CASES ON

DELICTS

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G.R. No. L-32055 February 26, 1988

REYNALDO BERMUDEZ, SR., and, ADONITA YABUT BERMUDEZ petitioners-appellants,

vs.
HON. JUDGE A. MELENCIO-HERRERA, DOMINGO PONTINO y TACORDA and CORDOVA NG SUN
KWAN, respondents-appellees.

YAP, J.:

This is a direct appeal on pure questions of law from the Order of March 10, 1970 of the Honorable Judge
(now Supreme Court Justice) Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera of the defunct Court of First Instance of Manila,
Branch XVII, dismissing plaintiffs-appellants' complaint in Civil Case No. 77188 entitled "Reynaldo
Bermudez, Sr. and Adonita Yabut Bermudez, plaintiffs, versus Domingo Pontino y Tacorda and Cordova Ng
Sun Kwan, defendants," and from the Order of May 7, 1970 denying plaintiffs-appellants' Motion for
Reconsideration.

The background facts of the case are as follows:

A cargo truck, driven by Domingo Pontino and owned by Cordova Ng Sun Kwan, bumped a jeep on which
Rogelio, a six-year old son of plaintiffs-appellants, was riding. The boy sustained injuries which caused his
death. As a result, Criminal Case No.92944 for Homicide Through Reckless Imprudence was filed against
Domingo Pontino by the Manila City Fiscal's Office. Plaintiffs-appellants filed on July 27,1969 in the said
criminal case "A Reservation to File Separate Civil Action."

On July 28,1969, the plaintiffs-appellants filed a civil case for damages with the Court of First Instance of
Manila docketed as Civil Case No. 77188, entitled "Reynaldo Bermudez, Sr. et al., Plaintiffs vs. Domingo
Pontino y Tacorda and Cordova Ng Sun Kwan, Defendants." Finding that the plaintiffs instituted the action
"on the assumption that defendant Pontino's negligence in the accident of May 10, 1969 constituted a
quasi-delict," the trial court stated that plaintiffs had already elected to treat the accident as a "crime" by
reserving in the criminal case their right to file a separate civil action. That being so, the trial court decided
to order the dismissal of the complaint against defendant Cordova Ng Sun Kwan and to suspend the
hearing of the case against Domingo Pontino until after the criminal case for Homicide Through Reckless
Imprudence is finally terminated. From said order, plaintiffs filed the present appeal, stating as their main
reasons the following:

I. The main issue brought before this Honorable Court is whether the present action is based on
quasi-delict under the Civil Code and therefore could proceed independently of the criminal case for
homicide thru reckless imprudence.

II. The second question of law is whether the lower court could properly suspend the hearing of the civil
action against Domingo Pontino and dismiss the civil case against his employer Cordova Ng Sun Kwan by
reason of the fact that a criminal case for homicide thru reckless imprudence is pending in the lower court
against Domingo Pontino

III. The last question of law is whether the suspension of the civil action against Domingo Pontino and the
dismissal of the civil case against his employer Cordova Ng Sun Kwan by reason of the pending criminal
case against Domingo Pontino for homicide thru reckless imprudence in the lower court could be validly
done considering that the civil case against said defendants-appellees also sought to recover actual
damages to the jeep of plaintiffs-appellants."

We find the appeal meritorious.

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The heart of the issue involved in the present case is whether the civil action filed by the
plaintiffs-appellants is founded on crime or on quasi-delict. The trial court treated the case as an action
based on a crime in view of the reservation made by the offended party in the criminal case (Criminal Case
No. 92944), also pending before the court, to file a separate civil action. Said the trial court:

It would appear that plaintiffs instituted this action on the assumption that defendant Pontino's negligence in
the accident of May 10, l969 constituted a quasi-delict. The Court cannot accept the validity of that
assumption. In Criminal Case No. 92944 of this Court, plaintiffs had already appeared as complainants.
While that case was pending, the offended parties reserved the right to institute a separate civil action. If, in
a criminal case, the right to file a separate civil action for damages is reserved, such civil action is to be
based on crime and not on tort. That was the ruling in Joaquin vs. Aniceto, L-18719, Oct. 31, 1964."

We do not agree. The doctrine in the case cited by the trial court is inapplicable to the instant case. In
Joaquin vs. Aniceto, the Court held:

The issue in this case is: May an employee's primary civil liability for crime and his employer's subsidiary
liability therefor be proved in a separate civil action even while the criminal case against the employee is
still pending?

To begin with, obligations arise from law, contract, quasi-contract, crime and quasi-delict. According to
appellant, her action is one to enforce the civil liability arising from crime. With respect to obligations arising
from crimes, Article 1161 of the New Civil Code provides:

Civil obligations arising from criminal offenses shall be governed by the penal laws, subject to the
provisions of article 21 77, and of the pertinent provisions of Chapter 2, Preliminary, Title, on Human
Relations, and of Title XVIII of this book, regulating damages.

xxx xxx xxx

It is now settled that for an employer to be subsidiarily liable, the following requisites must be present: (1)
that an employee has committed a crime in the discharge of his duties; (2) that said employee is insolvent
and has not satisfied his civil liability; (3) that the employer is engaged in some kind of industry. (1 Padilla,
Criminal Law, Revised Penal Code 794 [1964])

Without the conviction of the employee, the employer cannot be subsidiarily liable.

In cases of negligence, the injured party or his heirs has the choice between an action to enforce the civil
liability arising from crime under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code and an action for quasi- delict under
Article 2176-2194 of the Civil Code. If a party chooses the latter, he may hold the employer solidarity liable
for the negligent act of his employee, subject to the employer's defense of exercise of the diligence of a
good father of the family.

In the case at bar, the action filed b appellant was an action for damages based on quasi-delict. 1 The fact
that appellants reserved their right in the criminal case to file an independent civil action did not preclude
them from choosing to file a civil action for quasi-delict.

The appellants invoke the provisions of Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, which provide:

Section 1. — Institution of criminal and civil action. — When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for
recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged is impliedly instituted with the criminal action,
unless the offended party expressly waives the civil action or reserves his right to institute it separately.

Section 2. — Independent civil action.-In the cases provided for in Articles 31, 32, 33, 34 and 2177 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines, an independent civil action entirely separate and distinct from the criminal
action, may be brought by the injured party during the pendency of the criminal case,provided the right is
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reserved as required in the preceding section. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal
prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.

Article 2177 of the Civil Code, cited in Section 2, of Rule 111, provides that —

Article 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate and
distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover
damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant.

The appellant precisely made a reservation to file an independent civil action in accordance with the
provisions of Section 2 of Rule 111, Rules of Court. In fact, even without such a reservation, we have
allowed the injured party in the criminal 1 case which resulted in the acquittal of the accused to recover
damages based on quasi-delict. In People vs. Ligon, G.R. No. 74041, we held:

However, it does not follow that a person who is not criminally liable is also free from civil liability. While the
guilt of the accused in a criminal prosecution must be established beyond reasonable doubt, only a
preponderance of evidence is required in a civil action for damages (Article 29, Civil Code). The judgment
of acquittal extinguishes the civil liability of the accused only when it includes a declaration that the facts
from which the civil liability might arise did not exist (Padilla vs. Court of Appeals, 129 SCRA 559).

WHEREFORE, we grant the petition and annul and set aside the appealed orders of the trial court, dated
March 10, 1970 and May 7, 1970, and remand the case for further proceedings. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Paras, Padilla and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.

Melencio-Herrera, J., took no part.

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G.R. No. L-45129 March 6, 1987

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE BENJAMIN RELOVA, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Batangas, Second Branch, and MANUEL OPULENCIA, respondents.

FELICIANO, J.:

In this petition for certiorari and mandamus, the People of the Philippines seek to set aside the orders of the
respondent Judge of the Court of First Instance of Batangas in Criminal Case No. 266, dated 12 August 1976 and 8
November 1976, respectively, quashing an information for theft filed against private respondent Manuel Opulencia on
the ground of double jeopardy and denying the petitioner's motion for reconsideration.

On 1 February 1975, members of the Batangas City Police together with personnel of the Batangas Electric Light
System, equipped with a search warrant issued by a city judge of Batangas City, searched and examined the
premises of the Opulencia Carpena Ice Plant and Cold Storage owned and operated by the private respondent
Manuel Opulencia. The police discovered that electric wiring, devices and contraptions had been installed, without the
necessary authority from the city government, and "architecturally concealed inside the walls of the building" 1 owned
by the private respondent. These electric devices and contraptions were, in the allegation of the petitioner "designed
purposely to lower or decrease the readings of electric current consumption in the electric meter of the said electric
[ice and cold storage] plant." 2 During the subsequent investigation, Manuel Opulencia admitted in a written statement
that he had caused the installation of the electrical devices "in order to lower or decrease the readings of his electric
meter. 3

On 24 November 1975, an Assistant City Fiscal of Batangas City filed before the City Court of Batangas City an
information against Manuel Opulencia for violation of Ordinance No. 1, Series of 1974, Batangas City. A violation of
this ordinance was, under its terms, punishable by a fine "ranging from Five Pesos (P5.00) to Fifty Pesos (P50.00) or
imprisonment, which shall not exceed thirty (30) days, or both, at the discretion of the court." 4 This information reads
as follows:

The undersigned, Assistant City Fiscal, accuses Manuel Opulencia y Lat of violation of Sec. 3 (b) in relation to Sec. 6
(d) and Sec. 10 Article II, Title IV of ordinance No. 1, S. 1974, with damage to the City Government of Batangas, and
penalized by the said ordinance, committed as follows:

That from November, 1974 to February, 1975 at Batangas City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, with intent to defraud the City Government of Batangas, without proper
authorization from any lawful and/or permit from the proper authorities, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously make unauthorized installations of electric wirings and devices to lower or decrease the consumption of
electric fluid at the Opulencia Ice Plant situated at Kumintang, Ibaba, this city and as a result of such unathorized
installations of electric wirings and devices made by the accused, the City Government of Batangas was damaged
and prejudiced in the total amount of FORTY ONE THOUSAND, SIXTY TWO PESOS AND SIXTEEN CENTAVOS
(P41,062.16) Philippine currency, covering the period from November 1974 to February, 1975, to the damage and
prejudice of the City Government of Batangas in the aforestated amount of P41,062.16, Philippine currency.

The accused Manuel Opulencia pleaded not guilty to the above information. On 2 February 1976, he filed a motion to
dismiss the information upon the grounds that the crime there charged had already prescribed and that the civil
indemnity there sought to be recovered was beyond the jurisdiction of the Batangas City Court to award. In an order
dated 6 April 1976, the Batangas City Court granted the motion to dismiss on the ground of prescription, it appearing
that the offense charged was a light felony which prescribes two months from the time of discovery thereof, and it
appearing further that the information was filed by the fiscal more than nine months after discovery of the offense
charged in February 1975.

Fourteen (14) days later, on 20 April 1976, the Acting City Fiscal of Batangas City filed before the Court of First
Instance of Batangas, Branch 11, another information against Manuel Opulencia, this time for theft of electric power
under Article 308 in relation to Article 309, paragraph (1), of the Revised Penal Code. This information read as follows:

5
The undersigned Acting City Fiscal accuses Manuel Opulencia y Lat of the crime of theft, defined and penalized by
Article 308, in relation to Article 309, paragraph (1) of the Revised Penal Code, committed as follows:

That on, during, and between the month of November, 1974, and the 21st day of February, 1975, at Kumintang, lbaba,
Batangas City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent of
gain and without the knowledge and consent of the Batangas Electric Light System, did then and there, wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and appropriate electric current valued in the total amount of FORTY ONE
THOUSAND, SIXTY TWO PESOS AND SIXTEEN CENTAVOS (P41,062.16) Philippine Currency, to the damage and
prejudice of the said Batangas Electric Light System, owned and operated by the City Government of Batangas, in the
aforementioned sum of P41,062.16.

The above information was docketed as Criminal Case No. 266 before the Court of First Instance of Batangas, Branch
II. Before he could be arraigned thereon, Manuel Opulencia filed a Motion to Quash, dated 5 May 1976, alleging that
he had been previously acquitted of the offense charged in the second information and that the filing thereof was
violative of his constitutional right against double jeopardy. By Order dated 16 August 1976, the respondent Judge
granted the accused's Motion to Quash and ordered the case dismissed. The gist of this Order is set forth in the
following paragraphs:

The only question here is whether the dismissal of the first case can be properly pleaded by the accused in the motion
to quash.

In the first paragraph of the earlier information, it alleges that the prosecution "accuses Manuel Opulencia y Lat of
violation of Sec. 3(b) in relation to Sec. 6(d) and Sec. 10 Article II, Title IV of Ordinance No. 1, s. 1974, with damage to
the City Government of Batangas, etc. " (Emphasis supplied). The first case, as it appears, was not simply one of
illegal electrical connections. It also covered an amount of P41,062.16 which the accused, in effect, allegedly with
intent to defraud, deprived the city government of Batangas. If the charge had meant illegal electric installations only, it
could have alleged illegal connections which were done at one instance on a particular date between November,
1974, to February 21, 1975. But as the information states "that from November, 1974 to February 1975 at Batangas
City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused with intent to defraud
the City Government of Batangas, without proper authorization from any lawful and/or permit from the proper
authorities, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously make unauthorized installations of electric wirings
and devices, etc." (Emphasis supplied), it was meant to include the P 41,062.16 which the accused had, in effect,
defrauded the city government. The information could not have meant that from November 1974 to 21 February 1975,
he had daily committed unlawful installations.

When, therefore, he was arraigned and he faced the indictment before the City Court, he had already been exposed,
or he felt he was exposed to consequences of what allegedly happened between November 1974 to February 21,
1975 which had allegedly resulted in defrauding the City of Batangas in the amount of P 41,062.16. (Emphases and
parentheses in the original)

A Motion for Reconsideration of the above-quoted Order filed by the petitioner was denied by the respondent Judge in
an Order dated 18 November 1976.

On 1 December 1976, the present Petition for certiorari and mandamus was filed in this Court by the Acting City Fiscal
of Batangas City on behalf of the People.

The basic premise of the petitioner's position is that the constitutional protection against double jeopardy is protection
against a second or later jeopardy of conviction for the same offense. The petitioner stresses that the first information
filed before the City Court of Batangas City was one for unlawful or unauthorized installation of electrical wiring and
devices, acts which were in violation of an ordinance of the City Government of Batangas. Only two elements are
needed to constitute an offense under this City Ordinance: (1) that there was such an installation; and (2) no authority
therefor had been obtained from the Superintendent of the Batangas City Electrical System or the District Engineer.
The petitioner urges that the relevant terms of the City Ordinance — which read as follows:

Section 3.-Connection and Installation

(a) x x x

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(b) The work and installation in the houses and building and their connection with the Electrical System shall be done
either by the employee of the system duly authorized by its Superintendent or by persons adept in the matter duly
authorized by the District Engineer. Applicants for electrical service permitting the works of installation or connection
with the system to be undertaken by the persons not duly authorized therefor shall be considered guilty of violation of
the ordinance.

would show that:

The principal purpose for (sic) such a provision is to ensure that electrical installations on residences or buildings be
done by persons duly authorized or adept in the matter, to avoid fires and accidents due to faulty electrical wirings. It is
primarily a regulatory measure and not intended to punish or curb theft of electric fluid which is already covered by the
Revised Penal Code. 5

The gist of the offense under the City Ordinance, the petitioner's argument continues, is the installing of electric wiring
and devices without authority from the proper officials of the city government. To constitute an offense under the city
ordinance, it is not essential to establish any mens rea on the part of the offender generally speaking, nor, more
specifically, an intent to appropriate and steal electric fluid.

