sign that
a contract might possibly be a contract to sell, such stipulation in itself, taken in isolation, is by no
means determinative and conclusive as to the contract being a contract to sell. Still controlling are
(1) the lack of any stipulation in the sale contract reserving the title of the property on the vendors
and (2) the lack of any stipulation giving the sellers the right to unilaterally rescind the contract
upon non-payment of the balance thereof within a fixed period. The absence of such stipulations in
a sale contract makes the said contract a contract of sale. Hence, the Contract to Purchase and Sale
entered into by Gregorio and Hipolito is a contract of sale.
The Contract to Purchase and Sale is a mere contract to sell; it is a contract of sale. According to
Article 1458 of the Civil Code, by a contract of sale, one of the contracting parties obligates himself
to transfer the ownership and to deliver a determinate thing, and the other to pay therefor a price
certain in money or its equivalent. Accordingly, the elements of a valid contract of sale under Article
1458 of the Civil Code are: (1) consent or meeting of the minds; (2) determinate subject matter; and
(3) price certain in money or its equivalent.
SPOUSES JOHN T. SY AND LENY N. SY, AND VALENTINO T. SY
v. MA. LOURDES DE VERA-NAVARRO AND BENJAEMY HO TAN LANDHOLDINGS, INC.,
HEREIN REPRESENTED BY GRACE T. MOLINA, IN HER CAPACITY AS CORPORATE
SECRETARY
DOCTRINE
An equitable mortgage is defined as one which although lacking in some formality, or form or
words, or other requisites demanded by a statute, nevertheless reveals the intention of the parties
to charge real property as security for a debt, and contains nothing impossible or contrary to law. Its
essential requisites are: (1) that the parties entered into a contract denominated as a contract of
sale; and (2) that their intention was to secure an existing debt by way of a mortgage.
Article 1602 of the Civil Code states that a contract shall be presumed to be an equitable
mortgage, in any of the following cases:
(1) When the price of a sale with right to repurchase is unusually inadequate;
(2) When the vendor remains in possession as lessee or otherwise;
(3) When upon or after the expiration of the right to repurchase another instrument
extending the period of redemption or granting a new period is executed;
(4) When the purchaser retains for himself a part of the purchase price;
(5) When the vendor binds himself to pay the taxes on the thing sold;
(6) In any other case where it may be fairly inferred that the real intention of the parties is
that the transaction shall secure the payment of a debt or the performance of any other
obligation.
Jurisprudence consistently shows that the presence of even one of the circumstances enumerated
in Article 1602 suffices to convert a purported contract of sale into an equitable mortgage. The
existence of any of the circumstances defined in Article 1602 of the New Civil Code, not the
concurrence nor an overwhelming number of such circumstances, is sufficient for a contract of sale
to be presumed an equitable mortgage.
The nomenclature given by the parties to the contract is not conclusive of the nature and legal
effects thereof. Even if a document appears on its face to be a sale, the owner of the property may
prove that the contract is really a loan with mortgage, and that the document does not express the
true intent of the parties.
GENEROSO SEPE v. HEIRS OF ANASTACIA* KILANG, REP. BY HER CHILDREN MARIA,
DONATA, FELICIANA, DOMINGA AND SEVERO ALL SURNAMED SOLIJON
DOCTRINE
Article 1354 of the Civil Code provides: "Although the cause is not stated in the contract, it is
presumed that it exists and is lawful, unless the debtor proves the contrary." Otherwise stated, the
law presumes that even if the contract does not state a cause, one exists and is lawful; and it is
incumbent on the party impugning the contract to prove the contrary. If the cause is stated in the
contract and it is shown to be false, then it is incumbent upon the party enforcing the contract to
prove the legality of the cause.
The presumption of sufficient consideration can be overcome by preponderance of evidence and

