Join and Several Liability and Contribution Laws

MATTHIESEN, WICKERT & LEHRER, S.C.
Hartford, WI ❖ New Orleans, LA ❖ Orange County, CA

❖ Austin, TX ❖ Jacksonville, FL ❖ Boston, MA
Phone: (800) 637-9176
[email protected]
www.mwl-law.com
JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILITY AND CONTRIBUTION LAWS IN ALL 50 STATES

Generally
Contribution, subrogation, and indemnity are confusing legal subjects and often mistakenly conflated and confused for one another. Indemnity and
subrogation are common law concepts which are not allowed when the payments are voluntary. Contribution between joint tortfeasors has become
an action controlled by state statute in most states. In contribution claims, a liability payment made by a tortfeasor’s insurer (either due to judgment
or settlement) is recovered from a co-tortfeasor who did not contribute to the original settlement or judgment. Most states have determined that
contribution from a co-tortfeasor is not allowed when there is a settlement which does not extinguish the liability of the co-tortfeasor. Most states
allow a contribution claim against a co-tortfeasor who was not a party to the lawsuit when there is a judgment.
The concept of contribution among tortfeasors and the differences between joint, several, and joint and several liability are closely related and
equally confusing. Joint and several liability law is intended to address the inequities resulting from a tortfeasor being insolvent or unable or unwilling
to pay for damages it causes. When that happens, either the other defendants or the plaintiff must pay for the insolvent, non-paying defendant’s
share. States have different methods of dealing with that situation. The “joint” in joint and several was originally only a procedural device that
allowed defendants to be joined in a single lawsuit, where multiple tortfeasors acted in concert or where vicarious liability applied. A more accurate
term – and one used in England even today – would be “concurrent tortfeasors.” The “several” in joint and several concerns the liability of damages
caused by the concurring negligence of the defendant and a co-tortfeasor and indicates that the defendant is liable to the same extent as though it
had been caused by its negligence alone. The use of the term “several liability” is imprecise, historically inaccurate, and potentially confusing. Under
this common-law, an individual defendant had the burden of bringing separate actions against other responsible defendants for contribution. The
intent underlying joint and several liability is that the joinder of multiple wrongdoers and assignment of percentages of fault eliminated the burden
on defendants of pursuing a multiplicity of actions (i.e., contribution actions) with potentially inconsistent results. However, it has only been in the
wake of the tort reform era that “several liability” has come to mean fractional or partial liability, rather than full liability, for the harm to which a
tortfeasor contributed.
Equitable Contribution / Subrogation Among Co-Insurers
This chart concerns contribution among joint tortfeasors, which applies subrogation principles, and is sometimes referred to as “reimbursement by
subrogation.” Apportionment in such contribution claims involves and is dependent on the respective fault of the joint tortfeasors. This chart does
not address or concern itself within another type of contribution which is more common – the right of equitable contribution between concurrent
insurers. This type of equitable contribution is not based on principles of subrogation to the rights of the insured against the party legally responsible.
Instead, the insurer seeking indemnification against a concurrent insurer does so entirely in its own right and based on whether, under the terms of
its insurance policy, the non-participating coinsurer has a legal obligation to provide a defense or indemnity coverage for the claim or action prior to
Work Product of Matthiesen, Wickert & Lehrer, S.C. 1 Last Updated: 1/7/2022
the date of the settlement. In this sense, equity plays no role in whether an insurer which has made payments may seek contribution from another
insurer who has no obligation to the insured. Further, an insurer will normally be compelled to contribute no more than the limits fixed in its policy.
Nevertheless, contribution from a concurrent insurer is a claim which is totally independent of the rights of the insured and is very dependent on the
language of the policies involved.
Where a first or third-party co-insurer pays a judgment or settles a claim and seeks reimbursement from another co-insurer for a proportionate share
of the claim, the overpaying carrier can make a claim based on a direct equitable duty of contribution and/or under subrogation principles. While
both legal theories seek the same end – proportionate share payment by the underpaying co-insurer, they are handled quite differently.
Equitable Contribution. Many states recognize a right of equitable contribution between co-insurers based on equitable principles that imply a
contract between the parties to contribute ratably to the discharge of their common obligation. Nat’l Cas. Co. v. Great Southwest Fire Ins. Co., 833
P.2d 741 (Colo. 1992); Royal Globe Ins. Co. v. Aetna Ins. Co., 403 N.E.2d 680 (Ill. App. 1980); Ohio Cas. Ins. Co. v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 546 S.E.2d
421 (Va. 2001). An equitable contribution claim between co-insurers requires that the policies insure a common obligation to the same insured, the
same property, and the same interests in the property. They must cover the same risk and owe insurance payments to the same insured. State Farm
Fire & Cas. Co. v. Monroe Guar. Ins. Co., 111 F.3d 42 (6th Cir. 1997); Reliance Ins. Co. v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 13 F.3d 98 (6th Cir. 1994); Nat’l Cas.
Co. v. Great Southwest Fire Ins. Co., 833 P.2d 741 (Colo. 1992); Royal Globe Ins. Co. v. Aetna Ins. Co., supra; Ind. Ins. Co. v. Sentry Ins. Co., 437 N.E.2d
1381 (Ind. App. 1982). In order for a right of equitable contribution to run between co-insurers, the respective policies must address a common
obligation; that is, it must afford coverage to the same insured, the same property, and the same interests in the property and it must cover the same
risk and owe payments, if any, to the same insured. For example, an insurer providing fire coverage to an owner might not be able to seek equitable
contribution from an insurer providing builders’ risk coverage to a contractor, though there might possibly be a right of contribution where a property
owner has purchased both fire insurance and builder’s risk coverage. Where coinsurance is created by “other insurance” clauses, as opposed to cases
where each insurer is liable for the entire loss, the defense that the insurer paying the whole claim was a “volunteer” might have applicability. This
may be the case where both policies provide for “pro rata” apportionment in the event of overlapping coverage. Mid-Continent Ins. Co. v. Liberty
Mut. Ins. Co., 236 S.W.3d 765 (Tex. 2007); Fid. & Cas. Co. v. Fireman’s Fund Indem. Co., 100 P.2d 364(Cal. App. 1940); Commercial Union Ins. Co. v.
Farmers Mut. Ins. Co., 457 S.W.2d 224 (Mo. 1970); Farm Bureau Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Buckeye Union Cas. Co., 67 N.E.2d 906 (Ohio 1946); INA v. Fire
Ins. Exch., 525 S.W.2d 446 (Tex. App. 1975).
Subrogation. If one of two insurers co-insuring a claim settles the claim or pays a judgment, it might be subrogated to its insured’s rights to coverage
under another applicable policy of insurance. Foremost County Mut. Ins. Co. v. Home Indem. Co., 897 F.2d 754 (5th Cir. 1990); Arrow Exterminators,
Inc. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 136 F.Supp.2d 1340 (N.D. Ga. 2001); Mid-Continent Ins. Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 236 S.W.3d 765 (Tex. 2007); Sharon Steel
Corp. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 931 P.2d 127 (Utah 1997). Subrogation, in turn, can be “legal” (equitable) or “contractual” in nature. An equitable right
of subrogation may exist if one co-insurer pays a greater proportion of a judgment or settlement than what is warranted under the insurance policies,
because it is only fair to allow the carrier paying the claim to recover from the other carrier the amount the other carrier would have owed. Mid-
Continent Ins. Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 236 S.W.3d 765 (Tex. 2007). Contractual subrogation is determined from the specific language of the
insurance policy involved.
While a right of contribution exists independently of the insured’s right to recover from the co-insurer, the right of subrogation is based upon the
rights of the insured – stepping into the shoes of the insured, so to speak. If a contractor’s general liability carrier pays a claim for property damage at
the project site and the loss may also be covered by a first party builder’s risk policy naming the owner as insured, the contractor may not have direct
rights under the builder’s risk policy, and consequently, the GL carrier will also not have a cause of action for subrogation. Note, however, that in
some jurisdictions, if a co-insurer fully pays the claim of its insured (even if the other co-insurer has notice of the claim and the settlement), its right
of subrogation may be abolished. Mid-Continent Ins. Co., supra. Moreover, the existence of a subrogation right doesn’t necessarily mean that one co-
insurer is bound by and liable for the settlement decisions made by another co-insurer. There may be a reasonable, good faith standard.
Joint and Several Liability

