99

CHAPTER VI

The Duty Not to ‘Recognize as Lawful’ a Situation

Created by the Illegal Use of Force or Other
Serious Breaches of a Jus Cogens Obligation:
An Obligation without Real Substance?
STEFAN TALMON

I. INTRODUCTION

1) The Articles of the International Law Commission (ILC) on the Re-

Jus cogens.
sponsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (ILC Articles on
State Responsibility) provide in Art. 41(2) that ‘no State shall recognize as
lawful a situation created by a serious breach’ of an obligation arising under
a peremptory norm of general international law.1 A peremptory norm of
general international law (jus cogens) is defined as a norm which is accepted
and recognized by the international community of States as a whole as a
norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified
only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same
character.2 The ILC identified as jus cogens the prohibition of aggression
and the illegal use of force, the prohibitions against slavery and the slave
trade, genocide and racial discrimination and apartheid, the prohibition
against torture, the basic rules of international humanitarian law and the
right of self-determination.3 The following norms have been added to these:

1
General Assembly Resolution 56/83 (2001), 12 December 2001, Annex. The General
Assembly took note of the articles and commended them to the attention of Governments
without prejudice to the question of their future adoption or other appropriate action (ibid.,
para. 3).
2
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), 23 May 1969 (1155 UNTS 331),
Art. 53.
3
Report of the International Law Commission, 53rd Session, GAOR, 56th Session, Supp.
No. 10 (A/56/10), 2001, pp. 283-284, paras. 4,5.
100 Stefan Talmon

the prohibition of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment 4 and crimes

against humanity, the prohibition of piracy, and the principle of permanent
sovereignty over natural resources.5 The German Constitutional Court con-
sidered even the ‘basic rules for the protection of the environment’ as form-
ing part of jus cogens.6
The obligation of non-recognition as laid down in the ILC Articles re-
cently gained prominence in the advisory opinion of the International Court
of Justice (ICJ) on the Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (2004).7
The Court advised that the construction of the wall being built by Israel, the
occupying power, in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including in and
around East Jerusalem, and its associated regime, were contrary to interna-
tional law. It held that Israel had violated certain obligations erga omnes in-
cluding the obligation to respect the right of the Palestinian people to self-
determination, certain rules of humanitarian law applicable in armed con-
flict which are fundamental to the respect of the human person and elemen-
tary considerations of humanity, and Art. 1 common to the four Geneva
Conventions.8 The Court then stated:
‘Given the character and the importance of the rights and obligations
involved, the Court is of the view that all States are under an obligation
not to recognize the illegal situation resulting from the construction of
the wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including in and around
East Jerusalem. They are also under an obligation not to render aid or
assistance in maintaining the situation created by such construction.’9

4
German Federal Constitutional Court, 2nd Chamber, Order of 24 June 2003, 2 BvR
685/03, BVerfGE 108, p. 129, at para. 67.
5
See e.g. Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, 6th edn., Oxford 2003, p.
489.
6
Order of the German Federal Constitutional Court of 26 October 2004, 2 BvR 955/00,
Deutsches Verwaltungsblatt 2005, pp. 175-183, at p. 178 (translation supplied).
7
Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Terri-
tory, ICJ Reports 2004 (hereinafter Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory), available at
<www.icj-cij.org>.
8
Ibid., paras. 155-158.
9
Ibid., para. 159. See also the written statement by France to the ICJ, dated 30 January:
‘Since it is internationally wrongful, the act of constructing the wall on the Occupied Palestin-
ian Territory also entails legal consequences for third States and international organizations.
Inter alia, they are under an obligation not to recognize as lawful the situation created by the
route taken by this wall.’ The statement is available at <http://www.icj-cij.org>.
 An Obligation without Real Substance? 101

This was the second time that the ICJ had found that States were under
an obligation not to recognize an illegal situation. In the Namibia advisory
opinion of 1971, the Court held that the presence of South Africa in Na-
mibia was illegal and that States Members of the United Nations were under
an obligation to refrain from any act and in particular any dealings with the
Government of South Africa implying the recognition of the legality of
South Africa’s presence and administration.10
State practice also knows of numerous examples of collective non-
recognition of situations created by a serious breach of the prohibition of the
use of force and other jus cogens obligations. For example, on 11 March
1932, in the wake of the Manchurian conflict between Japan and China, the
Assembly of the League of Nations declared that ‘it is incumbent upon the
members of the League of Nations not to recognize any situation, treaty or
agreement which may be brought about by means contrary to the Covenant
of the League of Nations or to the Pact of Paris.’11 The political organs of the
United Nations have frequently called upon States not to recognize illegal
States such as Rhodesia, the South African Bantustans and the Turkish Re-
public of Northern Cyprus,12 the annexation of territory,13 governments in-

10
Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia
(South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), ICJ Reports
1971, p. 16 (hereinafter Namibia).
11
LNOJ, Spec. Supp. No. 101, 1932, pp. 87-88. On the collective non-recognition of
Manchukuo, see David Turns, ‘The Stimson Doctrine of Non-Recognition: Its Historical
Genesis and Influence on Contemporary International Law’, Chinese Journal of International
Law 2 (2003), 105-143; Stefan Talmon, Kollektive Nichtanerkennung illegaler Staaten, Tübin-
gen 2006 (forthcoming), ch. 2.I.
12
There is ample literature on the question of non-recognition of new States created by a
violation of jus cogens: see John Dugard, Recognition and the United Nations, Cambridge
1987, pp. 123-163; Vera Gowlland-Debbas, Collective Responses to Illegal Acts in Interna-
tional Law, Dordrecht 1990; Heike Krieger, Das Effektivitätsprinzip im Völkerrecht, Berlin
2000, pp. 176-256; Talmon, op. cit. (note 11), ch. 1-3.
13
See e.g. Commission of Human Rights resolution 2005/8, 14 April 2005, para. 5 (non-
recognition of the Israeli annexation of the Syrian Golan Heights), Security Council resolu-
tion 478 (1980), 2 August 1980, para. 5 (non-recognition of the Israeli annexation of East
Jerusalem); Security Council resolution 662 (1990), 9 August 1990, para. 2 (non-recognition
of the Iraqi annexation of Kuwait).
102 Stefan Talmon

stalled by a foreign illegal occupying power,14 the legality of the presence and
administration of an occupying power,15 and even the result of elections.16
2) In the advisory opinion on the Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Ter-
ritory, the ICJ confirmed that the obligation ‘not to recognize as legal’ terri-
torial acquisitions resulting from the threat of use of force reflects customary
international law.17 This finding is supported by a long list of declarations
and instruments to this effect, starting in 1949 with the Draft Declaration on
the Rights and Duties of States which provided in Art. 11 that ‘every State
has the duty to refrain from recognizing any territorial acquisition by an-
other State’ in violation of the prohibition of the threat or use of force.18 In
1964, the Second Conference of Heads of State and Government meeting in
Cairo stated in a Declaration on Peaceful Coexistence and the Codification
of its Principles by the United Nations that ‘States must abstain from all use
or threat of force directed against the territorial integrity and political inde-
pendence of other States; a situation brought about by the threat or use of
force shall not be recognized.’19 The obligation ‘not to recognize as legal’ the
acquisition or occupation of territory resulting from aggression or the threat
or use of force was also included in the 1970 Declaration on Principles of
International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among
States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations (Friendly Rela-
tions Declaration), the 1970 Declaration on the Strengthening of Interna-
tional Security, the 1974 Definition of Aggression, the 1975 Helsinki Final
Act of the Conference of Security and Co-operation in Europe, and the 1987

14
See e.g. Security Council Resolution 661 (1990), 6 August 1990, para. 9(b) (non-
recognition of any regime set up by the occupying power); Presidential Statement of 3 May
1985 (non-recognition of interim government in illegally occupied Namibia).
15
See e.g. Security Council Resolution 283 (1970), 29 July 1970, paras. 1, 2 (non-
recognition of South African presence in Namibia).
16
See e.g. Security Council Resolutions 554 (1985), 17 August 1984, para. 5 (non-
recognition of the results of the so-called ‘elections’ in South Africa); 439 (1978), 13 Novem-
ber 1978, para. 3 (non-recognition of organs established by elections in Namibia).
17
Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, ICJ Reports 2004, para. 87.
18
ILC Yb. 1949, pp. 286-290, at p. 288.
19
Odette Jakowitsch/Karl P. Sauvant, The Third World Without Superpowers: The Col-
lected Documents of the Non-Aligned Countries, Vol. 1, New York 1978, pp. 50-51.
 An Obligation without Real Substance? 103