that mere assertion that the contract has no consideration is not enough. To contradict facts in a
notarial document and the presumption of regularity in its favor, the evidence must be clear,
convincing and more than merely preponderant.
SEBASTIAN M. QUINOL,* ALIMITA RENDAL-QUINOL, PORFERIA QUINOL-MACATIGUIB,
MARCELO MACATIGUIB, BALTAZAR QUINOL, ELAINE KILAPKILAP-QUINOL, AND
PATRICIA QUINOL
v. LORENZA INOCENCIO, EPIFANIA POA, JIMMY POA, ARTEMIO QUINOL, AND JESUS
QUINOL
DOCTRINE
Tax declarations and tax receipts as evidence of ownership cannot prevail over a certificate of title
which, to reiterate, is a presumptive proof of ownership.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. SUSAN SAYO Y REYES AND ALFREDO ROXAS Y SAGON
DOCTRINE
Moral and exemplary damages of P500,000.00 and P100,000.00, respectively, are ordinarily
awarded in cases of Trafficking in Persons as a prostitute. The ratio for the award of damages was
explained by the Court in People v. Lalli, where it ruled that “the criminal case of Trafficking in
Persons as a Prostitute is an analogous case to the crimes of seduction, abduction, rape, or other
lascivious acts.
Moral damages are prescribed under Articles 2217 and 2219 of the Civil Code:
“ART. 2217. Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety,
besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury.
Though incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages may be recovered if they are the
proximate result of the defendant's wrongful act or omission.”
SPOUSES ISIDRO R. SALITICO AND CONRADA C. SALITICO
v. HEIRS OF RESURRECCION• MARTINEZ FELIX, NAMELY: LUCIANO, CORAZON AND
CONCEPCION, ALL SURNAMED FELIX, RECAREDO P. HERNANDEZ, IN HIS CAPACITY AS
ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE OF AMANDA H. BURGOS, AND THE REGISTER OF
DEEDS
DOCTRINE
Reading Article 777 of the Civil Code together with the pertinent provisions of PD 1529 and the Rules
of Court, while an heir may dispose and transfer his/her hereditary share to another person, before
the transferee may compel the issuance of a new certificate of title covering specific property in
his/her name, a final order of distribution of the estate or the order in anticipation of the final
distribution issued by the testate or intestate court must first be had.
Article 777 of the Civil Code, which is substantive law, states that the rights of the inheritance are
transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent. Article 777 operates at the very
moment of the decedent's death meaning that the transmission by succession occurs at the precise
moment of death and, therefore, at that precise time, the heir is already legally deemed to have
acquired ownership of his/her share in the inheritance, "and not at the time of declaration of heirs,
or partition, or distribution." Thus, there is no legal bar to an heir disposing of his/her hereditary
share immediately after such death. The Court, early on in Teves de Jakosalem v. Rafols, et al.,
explained that a sale made by a legal or intestate heir of his share in an inheritance does not
interfere with the administration of the estate.
MA. LUISA A. PINEDA v. VIRGINIA ZUÑIGA VDA. DE VEGA
DOCTRINES
1. While delay on the part of respondent was not triggered by an extrajudicial demand because
petitioner had failed to so establish receipt of her demand letter, this delay was triggered when
petitioner judicially demanded the payment of respondent's loan from petitioner.
2. In Cerna v. CA, the Court ruled that the filing of a collection suit barred the foreclosure of the
mortgage.
The RTC erred in granting petitioner the remedies of collection and foreclosure of mortgage
successively. The settled rule is that these remedies of collection and foreclosure are mutually
exclusive. The invocation or grant of one remedy precludes the other.
AGBAYANI v. LUPA REALTY HOLDING CORPORATION
G.R. No. 201193, June 10, 2019, En Banc (Caguioa, J.)
DOCTRINE
Simulation requires the following: (1) A deliberate declaration contrary to the will of the parties; (2)
Agreement of the parties to the apparently valid act; and (3) The purpose is to deceive or to hide
from third persons although it is not necessary that the purpose be illicit or for purposes of fraud.
The above three requisites must concur in order that simulation may exist.
SPS. TEDY GARCIA AND PILAR GARCIA v. LORETA T. SANTOS, WINSTON SANTOS AND
CONCHITA TAN
DOCTRINE
According to Article 624, there arises a title to an easement of light and view, even in the absence of
any formal act undertaken by the owner of the dominant estate, if this apparent visible sign, such as
the existence of a door and windows, continues to remain and subsist, unless, at the time the
ownership of the two estates is divided, (1) the contrary should be provided in the title of
conveyance of either of them, or (2) the sign aforesaid should be removed before the execution of
the deed.
YOUNG BUILDERS CORP. v. BENSON INDUSTRIES, INC.
DOCTRINE
The complaint filed by YBC is an action for a sum of money arising from its main contract with BII for
the construction of a building. YBC's cause of action is primarily based on BII's alleged non-payment
of its outstanding debts to YBC arising from their main contract, despite demand. If there was a
written building or construction contract that was executed between BII and YBC, then that would
be the actionable document because its terms and stipulations would spell out the rights and
obligations of the parties. However, no such contract or agreement was attached to YBC's
Complaint. Clearly, the subject Accomplishment Billing is not an actionable document contemplated
by the Rules, but is merely evidentiary in nature.
CHEVRON PHILIPPINES, INC. (FORMERLY KNOWN AS CALTEX PHILIPPINES, INC. v. LEO Z.
MENDOZA
G.R. Nos. 211533 & 212071, June 19, 2019, En Banc (Caguioa, J.)
DOCTRINE
Jurisprudence has held that the elements of an abuse of right under Article 19 of the Civil Code are
the following: (1) the existence of a legal right or duty, (2) which is exercised in bad faith, and (3) for
the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another. Malice or bad faith is at the core of an abuse of
right. Malice or bad faith implies a conscious and intentional design to do a wrongful act for a
dishonest purpose or moral obliquity. Such must be substantiated by evidence. In the instant case,
as noted by the CA, "Mendoza utterly failed in this regard, and was unable to prove the alleged
indications of bad faith on the part of Chevron."
HEIRS OF SPOUSES MONICO SUYAM AND CARMEN BASUYAO* (BOTH DECEASED),
NAMELY: OLIVER B. SUYAM, MABLE B. SUYAM, CHRISTOPHER B. SUYAM, ABEL B. SUYAM,
AND CHESTER B. SUYAM, REPRESENTED BY THEIR ATTORNEY-INFACT AND ON HIS OWN
BEHALF, TELESFORO B. SUYAM
HEIRS OF FELICIANO JULATON @ PONCIANO, NAMELY: LUCINA J. BADUA, SEMEON
JULATON, JULIANA J. BUCASAS, ISABEL** J. ALLAS, RODOLFO JULATON, CANDIDA*** J.
GAMIT, REPRESENTED BY THEIR ATTORNEY-IN FACT AND ON HER OWN BEHALF,
CONSOLACION JULATON
DOCTRINE
According to Section 14 of the Public Land Act, no certificate of title shall be issued pursuant to a
homestead patent application made under Section 13 unless one-fifth of the land has been
improved and cultivated by the applicant within no less than one and no more than five years from
and after the date of the approval of the application. The certificate shall issue only when the
applicant shall prove that he has resided continuously for at least one year in the municipality in
which the land is located, or in a municipality adjacent to the same, and has cultivated at least one-
fifth of the land continuously since the approval of the application. The subject property was clearly