Historically, states have followed one of three (3) approaches when dealing with multiple parties responsible for causing an injury or damage: (1) joint
liability, (2) several liability, or (3) joint and several liability. Joint tortfeasors are two or more individuals who either (1) act in concert to commit a
tort, (2) act independently but cause a single, indivisible tortious injury, or (3) share responsibility for a tort because of vicarious liability. If two or
more parties have JOINT LIABILITY, they are each liable up to the full amount of the obligation. Only one action can be brought and if only one
tortfeasor is sued, no further recovery can be had from the other tortfeasors. If two or more parties have SEVERAL LIABILITY, each tortfeasor is liable
only for their respective obligations based on their percentage of fault. If, however, two or more parties have JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILITY, any of
the defendants can be pursued as if they were jointly liable and it becomes the responsibility of the defendants to figure out their respective
proportions of liability and payment. The plaintiff may not recover for the same injury twice but has the option of proceeding against just one jointly
and severally liable defendant to recover 100% of his damages. The concept of joint and several liability was intended to ensure that the plaintiff is
made whole where one or more defendants cannot make good on the damages. States differ on which form of liability they apply, and states are
changing their approaches as tort reform legislation is enacted. Today, joint and several liability comes in three general forms, with minor variations
from state to state:
(1) Pure Joint and Several Liability: Places the risk of insolvency and the burden of identifying non-party tortfeasors on the defendants. Each
defendant is responsible for the entire amount of damages regardless of the amount of responsibility. Seven (7) states practice Pure Joint and
Several Liability (Alabama, Delaware, Maryland, Massachusetts, North Carolina, Rhode Island, and Virginia).
(2) Modified Joint and Several Liability: A cross between Pure Joint and Several Liability and Pure Several Liability. Splits the risk of insolvency
between the plaintiff and the solvent defendants. A defendant is responsible for the entire verdict only if they are found to be at or above a
specified percentage of fault. Twenty-nine (29) states practice Modified Joint and Several Liability (California, Colorado, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois,
Iowa, Louisiana, Maine, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York,
North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin).
(3) Pure Several Liability: Places the risk of insolvency and burden of identifying non-party tortfeasors on the plaintiff. Each Defendant is only
liable for their assigned portion of damages based on their percentage of responsibility. Fourteen (14) states practice Pure Several Liability
(Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Michigan, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, and Wyoming).
Contribution Law
“Contribution” is a claim brought by one tortfeasor against another tortfeasor to recover some or all the money damages the first tortfeasor owes to
an injured/damaged plaintiff, as a result of a settlement or a judgment in favor of the plaintiff. For example, if a plaintiff sues a general contractor for
injuries resulting from a fall on the job site, the general contractor’s insurer could pursue a claim for contribution against a subcontractor who was
directly responsible for causing the injury. The insurer would seek reimbursement from the subcontractor based on the latter’s proportionate share
of responsibility, liability, or fault assigned to the subcontractor either in the original lawsuit or in a separate lawsuit seeking the contribution.
Understanding contribution law is important for subrogation practitioners because an insurer who settles on behalf of its insured must know whether
the settlement will extinguish its subrogated right of contribution against the other tortfeasors to determine what should be paid in settlement.
In some cases, contribution claims are brought within the original lawsuit itself, when one defendant files a cross-claim against a co-defendant. In
other cases, a defendant brings (impleads) a completely new party into the lawsuit claiming that it is also responsible for causing the injury or
damages. In many cases – depending on state law – a liability insurance carrier might settle with the plaintiff before or during a pending lawsuit or as
a result of a judgment, and then seek to make an independent claim for contribution against the third-party defendant, seeking to recover some or all
the damages it paid to the plaintiff, based on allegations that the third-party defendant bears a proportionate share of responsibility, based on its
actions.
Contribution (sharing of liability) differs from indemnity in that the latter is a complete shifting of liability based on common law or statute (e.g., a
manufacturer must indemnify an innocent retailer for sale of a defective product) or even contract, such as a construction contract which requires a
subcontractor to indemnify a general contractor for all damages arising out of the subcontractor’s work, etc.
Contribution is subrogation’s cousin. Insurance carriers differ in the way they approach the right of contribution, but like subrogation, the goal of
contribution is to bring back into the insurance company’s coffers, claim dollars that have been paid out. Insurance companies routinely miss
opportunities to seek contribution recovery dollars because they don’t recognize contribution opportunities or because they have internal
procedures and protocols which allow such contribution rights to go unrealized.
In 1939, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws drafted the first Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act (“UCATA”).
The UCATA was revised in 1955, and by 1988, 17 states had adopted it. The UCATA provides for contribution when two or more persons become
jointly and severally liable in tort for the same injury to person or property, “even though judgment has not been recovered against all or any of
them.” Virtually all tort cases involve potential contribution issues that can arise when one or more tortfeasors enter into settlement agreements.
The same is true for other tort cases in which liability may be shared by multiple defendants or even unnamed tortfeasors. Settlements with joint
tortfeasors raise two major issues. In some jurisdictions, when a joint tortfeasor enters into a settlement, the settling tortfeasor may be entitled to
contribution provided that certain conditions are met. Conversely, a settling tortfeasor may or may not be protected from contribution liability
according to whether other conditions have been satisfied. It is the former scenario that this chart primarily addresses.
Statute of Limitations
Although a state may have a special statute of limitations providing that actions for contribution must be commenced within a specified time after
the cause of action accrues to the injured person (usually the date of the accident or injury) so that the time to file a third-party complaint is
governed by the time the original cause of action accrues and not from the time the right to contribution accrues, the general rule is that the statute
of limitations governing claims for contribution runs from the discharge of the obligation (liability claim payment to the plaintiff by defendant seeking
contribution) and not from the time when the original tort occurred. This means that in many situations, the right of contribution is still viable even
though the plaintiff’s time in which to pursue a defendant has lapsed. For example, Wisconsin’s Wis. Stat. § 893.92 provides:
Wis. Stat. § 893.92. Action for contribution. An action for contribution based on tort, if the right of contribution does not arise out of a prior
judgment allocating the comparative negligence between the parties, shall be commenced within one year after the cause of action accrues or be
barred.
In jurisdictions where the practice permits a party seeking contribution to base its contribution action upon the principal obligation or a judgment as
assignee or subrogee of the creditor, the ordinary rule in simple actions for contribution that the statute of limitations begins to run on payment may
not apply to an action brought on this theory, and the statute of limitations may begin to run from the date the principal obligation becomes due or
from the date of the judgment. While the statute of limitations differs from state to state, the majority rule is that in states which allow such
contribution actions, the statute of limitations for the party seeking contribution runs from the date of its original liability claim payment to the
plaintiff.
CONTRIBUTION ACTIONS IN ALL 50 STATES
STATE JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILTY CONTRIBUTION LAW STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
Pure Joint and Several Liability

Each defendant may be held liable for
the entire loss. Tatum v. Schering
Corp., 523 So.2d 1048 (Ala. 1988).
The right of action against joint No contribution or indemnity between joint tortfeasors is allowed
tortfeasors is one and indivisible and unless a valid indemnification agreement exists, or contribution In actions seeking indemnification,
fault-based apportionment between plaintiff is totally without fault but held liable due to non-delegable the SOL period must be filed two (2)
ALABAMA tortfeasors is not allowed. Ex parte duty. An important exception exists in medical malpractice cases years after liability has become fixed.
Goldsen, 783 So.2d 53 (Ala. 2000). where one tortfeasor can seek indemnity against another if the Ex parte Stonebrook Dev., L.L.C., 854
other’s negligence was the primary or proximate cause of the So.2d 584, 591 (Ala. 2003).
Matkin v. Smith, 643 So.2d 949 (Ala.
injury. Hardy v. McMullan, 612 So.2d 1146 (Ala. 1992).
1994); Crigler v. Salac, 438 So.2d 1375
(Ala. 1983); Mikkelsen v. Salama, 619
So.2d 1382 (Ala. 1993); General
Motors Corp. v. Edwards, 482 So.2d
1176 (Ala. 1985).
Alaska repealed its Uniform Contribution Act when it eliminated

Pure Several Liability joint and several liability. This doesn’t mean that Alaska’s pro-rata
Alaska has a system of pure statutory contribution system is no longer in effect. The repeal
comparative negligence with several does not imply rejection of the principle of contribution based on Two (2) years from the time the right
liability. Plaintiff is only allowed to proportional fault. Common law contribution is still available – it is of action for contribution accrues
ALASKA recover from each defendant their called “Equitable Apportionment.” McLaughlin v. Lougee, 137 P.3d (ordinarily by payment). Alaska Gen.
share of the liability. Alaska Stat. § 267 (Alaska 2006). A liable defendant may obtain contribution, Alarm v. Grinnell, 1 P.3d 98 (Alaska
09.17.080; Alaska Stat. §§ 09.16.10 to (equitable apportionment) by an independent action against non- 2000).
09.16.60 (repealed 1989); McLaughlin party persons who may be responsible for plaintiff’s damages or
v. Lougee, 137 P.3d 267 (Alaska 2006). through joinder under Rule 14(c) in the original suit initiated by
plaintiff.
Pure Several Liability Arizona adopted a pure comparative fault tort system as part of its
Generally, defendants are held enactment of the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasor’s Act
(“UCATA”), A.R.S. § 12-2501, et seq. Since 1988, the doctrine of
severally liable, except when
joint and several liability has been abolished making contribution
tortfeasors are acting in concert or
actions rare under the statute. Bill Alexander Ford v. Casa Ford, 931
there is an issue of vicarious liability.
A.R.S. § 12-2506; Yslava v. Hughes P.2d 1126 (Ariz. App. 1996). No right of contribution when a single
Aircraft Co., 936 P.2d 1274 (Ariz. tortfeasor settles a plaintiff’s claim against him. Three (3) years from date of
ARIZONA 1997). Unless acting in concert or hazard wastes involved. No right of payment or judgment. A.R.S. § 12-
contribution where a settling defendant’s liability is several only. 541.
Contribution allowed only in rare instances where joint and several
liability. PAM Transp. v. Freightliner Corp., 893 P.2d 1295 (Ariz.
1995).
Equitable contribution (arising without regard to contribution
statute) is still viable. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Am. Cas. Co., 938 P.2d 71
(Ariz. 1996).
Pure Several Liability

