Notes On Political Law by Prof. Carlo Cruz

JURISTS BAR REVIEW CENTER™
NOTES ON POLITICAL LAW

Excerpts from the 2022 Decisions of the Supreme Court
Compiled by
CARLO L. CRUZ
STATE IMMUNITY
DELEGATION OF POWER
"Any ambiguity or vagueness in the delegation must be resolved in favor of

[nondelegation]." Otherwise, the delegatee might abdicate their duty to perform the task
delegated to them. (Shenzhou Mining Group Corp. v. Mamanwa Tribes of Barangays Taganito and
Urbiztondo, G.R. No. 206685, March 16, 2022)
Redelegation
There are instances where an official may validly exercise authority through persons
appointed to assist them with their functions. In American Tobacco Company v. Director of
Patents, this Court upheld the director of patents' delegation of the power to hear inter
partes proceedings to designated hearing officers. In so ruling, it held that this delegation gave
the director "administrative flexibility necessary for the prompt and expeditious discharge of
[their] duties in the administration" of intellectual property laws. It must be clarified, however,
that the director of patents themselves was the very entity designated under Republic Act No.
166 in relation to Republic Act No. 165 to hear and decide those cases. The same is true
in Mollaneda v. Umacob, where this Court held that the Administrative Code of 1987 granted the
Civil Service Commission power to deputize another department, agency, official, or group of
officials to hear and receive evidence concerning complaints against public officers.
In contrast, the authority involved in this case is vested by law in the Commission. The
Commission then delegated this authority to Chairperson Insigne. When Insigne authorized
Masagnay to sign on his behalf, Insigne did so as someone to whom authority had already been
delegated. "A power once delegated cannot be redelegated."
It is true that the delegatee may be permitted to redelegate functions assigned to them.
However, the power of redelegation must be granted by the delegating authority, and not
unilaterally exercised by the delegatee. This was demonstrated in In re Razon, where this Court,
as the delegating authority, allowed the authorized officers of specific law enforcement agencies
to endorse search warrant applications in certain criminal cases.
In this case, there was no showing that the Commission En Banc allowed Insigne to
redelegate the power to sign compliance certificates to other officials from the Commission.
The delegatee's exercise of the delegated power is always subject to the review of the
delegating authority. When the delegation is found to be void, all acts performed pursuant to
that delegation may be declared void by the delegating authority. (Shenzhou Mining Group Corp.
v. Mamanwa Tribes of Barangays Taganito and Urbiztondo, G.R. No. 206685, March 16, 2022)
Administrative Code
Repeals, by implication, are not favored unless it is manifest that the legislature so intended, and the rule is that
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laws must be harmonized and reconciled as much as possible so that each provision of law will be effective.
Article 13 of the Civil Code and Section 31 of the Administrative Code of 1987 are not
entirely repugnant or irreconcilable, such that one cannot be enforced without nullifying the
other.
The two provisions are cited here again for easier reference:
ARTICLE 13. When the laws speak of years, months, days or nights, it shall be
understood that years are of three hundred sixty-five days each; months, of thirty days; days, of
twenty-four hours; and nights from sunset to sunrise.
If months are designated by their name, they shall be computed by the number of days in
which they respectively have.
In computing a period, the first day shall be excluded, and the last day included.
SECTION 31. Legal Periods. — "Year" shall be understood to be twelve calendar months;
"month" of thirty days, unless it refers to a specific calendar month in which case it shall be
computed according to the number of days the specific month contains; "day," to a day of twenty-
four hours; and "night," from sunset to sunrise.
A perusal of the two provisions shows that Article 13 of the Civil Code is a general
provision, which states the general rule that "when the laws speak of years, ... it [is to] be
understood [as] 365 days . . ." On the other hand, Section 31 of the Administrative Code is an
exception to the general rule because it provides its own definition of legal periods. xxx.
The Administrative Code of 1987 covers the administration, organization, and

procedures of the Government and its various agencies. Book VII of the Administrative Code
generally prescribes the administrative procedures, which include provisions for the
adjudication and appeal of administrative cases.
Accordingly, Section 31 of the Administrative Code applies in particular to periods

embraced within the Administrative Code, including prescription of proceedings or appeals in
administrative cases. (Abello v. Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank, G.R. No. 232706, July
18, 2022)
[Note: "Where there are two statutes that apply to a particular case, that which was specially
designed for the said case must prevail over the other."| (Abello v. Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage
Bank, G.R. No. 232706, July 18, 2022)]
[Note: Section 31 of the Administrative Code, being a specific provision pertaining to

administrative cases, is an exception to Article 13 of the Civil Code, which "has been intended for
general application in the interpretation of the laws."
At any rate, this case involves the prescription of actions, which is principally governed by Title
V, Book III of the Civil Code, and the determination of legal periods under Article 13 of the Civil
Code."| (Abello v. Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank, G.R. No. 232706, July 18, 2022)]
||| Administrative Bodies
Authority
The present case is another reminder to the Energy Regulatory Commission (ERC) that
while it is an independent quasi-judicial regulatory body, it has no independence or discretion
to disregard, as it is legally bound to follow, the rules, regulations, and circulars issued by the
Department of Energy (DOE) pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9136, otherwise known as the
"Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001" (EPIRA). Its legal duty, first and foremost, is to
enforce such rules, regulations, and circulars, as formulated and adopted by the Department of
Energy. (Independent Electricity Market Operator of the Philippines, Inc. v. Energy Regulatory
Commission, G.R. No. 254440, March 23, 2022)
[Note: From the foregoing, it is clear that the ERC has the following duties imposed by law,
including its own rules and guidelines: (1) to implement the joint endorsement of the DOE and the
electric power industry participants for the transition to the IMO; (2) to act on and approve applications
for market fees filed by the Market Operator; and (3) verify the completeness of pre-filing requirements,
and accordingly notify the Pre-Filer either with a CCE or a NISE. The ERC unlawfully neglected and
refused to perform the foregoing duties imposed upon it by law. (Independent Electricity Market Operator of
the Philippines, Inc. v. Energy Regulatory Commission, G.R. No. 254440, March 23, 2022)]
[Note: The ERC's continued refusal, unreasonable and unnecessary delay in acting upon IEMOP's
Market Fees Application justify the issuance of the mandamus to direct the ERC to promptly act upon the
said Application and proceed with dispatch in the process of its approval or disapproval. Such continued
refusal and unreasonable and unnecessary delay without legal basis likewise constitute grave abuse of
discretion, manifest injustice, or palpable excess of authority that further warrants the remedy of
mandamus. (Independent Electricity Market Operator of the Philippines, Inc. v. Energy Regulatory Commission,
G.R. No. 254440, March 23, 2022)]
Finally, we stress that Section 27 of EO No. 273 mandates the Secretary of Finance to promulgate rules and
regulations to implement the EO. However, the Secretary of Finance did not issue rules construing the term "toilet
waters" as it did in RR No. 8-84. On the other hand, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR) exercised its
authority to interpret the provisions of the Tax Code and issued BIR Ruling No. 043-2000 and Revenue
Memorandum Circular (RMC) No. 17-02, treating all toilet waters, regardless of essential oil content, subject to
the excise tax under Section 150 (b). To date, the Secretary of Finance, who is vested with the power to review
rulings of the CIR, has not modified or reversed the CIR's issuances.
It is a settled rule that the interpretation placed upon a statute by the executive officers,
whose duty is to enforce it, is entitled to great respect by the courts. Administrative
construction of tax law, while not conclusive, will be followed unless clearly erroneous. Avon
Products has not shown why we should deviate from this well-settled rule. Thus, the general
interpretation of the statute accorded by the CIR in BIR Ruling No. 043-2000 and published in
RMC No. 17-02 shall be given effect. . (Avon Products Manufacturing, Inc. v. Commissioner of
Internal Revenue, G.R. Nos. 206286, 209257 & 210086, March 2, 2022)
[Note: Since Avon Products admitted that the principal ingredient of its splash colognes and
body sprays is alcohol, and the products are meant for putting fragrance on the skin, the CTA correctly
concluded that Avon Products' splash colognes and body sprays are "toilet waters" subject to the excise
tax on non-essential goods in Section 150 (b) of the Tax Code. Accordingly, Avon Products is not entitled
to a refund. (Avon Products Manufacturing, Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, G.R. Nos. 206286,
209257 & 210086, March 2, 2022)]
Quasi-Legislation
Rules Must Not be Ultra Vires
As such, the COMELEC Rules cannot be allowed to, in effect, override the substantive
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law, especially the Constitution. The COMELEC Rules cannot be applied in a way that would
shorten the period provided by the Constitution to aggrieved parties within which to question
the adverse decision or ruling of the COMELEC. (Gana-Carait v. Commission on Elections, G.R.
No. 257453, August 9, 2022)
On January 15, 2020, this Court's First Division xxx promulgated G.R. Nos. 215801 and
218924 where this Court held that the Commissioner of Internal Revenue gravely abused its
authority in issuing Revised Memorandum Circular No. 65, and that in doing so, "[the Circular]
did not merely interpret or clarify[,] but changed altogether the long standing rules of the
Bureau of Internal [R]evenue." (Delos Santos v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, G.R. No. 222548,
June 22, 2022)
[Note: The Circular unduly expanded and modified several provisions of the National Internal
Revenue Code. Section 32 of the National Internal Revenue Code does not include these charges in its
enumeration of sources of gross income. Moreover, Sections 105 to 108 of the National Internal Revenue
Code imposes Value-Added Tax on transactions involving sale, barter, or exchange of goods, rendition of
services, and the use or lease of properties. However, condominium association dues, membership fees,
and other charges also do not arise from these transactions. The very nature of a condominium
corporation negates the application of the National Internal Revenue Code provisions on Value-Added
Tax. Thus, the promulgation of G.R. Nos. 215801 and 218924 declaring the Circular invalid has mooted
the Petition. (Delos Santos v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, G.R. No. 222548, June 22, 2022)]
the adverse decision or ruling of the COMELEC. (Gana-Carait y Villegas v. Commission on
Elections, G.R. No. 257453, August 9, 2022)
Publication
More significantly, no copy of the afore-cited Memoranda can be found through a

cursory internet search. There is also nothing in the records to show that the said Memoranda
were ever published (whether online or in print) as to sufficiently inform those concerned of the
existence of said requirements. In Arroyo v. Department of Justice, We held that the publication
requirement applies to both statutes and administrative regulations and issuances xxx. (Tito v.
Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 258459, August 16, 2022)
Quasi-Judicial Power
Jurisdiction
The above-cited provisions by the PRC, while showing that they may have appellate
jurisdiction over decisions or orders of the Board, does not divest the CA of its own appellate
jurisdiction. To put it simply, there is no law granting the PRC exclusive appellate jurisdiction
over cases decided by the Board, nor is there any law excluding such cases from being taken
cognizance by the CA through a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, as will
be discussed further below. (Professional Regulation Commission v. Alo, G.R. No. 214435, February
14, 2022)
[Note: Rule 43 of the Rules of Court is consistent with the aforequoted provision, particularly
Section 9 (3) of BP 129, which grants the CA exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments,
decisions, resolutions, orders or awards of RTCs and quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or
commissions (Professional Regulation Commission v. Alo, G.R. No. 214435, February 14, 2022)]
The jurisdiction of the CIAC may include, but is not limited to, violation of specifications
for materials and workmanship; violation of the terms of agreement; interpretation and/or
application of contractual time and delays; maintenance and defects; and payment, default of
employer or contractor, and changes in contract cost. Excluded from the coverage of this law
are disputes arising from employer-employee relationships, which shall continue to be covered
by the Labor Code of the Philippines. (Papa v. Design Arki, Inc., G.R. No. 249977, September 28,
2022)
The Second Arbitral Award should be vacated in part because it reversed the First
Arbitral Award. The two arbitral tribunals are coequal bodies and cannot reverse or render
another award on the same issue previously resolved by another tribunal. (ASEC Development
and Construction Corp. v. Toyota Alabang, Inc., G.R. Nos. 243477-78, April 27, 2022)
Among the powers bestowed on the NCIP is the jurisdiction "to decide all appeals from
the decisions and acts of all various offices with the Commission." This necessarily includes
decisions and acts of the regional and field offices of the NCIP. (Santos v. Gabaen, G.R. No.
195638, March 22, 2022)
[Note: However, it must be clarified that the NCIP does not automatically have jurisdiction over
all disputes involving ICCs/IPs. In Unduran v. Aberasturi, it was declared that Section 66 of R.A. No.
8371 does not confer on the NCIP exclusive and original jurisdiction over all claims and disputes
involving rights of ICCs/IPs. This Court emphasized that the proper construction of the provision,
particularly its qualifying proviso,is that the NCIP's jurisdiction over such claims and disputes occur "only
when they arise between or among parties belonging to the same ICC/IP." (Santos v. Gabaen, G.R. No.
195638, March 22, 2022)]
[Note: Here, it is undisputed that Santos does not belong to the ICC of Erong and PINPAL. The
remedies the NCIP suggested are not available to Santos because she could not file a motion for
reconsideration before the NCIP nor an appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA). She has no available remedy
within the NCIP as it does not have jurisdiction over her claim. Therefore, a petition under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court is the proper remedy to challenge the confiscation of the almaciga resins. (Santos v.
Gabaen, G.R. No. 195638, March 22, 2022)]
Proceedings
Res Judicata
Petitioner maintains that it was gross error for the CA to rule that res judicata does not apply as a bar to the present
case. Aside from having been exonerated for plunder, malversation, and violation of R.A. No. 3019 in OMB Case
No. C-C-10-0402-I for lack of substantial evidence, the administrative charges of grave misconduct and violation
of R.A. No. 6713 were, likewise, dismissed by the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 120934, the decision on which has since
been declared final and executory by this Court. Thus, the conclusiveness of judgment in the prior litigated case
necessarily precludes respondent from relitigating the same facts against him.
In its Comment, respondent counters that conclusiveness of judgment does not find application in the present case.
The point or question in issue here is whether petitioner is guilty of grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the
best interest of the service when he simultaneously served as an officer of ESBI and the LWUA. In CA-G.R. SP No.
120934, the issue involved was petitioner's participation in the unlawful investment in, and eventual acquisition of,
ESBI by the LWUA. Moreover, there is no identity of parties in two cases.
|||
The Court agrees with the CA that CA-G.R. SP No. 120934 does not constitute res
judicata and is not a bar to the present case. xxx. This doctrine is embodied under Section 47,
Rule 39 of the Rules of Court xxx.
There is no dispute as to the presence of the first, second, and third elements here. With
respect to the fourth element, this Court finds no identity of causes of action between CA-G.R.
SP No. 120934 and the present case. CA-G.R. SP No. 120934 involved petitioner's complicity and
degree of participation in the anomalous and irregular acquisition of ESBI by the LWUA, while
the present case deals with the propriety of the simultaneous occupation of petitioner of
positions in the LWUA and ESBI. This Court agrees with the observation of the CA that CA-
G.R. SP No. 120934 "never touched upon the legality and propriety of the concurrent holding
and simultaneous exercise of [petitioner] of the positions and functions of the office of the
Corporate Legal Officer of the LWUA and the Assistant Corporate Secretary of ESBI." Be that as
it may, there is no identity of parties between the two cases. In CA-G.R. SP No. 120934, the
complainants are LWUA employees Rustico B. Tutol, Luis D.G. Estrada, and Carmen F.
Amores, while in the present case, the complainant is the FIO of the Ombudsman. To further
highlight the lack of this requisite, both parties in the present case were actually co-respondents
in CA-G.R. SP No. 120934. Without identity of parties, the rule on conclusiveness of judgment
does not apply and cannot serve to bar the present case. (Espinas v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R.
No. 250013, June 15, 2022)
Position Papers
The case of JR Hauling Services v. Solamo (JR Hauling Services) reiterates that labor
tribunals’ decisions may (be) on the basis of position papers and supporting affidavits xxx.
(Mulleno v. TV5 Network, Inc., G.R. No. 247445, June 13, 2022)
Primary Jurisdiction
Moreover, a review of the respective jurisdictions of the POEA and the LA reveals that
these administrative bodies do not have concurrent jurisdiction. On the one hand, the Migrant
Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995, as amended by Republic Act (RA) No.
10022, provides that the LA shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide the
claims arising out of an employer-employee relationship or by virtue of any law or contract
involving Filipino workers for overseas deployment including claims for actual, moral,
exemplary, and other forms of damage xxx. The jurisdiction of these administrative bodies does
not in any way intersect as to warrant the application of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction.
Accordingly, the appreciation by the POEA and LA of the complaints should be limited to
matters falling within their respective jurisdictions, and only insofar as relevant to the
resolution of the controversies presented before them. (U R Employed International Corp. v.
Pinmiliw, G.R. No. 225263, March 16, 2022)
Exhaustion of
Administrative Remedies
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is grounded on practical reasons,

including allowing the administrative agencies concerned to take every opportunity to correct
its own errors, as well as affording the litigants the opportunity to avail of speedy relief through
the administrative processes and sparing them of the laborious and costly resort to courts.
In Republic of the Philippines v. Lacap, this Court explained the rationale behind the
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies as follows:
The general rule is that before a party may seek the intervention of the court, he should
first avail of all the means afforded him by administrative processes. The issues which
administrative agencies are authorized to decide should not be summarily taken from them and
submitted to a court without first giving such administrative agency the opportunity to dispose
of the same after due deliberation.
Corollary to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is the doctrine of

primary jurisdiction; that is, courts cannot or will not determine a controversy involving a
question which is within the jurisdiction of the administrative tribunal prior to the resolution of
that question by the administrative tribunal, where the question demands the exercise of sound
administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience and services of the
administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact.
Of course, this general rule allows for some exceptions, which have been repeatedly
outlined by this Court. The case of The Roman Catholic Bishop of Malolos, Inc. v. The Heirs of
Mariano Marcos, citing previous jurisprudence, provides:
However, this principle is not inflexible, and admits of several exceptions that include
situations where the very rationale of the doctrine has been defeated. The Court has taken many
occasions to outline these exceptions, including its observation in Samar II Electric Cooperative,
Inc., et al. v. Seludo, Jr., to wit:
True, the doctrines of primary jurisdiction and exhaustion of administrative remedies are
subject to certain exceptions, to wit: (a) where there is estoppel on the part of the party invoking the
doctrine; (b) where the challenged administrative act is patently illegal, amounting to lack of
jurisdiction; (c) where there is unreasonable delay or official inaction that will irretrievably
prejudice the complainant; (d) where the amount involved is relatively so small as to make the rule
impractical and oppressive; (e) where the question involved is purely legal and will ultimately
have to be decided by the courts of justice; (f) where judicial intervention is urgent; (g) where the
application of the doctrine may cause great and irreparable damage; (h) where the controverted
acts violate due process; (i) where the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies has been
rendered moot; (j) where there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy; (k) where strong
public interest is involved; and (l) in quo warranto proceedings.
However, the records would show that none of these exceptions are present in this case.
Alo filed the petition for review with the CA on May 2, 2013 without any justification or reason
on why she did not file an appeal with the PRC instead, considering that the latter is the proper
procedure and it was still within the 15-day reglementary period. Not only is this a blatant
disregard of procedural rules, but also a denial of an opportunity for the PRC to review the
Board's decision and if necessary, correct or modify the same, without resorting to the judiciary
and unnecessarily adding to the courts' already clogged dockets. This is definitely contrary to
the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies, and thus, the CA should have dismissed the
petition for lack of cause of action. (Professional Regulation Commission v. Alo, G.R. No. 214435,
February 14, 2022)
In this case, and as aptly pointed out by the CA, the main issue raised by Lourdes in her
petition for review before the CA is purely legal — whether the dismissal of the complaint by
the HLURB Arbiter and the Board of Commissioners anchored on the failure of Lourdes to
implead an indispensable party is correct or not. Thus, this Court finds that the CA did not err
when it did not dismiss Lourdes' petition for review for failure to observe the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies, considering that such non-observance was justified. (De
Leon v. Asombrado-Llacuna, G.R. No. 246127, March 2, 2022)
In general, where administrative remedies are available, petitions for the issuance of the
extraordinary writs should not be granted by the courts in order to give the administrative body
the opportunity to decide the matter by itself correctly, and to prevent unnecessary and
premature resort to courts. However, this principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies is
not without exception.
Jurisprudence would reveal that the Court has set aside such rule: (1) when there is a
violation of due process, (2) when the issue involved is purely a legal question, (3) when the
administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, (4) when
there is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency concerned, (5) when there is
irreparable injury, (6) when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an alter ego
of the President bears the implied and assumed approval of the latter, (7) when to require
exhaustion of administrative remedies would be unreasonable, (8) when it would amount to a
nullification of a claim, (9) when the subject matter is a private land in land case proceedings,
(10) when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy, and (11) when
there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention.
From the records, it can be clearly seen that the circumstances of the instant case
necessitate that We set aside the general rule. (Light Rail Transit Authority v. City of Pasay, G.R.
No. 211299, June 28, 2022)
[Note: The issues involved in this petition are purely legal issues. It is evident that from the
outset, LRTA primarily intended to question the authority of the tax assessor to impose tax assessments
on its property, and the authority of the treasurer to collect said tax, as LRTA claims to be a non-taxable
entity. This can be seen when the LRTA deliberately chose to file the remedies of certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus, instead of just filing a protest to contest the amounts in the assessment. (Light Rail Transit
Authority v. City of Pasay, G.R. No. 211299, June 28, 2022)]
The President's power of review emanates from his power of control over the executive
departments, bureaus, and offices enshrined under Section 17 of Article VII of the
Constitution. Distrust of an administrative agency alone unsupported by concrete evidence is
not sufficient reason to dispense with the doctrine of administrative remedies. xxx. To
emphasize, in no way will the Court condone the circumvention of the mechanisms of
administrative appeals on mere suspicion of an agency's integrity. Rivera should have filed an
appeal to the Office of the President before she proceeded with the Petition for Certiorari. (Rivera
v. Abungan, G.R. No. 240796, April 5, 2022)
DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES
Treaties
Again, the Loan Agreements themselves are distinct from the mutually adopted bidding
procedures through which the infrastructure projects were awarded to foreign contractors.
Relative to procurement laws, the award of projects to the foreign contractors and their
consequent financing under the Loan Agreements are outside the purview of the GPRA and
the 2016 Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations (2016 RIRR) effective at the time the
CRPIP and NCWS projects were awarded. Such matter has already been settled in Abaya v.
Ebdane, Jr. (Abaya), Department of Budget and Management Procurement Service v. Kolonwel
Trading (Kolonwel), and Land Bank of the Phils. v. Atlanta Industries, Inc. (Atlanta Industries).
Similar to the instant controversy, Abaya involved an exchange of notes between the
GRP and Government of Japan, concerning loans to be extended by the latter to the former, also
embodying the salient terms of such loans. These international instruments specifically
provided that the services would be procured in accordance with the guidelines prescribed by
the Japanese government-owned bank, to which the GRP acceded. Upholding the validity of the
procurement procedure, even while deviating from the GPRA, the Court ruled:
The petitioners' arguments fail to persuade. The Court holds that Loan Agreement No.
PH-P204 taken in conjunction with the Exchange of Notes dated December 27, 1999 between the
Japanese Government and the Philippine Government is an executive agreement.
xxx xxx xxx
Under the fundamental principle of international law of pacta sunt servanda, which is, in
fact, embodied in Section 4 of RA 9184 as it provides that "[a]ny treaty or international or
executive agreement affecting the subject matter of this Act to which the Philippine government
is a signatory shall be observed," the DPWH, as the executing agency of the projects financed by
Loan Agreement No. PH-P204, rightfully awarded the contract for the implementation of civil
works for the CP I project to private respondent China Road & Bridge Corporation. (Colmenares v.
Duterte, G.R. Nos. 245981 & 246594, August 9, 2022)
[Note: On to their final contention, petitioners argue that the choices of arbitral tribunal and
applicable law are skewed in favor of the Chinese lender, especially considering the purported partiality
of the chosen tribunal, thus defeating the State's pursuit of an independent foreign policy. While
respondents insist on the principle of party autonomy in contracts, particularly choice of applicable law
and forum, petitioners still point out that the Philippines is contending with a global superpower, thus
upsetting any parity in bargaining power.
The Court rules in favor of respondents. xxx.
Given that these commercial relationships are contractual in nature, arbitration thereon is
understood as a purely private system of adjudication facilitated by private citizens, which has been
consistently recognized as valid, binding, and enforceable. Given such fundamental principles, courts
should liberally construe arbitration clauses, adopting the interpretation that would render such clauses
effective.
Particularly, in contracts with a foreign element, the courts have generally respected the
contracting parties' stipulated choice of law. xxx. (Colmenares v. Duterte, G.R. Nos. 245981 & 246594,
August 9, 2022)]
In this regard, We provide the following guidelines for refugee status determination
proceedings:
1. To discharge the shared and collaborative burden between the applicant and the
protection officer: (a) the applicant must provide accurate, full, and credible account or proof in
support of his or her claim, and submit all relevant evidence reasonably available; and (b) the
protection officer must assist and aid the applicant in explaining, clarifying, and elucidating his
or her claim.
2. Notwithstanding the protection officer's shared burden, it is also the duty of the
protection officer to assess the credibility of the statements of the applicant and the evidence on
record.
3. The facts, as ascertained, should be applied to the definition of a refugee under
the 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1967 Protocol, considering the subjective and objective
elements of the phrase "well-founded fear." The protection officer should determine if the
applicant has established, to a reasonable degree, that he or she would have been persecuted had
the applicant not left his or her country of origin or would be persecuted if the applicant returns
thereto.
Ultimately, in as much as we want to extend the mantle of our country's protection to an