acquired by Isabel through a fraudulently issued homestead patent.
RIZAL COMMERCIAL BANKING CORP. v. PLAST-PRINT INDUSTRIES INC.
DOCTRINE
Our Civil Code now admits of the so-called imperfect or modificatory novation where the original
obligation is not extinguished but modified or changed in some of the principal conditions of the
obligation. Thus, Article 1291 provides that obligations may be modified.
ART. 1291. Obligations may be modified by: (1) Changing their object or principal conditions; (2)
Substituting the person of the debtor; (3) Subrogating a third person in the rights of the creditor.
ART. 1292. In order that an obligation may be extinguished by another which substitute the same, it
is imperative that it be so declared in unequivocal terms, or that the old and the new obligations be
on every point incompatible with each other.
Novation has been defined as the substitution or alteration of an obligation by a subsequent one
that cancels or modifies the preceding one. Unlike other modes of extinction of obligations,
novation is a juridical act of dual function, in that at the time it extinguishes an obligation, it creates
a new one in lieu of the old. This is not to say however, that in every case of novation the old
obligation is necessarily extinguished. Our Civil Code now admits of the so-called imperfect or
modificatory novation where the original obligation is not extinguished but modified or changed in
some of the principal conditions of the obligation.
While the provisions of the Restructuring Agreement had the effect of "superseding" the "existing
agreements" as to Plast-Print's outstanding loans, the changes contemplated in said agreement
merely modified certain terms relating to these loans, particularly, those pertaining to the waiver of
penalties, reduction of interest rates, renewal of payment periods, and fixing of principal amounts
payable as of the date of the execution of the Restructuring Agreement. These modifications, while
significant, do not amount to a total novation of Plast-Print's outstanding loans so as to extinguish
the REM constituted to secure such loans, or nullify the foreclosure of properties conducted before
these modifications had taken effect.
MAKATI WATER, INC. v. AGUA VIDA SYSTEMS, INC.
DOCTRINE
The Court has previously held that in construing an instrument with several provisions, a
construction must be adopted as will give effect to all. Under Article 1374 of the Civil Code, contracts
cannot be construed by parts, but clauses must be interpreted in relation to one another to give
effect to the whole. The legal effect of a contract is not determined alone by any particular provision
disconnected from all others, but from the whole read together.
SACLOLO v. MARQUITO
DOCTRINE
An equitable mortgage, like any other mortgage, is a mere accessory contract "constituted to secure
the fulfillment of a principal obligation," i.e., the full payment of the loan. Since the true transaction
between the parties was an equitable mortgage and not a sale with right of repurchase, there is no
"redemption" or "repurchase" to speak of and the periods provided under Article 1606 do not apply.
Instead, the prescriptive period under Article 1144 of the Civil Code is applicable. In other words, the
parties had 10 years from the time the cause of action accrued to file the appropriate action.
SPS. BELVIS v. SPS. EROLA
DOCTRINE
While petitioners cannot be deemed to be builders in good faith, it being undisputed that the land in
question is titled land in the name of respondents, the CA and the lower courts overlooked the fact
that petitioners constructed improvements on the subject lot with the knowledge and consent of
respondents. In exceptional cases, the Court has applied Article 448 to instances where a builder,
planter, or sower introduces improvements on titled land if with the knowledge and consent of the
owner.
Article 448. The owner of the land on which anything has been built, sown or planted in good faith,
shall have the right to appropriate as his own the works, sowing or planting, after payment of the
indemnity provided for in Articles 546 and 548, or to oblige the one who built or planted to pay the
price of the land, and the one who sowed, the proper rent. However, the builder or planter cannot
be obliged to buy the land if its value is considerably more than that of the building or trees. In such
case, he shall pay reasonable rent, if the owner of the land does not choose to appropriate the
building or trees after proper indemnity. The parties shall agree upon the terms of the lease and in
case of disagreement, the court shall fix the terms thereof.
HEIRS OF SPOUSES RAMIREZ v. ABON
DOCTRINE
Section 109 of PD 1529 also contemplates a situation wherein the petition for reconstitution is filed
by another person having an interest in the property who is not the registered owner. In other
words, when an owner's duplicate certificate of title is lost or destroyed, a person who is a
transferee of the ownership over the property, who is not necessarily the registered owner, may also
file the petition for reconstitution. Similarly, in this situation, the other persons having interest in the
property should be notified of the proceedings. In this situation, the registered owner must also be
duly notified of the proceedings. By his or her very status as registered owner, the latter is an
interested party in the petition for reconstitution case.
HEIRS OF CULLADO v. GUTIERREZ
G.R. No. 212938, July 30, 2019, En Banc (Caguioa, J.)
DOCTRINE
While the RTC could have resolved the issue of ownership provisionally to determine the "better
right of possession," which is allowed in an accion publiciana, it was without any power or
jurisdiction to order the reconveyance of the land in dispute because that can be done only upon a
definitive ruling on the said issue - something that cannot be done in an accion publiciana.
SPOUSES MODOMO v. SPOUSES LAYUG
DOCTRINE
While the Civil Code permits the subsequent modification of existing obligations, these obligations
cannot be deemed modified in the absence of clear evidence to this effect. Novation is never
presumed, and the animus novandi, whether total or partial, must appear by express agreement of
the parties, or by their acts that are too clear and unequivocal to be mistaken. Accordingly, the
burden to show the existence of novation lies on the party alleging the same.
ENGR. RICARDO O. VASQUEZ v. PNB AND NOTARY PUBLIC JUDE* JOSE F. LATORRE, JR.
G.R. No. 228355, 28 August 2019, Second Division (Caguioa, J.)
DOCTRINE
The principle of mutuality of contracts is pronounced in Article 1308 of the Civil Code, which states
that a contract "must bind both contracting parties; its validity or compliance cannot be left to the
will of one of them." The principle of mutuality of contracts dictates that a contract must be
rendered void when the execution of its terms is skewed in favor of one party.
THE MERCANTILE INSURANCE CO., INC. v. DMCI-LAING CONSTRUCTION, INC.
G.R. No. 205007, 16 September 2019, Second Division (Caguioa, J.)
DOCTRINE
Altech's obligation to perform the specified works under the Sub Contract constitutes an obligation
to do. Obligations to do have as their object a prestation consisting of a performance of a certain
activity which, in turn, cannot be exacted without exercising violence against the person of the
debtor. Accordingly, the debtor's failure to fulfill the prestation gives rise to the creditor's right to
obtain from the latter's assets the satisfaction of the money value of the prestation.
ART. 2047. By guaranty a person, called the guarantor, binds himself to the creditor to fulfill
the obligation of the principal debtor in case the latter should fail to do so.