Declaration on the Enhancement of the Effectiveness of the Principle of Re-

fraining from the Threat or Use of Force in International Relations.20
In its Articles on State Responsibility, the ILC has extended the obliga-
tion ‘not to recognize as lawful’ beyond aggression and the illegal use of
force to all situations created by a serious breach of a jus cogens obligation.
While there is some State practice with regard to the non-recognition of
situations created by a serious breach of the right of self-determination of
peoples and the prohibition of racial discrimination (viz. the prohibition of
apartheid),21 there is virtually no such practice to support a duty of non-
recognition with regard to situations created by serious breaches of other jus
cogens norms such as the prohibitions of slavery and the slave trade, geno-
cide, torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, crimes
against humanity, or the basic rules of international humanitarian law. In
view of the lack of State practice, it has rightly been questioned whether cus-
tomary international law knows of a general duty of non-recognition of all
situations created by a serious breach of jus cogens.22
This paper examines the content of the obligation ‘not to recognize as
‘lawful’ a situation created by a serious breach of a jus cogens obligation, and
the practical difficulties that may arise in complying with this obligation. It
also asks whether an obligation of non-recognition makes legal sense in
cases of serious breaches of jus cogens obligations, other than those resulting
in the creation of a new State or the acquisition or occupation of territory.

II. THE CONTENT OF THE OBLIGATION OF NON-RECOGNITION

1) While the obligation ‘not to recognize as lawful’ a situation created

by a serious breach of the prohibition of the threat or use of force seems to
be well established in international law, it is unclear exactly what that obliga-

20
For a detailed analysis of these instruments, see Talmon, op. cit. (note 11), ch.
4.III.2.a.(3).
21
But see the statement made on behalf of Australia in the East Timor case: ‘Australia
denies that States are under an automatic obligation, under general international law, not to
recognize or deal with a State which controls and administers a territory whose people are
entitled to self-determination. There is no automatic obligation of non-recognition or non-
dealing, even though that State may be denying the people the right to self-determination.’
(CR 95/14, 16 February 1995, p. 36, para. 5 (James Crawford)).
22
Order of the German Federal Constitutional Court of 26 October 2004, 2 BvR 955/00
(sep. op. Lübbe-Wolff), available at <http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de>.
104 Stefan Talmon

tion entails. In his separate opinion in the advisory opinion on the Wall in
the Occupied Palestinian Territory Judge Kooijmans stated:
‘Article 41, paragraph 2, [of the ILC Articles on State Responsibility]
however, explicitly mentions the duty not to recognize as lawful a situa-
tion created by a serious breach just as operative subparagraph (3) (D)
[of the Court’s Opinion23] does. In its commentary the ILC refers to un-
lawful situations which – virtually without exception – take the form of
a legal claim, usually to territory. […] all examples mentioned refer to
situations arising from formal or quasi-formal promulgations intended
to have an erga omnes effect. I have no problem with accepting a duty
of non-recognition in such cases.
I have great difficulty, however, in understanding what the duty not to
recognize an illegal fact involves. What are the individual addressees of
this part of operative subparagraph (3) (D) supposed to do in order to
comply with this obligation? That question is even more cogent consid-
ering that 144 States unequivocally have condemned the construction of
the wall as unlawful (res. ES-10/13), whereas those States which ab-
stained or voted against (with the exception of Israel) did not do so be-
cause they considered the construction of the wall as legal. The duty not
to recognize amounts, therefore, in my view to an obligation without
real substance.’24
Most of the jus cogens norms which were identified by the ILC refer to
factual situations or actions rather than to claims under international law.
What does it mean, for example, not to recognize as lawful a situation cre-
ated by acts of genocide or slavery? What actual legal consequences followed
from the genocide in Rwanda for third States in terms of Art. 41(2) of the
ILC Articles on State Responsibility? To say that States are under an obliga-
tion not to recognize a situation as lawful raises more questions than it an-
swers.
The same is true in case of unlawful situations which take the form of a
legal claim to territory. In contrast to Judge Kooijmans, the Court did not
treat the construction of the wall as a ‘fact’ but treated it as amounting to a

23
Operative subparagraph 3(D) reads: ‘All States are under an obligation not to recog-
nize the illegal situation resulting from the construction of the wall and not to render aid or
assistance in maintaining the situation created by such construction’.
24
Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, ICJ Reports 2004, paras. 43, 44 (sep. op.
Kooijmans) (italics added).
 An Obligation without Real Substance? 105

de facto ‘claim’ to territory. The Court recalled that both the General As-
sembly and the Security Council had referred, with regard to Palestine, to
the customary rule of the ‘inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by
war’.25 The Court noted that, since 1977, Israel had conducted a policy and
developed practices involving the establishment of settlements in the Occu-
pied Palestinian Territory, contrary to the terms of Art. 49(6) of the Fourth
Geneva Convention, and that the route of the wall as fixed by the Israeli
Government included within the ‘Closed Area’26 some 80 per cent of the set-
tlers living in the Occupied Palestinian Territory. Moreover, it was apparent
that the wall’s sinuous route had been traced in such a way as to include
within that area the great majority of the Israeli settlements in the occupied
Palestinian Territory (including East Jerusalem). From this, the Court con-
cluded that ‘the construction of the wall and its associated regime create a
“fait accompli” on the ground that could well become permanent, in which
case, and notwithstanding the formal characterization of the wall by Israel, it
would be tantamount to de facto annexation.’27 The Court, in effect, spelled
out the obligation of States not to recognize as lawful any territorial acquisi-
tion by Israel brought about by the construction of the wall.28 However, even
if the obligation is to be interpreted as an obligation not to recognize as law-
ful a de facto claim to territory, the question still remains as to what the sub-
stance of that obligation is.
As both the Court’s opinion and Art. 41(2) of the ILC Articles on State
the act of aiding and
Responsibility show, the obligation not to recognize as lawful a certain situa-
assisting is a violation
tion must be distinguished from the obligation not to render aid or assis- of the duty that comes
tance in maintaining that situation. In some respects, the latter may be seen from the logical
as a logical extension of the duty of non-recognition. However, it has a sepa- extension of the duty
of non- recognition.
25
Ibid., Advisory Opinion, para. 117.
26
The ‘Closed Area’ is the part of the West Bank lying between the armistice demarca-
tion line between Israeli and Arab forces as fixed in 1949 (‘Green Line’) and the wall (ibid.,
para. 85).
27
Ibid., para. 121.
28
Cf. the sep. op. of Judge Koroma: ‘Equally important is the finding that the interna-
tional community as a whole bears an obligation […] not to recognize any unilateral change
in the status of the territory brought about by the construction of the wall.’ (ibid., para. 7). See
also the statement of the Brussels European Council on the Middle East Peace Process: ‘The
European Union will not recognise any change to the pre-1967 borders other than those ar-
rived at by agreement between the parties’ (Presidency Conclusions – Brussels 25/26 March
2004, p. 10).
106 Stefan Talmon

rate scope of application insofar as actions are concerned which would not
imply recognition of the situation created by a serious breach as lawful.29
Again, difficult questions arise. Does, for example, the financing by foreign
States of a web of new roads in the occupied Palestinian territory, made nec-
essary by the construction of the wall and the Israeli settlements in the West
Bank, imply recognition of the illegal situation resulting from the construc-
tion of the wall? Or does it simply aid and assist in maintaining the situation
created by the wall?30 It may be argued that the financing of roads in the
West Bank, as well as the provision of food aid by the UN Work and Relief
Agency (UNWRA) to people cut off from their fields by the wall, do neither,
as they simply alleviate the plight of the Palestinians in the occupied territo-
ries.
Subsequent practice with regard to the illegal situation resulting from
the construction of the wall is inconclusive. The General Assembly, at its
tenth emergency special session, only acknowledged the Court’s ruling and
called upon all States Members of the United Nations ‘to comply with their
legal obligations as mentioned in the Advisory Opinion’.31 The Special Rap-
porteur of the Commission on Human Rights on the situation of human
rights in the occupied Palestinian territories reminded ‘States of their obliga-
tion not to recognize the illegal situation resulting from the construction of
the Wall and not to render aid or assistance in maintaining the situation cre-
ated by such construction’, but without specifying exactly what that means.32
State practice shows that the duty of non-recognition so far has not affected
the relations of third States with Israel; in particular, no State has refrained
from any dealings with the Government of Israel with regard to the occupied
Palestinian territory on the Israeli side of the wall (including East Jerusalem),
cut funds or aid provided to Israel proportionate to the money spent by Is-
rael on the construction and maintenance of the wall, or altered its conduct
in any other way.