In contrast, the petitioner goes on, the offense of theft under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code filed before the
Court of First Instance of Batangas in Criminal Case No. 266 has quite different essential elements. These elements
are:

1. That personal property be taken;

2. That the personal property (taken) belongs to another;

3. That the taking be done with intent of gain;

4. That the taking be done without the consent of the owner; and

5. That the taking be accomplished without violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things. 6

The petitioner also alleges, correctly, in our view, that theft of electricity can be effected even without illegal or
unauthorized installations of any kind by, for instance, any of the following means:

1. Turning back the dials of the electric meter;

2. Fixing the electric meter in such a manner that it will not register the actual electrical consumption;

3. Under-reading of electrical consumption; and

4. By tightening the screw of the rotary blade to slow down the rotation of the same. 7

The petitioner concludes that:

The unauthorized installation punished by the ordinance [of Batangas City] is not the same as theft of electricity [under
the Revised Penal Code]; that the second offense is not an attempt to commit the first or a frustration thereof and that
the second offense is not necessarily included in the offense charged in the first inforrnation 8

The above arguments made by the petitioner are of course correct. This is clear both from the express terms of the
constitutional provision involved — which reads as follows:

No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an act is punished by a law and an
ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act.
(Emphasis supplied; Article IV (22), 1973 Constitution) 9

and from our case law on this point. 10 The basic difficulty with the petitioner's position is that it must be examined, not
under the terms of the first sentence of Article IV (22) of the 1973 Constitution, but rather under the second sentence
of the same section. The first sentence of Article IV (22) sets forth the general rule: the constitutional protection
against double jeopardy is not available where the second prosecution is for an offense that is different from the
7
offense charged in the first or prior prosecution, although both the first and second offenses may be based upon the
same act or set of acts. The second sentence of Article IV (22) embodies an exception to the general proposition: the
constitutional protection, against double jeopardy is available although the prior offense charged under an ordinance
be different from the offense charged subsequently under a national statute such as the Revised Penal Code,
provided that both offenses spring from the same act or set of acts. This was made clear sometime ago in Yap vs.
Lutero. 11

In Yap, petitioner Manuel Yap was charged in Criminal Case No. 16054 of the Municipal Court of Iloilo City, with
violation of Article 14 of Ordinance No. 22, Series of 1951, in relation to Ordinance No. 15, Series of 1954, of the City
of Iloilo. The information charged him with having "wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously drive[n] and operate[d]" an
automobile — "recklessly and without reasonable caution thereby endangering other vehicles and pedestrians passing
in said street." Three months later, Yap was again charged in Criminal Case No. 16443 of the same Municipal Court,
this time with serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence. The information charged him with violation of the
Revised Motor Vehicle Law (Act No. 3992 as amended by Republic Act No. 587) committed by driving and operating
an automobile in a reckless and negligent manner and as a result thereof inflicting injuries upon an unfortunate
pedestrian. Yap moved to quash the second information upon the ground that it placed him twice in jeopardy of
punishment for the same act. This motion was denied by the respondent municipal judge. Meantime, another
municipal judge had acquitted Yap in Criminal Case No. 16054. Yap then instituted a petition for certiorari in the Court
of First Instance of Iloilo to set aside the order of the respondent municipal judge. The Court of First Instance of Iloilo
having reversed the respondent municipal judge and having directed him to desist from continuing with Criminal Case
No. 16443, the respondent Judge brought the case to the Supreme Court for review on appeal. In affirming the
decision appealed from and holding that the constitutional protection against double jeopardy was available to
petitioner Yap, then Associate Justice and later Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion wrote:

To begin with, the crime of damage to property through reckless driving — with which Diaz stood charged in the court
of first instance — is a violation of the Revised Penal Code (third paragraph of Article 365), not the Automobile Law
(Act No. 3992, as amended by Republic Act No. 587). Hence, Diaz was not twice accused of a violation of the same
law. Secondly, reckless driving and certain crimes committed through reckless driving are punishable under different
provisions of said Automobile Law. Hence — from the view point of Criminal Law, as distinguished from political or
Constitutional Law — they constitute, strictly, different offenses, although under certain conditions, one offense may
include the other, and, accordingly, once placed in jeopardy for one, the plea of double jeopardy may be in order as
regards the other, as in the Diaz case. (Emphases in the original)

Thirdly, our Bill of Rights deals with two (2) kinds of double jeopardy. The first sentence of clause 20, section 1, Article
III of the Constitution, ordains that "no person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense."
(Emphasis in the original) The second sentence of said clause provides that "if an act is punishable by a law and an
ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act." Thus,
the first sentence prohibits double jeopardy of punishment for the same offense, whereas the second contemplates
double jeopardy of punishment for the same act. Under the first sentence, one may be twice put in jeopardy of
punishment of the same act provided that he is charged with different offenses, or the offense charged in one case is
not included in or does not include, the crime charged in the other case. The second sentence applies, even if the
offenses charged are not the same, owing to the fact that one constitutes a violation of an ordinance and the other a
violation of a statute. If the two charges are based on one and the same act conviction or acquittal under either the law
or the ordinance shall bar a prosecution under the other. 12 Incidentally, such conviction or acquittal is not
indispensable to sustain the plea of double jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. So long as jeopardy has
attached under one of the informations charging said offense, the defense may be availed of in the other case
involving the same offense, even if there has been neither conviction nor acquittal in either case.

The issue in the case at bar hinges, therefore, on whether or not, under the information in case No. 16443, petitioner
could — if he failed to plead double jeopardy — be convicted of the same act charged in case No. 16054, in which he
has already been acquitted. The information in case No. 16054 alleges, substantially, that on the date and in the place
therein stated, petitioner herein had wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously driven and operated "recklessly and without
reasonable caution" an automobile described in said information. Upon the other hand, the information in case No.
16443, similarly states that, on the same date and in the same place, petitioner drove and operated the
aforementioned automobile in a "reckless and negligent manner at an excessive rate of speed and in violation of the
Revised Motor Vehicle Law (Act No. 3992), as amended by Republic Act No. 587, and existing city ordinances." Thus,
if the theories mentioned in the second information were not established by the evidence, petitioner could be

8
convicted in case No. 16443 of the very same violation of municipal ordinance charged in case No. 16054, unless he
pleaded double jeopardy.

It is clear, therefore, that the lower court has not erred eventually sustaining the theory of petitioner herein.

Put a little differently, where the offenses charged are penalized either by different sections of the same statute or by
different statutes, the important inquiry relates to the identity of offenses charge: the constitutional protection against
double jeopardy is available only where an Identity is shown to exist between the earlier and the subsequent offenses
charged. In contrast, where one offense is charged under a municipal ordinance while the other is penalized by a
statute, the critical inquiry is to the identity of the acts which the accused is said to have committed and which are
alleged to have given rise to the two offenses: the constitutional protection against double jeopardy is available so
long as the acts which constitute or have given rise to the first offense under a municipal ordinance are the same acts
which constitute or have given rise to the offense charged under a statute.

The question may be raised why one rule should exist where two offenses under two different sections of the same
statute or under different statutes are charged, and another rule for the situation where one offense is charged under a
municipal ordinance and another offense under a national statute. If the second sentence of the double jeopardy
provision had not been written into the Constitution, conviction or acquittal under a municipal ordinance would never
constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act under a national statute. An offense penalized by municipal
ordinance is, by definition, different from an offense under a statute. The two offenses would never constitute the
same offense having been promulgated by different rule-making authorities — though one be subordinate to the other
— and the plea of double jeopardy would never lie. The discussions during the 1934-1935 Constitutional Convention
show that the second sentence was inserted precisely for the purpose of extending the constitutional protection
against double jeopardy to a situation which would not otherwise be covered by the first sentence. 13

The question of Identity or lack of Identity of offenses is addressed by examining the essential elements of each of the
two offenses charged, as such elements are set out in the respective legislative definitions of the offenses involved.
The question of Identity of the acts which are claimed to have generated liability both under a municipal ordinance and
a national statute must be addressed, in the first instance, by examining the location of such acts in time and space.
When the acts of the accused as set out in the two informations are so related to each other in time and space as to
be reasonably regarded as having taken place on the same occasion and where those acts have been moved by one
and the same, or a continuing, intent or voluntary design or negligence, such acts may be appropriately characterized
as an integral whole capable of giving rise to penal liability simultaneously under different legal enactments (a
municipal ordinance and a national statute).

In Yap, the Court regarded the offense of reckless driving under the Iloilo City Ordinance and serious physical injuries
through reckless imprudence under the Revised Motor Vehicle Law as derived from the same act or sets of acts —
that is, the operation of an automobile in a reckless manner. The additional technical element of serious physical
injuries related to the physical consequences of the operation of the automobile by the accused, i.e., the impact of the
automobile upon the body of the offended party. Clearly, such consequence occurred in the same occasion that the
accused operated the automobile (recklessly). The moral element of negligence permeated the acts of the accused
throughout that occasion.

In the instant case, the relevant acts took place within the same time frame: from November 1974 to February 1975.
During this period, the accused Manuel Opulencia installed or permitted the installation of electrical wiring and devices
in his ice plant without obtaining the necessary permit or authorization from the municipal authorities. The accused
conceded that he effected or permitted such unauthorized installation for the very purpose of reducing electric power
bill. This corrupt intent was thus present from the very moment that such unauthorized installation began. The
immediate physical effect of the unauthorized installation was the inward flow of electric current into Opulencia's ice
plant without the corresponding recording thereof in his electric meter. In other words, the "taking" of electric current
was integral with the unauthorized installation of electric wiring and devices.

It is perhaps important to note that the rule limiting the constitutional protection against double jeopardy to a
subsequent prosecution for the same offense is not to be understood with absolute literalness. The Identity of offenses
that must be shown need not be absolute Identity: the first and second offenses may be regarded as the "same
offense" where the second offense necessarily includes the first offense or is necessarily included in such first offense
or where the second offense is an attempt to commit the first or a frustration thereof. 14 Thus, for the constitutional
plea of double jeopardy to be available, not all the technical elements constituting the first offense need be present in
9
the technical definition of the second offense. The law here seeks to prevent harrassment of an accused person by
multiple prosecutions for offenses which though different from one another are nonetheless each constituted by a
common set or overlapping sets of technical elements. As Associate Justice and later Chief Justice Ricardo Paras
cautioned in People vs. del Carmen et al., 88 Phil. 51 (1951):

While the rule against double jeopardy prohibits prosecution for the same offense, it seems elementary that an
accused should be shielded against being prosecuted for several offenses made out from a single act. Otherwise, an
unlawful act or omission may give use to several prosecutions depending upon the ability of the prosecuting officer to
imagine or concoct as many offenses as can be justified by said act or omission, by simply adding or subtracting
essential elements. Under the theory of appellant, the crime of rape may be converted into a crime of coercion, by
merely alleging that by force and intimidation the accused prevented the offended girl from remaining a virgin. (88 Phil.
at 53; emphases supplied)

By the same token, acts of a person which physically occur on the same occasion and are infused by a common intent
or design or negligence and therefore form a moral unity, should not be segmented and sliced, as it were, to produce
as many different acts as there are offenses under municipal ordinances or statutes that an enterprising prosecutor
can find

It remains to point out that the dismissal by the Batangas City Court of the information for violation of the Batangas
City Ordinance upon the ground that such offense had already prescribed, amounts to an acquittal of the accused of
that offense. Under Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code, "prescription of the crime" is one of the grounds for "total
extinction of criminal liability." Under the Rules of Court, an order sustaining a motion to quash based on prescription
is a bar to another prosecution for the same offense. 15

It is not without reluctance that we deny the people's petition for certiorari and mandamus in this case. It is difficult to
summon any empathy for a businessman who would make or enlarge his profit by stealing from the community.
Manuel Opulencia is able to escape criminal punishment because an Assistant City Fiscal by inadvertence or
otherwise chose to file an information for an offense which he should have known had already prescribed. We are,
however, compelled by the fundamental law to hold the protection of the right against double jeopardy available even
to the private respondent in this case.

The civil liability aspects of this case are another matter. Because no reservation of the right to file a separate civil
action was made by the Batangas City electric light system, the civil action for recovery of civil liability arising from the
offense charged was impliedly instituted with the criminal action both before the City Court of Batangas City and the
Court of First Instance of Batangas. The extinction of criminal liability whether by prescription or by the bar of double
jeopardy does not carry with it the extinction of civil liability arising from the offense charged. In the present case, as
we noted earlier, 16 accused Manuel Opulencia freely admitted during the police investigation having stolen electric
current through the installation and use of unauthorized elibctrical connections or devices. While the accused pleaded
not guilty before the City Court of Batangas City, he did not deny having appropriated electric power. However, there is
no evidence in the record as to the amount or value of the electric power appropriated by Manuel Opulencia, the
criminal informations having been dismissed both by the City Court and by the Court of First Instance (from which
dismissals the Batangas City electric light system could not have appealed 17) before trial could begin. Accordingly,
the related civil action which has not been waived expressly or impliedly, should be remanded to the Court of First
Instance of Batangas City for reception of evidence on the amount or value of the electric power appropriated and
converted by Manuel Opulencia and rendition of judgment conformably with such evidence.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and mandamus is DENIED. Let the civil action for related civil liability be
remanded to the Court of First Instance of Batangas City for further proceedings as indicated above. No
pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Yap (Chairman), Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gancayco and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.

Cruz, J., took no part.

Footnotes
10
1 Petition for certiorari and Mandamus, dated 27 November 1976, p. 2.

2 Id.

3 Id.; and Annex "A " of the Petition.

4 Order dated 6 April 1976 of Acting City Judge Aguileo S. de Villa, City Court, Branch I, Batangas City, Criminal Case
No. 2385.

5 Memorandum for the Petitioner dated 16 April 1977, pp. 13-14.

6 Memorandum for the Petitioner dated 16 April 1977, p. 14, citing Reyes, Revised Penal Code [1971] p. 584.

7 Memorandum for Petitioner dated 16 April 1977, p. 15.

8 Id., p. 16; emphasis in the original; brackets supplied.

9 The above paragraph is taken verbatim from Article III (20) of the 1935 Constitution and is carried over, again
verbatim in Article III (21) of the proposed Constitution adopted by the Constitutional Commission of 1986. The
Philippine Bill of July 1, 1902 had provided that "no person for the same offense shall be twice put in jeopardy of
punishment-" (Sec. 5, 1 Phil. Anno. Laws [1956] 51). This provision of the Philippine Bill was carried over in Identical
words in the Jones Law of August 29, 1916 (Sec. 3, Ibid, 105).

10 The case law on this point includes: Lu Hayco vs. Court of Appeals, 138 SCRA 227 (1985); People vs. Bocar, 138
SCRA 166 (1985); People vs. Militante, 117 SCRA 910 (1982); Flores Jr. vs. Ponce Enrile, 115 SCRA 236 (1982);
People vs. Glorin 80 SCRA 675 (1977); People vs. Consulta, 70 SCRA 277 (1976); Tacas vs. Cariaso 72 SCRA 527
(1976); Bustamante vs. Maceren, 48 SCRA 155 (1972); People vs. Mencias, 46 SCRA 88 (1972); People vs.
Doriquez, 24 SCRA 163 (1968); Culanag vs. Director of Prisons, 20 SCRA 1123 (1967); People vs. Ramos, 2 SCRA
523 (1961); Yap vs. Hon. Lutero, 105 Phil. 1307 (1959); People vs. Opemia 98 Phil. 698 (1956); People vs. Alger 92
Phil. 227 (1953); People vs. del Carmen, 88 Phil. 51 (1951); Melo vs. People, 85 Phil. 766 (1950); People vs. Ylagan,
58 Phil. 851 (1933); People vs. Cabrera, 43 Phil. 82 (1922); Julia vs. Sotto, 2 Phil. 247 (1903).

11 G.R. No. L-12669, 30Aprill959.Unfortunately,this decision is not reported in full; see 105 Phil. 1307 (1959).

12 Emphases supplied.

13 The second sentence of Article Ill (22) of the 1935 Constitution was originally introduced by Delegate Francisco.
The amendment read:

"Si un acto esta penado tanto por una ley general como por una ordenanza municipal, la absolucion o condena bajo
la una sera obice para un procesamiento ulterior bajo la otra. " (IV Proceedings of the Philippine Constitutional
Convention [1966; SH Laurel, Ed.] p. 97)

Delegate Jose P. Laurel speaking in connection with the Francisco amendment said:

"MR. LAUREL. Mr. President and Gentlemen of the Convention: Pardon me if I have to make a little explanation in
connection with this case. In the case of the United States vs. Grafton, the Supreme Court of the United States said
that a person accused before a military tribunal and acquitted, cannot again be accused before a civil court, because
to do so will be to place a person twice in jeopardy. In that case, Grafton who was a soldier was accused before the
military court. This military court acquitted him. Later on he was again prosecuted for the same offense before a civil
court, and the civil court convicted him to fourteen years, eight months and one day. Upon the appeal to the Supreme
Court of the United States, the U.S. Supreme Court set aside the judgment of the lower court on the ground that
Grafton had been placed twice in jeopardy.

Now, in connection with my statement regarding laws and municipal ordinances, we have in our jurisprudence quite a
number of cases, particularly the cases of US. vs. Joson US. vs. Espiritu Santo and other cases holding that the
conviction under a general law settled power to prosecution (sic) under a local law, and vice versa, on the ground that
there are two distinct sovereignties and two distinct violations of the law. We have, therefore, reached a situation
where you have in one case the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States, and the decision of our Supreme

11
Court in the Philippine Islands. Now, the theory in the Supreme Court of the United States in the Grafton case was that
when the courts acquitted Grafton the acquittal was by the same authority, the authority of the United States that
established the military court. The civil government was established by the same authority of the government of the
United States, and consequently-to convict a man already acquitted would be [to] place [him] twice in jeopardy on the
same principle that it was the same authority that convicted and condemned Grafton.