If a person binds himself solidarily with the principal debtor, the provisions of Section 4, Chapter 3,
Title I of this Book shall be observed. In such case the contract is called a suretyship.
Through a contract of suretyship, one party called the surety, guarantees the performance by
another party, called the principal or obligor, of an obligation or undertaking in favor of
another party, called the obligee. As a result, the surety is considered in law as being the same
party as the debtor in relation to whatever is adjudged touching upon the obligation of the
latter, and their liabilities are interwoven as to be inseparable.
While the contract of surety stands secondary to the principal obligation, the surety's liability is
direct, primary and absolute, albeit limited to the amount for which the contract of surety is issued.
The surety's liability attaches the moment a demand for payment is made by the creditor.
ELMER MONTERO v. SANTIAGO MONTERO, JR. AND CHARLIE MONTERO
G.R. No. 217755, 18 September 2019, Second Division (Caguioa, J.)
DOCTRINE
According to jurisprudence, "in a number of cases, the Court has held that actions for reconveyance
of or for cancellation of title to or to quiet title over real property are actions that fall under the
classification of cases that involve title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein."
Hence, the instant case is clearly one involving title to, possession of, and interest in real property.
As the subject matter of petitioner Elmer's Complaint involves title to, possession of, and interest in
real property which indisputably has an assessed value of below P20,000.00, the CA was correct in
finding that the RTC had no jurisdiction to hear, try and decide the case.
CAMARINES SUR TEACHERS AND EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC. v. PROVINCE OF
CAMARINES SUR, REPRESENTED BY GOVERNOR LUIS RAYMUND F. VILLAFUERTE, JR.
G.R. No. 199666, 07 October 2019, Second Division (Caguioa, J.)
DOCTRINE
It must be emphasized that the right to rescind or resolve by the injured party is not absolute as the
third paragraph of Article 1191 authorizes the court to fix a period; thus, rescission will not be
granted in the following cases: (1) where the breach is only slight or casual; (2) where there has
been substantial compliance; and (3) where the court finds valid reason for giving a period of
fulfillment of the obligation. Likewise, the courts may deny revocation of a donation based on non-
fulfillment of "conditions" under Article 764 when the unperformed part is insignificant.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. TANDUAY LUMBER, INC.
G.R. No. 223822, 16 October 2019, Second Division (Caguioa, J.)
DOCTRINE
Clearly, the State's complaint for reversion is based solely on Section 118 of CA 141. Since the
restriction on the conveyance, transfer or disposition of the patented land subject of this case within
five years from and after the issuance of the patent pursuant to Section 118 of CA 141 has been
removed and the title of the patentee Epifania San Pedro is, under RA 11231, now considered as title
in fee simple, which is not subject to any restriction on alienation or encumbrance, the Government
no longer has any legal basis to seek the reversion or reconveyance of the subject land.
CHUA PING HIAN ALSO KNOWN AS JIMMY CHING v. SILVERIO MANAS (DECEASED),
SUBSTITUTED BY HIS HEIRS
DOCTRINE
In a reciprocal obligation, the performance of one is conditioned on the simultaneous fulfillment of
the other obligation. Neither party incurs in delay if the other does not comply or is not ready to
comply in a manner with what is incumbent upon him. In the instant case, it is not of serious dispute
that respondent Manas reneged on his obligations as seller, justifying petitioner Ching's refusal to
pay the balance of the purchase price.
PABLO UY, as substituted by his heirs, namely: MYLENE D. UY, PAUL D. UY and PAMELA
UY DACUMA v. HEIRS OF JULITA UY-RENALES
G.R. No. 227460, December 5, 2019, First Division (Caguioa, J.)
DOCTRINE
The notarization of a document does not guarantee its validity because it is not the function of the
notary public to validate an instrument that was never intended by the parties to have any binding
legal effect. Neither is the notarization of a document conclusive as to the nature of the transaction,
nor is it conclusive of the true agreement of the parties thereto.
ATTY. LEONARD FLORENT BULATAO v. ZENAIDA ESTONACTOC
DOCTRINE
A 5% per month or 60% per annum interest rate is highly iniquitous and unreasonable. However, the
invalidity of the 5% per month interest rate does not affect the obligation of the debtor to repay her
loan. Since the obligation of making interest payments is illegal and thus non-demandable, the
payment of the principal loan obligation was not yet demandable. With the debtor not being in a
state of default, the foreclosure of the subject properties should not have proceeded.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. SPOUSES MARCELINO AND NENITA BUNSAY
DOCTRINE
Capital Gains Tax and other transfer taxes may not be awarded in the form of consequential
damages since the term assumes a fixed definition in the context of expropriation proceedings; it
is limited to the impairment or decrease in value of the portion which remains with the affected
owner after expropriation. It must be clarified, however, that the courts are not precluded from
considering the value of CGT and other transfer taxes in determining the amount of just
compensation to be awarded to the affected owner.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. REMAR QUIÑONEZ
G.R. No. 237412, January 6, 2020, First Division (Caguioa, J.)
DOCTRINE
Article 41 of the Family Code places upon the present spouse the burden of proving the additional
and more stringent requirement of "well-founded belief" which can only be discharged upon a
showing of proper and honest-to-goodness inquiries and efforts to ascertain not only the absent
spouse's whereabouts but, more importantly, that the absent spouse is still alive or is already
dead.
To be able to comply with this requirement, the present spouse must prove that his/her belief was
the result of diligent and reasonable efforts and inquiries to locate the absent spouse and that
based on these efforts and inquiries, he/she believes that under the circumstances, the absent
spouse is already dead. It requires exertion of active effort (not a mere passive one).
Article 41 of the Family Code provides the requirements for a declaration of presumptive
death. Culled from this provision, the essential requisites for a declaration of presumptive
death for the purpose of remarriage are:
1. That the absent spouse has been missing for four consecutive years, or two consecutive years
if the disappearance occurred where there is danger of death under the circumstances laid
down in Article 391, Civil Code;
2. That the present spouse wishes to remarry;
3. That the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the absentee is dead; and
4. That the present spouse files a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive
death of the absentee.
RICARIDO GOLEZ, in his own behalf and his children, in substitution of the deceased
PRESENTACION GOLEZ v. MARIANO ABAIS
DOCTRINE
Under MC 19, while the succession or transfer of farmholdings granted under PD 27 recognized the
pertinent provisions of the Civil Code on succession, such was subject to certain limitations.
Accordingly, even as the successional rights of the original farmer-beneficiary were recognized, MC
19 prescribed the manner through which the succeeding sole owner-cultivator should be identified.
THE HEIRS OF MARSELLA LUPENA v. PASTORA MEDINA et al.