29
Report of the International Law Commission, 53rd Session, GAOR, 56th Session, Supp.
No. 10 (A/56/10), 2001, p. 291, para. 12.
30
See ‘Israel seeks funds for separate Arab roads’, The Guardian, 6 September 2004, p.
13.
31
General Assembly Resolution ES-10/15, 20 July 2004, para. 3.
32
Report of the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, John Dugard,
on the situation of human rights in the Palestinian territories occupied by Israel since 1967,
UN Doc. E/CN.4/2005/29, 7 December 2004, p. 19.
 An Obligation without Real Substance? 107

2) Legal literature has not contributed much to the elucidation of the

content of the duty not to recognize as lawful a situation created by a serious
breach of a jus cogens obligation. Most authors do not address the question
of the content of the duty at all. Those who do, for the most part merely
paraphrase the formulation used by the ILC. For Georges Abi-Saab, for ex-
ample, the obligation ‘consists mainly in the non-recognition of what is con-
sidered illegal and of its results’.33 But, what does ‘non-recognition’ mean;
what are third States supposed to do to avoid implied recognition of the le-
gality of what is considered illegal or of its results? For some writers, the ob-
ligation not to recognize a situation as lawful seems to amount to nothing
more than a formal declaration of non-recognition in order to prevent pre-
scriptive title or rights arising by adverse possession or negative prescription
or by historical consolidation.34 There are two problems with this view. First,
there is serious doubt that in international law prescription can create rights
out of situations brought about by illegal acts.35 This applies particularly in
situations created by a serious breach of a jus cogens obligation. Ian Brown-
lie has rightly pointed out that ‘the specific content of norms of this kind
involves the irrelevance of protest, recognition, and acquiescence; prescrip-
tion cannot purge this type of illegality.’36 Thus, non-recognition does not
serve any legal purpose in this context. Secondly, the question of prescriptive
title or rights arises only if the object of non-recognition is not merely a fac-
tual situation but, at the same time, an asserted legal status such as statehood,
or a claim to title to territory arising from the factual situation. No such
claims to status or title will usually arise from acts of genocide, torture or
slavery, or the violation of the basic rules of international humanitarian law.

33
Georges Abi-Saab, ‘The Concept of “International Crimes” and its Place in Contem-
porary International Law’, in: Joseph H.H. Weiler/Antonio Cassese/Marina Spinedi (eds.),
International Crimes of State. A Critical Analysis of the ILC’s Draft Article 19 on State Re-
sponsibility, Berlin 1989, pp. 141-150, at p. 149.
34
See e.g. Yoram Dinstein, War, Aggression and Self-Defence, 3rd edn., Cambridge 2001,
p. 154 (‘But probably the gist of non-recognition is that, despite a continuous and effective
control over the annexed territory, no prescriptive rights evolve in favour of the aggressor.’);
James Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law, Oxford 1979, p. 123, n. 179
(‘non-recognition is an attempt to prevent its attribution [of legal status] by the process of
recognition and consolidation.’).
35
See Brownlie, op. cit. (note 5), pp. 149-150. See also UN Doc. A/6799, 26 September
1967, p. 18, para. 77 (‘international law could not legalize the consequences of unlawful acts’).
36
Ibid., p. 490.
108 Stefan Talmon

3) In order to determine the substance of the obligation ‘not to recog-

nize as lawful’ a certain situation, it may be helpful to examine the origins of
this term. The formulation first appeared in the work of the ad hoc Special
Committee on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Rela-
tions and Co-operation among States.37 Over a period of seven years, from
1963 to 1970, the Special Committee drafted the Friendly Relations Declara-
tion which was finally adopted by the General Assembly by consensus on 24
October 1970.38 In the context of the first principle of the Declaration on the
prohibition of the threat or use of force, the Special Committee dealt with
the question of the non-recognition of territorial acquisitions resulting from
the threat or use of force. The non-aligned countries and the Latin American
States on the Committee suggested including a provision in the Declaration
that ‘no territorial acquisitions or special advantages obtained either by force
or by any other means of coercion shall be recognized.’39 The proposal met
with serious reservations on the part of the Western States40 which argued
that, while the doctrine of non-recognition of factual situations was superfi-
cially attractive, it was questionable whether it would work in practice. It was
the task of the Special Committee to create norms which could be valid in
the practical conduct of international relations, and the Committee should
not blind itself to the realities of the modern world.41 It was pointed out that
it was difficult, as a strictly legal proposition, to deny the existence of specific
situations resulting from the illegal use of force; it was doubtful whether that

37
The ad hoc Special Committee was established by General Assembly Resolution 1966
(XVIII), 16 December 1963. On the work of the Committee, see UN Doc. A/AC.125/12, 3
April 1970, pp. 1-26.
38
General Assembly Resolution 2625 (XXV), 24 October 1970.
39
UN Docs. A/AC.125/L.48, 27 July 1967, Principle A, para. 4, sentence 2 (submitted by
Algeria, Cameroon, Ghana, India, Kenya, Madagascar, Nigeria, Syria, UAR and Yugoslavia);
A/AC.125/L.49, Rev.1, 1 August 1967, Principle A, para. 2(h) (submitted by Argentina, Chile,
Guatemala, Mexico and Venezuela), both , also reproduced in UN Doc. A/6799, 26 Septem-
ber 1967, p. 10, paras. 26, 27. See also the earlier proposal of 11 non-aligned countries: UN
Doc. A/AC.125/L.21, 22 March 1966, paras. 4, 5 and the proposal of Chile: UN Doc.
A/AC.125/L.23, 22 March 1966: ‘It shall be expressly declared that contemporary interna-
tional law in no way recognizes the validity of de facto situations brought about by the illegal
threat or use of force’. For earlier proposals, see UN Docs. A/AC.119/L.7 and A/AC.119/L.15.
40
Especially Australia, Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the
USA voiced concern about a comprehensive obligation of non-recognition.
41
UN Doc. A/6230, 27 June 1966, p. 39, para. 101. For more details, see also UN Docs.
A/AC.125/SR.25, 25 July 1966, pp. 16-17; A/AC.125/SR.26, 25 July 19966, pp. 12, 21-22.
 An Obligation without Real Substance? 109

idea could be transformed into a legal obligation at the present stage of de-
velopment of international institutions. It was essential that rules of law
should be applicable in practice. If the idea was to be retained and a princi-
ple of law applicable in international relations was to be formulated, the
question would have to be raised again in more realistic terms.42 There was a
general fear that the duty of non-recognition might be used by some to con-
stitute a bar to trade arrangements, normal communications, and practical
contacts of any kind with the accused State. It was pointed out that it would
hardly be realistic for any State to make so broad an undertaking. In any
event, it was evident that the adoption of such a measure could not be based
on any interpretation of Art. 2(4) of the UN Charter. The Swedish represen-
tative on the Committee, Hans Blix, led the way to a compromise by stating
that, ‘if States were asked merely not to “recognize” or “consider” as legal
that which was illegal, there would be no great difficulty’ with the obligation
of non-recognition.43 The idea of limiting the obligation of non-recognition
in that way was taken up by the Drafting Committee which, in its Report to
the Special Committee, advanced the following formula with a view to pro-
viding a basis for further debate:
‘The territory of any State may not, on any grounds whatsoever, be the
object of acquisition by any other State, following the use of armed force.
No territorial acquisition or special advantages obtained by the illicit
use of force shall be recognized as legal.’44
The formulation ‘not to recognize as legal’ was initially opposed by the
non-aligned countries and the Latin American States, which had advocated
in their proposals an obligation of unqualified non-recognition. The Syrian
delegate stated that ‘the words “as legal” […] were unacceptable to his dele-
gation, which was deeply concerned at attempts to interpret the statement as
excluding de facto situations created by the illicit use of force.’45 The repre-
sentative of Mexico, speaking also on behalf of Argentina, Chile, Guatemala
and Venezuela, declared that the delegations wished to re-state their view