As of 3/25/03, defendants are
severally – not jointly – liable, and
each defendant will only be liable for
damages based on his percentage of A joint tortfeasor’s failure to sue for contribution within the
Three (3) years from date joint
fault. A.C.A. §§ 16-55-201 and 16-55- principal lawsuit does not impair the party’s ability to seek
tortfeasor pays more than his pro-
ARKANSAS 201(a)-(b)(1). contribution in a separate action. A settling joint tortfeasor may
rata share of common liability. A.C.A.
Two exceptions: (1) Defendant more not seek contribution against one whose liability to the claimant § 16-56-105.
than 10% at fault and another was not extinguished by settlement. A.C.A. § 16-55-203.
defendant insolvent; and (2)
Defendants act in “concert” or as
“agent.” A.C.A. §§ 16-55-203(a)(1)-(5)
and 16-55-205(a).
California allows for contribution by statute. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code §
875 states:
• Where judgment rendered jointly against two or more
defendants there is right of contribution.
• Contribution allowed only after one tortfeasor has discharged
joint judgment or has paid over his pro-rata share.
Modified Joint and Several Liability Contribution limited to the excess paid over pro rata share of
contribution plaintiff and no contribution defendant owes
Joint and several liability for economic contribution beyond his pro-rata share of entire judgment.
damages on negligence claims, • No contribution if intentional act. One (1) year from date the
otherwise several liability for non- • A liability carrier who has discharged or extinguished the settlement is paid. Smith v. Parks
CALIFORNIA economic damages. Cal. Civ. Code liability of a tortfeasor judgment debtor is subrogated to his
Manor, 243 Cal. Rptr. 256 (Cal. App.
Ann. § 1431. right of contribution.
• No contribution if there is indemnity right. 1987).
Exceptions: Strict liability claims. Daly
v. General Motors Corp., 575 P.2d Is called “partial equitable indemnity.” Good faith settlement
1162 (Cal. 1978). finding bars contribution against settling tortfeasor and provides
offset in the amount of the settlement to subsequent liability of
non-settlors. A settling defendant can recover equitable indemnity
from a non-settling defendant to the extent the settling defendant
has discharged a liability the non-settling defendant should be
responsible to pay. The right of contribution can be enforced in a
separate lawsuit. Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Teledyne Indus., Inc., 53
Cal. App.3d 693, 126 Cal. Rptr. 455 (Cal. Ct. App. 1975).
One (1) year after judgment final.

C.R.S. § 13-50.5-104. If no judgment,
contribution plaintiff must discharge
common liability within the
applicable SOL period and initiate
contribution action within one (1)
Modified Joint and Several Liability A right of contribution exists in favor of a tortfeasor who has paid
year of payment.
Generally, a rule of several liability, more than his pro-rata share of the common liability. A claim for
In cases against architects,
COLORADO except where defendants act in contribution may be brought in the underlying action or as a
contractors, builders, etc., general
concert. C.R.S. § 13-21-111.5; Vickery separate action. Fibreboard Corp. v. Fenton, 845 P.2d 1168 (Colo.
1993); C.R.S. § 13-80-104(1)(b)(II)(B). contractor must bring contribution/
v. Evans, 266 P.3d 390 (Colo. 2011).
indemnity claim within 90 days after
the claim arises. However, statute
doesn’t toll 6-year statute of repose
under C.R.S. § 13-80-104. Thermo
Dev., Inc. v. Cent. Masonry Corp., 195
P.3d 1166 (Colo. App. 2008).
One (1) year after judgment final.

Pure Several Liability C.G.S.A. § 52-572(o). If no judgment,
A right of contribution exists in favor of a defendant required to
Several liability, generally, but there is contribution plaintiff must discharge
pay more than his proportionate share of a judgment. A
joint and several liability for actions common liability within the
CONNECTICUT contribution plaintiff who pays or agrees to pay a settlement or
not based in negligence. C.G.S.A. 925 applicable SOL period and initiate
judgment can commence a separate action for contribution by
§ 52-572(h); Allard v. Liberty Oil Equip. contribution action within one (1)
other tortfeasors. C.G.S.A. § 52-572h (1986).
Co., Inc., 756 A.2d 237 (Conn. 2000). year of payment. C.G.S.A. § 52-
572(e).
Pure Joint and Several Liability A settling contribution plaintiff is not entitled to contribution from
Separate contribution actions are
Plaintiff can recover entire amount of a tortfeasor whose liability was not extinguished by the settlement.
rarely allowed. Usually, they must be
DELAWARE damages from any defendant. 10 Del. No contribution in a separate action if it can be enforced by cross-
filed in the underlying third-party
C. § 6301; Blackshear v. Clark, 391 claim in the original action. 10 Del. C. § 6302; Am. Ins. Co. v.
action.
A.2d 747 (Del. 1978). Material Transit, Inc., 446 A.2d 1101, 1104 (Del. Super. 1982).

Joint and Several Liability - Plaintiff
can sue one defendant for the full D.C. Court of Appeals has yet to decide whether a settling
DISTRICT OF
amount of the damages, but plaintiff defendant has a right to contribution. Paul v. Bier, 758 A.2d 40, 46 N/A
COLUMBIA
can only obtain a single recovery. (D.C. 2000).
Leiken v. Wilson, 445 A.2d 993, 999
(D.C. 1982).
In T&S Enterprises Handicap Accessibility, Inc. v. Wink Indus.
Maintenance & Repair, Inc., 11 So.3d 411 (Fla. App. 2009), the
court held that the abolition of joint and several liability acts to
defeat all third-party causes of action for contribution. Because
Pure Several Liability judgment is now entered purely on a pro rata finding of fault, there
Removed joint and several liability in is no longer a need to seek recovery from a non-party joint
tortfeasor. A defendant who intends to place fault on a non-party
2006. Now a system of pure
joint tortfeasor is required to plead such as an affirmative defense
comparative fault - does not apply to and prove the fault of that non-party as a Fabre Defendant (non-
certain actions, including intentional party defendant whom a party defendant asserts is wholly or
torts. F.S.A. § 768.81; T&S Enterprises partially responsible for the negligence alleged by plaintiff
Handicap Accessibility, Inc. v. Wink pursuant to § 768.81(3). To allocate fault to a “Fabre defendant”, it
Indus. Maint. & Repair, Inc., 11 So.3d must (a) plead the fault of the non-party and identify the non-party
411 (Fla. App. 2009). in an affirmative defense, and, (b) prove at trial by a
preponderance of evidence the fault of the non-party (the Fabre
Contribution is the legal doctrine that defendant) causing plaintiff’s injuries in order to get that non-party
allows a tortfeasor to collect from on the verdict form for purposes of having the jury allocate One (1) year after judgment. F.S.A. §
others responsible for the same tort damages to the non-party. 768.31(d)(2). If no judgment, must
after the tortfeasor has paid more discharge liability within underlying
When a release is given in good faith to one of two or more
than his or her pro rata share, persons liable in tort for the same injury, it does not discharge any SOL period and file contribution
wherein the shares represent the of the other tortfeasors from liability for the injury or wrongful action within one (1) year after
FLORIDA percentage of fault attributable to death unless it so provides. It does reduce the claim against the payment. F.S.A. § 768.31(d)(1).
each of the tortfeasors. others to the extent of the amount of the settlement and It
discharges the tortfeasor to whom it is given from all liability for
Section 768.31 states that a party can contribution to any other tortfeasor. F.S.A. § 768.31. Boca Raton For contribution against state or local
only seek contribution when a Transp., Inc. v. Zaldivar, 648 So.2d 812, 813 (Fla. App. 1995). government, six (6) months after
tortfeasor has paid more than his “pro Section 768.31(5) requires that the settling parties act in good faith settlement for contribution claims.
rata share of the common liability, with respect to the non-settling ones. Am. States Ins. Co. v. F.S.A. § 768.28(14).
and the tortfeasor’s total recovery is Kransco, 641 So.2d 175, 177 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994). “Individuals
limited to the amount paid by her or not participating in the settlement are barred from seeking
him in excess of her or his pro rata contribution only if the settling parties acted in good faith with
share.” Therefore, § 768.31 and respect to them.” International Action Sports, Inc. v. Sabellico, 573
So.2d 928, 930 (Fla. App. 1991). Good faith “consists of a good
Florida’s Comparative Fault Statute, § faith determination of relative liabilities.” Am. States Ins. Co., 641
768.81 are somewhat in conflict So.2d at 177. Factors that are considered in determining good faith
because the latter restricts a are the amount of settlement, the depositions of settling parties,
tortfeasor’s contribution beyond his and any evidence of collusion or bad faith. See Seaboard System
own pro rata share of the entire R.R., Inc. v. Goforth, 545 So.2d 482, 483 (Fla. App. 1989).
liability. Equitable subrogation can be used to allow an initial tortfeasor
held liable for the entirety of a personal injury plaintiff’s damages
to recover from a subsequent tortfeasor whose negligence (e.g.,
medical malpractice) exacerbated plaintiff’s injuries. Underwriters
at Lloyds v. City of Lauderdale Lakes, 382 So.2d 702 (Fla. 1980).
There is generally no right to contribution between the co-