DOCTRINE
Under paragraph "d" of Section 4.3 of the Revised Manual for Land Surveying Regulations in the
Philippines, a geodetic engineer, in the conduct of relocation survey, must indicate in his plan the
positions of buildings, fences wall and other permanent improvements adversely affected by the
determination of the boundaries. Absent indication in the Relocation Plan of any encroachment, the
same cannot be considered as competent proof that the lot was unlawfully occupied.
DANILO ROMERO et al. v. CRISPINA SOMBRINO
DOCTRINE
Security of tenure may be invoked only by tenants de jure and not by those who are not true and
lawful tenants but became so only through the acts of a supposed landholder who had no right to
the landholdings. Tenancy relation can only be created with the consent of the landholder who is
either the owner, lessee, usufructuary or legal possessor of the land.
CYNTHIA A. GALAPON v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 243722 (formerly UDK-16060), January 22, 2020, First Division (Caguioa, J.)
DOCTRINE
Article 26 (2) of the Family Code applies to mixed marriages where the divorce decree is: (i) obtained
by the foreign spouse; (ii) obtained jointly by the Filipino and foreign spouse; and (iii) obtained
solely by the Filipino spouse.
REDENTOR CATAPANG et al. v. LIPA BANK
DOCTRINE
Article 1332 of the Civil Code shifts the burden of proof from the party alleging the mistake to the
party enforcing the contract. It also alters the rule that a party is presumed to know the meaning of
a document which he signed. Hence, if one of the parties is unable to read or if the contract is in a
language not understood by him, and he alleges fraud or mistake, the burden of proving that the
terms of the contract have been fully explained to the former is shifted to the person enforcing the
contract. If this burden is not satisfied, the presumption of mistake or fraud stands unrebutted.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JULIANA SAN MIGUEL VDA. DE RAMOS et al.
G.R. No. 211576, February 19, 2020, First Division (Caguioa, J.)
DOCTRINE
The sheer fact that there is a remaining portion of real property after the expropriation is not
enough, by and of itself, to be basis for the award of consequential damages. To be sure, it must still
be proven by sufficient evidence that the remaining portion suffers from an impairment or decrease
in value.
PHILIPPINE BANK OF COMMUNICATIONS v. THE REGISTER OF DEEDS FOR THE
PROVINCE OF BENGUET
G.R. No. 222958, March 11, 2020, First Division (Caguioa, J.)
DOCTRINE
A registered owner who fails to prove the loss or destruction of his/her owner's duplicate certificate
of title may not be barred from refiling a new petition to replace the same.
MERCEDES GATMAYTAN v. MISIBIS LAND, INC.
G.R. No. 222166, June 10, 2020, First Division (Caguioa, J.)
DOCTRINE
In all cases of registration procured by fraud, the owner may pursue all his legal and equitable
remedies against the parties to such fraud and that registration procured by the presentation of a
forged deed or other instrument shall be null and void. A Torrens title issued without prior
presentation and cancellation of the existing owner's duplicate title does not bind the property to
which it pertains. The title so issued does not produce the effects of a Torrens title contemplated
under PD 1529, including the effects of constructive notice. It is literally a scrap of paper.
THE ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP OF MALOLOS, INC. v. THE HEIRS OF MARIANO MARCOS
DOCTRINE
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, in and of itself, is grounded on practical
reasons, including allowing the administrative agencies concerned to take every opportunity to
correct its own errors, as well as affording the litigants the opportunity to avail of speedy relief
through the administrative processes and sparing them of the laborious and costly resort to courts.
However, this principle is not inflexible, and admits of several exceptions that include situations
where the very rationale of the doctrine has been defeated.
NIEVES SELERIO et al. v. TREGIDIO BANCASAN
DOCTRINE
Article 1144 must be read in conjunction with Article 1155 of the Civil Code. Article 1155 states that
"[t]he prescription of actions is interrupted when they are filed before the court, when there is a
written extrajudicial demand by the creditors, and when there is any written acknowledgment of the
debt by the debtor." Jurisprudence holds that an interruption of the prescriptive period wipes out
the period that has elapsed, sets the same running anew, and creates a fresh period for the filing of
an action. Thus, in Republic v. Bañez, the Court held that a written acknowledgment of a debt by the
debtor effectively restarts the prescriptive period.
USUSAN DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 209462, July 15, 2020, First Division (Caguioa, J.)
DOCTRINE
The burden to prove a property's alienable and disposable classification rests with the petitioner.
The CA found that petitioner was unable to do so. Not being a trier of facts and with no additional
evidence presented by petitioner to refute the CA's factual finding in respect of the three documents
that it submitted for the CA's consideration to convince the CA that the subject lot has indeed been
classified as AnD land of public domain, the Court is left with no option but to deny its Petition.
SPS. ANASTACIO SR v. HEIRS OF COLOMA
G.R. No. 224572, August 27, 2020, First Division (Caguioa, J.)
DOCTRINE
A rebuttable presumption is established in Article 116 of the Family Code and the party who invokes
that presumption must first establish that the property was acquired during the marriage because
the proof of acquisition during the marriage is a condition sine qua non for the operation of the
presumption in favor of the conjugal partnership. It is not necessary to prove that the property was
acquired with conjugal funds and the presumption still applies even when the manner in which the
property was acquired does not appear. Once the condition sine qua non is established, then the
presumption that all properties acquired during the marriage, whether the acquisition appears to
have been made, contracted or registered in the name of one spouse or both spouses, are conjugal,
remains until the contrary is proved.
TIROL v. NOLASCO
G.R. No. 230103, August 27, 2020, First Division (Caguioa, J.)
DOCTRINE
As far as respondent Sol is concerned, she would inherit from Roberto Jr. pursuant to Article 887(3)
and part of his estate would be his share in the estate of her mother, Gloria. Respondent Sol could
not inherit from the estate of Roberto Sr. because Roberto Jr. predeceased Roberto Sr., his father,
and the children of Roberto Jr. would succeed by right of representation from their grandfather
pursuant to Article 972 of the Civil Code. Moreover, respondent Sol is not related by blood, but only
by affinity, to Roberto Sr.
ART. 887. The following are compulsory heirs:
(1) Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to their legitimate parents and ascendants;
(2) In default of the foregoing, legitimate parents and ascendants, with respect to their legitimate
children and descendants;
(3) The widow or widower;
(4) Acknowledged natural children, and natural children by legal fiction;
(5) Other illegitimate children referred to in Article 287.
DR. NIXON L. TREYES v. ANTONIO L. LARLAR, REV. FR. EMILIO L. LARLAR, et.al.