applicant, we cannot do so without first being convinced that the applicant is unable, or
unwilling, to avail himself of the protection of his home country due to a well-rounded fear of
religious persecution. The humanitarian nature of international refugee law requires us to offer
a helping hand to those who have satisfied the requirements for recognition of refugee status.
But the same cannot be offered indiscriminately with our finite resources. Care must be taken if
we are to provide home and solace to those who truly need it so they can rest their fearful
hearts.
Thus, the case should be remanded to the DOJ-RSPPU in order to re-evaluate

petitioner's application in accordance with the evidentiary threshold and guidelines established
in the instant case. (Sabir v. Department of Justice-Refugees and Stateless Persons Protection Unit,
G.R. No. 249387, August 2, 2022)
Social Justice
An employer's blanket policy of no-spouse employment is discriminatory. To justify its

enforcement, the employer must clearly establish a reasonable business necessity. (Dela Cruz-
Cagampan v. One Network Bank, Inc., G.R. No. 217414, June 22, 2022)
[Note: Indeed, employers may freely conduct their affairs and employ discretion and judgment in
managing all aspects of employment. However, their exercise of this right to management prerogative
must be in accord with justice and fair play. (Dela Cruz-Cagampan v. One Network Bank, Inc., G.R. No.
217414, June 22, 2022)]
[Note: Thus, a bona fide occupational qualification requires the concurrence of two elements: "(1)
that the employment qualification is reasonably related to the essential operation of the job involved; and,
(2) that there is a factual basis for believing that all or substantially all persons meeting the qualification
would be unable to properly perform the duties of the job." (Dela Cruz-Cagampan v. One Network Bank,
Inc., G.R. No. 217414, June 22, 2022)]
In line with the Constitutional policy of giving protection to labor, the Civil Code and
the Labor Code provide that doubts in the interpretation of labor legislation and contracts shall
be construed in favor of labor. Likewise, the Court has consistently held that doubts in the
appreciation of evidence in labor cases shall work to the advantage of labor. (Celis v. Bank of
Makati (A Savings Bank), Inc., G.R. No. 250776, June 15, 2022)
Affording protection to labor and construing doubt in favor of the laborer are not only
statutorily required under the Labor Code, but are also consistent with the "social justice
suppositions underlying labor laws[.]" xxx Social justice requires consideration for labor due to
their disadvantaged position. The Court of Appeals should not have placed such an onerous
evidentiary burden on petitioners given the evidence already on record. Both parties submitted
competing testimonial evidence, giving sufficient basis to apply the principle of equipoise and
rule in favor of labor. (Wahing v. Spouses Daguio, G.R. No. 219755, April 18, 2022)
Writ of Kalikasan
Petitioners, or themselves and in representation of the residents of the Municipality of Sta. Cruz, Province of
Zambales and the Municipality of Infanta, Province of Pangasinan, filed before the Court a special civil action for
the issuance of a Writ of Kalikasan, with a prayer for the grant of a Temporary Environmental Protection Order
(TEPO) pursuant to A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC that sought to enjoin the conduct of nickel mining operations in the
Municipality of Sta. Cruz, Province of Zambales.
A writ of kalikasan is a remedy under Section 1, Rule 7 of the Rules of Procedure for
Environmental Cases. It provides:
Section 1. Nature of the writ. — The writ is a remedy available to a natural or juridical
person, entity authorized by law, people's organization, non-governmental organization, or any
public interest group accredited by or registered with any government agency, on behalf of
persons whose constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology is violated, or threatened
with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or private
individual or entity, involving environmental damage of such magnitude as to prejudice the life,
health or property of inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces.
The requisites of a writ of kalikasan are as follows:
xxx (1) there is an actual or threatened violation of the constitutional right to a balanced
and healthful ecology; (2) the actual or threatened violation arises from an unlawful act or
omission of a public official or employee, or private individual or entity; and (3) the actual or
threatened violation involves or will lead to an environmental damage of such magnitude as to
prejudice the life, health or property of inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces.
The writ of kalikasan has been described as follows:
The writ is categorized as a special civil action and was, thus, conceptualized as an
extraordinary remedy, which aims to provide judicial relief from threatened or actual violation/s
of the constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology of a magnitude or degree of
damage that transcends political and territorial boundaries. It is intended "to provide a stronger
defense for environmental rights through judicial efforts where institutional arrangements of
enforcement, implementation and legislation have fallen short" and seeks "to address the
potentially exponential nature of large-scale ecological threats." (Concerned Citizens of Sta. Cruz,
Zambales v. Paje, G.R. No. 236269, March 22, 2022)
[Note: It bears stressing that the CA denied the petitioners' petition for writ of kalikasan, as well as
their application for TEPO and Urgent Motion for Ocular Inspection, on the sole basis of the DENR
Closure Orders dated February 8, 2017 which cancelled the respective MPSAs of respondent companies.
The CA underscored that with the closure of the mining operations, "there can be no unlawful act or
omission that may be committed by respondent mining companies that would result in actual or threatened
violation of petitioners' constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology." For the CA, the DENR Closure
Orders have rendered the case moot. Thus, it found that "no useful purpose can be served in passing upon the
merits of the petition."
The foregoing ruling of the CA no longer holds, owing to the subsequent and supervening events
as manifested by the OSG and LAMI, more particularly on the lifting of the DENR Closure Order dated
February 8, 2017 which previously cancelled the respective MPSA's of respondent mining companies.
(Concerned Citizens of Sta. Cruz, Zambales v. Paje, G.R. No. 236269, March 22, 2022)]
[Note: Indeed, with the lifting of the Closure Orders dated February 8, 2017 and the resumption
of the mining operations of respondent companies as manifested by the OSG, petitioners' allegations —
i.e., that respondent companies conduct unsystematic mining activities, and that their mining operations
violate pertinent environmental and mining laws, which were considered by the DENR in the issuance of
said Closure Orders — become material and significantly relevant in the subject petition for writ
of kalikasan. Thus, the propriety of the ultimate relief in a petition for writ of kalikasan, that is, to prevent
further violations of the constitutionally protected rights to a balanced and healthful ecology remains a
justiciable controversy. This has not been squarely passed upon or resolved by the CA. xxx.
WHEREFORE, the Resolutions dated May 22, 2017 and December 14, 2017 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 00032 are SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the case is REMANDED to the Court of
Appeals for the continuation of proceedings with dispatch. (Concerned Citizens of Sta. Cruz, Zambales v.
Paje, G.R. No. 236269, March 22, 2022)]
LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
Laws
As a general rule, laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided.
However, this rule is subject to certain recognized exceptions, as when the statute in question is
curative in nature, or creates new rights xxx.
.
In Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections, the Court shed light on the nature of statutes that
may be deemed curative and may therefore be applied retroactively notwithstanding the
absence of an express provision to this effect:
According to Tolentino, curative statutes are those which undertake to cure errors and
irregularities, thereby validating judicial or administrative proceedings, acts of public officers, or
private deeds and contracts which otherwise would not produce their intended consequences by
reason of some statutory disability or failure to comply with some technical requirement. They
operate on conditions already existing, and are necessarily retroactive in operation. Agpalo, on
the other hand, says that curative statutes are "healing acts xxx curing defects and adding to the
means of enforcing existing obligations xxx (and) are intended to supply defects, abridge
superfluities in existing laws, and curb certain evils xxx By their very nature, curative statutes
are retroactive xxx (and) reach back to past events to correct errors or irregularities and to render
valid and effective attempted acts which would be otherwise ineffective for the purpose the
parties intended."
In Nunga, Jr. v. Nunga III, the Court further clarified that while a law creating new rights
may be given retroactive effect, this can only be done if the new right does not prejudice or
impair any vested rights. (Republic v. Buenaventura, G.R. No. 198629, April 5, 2022)
[Note: On this basis, the Court finds that RA 11573, particularly Section 6 (amending Section 14
of PD 1529) and Section 7 (prescribing the required proof of land classification status), may operate
retroactively to cover applications for land registration pending as of September 1, 2021 or the date
when RA 11573 took effect. To be sure, the curative nature of RA 11573 can easily be discerned from its
declared purpose, that is, "to simplify, update and harmonize similar and related provisions of land laws
in order to simplify and remove ambiguity in its interpretation and implementation. xxx" (Republic v.
Buenaventura, G.R. No. 198629, April 5, 2022)
Party-Lists
From the confluence of assertions above, it is easily discernible that IWI is a sectoral
organization. This Court thus finds credence to IWI's insistence that the purpose/s for which it
was organized 'does not, in any way, relate to any religion, religious sect or denomination,
organization or association organized for religious purpose.' Further, it is plainly observable
that there is 'no common religion to speak of that relates to or associates, in any way, to
petitioner [IWI] and even as to the members of the petitioner [IWI].' Notably, under Section 6 of
R.A. No. 7941, a party may be denied registration for the party-list system if it is a religious
organization, or organized for religious purposes. Being a ground for disqualification that the
law explicitly provides, there must first be a determination and a positive finding that indeed
the party to be disqualified is a religious organization. This must be so, especially where the
Constitution and By-Laws of an applicant party could easily be examined to determine whether
it is organized for a religious purpose. In IWI's case, there is nothing from the documents it
submitted before the COMELEC which would show that it is a religious organization, or
organized for a religious purpose. Hence, it could not be disqualified on such ground. (Igorot
Warriors International, Inc. v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 258181, March 1, 2022)
This Court, likewise, finds that IWI sufficiently stated in its petition for registration,
more specifically under paragraphs 23 and 24 thereof, that all of its officers and members were
made aware of the petition and have given their consent thereto xxx.
This Court also hastens to add that the COMELEC was in grave error for denying the
petition on the ground of IWI's failure to 'submit proof to enable determination that all its members
are made aware of the petition and have given their consent thereto.' Contrary to its position,
the wording of Section 6, Rule 1 of Resolution No. 9366 is crystal clear: that in order to comply
with its requirements, party-list groups need only stipulate that 'all of its officers and members
are made aware of the petition and have given their consent thereto.' Markedly, no proof is
required by Resolution No. 9366 for the COMELEC to make any determination of such
representation. Section 7 of Resolution No. 9366 requires the submission of a party's list of all its
officers and members to determine whether the majority of its membership and officers belong
to the sector it seeks to represent, not to determine whether consent was given. The statement in
its petition for registration that consent was given by all the officers and members would thus
suffice. Be that as it may, IWI attached to its motion for reconsideration the consent forms of all
its officers and members signifying their knowledge of such petition and their consent for its
consequent filing and eventual participation in the elections. (Igorot Warriors International, Inc. v.
Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 258181, March 1, 2022)
Finally, by virtue of the list of IWI officers and members, which it has attached in its
petition for registration, indicating the corresponding tribes to which the respective officers and
members belong to, this Court is persuaded that IWI had, in fact, satisfied the requirement to
show that the majority of its membership and officers are bona fide, members of the sector it
seeks to represent, in this case, not merely Igorots but also other ICCs. (Igorot Warriors
International, Inc. v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 258181, March 1, 2022)
[Note: All told, there exists grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on the part of the COMELEC En Banc. Ostensibly, its actions were not in harmony with the statutory
policy to develop and guarantee a 'full, free and open party system in order to attain the broadest
possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives by enhancing
their chances to compete for and win seats in the legislature, and shall provide the simplest scheme
possible.' (Igorot Warriors International, Inc. v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 258181, March 1, 2022)]
The COMELEC may refuse or cancel the registration of a party on the grounds provided
under Section 6 of RA No. 7941, to wit:
Section 6. Refusal and/or Cancellation of Registration. — The COMELEC may, motu

proprio or upon verified complaint of any interested party, refuse or cancel, after due notice and
hearing, the registration of any national, regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition on
any of the following grounds:
(1) It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or association, organized for
religious purposes;
(2) It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal;
(3) It is a foreign party or organization;
(4) It is receiving support from any foreign government, foreign political party,
foundation, organization, whether directly or through any of its officers or members or indirectly
through third parties for partisan election purposes;
(5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating to elections;
(6) It declares untruthful statements in its petition;
(7) It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or
(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to obtain at least
two per centum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding
elections for the constituency in which it has registered.
The above provision was replicated in Section 6 of COMELEC Resolution No. 9366,
which provides that:
Section 6. Petition for Registration, Contents. — The petition for registration shall be
verified and shall state the following: a) name and acronym of the petitioner, with the acronym
not exceeding twenty (20) characters; b) nature of the organization: whether it is a sectoral party,
sectoral organization, political party or coalition; c) the sector or sectors which it seeks to
represent; d) the name and address of its President/Chairman or, in his absence, the Secretary-
General, who will represent the party in the petition; e) petitioner's principal headquarters and
postal office address; f) names, positions, and addresses of its elected officers; g) petitioner's
intention or desire to participate in the party-list election; h) names and addresses of its chapter
offices; i) that all of its officers and members are made aware of the petition and have given
their consent thereto; j) the list of documents attached to the petition; k) names, addresses and
representatives of sectoral parties or organizations affiliated with the petitioner, which affiliates
need not be registered with the Commission, but have given their consent thereto; 1) that it is not
a religious sect or denomination, organization or association organized for religious purposes; m)
that it shall not advocate violence or unlawful means to achieve its goals; n) that it is not an
adjunct or a project organized or an entity funded or assisted by the government; o) that it is not
a foreign party or organization; p) that it does not receive support for partisan political purposes
from any foreign government, foreign political party, foundation, organization, whether directly
or indirectly, or through it officers or members, or indirectly through third parties; q) the period
of existence of petitioner, which shall be at least one (1) year at the time the petition is filed; and r)
that it commits to comply with the laws, rules and regulations relating to elections. xxx
Section 6 (i) categorically requires a petition for registration to state that all of
petitioner's officers and members are made aware of the petition and have given their consent
thereto. The provision is clear and should not be open to interpretation.
In its petition for registration, as well as its petition for certiorari before the Court, AKO
BREEDER stated that it was able to obtain the consent of 2,401 out of the 3,757 members or a
total percentage of 63.91%. AKO BREEDER claims that due to the existence of the pandemic, as
well as the physical and logistical challenges which arose pursuant thereto, requiring the
unanimous consent of all of its members would lead to an absurd and unreasonable situation
where failure to secure the consent of even just one member would lead to the dismissal of its
petition for registration. We also note the existence of AKO BREEDER Party-List Board of
Directors Resolution No. 10 dated March 13, 2021 which stated that upon
consultation, majority of the members of AKO BREEDER have signified their approval and
consent authorizing the organization to file a petition for registration as a party-list with the
COMELEC. These statements clearly show that AKO BREEDER failed to comply with the
mandatory requirement under Section 6 (i) of COMELEC Resolution No. 9366.
While the Court acknowledges the challenges and limitations brought about by the
pandemic, AKO BREEDER should have exerted all efforts to comply with the requirements set
forth by the COMELEC. It had ample time to prepare all the requirements required under
COMELEC Resolution No. 9366. (Ako Breeder v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 258372, June
21, 2022)
EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
Presidential Immunity
xxx (the) President xxx must be dropped as a party respondent pursuant to privilege of
presidential immunity from suit. (Colmenares v. Duterte, G.R. Nos. 245981 & 246594, August 9,
2022)
[Note: Settled is the rule that the President of the Republic of the Philippines cannot be sued during his/her
tenure. This immunity from suit applies to (the) President xxx regardless of the nature of the suit filed against him for
as long as he sits as the President of the Republic of the Philippines. In the case of De Lima v. President Duterte, Senator
Leila De Lima (Senator De Lima) sued (the) President xxx in a petition for a writ of habeas data seeking to enjoin the
latter from committing acts allegedly violative of her right to life, liberty and security. In her petition, Senator De
Lima argued that (the) President xxx is not entitled to immunity from suit, especially from a petition for the issuance
of the writ of habeas data, because his actions and statements were unlawful or made outside of his official conduct.
The Office of the Solicitor General countered that the immunity of the sitting President is absolute, and it extends to
all suits including petitions for the writ of amparo and writ of habeas data and that the present suit is the distraction
that the immunity seeks to prevent because it will surely distract the President from discharging his duties as the
Chief Executive. In resolving the petition, this Court pronounced that presidential immunity applies regardless of the
nature of the suit brought against an incumbent President. (Colmenares v. Duterte, G.R. Nos. 245981 & 246594,
August 9, 2022)]
Incompatible Offices
Further, since petitioners merely served in an ex-officio capacity in the Board, it follows
that they have no right to receive additional compensation or benefits for it, such being part and
parcel of their principal office. To rule otherwise would contravene the constitutional
proscription against double compensation.
Petitioners repeatedly argue that the Civil Liberties Union case is inapplicable, since they
are not Cabinet members; however, this Court, in a long line of cases, has already applied the
double compensation prohibition to positions outside the Cabinet. Thus, this argument
likewise fails. (Suratos v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 253584, March 1, 2022)
Power of Control
We hold that the first part of respondents' solution requiring Customs employees to render three 8-hour shifts for a
continuous 24-hour service, and to limit the hours of overtime rendered to weekends and holidays, was a valid and
reasonable exercise of the ordinance-making power of the Executive.
As explained by the Court in Province of Pampanga vs. Executive Secretary Alberto Romulo,
et al.,”the President's inherent ordinance-making power is not a delegated authority from the
legislature, but is a consequence of executive control over officials of the executive branch. In
the exercise of executive control, the President has the inherent power to adopt rules and
regulations and delegate this power to subordinate executive officials." Hence, We find the
instructions to limit overtime work through a shifting schedule to be valid, reasonable, and not
violative of any legal provision. (Bureau of Customs v. Biazon, G.R. No. 205836, July 12, 2022)
The President's power of review emanates from his power of control over the executive
departments, bureaus, and offices enshrined under Section 17 of Article VII of the
Constitution. Distrust of an administrative agency alone unsupported by concrete evidence is
not sufficient reason to dispense with the doctrine of administrative remedies. (Rivera v.
Abungan, G.R. No. 240796, April 5, 2022)
In Philippine Health Insurance Corp. v. Commission on Audit, the Court reiterated that the
presidential approval of a new compensation and benefit scheme, including the grant of
allowances that are unauthorized by law should not stop the State from correcting the
erroneous application of a statute. (Development Bank of the Philippines v. Commission on Audit,
G.R. Nos. 210965 & 217623, March 22, 2022)
Pardoning Power
While Rolando, Jr. cannot avail of the benefits granted to a penal colonist, he may be
entitled to the benefits of RA 10592.
First, it is not disputed that Rolando, Jr. was classified as a penal colonist effective 05
November 1998. Nevertheless, conferment by the Director General of the Bureau of Corrections
of a colonist status, by itself, does not operate to reduce said prisoner's sentence. The prisoner is
also required to secure presidential approval. In Tiu v. Dizon, We held:
Section 5 of Act No. 2489 is clear and unambiguous: "[p]risoners serving sentences of life
imprisonment receiving and retaining the classification of penal colonists or trusties will
automatically have the sentence of life imprisonment modified to a sentence of thirty years when
receiving the executive approval for this classification upon which the regular credit now
authorized by law and special credit authorized in the preceding paragraph, for good conduct,
may be made."
The wording of the law is such that the act of classification as a penal colonist or
trustie [sic] is separate from and necessarily precedes the act of approval by the Executive.
Under Section 6, Chapter 3, Part II, Book I of the BuCor-OM quoted earlier, the Director of
Corrections may, upon the recommendation of the Classification Board of the Bureau of
Corrections, classify an inmate as a colonist. It is crucial, however, that the prisoner not only
receives, but retains such classification, because the grant of a colonist status may, for cause, be
revoked at any time by the Superintendent with the approval of the Director of Corrections
pursuant to Section 9 of the same Chapter. It is the classification of the penal colonist and
trustie [sic] of the Director of Corrections which subsequently receives executive approval.
The foregoing is bolstered by the fact that the reduction of a prisoner's sentence is a
partial pardon, and our Constitution reposes in the President the power and the exclusive
prerogative to extend the same. The 1987 Constitution, specifically under Section 19, Article VII
thereof, provides that the President possesses the power to grant pardons, along with other acts
of executive clemency, which petitioner explicitly recognized by applying for commutation of
sentence even during the pendency of his request for the implementation of the conditional
pardon. Section 19, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution reads:
Section 19. Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided in this Constitution, the
President may grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after
conviction by final judgment.
He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all the
Members of the Congress.
It has long been recognized that the exercise of the pardoning power, notwithstanding
the judicial determination of guilt of the accused, demands the exclusive exercise by the
President of the constitutionally vested power. Stated otherwise, since the Chief Executive is
required by the Constitution to act in person, he may not delegate the authority to pardon
prisoners under the doctrine of qualified political agency, which "essentially postulates that
the heads of the various executive departments are the alter egos of the President, and, thus, the
actions taken by such heads in the performance of their official duties are deemed the acts of the
President unless the President himself should disapprove such acts."
In this case, nothing in the records shows that the President has signified his approval to
either Rolando, Jr.'s classification as a penal colonist or the latter's release in view of his status as
colonist. Absent proof of such executive approval, his sentence cannot be reduced or modified,
not even by this Court. (Spouses Maclang, Sr. v. De Lima, G.R. No. 214218, September 21, 2022)
[Note: Second, We held in Inmates of the New Bilibid Prison v. De Lima, that the benefits of RA 10592
can be applied retroactively. Among the amendments introduced by said law are the increase in the
number of days that may be credited for TAGC; expansion of the application of TAGC for prisoners even
during preventive imprisonment; and deduction of 15 days for each month of study, teaching, or
mentoring service. (Spouses Maclang, Sr. v. De Lima, G.R. No. 214218, September 21, 2022)]
[Note: Third, based on his Prison Record, Rolando, Jr. was preventively imprisoned from 27
October 1997 to 28 July 2004, or a period of six years, nine months, and two days. He had also been
serving his actual sentence since 29 July 2004. The OSG, in its Comment, computed Rolando, Jr.'s total
time served, with TAGC under RA 10592, at 30 years, four months and four days as of 19 March 2014.
Given that said computation was made more than eight years ago, it may well be that, taking in
consideration any earned TAGC, Rolando, Jr. is already entitled to immediate release on account of the
full service of his sentence. TAGC, Rolando, Jr. is already entitled to immediate release on account of the
full service of his sentence. . (Spouses Maclang, Sr. v. De Lima, G.R. No. 214218, September 21, 2022)]
Borrowing Power
Section 20, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution provides:
The President may contract or guarantee foreign loans on behalf of the Republic of the
Philippines with the prior concurrence of the Monetary Board, and subject to such limitations as
may be provided by law. Xxx
Petitioners insist on a literal interpretation of the words "prior concurrence," such that
the MB must have given full approval to the subject loan before its execution (i.e., signing of the
loan agreement). However, the deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, along with
precursor and existing laws and regulations, contemplate more nuanced mechanics to this
requirement. xxx. More tangibly, Members of the Constitutional Commission understood that
Article VII, Section 20, particularly its prior concurrence requirement, would be implemented
through more detailed laws and regulations. (Colmenares v. Duterte, G.R. Nos. 245981 & 246594,
August 9, 2022)
[Note: Thus, Section 177 of R.A. No. 4860, as amended, statutorily empowers the President to
contract loans with foreign entities. Meanwhile, Section 123 of R.A. No. 7653, as amended by R.A. No.
11211, requires that "the Government, through the Secretary of Finance, shall request the opinion, in
writing, of the [MB] on the monetary implications of" credit operations abroad. In Section 23 of its Manual
of Regulations on Foreign Exchange Transactions, the BSP requires that "[p]rior [MB] approval shall be
obtained for public sector foreign/foreign currency loans/borrowings[.]" (Colmenares v. Duterte, G.R. Nos.
245981 & 246594, August 9, 2022)]
[Note: Contrary to petitioners' rigid interpretation of "prior concurrence," this requirement is