defendants when fault is apportioned by a jury or judge. This is
Pure Several Liability because each is liable only for its proportionate share. O.C.G.A. §
Several Liability - If some tortfeasors 51-12-33(b) (apportionment statute) flatly states that apportioned
settle and others do not, the settling damages “shall not be subject to any right of contribution.”
tortfeasor’s fault may be considered, O.C.G.A. § 51-12-33(b); McReynolds v. Krebs, 725 S.E.2d 584 (Ga. Twenty (20) year SOL on contribution
but no setoff is permitted, in assessing 2012). Any settling tortfeasors’ fault is considered in assessing the action begins to run when judgment
the non-settling tortfeasor’s non-settling tortfeasors’ portion of fault, but no setoff is permitted is entered or settlement is made.
GEORGIA for the settlement amount. O.C.G.A. § 51-12-33(b); McReynolds v. Independent Mfg. Co., Inc. v.
percentage of the fault. The
apportionment statute (O.C.G.A. § 51- Krebs, 725 S.E.2d 584 (Ga. 2012). However, the enactment of the Automotive Products, Inc., 233 S.E.2d
12-33) “flatly states that apportioned apportionment statute did not abolish the right of contribution 874 (Ga. App. 1977).
damages shall not be subject to any between settling joint tortfeasors when there has been no
right of contribution.” McReynolds v. apportionment of damages by a trier of fact. Where parties settle
Krebs, 725 S.E.2d 584 (Ga. 2012). voluntarily and a jury does not apportion damages, the right of
contribution still exists. Zurich American Ins. Co. v. Heard, 740
S.E.2d 429 (Ga. App. 2013).
Modified Joint and Several Liability

Contribution plaintiff is entitled to contribution from a tortfeasor
Since 1999, generally several liability; whose liability was extinguished by the settlement, either in main Underlying two (2) year SOL appears
however, some exceptions include action or separate action. An independent action for contribution applicable but runs from date of
HAWAII joint and several liability for personal will not be allowed if the right can be enforced with a third-party settlement payment. Albert v. Dietz,
injury claim non-economic damages action or cross-claim in the principal lawsuit. Haw. Stat. § 663-12 283 F. Supp. 854 (D.C. Haw. 1968).
and intentional tort damages. Haw. (1984); Gump v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 5 P.3d 407 (Haw. 2000).
Rev. Stat. § 663-10.9.
Modified Joint and Several LiabilityContribution plaintiff is entitled to contribution from a tortfeasor 3 Years
Joint and several only for vicarious whose liability was extinguished by the settlement, either in main Idaho Code § 6-803; Porter v.
IDAHO
liability and defendants acting in action or separate action. Idaho Code § 6-803 (1971); Horner v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Idaho, 627 P.2d
concert. Idaho Code § 6-803. Sani-Top, Inc., 141 P.3d 1099 (Idaho 2006). 311 (Idaho 1981).
Right of contribution exists between two or more parties liable for

injury or property damage even if there is no judgment against any
or all of them. Dunbar v. Latting, 621 N.E.2d 232 (Ill. App. 1993). No Suit Filed: Two (2) years from
Modified Joint and Several Liability Liability of contribution defendant must be extinguished. date of contribution plaintiff’s
Contribution also allowed where contribution plaintiff settles and payment.
Joint and several liability, except when
a defendant is less than 25% liable, in good faith obtains release which extinguishes liability of both Suit Filed: Two (2) years from date
which leads to joint and several contribution plaintiff and contribution defendant. Also applies contribution plaintiff served.
liability for medical and related anytime a plaintiff collects damages inconsistent with jury’s finding 740 I.L.C.S. § 15/13-204.
ILLINOIS of percentage of responsibility. No contribution against parties
expenses, but several liability for However, a plaintiff may not add a
plaintiff’s other damages. 735 I.L.C.S. who settle in good faith. 740 I.L.C.S. § 100/2 (1987); Fed. Ins. Co. ex third-party contribution defendant as
§ 10-5/2-1117; Unzicker v. Kraft Food rel. Nat’l Mfg. Co. v. Helmar Lutheran Church, 2004 WL 2921874 a direct defendant if the relevant
Ingredients Corp., 783 N.E.2d 1024 (Ill. (N.D. Ill. Dec. 14, 2004). The Contribution Act “promotes statute of limitations has run. Ponto
2002). settlement by providing that a defendant who enters a good-faith v. Levan, 2012 Ill. App. 2d 110355
settlement with the plaintiff is discharged from any contribution (2nd Dist. 2012).
liability to a non-settling defendant.” BHI Corp. v. Litgen Concrete
Cutting & Coring Co., 827 N.E.2d 435 (Ill. 2005).

Several liability, except for claims of Both the common law of Indiana and the Comparative Fault Act
INDIANA medical malpractice. I.C. § 34-51-2-8; prohibit contribution among joint tortfeasors. I.C. § 34-51-2-12; N/A
Control Techniques, Inc. v. Johnson, Mullen v. Cogdell, 643 N.E.2d 390 (Ind. App. 1994).
762 N.E.2d 104 (Ind. 2002).
Contribution plaintiff is entitled to contribution from a tortfeasor

whose liability was extinguished by the settlement, either in main
action or separate action. Contribution plaintiff must extinguish
liability of contribution defendant to bring separate action. I.C.A. §
668.5; Wilson v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins., 770 N.W.2d 324 (Iowa
Modified Joint and Several Liability 2009). A contribution action may be
brought within the original action or
Joint and several liability only for Section 668.7 provides that a release discharges the defendant a separate action brought within one
IOWA defendants 50% or more at fault and from all liability for contribution, but it does not discharge any (1) year if the parties’ percentages of
for plaintiff’s economic damages only. other persons liable upon the same claim unless it so provides. fault have not been established by
I.C.A. § 668.4. “Nothing requires naming these parties. The court did not require the court. I.C.A. § 668.6(3).
such a rigid rule when the released parties are otherwise
sufficiently identified in a manner that the parties to the release
would know who was to be benefitted”. Nationwide Agribusiness
Ins. Co. v. PGI Int’l, 2016 WL 1680978 (Iowa App. 2016). A court
may reform the release to reflect the intent of the parties.
The “one-action rule” requires that all parties must have their fault
determined in a single trial. All liable parties are joined in one
Pure Several Liability action. No party is liable for the fault of others, so “the equitable
Each defendant only liable for its need for contribution vanished,” and the Kansas Supreme Court
percentage of damages awarded. abolished it. Teepak, Inc. v. Learned, 699 P.2d 35 (Kan. 1985). N/A
KANSAS
K.S.A. § 60-258a; Albertson v. Defendant in comparative negligence action cannot settle claim on
Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft, behalf of party or parties against whom plaintiff has not sought
634 P.2d 1127 (Kan. 1981). recovery and then seek contribution from those parties in
proportion to percentage of causal negligence attributable to
them. Ellis v. Union Pac. R. Co., 643 P.2d 158 (Kan. 1982).
Contribution allowed (unless act of moral turpitude), but rare,

