PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, DIRECTOR GENERAL OF THE

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE, CHIEF STATE PROSECUTOR JOVENCITO ZUÑO, STATE

PROSECUTORS PETER L. ONG and RUBEN A. ZACARIAS; 2ND ASSISTANT CITY PROSECUTOR
CONRADO M. JAMOLIN and CITY PROSECUTOR OF QUEZON CITY CLARO ARELLANO v. PANFILO
M. LACSON G.R. No. 149453, April 1, 2003, CALLEJO, SR., J.
The raison d’ etre for the requirement of the express consent of the accused to a provisional dismissal of a
criminal case is to bar him from subsequently asserting that the revival of the criminal case will place him in
double jeopardy for the same offense or for an offense necessarily included therein.
FACTS:
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the Resolution remanding this case to the RTC for the
determination of several factual issues relative to the application of Section 8 of Rule 117 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure on the dismissal of criminal cases filed against Panfilo Lacson and his co-
accused with the said court. In the criminal cases, the respondent and his co-accused were charged with
multiple murder for the shooting and killing of eleven male victims. The Court ruled that the provisional
dismissal of criminal cases were with the express consent of the respondent as he himself moved for said
provisional dismissal when he filed his motion for judicial determination of probable cause and for
examination of witnesses. The petitioners contend that Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure is not applicable in the present case and the time-bar in said rule should not be applied
retroactively.
ISSUE: Whether the provisional dismissal issued by the Court was proper
RULING: No. Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that a case shall
not be provisionally dismissed except with the express consent of the accused and with notice to the
offended party. The provisional dismissal of offenses punishable by imprisonment not exceeding six (6)
years or a fine of any amount, or both, shall become permanent one (1) year after issuance of the order
without the case having been revived. With respect to offenses punishable by imprisonment of more than
six (6) years, their provisional dismissal shall become permanent two (2) years after issuance of the order
without the case having been revived. Having invoked said rule before the petitioners-panel of prosecutors
and before the CA, the respondent is burdened to establish the essential requisites of the first paragraph
thereof, namely: 1. The prosecution with the express conformity of the accused or the accused moves for a
provisional (sin perjuicio) dismissal of the case; or both the prosecution and the accused move for a
provisional dismissal of the case; 2. The offended party is notified of the motion for a provisional dismissal
of the case; 3. The court issues an order granting the motion and dismissing the case provisionally; 4. The
public prosecutor is served with a copy of the order of provisional dismissal of the case. Express consent to
a provisional dismissal is given either viva voce or in writing. It is a positive, direct, unequivocal consent
requiring no inference or implication to supply its meaning. Where the accused writes on the motion of a
prosecutor for a provisional dismissal of the case “no objection” or “with my conformity,” the writing
amounts to express consent of the accused to a provisional dismissal of the case. The mere inaction or
silence of the accused to a motion for a provisional dismissal of the case or his failure to object to a
provisional dismissal does not amount to express consent. A motion of the accused for a provisional
dismissal of a case is an express consent to such provisional dismissal. If a criminal case is provisionally
dismissed with the express consent of the accused, the case may be revived only within the periods
provided in the new rule. If a criminal case is provisionally dismissed without the express consent of the
accused or over his objection, the new rule would not apply. The case may be revived even beyond the
prescribed periods subject to the right of the accused to oppose the same on the ground of double jeopardy
or that such revival or refiling is barred by the statute of limitations Respondent has failed to prove that the
first and second requisites of the first paragraph of the new rule were present when Judge Agnir, Jr.
dismissed Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689. The prosecution did not file any motion for the
provisional dismissal of the said criminal cases. The respondent did not pray for the dismissal, provisional
or otherwise, of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99- 81679 to Q-99-81689. Neither did he ever agree, impliedly or
expressly, to a mere provisional dismissal of the cases
RENATO CUDIA, Petitioner, - versus - THE COURT OF APPEALS, The HON. CARLOS D. RUSTIA, in
his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court Branch LVI, Angeles City, Respondents.