42
UN Doc. A/7326, p. 31, para. 75.
43
UN Doc. A/AC.125/SR.81-96 [86], 21 October 1968, p. 43.
44
UN Doc. A/7326, p. 41, para. 111, item 7. See also Hans Blix, ‘Contemporary Aspects
of Recognition’, Recueil des Cours 130 (1970-II), 587, at 662-664; Konstantin Obradović,
‘Prohibition of the Threat or Use of Force’, in: Milan Šahović (ed.), Principles of International
Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation, Belgrade 1972, pp. 51-128, at pp. 92-95.
45
UN Doc. A/AC.125/SR.81-96 [96], 21 October 1968, pp. 169-170.
110 Stefan Talmon

that ‘territorial acquisitions or advantages obtained by the use of force or

other forms of coercion should not be recognized either de jure or de facto.
Such an addition would maintain the universal validity of the principle, as
one of the general principles of law within the meaning of Article 38 of the
Statute of the International Court of Justice, and as a principle whose origins
could be traced back to the first Inter-American Conference in 1889 and
which had been expressly recognized in various League of Nations and
United Nations resolutions.’46 Such absolute non-recognition – refusing rec-
ognition both to the legality (i.e. de jure recognition) and the factual control
of the administration of the State in breach (i.e. de facto recognition) – was,
however, unacceptable to the Western States whose view finally prevailed.47
Paragraph 10 of the first principle of the Declaration provides that ‘no terri-
torial acquisition resulting from the threat of use of force shall be recognized
as legal.’ Hans Blix, who may be regarded as the father of the term ‘non-
recognition as legal’, explained its meaning in his Hague Academy lectures
in 1970 as follows:
‘no formal admission may be made of the legality of a forcible territorial
acquisition as described. This would appear to allow States to determine
for themselves – in the absence of any collective action by the United
Nations – to what extent they would allow practical co-operation and
courtesies without any formal admission of the legality of the situation.
There had been concerns that a flat provision for non-recognition could
have been used for arguments against any practical relations and cour-
tesies predicated upon an illegal situation – a position deemed unrealis-
tic. This concern was allayed by the formulation eventually adopted. Its
acceptance would not, of course, be a substitute for decisions by the
United Nations Security Council on collective non-recognition in con-
crete cases. On the contrary, only such decisions and concrete guidance
as to what restraints shall be exercised under the label of non-

46
Ibid., p. 161. Mexico maintained its legal position to the very end of the negotiations.
At the last session of the Special Committee on 1 May 1970 the Mexican representative de-
clared that ‘his delegation regarded the sentence: “No territorial acquisition resulting from the
threat or use of force shall be recognized as legal” as a declaration condemning as illegal any
territorial gain resulting from the threat or use of force and, consequently, any de jure or de
facto recognition of such gains was a violation of international law [...].’ (GAOR, 25th session,
Suppl. No. 18 (A/8018), 1970, p. 107, para. 210).
47
See Bernt Graf zu Dohna, Die Grundprinzipien des Völkerrechts über die freund-
schaftlichen Beziehungen und die Zusammenarbeit zwischen den Staaten, Berlin 1973, p. 81.
 An Obligation without Real Substance? 111

recognition [...] can be expected to lead to any uniform and effective in-
ternational reaction.’48
The compromise on the content of the obligation of non-recognition
was also adopted in the case of the 1974 Definition of Aggression, which use of force .
provides in Art. 5(3) that ‘no territorial acquisition or special advantage re-
sulting from aggression shall be recognized as lawful.’49 The initial proposals
of the non-aligned countries only provided that territorial acquisitions ‘shall
not be recognized’.50 It was at the 94th meeting of the Special Committee on
the Question of Defining Aggression on 3 February 1972 when it was pro-
posed that the words ‘as legal’ be added after the word recognized.51 The ad-
dition of the words ‘as legal’ was again opposed by the Mexican delegate who
stated that ‘it should be laid down with the utmost clarity that States had a
duty not to recognize such acquisitions either de jure or de facto.’52 This,
however, was unacceptable to the Western States, which were generally op-
posed to the inclusion of the obligation of non-recognition in the definition
of aggression. As they could not prevent this, their main aim was to water
down any such obligation.53 The replacement of the word ‘legal’ by the word
‘lawful’ signified an editorial but not a substantive change. Several delega-
tions expressly pointed out that Art. 5(3) of the Definition of Aggression was
to be interpreted in line with the relevant provision on non-recognition in
the Friendly Relations Declaration.54
Adding the words ‘as legal’ or ‘as lawful’ was intended to give States the
broadest possible scope of action in their relations with the perpetrator of
the illegal act and could have considerably weakened the obligation of non-

48
Blix, loc. cit. (note 44), 664-665. See also Brownlie, International Law and the Use of
Force by States, Oxford 1963, 420-423 who also draws a distinction between admission of
legality (i.e. de jure recognition) and de facto recognition of control over territory.
49
General Assembly Resolution 3314 (XXIX), 14 December 1974, Annex (italics added).
50
UN Docs. A/AC.134/L.3, and Add.1, 25 June 1968, preambular para. 6;
A/AC.134/L.16 and Add. 1 and 2, 24 March 1969, para. 8. See also A/AC.134/L.12, 26 Febru-
ary 1969, para. 4 (‘No territorial gains or special advantages resulting from armed aggression
shall be recognized.’).
51
GAOR, 27th Session, Supp. No. 19 (A/8719), 1972, p. 17.
52
UN Doc. A/AC.134/SR.100-109 [106], 29 August 1973, p. 30.
53
Thomas Bruha, Die Definition der Aggression, Berlin 1980, p. 204.
54
See e.g. GAOR, 29th Session, Supp. No. 19 (A/9619), 1974, p. 24 (USA); p. 26 (Yugo-
slavia). See also the Report of the Special Committee on the Question of Defining Aggression,
UN Doc. A/9411, 10 December 1973, p. 13. para. 29.
112 Stefan Talmon

recognition.55 However, subsequent non-recognition practice in the cases of

Rhodesia, the South African presence in Namibia, the Bantustan States in
South Africa, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus and the Iraqi an-
nexation of Kuwait shows that the international community regards the ob-
ligation of non-recognition as amounting to more than the prohibition of a
formal admission of legality; it requires States to refrain from any action im-
plying recognition of the legality of the situation in question.56 The concept
of implied recognition is difficult to reconcile with an understanding of the
obligation of non-recognition as precluding only the formal admission of
legality.57 The obligation of non-recognition of the legality of a certain situa- duty of active
tion thus amounts to a ‘duty of active abstention’.58 abstention.
4) The purely formal view of the obligation of non-recognition underly-
ing the Friendly Relations Declaration and the Definition of Aggression was
also not shared by the ICJ in the Namibia advisory opinion.59 For the Court,
the duty of non-recognition excluded not only the formal admission of the Can be invoked for
the ICC- conduct in
legality of a situation, but any acts or dealings that could ‘imply a recogni- question argument.
tion’ that the situation was legal.60 The obligations of non-recognition were
not restricted to obligations set forth by the Security Council. To the con-
trary, the Court gave advice on those dealings that were precluded ‘under
the Charter of the United Nations and general international law’.61 The pas-
sage from the Namibia opinion which is usually cited in evidence for the
proposition that the precise obligations of non-recognition must, in order to