because defendants are severally liable only for a percentage of Five (5) year SOL begins to run upon
liability based on assessed percentage of fault. Percentages are payment by contribution plaintiff.
Several Liability; no right of assigned to settling parties but not to non-parties. Settlement K.R.S. § 413.120.
KENTUCKY
contribution between co-defendants. discharges defendant from any liability in contribution. K.R.S. §
Baker v. Richeson, 440 S.W.2d 272
K.R.S. § 411.182. 412.030; Dix & Assocs. Pipeline Contractors v. Key, 799 S.W.2d 24 (Ky. 1969).
(Ky. 1990).
Defendant not liable for more than his percentage of fault and not
jointly liable with any other person for damages not attributable to
Joint and Divisible Liability him, unless he conspires to commit intentional, tortious act. Non-
Generally, several liability, unless intentional tortuous acts are now considered joint and divisible,
defendants commit an intentional and each joint tortfeasor is liable only for the degree of fault
tort; they are then jointly and attributed to his actions. La. C.C. arts. 2323 and 2324.
severally (solidarily) liable. La. C.C. Art. Contribution permits a tortfeasor who has paid more than his
1815, et seq.; Ross v. Conoco, Inc., 828 share of a solidary obligation (joint liability) to seek reimbursement
So.2d 546 (La. 2002). from the other tortfeasors for their respective shares of the
The Louisiana Legislature amended judgment, but only if actions are intentional and/or willful. One (1) year SOL applies but runs
Art. 2324 in 1996, transforming Hamway v. Braud, 838 So.2d 803 (La. App. 2002). from date of payment. La. Civ. Code
LOUISIANA solidary liability into a complex “joint When a plaintiff settles with and releases one of several joint Art. 3492, 3595; Cole v. Celotex
and divisible” obligation. It is tortfeasors, he deprives the remaining tortfeasors (obligors) of Corp., 599 So.2d 1058 (La. 1992).
described as “comparative fault.” A their right of contribution and reduces the recovery against the
defendant’s liability is proportionate remaining obligor by the percentage of fault of the released
to his percentage of fault. Notre tortfeasor. Taylor v. U.S.F.& G., 630 So.2d 237 (La. 1993).
Dame, LLC v. Kolbe & Kolbe Mill Work Non-parties who are found at fault may also be assigned a
Co., 151 F. Supp.3d 715 (E.D. La. percentage of fault, reducing the defendant’s liability to the
2015). plaintiff.
Plaintiff responsible for his own A cause of action for indemnity does not arise until the lawsuit is
percentage of fault. La. C.C. Art. 2323. concluded and the party seeking indemnity has made payment to
plaintiff or sustained any loss (such as payment of defense costs).
Suire v. Lafayette City Parish Consol. Gov’t, 907 So.2d 37 (La. 2005).
Joint tortfeasors have a right to contribution which may be
Defendants are jointly and severally Contribution action brought within a
enforced through a separate action. It is an equitable right,
liable for total amount of judgment to reasonable period of time not
MAINE founded on the principles of natural justice, as opposed to a
plaintiff. 14 M.R.S.A. § 156-A; Peerless subject to affirmative defense of
statutory right. Otis Elevator Co. v. F.W. Cunningham & Sons, 454
Div. v. U.S. Special Hydraulic Cylinders laches.
A.2d 335 (Me. 1983).
Corp., 742 A.2d 906 (Me. 1999).
Tortfeasor has action for contribution against joint tortfeasor who
signs release and agrees he’s a joint tortfeasor or who is so
determined by a court. A joint tortfeasor who paid more than his
Pure Joint and Several Liability pro-rata share of judgment may enforce right of contribution by Three (3) years from date of
making a post-trial motion for Judgment of Contribution or
Joint and Several Liability; each Recovery Over pursuant to Md. Rule 2-614 even if he did not file a payment or judgment. Md. Cts. &
MARYLAND defendant may be liable for full cross-claim against his joint tortfeasors. Lerman v. Heemann, 701 Jud. Proc. § 5-101 (1998); Tadjer v.
amount of damages. Md. Code § 3- A.2d 426 (Md. 1997). Montgomery County, 487 A.2d 658
1401. A contractual waiver of subrogation does not bar contribution (Md. 1985).
under the Maryland Uniform Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors
Act (“UCATA”). Gables Construction, Inc. v. Red Coats, Inc., 2019
WL 2067348 (Md. App. 2019).
Pure Joint and Several Liability Contribution plaintiff entitled to recover from joint tortfeasor the One (1) year after judgment.
Joint and several liability with amount of a reasonable settlement which is in excess of his pro- M.G.L.A. 231B § 1(c). If no judgment,
defendant’s liability being divided rata share of liability, in third-party action or separate action. Ann. must discharge liability within SOL
MASSACHUSETTS equally regardless of percentage of
L. Mass. Ch. 231B, § 1 (1962); Shantigar Foundation v. Bear Mt. period and file contribution action
fault. Ann L. Mass. Ch. 231B, § 1;
Zeller v. Cantu, 478 N.E.2d 930 (Mass. Builders, 804 N.E.2d 324 (Mass. 2004); Ace Am. Ins. Co. v. Riley within one (1) year after payment.
1985). Bros., Inc., 2013 WL 4029087 (Mass. Super. 2013). M.G.L.A. 231B, § 1(d).
Judgment: Separate action must be

Judgment: Contribution plaintiff who satisfies all or part of a filed within one (1) year after
judgment for which he is jointly liable is entitled to contribution judgment has become final by lapse
only if the contribution defendant was made a party to the original of time for appeal or after appellate
action and a reasonable effort was made to notify him of the review.
commencement of the action. Settlement: Separate action barred
Settlement: A tortfeasor who enters into a settlement with the unless contribution plaintiff has paid
Several liability, but with many claimant is entitled to bring an action for contribution when the within SOL applicable to plaintiff’s
exceptions, including medical contribution defendant’s liability was extinguished by the right of action against him (three
MICHIGAN
malpractice cases. Mich. Comp. L. § settlement, a reasonable effort was made to notify him of the years) and has commenced his
600.6304; Driver v. Naini, 802 N.W.2d settlement negotiations, and he was given a reasonable contribution action within one (1)
311 (Mich. 2011). opportunity to participate in the settlement negotiations. year after payment – unless
contribution plaintiff has agreed
Contribution may be enforced by motion or a separate action. while underlying action is pending
Liability insurer is subrogated to rights of contribution plaintiff. against him to discharge common
Gerling Konzern Allgemeine Versicherungs AG v. Lawson, 684 liability and, within one (1) year after
N.W.2d 358 (Mich. 2004). the agreement, paid liability and
commenced his contribution action.
Modified Joint and Several Liability The six (6) year SOL for the
Generally several liability, unless contribution/ indemnity action does
Contribution in proportion to percentage of fault is allowed. A
particular defendant is more than 50% not begin to run until contribution
contribution plaintiff may sue for contribution in the underlying
MINNESOTA at fault, or if defendants act in plaintiff has paid. M.S.A. §
action or in a separate action. Anderson v. Gabrielson, 126 N.W.2d
concert. M.S.A. § 604.02; Staab v. 541.05(1)(5); Blomgren v. Marshall
239 (Minn. 1964).
Diocese of St. Cloud, 813 N.W.2d 68 Mgmt. Services, Inc., 483 N.W.2d 504
(Minn. 2012). (Minn. App. 1992).

Joint and several liability abolished in 2007. Today, contribution
Several liability, unless defendants act Three (3) years from date of
actions allowed for those whose liability is joint and several
in concert - then joint and several payment.* M.C.A. § 15-1-49.
MISSISSIPPI because they took part in a common plan to commit a tortious act.
liability. M.C.A. § 85-5-7; J.B. Hunt *Unclear under MS law. Catch-All
M.C.A. § 85-5-7 (1989); DePriest v. Barber, 798 So.2d 456 (Miss.
Transport v. Forrest General Hosp., 34 Statute.
2001).
So.3d 1171 (Miss. 2010).

Joint and several liability only where Five (5) years from date of
Joint tortfeasors have a right to contribution. Contribution may be
defendants are 51% or more at fault - settlement or payment of judgment.
sought in the underlying action or in a separate action. Mo. Rev.
MISSOURI otherwise several liability. Mo. Rev. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 516.120 (2002);
Stat. § 537.060; Safeway Stores, Inc. v. City of Raytown, 633 S.W.2d
Stat. § 537.067; Burg v. Dampier, 346 Greenstreet v. Rupert, 795 S.W.2d
727 (Mo. 1982).
S.W.3d 343 (Mo. Ct. App. W. Dist. Div. 539 (Mo. App. 1990).
2 2011).
Joint tortfeasors have a right to contribution. Contribution may be

sought in the underlying action or as a separate action. Mont. Code
§ 27-1-703; Consolidated Freightways v. Osier, 605 P.2d 1076
(Mont. 1979).
Modified Joint and Several Liability A person who has settled a claim with a defendant without a
Joint and several liability, unless a lawsuit having been filed may not bring an action for contribution Three (3) years from date of
particular defendant is 50% or less at against a joint tortfeasor under § 27–1–703. A settling defendant settlement or payment of judgment.
MONTANA
fault, then several. Mont. Stat. § 27-1- may not bring a subsequent, separate, contribution action against Mont. Stat. § 30-3-122(7).
703; Newville v. Dept. of Family a person that was not a party in the underlying action. Montana
Services, 883 P.2d 793 (Mont. 1994). does not recognize a common law right of indemnity where the
negligence of the party seeking indemnification was remote,
passive, or secondary, compared to the active negligence of the
party from whom indemnity is sought. Metro Aviation, Inc. v.
United States, 305 P.3d 832 (2013).
Joint tortfeasors have a right to contribution. The contribution
plaintiff must extinguish the liability of the joint tortfeasor from
whom contribution is sought. The right to contribution becomes
enforceable when one tortfeasor discharges more than his
proportionate share of the judgment. Royal Indem. Co. v. Aetna
Cas. & Surety Co., 229 N.W.2d 183 (Neb. 1975). Before
contribution plaintiff can recover against contribution defendant,
Modified Joint and Several Liability contribution plaintiff must prove by the greater weight of the
evidence each and all of the following: Four (4) years from date of
Joint and several liability for economic settlement or payment of judgment.
(1) Both that plaintiff and defendant had a common liability to the
damages (or defendants acting in third party, and the amount of that common liability; Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-206 (1995);
NEBRASKA
concert), several liability for non- (2) Both that plaintiff paid more than its pro-rata share of the Cepel v. Smallcomb, 628 N.W.2d 654
economic damages. Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ common liability, and the amount of money that it paid over and (Neb. 2001).
25-21, 185.10. above its pro-rata share;
(3) The part of the common liability that is owed by defendant, and
(4) That plaintiff has extinguished defendant’s liability to third
party.
If liability of contribution defendant was extinguished by
settlement, then instead of No. 3 above, you must show that
amount paid in settlement by contribution plaintiff was
reasonable.
Where two or more persons become jointly or severally liable in