really enabled through a more detailed and elaborate procedure. It is only the Approval-in-Principle
which, strictly speaking, entails prior action from the MB, but which nevertheless allows negotiations to
proceed with the indicative financial terms and purpose of the loan as starting points. After negotiations,
the parties may already finalize the terms of the loan and sign the same, subject to fulfillment of certain
conditions imposed by the Approval-in-Principle, before the MB grants its Final Approval.| (Colmenares
v. Duterte, G.R. Nos. 245981 & 246594, August 9, 2022)]
Section 21, Article XII of the Constitution provides:
Foreign loans may only be incurred in accordance with law and the regulation of the
monetary authority. Information on foreign loans obtained or guaranteed by the Government
shall be made available to the public.
This specific directive is further bolstered by its kindred provisions, Section 7 of Article
III on the right to information on matters of public concern; and Section 28 of Article II on the
State policy of full public disclosure on transactions involving public interest. xxx.
The language of the last sentence of Section 21, Article XII indicates proactive
language, i.e.," shall be made available to the public," suggesting that relevant government
bodies need not even wait for persons to request information on government-contracted foreign
loans before these are made accessible. After all, this stance is consistent with the policy of
transparency conveyed by the provision. It is no coincidence that the framers of the 1987
Constitution saw fit to devote a specific provision directing access to information on foreign
loans, notwithstanding the broader guarantees already provided by Section 7 of Article III and
Section 28 of Article II. (Colmenares v. Duterte, G.R. Nos. 245981 & 246594, August 9, 2022)
The subject Confidentiality Clause reads:
8.8. Confidentiality. The Borrower shall keep all the terms, conditions and the standard
fees hereunder or in connection with this Agreement strictly confidential. Without the prior
written consent of the Lender, the Borrower shall not disclose any information hereunder or in
connection with this Agreement to any third party unless required to be disclosed by the
Borrower to any courts of competent jurisdiction, relevant regulatory bodies, or any government
institution and/or instrumentalities of the Borrower in accordance with any applicable Philippine
law.
With the above principles, the foregoing language unduly diminishes the State's
obligation to allow public access to information on government-contracted foreign loans. The
scope of confidentiality is far too sweeping, considering the commitment to "keep all the terms,
conditions xxx strictly confidential." Under the assailed clause, access to the information
requires the lender's prior consent, whereas the policy of disclosure in Section 21 of Article XII is
unqualified. The Confidentiality Clause grants access only to government entities, but the
Constitutional provision ensures broader public availability of such information. Withal, the
assailed clause makes disclosure the exception rather than the rule, when Section 21 of Article
XII clearly mandates otherwise. In any case, such faulty language cannot surmount the
Constitutionally-mandated public availability of information on government-contracted foreign
loans. (Colmenares v. Duterte, G.R. Nos. 245981 & 246594, August 9, 2022)
[Note: Nevertheless, jurisprudence recognizes limited exceptions extending confidentiality, i.e.,

national security matters, trade secrets and banking transactions, criminal matters, and other confidential
matters such as diplomatic correspondence, closed-door Cabinet meetings and deliberations of this
Court. Still, that a type of information is recognized as privileged does not, however, necessarily mean
that it would be considered privileged in all instances. For in determining the validity of a claim of
privilege, the question that must be asked is not only whether the requested information falls within one
of the traditional privileges, but also whether that privilege should be honored in a given procedural
setting. (Colmenares v. Duterte, G.R. Nos. 245981 & 246594, August 9, 2022)]
JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
Judicial Power
The case of Funa v. Acting Secretary Alberto C. Agra, et al., enunciates the parameters of
the exercise of the power of judicial review, thus:
The power of judicial review is subject to limitations, to wit: (1) there must be an actual
case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person challenging the act
must have the standing to assail the validity of the subject act or issuance, that is, he must have a
personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct
injury as a result of its enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the
earliest opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the
case. (Colmenares v. Duterte, G.R. Nos. 245981 & 246594, August 9, 2022)
We elaborately ruled in Opis v. Dimaano that a judge's order of inhibition is not

administrative, but judicial in nature and the proper remedy for an erroneous order is a motion
for reconsideration or an appeal xxx. (Anonymous Complaint v. Yu-Casano, JIB FPI No. 22-120-
RTJ, September 28, 2022)
[Note: This Court, thus, agree with the JIB's recommendation that respondent's Order of
voluntarily inhibiting herself from the consolidated cases cannot be an appropriate subject of this
Anonymous Complaint. Complainant failed to avail of any of the judicial remedies and opted to subject
respondent to an administrative disciplinary proceeding instead, as the records evince. (Anonymous
Complaint v. Yu-Casano, JIB FPI No. 22-120-RTJ, September 28, 2022)]
It may well be remembered that the power of a court to issue subpoena or 'to compel the
attendance of persons to testify in a case pending before it' is recognized as an inherent power of all
courts. Hence, unless there is a law or rule which explicitly says otherwise, We find that there is
nothing which could prevent the CA from issuing a subpoena to compel Lucas to testify before
it in the annulment case. (Adusa Holdings, Inc. v. Agassee Properties and Holdings Corp., G.R. No.
255143, March 2, 2022)
Article VII, Section 4
Applying the ruling in Reyes to the present petitions, this Court, sitting En Banc, can only
take cognizance of an election contest if the following requisites concur: (a) a petition is filed
before it; and (b) the petition is filed against a Presidential or Vice-Presidential candidate who
has been validly proclaimed, properly taken his or her oath, and assumed office.
These conditions are not present here. The Buenafe and Ilagan Petitions are filed under
Rule 65 assailing the Resolutions of the COMELEC En Banc. While respondent Marcos, Jr. has
been proclaimed as the Presidential candidate with the highest number of obtained votes, he
has yet to take his oath and assume office. As xxx astutely pointed out, the term of office
begins at noon on the 30th day of June following the election. Hence, as long as the petitions
remain with this Court before 30 June 2022, this Court has jurisdiction to resolve them. (Buenafe
v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 260374, June 28, 2022)
[Note: An election protest should be filed within thirty days after the proclamation of the winner.
On the other hand, a petition for quo warranto should be filed within ten days after the proclamation of
the winner.
The petitioner in an election protest is limited to the registered candidate for President or Vice-
President of the Philippines who received the second or third highest number of votes. On the other
hand, a quo warranto case may be filed by any registered voter who has voted in the election concerned.
An election protest is anchored on allegations· of electoral frauds, anomalies, or irregularities in
the protested precincts, while a petition for quo warranto attacks the protestee's ineligibility or specific
acts of disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines.
In any case, the proclamation, oath-taking, and assumption of the President result in removing
from the jurisdiction of this Court any pre-proclamation remedy elevated to the Court from the
COMELEC. (Buenafe v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 260374, June 28, 2022)]
Jurisdiction
In this regard, the Court reminds that since the redevelopment awarded to Phoenix was
in the nature of a government infrastructure project, no court apart from the Supreme Court
had the power, authority or jurisdiction to issue an injunctive writ against it, pursuant to
Section 1 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1818, which prohibits issuances of restraining orders
on infrastructure projects. In which case, despite the injunctive writ from the CA, Phoenix was
well within its rights to continue its construction, and the LRTA well within its own rights to
allow the same, since the injunctive writ that the CA issued against it was a clear contravention
of the prohibition under P.D. No. 1818. (Light Rail Transit Authority v. Joy Mart Consolidated, Inc.
G.R. No. 211281. February 15, 2022)
R.A. No. 8975 enjoins all courts, except the Supreme Court, from issuing any temporary
restraining order, preliminary injunction, or preliminary mandatory injunction against the
government, or any of its subdivisions, officials or any person or entity to restrain, prohibit or
compel the bidding or awarding of a contract or project of the national government. The twin
objectives of the statute are: (1) to avoid unnecessary increase in construction costs; and (2) to
allow the public to enjoy soonest the benefits of national government projects. (Metro Rail
Transit Corp. v. Department of Transportation, G.R. No. 225942, July 20, 2022)
[Note: Petitioners do not question the declaration of the RTC and the CA that the MRT3 is a
national government project within the definition of Section 2 of R.A. No. 8795. However, they insist that
the injunction that they are asking for seeks "to implement, rather than to obstruct, the government
project which the DOTr entered into with MRTC." They contend that a WPI would stop the DOTr from
committing a serious and material breach of the 1997 BLT Agreement, as well as the constitutional
provisions pertaining to the principles of due process and the lawful appropriation of public funds. xxx.
It is readily apparent that petitioners seek to restrain, prohibit or compel the bidding or awarding of the
procurement of the LRVs for MRT3 in favor of other suppliers. The WPI that they are seeking, in the
guise of a supposed interim measure of protection, squarely falls within the proscription mandated by
R.A. No. 8975. Simply put, the RTC is indeed prohibited from issuing the WPI sought by petitioners.
(Metro Rail Transit Corp. v. Department of Transportation, G.R. No. 225942, July 20, 2022)]
The Constitution confers original jurisdiction upon this Court over petitions
for certiorari, prohibition, quo warranto, and habeas corpus. Under Rule 65, Section 2 of the Rules
of Civil Procedure, a petition for prohibition assails acts done in the exercise of judicial, quasi-
judicial, or ministerial functions xxx. Simply put, courts may correct, undo, or enjoin an act of a
governmental instrumentality through certiorari or prohibition upon showing of grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and when delineations of authority were
exceeded. (Anti-Trapo Movement of the Philippines v. Land Transportation Office, G.R. No. 231540,
June 27, 2022)
Hierarchy of Courts
Hierarchy of courts is the mechanism that ordains a sequence of recourse to courts

vested with concurrent jurisdiction. The hierarchy begins from the trial courts, then the Court
of Appeals and the other intermediate courts, then finally the Supreme Court. This sequence
recognizes; (1) the various levels of courts in the country as they are established under the
Constitution and by law; (2) their ranking and effect of their rulings in relation with one
another; and (3) how they interact with one another. Given the differences in these aspects, the
questions these courts resolve also differ: trial courts decide questions of fact and law at first
instance; the Court of Appeals and the other intermediate courts, both questions of fact and law;
and this Court, only questions of law in general. (Villafuerte v. Securities and Exchange
We are not a trier of facts. Direct recourse to this Court is allowed only to resolve
questions of law. We cannot simply take the allegations in the petition and accept these as facts,
more so in this case where these allegations are contested.
In Gios-Samar, Inc. v. Department of Transportation and Communications, We declared that

"when a question before the Court involves determination of a factual issue indispensable to
the resolution of the legal issue, the Court will refuse to resolve the question regardless of
the allegation or invocation of compelling reasons, such as the transcendental or paramount
importance of the case." We find no compelling reason to stray from this precept.
Indeed, direct resort to the Court in violation of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts is a
sufficient cause for dismissal of the instant petition. This Court is a court of last resort, and
must so remain if it is to satisfactorily perform the functions assigned to it by the Constitution
and immemorial tradition. (Custodio v. Department of Public Works and Highways, G.R. No.
225373, February 16, 2022; Colmenares v. Duterte, G.R. Nos. 245981 & 246594, August 9, 2022;
Villafuerte v. Securities and Exchange Commission, G.R. No. 208379, March 29, 2022; Santos v.
Gabaen, G.R. No. 195638, March 22, 2022)
The invocation of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts by petitioners is likewise

unavailing, as the same argument had already been raised before this Court and shot down
in Estrada v. Hon. Desierto (Estrada), citing the established procedure in Kuizon, Mendoza-Arce,
and Perez. In Estrada, it was reiterated that the original action for certiorari should be filed with
this Court and not with the CA. Significantly, the parties in Perez and Estrada likewise
questioned the OMB's finding of lack of probable cause, as in this case. Petitioners'
interpretation of our ruling in Carpio-Morales — that it outlawed direct resort to this Court,
leaving criminal cases decided by the OMB subject to review only via petition
for certiorari before the CA — is untenable. (Abad v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 234696,
October 3, 2022)
[Note: The matter has already been clarified and exhaustively discussed in Gatchalian v. Office of
the Ombudsman (Gatchalian), wherein it was argued that the consequence of the Carpio-Morales case is that
all orders, directives, and decisions of the OMB — whether it be an incident of administrative or criminal
cases — are now reviewable by the CA. In finding such contention untenable,
the ponencia in Gatchalian pointed out that Carpio-Morales involved an interlocutory order issued in an
administrative case, and was thus limited in its application; it cannot be read to apply to decisions or
orders of the OMB in non-administrative or criminal cases. The CA had subject matter jurisdiction over
the Rule 65 petition in Carpio-Morales because what was being assailed was an interlocutory order. It was
also held therein that the petition was correctly filed with the CA because it was an administrative matter.
The Court in Carpio-Morales was thus applying only what was well-established in jurisprudence. It never
even intimated that it was abandoning the rulings in Kuizon and Estrada and the distinctions made therein
between the appellate recourse for decisions or orders of the Ombudsman in administrative and non-
administrative cases. (Abad v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 234696, October 3, 2022)]
[Note: The unconstitutionality of Sec. 14 of R.A. No. 6770 did not necessarily have an effect over
the appellate procedure for orders and decisions arising from criminal cases precisely because said
procedure was not prescribed by the aforementioned section. The rule that decisions or orders of the
OMB finding the existence or absence of probable cause should be questioned through a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 filed with this Court was laid down by the Court itself, and not anchored on
Sec. 14 of R.A. No. 6770. Thus, the declaration of unconstitutionality of Sec. 14 is immaterial insofar as the
appellate procedure for orders and decisions by the OMB in criminal cases is concerned. Abad v. Office of
the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 234696, October 3, 2022)]
[Note: Having filed a petition for certiorari with the CA instead of this Court, petitioners clearly
raised their case before the wrong forum resulting in the finality of the OMB's June 3, 2014 Review
Resolution approving the DOJ's recommendation. Clearly, petitioners have already lost their right to
assail the OMB's finding of absence of probable cause. The CA, therefore, did not commit any reversible
error in denying their petition for availing of the wrong remedy. (Abad v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R.
No. 234696, October 3, 2022)]
Still, on the hierarchy of courts, petitioners' direct invocation of the Court's jurisdiction,
as to the other substantive issues, is permitted as they raise only legal questions relative to the
validity of the assailed Loan Agreements. (Colmenares v. Duterte, G.R. Nos. 245981 & 246594,
August 9, 2022)
[Note: Coupled with the emphasis on the herein grave and far-reaching issues, petitioners did
not raise any factual matters, limiting their arguments only to the legalities of the Loan Agreements. They
appraise the agreements' allegedly contentious stipulations as against various Constitutional directives
concerning the concurrence of the BSP MB prior to contracting foreign loans, preference to Filipinos in
transactions involving the national economy and patrimony, the pursuit of an independent foreign
policy, and the State's waiver of immunity from suit and ownership over patrimonial assets. (Colmenares
v. Duterte, G.R. Nos. 245981 & 246594, August 9, 2022)]
Preliminarily, the petition should be dismissed outright as petitioner availed himself of