G.R. No. 232579, September 8, 2020, En Banc (Caguioa, J.)
DOCTRINE
Article 777 of the Civil Code states that the rights of succession are transmitted from the moment of
the death of the decedent. The operation of Article 777 occurs at the very moment of the decedent's
death – the transmission by succession occurs at the precise moment of death and, therefore, the
heir is legally deemed to have acquired ownership of his/her share in the inheritance at that very
moment, and not at the time of declaration of heirs, or partition, or distribution.
YON MITORI INTERNATIONAL INDUSTRIES v. UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 225538, October 14, 2020, First Division (Caguioa, J.)
DOCTRINE
For the principle of unjust enrichment to apply, the following requisites must concur: (i) a person is
unjustly benefited; and (ii) such benefit is derived at the expense of or with damages to another.
Moreover, to substantiate a claim for unjust enrichment, the claimant must unequivocally prove
that another party knowingly received something of value to which he was not entitled and that the
state of affairs are such that it would be unjust for the person to keep the benefit.
TAMAYAO v. LACAMBRA
G.R. No. 244232, November 3, 2020, First Division (Caguioa, J.)
DOCTRINE
The provision contemplates a case of double or multiple sales by a single vendor. More specifically,
it covers a situation where a single vendor sold one and the same immovable property to two or
more buyers. According to a noted civil law author, it is necessary that the conveyance must have
been made by a party who has an existing right in the thing and the power to dispose of it. It cannot
be invoked where the two different contracts of sale are made by two different persons, one of them
not being the owner of the property sold. And even if the sale was made by the same person, if the
second sale was made when such person was no longer the owner of the property, because it had
been acquired by the first purchaser in full dominion, the second purchaser cannot acquire any right.
Art. 1544. If the same thing should have been sold to different vendees, the ownership shall be
transferred to the person who may have first taken possession thereof in good faith, if it should be
movable property.
Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall belong to the person acquiring it who in
good faith first recorded it in the Registry of Property.
Should there be no inscription, the ownership shall pertain to the person who in good faith was first
in the possession; and, in the absence thereof, to the person who presents the oldest title, provided
there is good faith.
BERNARDO v. FERNANDO
G.R. No. 211034, November 18, 2020, First Division (Caguioa, J.)
DOCTRINE
The law requires that every reasonable presumption leans towards legitimacy, and establishes
the status of a child from the moment of his birth. In case of the need to prove filiation, the same
may only be raised in a direct and separate action instituted to prove the filiation of the child.
Relatedly, as provided by Article 173 of the Family Code, an action to claim legitimate filiation is
strictly personal to the child whose filiation is in question, and he or she may exercise such
anytime within his lifetime. The only three instances when such right passes to the child's heirs
are: (1) when the child dies during minority; (2) when the child dies in a state of insanity; or (3)
when the child dies after the commencement of the action.
A birth certificate, being a public document, is an important piece of evidence, and offers prima
facie evidence of filiation in accordance with the rule that entries in official records made in the
performance of the duties of a public officer are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated.
However, as the Court has held in several cases, for a birth certificate to prove paternity, it must be
shown that the putative father had a hand in its preparation.
MACUTAY v. SAMOY
DOCTRINE
As to accion publiciana, this is an ordinary civil proceeding to determine the better right of
possession of real property independently of title. It also refers to an ejectment suit filed after the
expiration of one year from the accrual of the cause of action or from the unlawful withholding of
possession of the real property. The issue in an accion publiciana is the "better right of possession"
of real property independently of title. This "better right of possession" may or may not proceed
from a Torrens title.
While there is no express grant in the Rules of Court that the court wherein an accion publiciana is
lodged can provisionally resolve the issue of ownership, there is ample jurisprudential support for
upholding the power of a court hearing an accion publiciana to also rule on the issue of ownership.
This adjudication is not a final determination of the issue of ownership; it is only for the purpose of
resolving the issue of possession, where the issue of ownership is inseparably linked to the issue of
possession.
The allegations in the RTC Complaint shows that the case instituted by Nicasio was one of Accion
Publiciana. The three usual actions to recover possession of real property are: (1) Accion interdictal
or a summary ejectment proceeding, which may be either for forcible entry (detentacion) or
unlawful detainer (desahucio), for the recovery of physical or material possession (possession de
facto) where the dispossession has not lasted for more than one year, and should be brought in the
proper inferior court; (2) Accion publiciana or the plenary action to recover the better right of
possession (possession de jure), which should be brought in the proper inferior court or RTC
(depending upon the value of the property) when the dispossession has lasted for more than one
year (or for less than a year in cases other than those mentioned in Rule 70 of the ROC); and (3)
Accion reivindicatoria or accion de reivindicacion or reivindicatory action, which is an action for
recovery of ownership which must be brought in the proper inferior court or RTC (depending upon
the value of the property).
HEIRS OF CABURNAY v. HEIRS OF SISON
DOCTRINE
When Perpetua died, the conjugal partnership between her and Teodulo was terminated
pursuant to Article 126 (1) of the Family Code. With Perpetua's death, the liquidation of the
conjugal partnership between her and Teodulo should have ensued. In many instances, however,
the surviving spouse and the heirs of the deceased spouse do not liquidate the conjugal properties
and they keep them undivided. In such case, a co-ownership is deemed established for the
management, control and enjoyment of the common property. Since the conjugal partnership no
longer subsists, the fruits of the common property are divided according to the law on co-
ownership; that is, in proportion to the share or interest of each party.
Given that complete separation of property governed the subsequent marriage of Teodulo and
Perla, the 9/16 undivided share or interest in the subject property of Teodulo belonged to him and
remained with him as his separate property when he married Perla. Thus, he could have disposed of
this without need of consent from Perla. However, this disposition or encumbrance is valid only to
the extent of the share or interest of the surviving spouse in the terminated marriage property, and
cannot in no way bind the shares or interests therein of the other heirs of the deceased spouse.
HEIRS OF VILLEZA v. ALIANGAN