Now, the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands, and with due apology to the Supreme Court, failed to follow the
logic of the Grafton case and adhered to the practice obtaining in several states of the Union that in cases where there
are two violations, one for a general law and one against a local law, there is no double jeopardy on the ground of two
distinct sovereignties and two distinct laws. But there is no doubt that it would be unjust and should not be allowed.
The objection and the example given here by the Representative from Cebu that a person may be influential or may
be shrewd enough in case he is accused, for instance, of gambling, in hurrying to the chief of police and having him
accused of violation of a municipal ordinance in which case, according to him, it will not be possible to accuse him
under a general law, and therefore that will defeat in a way the administration of justice because that will make the
administration of justice dependent upon the ability and the shrewdness of the person accused of gambling to hurry to
the justice of the peace court. But I desire to inform the members of this Convention, in answer to that argument, that
in my opinion it is preferable that a man should be only accused and convicted once, for instance, for violation of a
municipal ordinance and no longer be prosecuted for violation of a general law, rather than to permit that same person
be convicted say one month in the municipal court and then six months in another court for the same offense. I [would]
rather see a person convicted once in violation of a municipal offense, rather than to permit the conviction of that
person, one for violation of a municipal ordinance, and one for violation of a general law for the same offense, in
gambling in that case. If the selection is made, I would prefer the prosecution of a man under a general law than to
permit his prosecution twice for the same act of gambling.

x x x (IV Id. pp. 113-115; brackets supplied)

The distinction between "acts" and "offenses" in the context of the double jeopardy provision was present in the minds
of the delegates to the Convention. Thus:

MR. LAUREL. Mr. President, that has practically been brought up here, because some of our delegates suggested
that the word "act" be incorporated, which would give rise to difficulties, because one act may constitute different
offense. But when we retain the word "offense, " there will be distinct offenses, and consequently, that may be
desirable here to retain what is stated in the draft, that is, the word "offense;" but as I said, still if we accept in principle
the fact that no person shall be prosecuted twice for violation of a general offense, or if you give latitude to the
Committee as to the form of expression, we shall be able to arrive at that point where we can present a proper precept
embodying the Idea that we shall approve in principle only. I am not in a position to say now whether it would be
advisable to retain it; I do not know whether it would be advisable to insert the word "act," because an act may
constitute several offenses. It seems to me that it is for the committee to study properly the draft, and recommend
what it thinks best.

MR. JOVEN. Does not the gentleman think that such modification is a question of form and not of substance?

MR. LAUREL. Well my suggestion that we approve in principle the proposition covers this particular case. That is to
say, a person may not be prosecuted twice in a case where there are two laws, one general law and one municipal
ordinance. That is to say, in case he is prosecuted under a general law, that is a part or the consequences of a
municipal ordinance, and vice versa. That is the Idea, the primary Idea, and that is our recommendation. Now, as to
how we should word it, whether we should retain the draft as it is or we shall modify or amplify that and then
incorporate the amendment suggested by Delegate Francisco, I think it is just a matter of style and can be entirely left
to the Committee on Style. " (IV Id, pp. 116-117)

xxx xxx xxx

"SR. FRANCISCO. Senor Presidente, Caballeros de la convencion, voy a ser breve. Yo no estoy conforme con la
ultima parte del discurso de mi distinguido amigo el Delegado por Batangas, Sr. Laurel, al decir que la frase "en
ningun caso se pondra a una persona en peligro de ser condenada dos veces por el mismo delito," cubre la enmienda
que he presentado. La razon es muy sencilla. Las palabras "mismo delito" no quieren decir un mismo acto. Esta
cuestion ha sido planteada ante la Corte Suprema. Al ejecutar un acto penado bajo o una ordenanza municipal y
penado bajo o una ley general, se presents una accion contra el en el juzgado de paz. Convicto en el juzgado de paz

12
y firme la sentencia, se presenta otra acusacion contra el en el juzgado de Primera Instancia por infraccion de una ley
general. El acusado se defiende alegando que esta en jeopardy, porque ya habia sido condenado por ese mismo
acto, y la Corte Suprema declaro que la teoria del acusado era erronea, porque dice que lo que la ley prohibe es que
se ponga a uno en peugro de ser condenado por un mismo delito y no por un mismo acto, y la Corte Supreme
declare, en ese caso particular, que como quiera que aquel acto estaba penado por una ordenanza municipal y por
una ley general, se cometen dos delitos; uno contra el municipio y otro contra el Estado o contra la ley general de ahi
que mi enmienda en el sentido de que cuando un acusado ha cometido un acto penado por una ordenanza municipal
y al tiempo por una ley general, y dicho acusado ya ha sido convictopor la infraccion procesado ulteriormente bajo
otra ley. Creo, por lo tanto, que no es cuestion solamente de estilo, sino que es una cuestion fundamental" (IV Id, p.
119, emphases supplied)

14 Section 9, Rule 117, Revised Rules of Court.

15 Sections of and 8, Rule 117, Revised Rules of Court; see Cabral vs. Puno, 70 SCRA 606 (1976).

16 Supra, Note 3.

17 People v. Velez, 77 Phil. 1046 (1946); People v. Maceda, 73 Phil. 679 (1942); People v. Liggayu et al. 97 PhiL 865
(1955).

13
G.R. No. 107125 January 29, 2001

GEORGE MANANTAN, petitioner,

vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, SPOUSES MARCELINO NICOLAS and MARIA NICOLAS, respondents.

QUISUMBING, J.:

This is a petition for review of the decision dated January 31, 1992 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 19240,
modifying the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Santiago, Isabela, Branch 21, in Criminal Case No. 066.
Petitioner George Manantan was acquitted by the trial court of homicide through reckless imprudence without a ruling
on his civil liability. On appeal from the civil aspect of the judgment in Criminal Case No. 066, the appellate court found
petitioner Manantan civilly liable and ordered him to indemnify private respondents Marcelino Nicolas and Maria
Nicolas P104,400.00 representing loss of support, P50,000.00 as death indemnity, and moral damages of P20,000.00
or a total of P174,400.00 for the death of their son, Ruben Nicolas.

The facts of this case are as follows:

On June 1, 1983, the Provincial Fiscal of Isabela filed an information charging petitioner Manantan with reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide, allegedly committed as follows:

That on or about the 25th day of September 1982, in the municipality of Santiago, province of Isabela, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, being then the driver and person-in-charge of an
automobile bearing Plate No. NGA-816, willfully and unlawfully drove and operated the same while along the Daang
Maharlika at Barangay Malvar, in said municipality, in a negligent, careless and imprudent manner, without due regard
to traffic laws, regulations and ordinances and without taking the necessary precaution to prevent accident to person
and damage to property, causing by such negligence, carelessness and imprudence said automobile driven and
operated by him to sideswipe a passenger jeep bearing plate No. 918-7F driven by Charles Codamon, thereby
causing the said automobile to turn down (sic) resulting to the death of Ruben Nicolas a passenger of said automobile.

CONTRARY TO LAW.1

On arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial on the merits ensued.

The prosecution's evidence, as summarized by the trial court and adopted by the appellate court, showed that:

[I]n the morning of September 25, 1982, Fiscal Wilfredo Ambrocio… decided to catch shrimps at the irrigation canal at
his farm. He invited the deceased who told him that they (should) borrow the Ford Fiera of the accused George
Manantan who is also from Cordon. The deceased went to borrow the Ford Fiera but…said that the accused also
wanted to (come) along. So Fiscal Ambrocio and the deceased dropped by the accused at the Manantan Technical
School. They drank beer there before they proceeded to the farm using the Toyota Starlet of the accused. At the farm
they consumed one (more) case of beer. At about 12:00 o'clock noon they went home. Then at about 2:00 or 3:00
o'clock that afternoon, (defense witness Miguel) Tagangin and (Ruben) Nicolas and the accused returned to the house
of Fiscal Ambrocio with a duck. They cooked the duck and ate the same with one more case of beer. They ate and
drank until about 8:30 in the evening when the accused invited them to go bowling. They went to Santiago, Isabela on
board the Toyota Starlet of the accused who drove the same. They went to the Vicap Bowling Lanes at Mabini,
Santiago, Isabela but unfortunately there was no vacant alley. While waiting for a vacant alley they drank one beer
each. After waiting for about 40 minutes and still no alley became vacant the accused invited his companions to go to
the LBC Night Club. They had drinks and took some lady partners at the LBC. After one hour, they left the LBC and
proceeded to a nearby store where they ate arroz caldo…and then they decided to go home. Again the accused drove
the car. Miguel Tabangin sat with the accused in the front seat while the deceased and Fiscal Ambrocio sat at the back
seat with the deceased immediately behind the accused. The accused was driving at a speed of about 40 kilometers
per hour along the Maharlika Highway at Malvar, Santiago, Isabela, at the middle portion of the highway (although
according to Charles Cudamon, the car was running at a speed of 80 to 90 kilometers per hours on [the] wrong lane of
the highway because the car was overtaking a tricycle) when they met a passenger jeepney with bright lights on. The
accused immediately tried to swerve the car to the right and move his body away from the steering wheel but he was
not able to avoid the oncoming vehicle and the two vehicles collided with each other at the center of the road.

xxx
14
As a result of the collision the car turned turtle twice and landed on its top at the side of the highway immediately at
the approach of the street going to the Flores Clinic while the jeep swerved across the road so that one half front
portion landed on the lane of the car while the back half portion was at its right lane five meters away from the point of
impact as shown by a sketch (Exhibit "A") prepared by Cudamon the following morning at the Police Headquarters at
the instance of his lawyer. Fiscal Ambrocio lost consciousness. When he regained consciousness he was still inside
the car (lying) on his belly with the deceased on top of him. Ambrocio pushed (away) the deceased and then he was
pulled out of the car by Tabangin. Afterwards, the deceased who was still unconscious was pulled out from the car.
Both Fiscal Ambrocio and the deceased were brought to the Flores Clinic. The deceased died that night (Exhibit "B")
while Ambrocio suffered only minor injuries to his head and legs.2

The defense version as to the events prior to the incident was essentially the same as that of the prosecution, except
that defense witness Miguel Tabangin declared that Manantan did not drink beer that night. As to the accident, the
defense claimed that:

…The accused was driving slowly at the right lane [at] about 20 inches from the center of the road at about 30
kilometers per hour at the National Highway at Malvar, Santiago, Isabela, when suddenly a passenger jeepney with
bright lights which was coming from the opposite direction and running very fast suddenly swerve(d) to the car's lane
and bumped the car which turned turtle twice and rested on its top at the right edge of the road while the jeep stopped
across the center of the road as shown by a picture taken after the incident (Exhibit "1") and a sketch (Exhibit "3")
drawn by the accused during his rebuttal testimony. The car was hit on the driver's side. As a result of the collision, the
accused and Miguel Tabangin and Fiscal Ambrocio were injured while Ruben Nicolas died at the Flores Clinic where
they were all brought for treatment.3

In its decision dated June 30, 1988, promulgated on August 4, 1988, the trial court decided Criminal Case No. 066 in
petitioner's favor, thus:

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing considerations, the Court finds the accused NOT GUILTY of the crime
charged and hereby acquits him.

SO ORDERED.4

On August 8, 1988, private respondents filed their notice of appeal on the civil aspect of the trial court's judgment. In
their appeal, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 19240, the Nicolas spouses prayed that the decision appealed from be
modified and that appellee be ordered to pay indemnity and damages.

On January 31, 1992, the appellate court decided CA-G.R. CV No. 19240 in favor of the Nicolas spouses, thus:

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is MODIFIED in that defendant-appellee is hereby held civilly liable for his
negligent and reckless act of driving his car which was the proximate cause of the vehicular accident, and sentenced
to indemnify plaintiffs-appellants in the amount of P174,400.00 for the death of Ruben Nicolas,

SO ORDERED.5

In finding petitioner civilly liable, the court a quo noted that at the time the accident occurred, Manantan was in a state
of intoxication, due to his having consumed "all in all, a total of at least twelve (12) bottles of beer…between 9 a.m.
and 11 p.m."6 It found that petitioner's act of driving while intoxicated was a clear violation of Section 53 of the Land
Transportation and Traffic Code (R.A. No. 4136)7 and pursuant to Article 2185 of the Civil Code,8 a statutory
presumption of negligence existed. It held that petitioner's act of violating the Traffic Code is negligence in itself
"because the mishap, which occurred, was the precise injury sought to be prevented by the regulation."9

Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but the appellate court in its resolution of August 24, 1992 denied the motion.

Hence, the present case. Petitioner, in his memorandum, submits the following issues for our consideration:

FIRST – THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT ACQUITTING THE PETITIONER OF THE CRIME OF RECKLESS
IMPRUDENCE RESULTING TO HOMICIDE FORECLOSED ANY FURTHER INQUIRY ON THE ACCUSED'S
(PETITIONER'S) NEGLIGENCE OR RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE BECAUSE BY THEN HE WILL BE PLACED IN
"DOUBLE JEOPARDY" AND THEREFORE THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN PASSING UPON THE SAME
ISSUE AGAIN.
15
SECOND – THE COURT OF APPEALS DID NOT HAVE JURISDICTION TO AWARD DAMAGES AND INDEMNITY
TO THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS CONSIDERING THAT THE NON-DECLARATION OF ANY INDEMNITY OR
AWARD OF DAMAGES BY THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF ISABELA, BRANCH XXI, WAS ITSELF
CONSISTENT WITH THE PETITIONER'S ACQUITTAL FOR THE REASON THAT THE CIVIL ACTION WAS
IMPLIEDLY INSTITUTED WITH THE CRIMINAL ACTION AND THERE WAS NO EXPRESS WAIVER OF THE CIVIL
ACTION OR RESERVATION TO INSTITUTE IT SEPARATELY BY THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS IN THE TRIAL
COURT.

THIRD – THE COURT OF APPEALS DID NOT HAVE JURISDICTION TO TAKE COGNIZANCE OF THE CASE
CA-G.R. CV No. 19240 ENTITLED: SPOUSES MARCELINO NICOLAS AND MARIA NICOLAS v. GEORGE
MANANTAN, AND RENDER THE DECISION SOUGHT TO BE REVIEWED WHEN THE SAME WAS PROSECUTED
BY THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS IN THEIR PERSONAL CAPACITIES AND THE FILING FEES NOT HAVING
BEEN PAID, THUS VIOLATING THE MANCHESTER DOCTRINE.

In brief, the issues for our resolution are:

(1) Did the acquittal of petitioner foreclose any further inquiry by the Court of Appeals as to his negligence or reckless
imprudence?

(2) Did the court a quo err in finding that petitioner's acquittal did not extinguish his civil liability?

(3) Did the appellate court commit a reversible error in failing to apply the Manchester doctrine to CA-G.R. CV No.
19240?

On the first issue, petitioner opines that the Court of Appeals should not have disturbed the findings of the trial court
on the lack of negligence or reckless imprudence under the guise of determining his civil liability. He argues that the
trial court's finding that he was neither imprudent nor negligent was the basis for his acquittal, and not reasonable
doubt. He submits that in finding him liable for indemnity and damages, the appellate court not only placed his
acquittal in suspicion, but also put him in "double jeopardy."

Private respondents contend that while the trial court found that petitioner's guilt had not been proven beyond
reasonable doubt, it did not state in clear and unequivocal terms that petitioner was not recklessly imprudent or
negligent. Hence, impliedly the trial court acquitted him on reasonable doubt. Since civil liability is not extinguished in
criminal cases, if the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt, the Court of Appeals had to review the findings of the
trial court to determine if there was a basis for awarding indemnity and damages.1âwphi1.nêt

Preliminarily, petitioner's claim that the decision of the appellate court awarding indemnity placed him in double
jeopardy is misplaced. The constitution provides that "no person shall be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. If
an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another
prosecution for the same act."10 When a person is charged with an offense and the case is terminated either by
acquittal or conviction or in any other manner without the consent of the accused, the latter cannot again be charged
with the same or identical offense.11 This is double jeopardy. For double jeopardy to exist, the following elements must
be established: (a) a first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy must have terminated;
and (3) the second jeopardy must be for the same offense as the first.12 In the instant case, petitioner had once been
placed in jeopardy by the filing of Criminal Case No. 066 and the jeopardy was terminated by his discharge. The
judgment of acquittal became immediately final. Note, however, that what was elevated to the Court of Appeals by
private respondents was the civil aspect of Criminal Case No. 066. Petitioner was not charged anew in CA-G.R. CV
No. 19240 with a second criminal offense identical to the first offense. The records clearly show that no second
criminal offense was being imputed to petitioner on appeal. In modifying the lower court's judgment, the appellate
court did not modify the judgment of acquittal. Nor did it order the filing of a second criminal case against petitioner for
the same offense. Obviously, therefore, there was no second jeopardy to speak of. Petitioner's claim of having been
placed in double jeopardy is incorrect.

Our law recognizes two kinds of acquittal, with different effects on the civil liability of the accused. First is an acquittal
on the ground that the accused is not the author of the act or omission complained of. This instance closes the door to
civil liability, for a person who has been found to be not the perpetrator of any act or omission cannot and can never be
held liable for such act or omission.13 There being no delict, civil liability ex delicto is out of the question, and the civil
action, if any, which may be instituted must be based on grounds other than the delict complained of. This is the

16
situation contemplated in Rule 111 of the Rules of Court.14 The second instance is an acquittal based on reasonable
doubt on the guilt of the accused. In this case, even if the guilt of the accused has not been satisfactorily established,
he is not exempt from civil liability which may be proved by preponderance of evidence only.15 This is the situation
contemplated in Article 29 of the Civil Code,16 where the civil action for damages is "for the same act or omission."
Although the two actions have different purposes, the matters discussed in the civil case are similar to those
discussed in the criminal case. However, the judgment in the criminal proceeding cannot be read in evidence in the
civil action to establish any fact there determined, even though both actions involve the same act or omission.17 The
reason for this rule is that the parties are not the same and secondarily, different rules of evidence are applicable.
Hence, notwithstanding herein petitioner's acquittal, the Court of Appeals in determining whether Article 29 applied,
was not precluded from looking into the question of petitioner's negligence or reckless imprudence.