the wrong remedy and violated the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. The proper recourse from a
denial of a motion to quash is to proceed to trial, and if an adverse decision is rendered, to
appeal therefrom in the manner authorized by law. Assuming arguendo that certiorari is
available, the petition should have been filed with the Court of Appeals (CA). (Causing v. People,
G.R. No. 258929, April 5, 2022)
Indeed, the doctrine of hierarchy of courts is not an iron-clad rule as the Court
enumerated the following exceptions in numerous cases: (a) when there are genuine issues of
constitutionality that must be addressed at the most immediate time; (b) when the issues
involved are of transcendental importance; (c) cases of first impression where no jurisprudence
yet exists that will guide the lower courts on the matter; (d) the constitutional issues raised are
better decided by the Court; (e) where exigency in certain situations necessitate urgency in the
resolution of the cases; (f) the filed petition reviews the act of a constitutional organ; (g) when
petitioners rightly claim that they had no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law that could free them from the injurious effects of respondents' acts in
violation of their right to freedom of expression; and (h) the petition includes questions that are
dictated by public welfare and the advancement of public policy, or demanded by the broader
interest of justice, or the orders complained of were found to be patent nullities, or the appeal
was considered as clearly an inappropriate remedy. (Causing v. People, G.R. No. 258929, April 5,
2022; see Santos v. Gabaen, G.R. No. 195638, March 22, 2022)
Here, petitioners filed the case directly before this Court despite the concurrent
jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts to issue the writs
of certiorari and prohibition they pray for. (Villafuerte v. Securities and Exchange Commission,
G.R. No. 208379, March 29, 2022)
[Note: Some of the issues here are not purely legal. xxx. These reasons, along with petitioners'
lack of legal standing, constrain us to dismiss the Petition. (Villafuerte v. Securities and Exchange
As already mentioned, Felicidad filed the instant petition under Rule 65 directly before
the Court challenging the assailed Orders. On this score alone, the petition must be dismissed
for failure to observe the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. (Ortiz-Bulatao v. Marata, G.R. No.
226900, March 15, 2022)
[Note: This Court thus reaffirms the judicial policy that it will not entertain direct resort to it
unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts, and exceptional and compelling
circumstances, such as cases of national interest and of serious implications, justify the availment of the
extraordinary remedy of writ of certiorari, calling for the exercise of its primary jurisdiction. In this case,
no compelling reason was given to justify the direct resort to the Court. Thus, the dismissal of the instant
petition is in order. (Ortiz-Bulatao v. Marata, G.R. No. 226900, March 15, 2022)]
Judicial Review
But even if this Court is vested with judicial power, it does not mean that we should rule
upon any question we have the authority to resolve. Courts will not entertain questions on the
validity or constitutionality of a statute or a governmental act unless the following requisites for
judicial review are met:
[T]hat the question must be raised by the proper party; that there must be an actual case or
controversy; that the question must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and, that the
decision on the constitutional or legal question must be necessary to the determination of the case
itself. (Anti-Trapo Movement of the Philippines v. Land Transportation Office, G.R. No. 231540, June
27, 2022; see Aguinaldo v. New Bilibid Prison, G.R. No. 221201, March 29, 2022; Santos v. Gabaen,
G.R. No. 195638, March 22, 2022)
Actual Case
As defined, an actual case or controversy is one that involves a conflict of legal rights, an
assertion of opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial resolution; the case must not be moot or
academic or based on extra-legal or other similar considerations not cognizable by a court of
justice. Clearly, the existence of an actual clash between legal rights brought about by the
assailed act is required before courts of justice may exercise the power of judicial review.
(Aguinaldo v. New Bilibid Prison, G.R. No. 221201, March 29, 2022)
[Note: It was thus important for petitioner to show the effect of the assailed COMELEC
Resolution on him, how it may have diminished his legal rights, i.e., the actual facts that would ground
the COMELEC Resolution's supposed unconstitutionality. Petitioner had not shown any such
circumstances. Absent a clear showing of a diminished right for which petitioner will suffer because of
the implementation of the assailed COMELEC Resolution, it cannot be said that a conflict of legal rights
exists. On this score alone, the instant petition is already dismissible. (Aguinaldo v. New Bilibid Prison, G.R.
No. 221201, March 29, 2022)]
Here, petitioners allege that the Loan Agreements are invalid for running afoul of
various Constitutional directives, particularly for failure to secure the necessary MB
concurrence, in bypassing qualified Filipinos in favor of foreign project contractors, and for
containing stipulations that defeat the State's pursuit of an independent foreign policy.
These are actionable issues. The very execution of the Loan Agreement already
constituted a governmental act subject to the Court's scrutiny, since various Constitutional
provisions, laws, and issuances are in place to regulate the manner by which such loans are
entered into. What is more, petitioners sufficiently substantiate which of the various Loan
Agreements' stipulations appear Constitutionally suspect. These are matters which deserve the
Court's attention since, by the mere enactment of the questioned law or the approval of the
challenged act, the dispute is said to have ripened into a judicial controversy even without any
other overt act. Indeed, even a singular violation of the Constitution and/or the law is enough
to awaken judicial duty. (Colmenares v. Duterte, G.R. Nos. 245981 & 246594, August 9, 2022)
[Note: The assailed Loan Agreements are public contracts covering matters of public concern,
considering that "[a] government or public contract has been defined as a contract entered into by state
officers acting on behalf of the state, and in which the entire people of the state are directly interested."
Additionally, stability and predictability are key pillars on which the legal system must be founded and
run to guarantee a business environment conducive to sustainable economic growth. These petitions
assail the validity of the Loan Agreements, touching upon issues of foreign debt and the manner of
securing the same, foreign participation in high-end public works projects, and international implications
of arbitration clauses — matters which require the Court's immediate attention. With far-reaching legal
and economic implications, the Court finds that petitioners possess the personality to bring these
petitions.
Except as to the issue concerning the validity of the Waiver of Immunity Clauses, the Court
likewise finds there exists an actual case ripe for adjudication. As defined, an actual case or controversy is
one that involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial
resolution; the case must not be moot or academic or based on extra-legal or other similar considerations
not cognizable by a court of justice. Clearly, the existence of an actual clash between legal rights brought
about by the assailed act is required before courts of justice may exercise the power of judicial review.
(Colmenares v. Duterte, G.R. Nos. 245981 & 246594, August 9, 2022)]
[Note: In any other situation, on the ground of mootness, the Court would have refrained from
making any pronouncements on the issue regarding the disclosure of loan documents .xxx.
Yet, xxx the petitions raise matters that are capable of repetition but evading review, because,
absent guiding principles thereon, the Executive branch could just as easily incorporate the assailed
Confidentiality Clauses in future foreign loans, and invoke the same to bar the invocation of the right to
information. If only to advise the bench, bar, and public, as well as to abate similar issues, the Court lays
some guiding principles on this matter.
Additionally, petitioners sound the alarms over the Loan Agreements' Waiver of Immunity
Clause, arguing that these unconstitutionally bargain away the national economy and patrimony. Hence,
petitioners would have the Court completely strike down the Waiver of Immunity Clause. Respondents
dismiss these contentions as speculative, especially since suability and liability are distinct concepts, also
considering that no specific national assets have been collateralized, that an arbitral award against the
Philippines may be refused recognition if contrary to public policy, and that, at all times, the GRP is
solvent to pay its debts. As these aspects of the Loan Agreement have yet to be of any concern, the Court
shall not prematurely delve substantively into such matters. (Colmenares v. Duterte, G.R. Nos. 245981 &
246594, August 9, 2022)]
[Note: While the issue on the disclosure of related loan documents has been rendered moot, the
Court counsels that wordings similar to the assailed Confidentiality Clause cannot, for future purposes,
withstand Constitutional scrutiny. Concerned government agencies are urged to be more circumspect
before agreeing to such stipulations. In any case, such language cannot bar public availability of
information on government-contracted foreign loans, as mandated by Section 21, Article XII of
the Constitution. (Colmenares v. Duterte, G.R. Nos. 245981 & 246594, August 9, 2022)]
"A case or issue is considered moot and academic when it ceases to present a justiciable
controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that an adjudication of the case or a declaration
on the issue would be of no practical value or use. In such instance, there is no actual substantial
relief which a petitioner would be entitled to, and which would be negated by the dismissal of
the petition. Courts generally decline jurisdiction over such case or dismiss it on the ground of
mootness. This is because the judgment will not serve any useful purpose or have any practical
legal effect because, in the nature of things, it cannot be enforced." (Philippine Veterans Bank v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 24935, August 22, 2022)
[Note: Applying the foregoing, the Court finds that the CA's supervening promulgation of its
Decision dated May 21, 2021 in CA-G.R. SP No. 157608 — which dismissed PVB's petition before it on the
merits — rendered the present case moot and academic. This is because, as already discussed, the main
issue in the instant petition is the propriety of the CA's denial of PVB's prayer for TRO/WPI, which is but
an incident of CA-G.R. SP No. 157608. Since this issue is but an incident of the main case before the CA
which had already been resolved, ruling on the present issue would be merely an academic exercise
carrying no practical effect. Accordingly, the Court is constrained to dismiss the instant petition. In this
relation, it is relevant to point out that it would be premature for the Court to tackle the merits of the CA's
recent Decision for the reason that it is not the matter herein appealed. (Philippine Veterans Bank v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 24935, August 22, 2022)]
The Court likewise notes that petitioner's relevant term of public office has officially ended. As stated in Section 43,
Chapter I, Title II of Republic Act No. 7160, the term of office of all elective officials elected after the effectivity of
said law shall be three years, starting from noon of 30 June 1992 or such date as may be provided for by law. As
such, petitioner, being elected to office after the 13 May 2019 National and Local Elections, has a term of office that
began at noon of 30 June 2019, and ended at noon of 30 June 2022. Clearly, such date has already passed, and thus,
the petitioner's term of office, relevant to the instant case, has already ended.
In the case of Gunsi, Sr. v. COMELEC (Gunsi), a case emanating from a petition for the
denial of due course to or cancellation of the CoC, We previously held that the expiration of the
term of office is a supervening event that rendered the case moot and academic. xxx.We
clarified in Gunsi that there are exceptions to the mootness doctrine, and We find that the
instant case falls under one of the cited exceptions since the issue in this case is capable of
repetition yet evasive of review. In the face of such exception, the mootness of a case is set
aside so the Court can resolve the legal issues raised therein due to the susceptibility of
their recurrence. xxx.
The main issue in this case is the petitioner's status — whether she is a US citizen by
birth or by naturalization. While the term of office relevant to the instant case has already
terminated, such question on petitioner's status will remain an issue, as the petitioner, in the
exercise of her political right, may decide to run again for public office, and thus, file a
certificate of candidacy. In such situation, petitioner will again be plagued by the same issues if
they remain unresolved. xxx, there is indeed a need to clarify the issue surrounding petitioner's
citizenship in relation to her eligibility to run for public office, as this issue is of distinct public
importance, and one capable of repetition yet evading review. Thus, We find it necessary to
resolve the legal issue in this case, especially considering that there is clear basis to grant this
petition on the merits. (Gana-Carait y Villegas v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 257453,
August 9, 2022)
With the amendments introduced in DOJ Circular No. 18, the prosecution's objection to Montierro and Baldadera's
plea bargaining proposals, which was based solely on DOJ Circular No. 27, can now be considered as effectively
withdrawn. As such, the issues of whether the RTC erred in declaring DOJ Circular Nos. 61 and 27 invalid and
overruling the prosecution's continuing objection to Montierro and Baldadera's plea bargaining proposals are now
rendered moot and academic.
Nevertheless, when a case or an issue becomes moot, jurisprudence provides that the
Court will still rule on the case when any of the following circumstances is present: first, there is
a grave violation of the Constitution; second, the exceptional character of the situation and the
paramount public interest are involved; third, when the constitutional issue raised requires
formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and fourth, the
case is capable of repetition yet evading review. In the present case, all four of the above
circumstances obtain. (People v. Montierro, G.R. Nos. 254564, 254974, A.M. No. 21-07-16-SC &
A.M. No. 18-03-16-SC, July 26, 2022)
The conclusion of the May 9, 2022 National and Local Elections and the subsequent proclamation of one Sheena
Tan as the Mayor-elect of Santiago City, Isabela have undoubtedly rendered the petition moot insofar as it seeks to
nullify the denial of Aggabao's COC as substitute of Navarro, the non-inclusion of Aggabao's name as a mayoralty
candidate, and Navarro's declaration as an independent candidate. A case is moot when it ceases to present a
justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that an adjudication of the case or a declaration on the
issue would be of no practical value or use.
Here, the election of Tan to the contested mayoralty post has put an end to the dispute, and none of the
complained actions by COMELEC (i.e., the denial of Aggabao's COC as substitute of Navarro, the non-inclusion of
Aggabao's name as a mayoralty candidate, and Navarro's declaration as an independent candidate) even if wrong
will not undo the outcome of the election to this office.
Despite the mootness of a case, however, the Court may still render a decision if it finds
that: (a) there is a grave violation of the Constitution; (b) the case involves a situation of
exceptional character and is of paramount public interest; (c) the issues raised require the
formulation of controlling principles to guide the Bench, the Bar and the public; and (4) the
case is capable of repetition yet evading review.
xxx the third exception applies here. Left unchecked, the COMELEC may repeat the
underlying questionable acts or omissions which resulted in the assailed dispositions, albeit not
necessarily against petitioners themselves again but against some other individuals in
elections to come. These underlying questionable acts or omissions include:
(a) ignoring the clear and repeated certifications and letters of a particular political party about
the identity of the candidate it seeks to endorse and the falsity of a candidate's claim of
endorsement by that particular political party; (b) failing to conduct a summary hearing on the
candidates' conflicting claims pertaining to their party membership and endorsement; and
(c) emasculating the TRO issued by the Court by perpetuating the erroneous COC cancellation
and improperly denying one's right to be substituted as a candidate.
As the final guardian and arbiter of the Constitution, the Court deems it necessary to lay
down principles on the observance of the right to due process, particularly the right to hearing
of candidates to whom conflicting CONAs have been issued, in view of the seeming vacuum in
the COMELEC's rules. (Aggabao v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 258456, July 26, 2022)
Here, BPO Circle prays for the inclusion of its name in the certified list of candidates and be printed in the ballots as
a party-list candidate for the May 2022 Elections. The conclusion of the elections on 09 May 2022 and the
proclamation of winners, however, has left the present petition bereft of any practical value. The success in this
recourse would not undo the questioned action of the COMELEC.
None of the exceptions obtains in this case. It must be emphasized that the only issue
raised in the petition is whether BPO Circle's alleged substantial compliance warrants the
relaxation of the COMELEC rules. Clearly, this case does not involve grave violation of the
Constitution or a situation of exceptional character. Neither does it require formulation of
controlling principles since it is already settled that liberal application of rules is merely an
exception and the Court's appreciation of substantial compliance by a party depends on the
factual circumstances of each case. (Business Process Outsourcing Circle v. Commissioner on
Elections, G.R. No. 258446, July 19, 2022)
[Note: Finally, for the case to fall under the last exception, two (2) elements must concur: (i) the
challenged action was in its duration too short to be fully litigated prior to its cessation or expiration, and
(ii) there was a reasonable expectation that the same complaining party would be subjected to the same
action again. In the instant case, the second element is absent since BPO Circle is expected to strictly
follow the COMELEC rules should it ever decide to participate in the next elections, instead of invoking
leniency in the application of said rules. (Business Process Outsourcing Circle v. Commissioner on Elections,
G.R. No. 258446, July 19, 2022)]
Applied in the case at bar, the thrust of the instant petition revolves around the validity
of MMAA No. 287, passed by the Regional Legislative Assembly of the ARMM under R.A. No.
6734, as amended by R.A. No. 9054, the organic laws of the ARMM. With the passage of R.A.
No. 11054 which superseded the previous organic laws of the ARMM and created a new
political entity, that is the BARMM, the main issue of the validity of MMAA No. 287 has been
rendered moot.
In the same vein, with the abolition of the entire administrative structure of the ARMM
and the respondents' manifestation that the personalities involved are no longer connected with
the BARMM, the resolution of the secondary issues of forum shopping and the legality in the
appointments to the position of Regional Secretary of the DOTC-ARMM and the discharge of
the functions of such office would not afford the parties any substantial relief or have any
practical legal effect on the case. Delving upon the intricacies of devolution might only
unnecessarily touch upon the validity of R.A. No. 11054.
Thus, under the premises, the Court finds it best to abstain from passing upon the merits
of this case where legal relief is no longer needed nor called for. An academic discussion
of the moot question involved in this case would have no practical legal effect as with the
attendant factual circumstances, it can no longer be enforced (Dimapanat v. Hataman, G.R. No.
228726, July 19, 202])
In the Marquez case, which involves similar circumstances to the present case, the
COMELEC En Banc, in its Resolution dated January 23, 2019, cancelled the COC of Norman
Cordero Marquez (Marquez) on the ground that he is a nuisance candidate. Marquez elevated
his case before the Court, but before the Court could render a decision, the NLE had been
concluded.
In giving due course to Marquez's petition despite its being moot with the conclusion of
the NLE, the Court explained that it may exercise jurisdiction even over moot issues, if it finds
that the case is capable of repetition, yet evading review xxx.
Applying the foregoing in the instant case, the Court deems it proper to also delve into
the merits of the case despite the conclusion of the May 2022 NLE, considering that, as ruled in
the Marquez case, similar issues would also likely arise in future elections. (Amad v. Commission
on Elections, G.R. No. 258448, July 5, 2022)
|| Just like in the first foray of Marquez against the COMELEC in Marquez v.
COMELEC, we find his situation here to be one capable of repetition, yet, evading review. To be
sure, the COMELEC, left unchecked, would be free to deploy the grounds it had utilized to
declare Marquez a nuisance candidate as against other candidates in subsequent elections. Too,
a similar TRO which the Court may issue in future election cases may again be emasculated by
perpetuating the erroneous exclusion of a qualified candidate, thus, improperly denying the
qualified candidate his or her opportunity to run for public office and the electorate the right to
vote for him or her. (Marquez v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 258435, June 28, 2022)
Here, the Petition for Review on Certiorari was filed on May 24, 2013. Upon this Court's directive in its July 17,
2013 Resolution, respondents filed their Comments, with Sto. Tomas, et al., first doing so on October 7, 2013.
Ongpin, Torres, and Manalo followed suit, filing theirs on October 9, 2013. David and Romero last filed their
Comment on October 14, 2013. By then, the extended Freeze Order had already expired, the sixth month falling on
June 26, 2013. The Petition is, therefore, already moot.
Nevertheless, despite the Freeze Order's expiration, this Court holds that the case
involves a situation of exceptional character and is of paramount public interest, warranting a
resolution on the merits. A review of the cases decided by this Court via signed decision or
resolution reveals that only a handful squarely involve freeze orders or bank inquiries under
the Anti-Money Laundering Act. Most of those cases were decided during the effectivity of
Republic Act No. 9160 before it was amended by several statutes, including Republic Act No.
10167 which governs this case. This case should, therefore, be resolved on the merits despite its
mootness. (Republic v. Ongpin, G.R. No. 207078, June 20, 2022)
A freeze order may only be effective for a maximum period of six months. It shall be
deemed ipso facto lifted upon the expiration of the six-month period, unless a petition for civil
forfeiture against the frozen monetary instrument or property has been filed. In which case, the
freeze order shall remain effective until an asset preservation order is issued. Thus, a freeze
order is merely an interim relief intended to temporarily preserve monetary instruments. It is
pre-emptive in character, meant to prevent the owner from disposing the property and
thwarting the State's effort in building its case and eventually filing civil forfeiture proceedings
and/or prosecuting the owner. Here, the CA issued the Freeze Order on 04 June 2019. Clearly,
the six-month period had long lapsed, thereby rendering this case moot. Moreover, the AMLC
pointed out that the incident in this case had been overtaken by the AMLC's filing of a petition
for civil forfeiture before the Regional Trial Court of Manila on 03 December 2019, docketed as
AMLA Case No. 19-007-37. In said case, the Office of the Executive Judge issued a provisional
asset preservation order and, eventually, an asset preservation order over the same bank
accounts subject of this petition. Petitioner participated in the civil forfeiture proceedings and
raised the same arguments on the supposed legality of its dealings with Kapa and Rosalie. In
light of supervening events, passing upon the merits of this petition would neither have
practical value, nor accord substantial relief to petitioner. The Freeze Order had since been
rendered ineffective. While the Court may resolve a moot case for compelling reasons, We find
none of such exceptional circumstances present in this case, as, in fact, petitioner failed to show
any. (Hawkson's Truck and Parts Center Corp. v. Honorable Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 250078, June
15, 2022)
In any case, the present petition is already moot because the 2019 May Elections was
held on 13 May 2019 and petitioner Garcia was not among the official candidates for the 2019
May Elections and was not voted for. (Garcia v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 243735, June
14, 2022)
In view of these, "[n]ow that Informations were already filed in the Sandiganbayan,
petitioners have all the opportunity there during the trial proper to dispute the findings of
probable cause, and, possibly, to eventually clear their names from the alleged crimes." It is
assumed that the involved personalities have employed efforts to explain their positions, and
maximize the legal remedies available to them pending trial. Hence, the decision to dismiss the
criminal cases, or to acquit/convict the accused is for the Sandiganbayan to determine at this
point. xxx. Simply put, a moot and academic case ceases to present a justiciable controversy by
virtue of supervening events, and thus, this Court should refrain from rendering a ruling on the
criminal aspect of the petitions. (Province of Bataan v. Casimiro, G.R. Nos. 197510-11 & 201347,
April 18, 2022)
In the Resolution dated April 4, 2017, the Sandiganbayan held that the Ombudsman committed an inordinate delay
in the conduct of the preliminary investigation. It noted that the Ombudsman took four years and six months to
complete the preliminary investigation, an inordinate and unreasonable delay. Thus, the Sandiganbayan dismissed
the case for violation of the accused's constitutional right to a speedy disposition of their cases xxx. Based on the
records of the case, the Ombudsman did not assail the denial of their motion for reconsideration; thus rendering the
dismissal final and executory.
In view of the foregoing supervening events, the present petition had become moot. An
issue is said to have become moot and academic when it ceases to present a justiciable
controversy so that a declaration on the issue would be of no practical use or value.
(Panuncialman v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 224987, March 23, 2022)
With the appointment of Flores as Department Head of CBAO, this Court finds that the issues raised by petitioner
in the instant complaint — whether AO 171, and the designation of Flores as acting Building Official by the
DPWH pursuant to AO 171, are valid or null and void — have become moot. It would be futile for the Court to
pass upon the validity or invalidity of AO 171, which, as it stands, is no longer operative.
To the Court's mind, the mootness as to the issue raised by petitioner in his complaint is
all too apparent in his petition since the arguments raised therein have essentially broadened
the said issue further to include not only the legality of AO 171, but also the legal infirmities
supposedly attendant in the following: (1) reorganization of the local departments of the City of
Baguio; (2) the creation of the CBAO; and (3) the appointment of Flores as Department Head of
CBAO. These matters, however, are not covered by AO 171. (Bernardez, Jr. v. City Government of
Baguio, G.R. No. 197559, March 21, 2022)
Locus Standi
Locus standi or legal standing refers to "a right of appearance in a court of justice on a
given question." It has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in a case such that the
party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being
challenged. The term "interest" means a material interest, an interest in issue affected by the
decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental
interest.
For a citizen to have standing to challenge a governmental act, it must appear that he or
she has been or is about to be denied some right or privilege to which he or she is lawfully
entitled or that he or she is about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the
statute or act complained of. In other words, he or she must establish that he or she has
suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the
government; the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and the injury is likely to be
redressed by a favorable action. Nothing of that sort was ever adduced by petitioners. (Custodio
v. Department of Public Works and Highways, G.R. No. 225373, February 16, 2022)
[Note: A perusal of the petition reveals that petitioners merely invoked that they are taxpayers.
When their locus standi to institute the present petition was questioned by the OSG, they opted not to
reply. A party's bare invocation that he or she is a taxpayer does not automatically bestow upon him or
her the locus standi to challenge any and all governmental acts without any justification. One cannot just
assert that a governmental act will make him or her suffer in an indefinite manner. Rather, it must be
shown that he or she will sustain direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the acts complained of. In
fine, petitioners have failed to establish their legal standing to file the instant suit. (Custodio v. Department
of Public Works and Highways, G.R. No. 225373, February 16, 2022)]
On March 6, 2012, COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 9371. Among its key provisions, this issuance defined
persons deprived of liberty (PDL) who are eligible to register and vote, constituted a Committee on PDL
Voting, laid down the guidelines for registration and voting, designated special polling places inside jails, and
constituted a Special Board of Election Inspectors and their support staff.|||
On the requisite of locus standi or legal standing, the Court finds that petitioners have
sufficiently proven that they possess the same. xxx. As held in Funa v. The Chairman, Commission
on Audit, Reynaldo A. Villar: xxx. However, the Court has time and again acted liberally on
the locus standi requirements and has accorded certain individuals, not otherwise directly
injured, or with material interest affected, by a Government act, standing to sue provided a
constitutional issue of critical significance is at stake. The rule on locus standi is after all a
mere procedural technicality in relation to which the Court, in a catena of cases involving a
subject of transcendental import, has waived, or relaxed, thus allowing non-traditional
plaintiffs, such as concerned citizens, taxpayers, voters or legislators, to sue in the public
interest, albeit they may not have been personally injured by the operation of a law or any
other government act. (Colmenares v. Duterte, G.R. Nos. 245981 & 246594, August 9, 2022)
This Court will only exercise the power of judicial review if the action is brought "by a
party who has legal standing to raise the constitutional or legal question." Legal standing
relates to "a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or
will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged." (Anti-
Trapo Movement of the Philippines v. Land Transportation Office, G.R. No. 231540, June 27, 2022)
However, there are exceptions to the rule on legal standing. As summarized in Funa v.
Villar, this Court takes cognizance of petitions from the following "non-traditional
suitors" despite the lack of direct injury from the questioned governmental action for raising
constitutional issues with crucial significance:
1. For taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal disbursement of public funds or that the
tax measure is unconstitutional;
2. For voters, there must be a showing of obvious interest in the validity of the election
law in question;
3. For concerned citizens, there must be a showing that the issues raised are of
transcendental importance which must be settled early; and
4. For legislators, there must be a claim that the official action complained of infringes
their prerogatives as legislators.
Here, petitioner, a nongovernmental organization which advocates governmental

reforms, is allegedly composed of concerned citizens. It invokes the supposedly "transcendental
public importance" of the issues raised, claiming that it filed the Petition "to protect the
[g]overnment from an anomalous contract, which is manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to
the Filipino people." (Anti-Trapo Movement of the Philippines v. Land Transportation Office, G.R.
No. 231540, June 27, 2022; see Villafuerte v. Securities and Exchange Commission, G.R. No. 208379,
March 29, 2022)
Here, petitioner's sheer assertion of transcendental importance does not warrant a

relaxation of the rule on legal standing. While a substantial amount of public funds was
involved in the procurement of driver's license cards, petitioner fell short of establishing that
respondent blatantly disregarded relevant constitutional and statutory prohibitions in awarding
the contract to Dermalog. Banner's submission of the Lowest Calculated Bid does not
automatically warrant an award of the contract in its favor, especially since it was found
noncompliant during the mandatory post-qualification. Petitioner similarly failed to show that
no other party has a more direct interest on the matter in question. (Anti-Trapo Movement of the
Philippines v. Land Transportation Office, G.R. No. 231540, June 27, 2022)
Still, regarding locus standi, petitioner merely stated his standing as "a citizen, lawyer
and taxpayer" without further elaborating on the same.
When suing as a citizen, the petitioner must be able to show not only that the law or any
government act is invalid, but also that he sustained, or is in imminent danger of sustaining,
some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers thereby in some
indefinite way. Alternatively, in assailing the constitutionality of a governmental act,
petitioners suing as citizens may dodge the requirement of having to establish a direct and
personal interest if they show that the act affects a public right. Mere mention of being a citizen,
without sufficiently alleging nor establishing how the implementation of Resolution No.
9371 would affect him or any supposed public right, fails to establish citizens' standing to
invoke the Court's exercise of judicial review.
Parties suing as taxpayers must specifically prove sufficient interest in preventing the
illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation. Apart from the glaring omission of these
requisite assertions, petitioner overlooks that Resolution No. 9371 is not a disbursement
measure, but, rather, outlines the procedure and logistics for the registration and voting of
PDLs.
Finally, on standing as a lawyer, the mere invocation of the duty to preserve the rule of
law does not suffice to clothe members of the bar with standing. Even more so must petitioner's
claim of lawyers' standing fail, considering that he did not substantiate this allegation.
(Aguinaldo v. New Bilibid Prison, G.R. No. 221201, March 29, 2022)
[Note: As a general rule, the challenger must have a personal and substantial interest in the case
such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement. Petitioner's
material averments fail to show how he stands to be affected by the implementation of Resolution No.
9371. He does not appear to be a PDL voter covered by the COMELEC issuance, or an official tasked with
implementing its provisions. Essentially, petitioner has no interest in this supposed controversy. As
firmly and consistently held by the Court, locus standi requires a personal stake in the outcome of a
controversy for significant reasons. It assures adverseness and sharpens the presentation of issues for the
illumination of the Court in resolving difficult constitutional questions. As the petitioner failed to meet
the requisites of judicial review, the Court sees no need to delve into the substantive issues raised.
(Aguinaldo v. New Bilibid Prison, G.R. No. 221201, March 29, 2022)]
Here, petitioners state that they are former legislators, former national treasurers, and a
former budget secretary and economics professor, who all maintain a continuing interest in the
subject of the petition in view of their advocacies and prior government positions. However,
this allegation by itself does not satisfy the requirement of standing. What is required is "a
material interest, an interest in issue affected by the decree as distinguished from mere interest
in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest." (Villafuerte v. Securities and Exchange
Petitioners also invoke the exceptions to the rule on standing, suing as taxpayers,
concerned citizens, and public interest advocates raising issues of transcendental
importance; and suing on behalf of BAP member-banks who are allegedly afraid to file the
case. Indeed, these exceptions have been recognized by jurisprudence xxx. However, none of
these exceptions apply here. (Villafuerte v. Securities and Exchange Commission, G.R. No. 208379,
March 29, 2022)
[Note: However, that a government project is later on used for an alleged improper purpose does
not necessarily make the prior funding of such project illegal; what makes a disbursement illegal is the
violation of a specific law or the commission of an irregularity in the deflection of such public funds.
Because there is no showing that the disbursement of funds per se is illegal or improper, the requirement
that a law was violated or that some irregularity was committed when public money was disbursed is not
met. Further, the requirement that petitioners are directly affected by such act is also not satisfied (as will
be expounded on later). Thus, this case does not qualify as a taxpayer's suit. (Villafuerte v. Securities and
Exchange Commission, G.R. No. 208379, March 29, 2022)]
Petitioners also assert that as citizens and public interest advocates seeking to enforce a
constitutional right, they have standing to file this suit. They claim that they have a strong
interest in the case as it involves constitutional issues. Further, the issues they raise are
of transcendental importance xxx.
To determine whether a matter is of transcendental importance, the Court considers "(1)

the character of the funds or other assets involved in the case; (2) the presence of a clear case of
disregard of a constitutional or statutory prohibition by the public respondent agency or
instrumentality of the government; and (3) the lack of any other party with a more direct and
specific interest in the questions being raised."
Here, petitioners failed to show a clear or obvious disregard of the relevant

constitutional provision which requires an immediate action from this Court. In the first place,
monopoly is not prohibited per se but is only regulated or disallowed when public interest so
requires. Further, We have already recognized that securities markets may regulate their own
operations by requiring membership in an SRO under the principle of self-regulation, consistent
with the State policy to "establish a socially conscious, free market that regulates itself" xxx.
(Villafuerte v. Securities and Exchange Commission, G.R. No. 208379, March 29, 2022).
Petitioners' claim that they are suing on behalf of BAP member-banks who are afraid of
retaliation from respondents deserves scant consideration. Aside from being unsubstantiated,
their allegations do not satisfy the jurisprudential requirements for third-party standing: (1) that
the party must have suffered an injury-in-fact, thus giving him or her a sufficiently concrete
interest in the outcome of the issue in dispute; (2) that the party must have a close relation to the
third party; and (3) that there must exist some hindrance to the third party's ability to protect
his or her own interests. Here, petitioners have not shown any injury-in-fact that gives them a
sufficiently concrete interest in the outcome of the case. They also have not shown any close
relation to the banks, nor have they sufficiently demonstrated how these banks are hindered
from filing the case. (Villafuerte v. Securities and Exchange Commission, G.R. No. 208379, March 29,
2022)
Further, We have held that generalized interests, albeit accompanied by the assertion of
a public right, do not establish standing. What is required in suits by concerned citizens is "an
allegation that the continuing enforcement of a law or any government act has denied the party
some right or privilege to which they are entitled, or that the party will be subjected to some
burden or penalty because of the law or act being complained of." Again, petitioners have not
alleged any sufficient and specific denial of their rights or any burden caused to them by the
assailed acts and issuances. (Villafuerte v. Securities and Exchange Commission, G.R. No. 208379,
March 29, 2022)
Petitioners add, seemingly as an afterthought, that they are investors in government