55
Gaetano Arangio-Ruiz, The United Nations Declaration on Friendly Relations and the
System of the Sources of International Law, Alphen aan den Rijn 1979, pp. 103-104.
56
See e.g. Security Council Resolution 662 (1990), 9 August 1990, where the Council
called upon ‘all States, international organizations and specialized agencies not to recognize
that annexation, and to refrain from any action or dealing that might be interpreted as an
indirect recognition of the annexation’.
57
See the problems faced by Brownlie, op. cit. (note 48), 420, n. 4.
58
The ILLC talks about a ‘duty of abstention’; see Report of the International Law
Commission, 53rd Session, GAOR, 56th Session, Supp. No. 10 (A/56/10), 2001, p. 287, para. 4.
59
Namibia, ICJ Reports 1971, p. 16.
60
Ibid., p. 55, para. 121.
61
Ibid. While the Court took note of Security Council Resolution 283 (1970), 29 July
1970, which defined some of the steps to be taken by States against South Africa it did not deal
with that Resolution (ibid., p. 55, para. 120). The Court’s findings as to the dealings that could
imply recognition of the legality of the South African presence in Namibia were later adopted
by the Security Council in its Resolution 301 (1971), 20 October 1971, para. 11.
 An Obligation without Real Substance? 113

exist, be invoked by the appropriate political organs of the United Nations

acting within their authority under the Charter62, does not relate to the obli-
gation of non-recognition but, generally, to the appropriate measures to be
taken by the United Nations and its member States to bring the illegal situa-
tion to an end.63 The obligations set out in the resolutions of the United Na-
tions organs are not always very precise. In Resolution 276 (1970), which lies
at the heart of the Namibia opinion, the Security Council had called upon all
States, in rather general terms, to refrain from any dealings with the Gov-
ernment of South Africa which were inconsistent with the Council’s declara-
tion that the continued presence of the South African authorities in Namibia
was illegal, and that consequently all acts taken by the Government of South
Africa on behalf of or concerning Namibia were illegal and invalid. The
question of which dealings with the Government of South Africa were in-
consistent with the Council’s declaration thus remained. The Court was
called upon to answer precisely this question by the Security Council.
The obligation and content of non-recognition do not depend upon any
action by the appropriate political organs of the United Nations.64 A decision
by a competent organ of the United Nations may establish legal certainty as
to the existence of a serious breach of a jus cogens obligation. But, in the ab-
sence of such a decision, States may make their own determination at their
own risk. That the obligation arises directly under customary international
law is also shown by the fact that, in several cases, the call for non-
recognition has been contained in a non-binding resolution of the General
Assembly or in a statement of the President of the Security Council, which
do not create any obligation. It is suggested that, with regard to the obliga-
tion of collective non-recognition, the function of the political organs of the
United Nations is one of coordination, rather than creation, of the obliga-
tion, as uncoordinated acts of non-recognition by individual States will not
usually be very effective.

62
See e.g. the statements of the representatives of Australia in the East Timor case: CR
95/10, 9 February 1995, pp. 24-25 (Derek Bowett); CR 95/14, 16 February 1995, p. 36, paras.
5-6 and p. 56, para. 63 (James Crawford).
63
The Court deals with the determination of ‘what measures are available and practica-
ble, which of them should be selected, what scope they should be given and by whom they
should be applied’ (ibid., p. 55, para. 120).
64
See Brownlie, op. cit. (note 5), p. 491 (‘This duty may be observed irrespective of or in
the absence of any direction from the United Nations if in the careful judgment of the indi-
vidual state a situation has arisen the illegality of which is opposable to states in general.’).
114 Stefan Talmon

While the Court did not adopt a purely formal approach to non-
recognition, it did not preclude all dealings with the Government of South
Africa with regard to Namibia. In operative clause 2 of its opinion the Court
held that Member States of the United Nations were ‘under obligation […]
to refrain from any acts and in particular any dealings with the Government
of South Africa implying recognition of the legality’ of South Africa’s pres-
ence in Namibia.65 The obligation of non-recognition is thus not so rigid as
to preclude all dealings under all circumstances, but precludes only such
dealings as would imply recognition of legality.66 This distinction between
dealings implying recognition of legality and those not implying recognition
of legality (and thus not being excluded by the obligation not to recognize as
lawful) has been confirmed by the ILC, which held that the obligation not to
render aid or assistance ‘has a separate scope of application insofar as actions
are concerned which do not imply recognition’ of the situation as lawful.67 In
practice, three categories of actions may thus be distinguished: actions im-
plying recognition of the legality of a situation (which may also aid or assist
in maintaining the illegal situation); actions amounting to aid or assistance
in maintaining the situation (without implying recognition of the legality of
the situation); and actions which do neither of these. This distinction, how-
ever, still leaves unanswered the question as to which actions imply recogni-
tion of a situation as lawful.
5) The ILC’s Commentary on Art. 41(2) of its Draft Articles on State
Responsibility is not very instructive on the content of the obligation of non-
recognition of the legality of situations created by a serious breach in the
sense of Art. 40. Spain pointed out that the ‘substantive consequences’ of
serious breaches as set out in Art. 41(2) were ‘largely undefined’ and called
upon the ILC ‘to clarify to the extent possible the obligations of all States’
and, in particular, to ‘streamline the content of the obligation not to recog-
nize as lawful the situation created by the breach’.68 There seems to be a lot

65
Namibia, ICJ Reports 1971, p. 16, at p. 58, para. 133 (emphasis added).
66
Cf. ibid., p. 166 (sep. op. Dillard). On the limits of the duty of non-recognition, see
also ibid., p. 149 (sep. op. Onyeama); pp. 134-137 (sep. op. Petrén); p. 219 (sep. op. De Castro);
p. 297, para. 123 (diss. op. Fitzmaurice).
67
Report of the International Law Commission, 53rd Session, GAOR, 56th Session, Supp.
No. 10 (A/56/10), 2001, p. 291, para. 12.
68
State Responsibility. Comments and observations received from Governments, UN
Doc. A/CN.4/515, 19 March 2001, p. 54.
 An Obligation without Real Substance? 115

of uncertainty among States as to the precise content of the obligation.

France even stated that Art. 41(2) appears not to be essential as it adds ‘noth-
ing of substance’.69 Virtually all examples in the Commentary of situations
not to be recognized as lawful refer to attempted acquisitions of sovereignty
over territory. With regard to the obligation not to recognize as lawful the
ILC only states that ‘it not only refers to the formal recognition of these
situations, but also prohibits acts which would imply such recognition.’70 As
States will not usually formally recognize ‘as lawful’ situations created by acts
of genocide or torture, the question arises as to what acts can imply such
recognition and are thus precluded under Art. 41(2)?
The concept of non-recognition was first introduced in the work of the
ILC by Willem Riphagen, the third Special Rapporteur on the topic of State
Responsibility. Art. 6(1)(a) of the 1982 draft articles provided that ‘an inter-
nationally wrongful act of a State, which constitutes an international crime,
entails an obligation for every other States not to recognize as legal the situa-
tion created by such act’. The formula was inspired by the non-recognition
rule in the 1970 Friendly Relations Declaration.71 In his ‘Preliminary Report
on the Content, Forms and Degrees of International Responsibility’, submit-
ted on 1 April 1980, he introduced non-recognition of a situation created by
a wrongful act as one of several ‘(other) “responses”’ to such an act. For
Riphagen, it was ‘obviously possible that a primary rule of international law
requires a State to recognize an existing factual situation created by another
State as “legal”, that is as entailing legal consequences.’72 He described non-
recognition in the following terms: ‘non-recognition [as a response to an
internationally wrongful act] is refusing to give an otherwise mandatory fol-
low-up to the event that has taken place.’73 If this is applied to the non-
recognition of a State created in violation of international law, it requires
that the legal consequences that arise ipso jure from a State’s creation be de-