G.R. No. 110315, THIRD DIVISION, January 16, 1998, ROMERO, J.

There must have been a valid and sufficient complaint or information in the former prosecution. If,
therefore, the complaint or information was insufficient because it was so defective in form or substance
that the conviction upon it could not have been sustained, its dismissal without the consent of the accused
cannot be pleaded. As the fiscal had no authority to file the information, the dismissal of the first information
would not be a bar to petitioner's subsequent prosecution. Jeopardy does not attach where a defendant
pleads guilty to a defective indictment that is voluntarily dismissed by the prosecution.
FACTS: On June 28, 1989, petitioner was arrested in Mabalacat allegedly for possessing an unlicensed
revolver. He was brought to Camp Pepito, Sto. Domingo, Angeles City, where he was detained. A
preliminary investigation was thereafter conducted by an investigating panel of prosecutors. As a result
thereof, the City Prosecutor of Angeles City filed an information against him for illegal possession of
firearms and ammunition. The case was raffled to Branch 60 of Angeles RTC
Upon his arraignment on August 14, 1989, petitioner pleaded "not guilty" to the charges. During the
ensuing pre-trial, the court called the attention of the parties to the fact that, contrary to the information,
petitioner had committed the offense in Mabalacat, and not in Angeles City. The judge ordered the re-
raffling of the case to a branch assigned to criminal cases involving crimes committed outside of the city.
Thereafter, the case was assigned to Branch 56 of the Angeles City RTC. On October 31, 1989 however,
the provincial prosecutor of Pampanga also filed an information charging petitioner with the same crime,
which was likewise raffled to Branch 56. This prompted the prosecutor in Criminal Case No. 11542 to file a
Motion to Dismiss/Withdraw the Information alleging that two separate informations for the same offense
had been filed against petitioner. The motion was granted. On May 21, 1990, petitioner filed a Motion to
Quash Criminal Case No. 11987 on the ground that his continued prosecution for the offense of illegal
possession of firearms and ammunition for which he had been arraigned in Criminal Case No. 11542, and
which had been dismissed despite his opposition would violate his right not to be put twice in jeopardy of
punishment for the same offense. The trial court denied the motion to quash, which was affirmed by the
CA.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was double jeopardy.
RULING: In order to successfully invoke the defense of double jeopardy, the following requisites must be
present: (1) a first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy must have been
validly terminated; and (3) the second jeopardy must be for the same offense or the second offense
includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the first information, or is an attempt to commit
the same or a frustration thereof. In determining when the first jeopardy may be said to have attached, it is
necessary to prove the existence of the following: (a) Court of competent jurisdiction (b) Valid complaint or
information (c) Arraignment (d) Valid plea (e) The defendant was acquitted or convicted or the case was
dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused. It is undisputed that
petitioner was arraigned in Criminal Case No. 11542, that he pleaded "not guilty" therein, and that the same
was dismissed without his express consent, nay, over his opposition even. The court may thus limit the
discussion to determining whether the first two requisites have been met. As to the first requisite, it is
necessary that there be a court of competent jurisdiction, for jurisdiction to try the case is essential to place
an accused in jeopardy. The Court of Appeals and the Solicitor General agreed that Branch 60, which
originally had cognizance of Criminal Case No. 11542, had no jurisdiction over the case. Although both
Branches 60 and 56 are sitting in Angeles City, it is Branch 56 which has jurisdiction to try offenses
committed in Mabalacat, Pampanga. Petitioner was arraigned before Branch 60, not Branch 56. With
respect to the second requisite, however, it is plainly apparent that the City Prosecutor of Angeles City had
no authority to file the first information, the offense having been committed in the Municipality of Mabalacat,
which is beyond his jurisdiction. Presidential Decree No. 1275, in relation to Section 9 of the Administrative
Code of 1987, pertinently provides that: Section 11. The provincial or the city fiscal shall: x x x b)
Investigate and/or cause to be investigated all charges of crimes, misdemeanors and violations of all penal