securities. But aside from once more being unsubstantiated, even if this is true, petitioners still
failed to establish how they as investors have suffered or will suffer direct or personal injury.
Without such showing, the claim of being an investor in itself cannot accord them standing.
(Villafuerte v. Securities and Exchange Commission, G.R. No. 208379, March 29, 2022)
Anent the requisite of legal standing, the complaining party must demonstrate a direct
injury already sustained or immediately in danger of sustaining as a result of the act
complained of. Here, this Court finds that Santos has no legal standing to institute a suit
defending the validity of the RUP of PINPAL. xxx. The requirement of legal standing is
imposed to ensure "that a party is seeking a concrete outcome or relief that may be granted by
courts." It is based on the principle of separation of powers as it spares the "unnecessary
interference or invalidation by the judicial branch of the actions rendered by its co-equal
branches of government." It is also intended to prevent the courts from indiscriminately being
exposed to all types of suits that may unduly overburden the dockets. (Santos v. Gabaen, G.R.
No. 195638, March 22, 2022)
[Note: | While Santos may have an indirect interest, as a buyer of the almaciga resins, this
interest is only incidental as compared to the interest of PINPAL — the holder of the RUP. As pointed out
by the OSG, her interest does not qualify as that contemplated to warrant the exercise of judicial review
because it arises only from her alleged exclusive dealership with PINPAL, and not from the RUP itself.
Santos has no direct or personal right prejudiced by the nullity of the RUP granted to PINPAL. Thus, she
is not in the position to ask for injunctive relief against the proceedings for the validity of the RUP before
the NCIP-RHO. (Santos v. Gabaen, G.R. No. 195638, March 22, 2022)]
Question of Constitutionality
Raised at the
Earliest Opportunity
It is settled that jurisdiction is conferred by law and any judgment, order or resolution
issued without it is void and cannot be given any effect. This rule applies even if the issue on
jurisdiction was raised for the first time on appeal or even after final judgment. It is true that
this principle has since been qualified by Sibonghanoy, where we ruled that a party could no
longer question the trial court's jurisdiction over the subject matter due to estoppel by laches. In
said case, the Court noted the party's active participation during trial and characterized the
party's invocation of the trial court's lack of jurisdiction almost 15 years after the questioned
ruling had been rendered as a last minute effort to absolve itself from an unfavorable judgment
on appeal. In applying the principle of estoppel by laches, the Court considered the patent
inequity and unfairness of having the judgment creditors go up their Calvary once more after
15 years. (Urot v. People, G.R. No. 208960, February 14, 2022; Heirs of Angel Yadao v. Heirs of Juan
Caletina, G.R. No. 230784. February 15, 2022)
[Note: In light of the foregoing, We hold that the principle of estoppel by laches should not apply
in this case since the exceptional circumstances in Sibonghanoy are not present. It must be emphasized that
for estoppel by laches to apply, the lack of jurisdiction must have been raised so belatedly as to warrant
the presumption that the party entitled to assert it had abandoned or declined to assert it. Here,
petitioner raised the lack of jurisdiction of the RTC to hear and decide the criminal case when she timely
filed her motion for reconsideration against the RTC's judgment of conviction and when the case was still
with the trial court. In contrast, Sibonghanoy represented an exceptional case wherein the party invoking
lack of jurisdiction did so only after fifteen (15) years after the rendition of the questioned ruling and when the
proceedings had already been elevated to the CA. Thus, the general rule that lack of jurisdiction may be
invoked at any stage of the proceedings should prevail, and petitioner should not be estopped from
raising the lack of jurisdiction of the RTC. (Urot v. People, G.R. No. 208960, February 14, 2022)]
[Note: Here, the complaint was initiated on July 1, 1993. Petitioners filed their Answer on July 30,
1993 and their Amended Answer in October 1995. Petitioners filed a Second Amended Answer on
October 24, 2008. Pre-trial and trial commenced as early as January 1994. Yet, petitioners raised the issue
of jurisdiction only on July 17, 2009 or sixteen (16) years after the complaint was filed. The trial was on
going for years. In fact, petitioners, as defendants, was about to present their last witness. (Heirs of Angel
Yadao v. Heirs of Juan Caletina, G.R. No. 230784. February 15, 2022)]
At any rate, even at this late stage, the complaint must still be dismissed. It is settled that
when a court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, the only power it has is to dismiss the
action. Any decision rendered without jurisdiction is a total nullity and may be struck down at
any time, even on appeal before this Court. As such, all proceedings before the RTC and the CA,
including their respective decisions, are void. Certainly, a judgment rendered by a court
without jurisdiction creates no rights and produces no effect. A void judgment for want of
jurisdiction is no judgment at all. All acts performed pursuant to it and all claims emanating
from it have no legal effect. (Dayaca v. Baloloy, G.R. No. 253134, July 6, 2022)
[Note: The Court does not lose sight of the fact that petitioner actively participated during trial,
and it was only when the CA issued the adverse decision when he raised the issue of jurisdiction again in
his Motion for Reconsideration. Nevertheless, the Court finds that the Tijam doctrine cannot be applied
under the given circumstances. Indeed, the Court has long clarified that estoppel by laches may only be
invoked to bar the defense of lack of jurisdiction if the factual milieu is analogous to Tijam v.
Sibonghanoy. xxx. (Dayaca v. Baloloy, G.R. No. 253134, July 6, 2022)]
Constitutional Avoidance
Finally, on the question of constitutionality of Section 3 (a) of R.A. No. 8371, in Parcon-
Song v. Parcon, it was held that courts should avoid resolving the constitutionality of a law if the
case can be ruled on other grounds. xxx. Similarly, in Alliance of Non-Life Insurance Workers of the
Philippines v. Hon. Mendoza, this Court emphasized that constitutional issues raised in a case will
not be passed upon "when it is not the lis mota. More so, when it can be resolved on some other
ground."
Here, this Court deems it proper to refrain from deciding on the constitutionality of
Section 3 (a) of R.A. No. 8371 and its counterpart provision in Section 1, Part II, Rule III of
its IRR, as the grounds of non-observance of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts, and the absence
of legal standing are enough reasons to dismiss the petition. (Santos v. Gabaen, G.R. No. 195638,
March 22, 2022)
There is no constitutional issue involved in this case. Although the 1997 BLT Agreement
involves a public service and, therefore, is imbued with public interest, the relationship between
the DOTr and the MRTC is primarily contractual and their dispute involves the adjudication of
contractual rights. (Metro Rail Transit Corp. v. Department of Transportation, G.R. No. 225942, July
20, 2022)
There is no question that the main thrust of petitioner's action is premised on the nullification of AO 171. It is
petitioner's belief that AO 171 usurped and divested his functions as the City Engineer of Baguio City. It bears
noting, however, that following the issuance and implementation of AO 171, Flores was later appointed as
Department Head of the CBAO. With this succeeding appointment of Flores to a new position, it is apparent that
AO 171 is no longer operative insofar as his designation as acting Building Official is concerned. xxx.
If, indeed, petitioner also seeks to strike them down as illegal, he should have prayed for
the nullification of the ordinance or administrative orders from which they are based. This the
petitioner failed to do. At best, petitioner, in his complaint filed with the RTC, implicitly
questioned the impropriety of Ordinance No. 01 (from which AO 171 emanated) by asserting
that the said ordinance, while an appropriation measure, contains non-appropriation items such
as the reorganization and restructuring of the local departments under the City of Baguio, and
the creation of the CBAO. In this regard, we agree with the ruling of the RTC that a collateral
attack on Ordinance No. 01 is proscribed xxx. We have consistently held that the validity of
laws, orders, or such other rules with the force of law cannot be attacked collaterally. This is
because there is a legal presumption of validity of these laws. Accordingly, the legal
presumption of Ordinance No. 01's validity stands unless the same is annulled in a direct
proceeding. (Bernardez, Jr. v. City Government of Baguio, G.R. No. 197559, March 21, 2022)
Judgments
While it may seem that petitioner is correct, considering that at the time
the subpoena duces tecum was issued in the instant case there was no pending litigation against
Estrada, et al., records show that the subpoena duces tecum addressed to petitioner was issued as
early as February 8, 2001, that is, four (4) months before the Marquez Case was promulgated on
June 27, 2001. Since, judicial interpretations of statutes, such as that in Marquez Case, cannot be
applied retroactively, it will not apply to the instant case. xxx. (Allied Banking Corp. v. Office of the
Ombudsman, G.R. No. 174755, March 29, 2022)
Otherwise stated, where a judicial interpretation abandons a doctrinal interpretation of

such law, the Court, recognizing that acts may have been performed under the impression of
the validity of its interpretation, has consistently held that such operative fact cannot be undone
by the mere subsequent declaration of the nullity of its interpretation; thus, the declaration can
only have a prospective application. But where no doctrine is abandoned, a judicial
interpretation of the law should be deemed incorporated at the moment of its legislation.
Applied to the instant case, at the time of the issuance of subpoena duces tecum addressed
to petitioner, the prevailing doctrine is that the OMB may examine and access bank accounts
and records in aid of their investigation, even without a pending litigation. The promulgation of
the Marquez Case four (4) months thereafter did not, in any way, invalidate the existing doctrine
then, for as settled in Ejercito v. Sandiganbayan, it applied prospectively, that is, to cases filed
after its promulgation. Without a doubt, the OMB had the authority to issue the assailed
subpoena duces tecum addressed to petitioner requiring it to produce the subject bank accounts
of Estrada, et al. (Allied Banking Corp. v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 174755, March 29,
2022)
[Note: In sum, We hold and so rule that petitioner committed a procedural blunder when it filed
a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with the CA assailing the two Orders of the
OMB. As discussed thoroughly above, the CA's jurisdiction is limited to review of orders, directives and
decisions of the OMB in administrative disciplinary cases only. Petitioner should have filed the petition
with the Supreme Court following the established doctrine that it is the Supreme Court that has
jurisdiction over orders, directives, and decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in criminal or non-
administrative matters. (Allied Banking Corp. v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 174755, March 29, 2022)]
Besides, the doctrine of immutability of judgments is not an iron-clad rule as it is subject

to the following exceptions: (1) the correction of clerical errors; (2) the so-called nunc pro
tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party; (3) void judgments; and (4) whenever
circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision rendering its execution unjust and
inequitable. (Perez v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. Nos. 225568-70, February 15, 2022)
Preliminarily, We emphasize that where there is a conflict between the dispositive part
and the opinion of the court contained in the text or body of the decision, the former must
prevail over the latter on the theory that the dispositive portion is the final order, while the
opinion is merely a statement ordering nothing. While the body of the decision, order, or
resolution might create some ambiguity in the manner the court's reasoning preponderates, it is
the dispositive portion thereof that finally invests rights upon the parties, sets conditions for the
exercise of those rights, and imposes the corresponding duties or obligations. Indeed, it is the
dispositive part of the judgment that actually settles and declares the rights and obligations of
the parties, finally, definitively, and authoritatively, notwithstanding the existence of
inconsistent statements in the body that may tend to confuse. (Nilo v. People, G.R. No. 254157,
October 5, 2022)
[Note: The contention that the trial judge who penned the decision was not the one who heard
the evidence and observed the demeanor of the witnesses must fail. It is sufficient that the judge, in
deciding the case, must base his or her ruling completely on the records before him or her, in the way that
appellate courts do when they review the evidence of the case raised on appeal. Thus, a judgment of
conviction penned by a different trial judge is not erroneous if he or she relied on the records available to
him or her. It is not necessary for the validity of a judgment that the judge who penned the decision
should actually hear the case in its entirety, for he or she can merely rely on the transcribed stenographic
notes taken during the trial as the basis for his or her decision. (Patulin v. People, G.R. No. 251155, March
16, 2022)]
Appellate Review of
Decisions of Lower Courts
As the rule now stands, in criminal cases where the penalty imposed by the RTC
is reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, an appeal is taken by filing a notice of appeal with the
RTC. On the other hand, in criminal cases where the penalty imposed by the RTC is death, the
CA shall automatically review the same without need of a notice of appeal. (People v. Olpindo,
G.R. No. 252861. February 15, 2022)
[Note: However, on June 24, 2006, R.A. No. 9346 was signed into law, prohibiting the imposition
of death penalty. xxx. As a result, trial courts are precluded from imposing the penalty of death and,
instead, shall mete out either reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, depending on the nomenclature of
penalties used by the law violated. Corollary to this, Secs. 3(d) and 10, Rule 122 of the Rules of Court
which prescribe an automatic review by the CA of cases where death penalty is imposed, became
ineffective without, however, the Court simultaneously resolving to suspend the aforesaid rule. At
present and during such time that R.A. No. 9346 is in effect, an automatic review of criminal cases is no
longer available and in no instance should the RTC elevate motu proprio the case records to the CA. (People
v. Olpindo, G.R. No. 252861. February 15, 2022)]
[Note: In this case, the Decision dated December 1, 2016 has become final and executory after
accused-appellant Olpindo, who was represented at the trial by his counsel de parte, Atty. June Elva G.
Dumangeng, did not file a notice of appeal. This appeal should thus be dismissed outright as provided
under Section 1, Rule 50 of the Rules of Court… (People v. Olpindo, G.R. No. 252861. February 15, 2022)]
[Note: Further, a deeper analysis of Sec. 3(e), Rule 122 of the Rules of Court, in relation to Sec.
13(c), Rule 124, would demonstrate that a petition for review on certiorari is simply not allowed in cases
of reclusion perpetua and life imprisonment when the purpose of the appeal is to open the case for review,
including questions of fact. (People v. Olpindo, G.R. No. 252861. February 15, 2022)]
Rule-Making Authority
|It is already well-settled, as stated in the case of Estipona, that plea bargaining in
criminal cases, by nature and tradition, is squarely a rule of procedure which falls within the
Court's exclusive rule-making power as provided under Section 5 (5), Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution. (People v. Montierro, G.R. Nos. 254564, 254974, A.M. No. 21-07-16-SC & A.M. No.
18-03-16-SC, July 26, 2022)
[Note: Undeniably, plea bargaining in criminal cases is an essential component of the
administration of justice. An accused enters into a plea bargaining agreement by admitting his/her guilt
with the hope of securing a more lenient punishment, and possibly probation, should the offer be
accepted and approved by the court. As such, the tedious process and protracted trial is shortened and
the accused is promptly given a chance at rehabilitation, redemption and reintegration to society. In the
same way, plea bargaining benefits the State as the prosecution secures a final conviction with very
minimal to nil use of its time and resources. Plea bargaining in criminal cases is clearly a procedural
mechanism geared towards promoting an efficient, inexpensive and speedy disposition of cases. (People v.
Montierro, G.R. Nos. 254564, 254974, A.M. No. 21-07-16-SC & A.M. No. 18-03-16-SC, July 26, 2022)]
[Note: In defining plea bargaining in criminal cases, jurisprudence has always referred to it as a
process of arriving at "a mutually satisfactory disposition of the case subject to court approval." Thus,
mutual consent of the prosecution and the offended party, on the one hand, and the defendant, on the
other, has always been emphasized as a condition precedent or an indispensable requirement to a valid
plea of guilty to a lesser offense.
This requirement of mutual consent was further highlighted in Sayre, where the Court found that
the trial court judge did not act with grave abuse of discretion in not approving the plea bargain of the
accused due to the continuing objection of the prosecution, which was based on the conflicting provisions
between DOJ Circular No. 27 and the Plea Bargaining Framework in Drugs. Cases. The Court held that
"[b]ecause of this continuing objection, the parties failed to arrive at a 'mutually satisfactory disposition of
the case' that may be submitted for the [trial] court's approval. The RTC correctly ordered the
continuation of the proceedings because there was no mutual agreement to plea bargain." (People v.
Montierro, G.R. Nos. 254564, 254974, A.M. No. 21-07-16-SC & A.M. No. 18-03-16-SC, July 26, 2022)]
[Note: Synthesizing the foregoing jurisprudential pronouncements, and cognizant of the ends of
the plea bargaining process in drugs cases, the Court herein clarifies that the consent of the parties is
necessary but the approval of the accused's plea of guilty to a lesser offense is ultimately subject to the
sound discretion of the court. In the exercise of this discretion, the trial court's duty is to evaluate the
qualifications of the accused and the circumstances or evidence of the case. It is mandated to decide each
case based on evidence, law, and jurisprudence, and to ensure that the applicant in a plea bargain is not:
(1) a recidivist, (2) habitual offender, (3) known in the community as a drug addict and troublemaker, (4)
one who has undergone rehabilitation but had a relapse, and (5) one who has been charged many times.
Thus, plea bargaining cannot be approved when the accused is not qualified or the evidence of his/her
guilt is strong. (People v. Montierro, G.R. Nos. 254564, 254974, A.M. No. 21-07-16-SC & A.M. No. 18-03-16-
SC, July 26, 2022)]
In this regard, courts are not bound by any resolution or administrative issuance that the
Secretary of Justice may promulgate. It is within the sole ambit of the Court's discretion to
impose rules governing the proceedings — including the Plea Bargaining Framework in Drugs
Cases. Thus, courts may overrule the objection of the prosecution when the objection has no
valid basis, or is not supported by evidence, or if the objection solely tends to undermine the
Court's plea bargaining framework, or that the objection is solely to the effect that it will
weaken the drugs campaign of the government. To narrowly construe the trial court's discretion
under Section 2, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court is to undermine the value of plea bargaining
itself and render it an ineffective tool of rehabilitation and restorative justice. (People v.
Montierro, G.R. Nos. 254564, 254974, A.M. No. 21-07-16-SC & A.M. No. 18-03-16-SC, July 26,
2022)
[Note: Moreover, plea bargaining is a mechanism that becomes available to the accused only after
the Information is filed. Well-settled is the rule in our jurisdiction that once the Information is filed in
court, any disposition of the case rests upon the sound discretion of the court. (People v. Montierro, G.R.
Nos. 254564, 254974, A.M. No. 21-07-16-SC & A.M. No. 18-03-16-SC, July 26, 2022)]
[Note: During the deliberations for this case, it was raised that the trial court cannot overrule the
objection of the prosecution to the plea bargaining proposal since mutual consent is a condition sine qua
non before the trial court may exercise its authority over a plea bargain. It was suggested that for the
courts to overrule the prosecution's objection, especially if the objection is grounded on an Executive
issuance or policy, would be an impermissible overreach into a matter supposedly within the sole
prerogative of the Executive and thus, violative of the principle of separation of powers.
However, it must be noted with import that the exclusive prerogative of the Executive begins and
ends with matters involving purely prosecutorial discretion. Prosecutorial discretion pertains to who to
prosecute, what case to prosecute, and how the case would be pursued based on the evidence available to
the prosecution. The prosecution has the freedom and authority to determine whether to charge a person,
what Information to file against them and how to prosecute the case filed before the courts. There is,
however, an obvious limit to prosecutorial prerogatives as the prosecutor obviously has no control over
how the court would decide the case. While a prosecutor may look at the evidence and determine the
charge and that a person is probably guilty of the same, a judge may look at the same set of evidence and
arrive at a different conclusion.
This dividing line between prosecutorial prerogatives and judicial discretion is why courts may
overrule objections on plea bargaining on certain grounds. The prosecution's objection may be based on
anything under the sun. If an objection is anchored on what is exclusively a prosecutorial prerogative, it
would indeed be a violation of the separation of powers for a court to override the prosecutor's objection.
If, however, the objection is based on a supposed "internal guideline" of the Executive that directly runs
counter to a Court issuance promulgated within the exclusive domain of the Judiciary — such as the Plea
Bargaining Framework — then it is not a violation, but rather a mere assertion, of the principle of
separation of powers. In other words, as any motion submitted for the court's resolution, if the
prosecution's basis for objection has no merit or runs afoul of the Constitutional prerogative exclusive to
the court, then it is not unconstitutional for a court to assert by ruling that such objection is invalid.
It must be clarified that courts are not given the unbridled discretion to overrule any objection of
the prosecution to a plea bargaining proposal. To be sure, the authority of the court over plea bargaining
in drugs cases is circumscribed foremost by the Court-issued framework on the acceptable plea bargains
and by the evidence and circumstances of each case. Thus, a court has no jurisdiction to overrule an
objection of the prosecution if the same is grounded on evidence showing that the accused is not qualified
therefor, or when the plea does not conform to the Court-issued rule or framework.
However, when a court overrules a prosecution's objection, which is solely grounded on an