G.R. No. 244667-69, December 2, 2020, First Division (Caguioa, J.)
DOCTRINE
The provision where the seller agrees to execute a deed of absolute sale when the buyer has paid in
full the purchase price has been construed by the Court to signify that the seller has withheld the
transfer of ownership until the purchase price has been paid in full, making the agreement between
the seller and the buyer a contract to sell and not a contract of sale. The aforecited stipulation
shows that the vendors reserved title to the subject property until full payment of the purchase
price.
MARASIGAN, JR v. PROVINCIAL AGRARIAN REFORM OFFICCER
DOCTRINE
Under R.A. No. 6657, the Land Bank of the Philippines is charged with the preliminary determination
of the value of lands placed under land reform program and the compensation to be paid for their
taking. Within 30 days from receipt of notice, the landowner shall inform the DAR of his acceptance
or rejection of the offer. In the event the landowner rejects the offer, a summary administrative
proceeding is held by the provincial (PARAD), the regional (RARAD) or the central (DARAB)
adjudicator, as the case may be, depending on the value of the land, for the purpose of determining
the compensation for the land. The landowner, the Land Bank, and other interested parties are then
required to submit evidence as to the just compensation for the land. The DAR adjudicator decides
the case within 30 days after it is submitted for decision. If the landowner finds the price
unsatisfactory, he may bring the matter directly to the appropriate Regional Trial Court.
Spouses Gaspar v. Herminio Angel E. Disini, Jr.
G.R. No. 239644. February 3, 2021, First Division (Caguioa, J.)
DOCTRINE
By filing a third-party complaint against Yu for the purpose of seeking reimbursement of the
purchase price they had paid for the subject Pajero, Spouses Gaspar effectively sought to declare the
COS null and void ab initio and recover what they had given on account of said void COS. The third-
party complaint thus assumes the nature of an action to declare the inexistence of a contract
which does not prescribe.
By the contract of sale, one of the contracting parties obligates himself or herself to transfer the
ownership of and to deliver a determinate thing, and the other to pay therefor a price certain in
money or its equivalent. In turn, the elements of a valid contract of sale are: (i) consent or meeting
of the minds; (ii) determinate subject matter; and (iii) price certain in money or its equivalent. With
respect to the second element, it is further required that the thing which is the subject matter of
the contract must be licit, and that the vendor must have a right to transfer the ownership thereof
at the time it is delivered.
SPOUSES CUENO vs. SPOUSES BAUTISTA
G.R. No. 246445. March 2, 2021, Division, Caguioa, J.:
DOCTRINE
All dispositions, alienations or encumbrances of conjugal real property acquired after the effectivity
of the New Civil Code needs the consent of the wife. Also, all donations of real or personal property
require the consent of the wife except those to the common children for securing their future or
finishing a career, and moderate donations for charity. But should the wife refuse unreasonably to
give her consent, the court may compel her to grant the same.
JESUS E. ULAY v. MARANGUYOD BUSTAMANTE
G.R. No. 231721-22, March 18, 2021, First Division (Caguioa, J.)
DOCTRINE
Prior to partition, a sale of a definite portion of a common property requires the consent of all co-
owners because it operates to partition the land with respect to the co-owner selling his or her
specific share therein. Operatively, a co-owner is an owner of the whole and over the whole he
exercises the right of dominion, but he is at the same time the owner of a portion which is truly
abstract.
CONSTANTINO Y. BELIZARIO v. DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL
RESOURCES AND THE REGISTRY OF DEEDS OF NASUGBU, BATANGAS
DOCTRINE
The well-settled doctrine is that indefeasibility of a title does not attach to titles issued pursuant to
patents that have been secured by fraud or misrepresentation inasmuch as the registration of a
patent under the Torrens system is not a mode of acquiring ownership and does not by itself vest
title; but it merely confirms the registrant's already existing one. The certificates of title registered in
the names of petitioners not being indefeasible can be ordered cancelled.
NICXON L. PEREZ, JR. v. AVEGAIL PEREZ-SENERPIDA, ASSISTED BY HER HUSBAND MR.
SENERPIDA
DOCTRINE
However, Article 493 of the Civil Code cannot supersede, and must yield to, Article 147 of the Family
Code, which expressly mandates that: "Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of
his or her share in the property acquired during cohabitation and owned in common, without the
consent of the other, until after the termination of their cohabitation.
FRANCIS LUIGI G. SANTOS v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 250520, May 5,
2021, First Division (Caguioa, J.)
DOCTRINE
It must be stressed once again that a change of name is a privilege not a matter of right, addressed
to the sound discretion of the court which has the duty to consider carefully the consequences of a
change of name and to deny the same unless weighty reasons are shown. Before a person can be
authorized to change his name, that is, his true or official name or that which appears in his birth
certificate or is entered in the civil register, he must show proper and reasonable cause or any
convincing reason which may justify such change.
REPUBLIC v. MANANSALA
G.R. No. 241890, May 3, 2021, First Division (Caguioa, J.)
DOCTRINE
The established legal principle in actions involving land registration is that a party must prove its
allegations not merely by a preponderance of evidence, but by clear and convincing evidence.
Evidence is clear and convincing if it produces in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or
conviction as to the allegation sought to be established. It is indeterminate, being more than
preponderance, but not to the extent of such certainty as is required beyond reasonable doubt in
criminal cases. Appropriately, this is the standard of proof that is required in reconstitution
proceedings.
Reconstitution is the restoration of the instrument or title allegedly lost or destroyed in its original
form and condition. Its only purpose is to have the title reproduced, after observing the procedure
prescribed by law, in the same form they were when the loss or destruction occurred. The process
involves diligent circumspect evaluation of the authenticity and relevance of all the evidence
presented for fear of the chilling consequences of mistakenly issuing a reconstituted title when in
fact the original is not truly lost or destroyed, or when an original title does not even exist in the
name of the petitioner or the person from whom the petitioner derives his purported claim or right.
SPOUSES ROLANDO AND CYNTHIA RODRIGUEZ v. EXPORT AND INDUSTRY BANK, INC.
DOCTRINE
Without a prior valid demand, the mortgagee-creditor's resort to extra-judicial foreclosure is
premature and thus, void. For the creditor's demand to be considered valid, it must: (i) specifically
relate to the obligation that is due and demandable; and (ii) fully apprise the debtor of the amount
due to the creditor, including any accrued interest and penalties imposed on the obligation. It
follows that an incomplete demand, or one that leaves the debtor unable to make a valid payment,
is ineffective and is insufficient for the purpose of rendering the debtor in default of the obligation.
TAN v. MALAYAN LEASING AND FINANCE CORP.
DOCTRINE
Although the suretyship itself is a contract that is ancillary to the main financial accommodation
contract between the principal and the creditor, what sets the surety apart from a mere guaranty is
that in a suretyship, the surety is principally liable, as opposed to a guarantor who is only
secondarily liable. So much so that with a suretyship agreement securing the loan transaction, a
creditor may go directly against the surety even without a prior demand on the principal debtor,
although the latter may be solvent or otherwise able to pay. A surety's liability stands irrespective of
the principal debtor's ability to perform his obligations under the contract which is subject of the
suretyship.
REPUBLIC v. VILLACORTA
DOCTRINE
Article 45(3) of the Family Code provides that a marriage may be annulled for any of the
following causes, existing at the time of the marriage: xxx (3) That the consent of either party was
obtained by fraud, unless such party afterwards, with full knowledge of the facts constituting the
fraud, freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife."
To constitute fraud that warrants annulment under Article 46(2): 1) the wife must have been
pregnant by a man other than her husband at the time of the marriage and 2) the wife must have
fraudulently concealed the same.
HEIRS OF HENRY LEUNG, REPRESENTED BY HIS WIDOW, MARILYN LEUNG v. HEIRS OF
MIGUEL MADIO, REPRESENTED BY EDDIE MADIO
G.R. No. 224991, June 23, 2021 (Caguioa, J.)
DOCTRINE
According to Section 24, CA 141, “the Director of Lands shall announce the sale thereof by
publishing the proper notice once a week for six consecutive weeks in the Official Gazette, and in
two newspapers one published in Manila and the other published in the municipality or in the
province where the lands are located, or in a neighboring province, and the same notice shall be
posted on the bulletin board of the Bureau of Lands in Manila, and in the most conspicuous place in
the provincial building and the municipal building of the province and municipality, respectively,
where the land is located”.
By: Atty. Jumrani