On the second issue, petitioner insists that he was acquitted on a finding that he was neither criminally negligent nor
recklessly imprudent. Inasmuch as his civil liability is predicated on the criminal offense, he argues that when the latter
is not proved, civil liability cannot be demanded. He concludes that his acquittal bars any civil action.

Private respondents counter that a closer look at the trial court's judgment shows that the judgment of acquittal did not
clearly and categorically declare the non-existence of petitioner's negligence or imprudence. Hence, they argue that
his acquittal must be deemed based on reasonable doubt, allowing Article 29 of the Civil Code to come into play.

Our scrutiny of the lower court's decision in Criminal Case No. 066 supports the conclusion of the appellate court that
the acquittal was based on reasonable doubt; hence, petitioner's civil liability was not extinguished by his discharge.
We note the trial court's declaration that did not discount the possibility that "the accused was really negligent."
However, it found that "a hypothesis inconsistent with the negligence of the accused presented itself before the Court"
and since said "hypothesis is consistent with the record…the Court's mind cannot rest on a verdict of conviction."18
The foregoing clearly shows that petitioner's acquittal was predicated on the conclusion that his guilt had not been
established with moral certainty. Stated differently, it is an acquittal based on reasonable doubt and a suit to enforce
civil liability for the same act or omission lies.

On the third issue, petitioner argues that the Court of Appeals erred in awarding damages and indemnity, since private
respondents did not pay the corresponding filing fees for their claims for damages when the civil case was impliedly
instituted with the criminal action. Petitioner submits that the non-payment of filing fees on the amount of the claim for
damages violated the doctrine in Manchester Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 149 SCRA 562 (1987)
and Supreme Court Circular No. 7 dated March 24, 1988.19 He avers that since Manchester held that "The Court
acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon payment of the prescribed docket fees," the appellate court was without
jurisdiction to hear and try CA-G.R. CV No. 19240, much less award indemnity and damages.

Private respondents argue that the Manchester doctrine is inapplicable to the instant case. They ask us to note that
the criminal case, with which the civil case was impliedly instituted, was filed on July 1, 1983, while the Manchester
requirements as to docket and filing fees took effect only with the promulgation of Supreme Court Circular No. 7 on
March 24, 1988. Moreover, the information filed by the Provincial Prosecutor of Isabela did not allege the amount of
indemnity to be paid. Since it was not then customarily or legally required that the civil damages sought be stated in
the information, the trial court had no basis in assessing the filing fees and demanding payment thereof. Moreover,
assuming that the Manchester ruling is applied retroactively, under the Rules of Court, the filing fees for the damages
awarded are a first lien on the judgment. Hence, there is no violation of the Manchester doctrine to speak of.

At the time of the filing of the information in 1983, the implied institution of civil actions with criminal actions was
governed by Rule 111, Section 1 of the 1964 Rules of Court.20 As correctly pointed out by private respondents, under
said rule, it was not required that the damages sought by the offended party be stated in the complaint or information.
With the adoption of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, and the amendment of Rule 111, Section 1 of the 1985
Rules of Criminal Procedure by a resolution of this Court dated July 7, 1988, it is now required that:

When the offended party seeks to enforce civil liability against the accused by way of moral, nominal, temperate or
exemplary damages, the filing fees for such civil action as provided in these Rules shall constitute a first lien on the
judgment except in an award for actual damages.

In cases wherein the amount of damages, other than actual, is alleged in the complaint or information, the
corresponding filing fees shall be paid by the offended party upon the filing thereof in court for trial.

17
The foregoing were the applicable provisions of the Rules of Criminal Procedure at the time private respondents
appealed the civil aspect of Criminal Case No. 066 to the court a quo in 1989. Being in the nature of a curative statute,
the amendment applies retroactively and affects pending actions as in this case.

Thus, where the civil action is impliedly instituted together with the criminal action, the actual damages claimed by the
offended parties, as in this case, are not included in the computation of the filing fees. Filing fees are to be paid only if
other items of damages such as moral, nominal, temporate, or exemplary damages are alleged in the complaint or
information, or if they are not so alleged, shall constitute a first lien on the judgment.21 Recall that the information in
Criminal Case No. 066 contained no specific allegations of damages. Considering that the Rules of Criminal
Procedure effectively guarantee that the filing fees for the award of damages are a first lien on the judgment, the effect
of the enforcement of said lien must retroact to the institution of the criminal action. The filing fees are deemed paid
from the filing of the criminal complaint or information. We therefore find no basis for petitioner's allegations that the
filing fees were not paid or improperly paid and that the appellate court acquired no jurisdiction.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 19240 promulgated on January 31, 1992, as well as its resolution dated August 24, 1992, denying
herein petitioner's motion for reconsideration, are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.1âwphi1.nêt

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, Mendoza, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

Footnotes:
1 Records, p. 1.

2 CA Rollo, pp. 53-55.

3 Id. at 56-57.

4 Records, p. 429.

5 CA Rollo, p. 60.

6 Id. at 57.

7 SEC. 53. Driving while under the influence of liquor or narcotic drug. – No person shall drive a motor vehicle while under the

influence of liquor or narcotic drug.

8 Civil Code, ART. 2185. Unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a person driving a motor vehicle has been

negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation.

9 Supra note 6, at 58.

10 Const., Art. III, Sec. 21.

11 Melo v. People, 85 Phil. 766, 768 (1950).

12 People v. Bocar, 138 SCRA 166, 171 (1985).

13 Almeida, et al. V. Abaroa, 8 Phil. 178, 181 (1907). See also Almeida Chantangco and Lete v. Abaroa, 40 Phil. 1056 (1910), 218

US 476, 54 l. Ed. 1116 (1910); Wise & Co. v. Larion, 45 Phil. 314 (1923), Francisco v. Onrubia, 46 Phil. 327 (1924). Article 29 of the

Civil Code serves only to limit and qualify the application of the Almeida doctrine.

14 Rules of Court, Rule 111, Sec. 2. Institution of Separate civil action. –

xxx

(b) Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a

final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist. (stress supplied)

15 Manahan, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 255 SCRA 202, 214 (1996), citing Padilla v. Court of Appeals, 129 SCRA 558 (1984).

18
16 Civil Code, ART. 29. When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not been proved

beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the same act or omission may be instituted (stress supplied). Such action

requires only a preponderance of evidence. Upon motion of the defendant, the court may require the plaintiff to file a bond to

answer for damages in case the complaint should be found to be malicious.

If in a criminal case, the judgment of acquittal is based upon reasonable doubt, the court shall so declare. In the absence of any

declaration to that effect, it may be inferred from the text of the decision whether or not the acquittal is due to that ground.

17 Almeida Chantangco and Lete v. Abaroa, supra note 13, at 1061.

18 Supra note 4.

19 The subject of which reads: ALL COMPLAINTS MUST SPECIFY THE AMOUNT OF DAMAGES SOUGHT NOT ONLY IN THE

BODY OF THE PLEADINGS, BUT ALSO IN THE PRAYER IN ORDER TO BE ACCEPTED AND ADMITTED FOR FILING. THE

AMOUNT OF DAMAGES SO SPECIFIED IN THE COMPLAINT SHALL BE THE BASIS FOR ASSESSING THE AMOUNT OF THE

FILING FEES.

20 Sec. 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. – When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for recovery of civil liability

arising from the offense charged is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended party expressly waives the civil

action or reserves his right to institute it separately.

21 People v. Escano, Jr., 193 SCRA 662, 665 (1991).

19
G.R. No. 102007 September 2, 1994

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ROGELIO BAYOTAS y CORDOVA, accused-appellant.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Public Attorney's Office for accused-appellant.

ROMERO, J.:

In Criminal Case No. C-3217 filed before Branch 16, RTC Roxas City, Rogelio Bayotas y Cordova was charged with
Rape and eventually convicted thereof on June 19, 1991 in a decision penned by Judge Manuel E. Autajay. Pending
appeal of his conviction, Bayotas died on February 4, 1992 at
the National Bilibid Hospital due to cardio respiratory arrest secondary to hepatic encephalopathy secondary to hipato
carcinoma gastric malingering. Consequently, the Supreme Court in its Resolution of May 20, 1992 dismissed the
criminal aspect of the appeal. However, it required the Solicitor General to file its comment with regard to Bayotas' civil
liability arising from his commission of the offense charged.

In his comment, the Solicitor General expressed his view that the death of accused-appellant did not extinguish his
civil liability as a result of his commission of the offense charged. The Solicitor General, relying on the case of People
v. Sendaydiego 1 insists that the appeal should still be resolved for the purpose of reviewing his conviction by the
lower court on which the civil liability is based.

Counsel for the accused-appellant, on the other hand, opposed the view of the Solicitor General arguing that the
death of the accused while judgment of conviction is pending appeal extinguishes both his criminal and civil penalties.
In support of his position, said counsel invoked the ruling of the Court of Appeals in People v. Castillo and Ocfemia 2
which held that the civil obligation in a criminal case takes root in the criminal liability and, therefore, civil liability is
extinguished if accused should die before final judgment is rendered.

We are thus confronted with a single issue: Does death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguish his
civil liability?

In the aforementioned case of People v. Castillo, this issue was settled in the affirmative. This same issue posed
therein was phrased thus: Does the death of Alfredo Castillo affect both his criminal responsibility and his civil liability
as a consequence of the alleged crime?

It resolved this issue thru the following disquisition:

Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code is the controlling statute. It reads, in part:

Art. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. — Criminal liability is totally extinguished:

1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to the pecuniary penalties liability therefor is
extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment;

With reference to Castillo's criminal liability, there is no question. The law is plain. Statutory construction is
unnecessary. Said liability is extinguished.

The civil liability, however, poses a problem. Such liability is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs
before final judgment. Saddled upon us is the task of ascertaining the legal import of the term "final judgment." Is it
final judgment as contradistinguished from an interlocutory order? Or, is it a judgment which is final and executory?

We go to the genesis of the law. The legal precept contained in Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code heretofore
transcribed is lifted from Article 132 of the Spanish El Codigo Penal de 1870 which, in part, recites:

La responsabilidad penal se extingue.

20
1. Por la muerte del reo en cuanto a las penas personales siempre, y respecto a las pecuniarias, solo cuando a su
fallecimiento no hubiere recaido sentencia firme.

xxx xxx xxx

The code of 1870 . . . it will be observed employs the term "sentencia firme." What is "sentencia firme" under the old
statute?

XXVIII Enciclopedia Juridica Española, p. 473, furnishes the ready answer: It says:

SENTENCIA FIRME. La sentencia que adquiere la fuerza de las definitivas por no haberse utilizado por las partes
litigantes recurso alguno contra ella dentro de los terminos y plazos legales concedidos al efecto.

"Sentencia firme" really should be understood as one which is definite. Because, it is only when judgment is such that,
as Medina y Maranon puts it, the crime is confirmed — "en condena determinada;" or, in the words of Groizard, the
guilt of the accused becomes — "una verdad legal." Prior thereto, should the accused die, according to Viada, "no hay
legalmente, en tal caso, ni reo, ni delito, ni responsabilidad criminal de ninguna clase." And, as Judge Kapunan well
explained, when a defendant dies before judgment becomes executory, "there cannot be any determination by final
judgment whether or not the felony upon which the civil action might arise exists," for the simple reason that "there is
no party defendant." (I Kapunan, Revised Penal Code, Annotated, p. 421. Senator Francisco holds the same view.
Francisco, Revised Penal Code, Book One, 2nd ed., pp. 859-860)

The legal import of the term "final judgment" is similarly reflected in the Revised Penal Code. Articles 72 and 78 of that
legal body mention the term "final judgment" in the sense that it is already enforceable. This also brings to mind
Section 7, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court which states that a judgment in a criminal case becomes final "after the
lapse of the period for perfecting an appeal or when the sentence has been partially or totally satisfied or served, or
the defendant has expressly waived in writing his right to appeal."

By fair intendment, the legal precepts and opinions here collected funnel down to one positive conclusion: The term
final judgment employed in the Revised Penal Code means judgment beyond recall. Really, as long as a judgment has
not become executory, it cannot be truthfully said that defendant is definitely guilty of the felony charged against him.

Not that the meaning thus given to final judgment is without reason. For where, as in this case, the right to institute a
separate civil action is not reserved, the decision to be rendered must, of necessity, cover "both the criminal and the
civil aspects of the case." People vs. Yusico (November 9, 1942), 2 O.G., No. 100, p. 964. See also: People vs. Moll,
68 Phil., 626, 634; Francisco, Criminal Procedure, 1958 ed., Vol. I, pp. 234, 236. Correctly, Judge Kapunan observed
that as "the civil action is based solely on the felony committed and of which the offender might be found guilty, the
death of the offender extinguishes the civil liability." I Kapunan, Revised Penal Code, Annotated, supra.

Here is the situation obtaining in the present case: Castillo's criminal liability is out. His civil liability is sought to be
enforced by reason of that criminal liability. But then, if we dismiss, as we must, the criminal action and let the civil
aspect remain, we will be faced with the anomalous situation whereby we will be called upon to clamp civil liability in a
case where the source thereof — criminal liability — does not exist. And, as was well stated in Bautista, et al. vs.
Estrella, et al., CA-G.R.
No. 19226-R, September 1, 1958, "no party can be found and held criminally liable in a civil suit," which solely would
remain if we are to divorce it from the criminal proceeding."

This ruling of the Court of Appeals in the Castillo case 3 was adopted by the Supreme Court in the cases of People of
the Philippines v. Bonifacio Alison, et al., 4 People of the Philippines v. Jaime Jose, et al. 5 and People of the
Philippines v. Satorre 6 by dismissing the appeal in view of the death of the accused pending appeal of said cases.

As held by then Supreme Court Justice Fernando in the Alison case:

The death of accused-appellant Bonifacio Alison having been established, and considering that there is as yet no final
judgment in view of the pendency of the appeal, the criminal and civil liability of the said accused-appellant Alison was
extinguished by his death (Art. 89, Revised Penal Code; Reyes' Criminal Law, 1971 Rev. Ed., p. 717, citing People v.
Castillo and Ofemia C.A., 56 O.G. 4045); consequently, the case against him should be dismissed.

21
On the other hand, this Court in the subsequent cases of Buenaventura Belamala v. Marcelino Polinar 7 and Lamberto
Torrijos v. The Honorable Court of Appeals 8 ruled differently. In the former, the issue decided by this court was:
Whether the civil liability of one accused of physical injuries who died before final judgment is extinguished by his
demise to the extent of barring any claim therefore against his estate. It was the contention of the
administrator-appellant therein that the death of the accused prior to final judgment extinguished all criminal and civil
liabilities resulting from the offense, in view of Article 89, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code. However, this court
ruled therein:

We see no merit in the plea that the civil liability has been extinguished, in view of the provisions of the Civil Code of
the Philippines of 1950 (Rep. Act No. 386) that became operative eighteen years after the revised Penal Code. As
pointed out by the Court below, Article 33 of the Civil Code establishes a civil action for damages on account of
physical injuries, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action.

Art. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct
from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the
criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.

Assuming that for lack of express reservation, Belamala's civil action for damages was to be considered instituted
together with the criminal action still, since both proceedings were terminated without final adjudication, the civil action
of the offended party under Article 33 may yet be enforced separately.

In Torrijos, the Supreme Court held that:

xxx xxx xxx

It should be stressed that the extinction of civil liability follows the extinction of the criminal liability under Article 89,
only when the civil liability arises from the criminal act as its only basis. Stated differently, where the civil liability does
not exist independently of the criminal responsibility, the extinction of the latter by death, ipso facto extinguishes the
former, provided, of course, that death supervenes before final judgment. The said principle does not apply in instant
case wherein the civil liability springs neither solely nor originally from the crime itself but from a civil contract of
purchase and sale. (Emphasis ours)

xxx xxx xxx

In the above case, the court was convinced that the civil liability of the accused who was charged with estafa could
likewise trace its genesis to Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code since said accused had swindled the first and
second vendees of the property subject matter of the contract of sale. It therefore concluded: "Consequently, while the
death of the accused herein extinguished his criminal liability including fine, his civil liability based on the laws of
human relations remains."

Thus it allowed the appeal to proceed with respect to the civil liability of the accused, notwithstanding the extinction of
his criminal liability due to his death pending appeal of his conviction.