Executive issuance or policy that contradicts a Court-issued rule on plea bargaining, it is not an intrusion
into the Executive's authority and discretion to prosecute crimes, but is simply a recognition of the
Court's exclusive rule-making power as enshrined in the Constitution.
It bears to emphasize that when the Court upholds its exclusive power to promulgate rules on
plea bargaining, it only recognizes the role of the Judiciary as impartial tribunals, with the mandate of
determining what is fair and reasonable under the circumstances, cognizant of the rights and interests of
both the State and the accused. In contrast, the prosecutor's mandate is to champion the cause of the State
and prosecute criminals to the full extent of the law, which may prevent it from fully seeing the middle
ground in the plea bargaining process. This is the reason why it is ultimately the Court which has the
power to promulgate the rules on plea bargaining. (People v. Montierro, G.R. Nos. 254564, 254974, A.M.
No. 21-07-16-SC & A.M. No. 18-03-16-SC, July 26, 2022)]
Accordingly, this Court stresses that the step-by-step procedure outlined under R.A. No.
9165 as amended by R.A. No. 10640 is a matter of substantive law, which cannot be simply
brushed aside as a simple procedural technicality. The provisions were crafted by Congress as
safety precautions to address potential police abuses, especially considering that the penalty
imposed may be life imprisonment. With major lapses in the prescribed procedure in this case,
the presumption of regularity in the performance of the duties of the law enforcement officers is
unavailing. (Tabian v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 247211, August 1, 2022)
Writ of Amparo
Section 19 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo (A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC) is explicit that both
questions of fact and law can be raised before the Court in a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45. As a rule then, the Court is not bound by the factual findings made
by the lower court which rendered the judgment in a petition for the issuance of the writ of
amparo. Be that as it may, a careful review of the records of the case reveals that the RTC
committed no reversible error in finding that no substantial evidence exists to compel the grant
of the writ prayed for by Morada.
The elements constituting enforced disappearance as defined under Republic Act No.
9851 are as follows:
(a) that there be an arrest, detention, abduction or any form of deprivation of liberty;
(b) that it be carried out by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, the State or a
political organization;
(c) that it be followed by the State or political organization's refusal to acknowledge or give
information on the fate or whereabouts of the person subject of the amparo petition; and
(d) that the intention for such refusal is to remove subject person from the protection of the law
for a prolonged period of time.
There is no question that the first and second elements are attendant in this case.
However, We agree with the RTC that the third and fourth elements are sorely lacking. While it
is admitted that Johnson was arrested for the alleged theft that he committed in the house of
Randy, it was sufficiently established by the respondents that he was already released from
their custody on October 14, 2015, as evidenced by the barangay blotter, signed by Johnson
himself. In fact, Morada neither denied nor refuted the said document of release. As opposed to
the unsubstantiated allegations of Morada that it is respondents who are responsible for
Johnson's disappearance, We accord greater weight to the documentary evidence presented by
the respondents exhibiting that Johnson was no longer in the custody of the respondents when
he disappeared. Such evidence strongly militate against Morada's claim of enforced
disappearance. (Morada v. Rias, G.R. No. 222226. February 14, 2022)
Morada further argues that the lack of cooperation on the part of the respondents
constitutes a refusal on their part to acknowledge Johnson's disappearance and the
corresponding intention to remove him from the protection of the law.This argument is
specious. (Morada v. Rias, G.R. No. 222226. February 14, 2022)
[Note: By her own admission, Morada disclosed that when she inquired about her son Johnson at
the barangay hall, she was immediately informed by respondent Rolly that Johnson was captured but
was also released from detention the same day. In support thereof, Rolly showed the barangay blotter
which bore Johnson's signature showing his release. Thus, it is clear that there was no refusal to give
information on the whereabouts of Johnson.
Morada further admitted that the NPD conducted an investigation on Johnson's disappearance
but the same was terminated due to the lack of a witness to give light to the investigation and on account
of the information from the barangay that he was already released from custody. The foregoing belie
Morada's claim of lack of cooperation on the part of the authorities. On this score, We agree with the
following observations of the RTC:
This documentary proof of Johnson's release from detention is, to the mind of the Court,
substantial evidence to establish that the respondents have not refused to acknowledge or give information
on the whereabouts of Johnson, as in fact it should be regarded as information positively showing that
Johnson was no longer under the hold of the barangay officials .
Accordingly, there was no intention to remove Johnson from the protection of the law for a
prolonged period of time as he had been released already. Hence, We see no enforced or involuntary
disappearance that would warrant the issuance of the writ of amparo. (Morada v. Rias, G.R. No. 222226.
February 14, 2022)]
"For the issuance of the writ, it is not sufficient that a person's life is endangered. It is
even not sufficient to allege and prove that a person has disappeared. It has to be shown by the
required quantum of proof that the disappearance was carried out by, or with the authorization,
support or acquiescence of the government or a political organization, and that there is a refusal
to acknowledge the same or to give information on the fate or whereabouts of the missing
persons." (Morada v. Rias, G.R. No. 222226. February 14, 2022)
[Note: In the instant case, the Court agrees with the RTC that Morada failed to prove by
substantial evidence her claim of enforced disappearance. Morada's petition is mainly anchored on the
alleged rumor which circulated in their community that Johnson was killed and his dead body was
mixed in cement. However, said allegation lacked corroborations. The presentation of testimonial,
documentary or at least circumstantial evidence could have made a difference in light of the denials made
by the respondents as regards Morada's claims, as well as the documentary evidence, showing that
Johnson is no longer in the charge of the barangay. Morada's continued reliance on mere rumors and
speculations, without presenting any clear and independent evidence showing that there was a threat to
Johnson's life, liberty, and security, even prior to his arrest or that he was physically harmed by the
respondents while in detention, does not amount to substantial evidence.
Not only did Morada fail to substantiate any extrajudicial killing or enforced disappearance in
this case, she also miserably failed to show any government participation or acquiescence in any killing
or disappearance. To reiterate, records show that Johnson was properly accounted for by the authorities
who initially detained him. (Morada v. Rias, G.R. No. 222226. February 14, 2022)]
[Note: Given the foregoing, there is no basis for the issuance of the writ of amparo. The liberality
accorded to amparo does not mean that a claimant is excused from the onus of proving his case. "Indeed,
even the liberal standard of substantial evidence demands some adequate evidence." (Morada v. Rias, G.R.
No. 222226. February 14, 2022)]
The writ of amparo is a protective remedy aimed at providing judicial relief consisting of
the appropriate remedial measures and directives that may be crafted by the court, in order to
address specific violations or threats of violation of the constitutional rights to life, liberty or
security. In granting the issuance of the writ, the courts must consider the "totality of the
obtaining situation" in determining whether a petitioner is entitled to a writ of amparo.
Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo (Amparo Rule) provides:
SECTION 1. Petition. — The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any
person whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an
unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity.
The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof.
As defined in the case of Mayor Mamba v. Bueno, viz.:
Extralegal killings are killings committed without due process of law, i.e., without legal
safeguards or judicial proceedings. On the other hand, enforced disappearance has been defined
by the Court as the arrest, detention, abduction, or any other form of deprivation of liberty by
agents of the State, or by persons or groups of persons acting with the authorization, support or
acquiescence of the State, followed by a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty, or by
concealment of the fate or whereabouts of the disappeared person, which place such a person
outside the protection of the law.
In an amparo action, the parties must establish their respective claims by substantial
evidence or that amount of evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion. It is more than a mere imputation of wrongdoing, or violation that would
warrant a finding of liability against the person charged. (Tabian v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 247211,
August 1, 2022)
In relation to this, Section 5 of the same rule enumerates what an amparo petition should
contain, among which is how the right to life, liberty and security of the petitioner or on whose
behalf the petition was filed, was violated or threatened, to wit:
(a) The personal circumstances of the petitioner;
(b) The name and personal circumstances of the respondent responsible for the threat, act
or omission, or, if the name is unknown or uncertain, the respondent may be described by an
assumed appellation;
(c) The right to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party violated or threatened
with violation by an unlawful act or omission of the respondent, and how such threat or
violation is committed with the attendant circumstances detailed in supporting affidavits;
(d) The investigation conducted, if any, specifying the names, personal circumstances,
and addresses of the investigating authority or individuals, as well as the manner and conduct of
the investigation, together with any report;
(e) The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to determine the fate or
whereabouts of the aggrieved party and the identity of the person responsible for the threat, act
or omission; and
(f) The relief prayed for.
The petition may include a general prayer for other just and equitable reliefs.
The writ shall issue if this Court is preliminarily satisfied with the prima facie existence of
the ultimate facts determinable from the supporting affidavits that detail the circumstances of
how and to what extent a threat to or violation of the rights to life, liberty, and security of the
aggrieved party was or is being committed. (Tabian v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 247211, August 1, 2022)
[Note: The rights to life, liberty, and security, as protected rights under the rule on writ
of amparo was discussed in the case of Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo, in this wise:
The right to security or the right to security of person finds a textual hook in Article III,
Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution which provides, viz.:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall
be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause
to be determined personally by the judge.
xxx xxx xxx
While the right to life under Article III, Section 1 guarantees essentially the right to be
alive — upon which the enjoyment of all other rights is preconditioned — the right to security of
person is a guarantee of the secure quality of this life, viz.: "The life to which each person has a
right is not a life lived in fear that his person and property may be unreasonably violated by a
powerful ruler. Rather, it is a life lived with the assurance that the government he established and
consented to, will protect the security of his person and property. The ideal of security in life and
property . . . pervades the whole history of man. It touches every aspect of man's existence." In a
broad sense, the right to security of person "emanates in a person's legal and uninterrupted
enjoyment of his life, his limbs, his body, his health, and his reputation. It includes the right to
exist, and the right to enjoyment of life while existing, and it is invaded not only by a deprivation
of life but also of those things which are necessary to the enjoyment of life according to the
nature, temperament, and lawful desires of the individual.
xxx xxx xxx
In the context of Section 1 of the Amparo Rule, "freedom from fear" is the right and any
threat to the rights to life, liberty or security is the actionable wrong. Fear is a state of mind, a
reaction; threat is a stimulus, a cause of action. Fear caused by the same stimulus can range from
being baseless to well-founded as people react differently. The degree of fear can vary from one
person to another with the variation of the prolificacy of their imagination, strength of character
or past experience with the stimulus. Thus, in the Amparo context, it is more correct to say that the
"right to security" is actually the "freedom from threat." Viewed in this light, the "threatened with
violation" [C]lause in the latter part of Section 1 of the Amparo Rule is a form of violation of the
right to security mentioned in the earlier part of the provision.
[T]he right to security of person is a guarantee of bodily and psychological integrity or

security. Article III, Section II of the 1987 Constitution guarantees that, as a general rule, one's
body cannot be searched or invaded without a search warrant. Physical injuries inflicted in the
context of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances constitute more than a search or
invasion of the body. It may constitute dismemberment, physical disabilities, and painful
physical intrusion. As the degree of physical injury increases, the danger to life itself escalates.
Notably, in criminal law, physical injuries constitute a crime against persons because they are an
affront to the bodily integrity or security of a person. (Tabian v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 247211, August
1, 2022)]
[Note: Respondent had reason to fear that her life would be met with the same fate as that of her
husband when she herself was involved with him in the selling of illegal drugs before.
In her judicial affidavit and petition for application of the issuance of the writ, respondent was
able to clearly narrate her personal circumstances on how she and her husband were arrested for using
and selling illegal drugs sometime in March 2015. To reiterate, the arresting officers at the time were
petitioner PO2 Canilon and Olaco. Respondent averred that she and her husband were eventually
released only after paying PO2 Canilon the amount of P50,000.00.
In August 2015, Olaco gave Joselito batong-bakal to sell, the transaction only taking place once, as
respondent and her husband were unable to remit the full amount of the proceeds.
In another instance, respondent was threatened by Paulo and SPO1 Cadag when they engaged
her to sell two bags of shabu worth P16,000.00. During the exchange, she was reminded by police officers,
SPO1 Cadag and PO2 Canilon that they can kill women, old or young, so she should be careful in selling
the illegal drugs they supplied her and Joselito with.
Such reminders to respondent were threats to her life, liberty, and security. (Tabian v. Gonzales,
G.R. No. 247211, August 1, 2022)]
[Note: Further, the same police officers visited their house on more than one occasion with
threats to entrap them. After Joselito's death, a result of the doubtful encounter with law enforcement
officers namely with P/Insp. Dogwe, PO2 Canilon, and the John Doe members of the Antipolo CPS
AIDSTOF and the Provincial Operating Unit Team, and the day after he was seen with the police officers'
confidential agent, there were several unknown and suspicious-looking people during Joselito's funeral
asking for Christina's whereabouts. (Tabian v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 247211, August 1, 2022)]
[Note: Still, petitioners lament that respondent was unable to prove that what occurred was a
legitimate police operation. In support of this, they were able to present a list of evidence to prove the
circumstances surrounding the case. xxx. The lapses that transpired in the alleged buy-bust operation
raises doubt as to the legitimacy thereof. Doubts exist as to whether a valid buy-bust operation indeed
took place against Joselito. Verily, the totality of the evidence presented by the respondent met the
requisite evidentiary threshold of substantial evidence that would warrant the issuance of a writ
of amparo. (Tabian v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 247211, August 1, 2022)]
The Rule on the Writ of Amparo explicitly states that the violation of or threat to the
right to life, liberty and security may be caused by either an act or an omission of a public
official. In Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo, this Court found that the right to security of a
person includes the positive obligation of the government to ensure the observance of the duty
to investigate xxx. Foregoing considered, the petitioners, PC/Supt. Tabian, PS/Supt. Enong,
and PS/Supt. Gran failed in their duty. (Tabian v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 247211, August 1, 2022)
[Note: After making the investigation report, petitioners PC/Supt. Tabian, PS/Supt. Enong, and
PS/Supt. Gran closed Joselito's case without detailing the facts and circumstances that led to the failed
buy-bust operation, shoot-out, and ultimately, his death. Additionally, the team leaders, P/Insp. Dogwe
and PS/Insp. Garcia, along with the unnamed John Doe members of the buy-bust team were all
exonerated on the basis of self-defense in this report.
No further action was commenced by the aforementioned police officers during their tenure in
office and by their successors, despite directives to reopen investigation by General Dela Rosa till present
day, evidencing their negligence to dutifully perform their duties as superiors, despite their defense that
they were about to retire when the incident occurred during their term.
Their omission in failing to further investigate Joselito's case despite directives violated
respondent's right to security and makes them accountable for the death of Joselito. (Tabian v. Gonzales,
G.R. No. 247211, August 1, 2022)]
[Note: The fact that respondent and Joselito were previously arrested for selling illegal drugs is
beside the point. As stated earlier, even if the respondent committed a crime, the petitioners, as law
enforcement agents, are not at liberty to disregard the respondent's constitutionally guaranteed rights to
life, liberty and security. (Tabian v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 247211, August 1, 2022)]
In sum, this Court affirms the finding of the CA that petitioners P/Insp. Dogwe, PO2
Canilon, and the John Doe members of the Antipolo CPS AIDSTOF and the Provincial
Operating Unit Team part of the buy-bust team conducted on July 5, 2018 are responsible for
the extralegal killing of Joselito. Further, we recommend the filing of the appropriate civil,
criminal, and administrative cases against them. (Tabian v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 247211, August 1,
2022)
[Note: This Court also agrees with the finding of the CA that petitioners SPO1 Cadag and PO2
Canilon are responsible for threatening to violate petitioner's rights to life, liberty, and security. In line
with the ruling in Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo, in failing to conduct a proper investigation and
reinvestigation during their tenure, PC/Supt. Tabian, PS/Supt. Enong, and PS/Supt. Gran, who served in
their corresponding positions as Acting Regional Director of the PNP Regional Office IV-A, Officer-in-
Charge (OIC) of the Rizal PNP Provincial Office and Police Superintendent and OIC of Antipolo Station
respectively, are also accountable for violating the respondent's rights to life, liberty, and security as they
failed to extend that protection provided under the law to victims of extralegal killings or enforced
disappearances. (Tabian v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 247211, August 1, 2022)]
Administrative Supervision
It is recognized that if the acts complained of arose from respondents' performance or

discharge of official duties as prosecutors of the Department of Justice, the Secretary of Justice
(SOJ) as their superior has the authority to discipline them. The authority may also pertain to
the Office of the Ombudsman, which similarly exercises disciplinary jurisdiction over them as
public officials, pursuant to Section 15, paragraph 1 of Republic Act No. 6770 or The
Ombudsman Act of 1989. It is therefore imperative that respondents' accountability as officials
performing or discharging their official duties be differentiated from their accountability as
members of the Bar.
As pointed out xxx, however, while the Court's jurisdiction to discipline erring members
of the Bar is not lost by the fact that the lawyers are also public officials, the Court should defer
from resolving respondents' administrative liability as members of the Bar in this case, since to
do so, at this time, would preclude the Secretary of Justice or the Ombudsman from ruling on
their administrative liability as public officials. Moreover, the Court is not powerless to dismiss
an administrative disciplinary complaint against a government lawyer if the same lacks merit.
(Crusade Against Violence v. Tajanlangit, A.C. No. 6616, February 16, 2022)
Further, Section 5 (5), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution vests on the Supreme Court
the exclusive authority to regulate the practice of law. xxx.
Respondent thus cannot exculpate himself from liability by invoking his employment in
government. Complainants charge respondent for his omission in violation of the CPR, and not
because respondent was a lawyer from the PAO. Canon 18 of the CPR states that "[a] lawyer
shall serve his [or her] client with competence and diligence." In recognition of his imprudence,
respondent admitted that he fell short of the highest standard of professional conduct in the
performance of his duties as a PAO lawyer in the service of complainants. We also reiterate the
directive found in Rule 18.03 the CPR: "A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to
him [or her], and his [or her] negligence in connection therewith shall render him [or her]
liable." Clearly, respondent should have been more circumspect in handling complainants'
case. (Salutan v. Alzate, Jr., A.C. No. 13367, August 31, 2022)
As preliminarily discussed, judicial clemency is granted based on a policy framework

created solely by the Court pursuant to its constitutional power of: (a) administrative
supervision over all courts and all personnel thereof with respect to dismissed judiciary
employees; and (b) regulation of the legal profession with respect to disbarred lawyers. In
deciding whether to grant clemency, the Court endeavors to strike a balance between extending
an act of mercy to an individual on the one hand, and on the other hand, preserving public
confidence in the courts, as well as the legal profession. Certainly, safeguarding the integrity of
the courts and the legal profession is an indispensable consideration in this assessment. Hence,
the petitioner should convincingly hurdle a high bar to be granted judicial clemency. (In Re:
Anonymous Letter dated August 12, 2010, A.M. No. RTJ-11-2289 [Formerly OCA IPI No. 11-3656-
RTJ]. February 15, 2022)
It is well-settled that judicial clemency is neither a right nor a privilege that may be
availed of at any time by erring lawyers or judges. Clemency rests in the sound discretion of the
Court after weighing the merits thereof against the preservation of the public confidence in the
judicial system. (Department of Justice v. Mislang, A.M. No. RTJ-14-2369 (Formerly OCA IPI No.
12-3907-RTJ). February 15, 2022)
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
Employment
However, it should be noted that the Court has already abandoned Lopez in the 2016
case of National Transmission Corp. v. Commission on Audit, where it held that rather than the
four-fold test and the other standards provided in the Labor Code, it is the special and civil
service laws, rules, and regulations which primarily determine the relationship between the
government and its alleged employees. (Civil Service Commission v. Annang, G.R. No. 225895,
September 28, 2022)
[Note: Here, the contract between Dr. Annang and CSU expressly provided that it was entered
into because "it is not possible to hire on casual or contractual basis, and that it is done in the exigency of
service." Given such circumstance, CSU was allowed by CSC Resolution No. 021480 to engage Dr.
Annang as a part-time faculty member under a contract of service. Hence, it is incorrect to argue that
because Dr. Annang's services were integral to the function of CSU as a university, she cannot be engaged
through a contract of service. xxx. (Civil Service Commission v. Annang, G.R. No. 225895, September
28, 2022)]
[Note: More importantly, it is incorrect to disregard the stipulations in the contract, particularly
that there would be no employer-employee relationship between the parties; that Dr. Annang's service
will not be credited as government service; that she will not be entitled to the benefits enjoyed by the
regular personnel of CSU; and that the contract is not subject to civil service laws, rules, and regulations.
While it is true that the employment status of a person is defined and prescribed by law and not by what
the parties say it should be, it is equally true that courts cannot stipulate for the parties nor amend their
agreement for to do so would alter their true intention. This especially applies here where the
engagement of Dr. Annang was done pursuant to a specific arrangement fully recognized by CSC rules.
(Civil Service Commission v. Annang, G.R. No. 225895, September 28, 2022)]
[Note: Since CSC MC No. 40-98, CSC Resolution No. 020790, and CSC Resolution No. 021480 all
provide that work pursuant to a contract of service may not be credited as government service, it follows
that Dr. Annang's work as a part-time faculty member cannot be accredited as such. Unless these rules
are invalidated in the proper proceeding, they are presumed valid and thus control. (Civil Service
Commission v. Annang, G.R. No. 225895, September 28, 2022)]
Thereafter, on July 12, 2012, she availed of the provisions of R.A. No. 9225 by taking an Oath of Allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines before the Consul General, Philippine Consulate in Toronto, Canada. As per Order TO-
RA9225-476-12, issued by Consul General Junever M. Mahilum-West, her petition filed under the said law was
granted and she was "deemed to have retained her Philippine citizenship." In recognition of her Filipino citizenship
after complying with the procedure and requirements of R.A. No. 9225 as implemented by Administrative Order
No. 91, series of 2004 and MC Nos. AFF-2004-01 and AFF-05-002 issued by the Department of Foreign
Affairs (DFA), she was issued Identification Certificate No. 560-07-12.
Given her previous compliance with the procedure and requirements of R.A. No. 9225
as implemented by the DFA, and the latter's declaration that she had thereby retained her
Philippine citizenship, even issuing an Identification Certificate for that purpose, Shotwell had
all the reason to believe that she is a Filipino citizen when she made the statement in her PDS in
connection with her application for the position with the DBP on February 13, 2013. And
despite petitioners' questions regarding the validity of her re-acquisition of Philippine
citizenship, which involve the interpretation of Sec. 5 (3) of R.A. No. 9225, it cannot be said that
Shotwell's statement as to her Filipino citizenship in the PDS is absolutely false, or that she
"knowingly made an untruthful statement." (Development Bank of the Philippines v. Office of the
Ombudsman, G.R. Nos. 228304-05, June 15, 2022)
[Note: It must be mentioned that when Shotwell applied for and was appointed to a government
position in 2013, existing jurisprudence interpreting Sec. 5 of R.A. No. 9225 all involved cases falling
under Sec. 5 (2), or those persons who have retained or re-acquired their Philippine citizenship and are
seeking elective positions in government. Such situation was recognized by the CSC when it issued CSC
Resolution No. 1600908 dated August 11, 2016, entitled Policy on Employment in the Government Service of
Filipino Citizens with Dual Citizenships. Pertinent portions of its whereas clauses read:
WHEREAS, Item 3, Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9225, otherwise known as the
Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003 states that those appointed to any public
office shall subscribe and swear to an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and its
duly constituted authorities prior to their assumption of office; provided that they renounce their
oath of allegiance to the country where they took that oath;
WHEREAS, a review of the jurisprudence involving cases of government officials and

employees with dual citizenships showed that such cases are limited to elective officials only;
WHEREAS, despite the implementation of RA 9225, there are no cases filed against dual
citizens appointed in the government service; and that there are no monitoring mechanisms
installed to identify government officials and employees with dual citizenships;
WHEREAS, the Commission has received queries and clarifications on the employment
status of those with dual citizenships working in the government; xxx xxx xxx
There being no executive issuance or jurisprudence on the correct application and interpretation
of Sec. 5 (3) concerning those seeking appointive positions in government at the time, Shotwell's reliance
on the regulations then being implemented by the DFA indicate good faith on her part and lack of
malicious intent in declaring herself as a Filipino citizen. Thus, the elements that the facts narrated in the
document be absolutely false, and that the narration be made with intent to injure, are not
present. (Development Bank of the Philippines v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. Nos. 228304-05, June 15,
2022)]
De Facto Officers
Moreover, the application of the doctrine of de facto officer is misplaced.
In Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, this Court explained the de facto doctrine:
During their tenure in the questioned positions, respondents may be considered de

facto officers and as such entitled to emoluments for actual services rendered. It has been held
that "in cases where there is no de jure officer, a de facto officer, who, in good faith has had
possession of the office and has discharged the duties pertaining thereto, is legally entitled to the
emoluments of the office, and may in an appropriate action recover the salary, fees and other
compensations attached to the office. This doctrine is, undoubtedly, supported on equitable
grounds since it seems unjust that the public should benefit by the services of an officer de
facto and then be freed from all liability to pay any one for such services. Any per diem,
allowances or other emoluments received by the respondents by virtue of actual services
rendered in the questioned positions may therefore be retained by them.
This doctrine presupposes an election or appointment to some office. Here, Masagnay

was never appointed or elected to occupy Insigne's position. At the time he signed the
compliance certificates, he was already the commissioner for Southern and Eastern Mindanao.
Insigne could not have appointed Masagnay as a de facto officer as he had no power to appoint
anyone to the position he occupied. Masagnay was merely designated as the officer-in-charge
during Insigne's absence. (Shenzhou Mining Group Corp. v. Mamanwa Tribes of Barangays Taganito
and Urbiztondo, G.R. No. 206685, March 16, 2022)
[Note: Here, public respondent Commission correctly considered the extent of Masagnay's
authority during the proceedings to cancel the compliance certificate issued to petitioner. This is
particularly crucial in this case, where the proceedings were initiated by respondents Mamanwa Tribes
whose consent to the exploitation of natural resources within their ancestral domain was indispensable.
Voiding the certificate and ordering petitioner to desist from further mining activities within
respondents' ancestral domain are in keeping with the Commission's statutory mandate to protect the
interest and wellbeing of indigenous peoples and indigenous cultural communities. (Shenzhou Mining
Group Corp. v. Mamanwa Tribes of Barangays Taganito and Urbiztondo, G.R. No. 206685, March 16, 2022)]
The lis mota of this instant petition boils down to the determination of whether Dr. Lamela was a de facto officer
from the time his temporary appointment expired on 11 September 2013.
[Note: Civil Service Commission v. Joson, Jr. traced the historical underpinnings of the concept of
a de facto officer —
The broad definition of what constitutes an officer de facto was formulated by Lord Holt
in Parker v. Kent, and reiterated by Lord Ellenborough and full King's Bench in 1865 in Rex v.
Bedford Level, "One who has the reputation of being the officer he assumes and yet is not a good
officer in point of law." A de facto officer is one who is in possession of the office and discharging
its duties under color of authority. By color of authority is meant that derived from an election or
appointment, however irregular or informal, so that the incumbent is not a mere volunteer.
The difference between the basis of the authority of a de jure officer and that of a de
facto officer is that one rests on right, the other on reputation. It may be likened to the difference
between character and reputation. One is the truth of a man, the other is what is thought of him."
It is the color of authority, not the color of title that distinguishes an officer de facto from a
usurper.
As early as the 1917 case of Luna v. Rodriguez, the concept of a de facto officer was engraved in our
jurisprudence to contemplate a person whose acts —
xxx [T]hough not those of a lawful officer, the law, upon principles of policy and justice
will hold valid so far as they involve the interest of the public and third persons, where the duties
of the office were exercised: (a) Without a known appointment or election, but under such
circumstances of reputation or acquiescence as were calculated to induce people, without
inquiry, to submit to or invoke his action, supposing him to be the officer he assumes to be; (b)
under color of a known or valid appointment or election, where the officer has failed to conform
to some precedent requirement or conditions, for example, a failure to take the oath of give a
bond or similar defect; (c) under color of a known election or appointment, void because the
officer was not eligible, or because there was a want of power in the electing or appointing body,
or by reason of some defect or irregularity in its exercise, such ineligibility, want of power or
defect being unknown to the public; and (d) under color of an election, or appointment, by or
pursuant to a public unconstitutional law, before the same is adjudged to be such. (Alameda v.
Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 254394, April 5, 2022)]
The Court resorts to the de facto officer doctrine to accord validity to the actions of a de
facto officer during the period of such officer's wrongful tenure, insofar as the public or third
persons are concerned. This principle was born of necessity, as the public cannot be expected to
investigate the right of a public official to an office before transacting with them. Thus, on the
basis of public policy and convenience, the public may assume that officials are legally qualified
and in office.
With the continuous reliance on this jurisprudential precept, the Court, in Tuanda v.
Sandiganbayan required the presence of the following elements for the application of the de
facto officer doctrine, viz.: (1) there must be a de jure office; (2) there must be a color of right or
general acquiescence by the public; and (3) there must be actual physical possession of the office
in good faith. (Alameda v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 254394, April 5, 2022)
Here, the COA ruled that Dr. Lamela cannot be regarded as a de facto officer, explicating
that:
In the case of Tuanda v. Sandiganbayan, the Supreme Court reiterated the elements and
conditions for the application of the de facto officership as follows:
1) There must be a de jure office;