tort for the same injury to person or property or for the same
wrongful death, there is a right of contribution among them even
though judgment has not been recovered against all or any of
them. The right of contribution exists only in favor of a tortfeasor
who has paid more than his equitable share of the common
Several liability, except for (1) strict liability, and the tortfeasor’s total recovery is limited to the
liability, defendants acting in concert, amount paid by the tortfeasor in excess of his equitable share. No
(2) environmental torts, or ordinary tortfeasor is compelled to make contribution beyond his own Contribution plaintiff may seek
negligence where the plaintiff is fault equitable share of the entire liability. A tortfeasor who enters into contribution during the original
NEVADA free - then joint and several liability a settlement with a claimant is not entitled to recover contribution proceeding or in separate proceeding
applies to all at-fault defendants. from another tortfeasor whose liability for the injury or wrongful filed within one (1) year of final
N.R.S. § 41-141; GES, Inc. v. Corbitt, 21 death is not extinguished by the settlement nor in respect to any judgment.
P.3d 11 (Nev. 2001); Buck by Buck v. amount paid in a settlement which is in excess of what was
Greyhound Lines, Inc., 783 P.2d 437 reasonable. N.R.S. § 17.225.
(Nev. 1989).
Joint tortfeasor has right of contribution unless he settles with
claimant prior to judgment. Judgment against one tortfeasor does
not discharge the other tortfeasors from liability, nor does
satisfaction of the judgment impair right of contribution. N.R.S. §
17.225; Van Cleave v. Gamboni Const., 706 P.2d 845 (Nev. 1985).

Joint and several liability for If Judgment: One (1) year from date
defendants more than 50% at fault, Whether or not the proportionate fault of the parties has been judgment final.
for other defendants with less than established, contribution actions may be enforced in a separate
50% fault, several liability. N.H. Rev.
action, even if a judgment has not been rendered against the If No Judgment: Contribution plaintiff
NEW
Stat. Ann § 507:7-e. person seeking contribution or the person from whom contribution must discharge common liability
HAMPSHIRE
within SOL of underlying action and
Joint and several always when is being sought. N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann § 507:7-e; Pike Industries v. then has one (1) year to file
defendants found to be acting in Hiltz Construction, 718 A.2d 236 (N.H. 1998). contribution action.
concert. Gouldreault v. Kleeman, 965
A.2d 1040 (N.H. 2009).
Contribution allowed provided there is a judgment, determination

of plaintiff’s damages, and existence of non-settling defendants.
Settling tortfeasor is entitled to contribution from other joint
Modified Joint and Several Liability tortfeasors if settlement extinguishes the joint tortfeasor’s liability Six (6) years from date the cause of
and settlement was reasonable, provided the settlement is
Several liability for defendants less elevated to a final judgment (e.g., consent judgment from court or action accrues (payment). N.J.S.A. §
NEW JERSEY than 60% at fault, otherwise dismissal). N.J. Stat. § 2A:53A-3; Steele v. Kerrigan, 689 A.2d 685 2A:14-1; Ideal Mut. Ins. Co. v. Royal
defendants will be held jointly and (N.J. 1997). No contribution allowed with ordinary settlement, Globe Ins. Co., 511 A.2d 1205 (N.J.
severally liable. N.J.S.A. § 2A:15-5.3. Super. 1986).
unless there was a dismissal, the non-settling tortfeasor was not a
party to the suit, and the SOL bars any subsequent claim against
the contribution defendant by the original plaintiff. Gangemi v.
National Health Laboratories, Inc., 701 A.2d 965 (N.J. App. 1997).
Contribution is eliminated between concurrent tortfeasors. Several

Modified Joint and Several Liability liability only. No contribution allowed by severally liable defendant.
Pure comparative fault adopted in N.M.S.A. § 41-3A-1. If concurrent tortfeasor liable only for his Three (3) years from date
1981. This abolished joint and several respective share of fault, no need for contribution. Wilson v. Galt, contribution plaintiff has either
liability between concurrent 668 P.2d 1104 (N.M. App. 1983). When successive tortfeasor discharged the common liability of
tortfeasors. There is only several liability (exception to several liability) or one of the exceptions the joint tortfeasors by payment or
NEW MEXICO liability, except for intentional torts, when joint and several applies (e.g., inherently dangerous activity), has paid more than his pro-rata
vicariously liable defendants, matters joint and several liability applies. The original injury and the share. N.M.S.A. § 55-3-118; Mora-
involving inherently dangerous subsequent enhancement of the injury must be “separate and San Miguel Elec. Co-Op., Inc. v. Hicks
activities, and products liability cases. causally-distinct injuries.” There must be negligence, causation, & Ragland, 598 P.2d 218 (N.M. App.
N.M.S.A. § 41-3A-1; Lewis v. Samson, and a distinct original injury. Gulf Ins. Co. v. Cottone, 148 P.3d 814 1979).
35 P.3d 972 (N.M. 2001). (N.M. 2006). Example: injury followed by negligent medical care.
There must be a second, distinct injury or enhancement.
Joint tortfeasors have right to contribution, provided they have
discharged the common liability of joint tortfeasors by payment or
have paid over their pro-rata share. Settlement or order must
satisfy “all claims” arising out of incident. A settling defendant who
has obtained a general release from plaintiff is free from any claim
of contribution by non-settling defendants under § 15-108. That
Modified Joint and Several Liability defendant will be dropped from the action. Furthermore, settling
Joint and several liability, except when defendant forfeits any claim that he/she may have for contribution
it is a personal injury defendant less against other non-settling defendants; he/she does not, however,
forfeit the right to indemnification. Two (2) years from date of payment.
than 50% liable - then several liability Berlin & Jones, Inc. v. State, 381
NEW YORK
and only for non-economic damages. Contribution may be sought in underlying action or a separate
N.Y.S.2d 778 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. 1976).
N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 1601; Cooney v. Osgood action. A joint tortfeasor who settles with tortfeasor relieves that
Machinery, 612 N.E.2d 277 (N.Y. tortfeasor of any potential contribution liability to any other
1993). person. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 1401; Sommer v. Fed. Signal Corp., 593
N.E.2d 1365 (N.Y. 1992). Settlement is “voluntary” if before
judgment, but not after judgment. Makeun v. New York, 471
N.Y.S.2d 293, 298 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984). Settling tortfeasor cannot
seek contribution from non-settling defendant even if he pays over
his share, because he’s a “volunteer.” Orsini v. Kugel, 9 F.3d 1042
(2nd Cir. 1993).
Contribution plaintiff for years were entitled to recover from joint
tortfeasor the amount of a reasonable settlement which is in
excess of his pro-rata share of liability in a third-party action or as a
separate action. N.C.G.S.A. § 1B-2; Chamock v. Taylor, 26 S.E.2d
911 (N.C. 1943). There was a common law right to contribution, or
equitable contribution, pursuant to which one person can obtain
reimbursement for a portion of the judgment or liability against
him. The extent to which common law contribution is still available
is not entirely clear following passage of the Uniform Right to
Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors Act (“UJTA”). One case One (1) year after judgment or
argues that there is no longer any common law contribution. payment. Three (3) years after
Pure Joint and Several Liability Holland v. Edgerton, 355 S.E.2d 514 (N.C. App. 1987) (“The right to voluntary dismissal of pending
NORTH
Joint and Several Liability. N.C.G.S.A. § contribution is statutory; therefore, it must be enforced according contribution claim. Safety Mut. Cas.
CAROLINA to the terms of the statute”). North Carolina has passed the UJTA. Corp. v. Spears, Barnes, Baker,
1B-2.
N.C.G.S.A. § 1B-1(a). It contains several specific statutory Wainio, Brown & Whaley, 409 S.E.2d
provisions regarding the right to contribution, including the 736 (N.C. App. 1991).
recognition of the right. G.S. § 1B-1(a). However, a general
contractor usually does not have a contribution claim against a
subcontractor, because they are not tortfeasors toward the owner.
A settling tortfeasor has a right of contribution only if he
extinguishes liability of the other tortfeasor. A tortfeasor which
settles with a claimant is not entitled to recover contribution from
another tortfeasor whose liability for the injury or wrongful death
hasn’t been extinguished nor in respect to any amount paid in a
settlement that is in excess of what was reasonable. G.S. § 1B-1(d).
Modified Joint and Several Liability Contribution allowed in underlying or separate action where
Must be brought by motion in
tortfeasor pays more than his share of common liability.
Several liability, unless defendants are Contribution plaintiff only entitled to contribution if liability of pending suit or within one (1) year of
NORTH
acting in concert. N.D.C.C. § 32-03.2- contribution defendant was extinguished by a reasonable judgment. If settlement, must be
DAKOTA
02; Pierce v. Shannon, 607 N.W.2d 878 settlement. N.D.C.C. § 32-03.2-02 (1987); Pierce v. Shannon, 607 brought within one (1) year of
(N.D. 2000). payment.
N.W.2d 878 (N.D. 2000).