To further justify its decision to allow the civil liability to survive, the court relied on the following ratiocination: Since
Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court 9 requires the dismissal of all money claims against the defendant whose
death occurred prior to the final judgment of the Court of First Instance (CFI), then it can be inferred that actions for
recovery of money may continue to be heard on appeal, when the death of the defendant supervenes after the CFI
had rendered its judgment. In such case, explained this tribunal, "the name of the offended party shall be included in
the title of the case as plaintiff-appellee and the legal representative or the heirs of the deceased-accused should be
substituted as defendants-appellants."

It is, thus, evident that as jurisprudence evolved from Castillo to Torrijos, the rule established was that the survival of
the civil liability depends on whether the same can be predicated on sources of obligations other than delict. Stated
differently, the claim for civil liability is also extinguished together with the criminal action if it were solely based
thereon, i.e., civil liability ex delicto.

However, the Supreme Court in People v. Sendaydiego, et al. 10 departed from this long-established principle of law. In
this case, accused Sendaydiego was charged with and convicted by the lower court of malversation thru falsification
of public documents. Sendaydiego's death supervened during the pendency of the appeal of his conviction.
22
This court in an unprecedented move resolved to dismiss Sendaydiego's appeal but only to the extent of his criminal
liability. His civil liability was allowed to survive although it was clear that such claim thereon was exclusively
dependent on the criminal action already extinguished. The legal import of such decision was for the court to continue
exercising appellate jurisdiction over the entire appeal, passing upon the correctness of Sendaydiego's conviction
despite dismissal of the criminal action, for the purpose of determining if he is civilly liable. In doing so, this Court
issued a Resolution of July 8, 1977 stating thus:

The claim of complainant Province of Pangasinan for the civil liability survived Sendaydiego because his death
occurred after final judgment was rendered by the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, which convicted him of three
complex crimes of malversation through falsification and ordered him to indemnify the Province in the total sum of
P61,048.23 (should be P57,048.23).

The civil action for the civil liability is deemed impliedly instituted with the criminal action in the absence of express
waiver or its reservation in a separate action (Sec. 1, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court). The civil action for the civil
liability is separate and distinct from the criminal action (People and Manuel vs. Coloma, 105 Phil. 1287; Roa vs. De la
Cruz, 107 Phil. 8).

When the action is for the recovery of money and the defendant dies before final judgment in the Court of First
Instance, it shall be dismissed to be prosecuted in the manner especially provided in Rule 87 of the Rules of Court
(Sec. 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court).

The implication is that, if the defendant dies after a money judgment had been rendered against him by the Court of
First Instance, the action survives him. It may be continued on appeal (Torrijos vs. Court of Appeals, L-40336, October
24, 1975; 67 SCRA 394).

The accountable public officer may still be civilly liable for the funds improperly disbursed although he has no criminal
liability (U.S. vs. Elvina, 24 Phil. 230; Philippine National Bank vs. Tugab, 66 Phil. 583).

In view of the foregoing, notwithstanding the dismissal of the appeal of the deceased Sendaydiego insofar as his
criminal liability is concerned, the Court Resolved to continue exercising appellate jurisdiction over his possible civil
liability for the money claims of the Province of Pangasinan arising from the alleged criminal acts complained of, as if
no criminal case had been instituted against him, thus making applicable, in determining his civil liability, Article 30 of
the Civil Code . . . and, for that purpose, his counsel is directed to inform this Court within ten (10) days of the names
and addresses of the decedent's heirs or whether or not his estate is under administration and has a duly appointed
judicial administrator. Said heirs or administrator will be substituted for the deceased insofar as the civil action for the
civil liability is concerned (Secs. 16 and 17, Rule 3, Rules of Court).

Succeeding cases 11 raising the identical issue have maintained adherence to our ruling in Sendaydiego; in other
words, they were a reaffirmance of our abandonment of the settled rule that a civil liability solely anchored on the
criminal (civil liability ex delicto) is extinguished upon dismissal of the entire appeal due to the demise of the accused.

But was it judicious to have abandoned this old ruling? A re-examination of our decision in Sendaydiego impels us to
revert to the old ruling.

To restate our resolution of July 8, 1977 in Sendaydiego: The resolution of the civil action impliedly instituted in the
criminal action can proceed irrespective of the latter's extinction due to death of the accused pending appeal of his
conviction, pursuant to Article 30 of the Civil Code and Section 21, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court.

Article 30 of the Civil Code provides:

When a separate civil action is brought to demand civil liability arising from a criminal offense, and no criminal
proceedings are instituted during the pendency of the civil case, a preponderance of evidence shall likewise be
sufficient to prove the act complained of.

Clearly, the text of Article 30 could not possibly lend support to the ruling in Sendaydiego. Nowhere in its text is there a
grant of authority to continue exercising appellate jurisdiction over the accused's civil liability ex delicto when his death
supervenes during appeal. What Article 30 recognizes is an alternative and separate civil action which may be brought
to demand civil liability arising from a criminal offense independently of any criminal action. In the event that no
criminal proceedings are instituted during the pendency of said civil case, the quantum of evidence needed to prove
23
the criminal act will have to be that which is compatible with civil liability and that is, preponderance of evidence and
not proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Citing or invoking Article 30 to justify the survival of the civil action despite
extinction of the criminal would in effect merely beg the question of whether civil liability ex delicto survives upon
extinction of the criminal action due to death of the accused during appeal of his conviction. This is because whether
asserted in
the criminal action or in a separate civil action, civil liability ex delicto is extinguished by the death of the accused while
his conviction is on appeal. Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code is clear on this matter:

Art. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. — Criminal liability is totally extinguished:

1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary penalties, liability therefor is
extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment;

xxx xxx xxx

However, the ruling in Sendaydiego deviated from the expressed intent of Article 89. It allowed claims for civil liability
ex delicto to survive by ipso facto treating the civil action impliedly instituted with the criminal, as one filed under Article
30, as though no criminal proceedings had been filed but merely a separate civil action. This had the effect of
converting such claims from one which is dependent on the outcome of the criminal action to an entirely new and
separate one, the prosecution of which does not even necessitate the filing of criminal proceedings. 12 One would be
hard put to pinpoint the statutory authority for such a transformation. It is to be borne in mind that in recovering civil
liability ex delicto, the same has perforce to be determined in the criminal action, rooted as it is in the court's
pronouncement of the guilt or innocence of the accused. This is but to render fealty to the intendment of Article 100 of
the Revised Penal Code which provides that "every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable." In such
cases, extinction of the criminal action due to death of the accused pending appeal inevitably signifies the concomitant
extinction of the civil liability. Mors Omnia Solvi. Death dissolves all things.

In sum, in pursuing recovery of civil liability arising from crime, the final determination of the criminal liability is a
condition precedent to the prosecution of the civil action, such that when the criminal action is extinguished by the
demise of accused-appellant pending appeal thereof, said civil action cannot survive. The claim for civil liability springs
out of and is dependent upon facts which, if true, would constitute a crime. Such civil liability is an inevitable
consequence of the criminal liability and is to be declared and enforced in the criminal proceeding. This is to be
distinguished from that which is contemplated under Article 30 of the Civil Code which refers to the institution of a
separate civil action that does not draw its life from a criminal proceeding. The Sendaydiego resolution of July 8, 1977,
however, failed to take note of this fundamental distinction when it allowed the survival of the civil action for the
recovery of civil liability ex delicto by treating the same as a separate civil action referred to under Article 30. Surely, it
will take more than just a summary judicial pronouncement to authorize the conversion of said civil action to an
independent one such as that contemplated under Article 30.

Ironically however, the main decision in Sendaydiego did not apply Article 30, the resolution of July 8, 1977
notwithstanding. Thus, it was held in the main decision:

Sendaydiego's appeal will be resolved only for the purpose of showing his criminal liability which is the basis of the
civil liability for which his estate would be liable. 13

In other words, the Court, in resolving the issue of his civil liability, concomitantly made a determination on whether
Sendaydiego, on the basis of evidenced adduced, was indeed guilty beyond reasonable doubt of committing the
offense charged. Thus, it upheld Sendaydiego's conviction and pronounced the same as the source of his civil liability.
Consequently, although Article 30 was not applied in the final determination of Sendaydiego's civil liability, there was a
reopening of the criminal action already extinguished which served as basis for Sendaydiego's civil liability. We
reiterate: Upon death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction, the criminal action is extinguished inasmuch as
there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused; the civil action instituted therein for recovery of civil liability ex
delicto is ipso facto extinguished, grounded as it is on the criminal.

Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court was also invoked to serve as another basis for the Sendaydiego resolution of
July 8, 1977. In citing Sec. 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, the Court made the inference that civil actions of the type
involved in Sendaydiego consist of money claims, the recovery of which may be continued on appeal if defendant dies
pending appeal of his conviction by holding his estate liable therefor. Hence, the Court's conclusion:

24
"When the action is for the recovery of money" "and the defendant dies before final judgment in the court of First
Instance, it shall be dismissed to be prosecuted in the manner especially provided" in Rule 87 of the Rules of Court
(Sec. 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court).

The implication is that, if the defendant dies after a money judgment had been rendered against him by the Court of
First Instance, the action survives him. It may be continued on appeal.

Sadly, reliance on this provision of law is misplaced. From the standpoint of procedural law, this course taken in
Sendaydiego cannot be sanctioned. As correctly observed by Justice Regalado:

xxx xxx xxx

I do not, however, agree with the justification advanced in both Torrijos and Sendaydiego which, relying on the
provisions of Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, drew the strained implication therefrom that where the civil
liability instituted together with the criminal liabilities had already passed beyond the judgment of the then Court of
First Instance (now the Regional Trial Court), the Court of Appeals can continue to exercise appellate jurisdiction
thereover despite the extinguishment of the component criminal liability of the deceased. This pronouncement, which
has been followed in the Court's judgments subsequent and consonant to Torrijos and Sendaydiego, should be set
aside and abandoned as being clearly erroneous and unjustifiable.

Said Section 21 of Rule 3 is a rule of civil procedure in ordinary civil actions. There is neither authority nor justification
for its application in criminal procedure to civil actions instituted together with and as part of criminal actions. Nor is
there any authority in law for the summary conversion from the latter category of an ordinary civil action upon the
death of the offender. . . .

Moreover, the civil action impliedly instituted in a criminal proceeding for recovery of civil liability ex delicto can hardly
be categorized as an ordinary money claim such as that referred to in Sec. 21, Rule 3 enforceable before the estate of
the deceased accused.

Ordinary money claims referred to in Section 21, Rule 3 must be viewed in light of the provisions of Section 5, Rule 86
involving claims against the estate, which in Sendaydiego was held liable for Sendaydiego's civil liability. "What are
contemplated in Section 21 of Rule 3, in relation to Section 5 of Rule 86, 14 are contractual money claims while the
claims involved in civil liability ex delicto may include even the restitution of personal or real property." 15 Section 5,
Rule 86 provides an exclusive enumeration of what claims may be filed against the estate. These are: funeral
expenses, expenses for the last illness, judgments for money and claim arising from contracts, expressed or implied. It
is clear that money claims arising from delict do not form part of this exclusive enumeration. Hence, there could be no
legal basis in (1) treating a civil action ex delicto as an ordinary contractual money claim referred to in Section 21,
Rule 3 of the Rules of Court and (2) allowing it to survive by filing a claim therefor before the estate of the deceased
accused. Rather, it should be extinguished upon extinction of the criminal action engendered by the death of the
accused pending finality of his conviction.

Accordingly, we rule: if the private offended party, upon extinction of the civil liability ex delicto desires to recover
damages from the same act or omission complained of, he must subject to Section 1, Rule 111 16 (1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure as amended) file a separate civil action, this time predicated not on the felony previously charged
but on other sources of obligation. The source of obligation upon which the separate civil action is premised
determines against whom the same shall be enforced.

If the same act or omission complained of also arises from quasi-delict or may, by provision of law, result in an injury to
person or property (real or personal), the separate civil action must be filed against the executor or administrator 17 of
the estate of the accused pursuant to Sec. 1, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court:

Sec. 1. Actions which may and which may not be brought against executor or administrator. — No action upon a claim
for the recovery of money or debt or interest thereon shall be commenced against the executor or administrator; but
actions to recover real or personal property, or an interest therein, from the estate, or to enforce a lien thereon, and
actions to recover damages for an injury to person or property, real or personal, may be commenced against him.

This is in consonance with our ruling in Belamala 18 where we held that, in recovering damages for injury to persons
thru an independent civil action based on Article 33 of the Civil Code, the same must be filed against the executor or
administrator of the estate of deceased accused and not against the estate under Sec. 5, Rule 86 because this rule
25
explicitly limits the claim to those for funeral expenses, expenses for the last sickness of the decedent, judgment for
money and claims arising from contract, express or implied. Contractual money claims, we stressed, refers only to
purely personal obligations other than those which have their source in delict or tort.

Conversely, if the same act or omission complained of also arises from contract, the separate civil action must be filed
against the estate of the accused, pursuant to Sec. 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court.

From this lengthy disquisition, we summarize our ruling herein:

1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil liability
based solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, "the death of the accused prior to final judgment
terminates his criminal liability and only the civil liability directly arising from and based solely on the offense
committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso strictiore."

2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of accused, if the same may also be
predicated on a source of obligation other than delict. 19 Article 1157 of the Civil Code enumerates these other sources
of obligation from which the civil liability may arise as a result of the same act or omission:

a) Law 20

b) Contracts

c) Quasi-contracts

d) . . .

e) Quasi-delicts

3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an action for recovery therefor may be pursued
but only by way of filing a separate civil action and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure as amended. This separate civil action may be enforced either against the executor/administrator or the
estate of the accused, depending on the source of obligation upon which the same is based as explained above.

4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file this separate civil action by
prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of the criminal action and prior to its extinction, the
private-offended party instituted together therewith the civil action. In such case, the statute of limitations on the civil
liability is deemed interrupted during the pendency of the criminal case, conformably with provisions of Article 1155 21
of the Civil Code, that should thereby avoid any apprehension on a possible privation of right by prescription. 22

Applying this set of rules to the case at bench, we hold that the death of appellant Bayotas extinguished his criminal
liability and the civil liability based solely on the act complained of, i.e., rape. Consequently, the appeal is hereby
dismissed without qualification.

WHEREFORE, the appeal of the late Rogelio Bayotas is DISMISSED with costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan and
Mendoza, JJ., concur.

Cruz, J., is on leave.

#Footnotes

1 Nos. L-33252, L-33253 and L-33254, 81 SCRA 120.

2 No. 22211-R, November 4, 1959, 56 O.G. No. 23, p. 4045.

26
3 supra.

4 L-30612, April 27, 1972, 44 SCRA 523.

5 No. L-28397, June 17, 1976, 71 SCRA 273.

6 No. L-26282, August 27, 1976, 72 SCRA 439.

7 No. L-24098, November 18, 1967, 21 SCRA 970.

8 No. L-40336, October 24, 1975, 67 SCRA 394.

9 Sec. 21. Where claim does not survive. — When the action is for recovery of money, debt or interest thereon, and
the defendant dies before final judgment in the Court of First Instance, it shall be dismissed to be prosecuted in the
manner especially provided in these rules.

10 Supra.

11 People v. Badeo, G.R. No. 72990, November 21, 1991, 204 SCRA 122; Petralba v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No.
81337, August 16, 1991, 200 SCRA 644; Dumlao v. Court of Appeals, No. L-51625, October 5, 1988, 166 SCRA 269;
Rufo Mauricio Construction v. Intermediate Appellate Court, No. L-75357, November 27, 1987, 155 SCRA 712; People
v. Salcedo, No. L-48642, June 22, 1987, 151 SCRA 220; People v. Pancho, No. L-32507, November 4, 1986, 145
SCRA 323; People v. Navoa, No. L-67966, September 28, 1984, 132 SCRA 410; People v. Asibar,
No. L-37255, October 23, 1982, 117 SCRA 856; People v. Tirol, No. L-30538, January 31, 1981, 102 SCRA 558; and
People v. Llamoso, No. L-24866, July 13, 1979, 91 SCRA 364.

12 Justice Barredo in his concurring opinion observed that:

. . . this provision contemplates prosecution of the civil liability arising from a criminal offense without the need of any
criminal proceeding to prove the commission of the crime as such, that is without having to prove the criminal liability
of the defendant so long as his act causing damage or prejudice to the offended party is proven by preponderance of
evidence.

13 Supra, p. 134.

14 Sec. 5. Claims which must be filed under the notice. If not filed, barred; exceptions. — All claims for money against
the decedent, arising from contract, express or implied, whether the same be due, not due, or contingent, all claims for
funeral expenses and expenses for the last sickness of the decedent, and judgment for money against the decedent,
must be filed within the time limited in the notice; otherwise they are barred forever, except that they may be set forth
as counterclaims in any action that the executor or administrator may bring against the claimants. Where an executor
or administrator commences an action, or prosecutes an action already commenced by the deceased in his lifetime,
the debtor may set forth by answer the claims he has against the decedent, instead of presenting them independently
to the court as herein provided, and mutual claims may be set off against each other in such action; and if final
judgment is rendered in favor of the defendant, the amount so determined shall be considered the true balance
against the estate, as though the claim had been presented directly before the court in the administration proceedings.
Claims not yet due, or contingent, may be approved at their present value.