laws and ordinances within their respective jurisdictions and have the necessary information or complaint
prepared or made against the persons accused. In the conduct of such investigations he or his assistants
shall receive the sworn statements or take oral evidence of witnesses summoned by subpoena for the
purpose. It is thus the Provincial Prosecutor of Pampanga, not the City Prosecutor, who should prepare
informations for offenses committed within Pampanga but outside of Angeles City. An information, when
required to be filed by a public prosecuting officer, cannot be filed by another. It must be exhibited or
presented by the prosecuting attorney or someone authorized by law. If not, the court does not acquire
jurisdiction. By clear implication, if not by express provision of the Rules of Court, and by a long line of
uniform decisions, questions relating to want of jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceeding. It
is a valid information signed by a competent officer which, among other requisites, confers jurisdiction on
the court over the person of the petitioner and the subject matter of the accusation. In consonance with this
view, an infirmity in the information, such as lack of authority of the officer signing it, cannot be cured by
silence, acquiescence, or even by express consent In light of the foregoing principles, there is thus no
breach of the constitutional prohibition against twice putting an accused in jeopardy of punishment for the
same offense for the simple reason that the absence of authority of the City Prosecutor to file the first
information meant that petitioner could never have been convicted on the strength thereof.

VICENTE FOZ, JR. and DANNY G. FAJARDO, Petitioners, -versus- PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondent. G.R. No. 167764, THIRD DIVISION, October 9, 2009, PERALTA, J.
Venue in criminal cases is an essential element of jurisdiction. The Court held in Macasaet v. People that:
It is a fundamental rule that for jurisdiction to be acquired by courts in criminal cases the offense
should have been committed or any one of its essential ingredients took place within the territorial
jurisdiction of the court. Territorial jurisdiction in criminal cases is the territory where the court has
jurisdiction to take cognizance or to try the offense all committed therein by the accused. Thus, it cannot
take jurisdiction over a person charged with an offense allegedly committed outside of that limited territory.
Furthermore, the jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case is determined by the allegations in the
complaint or information. And once it is so shown, the court may validly take cognizance of the case.
However, if the evidence adduced during the trial show that the offense was committed somewhere else,
the court should dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction.
The allegations in the Information that "Panay News, a daily publication with a considerable circulation in
the City of Iloilo and throughout the region" only showed that Iloilo was the place where Panay News was in
considerable circulation but did not establish that the said publication was printed and first published in
Iloilo City. Settled is the rule that jurisdiction of a court over a criminal case is determined by the allegations
of the complaint or information, and the offense must have been committed or any one of its essential
ingredients took place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court. Considering that the Information failed to
allege the venue requirements for a libel case under Article 360, the Court finds that the RTC of Iloilo City
had no jurisdiction to hear this case. Thus, its decision convicting petitioners of the crime of libel should be
set aside for want of jurisdiction without prejudice to its filing with the court of competent jurisdiction.
FACTS: In an Information dated October 17, 1994 filed before the RTC of Iloilo City, petitioners Vicente
Foz, Jr. and Danny G. Fajardo were charged with the crime of libel. Upon being arraigned on March 1,
1995, petitioners, assisted by counsel de parte, pleaded not guilty to the crime charged in the Information.
Trial thereafter ensued. On December 4, 1997, the RTC rendered its Decision finding petitioners guilty as
charged. Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied in an Order dated February 20, 1998.
Dissatisfied, petitioners filed an appeal with the CA. On November 24, 2004, the CA rendered its assailed
Decision which affirmed in toto the RTC decision. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, which the
CA denied in a Resolution dated April 8, 2005.
ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC of Iloilo City, Branch 23, had jurisdiction over the offense of libel as
charged in the Information dated October 17, 1994. (NO)
RULING: The Court notes that petitioners raised for the first time the issue of the RTC's jurisdiction over
the offense charged only in their Reply filed before this Court and finds that petitioners are not precluded
from doing so. In Fukuzume v. People, the Court ruled: It is noted that it was only in his petition with the CA
that Fukuzume raised the issue of the trial court’s jurisdiction over the offense charged. Nonetheless, the
rule is settled that an objection based on the ground that the court lacks jurisdiction over the offense
charged may be raised or considered motu proprio by the court at any stage of the proceedings or on
appeal. Moreover, jurisdiction over the subject matter in a criminal case cannot be conferred upon the court
by the accused, by express waiver or otherwise, since such jurisdiction is conferred by the sovereign
authority which organized the court, and is given only by law in the manner and form prescribed by law.
While an exception to this rule was recognized by this Court beginning with the landmark case of Tijam vs.
Sibonghanoy, wherein the defense of lack of jurisdiction by the court which rendered the questioned ruling
was considered to be barred by laches, we find that the factual circumstances involved in said case, a civil
case, which justified the departure from the general rule are not present in the instant criminal case. The
Court finds merit in the petition. DEAN’S CIRCLE 2019 – UST FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW 80 Venue in
criminal cases is an essential element of jurisdiction. The Court held in Macasaet v. People that: It is a
fundamental rule that for jurisdiction to be acquired by courts in criminal cases the offense should have
been committed or any one of its essential ingredients took place within the territorial jurisdiction of the
court. Territorial jurisdiction in criminal cases is the territory where the court has jurisdiction to take
cognizance or to try the offense allegedly committed therein by the accused. Thus, it cannot take
jurisdiction over a person charged with an offense allegedly committed outside of that limited territory.
Furthermore, the jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case is determined by the allegations in the
complaint or information. And once it is so shown, the court may validly take cognizance of the case.
However, if the evidence adduced during the trial show that the offense was committed somewhere else,
the court should dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction. (Emphasis supplied.) Article 360 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 4363, provides the specific rules as to the venue in cases of
written defamation, to wit: Article 360. Persons responsible.—Any person who shall publish, exhibit or
cause the publication or exhibition of any defamation in writing or by similar means, shall be responsible for
the same. The author or editor of a book or pamphlet, or the editor or business manager of a daily
newspaper, magazine or serial publication, shall be responsible for the defamations contained therein to
the same extent as if he were the author thereof. The criminal action and civil action for damages in cases
of written defamations, as provided for in this chapter shall be filed simultaneously or separately with the
court of first instance of the province or city where the libelous article is printed and first published or where
any of the offended parties actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense: Provided,
however, That where one of the offended parties is a public officer whose office is in the City of Manila at
the time of the commission of the offense, the action shall be filed in the Court of First Instance of the City
of Manila or of the city or province where the libelous article is printed and first published, and in case such
public officer does not hold office in the City of Manila, the action shall be filed in the Court of First Instance
of the province or city where he held office at the time of the commission of the offense or where the
libelous article is printed and first published and in case one of the offended parties is a private individual,
the action shall be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province or city where he actually resides at the
time of the commission of the offense or where the libelous matter is printed and first published x x x.
(Emphasis supplied.) In Agbayani v. Sayo, the rules on venue in Article 360 were restated as follows: 1.
Whether the offended party is a public official or a private person, the criminal action may be filed in the
Court of First Instance of the province or city where the libelous article is printed and first published. 2. If the
offended party is a private individual, the criminal action may also be filed in the Court of First Instance of
the province where he actually resided at the time of the commission of the offense. DEAN’S CIRCLE 2019
– UST FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW 81 3. If the offended party is a public officer whose office is in Manila at
the time of the commission of the offense, the action may be filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila. 4.
If the offended party is a public officer holding office outside of Manila, the action may be filed in the Court
of First Instance of the province or city where he held office at the time of the commission of the offense.