Joint and several liability for economic
Contribution allowed in underlying or separate action where
damages where defendant is more
tortfeasor pays more than his share of common liability.
than 50% at fault. Ohio Rev. Code
Contribution plaintiff only entitled to contribution if liability of One (1) year after judgment or timely
Ann. § 2307.22; Gurry v. C.P., 972 N.E.
OHIO contribution defendant was extinguished by a reasonable settlement. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §
154 (Ohio 2012).
settlement. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2307.25; Nationwide Ins. Co. v. 2307.26.
If found liable for intentional torts, Shenefield, 620 N.E.2d 866 (1992). A general release of “all other
joint and several liability applies for parties” is insufficient. It must name the non-settling party.
plaintiff’s economic damages – non-
economic losses are several liability.
Contribution allowed in underlying or separate action where

Pure Several Liability tortfeasor pays more than his share of common liability. Liability
Two (2) years after final judgment or
Several Liability - each tortfeasor is insurer specifically subrogated to rights of contribution tortfeasor. settlement. Fruehauf Trailer Co. v.
OKLAHOMA liable only for the amount of damages Contribution plaintiff only entitled to contribution if liability of Gilmore, 167 F.2d 324 (10th Cir.
allocated to that individual. 23 Okla. contribution defendant was extinguished by a reasonable 1948).
Stat. Ann. § 15. settlement. 12 Okla. Stat. § 832; Barringer v. Baptist Healthcare, 22
P.3d 695 (Okla. 2001).
Contribution plaintiff entitled to recover from joint tortfeasor the

amount of a reasonable settlement which is in excess of his pro-
rata share of liability in a third-party action or as a separate action.
O.A.R. §§ 31.800 and 31.805; Lasley v. Combined Transp., 261 P.3d
1215 (Or. 2011).
Several Liability, except for
Section 31.800 governs. The four elements of a claim for Two (2) years after final judgment or
OREGON environmental torts, but if part of
contribution by a tortfeasor settling with the tort victim are: (1) settlement. O.A.R. § 18.450.
judgment is uncollectable, it may be
joint liability in tort for the same injury; (2) contribution plaintiff
reallocated. O.A.R. § 31-610.
paid more than a proportional share of the common liability; (3)
settlement extinguished the contribution defendant's liability; and
(4) settlement was reasonable. Jensen v. Alley, 877 P.2d 108 (Or.
App. 1994).
Contribution allowed among joint tortfeasors. Any defendant who

pays more than his percentage may seek contribution in underlying
action or as a separate action. 42 P.S. § 7102; McMeekin v. Harry
M. Stevens, Inc., 530 A.2d 462 (Pa. Super. 1987). Section 8324
Modified Joint and Several Liability provides for contribution among joint tortfeasors provided the
Two (2) years from date of judgment
Several Liability, except for intentional contribution plaintiff has discharged the common liability or paid or settlement. Hughes v. Pron, 429
PENNSYLVANIA
torts and when defendants are more more than his share. If there is a settlement, the contribution A.2d 9 (Pa. Super. 1981).
than 60% at fault. 42 P.S. § 7102. plaintiff must extinguish the liability of the contribution defendant
to pursue contribution from him. To prove they are joint
tortfeasors, actual liability of both tortfeasors must be established.
Undecided if settling defendant can seek contribution from a non-
party to the original suit. If there is a judgment, however, he can.

Joint and Several Liability - plaintiff Contribution among joint tortfeasors allowed in underlying action One (1) year after judgment or
RHODE ISLAND may recover full amount of damages or separate action. R.I.G.I. § 10-6-3; Hawkins v. Gadoury, 713 A.2d
settlement. R.I.G.I § 10-6-4.
from any one tortfeasor. R.I.G.I. § 10- 799 (R.I. 1998).
6-2.
A tortfeasor who enters into a settlement with claimant is not

entitled to recover contribution from another tortfeasor whose
liability for the injury or wrongful death is not extinguished by
settlement or in respect to any amount paid in settlement which is
Modified Joint and Several Liability in excess of what was reasonable. A settling tortfeasor may recover
Several liability for a defendant found contribution from a non-settling tortfeasor provided the
less than 50% at fault, as long as settlement agreement must extinguish the non-settling
conduct did not involve drugs/alcohol tortfeasor’s liability and settlement amount must be reasonable. One (1) year after the common
SOUTH
and was not intentional - all others Where there is no judgment against the tortfeasor seeking liability is extinguished by the
CAROLINA
are jointly and severally liable. S.C. contribution, the right of contribution is barred unless they have release.
Code Ann. § 15-38-15; Branham v. either: (1) discharged by payment the common liability within the
Ford Motor Co., 701 S.E.2d 5 (S.C. SOL period applicable to plaintiff’s right of action against them and
2010). have commenced action for contribution within one (1) year after
payment, or (2) agreed while action is pending against them to
discharge common liability and have, within one (1) year after the
agreement, paid the liability and commenced their contribution
action for contribution. S.C. Code Ann. § 15-38-20.

A joint tortfeasor has a right of contribution in the underlying
Joint and several liability for
action and separate action if they settle and extinguish the liability
defendants 50% or more at fault.
of the contribution defendant. A release by the injured person of One (1) year after payment
S.D.C.L. § 15-8-11.
SOUTH one joint tortfeasor does not relieve him from contribution liability (judgment or settlement). Uniform
DAKOTA Joint and several liability for unless the release is given before right of contribution accrues and Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act
defendants less than 50% at fault, but provides a pro-rata reduction of plaintiff’s damages recoverable (“UCATA”).
with a cap on liability - no more than against all other tortfeasors. S.D.C.L. § 15-8-12; Freeman v. Berg,
twice their proportionate share of the 482 N.W.2d 32, 34 (S.D. 1992).
fault. S.D.C.L. § 15-8-15.1.
Where two or more persons are jointly or severally liable in tort for
the same injury to person or property, joint tortfeasors have right
of contribution, unless intentional. Right of contribution exists only
in favor of tortfeasor who paid more than the proportionate share
of shared liability between two or more tortfeasors for the same
injury or wrongful death, in accordance with the procedure set out
in § 29-11-104, and tortfeasor’s total recovery is limited to amount
paid by tortfeasor in excess of this proportionate share.
Contribution action can be brought in original action or in a
separate action. T.C.A. § 29-11-102; Velsicol Chem. Corp. v. Rowe,
Pure Several Liability 543 S.W.2d 337, 340 (Tenn. 1976). A tortfeasor who enters into
Generally, several liability, except settlement with a claimant isn’t entitled to recover contribution One (1) year after payment
when defendants act in concert or for from another tortfeasor whose liability for the injury or wrongful (judgment or settlement). Security
TENNESSEE death isn’t extinguished by settlement nor in respect to any Fire Protection v. City of Ripley, 608
products liability cases. Banks v. Elks
Club Pride of Tenn., 1102, 301 S.W.3d amount paid in a settlement which is over what was reasonable. A S.W.2d 874 (Tenn. App. 1980).
214 (Tenn. 2010). liability insurer, who by payment has discharged in full or in part
the liability of a tortfeasor and has thereby discharged in full its
obligation as insurer, may be subrogated to tortfeasor’s right of
contribution to the extent of the amount it paid in excess of the
tortfeasor’s proportionate share of shared liability between two or
more tortfeasors for the same injury or wrongful death, in
accordance with the procedure set out in § 29-11-103. This
provision does not limit or impair right of subrogation or
assignment arising from any other relationship and causes of
action for contribution or indemnity are fully assignable and
transferable. T.C.A. § 29-11-102(d)(e).
Each joint and several tortfeasor paying more than its proportion
of damages has a right to contribution from other jointly and
severally liable defendants up to the other defendants’ unpaid
Modified Joint and Several Liability share of damages. No defendant has a right of contribution against Two (2) years from date judgment or
Joint and several liability for any settling person and a settling defendant has no contribution settlement imposes liability on
TEXAS defendants more than 50% at fault, or rights against non-settling defendants. Contribution claims contribution plaintiff. Beaumont
defendants who act intentionally. Tex. between named defendants must be determined in the primary Coca Cola Bottling Co. v. Cain, 628
Civ. Prac. § 33.013. suit or they are waived unless right of contribution exists because a S.W.2d 99 (Tex. App. 1981).
third-party was not party of the primary suit and has made no
settlement with plaintiff. Tex. Civ. Prac. § 33.015; C & H Nationwide
v. Thompson, 903 S.W.2d 315 (Tex. 1994).
Utah has no joint and several liability. Therefore, a defendant in a
Several Liability - if some parties are
tort case is not entitled to contribution. A defendant may join
immune from suit, their share can be Four (4) years for personal injuries.
UTAH other responsible parties as defendants in the original action and
allocated to other defendants if their U.C.A. § 78-12-25(3).
may identify non-parties whom the trier of fact should consider
fault is less than 40%. U.C.A. § 78B-5-
when allocating fault. U.C.A. § 78B-5-820.
818.
Several liability where plaintiff is also Vermont does not afford joint tortfeasors a right to contribution.
VERMONT N/A
at fault in some manner. 12 Vt. Stat. Murray v. J & B Int’l Trucks, Inc., 508 A.2d 1351 (Vt. 1986).
Ann. § 1036.
Joint tortfeasors have a right to contribution in cases of negligence
with no moral turpitude. A joint tortfeasor who settles isn’t subject
to contribution from others and isn’t entitled to contribution
unless settlement specifically discharges or extinguishes all joint
Three (3) years from date of
tortfeasors from liability. Va. St. § 8.01-34; Va. St. § 8.01-35.1;
Pure Joint and Several Liability payment of judgment or settlement.
Sullivan v. Robertson Drug Co., 639 S.E.2d 250 (Va. 2007).
Joint and several liability for all Right of contribution arises when one tortfeasor has paid claims Va. St. § 8.01-246(4) (Implied
VIRGINIA Contract); Gemco-Ware, Inc. v.
tortfeasors. Va. St. § 8.01-443; Cox v. that another wrongdoer is also liable. Insurer making settlement of
Geary, 624 S.E.2d 16 (Va. 2006). claim against its insured is subrogated to his right of contribution. Rongene Mold, 360 S.E.2d 342 (Va.
Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co. v. Minnifield, 196 S.E.2d 75 (Va. 1973). 1987).
Insurance company that has subrogation and contribution rights
arising out of same accident may assert these rights separately.
Nationwide Mut. v. Jewel Tea Co., 202 Va. 527, 118 S.E.2d 646.
Right of contribution exists between or among two or more
persons who are jointly and severally liable for same loss, whether One (1) year from date of judgment.
judgment has been recovered against all or any of them. It may be If no judgment has been rendered,
enforced in original action or by a separate action. Contribution is the contribution plaintiff must have
available to a person who settles only (a) if liability of the person (a) discharged by payment the
against whom contribution is sought has been extinguished by common liability within the period of
Modified Joint and Several Liability the statute of limitations applicable
settlement and (b) to extent that the amount paid in settlement
Joint and several liability where was reasonable at time of settlement. R.C.W.A. § 4.22.040. to the claimant’s right of action
plaintiff is not at fault, cases of against him or her and commenced
WASHINGTON If the comparative fault of the parties to a claim for contribution the action for contribution within
vicarious liability, and where has been established previously by the court in the original action,
defendants act in concert - otherwise one (1) year after payment, or (b)
a party paying over that party’s equitable share of the obligation, agreed while the action was pending
several liability. R.C.W.A. § 4.22.070. upon motion, may recover judgment for contribution. If it hasn’t to discharge the common liability
been established in the original action, contribution may be and, within one (1) year after the
enforced in a separate action, whether a judgment has been agreement, have paid the liability
rendered against the person seeking contribution or person from and commenced an action for
whom contribution is being sought. R.C.W.A. § 4.22.050; Mazon v. contribution. R.C.W.A. § 4.22.050.
Krafchick, 144 P.3d 1168 (Wash. 2006).
Prior to abolishing joint and several, proportionate fault attributed