15 As explained by J. Regalado in the deliberation of this case.

16 Sec. 1. Institute of criminal and civil actions. — When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery
of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves
his right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.

Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal Code, and damages under Article 32, 33, 34
and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising from the same act or omission of the accused.

A waiver of any of the civil actions extinguishes the others. The institution of, or the reservation of the right to file, any
of said civil actions separately waives the others.

27
The reservation of the right to institute the separate civil actions shall be made before the prosecution starts to present
its evidence and under circumstances affording the offended party a reasonable opportunity to make such reservation.

In no case may the offended party recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the accused.

When the offended party seeks to enforce civil liability against the accused by way of moral, nominal, temperate or
exemplary damages, the filing fees for such civil action as provided in these Rules shall constitute a first lien on the
judgment except in an award for actual damages.

In cases wherein the amount of damages, other than actual, is alleged in the complaint or information, the
corresponding filing fees shall be paid by the offended party upon the filing thereof in court for trial.

17 Justice Regalado cited the Court's ruling in Belamala that since the damages sought, as a result of the felony
committed amounts to injury to person or property, real or personal, the civil liability to be recovered must be claimed
against the executor/administrator and not against the estate.

18 Ibid.

19 Justice Vitug who holds a similar view stated: "The civil liability may still be pursued in a separate civil action but it
must be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict, except when by statutory provision an independent civil
action is authorized such as, to exemplify, in the instance enumerated in Article 33 of the Civil Code." Justice
Regalado stressed that:

Conversely, such civil liability is not extinguished and survives the deceased offender where it also arises
simultaneously from or exists as a consequence or by reason of a contract, as in Torrijos; or from law, as stated in
Torrijos and in the concurring opinion in Sendaydiego, such as in reference to the Civil Code; or from a quasi-contract;
or is authorized by law to be pursued in an independent civil action, as in Belamala. Indeed, without these exceptions,
it would be unfair and inequitable to deprive the victim of his property or recovery of damages therefor, as would have
been the fate of the second vendee in Torrijos or the provincial government in Sendaydiego."

20 See Articles 19, 20, 21, 31, 32, 33, 34, 2176 of the Civil Code; see related provisions of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure, as amended, particularly Sec. 1, Rule 111.

21 Art. 1155. The prescription of actions is interrupted when they are filed before the court, when there is a written
extrajudicial demand by the creditors, and when there is any written acknowledgment of the debt by the debtor.

22 As explained by J. Vitug in the deliberation of this case.

28
G.R. No. 168539 March 25, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
HENRY T. GO, Respondent.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the Resolution1 of the Third Division2 of the
Sandiganbayan (SB) dated June 2, 2005 which quashed the Information filed against herein respondent for alleged
violation of Section 3 (g) of Republic Act No. 3019 (R.A. 3019), otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act.

The Information filed against respondent is an offshoot of this Court's Decision3 in Agan, Jr. v. Philippine International
Air Terminals Co., Inc. which nullified the various contracts awarded by the Government, through the Department of
Transportation and Communications (DOTC), to Philippine Air Terminals, Co., Inc. (PIATCO) for the construction,
operation and maintenance of the Ninoy Aquino International Airport International Passenger Terminal III (NAIA IPT
III). Subsequent to the above Decision, a certain Ma. Cecilia L. Pesayco filed a complaint with the Office of the
Ombudsman against several individuals for alleged violation of R.A. 3019. Among those charged was herein
respondent, who was then the Chairman and President of PIATCO, for having supposedly conspired with then DOTC
Secretary Arturo Enrile (Secretary Enrile) in entering into a contract which is grossly and manifestly disadvantageous
to the government.

On September 16, 2004, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon found probable cause to indict, among
others, herein respondent for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019. While there was likewise a finding of probable
cause against Secretary Enrile, he was no longer indicted because he died prior to the issuance of the resolution
finding probable cause.

Thus, in an Information dated January 13, 2005, respondent was charged before the SB as follows:

On or about July 12, 1997, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Pasay City, Metro Manila, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the late ARTURO ENRILE, then Secretary of the Department of
Transportation and Communications (DOTC), committing the offense in relation to his office and taking advantage of
the same, in conspiracy with accused, HENRY T. GO, Chairman and President of the Philippine International Air
Terminals, Co., Inc. (PIATCO), did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally enter into a Concession
Agreement, after the project for the construction of the Ninoy Aquino International Airport International Passenger
Terminal III (NAIA IPT III) was awarded to Paircargo Consortium/PIATCO, which Concession Agreement substantially
amended the draft Concession Agreement covering the construction of the NAIA IPT III under Republic Act 6957, as
amended by Republic Act 7718 (BOT law), specifically the provision on Public Utility Revenues, as well as the
assumption by the government of the liabilities of PIATCO in the event of the latter's default under Article IV, Section
4.04 (b) and (c) in relation to Article 1.06 of the Concession Agreement, which terms are more beneficial to PIATCO
while manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government of the Republic of the Philippines.4

The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 28090.

On March 10, 2005, the SB issued an Order, to wit:

The prosecution is given a period of ten (10) days from today within which to show cause why this case should not be
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused considering that the accused is a private person and
the public official Arturo Enrile, his alleged co-conspirator, is already deceased, and not an accused in this case.5

The prosecution complied with the above Order contending that the SB has already acquired jurisdiction over the
person of respondent by reason of his voluntary appearance, when he filed a motion for consolidation and when he
posted bail. The prosecution also argued that the SB has exclusive jurisdiction over respondent's case, even if he is a
private person, because he was alleged to have conspired with a public officer.6

29
On April 28, 2005, respondent filed a Motion to Quash7 the Information filed against him on the ground that the
operative facts adduced therein do not constitute an offense under Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019. Respondent, citing the
show cause order of the SB, also contended that, independently of the deceased Secretary Enrile, the public officer
with whom he was alleged to have conspired, respondent, who is not a public officer nor was capacitated by any
official authority as a government agent, may not be prosecuted for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019.

The prosecution filed its Opposition.8

On June 2, 2005, the SB issued its assailed Resolution, pertinent portions of which read thus:

Acting on the Motion to Quash filed by accused Henry T. Go dated April 22, 2005, and it appearing that Henry T. Go,
the lone accused in this case is a private person and his alleged co-conspirator-public official was already deceased
long before this case was filed in court, for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused, the Court grants the
Motion to Quash and the Information filed in this case is hereby ordered quashed and dismissed.9

Hence, the instant petition raising the following issues, to wit:

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED AND DECIDED A QUESTION OF
SUBSTANCE IN A MANNER NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW OR APPLICABLE JURISPRUDENCE IN
GRANTING THE DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE AND IN DISMISSING CRIMINAL CASE NO. 28090 ON
THE GROUND THAT IT HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON OF RESPONDENT GO.

II

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED AND DECIDED A QUESTION OF
SUBSTANCE IN A MANNER NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW OR APPLICABLE JURISPRUDENCE, IN
RULING THAT IT HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON OF RESPONDENT GO DESPITE
THE IRREFUTABLE FACT THAT HE HAS ALREADY POSTED BAIL FOR HIS PROVISIONAL LIBERTY

III

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED WHEN, IN COMPLETE DISREGARD OF
THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION, IT QUASHED THE INFORMATION
AND DISMISSED CRIMINAL CASE NO. 2809010

The Court finds the petition meritorious.

Section 3 (g) of R.A. 3019 provides:

Sec. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. – In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by
existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be
unlawful:

xxxx

(g) Entering, on behalf of the Government, into any contract or transaction manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to
the same, whether or not the public officer profited or will profit thereby.

The elements of the above provision are:

(1) that the accused is a public officer;

(2) that he entered into a contract or transaction on behalf of the government; and

(3) that such contract or transaction is grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the government.11

At the outset, it bears to reiterate the settled rule that private persons, when acting in conspiracy with public officers,
may be indicted and, if found guilty, held liable for the pertinent offenses under Section 3 of R.A. 3019, in consonance

30
with the avowed policy of the anti-graft law to repress certain acts of public officers and private persons alike
constituting graft or corrupt practices act or which may lead thereto.12 This is the controlling doctrine as enunciated by
this Court in previous cases, among which is a case involving herein private respondent.13

The only question that needs to be settled in the present petition is whether herein respondent, a private person, may
be indicted for conspiracy in violating Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019 even if the public officer, with whom he was alleged to
have conspired, has died prior to the filing of the Information.

Respondent contends that by reason of the death of Secretary Enrile, there is no public officer who was charged in the
Information and, as such, prosecution against respondent may not prosper.

The Court is not persuaded.

It is true that by reason of Secretary Enrile's death, there is no longer any public officer with whom respondent can be
charged for violation of R.A. 3019. It does not mean, however, that the allegation of conspiracy between them can no
longer be proved or that their alleged conspiracy is already expunged. The only thing extinguished by the death of
Secretary Enrile is his criminal liability. His death did not extinguish the crime nor did it remove the basis of the charge
of conspiracy between him and private respondent. Stated differently, the death of Secretary Enrile does not mean
that there was no public officer who allegedly violated Section 3 (g) of R.A. 3019. In fact, the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman for Luzon found probable cause to indict Secretary Enrile for infringement of Sections 3 (e) and (g) of
R.A. 3019.14 Were it not for his death, he should have been charged.

The requirement before a private person may be indicted for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019, among others, is
that such private person must be alleged to have acted in conspiracy with a public officer. The law, however, does not
require that such person must, in all instances, be indicted together with the public officer. If circumstances exist where
the public officer may no longer be charged in court, as in the present case where the public officer has already died,
the private person may be indicted alone.

Indeed, it is not necessary to join all alleged co-conspirators in an indictment for conspiracy.15 If two or more persons
enter into a conspiracy, any act done by any of them pursuant to the agreement is, in contemplation of law, the act of
each of them and they are jointly responsible therefor.16 This means that everything said, written or done by any of the
conspirators in execution or furtherance of the common purpose is deemed to have been said, done, or written by
each of them and it makes no difference whether the actual actor is alive or dead, sane or insane at the time of trial.17
The death of one of two or more conspirators does not prevent the conviction of the survivor or survivors.18 Thus, this
Court held that:

x x x [a] conspiracy is in its nature a joint offense. One person cannot conspire alone. The crime depends upon the
joint act or intent of two or more persons. Yet, it does not follow that one person cannot be convicted of conspiracy. So
long as the acquittal or death of a co-conspirator does not remove the bases of a charge for conspiracy, one
defendant may be found guilty of the offense.19

The Court agrees with petitioner's contention that, as alleged in the Information filed against respondent, which is
deemed hypothetically admitted in the latter's Motion to Quash, he (respondent) conspired with Secretary Enrile in
violating Section 3 (g) of R.A. 3019 and that in conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all. Hence, the criminal liability
incurred by a co-conspirator is also incurred by the other co-conspirators.

Moreover, the Court agrees with petitioner that the avowed policy of the State and the legislative intent to repress
"acts of public officers and private persons alike, which constitute graft or corrupt practices,"20 would be frustrated if
the death of a public officer would bar the prosecution of a private person who conspired with such public officer in
violating the Anti-Graft Law.

In this regard, this Court's disquisition in the early case of People v. Peralta21 as to the nature of and the principles
governing conspiracy, as construed under Philippine jurisdiction, is instructive, to wit:

x x x A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony
and decide to commit it. Generally, conspiracy is not a crime except when the law specifically provides a penalty
therefor as in treason, rebellion and sedition. The crime of conspiracy known to the common law is not an indictable
offense in the Philippines. An agreement to commit a crime is a reprehensible act from the view-point of morality, but

31
as long as the conspirators do not perform overt acts in furtherance of their malevolent design, the sovereignty of the
State is not outraged and the tranquility of the public remains undisturbed.

However, when in resolute execution of a common scheme, a felony is committed by two or more malefactors, the
existence of a conspiracy assumes pivotal importance in the determination of the liability of the perpetrators. In
stressing the significance of conspiracy in criminal law, this Court in U.S. vs. Infante and Barreto opined that

While it is true that the penalties cannot be imposed for the mere act of conspiring to commit a crime unless the
statute specifically prescribes a penalty therefor, nevertheless the existence of a conspiracy to commit a crime is in
many cases a fact of vital importance, when considered together with the other evidence of record, in establishing the
existence, of the consummated crime and its commission by the conspirators.

Once an express or implied conspiracy is proved, all of the conspirators are liable as co-principals regardless of the
extent and character of their respective active participation in the commission of the crime or crimes perpetrated in
furtherance of the conspiracy because in contemplation of law the act of one is the act of all. The foregoing rule is
anchored on the sound principle that "when two or more persons unite to accomplish a criminal object, whether
through the physical volition of one, or all, proceeding severally or collectively, each individual whose evil will actively
contributes to the wrong-doing is in law responsible for the whole, the same as though performed by himself alone."
Although it is axiomatic that no one is liable for acts other than his own, "when two or more persons agree or conspire
to commit a crime, each is responsible for all the acts of the others, done in furtherance of the agreement or
conspiracy." The imposition of collective liability upon the conspirators is clearly explained in one case where this
Court held that x x x it is impossible to graduate the separate liability of each (conspirator) without taking into
consideration the close and inseparable relation of each of them with the criminal act, for the commission of which
they all acted by common agreement x x x. The crime must therefore in view of the solidarity of the act and intent
which existed between the x x x accused, be regarded as the act of the band or party created by them, and they are
all equally responsible x x x

Verily, the moment it is established that the malefactors conspired and confederated in the commission of the felony
proved, collective liability of the accused conspirators attaches by reason of the conspiracy, and the court shall not
speculate nor even investigate as to the actual degree of participation of each of the perpetrators present at the scene
of the crime. Of course, as to any conspirator who was remote from the situs of aggression, he could be drawn within
the enveloping ambit of the conspiracy if it be proved that through his moral ascendancy over the rest of the
conspirators the latter were moved or impelled to carry out the conspiracy.

In fine, the convergence of the wills of the conspirators in the scheming and execution of the crime amply justifies the
imputation to all of them the act of any one of them. It is in this light that conspiracy is generally viewed not as a
separate indictable offense, but a rule for collectivizing criminal liability.

xxxx

x x x A time-honored rule in the corpus of our jurisprudence is that once conspiracy is proved, all of the conspirators
who acted in furtherance of the common design are liable as co-principals. This rule of collective criminal liability
emanates from the ensnaring nature of conspiracy. The concerted action of the conspirators in consummating their
common purpose is a patent display of their evil partnership, and for the consequences of such criminal enterprise
they must be held solidarily liable.22

This is not to say, however, that private respondent should be found guilty of conspiring with Secretary Enrile. It is
settled that the absence or presence of conspiracy is factual in nature and involves evidentiary matters.23 Hence, the
allegation of conspiracy against respondent is better left ventilated before the trial court during trial, where respondent
can adduce evidence to prove or disprove its presence.

Respondent claims in his Manifestation and Motion24 as well as in his Urgent Motion to Resolve25 that in a different
case, he was likewise indicted before the SB for conspiracy with the late Secretary Enrile in violating the same Section
3 (g) of R.A. 3019 by allegedly entering into another agreement (Side Agreement) which is separate from the
Concession Agreement subject of the present case. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 28091. Here, the
SB, through a Resolution, granted respondent's motion to quash the Information on the ground that the SB has no
jurisdiction over the person of respondent. The prosecution questioned the said SB Resolution before this Court via a
petition for review on certiorari. The petition was docketed as G.R. No. 168919. In a minute resolution dated August

32
31, 2005, this Court denied the petition finding no reversible error on the part of the SB. This Resolution became final
and executory on January 11, 2006. Respondent now argues that this Court's resolution in G.R. No. 168919 should be
applied in the instant case.

The Court does not agree. Respondent should be reminded that prior to this Court's ruling in G.R. No. 168919, he
already posted bail for his provisional liberty. In fact, he even filed a Motion for Consolidation26 in Criminal Case No.
28091. The Court agrees with petitioner's contention that private respondent's act of posting bail and filing his Motion
for Consolidation vests the SB with jurisdiction over his person. The rule is well settled that the act of an accused in
posting bail or in filing motions seeking affirmative relief is tantamount to submission of his person to the jurisdiction of
the court.27

Thus, it has been held that:

When a defendant in a criminal case is brought before a competent court by virtue of a warrant of arrest or otherwise,
in order to avoid the submission of his body to the jurisdiction of the court he must raise the question of the court’s
jurisdiction over his person at the very earliest opportunity. If he gives bail, demurs to the complaint or files any dilatory
plea or pleads to the merits, he thereby gives the court jurisdiction over his person. (State ex rel. John Brown vs.
Fitzgerald, 51 Minn., 534)

xxxx

As ruled in La Naval Drug vs. CA [236 SCRA 78, 86]:

"[L]ack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant may be waived either expressly or impliedly. When a defendant
voluntarily appears, he is deemed to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court. If he so wishes not to
waive this defense, he must do so seasonably by motion for the purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction of the court;
otherwise, he shall be deemed to have submitted himself to that jurisdiction."