Applying the foregoing law to this case, since Dr. Portigo is a private individual at the time of the publication
of the alleged libelous article, the venue of the libel case may be in the province or city where the libelous
article was printed and first published, or in the province where Dr. Portigo actually resided at the time of
the commission of the offense. The allegations in the Information that "Panay News, a daily publication with
a considerable circulation in the City of Iloilo and throughout the region" only showed that Iloilo was the
place where Panay News was in considerable circulation but did not establish that the said publication was
printed and first published in Iloilo City. Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code as amended provides that a
private individual may also file the libel case in the RTC of the province where he actually resided at the
time of the commission of the offense. The Information filed against petitioners failed to allege the
residence of Dr. Portigo. While the Information alleges that "Dr. Edgar Portigo is a physician and medical
practitioner in Iloilo City," such allegation did not clearly and positively indicate that he was actually residing
in Iloilo City at the time of the commission of the offense. It is possible that Dr. Portigo was actually residing
in another place. Settled is the rule that jurisdiction of a court over a criminal case is determined by the
allegations of the complaint or information, and the offense must have been committed or any one of its
essential ingredients took place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court. Considering that the
Information failed to allege the venue requirements for a libel case under Article 360, the Court finds that
the RTC of Iloilo City had no jurisdiction to hear this case. Thus, its decision convicting petitioners of the
crime of libel should be set aside for want of jurisdiction without prejudice to its filing with the court of
competent jurisdiction.

HECTOR TREÑAS, Petitioner, -versus- PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent. G. R. No.

195002, SECOND DIVISION, January 25, 2012, SERENO, J.
Where life or liberty is affected by its proceedings, courts must keep strictly within the limits of the law
authorizing them to take jurisdiction and to try the case and render judgment thereon. The rule is settled
that an objection may be raised based on the ground that the court lacks jurisdiction over the offense
charged, or it may be considered motu proprio by the court at any stage of the proceedings or on appeal.
Moreover, jurisdiction over the subject matter in a criminal case cannot be conferred upon the court by the
accused, by express waiver or otherwise. That jurisdiction is conferred DEAN’S CIRCLE 2019 – UST
FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW 85 by the sovereign authority that organized the court and is given only by law in
the manner and form prescribed by law. It has been consistently held by this Court that it is unfair to require
a defendant or accused to undergo the ordeal and expense of a trial if the court has no jurisdiction over the
subject matter or offense or it is not the court of proper venue.Section 15 (a) of Rule 110 of the Revised
Rules on Criminal Procedure of 2000 provides that "[s]ubject to existing laws, the criminal action shall be
instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or territory where the offense was committed or where
any of its essential ingredients occurred." This fundamental principle is to ensure that the defendant is not
compelled to move to, and appear in, a different court from that of the province where the crime was
committed as it would cause him great inconvenience in looking for his witnesses and other evidence in
another place.This principle echoes more strongly in this case, where, due to distance constraints, coupled
with his advanced age and failing health, petitioner was unable to present his defense in the charges
against him.
FACTS: Sometime in December 1999, Margarita Alocilja (Margarita) wanted to buy a house-and-lot in Iloilo
City covered by TCT No. 109266. It was then mortgaged with Maybank. The bank manager Joselito Palma
recommended the appellant Hector Treñas (Hector) to private complainant Elizabeth, who was an
employee and niece of Margarita, for advice regarding the transfer of the title in the latter's name. Hector
informed Elizabeth that for the titling of the property in the name of her aunt Margarita, the following
expenses would be incurred: P20,000.00- Attorney's fees, P90,000.00- Capital Gains Tax, P24,000.00-
Documentary Stamp, P10,000.00- Miscellaneous Expenses. Thereafter, Elizabeth gave P150,000.00 to
Hector who issued a corresponding receipt dated December 22, 1999 and prepared [a] Deed of Sale with
Assumption of Mortgage. Subsequently, Hector gave Elizabeth Revenue Official Receipt Nos. 00084370
for P96,000.00 and 00084369 for P24,000.00. However, when she consulted with the BIR, she was
informed that the receipts were fake. When confronted, Hector admitted to her that the receipts were fake
and that he used the P120,000.00 for his other transactions. Elizabeth demanded the return of the money.