2) There must be color of authority/right; and
3) There must be actual physical possession of the office in good faith.
As to the first element, the office of the Municipal Health Officer (MHO) is a de jure office
because the position of an MHO is provided under Sections 443 (a) and 478 of Republic Act No.
7160.
As to the second element, the color of authority is derived from an election or

appointment, however irregular or informal, so that the incumbent is not a mere volunteer. In
this case, Dr. Lamela did not have a color of authority as MHO, as there was no appointment
after the lapse of the one year period of his temporary appointment. The appointment of Dr.
[Lamela] was temporary in nature that, by law, it automatically expires after 12 month, pursuant
to Section 27(2), Chapter 5, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of Executive No. 292. xxx
Hence, the color of authority was present only during the period of the temporary
appointment of Dr. Lamela, and was lost upon its expiration.
As to the third element, this Commission cannot consider good faith on the part of Dr.
Lamela as he also knew that his appointment was temporary. However, equity dictates that Dr.
Lamela is entitled to just compensation for actual services rendered as MHO. Thus, he is not
liable to return the money already paid to him."
Indubitably, the COA failed to quote in its entirety the second requisite laid down
in Tuanda v. Sandiganbayan, i.e., there must be a color of right or general acquiescence by the
public. Thus, there is nary a doubt that mere general acquiescence suffices. xxx.
In sooth, the stance taken by the COA that Dr. Lamela was not a de facto officer fades
into thin air. Its proffered reasoning that the appointment of Dr. Lamela had no badge of
authority, while completely overlooking the general acquiescence by the public, is plain
sophistry. So, too, We find that the COA erred in ordering herein petitioners to refund the
amount of P1,248,085.69, corresponding to the salaries and personnel benefits of Dr.
Lamela. (Alameda v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 254394, April 5, 2022)
Government Agencies
It is noticeable that the above-mentioned provision (Section 234 (a) of the Local
Government Code) also contains a limitation to the exemption granted to the Republic or any of
its political subdivisions when the beneficial use of the real property it owns is granted to a
taxable person. At this point, it must be clarified that the term Republic likewise includes
government instrumentalities as held in Philippine Heart Center v. The Local Government of Quezon
City. Clearly, government instrumentalities are exempt from real property tax but the
exemption shall not extend to taxable private entities to whom the beneficial use of the
government instrumentality's properties has been vested. (Unimasters Conglomeration, Inc. v.
Tacloban City Government, G.R. No. 214195, March 23, 2022)
Certainly, the hotel, which is the subject matter of this case, is owned in common by the
Province of Leyte, which is a political subdivision, and by PMO and PTA, both government
instrumentalities that are exempt from payment of real property taxes. The subsequent
execution of a Contract of Lease between the co-owners of LPHI and UCI, a private entity, did
not divest the former of their exemption from realty taxes, only that the hotel lost the exemption
from being taxed and the burden to pay the taxes due thereon, passed on to UCI as the
beneficial user thereof. (Unimasters Conglomeration, Inc. v. Tacloban City Government, G.R. No.
214195, March 23, 2022)
[Note: In MWSS v. Central Board of Assessment Appeals, We emphasized that while the liability for
taxes generally falls on the owner of the real property, personal liability for real property taxes may also
expressly rest on the entity with the beneficial use of the real property at the time the tax accrues.
(Unimasters Conglomeration, Inc. v. Tacloban City Government, G.R. No. 214195, March 23, 2022)]
[Note: In the more recent case of Estampador v. City of Manila, We distinguished who between the
property owner and the beneficial user the tax liability falls. Citing once again the case of Philippine Heart
Center, We reiterated that it is the taxable person with the beneficial use who shall be responsible for the
payment of real property taxes due on government properties. Since tax collection is a personal action,
the tax authority should go after the taxable person.
Here, as correctly pointed out by the CTA En Banc, the tax exemption, which the owners of LPHI
carry, is withdrawn the moment the beneficial use or possession over the real property was granted to
petitioner, a taxable entity. From then on, tax liability accrued and the corresponding duty for the
payment of the real property tax devolved on petitioner as the taxable beneficial user and possessor
thereof. (Unimasters Conglomeration, Inc. v. Tacloban City Government, G.R. No. 214195, March 23, 2022)]
From the foregoing, it is apparent that the primary test in determining whether an entity
is a GOCC is how it was organized. In other words, the 2006 MIAA Case provides that unless a
government instrumentality was organized as a stock or non-stock corporation, then it must not
be considered as a GOCC as defined in the Administrative Code.
A cursory perusal of the LRTA charter would reveal that it was not organized as a stock
corporation because it has no capital stock divided into shares. In fact, the LRTA has no
stockholders or voting shares. xxx. Since the LRTA is neither a stock nor a non-stock
corporation, LRTA does not qualify as a GOCC. (Light Rail Transit Authority v. City of Pasay, G.R.
No. 211299, June 28, 2022)
An agency of the government refers to "any of the various units of the Government,
including a department, bureau, office, instrumentality, or government-owned or controlled
corporation, or a local government or a distinct unit therein." There is no dispute that LRTA is
a unit of the government. It performs public service, it is attached to the Department of
Transportation (DOTr), and its authorized capital is fully subscribed by the Republic of the
Philippines. xxx. As previously explained, LRTA is not a GOCC precisely because it is neither
a stock nor non-stock corporation. LRTA is also not integrated within the departmental
framework despite being attached to the DOTr, as will be discussed in detail later. xxx. LRTA
is given the primary responsibility for the "construction, operation, maintenance, and/or lease
of light rail transit systems in the Philippines, giving due regard to the reasonable
requirements of the public transportation system of the country." xxx. LRTA was specifically
created as a "corporate body" that is capable, among others, to prescribe and modify its own
by-laws, to sue and be sued, and to contract any obligation. xxx. LRTA is capitalized by up to
P3,000,000,000.00, and is tasked to manage its own revenues to meet its expenditures, to
contract domestic and foreign loans to carry out its operations, and to establish a sinking fund
to redeem bonds it issues. xxx. As held in the 2019 LRTA Case, LRTA exists by virtue of a
charter and its powers and functions are vested in and exercised by its Board of Directors
independent of outside interference.
Undoubtedly, in light of the ruling in 2006 MIAA Case and the statutory definition
under the GOCC Governance Act of 2011, We conclude that LRTA is a government
instrumentality vested with corporate powers to perform efficiently its governmental
functions. LRTA is like any other government instrumentality, the only difference is that LRTA
is vested with corporate powers. (Light Rail Transit Authority v. City of Pasay, G.R. No. 211299,
June 28, 2022)
[Note: Clearly, the general rule that tax exemption is strictly construed against the taxpayer
claiming the exemption does not apply in the instant case, as the legislature itself created an exemption to
national government instrumentalities from local taxation. Thus, such exemption is construed liberally in
favor of national government instrumentalities, which includes LRTA.xxx. The properties of LRTA are
properties of public dominion and therefore owned by the State or the Republic of the Philippines. xxx.
Thus, the inescapable conclusion is that the properties of the LRTA are not merely patrimonial properties,
but are properties of the public dominion that cannot be subjected to real property tax. (Light Rail Transit
Authority v. City of Pasay, G.R. No. 211299, June 28, 2022)]
[Note: The Republic may grant the beneficial use of its real property to an agency or
instrumentality of the national government. This happens when title of the real property is transferred to
an agency or instrumentality even as the Republic remains the owner of the real property. Such
arrangement does not result in the loss of the tax exemption privilege. Section 234 (a) of the Local
Government Code states that real property owned by the Republic loses its tax exemption only if the
"beneficial use thereof has been granted, for consideration or otherwise, to a taxable person." LRTA, as a
government instrumentality, is not a taxable person under Section 133 (o) of the LGC. Thus, even if We
assume that the Republic has granted to LRTA the beneficial use of the LRT properties, such fact does not
make these real properties subject to real estate tax.|(Light Rail Transit Authority v. City of Pasay, G.R. No.
211299, June 28, 2022)]
[Note: However, portions of the LRT properties that LRTA leases to private entities are not
exempt from real estate tax. For example, the land area occupied by private concessionaires in certain
LRT lines and terminals should be subject to real estate tax. In such a case, LRTA has granted the
beneficial use of such land area for a consideration to a taxable person and therefore such land area is
subject to real estate tax, which, if only to be clear and as pointed out by J. Caguioa, must consequently be
paid by said taxable person; not LRTA. |However, portions of the LRT properties that LRTA leases to
private entities are not exempt from real estate tax. For example, the land area occupied by private
concessionaires in certain LRT lines and terminals should be subject to real estate tax. In such a case,
LRTA has granted the beneficial use of such land area for a consideration to a taxable person and
therefore such land area is subject to real estate tax, which, if only to be clear and as pointed out
by J. Caguioa, must consequently be paid by said taxable person; not LRTA. (Light Rail Transit Authority v.
City of Pasay, G.R. No. 211299, June 28, 2022)]
.|||
[Note: To summarize, under Section 2 (10) and (13) of the Introductory Provisions of
the Administrative Code, which governs the legal relation and status of government units, agencies and
offices within the entire government machinery, LRTA is a government instrumentality, and not a GOCC.
Under Section 133 (o) of the LGC, LRTA as a government instrumentality is not a taxable person because
it is not subject to "[t]axes, fees or charges of any kind" by local governments. The only exception is when
LRTA grants the beneficial use of its real property to a "taxable person" as provided in Section 234 (a) of
the LGC, in which case, the specific real property leased becomes subject to real property tax, which must
be paid by the "taxable person" as stressed by J. Caguioa. Thus, only portions of the LRT leased to taxable
persons like private parties are subject to real property tax by the City.
Under Article 420 of the Civil Code, the rail roads and terminals of the LRT, being devoted to
public use, are properties of public dominion and thus owned by the State or the Republic of the
Philippines. Article 420, while not specifically mentioning "rail roads" or "rail road tracks," allow for the
inclusion of properties of a similar character. LRT rail roads, which necessarily include its terminals, are
of a similar character to public roads, as both are devoted for public use and both facilitate transportation
through certain vehicles. In any event, the LRT is owned by the State through the LRTA, as its agent, and
is definitely intended for some public service, which is to provide mass transportation to the people to
alleviate the traffic and transportation situation in Metro Manila. Therefore, being properties of public
dominion owned by the Republic, there is no doubt that the LRT rail roads and terminals are expressly
exempt from real estate tax under Section 234 (a) of the LGC, subject to the rule discussed above, and are
not subject to execution or foreclosure sale. (Light Rail Transit Authority v. City of Pasay, G.R. No. 211299,
June 28, 2022)]
Disciplinary Proceedings
We note that the formal charge was only filed after the allegations in the anonymous
letter was verified and properly substantiated by competent evidence. Section 9 of the Revised
Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service provides that the head of agencies
has the authority to take cognizance of complaints involving their respective personnel. When
Administrator Carmelita N. Ericta, as head of NSO, commenced an investigation based on the
anonymous complaint, she was well within her authority to do so.
Furthermore, the anonymous letter in this case was not the complaint within the
purview of Section 8, Rule II of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service,
which requires compliance of formalities before it can be acted upon. However, it may be used
as a basis for an investigation, as what happened in this case, that culminated into the filing of
the administrative complaint. The instant administrative complaint is deemed to have been
initiated by the NSO itself after its fact-finding investigation.
Indeed, while the letter-complaint is just a plain and simple letter filed through the
internet, to say that information in an anonymous complaint cannot be acted upon because it
was from an anonymous writer and because it lacks formal niceties, would effectively deprive
the Government of its disciplining power over people who hold a public trust. (Longasa v. Civil
Service Commission, G.R. No. 233145, February 14, 2022)
Appeals
As correctly posited by Maaliw, the CSC Decision and Resolution are appealable to the
CA through a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. This is consistent with
Section 9 (3) of Batas Pambansa Blg. (BP) 129| (Fernandez v. Maaliw, G.R. No. 248852, March 9,
2022])
[Note: At the outset, We find the Petition (before the Supreme Court from the CSC) to be compliant
with the requirements of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. (Fernandez v. Maaliw, G.R. No. 248852, March 9,
2022)]
Hence, in both the old and amended versions of the RRACCS, the right to question the
decisions of both the CSC ROs and the CSC in disciplinary proceedings is not expressly limited
only to the "party adversely affected," but also extends to the private complainant, as expressed
by the use of the generic term, "party." This is also consistent with the most recent
pronouncements of this Court in Light Rail Transit Authority, Philippine National
Bank, and Constantino-David, as discussed above. Therefore, the CA committed no error when it
gave due course to Maaliw's appeal questioning the CSC Decision and Resolution. (Fernandez v.
Maaliw, G.R. No. 248852, March 9, 2022)
The record shows that Fernandez was not afforded the right to a hearing, which should
have followed the procedure provided in the RRACCS. Specifically, Fernandez, before being
found liable for neglect of duty, should have been issued a Formal Charge under Rule 5 of
the RRACCS. Thereafter, she should have been allowed to file an Answer under Rule 6 of
the RRACCS. The CSC may also conduct a Formal Investigation under Rule 8 of
the RRACCS. (Fernandez v. Maaliw, G.R. No. 248852, March 9, 2022)
Double Compensation
Further, since petitioners merely served in an ex-officio capacity in the Board, it follows
that they have no right to receive additional compensation or benefits for it, such being part and
parcel of their principal office. To rule otherwise would contravene the constitutional
proscription against double compensation.
Petitioners repeatedly argue that the Civil Liberties Union case is inapplicable, since they
are not Cabinet members; however, this Court, in a long line of cases, has already applied the
double compensation prohibition to positions outside the Cabinet. Thus, this argument
likewise fails. (Suratos v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 253584, March 1, 2022)
[Note: Petitioners argue that since the foregoing provision did not expressly prohibit the grant of
other benefits, the Court should not construe it restrictively. This argument fails, pursuant to the basic
rules of construction that the express mention of one thing excludes all others (expressio unius est exclusio
alterius), and that a thing omitted must have been omitted intentionally (casus omissus pro omisso habendus
est). Since P.D. No. 1080 only specifically authorized the payment of per diem to board members, then
only such could be granted. This is in keeping with the principle that the power of any corporation
created by special law to adopt a compensation scheme is limited by the specific provisions in the
legislative act. (Suratos v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 253584, March 1, 2022)]
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
Admittedly, the OEC took effect under the aegis of the 1973 Constitution which
presented a unicameral legislative branch composed of members of the Batasan Pambansa.
However, this factual milieu does not automatically render the OEC inoperative after the 1987
Constitution shifted to a bicameral legislature consisting of the members of the House of
Representatives and the Senate. A different approach will only result in the absurd and illogical
distinction between members of the legislative department. To stress, Section 2 of
the OEC categorically states that it "shall govern all elections of public officers and, to the extent
appropriate, all referenda and plebiscites.” In Agujetas v. Court of Appeals, the Court noted that
the OEC "has undergone some amendments, basically by the 1987 Constitution, Republic Act No. 6646,
otherwise known as 'The Electoral Reform Law of 1987,' and RA No. 7166, providing for synchronized
national and local elections on May 11, 1992." The Court then clarified that "[w]hile legislations have
been enacted every time an election for elective officials is scheduled, the Omnibus Election Code remains
the fundamental law on the subject and such pieces of legislation are designed to improve the law and to
achieve the holding of free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections." (De Alban v. Commission on
Elections, G.R. No. 243968, March 22, 2022)
[Note: To be sure, Section 2 of RA No. 6646 is explicit that the OEC shall govern the elections
under the 1987 Constitution, to wit: "Section 2. Law Governing Elections. — The first local elections under
the New Constitution and all subsequent elections and plebiscites shall be governed by this Act and by the
provisions of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, otherwise known as the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines, and
other election laws not inconsistent with this Act." Also, Section 36 of RA No. 7166 reiterated OEC's
applicability in the synchronized May 1992 elections, thus: "Section 36. Governing Laws. — The elections
provided herein and all subsequent elections and plebiscite shall be governed by this Act, by the provisions of the
Omnibus Election Code, Republic Act No. 6646, and other election laws not inconsistent herewith." Section 36
of RA No. 8436, as amended by RA No. 9369, likewise applied the provisions of the OEC that are not
inconsistent with the law on automated elections, viz.: "Section 36. Applicability. — The provisions of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 881, as amended, otherwise known as the 'Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines,' and other
election laws not inconsistent with this Act shall apply." Taken together, the OEC remains the fundamental
law on elections despite the passage of the 1987 Constitution and the enactment of subsequent
statutes. Hence, contrary to De Alban's theory, the OEC applies to elections of all public officers
including senatorial candidates. (De Alban v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 243968, March 22, 2022)]
Jurisdiction
Section 2 (2), Article IX-C, the Constitution, vests appellate jurisdiction in the COMELEC
over all contests involving elective municipal officials decided by trial courts of general
jurisdiction, thus:
'SECTION 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and
functions:
xxx xxx xxx
(2) Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections,
returns, and qualifications of all elective regional, provincial, and city officials, and appellate
jurisdiction over all contests involving elective municipal officials decided by trial courts of
general jurisdiction, or involving elective barangay officials decided by trial courts of limited
jurisdiction.
Decisions, final orders, or rulings of the Commission on election contests involving

elective municipal and barangay offices shall be final, executory, and not appealable. xxx'
The Rules of Court likewise provides that a petition for certiorari in election cases
involving an act or an omission of a municipal or regional trial court shall be filed exclusively
with the COMELEC in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. Corollarily, the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure states that the COMELEC may hear and decide petitions for certiorari and prohibition
or mandamus in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, and allows the COMELEC, through its
Divisions, to issue injunctive reliefs, and exercise contempt powers. (Esquivel v. Commission on
Elections (2nd Division), G.R. No. 255307, March 29, 2022)
Certificates of Candidacy
When the COMELEC receives or acknowledges receipt of COCs and CONAs filed in
due form, it performs the administrative function of enforcement and administration of all laws
and regulations pertaining to the conduct of an election. Section 76 of the Omnibus Election
Code in relation to Section 32 of Resolution No. 10717 provides:
Omnibus Election Code, Section 76:
Sec. 76. Ministerial duty of receiving and acknowledging receipt. — The Commission,
provincial election supervisor, election registrar or officer designated by the Commission or the
board of election inspectors under the succeeding section shall have the ministerial duty to
receive and acknowledge receipt of the certificate of candidacy.
COMELEC Resolution No. 10717, Section 32:
Section 32. Ministerial Duty of Receiving and Acknowledging Receipt of Certificates of

Candidacy/Nomination and Acceptance. — The Receiving Officer has the ministerial duty to
receive and acknowledge the receipt of the COC and CONA; Provided that they are filed in
conformity with the rules and regulations.
Based thereon, the COMELEC must receive COCs and CONAs provided they are filed
in conformity with the rules and regulations. Thus, we agree with the COMELEC when it
asserted that up to the point when it received Ayson's COC and CONA (which it accorded with
the presumption of regularity for having been notarized), it merely performed its ministerial
function under the foregoing provisions. (Aggabao v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 258456,
July 26, 2022)
[Note: A ministerial act is one which an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a
prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of his
or her own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done. (Aggabao v. Commission on
Elections, G.R. No. 258456, July 26, 2022)]
[Note: To repeat, because Ayson's COC and CONA appeared to be regular on their face, the
COMELEC had no recourse but to accept them. Up to that point, no grave abuse of discretion could be
ascribed to the COMELEC simply because there was no occasion for the exercise of such discretion to
come into play. (Aggabao v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 258456, July 26, 2022)]
But following the acceptance of Ayson's COC and CONA, supervening events took
place which necessarily called for the COMELEC's exercise of its discretionary power vis-à-
vis the performance of its quasi-judicial functions, viz.: Senator Lacson, Chairperson of Partido
Reporma, disclaimed the CONA allegedly issued by Partido Reporma to Ayson; and he sought
the COMELEC's "immediate action" and requested that "the necessary correction/s be made in
the [COMELEC's] Certified List of Candidates." In fine, Senator Lacson was seeking a
resolution of a controversy which affected the candidacy of Ayson and Navarro, and
subsequently, Aggabao.
As astutely observed by Associate Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa (Justice Caguioa)

during our deliberation, when Senator Lacson sent his letters to the COMELEC challenging the
validity or authenticity of the CONA of Ayson, a legal controversy had then come to fore, i.e.,
which of the respective CONAs of Ayson and Navarro should prevail? To be sure, this legal
controversy required the COMELEC to look beyond the face of these CONAs. On this score,
Section 2 of Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution empowers the COMELEC to exercise
jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of all elective
officials, and to decide all questions affecting elections. It is mandated to "investigate and,
where appropriate, prosecute cases of violations of elections laws, including acts or omissions
constituting election frauds, offenses and malpractices." Thus, even after its acceptance of
Ayson's CONA, which initially appeared to be regular, the COMELEC became duty bound to
take cognizance of, and investigate, the material information coming from Senator Lacson that
Partido Reporma had not issued any CONA in favor of Ayson. (Aggabao v. Commission on
Elections, G.R. No. 258456, July 26, 2022)
In this regard, where the situation calls for the power of the COMELEC to exercise its
judgment or discretion involving a determination of fact, or resolution of
controversies where parties adduce evidence in support of their contentious, the COMELEC
ought to perform its quasi-judicial functions. In Francisco v. COMELEC, we pronounced:
The COMELEC's adjudicative function over election contests is quasi-judicial in character

since the COMELEC is a governmental body, other than a court, that is vested with jurisdiction to
decide the specific class of controversies it is charged with resolving. In adjudicating the rights of
persons before it, the COMELEC is not just empowered but is in fact required to investigate
facts or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, weigh evidence, and draw conclusions
from them as basis for their official action and exercise of discretion in a judicial nature. This
is simply in congruence with the concept of due process that all administrative adjudicatory
bodies are enjoined to observe.
The COMELEC is, thus, fully-clothed with authority to make factual determinations in
relation to the election contests before it. This has been the thrust of the decades worth of
constitutional revisions that transformed the COMELEC from a purely administrative body,
whose scope of decision-making is limited to those incidental to its duty to enforce election laws,
to a polling commission that also exercises original and exclusive, as well as appellate,
jurisdiction over election contests.
Baytan v. COMELEC echoed the rule that in the exercise of its quasi-judicial power, the
COMELEC should reckon with Section 3 of Article IX-C of the Constitution. This provision
requires all election cases, including pre-proclamation controversies, to be decided by the
COMELEC in Division; and the motion for reconsideration, by the COMELEC En Banc.
(Aggabao v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 258456, July 26, 2022)
[Note: Again, as correctly pointed out by Justice Caguioa, the COMELEC En Banc had, in several
instances, referred matters to its Divisions for hearing. The COMELEC, therefore, should have similarly
referred the administrative matter in this case to a Division and docketed the same as an election case,
heard the parties thereon, and thereafter resolved the material issue as to who between Ayson and
Navarro, and subsequently Aggabao was the real mayoralty candidate of Partido Reporma. That the
COMELEC rules may be silent on how these conflicting CONAS and the disavowals of the concerned
political party may be resolved did not justify its inaction. All it needed to do was adhere to the due
process requisites of notice and hearing attendant to every adjudication it does in the exercise of its quasi-
judicial functions. In Engle v. COMELEC, we held that in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions, the
COMELEC is mandated to hear and decide cases first by Division and, on motion for reconsideration, by
the COMELEC En Banc. The Court further stressed that the opinion of the COMELEC Law Department is
not binding and at most, is merely recommendatory. The COMELEC En Banc cannot short cut
proceedings by acting without prior action by a Division because this deprives the candidate of due
process. (Aggabao v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 258456, July 26, 2022)]
[Note: In Cerafica v. COMELEC, which involved the cancellation of COCs via minute resolutions
simply adopting the recommendations of the COMELEC Law Department, the Court ruled that the
COMELEC gravely abused its discretion because such situations properly called for the referral of the
case to a Division for summary hearing. (Aggabao v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 258456, July 26,
2022)]
Going by the undisputed facts, the COMELEC effectively aided the winning mayoralty
candidate by refusing to resolve the respective status of Ayson and Navarro, and later on of
Aggabao, as candidates. It opted to rely solely on the recommendation of its Law
Department, sans the benefit of its own independent confirmation which could have been done
by referring the case to the COMELEC Division for a summary hearing. Had the COMELEC
performed its adjudicative duty required under the Constitution and the law, Ayson or
Aggabao could have given the winning candidate a run for her money. But as things turned
out, both were denied the opportunity to run as the official mayoralty candidate of Partido
Reporma. The party itself was deprived of the right to prove who its official mayoralty
candidate was, and the electorate, consequently, was deprived of the opportunity to choose
either of these two candidates as their duly elected leader. (Aggabao v. Commission on Elections,
G.R. No. 258456, July 26, 2022)
[Note: But as for the assailed Document No. 21-3973 dated November 10, 2021, declaring
Navarro as an independent candidate; (b) Document No. 21-7467 dated December 22, 2021, denying
Aggabao's Certificate of Candidacy (COC) as substitute candidate for petitioner Navarro; and
(c) Document No. 222-0176 dated January 5, 2022, denying Aggabao's motion for reconsideration, the
Court nullifies and sets them aside for non-compliance with the due process requirements as discussed
above. (Aggabao v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 258456, July 26, 2022)]
Section 2 (1), Article IX (C) of the Constitution gives the COMELEC the broad power to
'[e]nforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election,
plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall.' There can hardly be any doubt that the intent of
this constitutional provision is to give COMELEC all the necessary and incidental powers for it
to achieve the objective of holding of free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections
Consistent with this power, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 10420, which, among
others, provides that '[n]o person can run for the position of Senator, Member of the House of
Representatives, Provincial, City, Municipal or ARMM Regional Official unless such
aspirant accomplishes and files a sworn COC in the form prescribed by the Commission,' and
Resolution No. 10430, which contains a copy of the amended COC form for aspirants to
accomplish. Unlike its previous version, the amended COC form includes Item No. 22, which
reads: 'Have you ever been found liable for an offense which carries with it the accessory penalty of
perpetual disqualification to hold public office which has become final and executory?'
Accordingly, in Minute Resolution No. 18-1182 dated 28 November 2018, the