Moreover, "[w]here the appearance is by motion for the purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction of the court over the
person, it must be for the sole and separate purpose of objecting to said jurisdiction. If the appearance is for any other
purpose, the defendant is deemed to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court. Such an appearance gives
the court jurisdiction over the person."

Verily, petitioner’s participation in the proceedings before the Sandiganbayan was not confined to his opposition to the
issuance of a warrant of arrest but also covered other matters which called for respondent court’s exercise of its
jurisdiction. Petitioner may not be heard now to deny said court’s jurisdiction over him. x x x.28

In the instant case, respondent did not make any special appearance to question the jurisdiction of the SB over his
person prior to his posting of bail and filing his Motion for Consolidation. In fact, his Motion to Quash the Information in
Criminal Case No. 28090 only came after the SB issued an Order requiring the prosecution to show cause why the
case should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction over his person.

As a recapitulation, it would not be amiss to point out that the instant case involves a contract entered into by public
officers representing the government. More importantly, the SB is a special criminal court which has exclusive original
jurisdiction in all cases involving violations of R.A. 3019 committed by certain public officers, as enumerated in P.D.
1606 as amended by R.A. 8249. This includes private individuals who are charged as co-principals, accomplices or
accessories with the said public officers. In the instant case, respondent is being charged for violation of Section 3(g)
of R.A. 3019, in conspiracy with then Secretary Enrile. Ideally, under the law, both respondent and Secretary Enrile
should have been charged before and tried jointly by the Sandiganbayan. However, by reason of the death of the
latter, this can no longer be done. Nonetheless, for reasons already discussed, it does not follow that the SB is already
divested of its jurisdiction over the person of and the case involving herein respondent. To rule otherwise would mean
that the power of a court to decide a case would no longer be based on the law defining its jurisdiction but on other
factors, such as the death of one of the alleged offenders.

Lastly, the issues raised in the present petition involve matters which are mere incidents in the main case and the
main case has already been pending for over nine (9) years. Thus, a referral of the case to the Regional Trial Court
would further delay the resolution of the main case and it would, by no means, promote respondent's right to a speedy
trial and a speedy disposition of his case.

33
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolution of the Sandiganbayan dated June 2, 2005, granting
respondent's Motion to Quash, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Sandiganbayan is forthwith DIRECTED to
proceed with deliberate dispatch in the disposition of Criminal Case No. 28090.

SO ORDERED.

34
G.R. No. 174654 August 17, 2011

FELIXBERTO A. ABELLANA, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and Spouses SAAPIA B. ALONTO and DIAGA ALONTO, Respondents.

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

The only issue that confronts this Court is whether petitioner Felixberto A. Abellana could still be held civilly liable
notwithstanding his acquittal.

Assailed before this Court are the February 22, 2006 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 78644
and its August 15, 2006 Resolution2 denying the motion for reconsideration thereto. The assailed CA Decision set
aside the May 21, 2003 Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City, Branch 13, in Criminal Case No.
CBU-51385 and acquitted the petitioner of the crime of falsification of public document by a private individual because
the Information charged him with a different offense which is estafa through falsification of a public document.4
However, the CA still adjudged him civilly liable.5

Factual Antecedents

In 1985, petitioner extended a loan to private respondents spouses Diaga and Saapia Alonto (spouses Alonto),6
secured by a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage over Lot Nos. 6471 and 6472 located in Cebu City.7 Subsequently, or in
1987, petitioner prepared a Deed of Absolute Sale conveying said lots to him. The Deed of Absolute Sale was signed
by spouses Alonto in Manila. However, it was notarized in Cebu City allegedly without the spouses Alonto appearing
before the notary public.8 Thereafter, petitioner caused the transfer of the titles to his name and sold the lots to third
persons.

On August 12, 1999,9 an Information10 was filed charging petitioner with Estafa through Falsification of Public
Document, the accusatory portion of which reads:

That on or about the 9th day of July, 1987, in the City of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the said accused, with deliberate intent, and with intent to defraud, did then and there falsify a public document
consisting of a Deed of Absolute Sale of a parcel of land consisting of 803 square meters executed before Notary
Public Gines N. Abellana per Doc. No. 383, Page No. 77, Book No. XXIII, Series of 1987 of the latter’s Notarial
Register showing that spouses Saapia B. Alonto and Diaga Alonto sold their parcel of land located at Pardo, Cebu
City, for a consideration of ₱130,000.00 in favor of accused by imitating, counterfeiting, signing or [causing] to be
imitated or counterfeited the signature[s] of spouses Saapia B. Alonto and Diaga Alonto above their typewritten names
in said document as vendor[s], when in truth and in fact as the accused very well knew that spouses Saapia B. Alonto
and Diaga Alonto did not sell their aforestated descri[b]ed property and that the signature[s] appearing in said
document are not their signature[s], thus causing it to appear that spouses Saapia B. Alonto and Diaga Alonto
participated in the execution of said document when they did not so participate[. Once] said document was falsified,
accused did then and there cause the transfer of the titles of said land to his name using the said falsified document,
to the damage and prejudice of spouses Saapia B. Alonto and Diaga Alonto in the amount of ₱130,000.00, the value
of the land .

CONTRARY TO LAW.11

During arraignment, petitioner entered a plea of "not guilty".12 After the termination of the pre-trial conference, trial
ensued.

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

In its Decision dated May 21, 2003, the RTC noted that the main issue for resolution was whether petitioner committed
the crime of estafa through falsification of public document.13 Based on the evidence presented by both parties, the
trial court found that petitioner did not intend to defraud the spouses Alonto; that after the latter failed to pay their
obligation, petitioner prepared a Deed of Absolute Sale which the spouses Alonto actually signed; but that the Deed of
Absolute Sale was notarized without the spouses Alonto personally appearing before the notary public. From these,
35
the trial court concluded that petitioner can only be held guilty of Falsification of a Public Document by a private
individual under Article 172(1)14 in relation to Article 171(2)15 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) and not estafa through
falsification of public document as charged in the Information.

The dispositive portion of the RTC Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused Felixberto Abellana GUILTY of the crime of
falsification of public document by private individuals under Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code and sentences him
to an indeterminate penalty of TWO (2) YEARS and FOUR (4) MONTHS of Prision Correccional, as minimum, to SIX
(6)YEARS, as maximum.

He is directed to institute reconveyance proceedings to restore ownership and possession of the real properties in
question in favor of private complainants. After private complainants shall have acquired full ownership and
possession of the aforementioned properties, they are directed to pay the accused the sum of ₱130,000.00 [with] legal
interest thereon reckoned from the time this case was instituted.

Should the accused fail to restore full ownership and possession in favor of the private complainants [of] the real
properties in question within a period of six (6) months from the time this decision becomes final and executory, he is
directed to pay said complainants the sum of ₱1,103,000.00 representing the total value of the properties of the
private complainants.

He is likewise directed to pay private complainants the following:

1. ₱15,000.00 for nominal damages;

2. ₱20,000.00 for attorney’s fees;

3. ₱50,000.00 as and for litigation expenses;

4. ₱30,000.00 as and for exemplary damages;

plus the cost of this suit.

SO ORDERED.16

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

On appeal, petitioner raised the issue of whether an accused who was acquitted of the crime charged may
nevertheless be convicted of another crime or offense not specifically charged and alleged and which is not
necessarily included in the crime or offense charged. The CA, in its Decision dated February 22, 2006, ruled in the
negative.17 It held that petitioner who was charged with and arraigned for estafa through falsification of public
document under Article 171(1) of the RPC could not be convicted of Falsification of Public Document by a Private
Individual under Article 172(1) in relation to Article 171(2). The CA observed that the falsification committed in Article
171(1) requires the counterfeiting of any handwriting, signature or rubric while the falsification in Article 171(2) occurs
when the offender caused it to appear in a document that a person participated in an act or proceeding when in fact
such person did not so participate. Thus, the CA opined that the conviction of the petitioner for an offense not alleged
in the Information or one not necessarily included in the offense charged violated his constitutional right to be informed
of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.18 Nonetheless, the CA affirmed the trial court’s finding with
respect to petitioner’s civil liability. The dispositive portion of the CA’s February 22, 2006 Decision reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, We resolve to set aside the Decision dated May 21, 2003 of the Regional Trial
Court, 7th Judicial Region, Branch 13, Cebu City only insofar as it found the petitioner guilty of a crime that is different
from that charged in the Information. The civil liability determinations are affirmed.

SO ORDERED.19

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied in the Resolution dated August 15, 2006.

Hence, petitioner comes before us through the present Petition for Review on Certiorari raising the lone issue of
whether he could still be held civilly liable notwithstanding his acquittal by the trial court and the CA.
36
 Our Ruling

The petition is meritorious.

It is an established rule in criminal procedure that a judgment of acquittal shall state whether the evidence of the
prosecution absolutely failed to prove the guilt of the accused or merely failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.20 In either case, the judgment shall determine if the act or omission from which the civil liability might arise did
not exist.21 When the exoneration is merely due to the failure to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt, the court should award the civil liability in favor of the offended party in the same criminal action.22 In other
words, the "extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of civil liability unless the extinction
proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil [liability] might arise did not exist."23

Here, the CA set aside the trial court’s Decision because it convicted petitioner of an offense different from or not
included in the crime charged in the Information. To recall, petitioner was charged with estafa through falsification of
public document. However, the RTC found that the spouses Alonto actually signed the document although they did not
personally appear before the notary public for its notarization. Hence, the RTC instead convicted petitioner of
falsification of public document. On appeal, the CA held that petitioner’s conviction cannot be sustained because it
infringed on his right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.24 The CA, however, found
no reversible error on the civil liability of petitioner as determined by the trial court and thus sustained the same.25

We do not agree.

In Banal v. Tadeo, Jr.,26 we elucidated on the civil liability of the accused despite his exoneration in this wise:

While an act or omission is felonious because it is punishable by law, it gives rise to civil liability not so much because
it is a crime but because it caused damage to another. Viewing things pragmatically, we can readily see that what
gives rise to the civil liability is really the obligation and moral duty of everyone to repair or make whole the damage
caused to another by reason of his own act or omission, done intentionally or negligently, whether or not the same be
punishable by law. x x x

Simply stated, civil liability arises when one, by reason of his own act or omission, done intentionally or negligently,
causes damage to another. Hence, for petitioner to be civilly liable to spouses Alonto, it must be proven that the acts
he committed had caused damage to the spouses.

Based on the records of the case, we find that the acts allegedly committed by the petitioner did not cause any
damage to spouses Alonto.

First, the Information charged petitioner with fraudulently making it appear that the spouses Alonto affixed their
signatures in the Deed of Absolute Sale thereby facilitating the transfer of the subject properties in his favor. However,
after the presentation of the parties’ respective evidence, the trial court found that the charge was without basis as the
spouses Alonto indeed signed the document and that their signatures were genuine and not forged.

Second, even assuming that the spouses Alonto did not personally appear before the notary public for the notarization
of the Deed of Absolute Sale, the same does not necessarily nullify or render void ab initio the parties’ transaction.27
Such non-appearance is not sufficient to overcome the presumption of the truthfulness of the statements contained in
the deed. "To overcome the presumption, there must be sufficient, clear and convincing evidence as to exclude all
reasonable controversy as to the falsity of the [deed]. In the absence of such proof, the deed must be upheld."28 And
since the defective notarization does not ipso facto invalidate the Deed of Absolute Sale, the transfer of said
properties from spouses Alonto to petitioner remains valid. Hence, when on the basis of said Deed of Absolute Sale,
petitioner caused the cancellation of spouses Alonto’s title and the issuance of new ones under his name, and
thereafter sold the same to third persons, no damage resulted to the spouses Alonto.1avvphi1

Moreover, we cannot sustain the alternative sentence imposed upon the petitioner, to wit: to institute an action for the
recovery of the properties of spouses Alonto or to pay them actual and other kinds of damages. First, it has absolutely
no basis in view of the trial court’s finding that the signatures of the spouses Alonto in the Deed of Absolute Sale are
genuine and not forged. Second, "[s]entences should not be in the alternative. There is nothing in the law which
permits courts to impose sentences in the alternative."29 While a judge has the discretion of imposing one or another
penalty, he cannot impose both in the alternative.30 "He must fix positively and with certainty the particular penalty."31

37
In view of the above discussion, there is therefore absolutely no basis for the trial court and the CA to hold petitioner
civilly liable to restore ownership and possession of the subject properties to the spouses Alonto or to pay them
₱1,103,000.00 representing the value of the properties and to pay them nominal damages, exemplary damages,
attorney’s fees and litigation expenses.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The February 22, 2006 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
78644 and its August 15, 2006 Resolution are AFFIRMED insofar as they set aside the conviction of the petitioner for
the crime of falsification of public document. The portion which affirmed the imposition of civil liabilities on the
petitioner, i.e., the restoration of ownership and possession, the payment of ₱1,103,000.00 representing the value of
the property, and the payment of nominal and exemplary damages, attorney’s fees and litigation expenses, is deleted
for lack of factual and legal basis.

SO ORDERED.

38
[ G.R. No. 240066. June 13, 2022 ]

GERRY S. FEGARIDO AND LINALIE A. MILAN, PETITIONERS,

VS.
ALMARINA[1] S. ALCANTARA, CYNTHIA A. DE VERA, YOLANDA A. TAYAG, CRISTY SUSAN A. DE GUZMAN,
JESSIE S. ALCANTARA, EMILIE A. VELANCIO, JUDITH A. RAGUINGAN, CHARLIE S. ALCANTARA, ALL SUING
AS HEIRS OF THEIR DECEASED MOTHER CRISTINA S. ALCANTARA (VICTIM), AND ALL REPRESENTED BY
THEIR ATTORNEY-IN-FACT AND CO-PLAINTIFF, CHARLIE S. ALCANTARA, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION
LEONEN, SAJ.:

In negligence cases, the aggrieved party may file an independent civil action for damages based on quasi-delict
separately from a criminal action for imprudence. This civil action may proceed simultaneously with the Criminal action
and requires only preponderance of evidence. Nevertheless, the aggrieved party may recover damages only once
based on the same act or omission.[2]

This Court resolves a Petition for Review on Certiorari[3] assailing the Decision[4] and Resolution[5] of the Court of
Appeals, which affirmed the Regional Trial Court's Decision[6] finding Gerry S. Fegarido (Fegarido) and Linalie A. Milan
(Milan) solidarily liable for damages.

At around 6:30 p.m. on October 15, 2008, Cristina S. Alcantara (Alcantara) figured in a vehicular crash while crossing
the road on 25th Street, East Bajac-Bajac, Olongapo City. She was hit by a public utility jeepney driven by Fegarido,
who was making a left turn toward 25th Street. The impact threw Cristina off a few meters away before hitting the
pavement.[7] She was rushed to the hospital to be treated for physical injuries, but was declared braindead and died
three days later.[8]

Fegarido was charged with reckless imprudence resulting in homicide in an amended Information filed before the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities.[9]

Meanwhile, the heirs of Cristina S. Alcantara filed before the Regional Trial Court a Complaint for damages with prayer
for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction/temporary restraining order[10] not only against Fegarido, but also
Milan, the registered owner of the jeepney.[11]

In its June 19, 2012 Decision,[12] the Municipal Trial Court in Cities acquitted Fegarido of the crime charged. It found
that the evidence on record was insufficient to prove with moral certainty that Fegarido recklessly drove the jeepney.[13]

Meanwhile, the Regional Trial Court rendered a Decision[14] in the civil action for damages on March 9, 2015, finding
Fegarido and Alcantara solidarily liable to Alcantara's heirs. It disposed of the case in this wise:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered in favor of the plaintiffs. The defendants are ordered to pay plaintiffs solidarily
the amount[s] of:
1. Php138,591.00 as actual damages;
2. Php100,000.00 as moral damages;
3. Php50,000.00 as exemplary damages;
4. Php40,000.00 as attorney's fees & litigation expenses; and
5. The cost of the suit.

Defendants['] counterclaim is dismissed; while plaintiff's application for a writ of preliminary injunction is denied.

SO DECIDED.[15]
In so ruling, the Regional Trial Court relied on the witnesses' narration of the events and found that Fegarido
negligently operated the jeepney causing Cristina's death. It likewise held Milan vicariously liable after she failed to
exercise the required diligence in the selection and supervision of her employees. It found that Milan had entrusted
her legal duties to her husband, Nestor, who testified that he tested Fegarido's driving skills only once.[16]

Fegarido and Milan appealed before the Court of Appeals.[17]

39
In its October 13, 2017 Decision,[18] the Court of Appeals affirmed the Regional Trial Court Decision finding Fegarido
and Milan solidarily liable for damages.[19] It ruled that Fegarido's acquittal in the criminal case for the prosecution's
failure to prove his criminal liability with moral certainty did not preclude a finding of liability for damages based on
negligence. It stressed that the pieces of evidence weighted against Fegarido, when taken together, established his
negligence based on quasi-delict.[20]

As to Milan's liability, the Court of Appeals similarly decreed that she failed to exercise the due diligence required by
law when she entrusted her legal duties in the selection and supervision of her employee to her husband.[21]

Fegarido and Milan moved for reconsideration, but their Motion[22] was denied in a May 4, 2018 Resolution.[23]

Dissatisfied, Fegarido and Milan filed the Petition for Review on Certiorari[24] before this Court against the heirs of
Alcantara.