1. Declaration of Presumptive Death (Art. 41 F.C.)
• • Possible Question: Requisites – what to prove by the present spouse to prove

presumptively dead ang missing spouse.
Remember: Judicial Declaration of presumptive death is only needed for the purposes of
remarriage. The Judicial action is not required for any other purpose.
2. Psychological Incapacity (Art. 36, F.C.)
• • Tan-Andal vs. Andal Case

• • Possible Question: Can it be considered as Psychology Incapacity?
• • Husband is drug addict, lazy, and abusive to children. There is evidence of a personality
disorder tracing back to childhood
• • Parents and siblings testify but there is no medical expert testimony.
Remember: Psychological Incapacity is not a medical concept but a legal concept. The court can
conclude that the concern spouse is psychological incapacitated based on the totality of evidence.
3. Human Relations and Abuse of Right (Art. 19 CC)
• • Possible Question: if there is an abuse of right

• • Example: Applicant will question the decision. Applicant contest that the one who is being
accepted is not qualified.
Remember: Essential requirement of Abuse of Right is malice. Look for Malice in the situation.
4. Succession (Art. 776-777 CC)
• Possible Question: Validity of sale by an heir from his/her deceased father, this was made before
the partition of the property.
Remember: Heir acquire rites from the moment of death. In this case, the delivery of the property
including the titles to the property will be made only after the property had been adjudicated to the
seller. Valid but conditional. sannieremotin #Caguiwarrior2022
5. Reciprocal Obligations (Art. 1169, Par. 3, CC)
• • Possible Question: Liability of Damages due to delay in the performance of an obligation

• • What contract? Possible contract of Sale, but there is a delay of payment because seller
did not pay on time.
Remember: In reciprocal obligations, neither party incurs delay if the other does not comply or is
not ready to comply what is incumbent upon him or her.
6. Distinction between Rescissible and Void Contracts
• • Possible Question: Debtor sold its property to an affiliate or associate so that creditor will
not go after it. Debtor has no intention to convey or give up the property.
Remember: When the contract is simulated it is void. Void Contract not Rescissible Contract.
7. Notarized Deed of Sale
• • Possible Question: Situation: Seller and Buyer did not appear to a notary public
Remember: An irregularly notarized deed of sale does not give rise to a presumption of a valid
contract. There must be prove of an actual sale with all the essential requisite present.
8. Equitable Mortgage
• • Possible Question: Situation: Debtor made the house as collateral. Contract is Deed of Sale
with right of repurchase. (Treated as Equitable Mortgage)
• • Question: Up to when can the property be redeemed even it has a period of repurchase in
the document?
Remember: Applicable period to redeem the property in an equitable mortgage is 10 years. Before
the period ends the remedy of the debtor is foreclosure of the property, it cannot be owned
because that will be a pactum commissorium. sannieremotin #Caguiwarrior2022
9. Void Interest Rate
• • Possible Question: High Interest Rate. Will it be valid since it has been agreed upon by
both parties?
Remember: Willingness or voluntariness of the parties does not make a valid stipulated interest
which is excessive uncontrollable or exorbitant.
10. Solidary Guarantor
• • Possible Question: A guarantor who allowed direct recourse against him.

Remember: A guarantor who engages to directly shoulder the debt of the debtor waiving the
benefit of excaution and the requirement of prior presentment demand protest or notice of any
kind undoubtedly makes himself/ herself solidary liable to the creditor.
11. Contract of Carriage
• • Possible Question: Vehicular accident and one of the passengers got amputated and the
victim sued the operator and the driver of the jeepney based on Contract of Carriage.
Remember: Only the operator not the driver is liable to the injured passenger in a claim for a
breach of contract of carriage.
12. Co-ownership (Art. 493, CC)
• • Possible Question: Co-owned property mortgage to a co-owner without the consent of the
co-owner, is it valid?
Remember: A co-owner is the owner only of undivided interest in co-ownership. The co-owner can
only mortgage his undivided interest but not the whole interest or property.
13. Donations
• • Possible Question: A donated property with a condition to build a building by the donee
and cannot be sold, mortgage or encumber. The building was built but the lower portion of the
ground floor was being rented. Can the donation be revoked?
Remember: Revocation of conditional donation must comply with requisites of rescission. It should
be substantial breach not trivial or insignificant. sannieremotin #Caguiwarrior2022
14. Easement of Light and View
• • Possible Question: Property acquired with a house and the vacant lot adjacent to it was
owned by the seller who sold the property. Then, on the adjacent lot the owner built a house 2
meters from the sold property.
Remember: Whenever by any title a right has been acquired to have direct views overlooking an
adjoining property. The owners of the sorbet estate cannot build their own at less than a distance
of 3 meters.
15. Builder-Planter-Sower
• • Possible Question: Between two siblings, (MARA and CLARA). Mara (owner of the land)
allowed Clara to build a house over the land, now Mara wants to recover the land. Clara, contest
that she should be paid by the expenses of the house that she builds.
Remember: When both of the landowner and the builder are in bad faith, they shall be treated in
good faith. Article 448 shall apply.
16. Sale of a land obtain thru free patent
• • Possible Question: Free patent, the property was sold in less than 5 years by the patentee.
It is illegal according to Commonwealth Act 141.
Remember: Sale of land obtained thru free patent within 5 years from the issuance of the free
patent is no longer prohibited under RA 11231 and this has retro active effect.
17. Reversion
• • Possible Question: A land that was allegedly acquired fraudulently, the original registered
owner is not qualified. The government file an action for reversion but it’s been a long time, the
property has already title and property has acquired by another owner.
Remember: For reversion to be barred, two (2) conditions must be met. 1. Equitable laches and 2.
Convincing Proof that the present owner is an innocent purchaser for value. The present owner
must prove the neglect and inaction on the part of the state to recover the property and the fact
that the present owner has no knowledge or notice of defect in his/her title. sannieremotin
#Caguiwarrior2022

Republic V

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REPUBLIC v.

CAPITAL RESOURCES CORPORATION

A compromise intended to resolve a matter under litigation is referred to as a judicial compromise.

mortgage, in any of the following cases:

(2) When the vendor remains in possession as lessee or otherwise;

extending the period of redemption or granting a new period is executed;

The presumption of sufficient consideration can be overcome by preponderance of evidence and

THE HEIRS OF MARSELLA LUPENA v. PASTORA MEDINA et al.

HEIRS OF VILLEZA v. ALIANGAN

By: Atty. Jumrani

• • Possible Question: Requisites – what to prove by the present spouse to prove

• • Tan-Andal vs. Andal Case

• • Possible Question: if there is an abuse of right

• • Possible Question: Liability of Damages due to delay in the performance of an obligation

9. Void Interest Rate

• • Possible Question: A guarantor who allowed direct recourse against him.

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