69
Ibid., UN Doc. A/CN.4/515/Add.2, 1 May 2001, p. 13.
70
Report of the International Law Commission, 53rd Session, GAOR, 56th Session, Supp.
No. 10 (A/56/10), 2001, p. 287, para. 5.
71
ILC Yb. 1982 II/1, p. 48, para. 7.
72
ILC Yb. 1980/II, p. 115, para. 45 (italics added).
73
Ibid., p. 117, para. 54. See also Report of the International Law Commission, 53rd Ses-
sion, GAOR, 56th Session, Supp. No. 10 (A/56/10), 2001, p. 289, para. 8 (‘where a serious
breach in the sense of article 40 has resulted in a situation that might otherwise call for recog-
nition, this has nevertheless to be withheld.’).
116 Stefan Talmon

nied. In particular, the rights, competences and privileges that are inherent
in statehood – and only those – are to be withheld from the new State.
Riphagen cites ‘immunities of foreign States and their property’ under gen-
eral international law as an example of a legal consequence that may be ig-
nored if the factual situation giving rise to that immunity was created in vio-
lation of international law.74 Riphagen’s successor as Special Rapporteur,
Gaetano Arangio-Ruiz, also interpreted ‘the obligation not to recognize as
“legal”’ in the sense of not ‘producing legal effects at the international level
and in the respective national systems’. 75 Imposing a duty of non-
recognition of a situation ‘as legal’ was thus intended to deny any legal effect
to a situation created by a serious breach of a jus cogens obligation.76
There are, however, very few factual situations created by such serious
breaches that, under customary international law or treaties, automatically
give rise to legal consequences, i.e. rights or privileges, that can be denied by
other States.77 Acts of aggression, the illegal use of force, the denial of the
right of self-determination of peoples, acts of genocide or crimes against
humanity may result in the creation of an illegal State or the illegal acquisi-
tion or occupation of territory.78 International law knows of only a very lim-
ited number of rights inherent in statehood, such as State immunity and the
right to exercise jurisdiction over the State’s territory and over all persons

74
Ibid., pp. 115-116, para. 46. See also Willem Riphagen, ‘The Legal Consequences of Il-
legal Acts under Public International Law’, Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Internationaal Recht
20 (1973), 27, at 34.
75
UN Doc. A/CN.4/453/Add.2, 8 June 1993, 29, para. 50. See also Art. 18(1)(a) of the
draft articles submitted by Gaetano Arangio-Ruiz: ‘all States shall […] refrain from recogniz-
ing as legal or valid, under international or national law, the situation created by the interna-
tional crime.’ (ILC Yb. 1995 II/2, p. 45, n. 14).
76
Cf. Gowlland-Debbas, op. cit. (note 12), p. 249 with regard to the duty of non-
recognition in Art. 14(2)(a) of the 1984 version of the Draft Articles on State Responsibility.
77
The Commentary on the Harvard Draft Convention on Rights and Duties of States in
Case of Aggression described the content of non-recognition as follows: ‘Rights flowing from
acts of force would not be recognized.’ (AJIL Supp. 33 (1939), 818-909, at 890).
78
See the statement of the observer for Malaysia in the Human Rights Commission: ‘It
was imperative that the international community should firmly uphold the principle of non-
recognition of territories acquired through Serbian aggression, ethnic cleansing and other
illegal acts.’ (UN Doc. E/CN.4/1992/S-2/SR.3, 4 December 1992, p. 16, para. 71).
 An Obligation without Real Substance? 117

and things within it.79 Non-recognition of an illegal State thus means deny-
ing the State the rights and privileges inherent in statehood. Belligerent oc-
cupation of foreign territory gives rise to limited rights of administration of
the occupying power under customary international law and treaties.80 It is
arguable that, subject to humanitarian considerations and the interests of the
civilian population in the occupied territory, these rights are to be denied to
an aggressor. States may, for example, refuse to recognize and enforce laws
enacted by the aggressor for the occupied territory or may deny recognition
to title to property even if the acquisition of property was within the 1907
Hague Regulations on Land Warfare.81 The aggressor may also be denied the
customary international law privilege that belligerents are not responsible
for damages caused to subjects of neutral States by military operations in
accordance with the laws of war.82 Acquisition of territory usually entails the
extension of the territorial scope of existing treaties and the right to con-
clude treaties for the acquired territory;83 it may also have an effect on voting
and other rights, under treaties that provide for proportionate voting or
other rights depending on the size of a party’s territory or population. In the
case of illegal acquisition of territory, these rights are to be denied.
While the denial of legal effects may make sense in the situations men-
tioned above, the question remains: what are the legal effects that can be de-
nied by other States arising from factual situations created by acts of slavery,
genocide, crimes against humanity, racial discrimination, torture, the viola-
tion of the basic rules of international humanitarian law and other norms of
jus cogens? While acts of genocide entail consequences under international
criminal law and, depending on the circumstances, the law of State respon-
sibility, these consequences are, of course, not to be denied by third States.
The denial of the legal effects of a situation could be interpreted in a wider

79
For an overview of the rights inherent in statehood, see Stefan Talmon, ‘The Constitu-
tive versus the Declaratory Theory of Recognition: Tertium Non Datur?’, British Year Book of
International Law 75 (2004) (forthcoming).
80
See e.g. Arts. 42-56 of the Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on
Land, Annexed to the 4th Hague Convention, 18 October 1907 (100 BFSP 338) and Arts. 47-
78 of the 4th Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War,
12 August 1949 (75 UNTS 287). See also the Order of the German Federal Constitutional
Court of 26 October 2004, 2 BvR 955/00, Deutsches Verwaltungsblatt 2005, 175-183, at 179.
81
Cf. Brownlie, op. cit. (note 48), p. 406, n. 3 with further references.
82
See Talmon, op. cit. (note 11), ch. 12.III.2.a; Brownlie, op. cit. (note 5), p. 490.
83
See VCLT, Art. 29.
118 Stefan Talmon

sense. It could be argued that any property or other rights predicated on acts
of genocide or convictions secured by acts of torture are to be denied any
legal effect by other States. It is also arguable that the general legal conse-
quences of acts of State under international law, such as the personal and
functional immunity of State officials from the jurisdiction of foreign courts
or State immunity, may be denied if the acts in question constitute genocide
or other serious breaches of jus cogens obligations.84 At least the latter inter-
pretation, however, would not be in conformity with the recent ruling of the
ICJ in the Arrest Warrant case.85 The German Federal Court of Justice ex-
pressly stated in its decision of 26 June 2003 that ‘recent attempts to limit the
principle of State immunity and, in case of violations of norms of jus cogens
not to recognize it’ were ‘not in conformity with general international law’.86
6) The answer to the question of what conduct the obligation of non-
recognition imposes on States must be sought in customary international
law, as reflected in the settled practice of States, the decisions of interna-
tional and national courts and tribunals, and the resolutions of the appropri-
ate political organs of the United Nations.87 The content of the obligation
will differ according to the factual situation which is not to be recognized as
lawful. There is ample practice in respect of the non-recognition of States
created by a serious breach of a jus cogens obligation. The violated norms
identified were, in the case of Rhodesia, the right of self-determination of the
people of Southern Rhodesia; in the case of the South African homeland
States the prohibition of racial discrimination (viz. the prohibition of apart-
heid); and, in the case of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, the pro-
hibition of the use of force.88 The State not to be recognized as lawful is to be ACCESSION
denied all rights, capacities and privileges inherent in statehood. In this con- ARGUMENT .
nection, it is necessary to distinguish between the rights inherent in state-
hood, i.e. the rights a State can demand under general international law be-

84
Cf. Regina v. Bartle and the Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis and Others, ex
parte Pinochet, 24 March 1999, ILM 38 (1999), 581, at 651 (per Lord Millet) but only with
regard to functional immunity.
85
Arrest Warrant of 11 August 2000, ICJ Reports 2002, para. 58.
86
German Federal Supreme Court, 3rd Senate, Decision of 26 June 2003, III ZR 245/98,
BGHZ 155, p. 279, para. 15 (translation supplied). See also ibid. for further references to the
literature on this question.
87
See Namibia, ICJ Reports 1971, p. 16, at p. 134 (sep op. Petrén).
88
See Talmon, op. cit. (note 11), ch. III.2.b(2) with further references.
 An Obligation without Real Substance? 119

cause it is a State, and the optional relations between States (and the result-
ing rights and privileges) that depend on the consent or co-operation of
other States. Only the former are subject to the duty of non-recognition; the
latter may be precluded by the obligation not to render aid or assistance in
maintaining the illegal State.89
Governments of existing States installed by an act of aggression, the ille-
gal use of force or the denial of the right of self-determination are not to be
treated as having the capacities of a government in international law.90 It is
argued that the same should apply in cases of governments coming to power
by acts of genocide.
The content of the obligation of non-recognition of the illegal acquisi-
tion or occupation of territory by a State has been set out by the ICJ in the
Namibia advisory opinion. Other States are not to enter into treaty relations
with a wrongdoingState in all cases in which its government purports to act
on behalf of or concerning the territory. Existing bilateral treaties or provi-
sions of treaties with the wrongdoer, which involve active intergovernmental
co-operation, must not be invoked or applied to the territory illegally occu-
pied or annexed. States are to abstain from sending diplomatic or special
missions to a wrongdoingState , or from including in their jurisdiction the
territory in question. They must abstain from sending consular agents to the
territory and must withdraw any such agent already there. States must also
abstain from entering into economic or other forms of relationship or deal-
ings with the wrongdoer on behalf of or concerning the territory.91
It is argued that the restraints set out in the Namibia opinion apply
equally to the de facto annexed territory on the Israeli side of the wall (in-
cluding East Jerusalem). For the European Union, for example, this means
that the EC-Israeli Association Agreement with its preferential tariffs for
products of Israeli origin must not be applied to products originating in the
de facto annexed territory.92 Products from the territory on the Israeli side of