by judgment to non-parties and paid by liable defendant could be
recovered from the non-party by contribution. A settling defendant
could not seek contribution.
In 2015, West Virginia abolished joint and several and passed a
new modified comparative fault system. W. Va. Code §§ 55-7-13
and 55-7-24. Under the new system, liability is “several” and
defendants are only responsible for their proportion of fault. After
5/25/15, the new § 55-7-13d allows juries to consider the fault of
non-parties. Any fault assigned to non-parties will be reduced from
plaintiff’s recovery in proportion to the % of fault charged to the
non-party. Where plaintiff has settled with a party or non-party
before verdict, plaintiff’s recovery will be reduced in proportion to
Modified Joint and Several Liability the % of fault assigned to the settling party or non-party. The new
system is applicable to all actions arising on or after 5/25/15.
Joint and Several Liability abolished as Defendants no longer need to file third-party complaints against
of June 2015 and Modified Two (2) years from date of judgment.
non-parties if they wish to assert claims for contribution to have
Comparative Fault implemented. W. Va. Code § 55-2-12. It applies to
fault assessed against other potentially liable parties and no longer
Liability of each defendant for actions based in tort or any other
need to give notice that they intend to have fault of non-parties
WEST VIRGINIA compensatory damages shall be only legal theory seeking damages for
considered. This may result in plaintiffs suing all potentially liable
several and not joint. Joint liability will personal injury, property damage, or
parties at the outset of litigation. The new § 55-7-13d allows jury to
only be imposed where there is a wrongful death arising on or after
consider fault of all potentially liable parties, regardless of whether
conscious conspiracy between two or June 2015.
the person was or could’ve been named a party, i.e., plaintiff can
more defendants. W. Va. Code § 55-7- now “try the empty chair.” The fault of a non-party may be
13a to § 55-7-13d (amended 3/5/15). considered if (1) plaintiff settles with non-party, or (2) defendant
provides notice no later than 180 days after service of process that
a non-party was at fault. Notice must be served on all parties and
filed with the court. Recovery is reduced by % of fault chargeable
to the non-party and fault assessed against non-parties does not
make that party liable, and may not be used as evidence, and isn’t
admissible in any other action. W.Va. Code §55-7-13d(a)(5).
Where a tortfeasor settles with and is released by plaintiff and
obtains a release for a joint tortfeasor, the release preserves the
settling tortfeasor’s right of contribution against the released joint
tortfeasor. No right of contribution exists against any defendant
who settles in good faith with plaintiff prior to the jury’s findings as
to total damages. Modular Bldg. Consultants of W. Va. Inc. v.
Poerio, Inc., 774 S.E.2d 555 (W. Va. 2015).
A joint tortfeasor who pays more than his share of the damages
can seek contribution against the other tortfeasors. State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Schara, 201 N.W.2d 758 (Wis. 1972). A
Modified Joint and Several Liability settlement by one tortfeasor does not alter the right to
Joint and several liability for contribution. Id. Each party’s degree of fault is allocated by the
defendants who are 51% or more at jury. Wis. Stat. § 895.045; Pachowitz v. Milwaukee Suburban One (1) year from payment. Wis.
fault and all acted in concert to cause Transport Corp., 202 N.W.2d 268 (Wis. 1972). The issue of Stat. § 893.92. Payment, not
WISCONSIN plaintiff’s damages. Wis. Stat. § contribution may be decided in the original litigation. Johnson v. determination of proportional
895.045; Richards v. Badger Mut. Ins., Heintz, 243 N.W.2d 815 (Wis. 1974). responsibilities, starts the one (1)
749 N.W.2d 581 (Wis. 2008). Several The right to contribution arises when one party has paid more year SOL period running.
liability for cases involving strict (judgment or settlement) than its just proportion of a joint liability.
products liability. The right of contribution cannot arise out of a prior judgment
allocating the comparative negligence between the two parties.
General Accident Ins. Co. v. Schoendorf & Sorgi, 549 N.W.2d 429
(Wis. 1996).

Several liability with each defendant Joint and several liability has been abolished. No right of
WYOMING only paying their share of the liability. contribution exists. Anderson Highway Signs & Supply v. Close, 6 N/A
Wyo. Stat. § 1-1-109; Pinnacle Bank v. P.3d 123 (Wyo. 2000).
Villa, 100 P.3d 1287 (Wyo. 2004).
These materials and other materials promulgated by Matthiesen, Wickert & Lehrer, S.C. may become outdated or superseded as time goes by. If you should have
questions regarding the current applicability of any topics contained in this publication or any publications distributed by Matthiesen, Wickert & Lehrer, S.C., please
contact Gary Wickert at [email protected]. This publication is intended for the clients and friends of Matthiesen, Wickert & Lehrer, S.C. This information should
not be construed as legal advice concerning any factual situation and representation of insurance companies and\or individuals by Matthiesen, Wickert & Lehrer, S.C.
on specific facts disclosed within the attorney\client relationship. These materials should not be used in lieu thereof in anyway.

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MATTHIESEN, WICKERT & LEHRER, S.C.

Hartford, WI ❖ New Orleans, LA ❖ Orange County, CA

JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILITY AND CONTRIBUTION LAWS IN ALL 50 STATES

Joint and Several Liability

CONTRIBUTION ACTIONS IN ALL 50 STATES

STATE JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILTY CONTRIBUTION LAW STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS

Pure Joint and Several Liability

Alaska repealed its Uniform Contribution Act when it eliminated

Pure Several Liability

One (1) year after judgment final.

One (1) year after judgment final.

Pure Joint and Several Liability

There is generally no right to contribution between the co-

Modified Joint and Several Liability

Right of contribution exists between two or more parties liable for

Pure Several Liability

Contribution plaintiff is entitled to contribution from a tortfeasor

Contribution allowed (unless act of moral turpitude), but rare,

Judgment: Separate action must be

Modified Joint and Several Liability

Modified Joint and Several Liability

Joint tortfeasors have a right to contribution. Contribution may be

Where two or more persons become jointly or severally liable in

Modified Joint and Several Liability

Contribution allowed provided there is a judgment, determination

Contribution is eliminated between concurrent tortfeasors. Several

Modified Joint and Several Liability

Contribution allowed in underlying or separate action where

Contribution plaintiff entitled to recover from joint tortfeasor the

Contribution allowed among joint tortfeasors. Any defendant who

Pure Joint and Several Liability

A tortfeasor who enters into a settlement with claimant is not

Modified Joint and Several Liability

Prior to abolishing joint and several, proportionate fault attributed

Pure Several Liability

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