Petitioners argue that the Regional Trial Court erred in declaring Fegarido negligent. They maintain that Fegarido was
acquitted in the criminal case after not being found negligent, thus negating any basis for liability.[25]

Petitioners likewise contend that the Regional Trial Court's ruling "was based on presumptions without any factual
basis."[26] They stress that respondents' witnesses never testified that petitioner Fegarido drove the vehicle in a
negligent and reckless manner. The Regional Trial Court merely inferred that since Fegarido had to deliberately step
hard on the gas, the jeepney he was driving was moving too fast.[27]

In their Comment,[28] respondents aver that petitioners cannot use Fegarido's acquittal to escape liability. They
maintain that under the law, the aggrieved party in a negligence case can choose to enforce the erring party's civil
liability through a separate civil action for damages, where they only need preponderance of evidence—which,
respondents insist, was met by the pieces of evidence they presented.[29]

For this Court's resolution are the following issues:

First, whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the Regional Trial Court Decision finding petitioner Gerry
S. Fegarido liable for negligence;

Second, whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the Regional Trial Court Decision finding petitioner
Linalie A. Milan vicariously liable for petitioner Gerry S. Fegarido's supposed negligence; and

Finally, whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in ordering petitioners to pay actual, moral, and exemplary
damages, and attorney's fees and litigation expenses.

The Petition is denied.

The issue of whether petitioners acted negligently is a question of fact beyond the ambit of a Rule 45 petition.[30] This
Court is not a trier of facts.[31] It need not reassess or reevaluate the evidence presented by the parties, especially
when the findings of both the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals are similar as to petitioners' negligence.[32]
In Torres v. People:[33]
It is a fundamental rule that only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.
The factual findings of the trial court, especially when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are generally binding and
conclusive on this Court. This Court is not a trier of facts. It is not duty-bound to analyze, review, and weigh the
evidence all over again in the absence of any showing of any arbitrariness, capriciousness, or palpable error. A
departure from the general rule may only be warranted in cases where the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are
contrary to the findings of the trial court or when these are unsupported by the evidence on record.[34] (Citations
omitted)
In this case, both the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals found that petitioner Fegarido's gross negligence
in operating the jeepney was the proximate cause of Alcantara's death. They relied on the testimonies of the following
witnesses, which, when taken together, sufficiently proved his negligence:
40
a) Testimony of Joe Barnes, a traffic enforcer of the Olongapo City Traffic Management & Public
Safety Office who was at duty at the time of the incident. He gave the go signal to the vehicles to
turn left to the 25th [S]treet, when he suddenly heard the screeching sound of a vehicle on sudden
break. He checked the vehicle and found a person lying on the pavement and personally rushed
the victim to the hospital.[35]

b) Dr. Rolando Ortiz, the physician who examined the victim stated that the patient sustained mostly
head injuries consistent with the vehicular accident.[36]

c) Marcelino Menor[,] Jr., the security guard on duty at the Landbank branch located at 25th [S]treet
East Bajac-Bajac, Olongapo City, stated that he saw a woman bumped by a brown passenger
jeepney which was later on discovered to be the subject vehicle driven by Fegarido. He saw how
the victim was hit on the left side of the jeep, the part where the reserved tire was. She was about
to cross the street when the jeep sideswept [sic] her. The jeep was running fast because it was
turning on the corner.[37]

Likewise based on the testimony of Joe Barnes, the traffic enforcer, the Regional Trial Court observed the following:
One, Fegarido's jeep was on full stop along Rizal Avenue awaiting Barnes' signal to execute a left turn towards 25th
Street. That means his gear must be either on neutral position; or if he was stepping on the brakes and clutch, the
jeep must be on its 1st gear. Either way, a jeep or any manually operated vehicle on 1st gear is not expected to run fast
outright unless the driver deliberately stepped hard on the gas. And this is more likely what happened. The court was
not apprised why Fegarido must be in a hurry to turn left to 25th Street, but at any rate it is undeniable that the jeep
roared fast ("pina-arangkada") as can be gleaned from the second detail of Barnes' testimony. Two, Barnes said at the
moment Cristina was side swept [sic] by the jeep, he heard a screeching sound. That means Fegarido stepped hard
on the brakes. And the only explanation he had to step hard on it coming from a full stop position was because he was
moving fast.[38]
Based on this, it can be inferred that at the time of the incident, the jeepney was being driven fast from the time it
made a left turn toward 25th Street up to the moment it hit the victim. The screeching sound the jeepney made when it
abruptly stopped after the incident, and Alcantara being thrown off a few meters away, prove that petitioner Fegarido
was making a left turn swiftly and negligently. This is bolstered by the personal account of Marcelino Menor, Jr., the
security guard who saw the jeepney moving fast while turning the corner, sideswiping Alcantara.

Neither can petitioner Fegarido's acquittal in the criminal case relieve him and petitioner Milan from civil liability.

Settled is the rule that the accused's acquittal, "even if based on a finding that [they are] not guilty, does not carry with
it the extinction of the civil liability based on quasi[-]delict."[39] This is based on the theory that a single act or omission
causing injury to another creates two kinds of liability: (1) civil liability ex delicto; and (2) civil liability quasi delicto. The
aggrieved party may choose to enforce either liability against the erring party, subject only to the prohibition against
double recovery of damages under Article 2177 of the Civil Code.[40] In Safeguard Security Agency, Inc. v. Tangco:[41]
An act or omission causing damage to another may give rise to two separate civil liabilities on the part of the offender,
i.e., (1) civil liability ex delicto, under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code; and (2) independent civil liabilities, such
as those (a) not arising from an act or omission complained of as a felony, e.g., culpa contractual or obligations arising
from law under Article 31 of the Civil Code, intentional torts under Articles 32 and 34, and culpa aquiliana under Article
2176 of the Civil Code; or (b) where the injured party is granted a right to file an action independent and distinct from
the criminal action under Article 33 of the Civil Code. Either of these liabilities may be enforced against the offender
subject to the caveat under Article 2177 of the Civil Code that the offended party cannot recover damages twice for
the same act or omission or under both causes.[42] (Citation omitted)
Similarly, in Elcano v. Hill:[43]
[A] separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found
guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, if he is actually charged also criminally, to recover
damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the
awards made in the two cases vary. In other words, the extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3,
Rule 111, refers exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability
41
for the same act considered as a quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not extinguished even by a declaration in the
criminal case that the criminal act charged has not happened or has not been committed by the accused.[44]
(Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
In Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. v. People,[45] this Court said that under the Rules of Criminal Procedure, only civil
liability arising from the crime charged is deemed instituted in the criminal action:
At the outset, we must explain that the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure has clarified what civil actions are deemed
instituted in a criminal prosecution.

Section 1 of Rule 111 of the current Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:

"When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged
shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right
to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.

....
Only the civil liability of the accused arising from the crime charged is deemed impliedly instituted in a criminal action;
that is, unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately, or institutes it prior
to the criminal action. Hence, the subsidiary civil liability of the employer under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code
may be enforced by execution on the basis of the judgment of conviction meted out to the employee.

It is clear that the 2000 Rules deleted the requirement of reserving independent civil actions and allowed these to
proceed separately from criminal actions. Thus, the civil actions referred to in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil
Code shall remain "separate, distinct and independent" of any criminal prosecution based on the same act. Here are
some direct consequences of such revision and omission:

1. The right to bring the foregoing actions based on the Civil Code need not be reserved in the criminal prosecution,
since they are not deemed included therein.

2. The institution or the waiver of the right to file a separate civil action arising from the crime charged does not
extinguish the right to bring such action.

3. The only limitation is that the offended party cannot recover more than once for the same act or omission.

What is deemed instituted in every criminal prosecution is the civil liability arising from the crime or delict per se (civil
liability ex delicto), but not those liabilities arising from quasi-delicts, contracts or quasi-contracts. In fact, even if a civil
action is filed separately, the ex delicto civil liability in the criminal prosecution remains, and the offended party may —
subject to the control of the prosecutor — still intervene in the criminal action, in order to protect the remaining civil
interest therein.

This discussion is completely in accord with the Revised Penal Code, which states that "[e]very person criminally
liable for a felony is also civilly liable."[46] (Citations omitted)
To repeat, an independent civil action, such as that based on quasi-delict under Article 2176 of the Civil Code, no
longer requires a prior reservation to be made before it can proceed independently and be tried simultaneously with its
concomitant criminal action.

Thus, here, the independent civil action for damages filed by respondents shall proceed regardless of Fegarido's
acquittal in the criminal case. It can be prosecuted independently of the criminal action and requires only
preponderance of evidence.[47]

Preponderance of evidence means "that the evidence as a whole adduced by one side is superior to that of the
other."[48] In Sabellina v. Buray:[49]
Preponderance of evidence simply means evidence that is of greater weight or more convincing than what is offered
against it. In determining where the preponderance of evidence lies, the court may consider all the facts and
circumstances of the case, such as: the witnesses' demeanor, their intelligence, their means and opportunity of
knowing the facts to which they are testifying, the nature of the facts to which they testify, the probability or
improbability of their testimony, their interest or want of interest, and their personal credibility so far as it may
legitimately appear to the court.[50] (Citations omitted)

42
On the other hand, to convict in a criminal case, the prosecution must prove the accused's guilt beyond reasonable
doubt. This quantum of evidence does not require absolute certainty, but must nonetheless produce in the court's
mind a moral certainty of guilt. In the event of doubt, the accused must be acquitted.[51] Macayan, Jr. v. People[52]
teaches:
This rule places upon the prosecution the task of establishing the guilt of an accused, relying on the strength of its own
evidence, and not banking on the weakness of the defense of an accused. Requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt
finds basis not only in the due process clause of the Constitution, but similarly, in the right of an accused to be
"presumed innocent until the contrary is proved." "Undoubtedly, it is the constitutional presumption of innocence that
lays such burden upon the prosecution." Should the prosecution fail to discharge its burden, it follows, as a matter of
course, that an accused must be acquitted.[53] (Citations omitted)
In a criminal case, the private complainants' interest is limited to the civil liability arising from the criminal action, their
role being limited to being prosecution witnesses, since it is the State that is considered the offended party.[54] But in a
civil case like the present one, the plaintiffs are the heirs of the deceased, some of whom may not have initiated the
criminal case.

Here, contrary to petitioners' argument, while the Municipal Trial Court in Cities acquitted petitioner Fegarido, it did not
discount the possibility that he acted negligently. It merely ruled that it could not ascertain with moral certainty the
reckless manner by which he drove the jeepney, ultimately killing Alcantara:
Prosecution witnesses, Marcelino Menor, Jr., security guard of Landbank, and Jomarie Barnes, traffic enforcer of
Olongapo City, identified the accused in open court and were in accord that the latter was the driver of the passenger
jeepney that hit and bumped the victim. However, the Court could not ascertain with moral certainty from their
testimonies the reckless manner by which the accused drove the said vehicle on October 18, 2009. . . .

....

On the other hand, the accused never denied that he was the driver of the passenger j[eep]ney at the time of the
accident. However, there is no direct evidence on record that would warrant accused's recklessness in driving his
vehicle that look the life of the victim. . . . The testimonies of prosecution witnesses Marcelino Menor, Jr. and Traffic
Enforcer Barnes as well as the traffic sketch report corroborate accused's account of the incident, hence, acquittal of
accused's criminal liability in this case is inevitable.[55]
Moreover, despite petitioner Fegarido's acquittal, the Municipal Trial Court in Cities decreed that the prosecution
established by preponderance of evidence that petitioner Fegarido was negligent in driving the vehicle:
While this Court exonerates the accused of the crime imputed against him, the Court finds him civilly liable to the heirs
of the victim. The accused's admission, the prosecution witnesses' declaration in open court that the former was the
driver of the passenger j[eep]ney that bumped the victim and the presentation of the death certificate of the victim find
the existence of a preponderance of evidence that the accused was negligent in driving his vehicle on October 15,
2008.[56]
Accordingly, there is no cogent reason to reverse the findings of the Regional Trial Court, as affirmed by the Court of
Appeals.

II

Article 2180 of the Civil Code provides that "[e]mployers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees ...
acting within the scope of their assigned tasks[.]"[57] As this Court has said, "[o]nce negligence on the part of the
employee is established, a presumption instantly arises that the employer was negligent in the selection and/or
supervision of said employee."[58] The employer may refute this presumption by presenting adequate evidence that
they exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of their employee.[59]

A review of the records reveals that petitioner Milan, the registered owner of the jeepney, had never personally vetted
petitioner Fegarido when he was applying as driver.[60] She delegated her legal duties to her husband Nestor, who
admitted having tested Fegarido's driving skill only once. Nestor likewise testified that he never experienced riding with
Fegarido as the driver. Moreover, Fegarido was required to submit only clearances from the police and the National
Bureau of Investigation, but was not required to undergo a medical, physiological, or even drug test.[61]

Petitioner Milan failed to exercise the diligence that the law requires of her in selecting and supervising her
employees. Nestor's testimony confirms the insufficient screening process petitioner Fegarido had gone through

43
before being employed. Accordingly, this Court affirms the Court of Appeals' ruling that she is vicariously liable for
Alcantara's death, and must solidarily pay with petitioner Fegarido the liabilities they owe respondents.

III

We likewise affirm the damages awarded by the Court of Appeals.

Actual or compensatory damages are "compensation for an injury that will put the injured party in the position where it
was before the injury. They pertain to such injuries or losses that are actually sustained and susceptible of
measurement."[62] They are "awarded in satisfaction of, or in recompense for, loss or injury sustained."[63]

Under the law, "[i]n crimes and quasi-delicts, the defendant shall be liable for all damages which are the natural and
probable consequences of the act or omission complained of[,]"[64] which may include damages for loss of earning
capacity.[65]

To justify an award of actual damages, the claimant is duty bound to substantiate their claim by presenting competent
proof of the actual amount of loss.[66] In Viron Transportation Company, Inc. v. Delos Santos:[67]
Actual damages, to be recoverable, must not only be capable of proof, but must actually be proved with a reasonable
degree of certainty. Courts cannot simply rely on speculation, conjecture or guesswork in determining the fact and
amount of damages. To justify an award of actual damages, there must be competent proof of the actual amount of
loss, credence can be given only to claims which are duly supported by receipts.[68] (Citations omitted)
Particularly on the required proof of loss of earning capacity, this Court has held that either or both testimonial and
documentary evidence may be presented to establish the deceased's income.[69]

In this case, other than the expenses incurred by respondents for the alleged hospitalization, medical, funeral, and
transportation, no other evidence was presented to prove Alcantara's earning capacity. In their Complaint,
respondents prayed for damages worth P350,000.00 for the expenses they allegedly incurred.[70] The Regional Trial
Court instead awarded P138,591.00 as actual damages, based on the receipts respondents presented during trial.[71]
Thus, the Court of Appeals committed no reversible error when it affirmed the award of actual damages to
respondents.

The award of moral damages is likewise proper.

"Moral damages are awarded to enable the injured party to obtain means, diversions or amusements that will serve to
alleviate the moral suffering he has undergone, by reason of the defendant's culpable action."[72] They are granted to
"compensate the claimant for [their] actual injury, and not to penalize the wrongdoer."[73]

Unlike actual damages, moral damages may be granted even without proof of pecuniary loss, as long as it is
established that the offender's act caused the complainant's injury.[74]

There is no doubt here that respondents have undergone emotional pain and mental anguish with the death of their
loved one. Alcantara's untimely demise undeniably caused them pain. To alleviate their suffering, this Court affirms the
award of damages worth P100,000.00.

This Court likewise sustains the award of exemplary damages.

In cases involving vehicular crashes, courts award exemplary damages as a means of molding "behavior that has
socially deleterious consequences," so as to serve as an example or warning for the public good.[75]

Petitioners here are a public utility driver and an operator who are duty bound "to exercise extraordinary degree of
diligence for the safety of the travelling public and their passengers."[76] To ensure that public utility drivers and
operators will refrain from disregarding their duty to the public, the award of exemplary damages worth P50,000.00 is
in order.

Finally, due to the prolonged litigation of this dispute, attorney's fees and litigation expenses worth P40,000.00 are
awarded to respondents.

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WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The October 13, 2017 Decision and May 4, 2018 Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 105000 are AFFIRMED.

Petitioners Gerry S. Fegarido and Linalie A. Milan are solidarily liable to pay respondents-heirs of Cristina S. Alcantara
the following:
1. Actual damages worth P138,591.00;
2. Moral damages worth P100,000.00;
3. Exemplary damages worth P50,000.00; and
4. Attorney's fees and litigation expenses worth P40,000.00.

The total amount shall earn legal interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the finality of this Decision until full
payment.[77]

SO ORDERED.

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