89
For a detailed study of the content of non-recognition of illegal States with respect to
the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, see Talmon, op. cit. (note 11), ch.5-12.
90
Cf. Robert Jennings/Arthur Watts (eds.), Oppenheim’s International Law, 9th edn,
Harlow 1992, p. 199. See also Security Council Resolutions 554 (1984), 17 August 1984, and
566 (1985), 19 June 1985, and the Presidential Statement of 3 May 1985 (UN Doc. S/17151).
91
Namibia, ICJ Reports 1971, p. 16, at p. 55, paras. 121, 122.
92
Euro-Mediterranean Agreement establishing an association between the European
Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the State of Israel, of the other
120 Stefan Talmon

the wall must not benefit from preferential treatment, unless they are im-
ported to EU Member States under the EC’s association agreement with the
PLO and are accompanied by a movement certificate EUR.1 issued by the
customs authorities of the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank.93 In addi-
tion, agricultural products which, under Community law, require a plant
health certificate issued in the plants’ country of origin must not be im-
ported at all into the EU from the territory on the Israeli side of the wall, un-
less they are accompanied by the necessary plant health certificate issued by
the competent Palestinian authorities. 94 Diplomatic and consular agents
based in East Jerusalem must be withdrawn and the jurisdiction of any dip-
lomatic and consular mission in Israel proper must not extend to the terri-
tory on the Israeli side of the wall (including East Jerusalem).
With regard to situations created by genocide, torture, crimes against
humanity and other serious breaches of a jus cogens norm there is no prac-
tice of non-recognition on which to draw. This is not surprising as these
situations, as a rule, do not automatically give rise to any legal consequences
which are capable of being denied by other States.

part, signed at Brussels, 20 November 1995: OJ L 147, 21 June 2000, p. 3. Art. 83 of the
Agreement provides: ‘This Agreement shall apply […] to the territory of the State of Israel.’
93
See Euro-Mediterranean Interim Association Agreement on Trade and Co-operation
between the European Community, of the one part, and the Palestine Liberation Organiza-
tion (PLO) for the benefit of the Palestinian Authority of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, of
the other part, signed at Brussels, 24 February 1997: OJ L 187, 16 July 1997, p. 3. Art. 73 pro-
vides: ‘This Agreement shall apply […] to the territory of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.’
On the procedure for the issue of movement certificates, see Protocol 3 to the Agreement. On
the question with regard to the West Bank and Gaza Strip in general, see Moshe Hirsch,
‘Rules of Origin as Trade or Foreign Policy Instruments? The European Union Policy on
Products Manufactured in the Settlements in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip’, Fordham
International Law Journal 26 (2003), 572-594; Christian Hauswaldt, ‘Problems under the EC-
Israel Association Agreement: The Export of Goods Produced in the West Bank and the Gaza
Strip under the EC-Israel Association Agreement’, European Journal of International Law 14
(2003), 591-611. The difference between the West Bank and Gaza Strip and the territory on
the Israeli side of the wall (including East Jerusalem) is that the EU Member States in the lat-
ter case have no discretion whether or not to accept certificates by Israeli authorities.
94
See Regina on the application of S.P. Anastasiou (Pissouri) Ltd. and Others v. Minister
of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, Case C-140/02, ECR 2003, p. I-10635; Regina v. Minister
of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, ex parte S.P. Anastasiou (Pissouri) Ltd. and Others, Case
C-219/98, ECR 2000, p. I-5241; The Queen v. Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, ex
parte S. P. Anastasiou (Pissouri) Ltd. and others, Case C-432/92, ECR 1994, p. I-3087.
 An Obligation without Real Substance? 121

III. PRACTICAL DIFFICULTIES WITH THE OBLIGATION OF

NON-RECOGNITION

1) The obligation not to recognize as lawful a situation created by a se-

rious breach of a jus cogens obligation gives rise to practical difficulties. The
first difficulty is knowing when the obligation will arise. The question has
been asked as to whether the imposition of the obligation is automatic or
whether it must be activated by a prior authoritative finding by the appro-
priate political organ of the United Nations that a serious breach has oc-
curred; in particular, whether a specific call for non-recognition by the Secu-
rity Council is a prerequisite to activation of the obligation.95 It has been
pointed out that, if it was left to individual States, they might arrive at differ-
ent conclusions, which would adversely affect the stability of the interna-
tional legal order.96 While earlier drafts of the ILC Articles on State Respon-
sibility in the 1980s provided that the performance of the obligation of non-
recognition was ‘subject mutatis mutandis to the procedures embodied in
the United Nations Charter with respect to the maintenance of international
peace and security’, and thus made it subject to a decision of the Security
Council,97 the final articles and the ILC’s Commentary adopted in 2001 do
not deal with this question. The obligations in Art. 41 of the ILC Articles on
State Responsibility rest on the assumption of international solidarity in the
face of a violation of a norm of jus cogens. They stem from an understand-
ing that a collective response by all States is necessary to counteract the ef-
fects of such a violation. In practice, it is most likely that this collective re-
sponse will be co-ordinated through the competent organs of the United
Nations.98 But this is not a prerequisite for the obligation of non-recognition
to arise. Many, if not most, of the calls for non-recognition have been made

95
See e.g. Australia’s argument in the East Timor case: CR 95/9, 8 February 1995, p. 26,
paras. 31, 32 (James Crawford).
96
UN Docs. A/C.6/56/SR.11, 9 November 2001, p. 10, para. 58; A/C.6/55/SR.14, 10 No-
vember 2000, p. 9, para. 43 and State Responsibility. Comments and observations received
from Governments, UN Doc. A/CN.4/515, 19 March 2001, p. 57 (China). See also the 4th Re-
port on State Responsibility by Gaetano Arangio-Ruiz, UN Doc. A/CN.4/461/Add.1, 26 April
1994, pp. 6-7, para. 18.
97
See Art. 6(2) of the 1982 draft articles (ILC Yb. 1982 II/1, p. 48) and Art. 14(3) of the
1984 draft articles (ILC Yb. 1984 II/2, p. 101 and ILC Yb. 1985 II/1, p. 13).
98
Cf. Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its 48th Session,
GAOR, 51st Session, Supp. No. 10 (A/51/10), 1996, pp. 169-170.
122 Stefan Talmon

in non-binding resolutions of the General Assembly and in statements of the

President of the Security Council, which could neither authoritatively de-
termine the existence of a serious breach nor create an obligation not to rec-
ognize a situation as lawful. The title of Art. 41 speaks of ‘particular conse-
quences of a serious breach’, not of the particular consequences of a UN
resolution. The ILC considers non-recognition to be the ‘minimum re-
sponse’ to a serious breach of jus cogens that is called for on the part of all
States, independently of more extensive measures which may be taken by
States through international organizations. The obligation of non-
recognition thus arises for each State as and when it forms the view that a
serious breach of a jus cogens obligation has been committed, and each State
will bear responsibility for its decision.99
2) The temporal element of the obligation constitutes another difficulty.
It has been pointed out that Art. 42(2) of the ILC Articles on State Responsi-
bility is problematic in that it contains no reference to time-frames.100 Is
non-recognition an open-ended obligation that only comes to an end with
the successful establishment of the status quo ante?101 It is definitely not a
short-term measure. Non-recognition of Rhodesia lasted for 15 years, while
non-recognition of South Africa’s illegal occupation of Namibia went on for
20 years. The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus has not been recognized
for the last 22 years, the international community has refused recognition of
the Israeli annexation of the Syrian Golan and East Jerusalem for 25 years,
and the non-recognition of the illegal incorporation of the Baltic States into
the Soviet Union lasted for 51 years. In all cases since 1945, collective non-
recognition has ended only with the establishment of the status quo ante.
However, the duty of non-recognition does not operate in a vacuum, di-
vorced from the situation on the ground and the responses of the interna-
tional community to that situation. After all, non-recognition is a collective
response to protect the fundamental interests of the international commu-