To settle his accounts, appellant Hector issued in favor of Elizabeth a Bank of Commerce check No.
0042856 dated November 10, 2000 in the amount of P120,000.00, deducting from P150,000.00 the
P30,000.00 as attorney's fees. When the check was deposited with the PCIBank, Makati Branch, the same
was dishonored for the reason that the account was closed. Notwithstanding repeated formal and verbal
demands, appellant failed to pay. Thus, the instant case of Estafa was filed against him. On 29 October
2001, an Information was filed by the Office of the City Prosecutor before the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
both of Makati City. DEAN’S CIRCLE 2019 – UST FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW 86 During arraignment on 26
April 2002, petitioner, acting as his own counsel, entered a plea of "Not Guilty." Allegedly due to old age
and poor health, and the fact that he lives in Iloilo City, petitioner was unable to attend the pre-trial and trial
of the case. On 8 January 2007, the RTC rendered a Decisionfinding petitioner guilty of the crime of Estafa
under section 1, paragraph (b), of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). On 24 August 2007,
petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration,which was denied by the RTC in a Resolution dated 2 July
2008. On 25 September 2008, petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal before the RTC.The appeal was docketed
as CA-G.R. CR No. 32177. On 9 July 2010, the CA rendered a Decision affirming that of the RTC. On 4
August 2010, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied by the CA in a Resolution
dated 4 January 2011.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that an accused has to present evidence in
support of the defense of lack of jurisdiction even if such lack of jurisdiction appears in the evidence of the
prosecution. (YES)
RULING: On the first issue, petitioner asserts that nowhere in the evidence presented by the prosecution
does it show that P150,000 was given to and received by petitioner in Makati City. Instead, the evidence
shows that the Receipt issued by petitioner for the money was dated 22 December 1999, without any
indication of the place where it was issued. Meanwhile, the Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage
prepared by petitioner was signed and notarized in Iloilo City, also on 22 December 1999. Petitioner claims
that the only logical conclusion is that the money was actually delivered to him in Iloilo City, especially since
his residence and office were situated there as well. Absent any direct proof as to the place of delivery, one
must rely on the disputable presumption that things happened according to the ordinary course of nature
and the ordinary habits of life. The only time Makati City was mentioned was with respect to the time when
the check provided by petitioner was dishonored by EquitablePCI Bank in its De la Rosa-Rada Branch in
Makati. Petitioner asserts that the prosecution witness failed to allege that any of the acts material to the
crime of estafa had occurred in Makati City. Thus, the trial court failed to acquire jurisdiction over the case.
Petitioner thus argues that an accused is not required to present evidence to prove lack of jurisdiction,
when such lack is already indicated in the prosecution evidence. In this case, the findings of fact of the trial
court and the CA on the issue of the place of commission of the offense are conclusions without any
citation of the specific evidence on which they are based; they are grounded on conclusions and
conjectures. The trial court, in its Decision, ruled on the commission of the offense without any finding as to
where it was committed. DEAN’S CIRCLE 2019 – UST FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW 87 In his Motion for
Reconsideration before the RTC, petitioner raised the argument that it had no jurisdiction over the offense
charged. The trial court denied the motion, without citing any specific evidence upon which its findings were
based, and by relying on conjecture. The instant case is thus an exception allowing a review of the factual
findings of the lower courts. The overarching consideration in this case is the principle that, in criminal
cases, venue is jurisdictional. A court cannot exercise jurisdiction over a person charged with an offense
committed outside its limited territory. In Isip v. People, this Court explained: The place where the crime
was committed determines not only the venue of the action but is an essential element of jurisdiction. It is a
fundamental rule that for jurisdiction to be acquired by courts in criminal cases, the offense should have
been committed or any one of its essential ingredients should have taken place within the territorial
jurisdiction of the court. Territorial jurisdiction in criminal cases is the territory where the court has
jurisdiction to take cognizance or to try the offense allegedly committed therein by the accused. Thus, it
cannot take jurisdiction over a person charged with an offense allegedly committed outside of that limited
territory. Furthermore, the jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case is determined by the allegations in
the complaint or information. And once it is so shown, the court may validly take cognizance of the case.
However, if the evidence adduced during the trial shows that the offense was committed somewhere else,
the court should dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction. (Emphasis supplied.) In a criminal case, the
prosecution must not only prove that the offense was committed, it must also prove the identity of the
accused and the fact that the offense was committed within the jurisdiction of the court. In this case, the
prosecution failed to show that the offense of estafa under Section 1, paragraph (b) of Article 315 of the
RPC was committed within the jurisdiction of the RTC of Makati City. That the offense was committed in
Makati City was alleged in the information as follows: That on or about the 23rd day of December, 1999, in
the City of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, received in trust from ELIZABETH LUCIAJA the amount of P150,000.00 x x x. (Emphasis
supplied.) Ordinarily, this statement would have been sufficient to vest jurisdiction in the RTC of Makati.
However, the Affidavit of Complaint executed by Elizabeth does not contain any allegation as to where the
offense was committed. Aside from the lone allegation in the Information, no other evidence was presented
by the prosecution to prove that the offense or any of its elements was committed in Makati City. Under
Article 315, par. 1 (b) of the RPC, the elements of estafa are as follows: (1) that money, goods or other
personal property is received by the offender in trust or on commission, or for administration, or under any
other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or to return the same; (2) that there be
misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by the offender, DEAN’S CIRCLE 2019 – UST
FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW 88 or denial on his part of such receipt; (3) that such misappropriation or
conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another; and (4) there is demand by the offended party to the
offender. There is nothing in the documentary evidence offered by the prosecutionthat points to where the
offense, or any of its elements, was committed. A review of the testimony of Elizabeth also shows that there
was no mention of the place where the offense was allegedly committed. Although the prosecution alleged
that the check issued by petitioner was dishonored in a bank in Makati, such dishonor is not an element of
the offense of estafa under Article 315, par. 1 (b) of the RPC. Indeed, other than the lone allegation in the
information, there is nothing in the prosecution evidence which even mentions that any of the elements of
the offense were committed in Makati. The rule is settled that an objection may be raised based on the
ground that the court lacks jurisdiction over the offense charged, or it may be considered motu proprio by
the court at any stage of the proceedings or on appeal. Moreover, jurisdiction over the subject matter in a
criminal case cannot be conferred upon the court by the accused, by express waiver or otherwise. That
jurisdiction is conferred by the sovereign authority that organized the court and is given only by law in the
manner and form prescribed by law. It has been consistently held by this Court that it is unfair to require a
defendant or accused to undergo the ordeal and expense of a trial if the court has no jurisdiction over the
subject matter or offense or it is not the court of proper venue.Section 15 (a) of Rule 110 of the Revised
Rules on Criminal Procedure of 2000 provides that "[s]ubject to existing laws, the criminal action shall be
instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or territory where the offense was committed or where
any of its essential ingredients occurred." This fundamental principle is to ensure that the defendant is not
compelled to move to, and appear in, a different court from that of the province where the crime was
committed as it would cause him great inconvenience in looking for his witnesses and other evidence in
another place.This principle echoes more strongly in this case, where, due to distance constraints, coupled
with his advanced age and failing health, petitioner was unable to present his defense in the charges
against him. There being no showing that the offense was committed within Makati, the RTC of that city has
no jurisdiction over the case.