99
Ibid., p. 165, para. 4.
100
UN Doc. A/C.6/54/SR.23, 2 November 1999, p. 7, para. 47 (Australia). See also State
Responsibility. Comments and observations received from Governments: UN Doc.
A/CN.4/515, 19 March 2001, p. 47 (United Kingdom).
101
Cf. the rhetorical statement of James Crawford, Counsel for Australia, that such an
obligation not to recognize based on customary international law would go on ‘for years, for
decades, indefinitely’ (East Timor, CR 95/9, 8 February 1995, p. 39, para. 62). See also the
same: ‘If [...] there is an automatic and general duty of non-recognition, how can this be lim-
ited, qualified or excluded by United Nations organs?’ (ibid., p. 41, para. 73).
 An Obligation without Real Substance? 123

nity. The practice of the political organs of the United Nations in the cases of
Rhodesia and Namibia shows that changes to the illegal situation which do
not constitute a return to the status quo may well affect the obligation not to
recognize. As the obligation of non-recognition was based on a denial of the
right to self-determination of the peoples in these territories, the Security
Council felt compelled to renew its call for non-recognition when the white
minority regimes organized elections among the population in order to le-
gitimize the situation.102 The obligation of non-recognition is also subject to
the possible endorsement of a settlement by the international community.
The Friendly Relations Declaration expressly provided that the duty not to
recognize as legal any territorial acquisition resulting from the threat of use
of force shall not be ‘construed as affecting the powers of the Security Coun-
cil under the Charter.’103 A similar safeguard clause with regard to the com-
petence of the Security Council under the Charter may be found in Art. 6 of
the Definition of Aggression and Art. 59 of the ILC Articles on State Re-
sponsibility.
3) Another difficulty with the obligation not to recognize as lawful a
situation created by a serious breach of a jus cogens obligation seems to lie in
its relationship with the duty to ‘co-operate to bring to an end through law-
ful means any serious breach’ as provided for in Art. 41(1) of the ILC Arti-
cles on State Responsibility. In its Order of 26 October 2004, the German
Federal Constitutional Court gave the obligation to co-operate priority over
the obligation not to recognize.104 The Court, assuming for the sake of ar-
gument that the expropriation without compensation of German-owned
property by the Soviet Union in the Soviet zone of occupation of Germany
between 1945 and 1949 constituted a serious breach of a norm of jus co-

102
See Security Council Resolutions 423 (1978), 14 March 1978, para. 2; 445 (1979), 8
March 1979, paras. 5, 6; 448 (1979), 30 April 1979, para. 3 (all with regard to the elections in
Rhodesia). Several States did not rule out the recognition as a result of these election; see Tal-
mon, op. cit. (note 11), ch. 2.II.5.c. See also Security Council Resolution 439 (1978), 13 No-
vember 1978, paras. 1,3 (Namibia).
103
Friendly Relations Declaration, principle 1, para. 10(b). But see also the declaration of
the representative of the United Arab Republic with regard to para. 10(b) that this general
safeguard clause ‘could not be interpreted in any way that would suggest that the Security
Council had any power to appropriate a part of the territory of a State to another State. Such
an interpretation would be contrary to the Charter and to the draft declaration itself.’ (GAOR,
25th Session, Supp. No. 18 (A/8018), 1970, p. 118, para. 250).
104
Order of the German Federal Constitution Court of 26 October 2004, 2 BvR 955/00,
Deutsches Verwaltungsblatt 2005, 175-183
124 Stefan Talmon

gens,105 nevertheless held that the German Government was not under an
obligation not to recognize as lawful the illegal expropriation and to treat it
as null and void. The Court stated:
‘when there is a well-established factual situation and divergent political
interests, States are only duty-bound to co-operate with a view to reach-
ing agreement. The reason for the obligation to co-operate is that it is of
prime importance to create a situation which, also in practical terms,
mitigates the violation of the peremptory norms while safeguarding the
interests of both parties.’106
In making this finding, the Court relied on the ICJ’s advisory opinion in
the Namibia case. Although all States were under an obligation to recognize
the invalidity of South Africa’s acts on behalf of or concerning Namibia, the
prime aim was to resolve or eliminate the situation. For that reason, the
Court argued, the international community had co-operated with South Af-
rica in the termination of the occupation of Namibia. The Court held that
the Federal Republic of Germany had fulfilled its obligation to co-operate in
achieving reunification by way of peaceful negotiations with the former oc-
cupying power and other States.107
This reasoning has several flaws. First, the duty of co-operation in Art.
41(1) is addressed to third States; it does not stipulate a duty of third States
or the injured State to co-operate with the responsible State in bringing to an
end the serious breach of a jus cogens obligation, but rather a duty to co-
operate among third States. The debates in the ILC show that Part Two,
Chapter III, of the Articles on State Responsibility was to create obligations
for ‘third States’.108 The obligations of the responsible State are laid down in
Chapters I and II of Part Two, and do not include a duty to co-operate with
other States in bringing the serious breach to an end. Secondly, the injured
State is also under an obligation not to recognize the situation created by a
serious breach of a jus cogens obligation. A serious breach by definition

105
The Court had rightly denied the jus cogens character of a duty to protect the prop-
erty of a State’s own citizens; ibid., p. 180.
106
Ibid., p. 181.
107
Ibid., p. 181.
108
See e.g. Fourth Report on State Responsibility, UN Doc. A/CN.4/517, 2 April 2001, p.
19, para. 48; State Responsibility. Comments and observations received from Governments:
UN Doc. A/CN.4/515, 19 March 2001, p. 46 (United Kingdom) (‘obligations of non-
recognition and non-assistance are imposed on third States’).
 An Obligation without Real Substance? 125

concerns the international community as a whole. Norms of jus cogens are

thus not at the disposal of the injured State; it cannot unilaterally negotiate
away the interests of the international community in ensuring a just and ap-
propriate settlement.109 If the protection of the property of its citizens against
expropriation by an occupying power had indeed been a norm of jus cogens,
it would not have been for Germany unilaterally to relinquish this property.

IV. CONCLUSION

Many problems still remain with regard to the obligation ‘not to recog-
nize as lawful’ a situation created by the illegal threat or use of force or other
serious breaches of jus cogens norms. There is more authority for the obliga-
tion as such (especially in cases of the illegal use of force, the denial of the
right of self-determination of peoples, and the prohibition of racial dis-
crimination) than for its particular content, and rules which readily corre-
spond to the obligation have not yet fully developed in customary interna-
tional law. In view of the content given to the obligation it is doubtful
whether such rules will ever be developed with regard to serious breaches of
some of the jus cogens norms identified by the ILC and others. The obliga-
tion of non-recognition of the legality of a specific situation amounts to a
duty of active abstention. The factual situation created by the serious breach
is to be denied its ordinary legal consequences. Thus, non-recognition can
operate only in cases of a factual situation that also takes the form of a legal
claim (to statehood, territorial sovereignty, governmental capacity, etc.) in-
tended to have erga omnes effect. To the extent that factual situations entail
such claims, the obligation of non-recognition does have real substance and
may prove a powerful sanction by the international community against the
responsible State. However, its scope of application seems to be rather lim-
ited.

109
Report of the International Law Commission, 53rd Session, GAOR, 56th Session, Supp.
No. 10 (A/56/10), 2001, pp. 289-290. para. 9. See also Arts. 26 and 20 of the ILC Articles on
State Responsibility.