COMELEC En Banc approved the recommendation of the COMELEC Law Department 'in
declaring that all Certificates of Candidacy (COCs) following the old form which lacks Item No.
22 as received by the COMELEC field offices shall BE DEEMED NOT FILED, following
COMELEC Resolution No. 10420, as amended by COMELEC Resolution No. 10430.'
Pursuant to these earlier issued resolutions, the COMELEC En Banc then issued the
herein assailed minute resolutions: Minute Resolution No. 19-0071, which deemed petitioner's
COC not filed for non-use of the amended COC form, and Minute Resolution No. 19-0099,
which denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration. xxx.
This Court has consistently acknowledged and affirmed COMELEC's wide latitude of
discretion in adopting means to carry out its mandate of ensuring free, orderly, and honest
elections subject only to the limitation that the means so adopted are not illegal or do not
constitute grave abuse of discretion. By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious and
whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. Mere abuse of discretion is not
enough. It must be grave, as when it is exercised arbitrarily or despotically by reason of passion
or personal hostility. Such abuse must be so patent and so gross as to amount to an evasion of a
positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation
of law. (Sarangani, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 244369, June 14, 2022)
Nuisance Candidates
| Section 69 of the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines provides:
Sec. 69. Nuisance candidates. — The Commission may, motu proprio or upon a verified
petition of an interested party, refuse to give due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy if it
is shown that said certificate has been filed to put the election process in mockery or disrepute
or to cause confusion among the voters by the similarity of the names of the registered
candidates or by other circumstances or acts which clearly demonstrate that the candidate has
no bona fide intention to run for the office for which the certificate of candidacy has been filed
and thus prevent a faithful determination of the true will of the electorate.
Thus, pursuant to the above-cited provision, the only grounds for which a candidate
may be declared as a nuisance candidate are as follows: (1) that such candidate only filed his or
her COC to put the election process in mockery or to cause disrepute; (2) that such candidate
only filed his or her COC to cause confusion among the voters; and (3) that there exists
circumstances that clearly demonstrate that the candidate has no bona fide intention to run for
office to prevent a faithful determination of the true will of the electorate. (Amad v. Commission
on Elections, G.R. No. 258448, July 5, 2022)
[Note: Here, the records are bereft of any evidence to clearly establish that Amad's filing of his
COC was intended to put the election process in mockery or to cause confusion among the voters.
Moreover, the COMELEC's allegation that Amad is only known within Northern Mindanao also does not
establish that he has no bona fide intention to run for Vice President.
Thus, it is manifestly clear that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion when,
without any factual or legal basis, it denied Amad's motion for reconsideration, and declared him a
nuisance candidate. (Amad v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 258448, July 5, 2022)]
As stated, this is not the first time Marquez came to the Court for affirmative relief
against his declaration as a nuisance candidate. The first time was in relation to the 2019
Elections where he filed a COC for Senator but was declared a nuisance due to alleged lack of
proof of his financial capacity to wage a nationwide campaign. Consequently, he filed a Petition
for Certiorari in Marquez v. COMELEC where the Court nullified the dispositions of the
COMELEC because the property requirement used against Marquez was "inconsistent with the
nature and essence of the Republican system ordained in our Constitution and the principle of
social justice underlying the same xxx." (Marquez v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 258435,
June 28, 2022)
History would show that election campaigns invariably entail the expenditure of
funds regardless of the methodology employed. A simple door-to-door campaign and the airing
of political advertisements on the radio and television, while varied in scope, both require
candidates to spend money. The difference lies only in how much money a candidate is willing,
able, and allowed to spend. Hence, for equating the perceived inability of Marquez to mount an
election campaign — with his supposed absence of bona fide intention to run for office, the
COMELEC indirectly violated the proscription against conflating a candidate's financial
capacity with bona fide intention to run as Marquez v. COMELEC had aptly decreed.
Verily, the grounds for the disqualification of Marquez in this case are in truth shrouded
property qualifications employed by the COMELEC to disqualify an otherwise qualified
candidate. In other words, the attempt of the COMELEC to pass off the inability of Marquez to
wage an election campaign as an indication of lack of bona fide intent to run for office is
unconstitutional and will not be allowed by the Court. For what cannot be done directly, cannot
be done indirectly. (Marquez v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 258435, June 28, 2022)
To emphasize, bona fide intent is present when a candidate is able to demonstrate that he
or she is serious in running for office. Several circumstances belie the COMELEC's conclusion
that Marquez did not have any bona fide intention to run for Senator. On the contrary, Marquez
has been consistently and vigorously asserting his right to be voted for. (Marquez v. Commission
on Elections, G.R. No. 258435, June 28, 2022)
The COMELEC considered non-membership in a political party as proof of Marquez's

alleged lack of bona fide intent to run for the position of Senator. Certainly, he should not be
prejudiced by this fact alone, for neither the law nor the rules impose such requirement on
persons intending to run for public office. (Marquez v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 258435,
June 28, 2022)
The COMELEC insists that Marquez is not virtually known to the entire country except
possibly in the locality where he resides. Assuming this to be true, it does not, standing alone,
suffice to declare one a nuisance candidate. In fact, it is not among the grounds for declaration
of a nuisance candidate enumerated in Section 69 of the Omnibus Election Code.
Further, declaring one a nuisance candidate simply because he or she is not known to
the entire country reduces the electoral process — a sacred instrument of democracy — to a
mere popularity contest. The matter of the candidate being known (or unknown) should not be
taken against that candidate but is best left to the electorate. As it is, our democratic and
republican state is based on effective representation. Thus, the electorate's choices must be
protected and respected.
Of note, nuisance candidates, as an evil to be remedied, do not justify the adoption of

measures, not specifically indicated under our election laws or rules, which would consequently
bar seemingly unpopular candidates from running for office. (Marquez v. Commission on
Elections, G.R. No. 258435, June 28, 2022)
Section 69 of the OEC empowers the COMELEC to "motu proprio or upon a verified petition
of an interested party, refuse to give due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy xxx." On the other
hand, Section 5 of RA No. 6646 provides that: "Section 5. Procedure in Cases of Nuisance
Candidates. — (a) A Verified petition to declare a duly registered candidate as a nuisance candidate
under Section 69 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 shall be filed personally or through a duly authorized
representative with the Commission by any registered candidate for the same office within five (5) days
from the last day for the filing of certificates of candidacy. Filing by mail shall not be allowed."
Obviously, the words "motu proprio" in Section 69 of the OEC do not appear in Section 5 of RA
No. 6646. Nevertheless, this omission can hardly be construed that the CoC is already prevented
from refusing due course or cancelling motu proprio the CoC of a nuisance candidate. On this
point, the Court reminds that implied repeal is frowned upon in this jurisdiction absent any
irreconcilable conflict between the two laws. Moreover, the legislative deliberations reveal
that RA No. 6646 was never intended to revoke the COMELEC's motu proprio authority under
Section 69 of the OEC. (De Alban v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 243968, March 22, 2022)
[Note: Evidently, Section 69 of the OEC enumerated the instances when a candidate is considered
a nuisance such as when the CoC is filed: (1) to put the election process in mockery or disrepute; (2) to
cause confusion among the voters by the similarity of the names of the registered candidates; and (3)
under circumstances or acts which clearly demonstrate that the candidate has no bona fide intention to run
for the office for which the certificate of candidacy has been filed. More importantly, Section 69 of
the OEC qualified that the objective in filing such CoC is to prevent "a faithful determination of the true will
of the electorate." The third instance refers to the candidate's "circumstances" or "acts" that would
demonstrate that the purpose of the filing of the CoC is inconsistent with the definition of a candidate as
someone "aspiring for or seeking elective public office." The common thread of the three instances is that
the nuisance candidates filed their CoCs not to aspire or seek public office but to prevent a faithful
determination of the people's true will. Relevantly, the assailed last phrase in Section 69 of
the OEC should cover all acts or circumstances clearly demonstrating that the CoC was filed in bad faith.
xxx. Given the discussions of the members of the Batasan Pambansa and the Constitutional Commission,
Section 69 of the OEC is cleared from any supposed vagueness and ambiguity with the use of proper
judicial construction. The assailed phrase can hardly be repugnant to the Constitution for it gives fair
notice of what conduct to avoid and does not leave law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its
provisions. (De Alban v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 243968, March 22, 2022)]
[Note: Although Cipriano relates to the candidate's material misrepresentation, the case of Timbol
v. COMELEC applied a similar principle that procedural due process must be observed before the
COMELEC may refuse to give due course to the CoC of a nuisance candidate. As intimated in the
legislative deliberations, the question of who may be considered a nuisance candidate is a factual issue
that should be decided minutely and wisely. Differently stated, the COMELEC's motu proprio authority
under Section 69 of the OEC must not result in the denial of the candidates' opportunity to be heard,
which must be construed as a chance to explain one's side or an occasion to seek a reconsideration of the
complained action or ruling. In election cases, the requirement of due process is satisfied if the parties are
given a fair and reasonable opportunity to clarify their respective positions. (De Alban v. Commission on
Elections, G.R. No. 243968, March 22, 2022)]
[Note: In this case, the COMELEC Law Department alleged that De Alban falls within the third
instance of Section 69 of the OEC or under circumstances or acts which clearly demonstrate that the
candidate has no bona fide intention to run for the office for which the CoC has been filed. Corollary, it is
incumbent upon the COMELEC Law Department to identify the "acts" or "circumstances" that would
clearly show De Alban's lack of bona fide intention to run for senator, with the objective to prevent a
faithful determination of the true will of the electorate. However, the COMELEC Law Department did
not adduce supporting substantial evidence and heavily relied on the general allegation that: "6.7. In entry
no. 20 of the COC which pertains to profession or occupation, Respondent declared the same as a Lawyer Teacher.
While such is a noble way to earn a living, it is most respectfully submitted that absent clear proof of Respondent's
financial capability, Respondent will not be able to sustain the financial rigors of waging a nationwide campaign."
The COMELEC Law Department did not discuss how the inclusion of De Alban in the ballots would
prevent the faithful determination of the will of the electorate. The COMELEC Law Department just
concluded that De Alban would not be able to sustain the financial rigors of waging a nationwide
campaign. This stance is obviously problematic anchored on flawed inferences. (De Alban v. Commission
on Elections, G.R. No. 243968, March 22, 2022)]
First, De Alban's profession as a "lawyer teacher" is not the "circumstance" contemplated

in the third instance of Section 69 of the OEC. Notably, De Alban even exceeds the minimum
qualification of being able to read and write required of a senator. Second, De Alban's chosen
profession is not a clear indication of his capability to wage a nationwide campaign. Third,
assuming that the COMELEC's inference on De Alban's profession is valid, the COMELEC
already has an idea as to the expenses of previous senatorial candidates based on their
submitted Statement of Contributions and Expenditures. Hence, the COMELEC could have at
least pegged an amount based on its data from the immediately preceding elections and
approximate acceptable expenses for campaigning. Yet, the COMELEC Law Department did
not specify any reasonable amount but expects De Alban to submit proof of the available funds
for his campaign. At any rate, it is already settled that financial capacity is not required to run
for public office because it is equivalent to a property qualification which is inconsistent with
the nature and essence of the Republican system and the principle of social justice. In Maquera v.
Borra, the Court struck down a law requiring candidates "to post a surety bond equivalent to the
one-year salary or emoluments of the position to which he is a candidate, which bond shall be forfeited in
favor of the national, provincial, city or municipal government concerned if the candidate, except when
the declared winner, fails to obtain at least 10% of the votes cast for the office to which he has filed his
certificate of candidacy, there being not more than four (4) candidates for the same office." (De Alban v.
Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 243968, March 22, 2022)]
Similarly, in Marquez v. COMELEC (Marquez), the Court held that "financial capacity to
sustain the financial rigors of waging a nationwide campaign" cannot be used, by itself, to declare a
candidate nuisance. The Court clarifies that financial capacity cannot be conflated with the bona
fide intention to run. Significantly, the Court in Marquez rejected the COMELEC's invocation of
Section 13 of RA 7166 because the law does not even set by rule any financial requirement for
the candidates, to wit: "Section 13 of RA 7166 merely sets the current allowable limit on expenses of
candidates and political parties for election campaign. It does not (whether by intention or operation)
require a financial requirement for those seeking to run for public office, such that failure to prove
capacity to meet the allowable expense limits would constitute ground to declare one a nuisance
candidate." Fourth, the required contents of De Alban's CoC do not include his financial capacity
or the source of campaign funds. At most, the COMELEC Law Department is merely guessing
whose candidacy should be questioned and initiated the action against De Alban without
factual bases. (De Alban v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 243968, March 22, 2022)]
[Note: In Marquez, the Court observed that this posture might be considered a violation of the
equal protection clause because the COMELEC did not require all senatorial candidates to prove their
financial capacity xxx. (De Alban v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 243968, March 22, 2022)]
Fifth, the COMELEC En Banc justified the cancellation of De Alban's CoC because he
had no strong and consolidated political machinery to cover the expenses of the campaign
especially since he is running as an independent candidate. In the same vein, the Court finds
that non-membership in a political party or being unknown nationwide, or the low probability
of success do not by themselves equate to the absence of bona fide intention to run for public
office under Section 69 of the OEC. Membership in a political party is not a requirement to run
for senator under the current electoral framework while non-membership does not prevent a
faithful determination of the will of the electorate. Also, the candidate's degree of success is
irrelevant to bona fide intention to run for public office. A candidate "has no less a right to run
when he faces prospects of defeat as when he expected to win." Neither the candidate's act of
participating for the first time in elections be equated with the absence of good faith. The Court
had overruled the COMELEC's postulation that a bona fide intention to run for public office is
absent if there is no "tiniest chance to obtain the favorable endorsement of a substantial portion of the
electorate." Again, it appears that the COMELEC Law Department initiated actions only against
De Alban and other unknown candidates without a political party, or those with low chances of
winning. The COMELEC did not bother to substantiate its conclusion that De Alban's CoC was
filed without bona fide intention to run for public office when it remarked that "[t]he Commission
is not duty-bound to adduce evidence for any party or for [De Alban] in this case. xxx" Worse, the
burden of evidence improperly shifted to De Alban to convince the COMELEC why his CoC
should be given due course. To reiterate, the COMELEC has the ministerial duty to receive and
acknowledge a duly filed CoC. The candidate's name will be on the ballot unless the CoC is
withdrawn or canceled. (De Alban v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 243968, March 22, 2022)
Lastly, the Court perceived that the COMELEC required De Alban to establish his
"capacity to wage a nationwide campaign" immediately after his CoC was filed. This premature
and dismissive approach on the part of the COMELEC reinforces the lack of factual basis in
cancelling the CoC which merely rests on the erroneous inference that De Alban's supposed
weak campaign machinery would not change even at the start of the campaign period. It would
have been different if the action of the COMELEC Law Department against De Alban was
initiated during the campaign period to determine whether he would not promote his
candidacy clearly demonstrating the lack of bona fide intention to run for public office. Quite the
contrary, De Alban presented evidence showing his plan to actively campaign with the use of
social media. The records show that De Alban submitted receipts of payment for his "De Alban
for Senator Movement," engagement posts on "Facebook" showing an initial number of
"impressions," and the receipt of payment for the maintenance of his website. On this score, the
COMELEC must have been aware of the popularity of social media, the number of online users
nationwide, and how these platforms potentially influence the preferences of registered
voters. (De Alban v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 243968, March 22, 2022)
In sum, the Court upholds the constitutionality of COMELEC's authority to motu

proprio refuse to give due course to or cancel the CoC of a nuisance candidate under Section 69
of the OEC. However, the Court ascribes grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC
in cancelling De Alban's CoC pursuant to an erroneous interpretation of the law and for lack of
supporting substantial evidence. The Court reminds the COMELEC that the candidate's bona
fide intention to run for public office is neither subject to any property qualifications nor
dependent upon membership in a political party, popularity, or degree of success in the
elections. (De Alban v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 243968, March 22, 2022)
Withdrawal of
Certificate of Candidacy/
Substitution
Section 73 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, or the Omnibus Election Code (OEC), states that
a person who has filed a CoC may withdraw the same by submitting to the COMELEC a
written declaration under oath. Section 77 of the OEC provides that in such case, the
nominating political party may field a candidate to replace the one who died, withdrew or was
disqualified. (Tito v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 258459, August 16, 2022)
As earlier adverted to, there is clearly nothing in the above-cited Section which provides
the requirements being asked of Tito. On the contrary, Section 39 of COMELEC Resolution No.
10717 only requires the submission of a Sworn Statement of Withdrawal signed by the
withdrawing candidate. This was submitted by Tito when he filed his CoC as Partido Reporma
substitute vice-gubernatorial candidate.
More significantly, no copy of the afore-cited Memoranda can be found through a
cursory internet search. There is also nothing in the records to show that the said Memoranda
were ever published (whether online or in print) as to sufficiently inform those concerned of the
existence of said requirements. In Arroyo v. Department of Justice, We held that the publication
requirement applies to both statutes and administrative regulations and issuances xxx.
Viewed in this light, the COMELEC's action is tainted with grave abuse of discretion, as
it not only appeared to have expanded the requirements of the law with respect to withdrawals
of CoCs, it also applied the same sans proof that said requirements have been duly published
for due process purposes. (Tito v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 258459, August 16, 2022)
[Note: Personal filing by the aspirant is mandated under Section 39 of COMELEC Resolution No.
10717 for purposes of withdrawing a candidacy. We nevertheless find, based on the documents
submitted by Tito in support of the substitution sought, that the evil sought to be prevented by the
requirement of personal filing — presumably, the filing of spurious withdrawals — has been sufficiently
avoided. In fact, even granting in gratia argumenti the applicability of the requirements under the
Memoranda cited by the COMELEC, We find that Tito was able to show substantial compliance with the
same. (Tito v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 258459, August 16, 2022)]
[Note: Aside from Agustin's notarized Statement of Withdrawal the SPA he issued authorizing
Tito to submit the same before the appropriate COMELEC office, and the CONA signed by Senator
Lacson, as Partido Reporma Chairman, naming Tito as the party's official candidate, the records also
show: (a) a Certification dated 15 November 2021 issued by Partido Reporma Secretary General Edwin
Jubahib (Jubahib) certifying that Agustin informed them of his inability to personally file his Statement of
Withdrawal as he was identified as a close contact of a person who had tested positive for COVID-19; (b)
a Certification dated 12 January 2022 issued by Rodel G. Balili, Vice Chairperson of the COVID-19 Task
Force in the Municipality of Nabunturan, where Agustin resides, to the effect that Agustin was identified
to be a close contact of a person who had tested positive for COVID-19; and (c) the Affidavit dated 15
November 2021 executed by Jubahib attesting to the fact that he personally witnessed Agustin sign the
Statement of Withdrawal. (Tito v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 258459, August 16, 2022)]
Substitution refers to an exceptional situation in an election scenario where the law leans
backwards to allow a registered party to put in place a replacement candidate when the death,
withdrawal or disqualification of its original candidate occurs.
Section 77 of the OEC governs cases of substitution, thus:
Section 77. Candidates in case of death, disqualification or withdrawal of another. — If after the
last day for the filing of certificates of candidacy, an official candidate of a registered or
accredited political party dies, withdraws or is disqualified for any cause, only a person
belonging to, and certified by, the same political party may file a certificate of candidacy to
replace the candidate who died, withdrew or was disqualified. The substitute candidate
nominated by the political party concerned may file his certificate of candidacy for the office
affected in accordance with the preceding sections not later than mid-day of the day of the
election. If the death, withdrawal or disqualification should occur between the day before the
election and mid-day of Election Day, said certificate may be filed with any board of election
inspectors in the political subdivision where he is a candidate, or, in the case of candidates to be
voted for by the entire electorate of the country, with the Commission.
For purposes of the upcoming May 2022 NLE, Section 40 of COMELEC Resolution No.
10717 further provides that:
SECTION 40. Substitution of Aspirants/Official Candidates in Case of Death,

Disqualification or Withdrawal of Another. — An aspirant/official candidate of a duly
registered PP or Coalition who dies, withdraws or is disqualified for any cause after the last day
for the filing of COCs may be substituted by an aspirant/official candidate belonging to, and
nominated by, the same PP or Coalition.
No substitute shall be allowed for any independent candidate.
The substitute of an aspirant who died, withdrew his candidacy, or was disqualified may
file a COC for the Office affected on or before November 15, 2021 (Monday) so that the name of
the substitute will be reflected on the official ballots.
No substitution due to withdrawal shall be allowed after November 15, 2021.
The substitute for an aspirant/candidate who died or was disqualified by final judgment,
may file a COC up to mid-day of Election Day; Provided that, the substitute and the substituted
aspirant/candidate have the same surnames.
If the death or disqualification should occur between the day before the election and mid-
day of Election Day, the substitute may file a COC with any of the Electoral Board, Election
Officer, Provincial Election Supervisor or Regional Election Director, as the case may be, in the
political subdivision where the person is a candidate, or in the case of a candidate for President,
Vice President and Senator, with the Law Department; Provided that, the substitute and
substituted candidate have the same surnames.
The OEC does not expressly speak of repudiation. Section 31 (c) of COMELEC
Resolution No. 10717, on the other hand, declares one who has repudiated a CONA from a duly
registered political party or coalition to be an independent candidate who, under Section 40,
cannot be validly substituted. In addition, while existing regulations provide for a deadline for
the withdrawal (and substitution of withdrawing candidates), the same is not true for cases of
repudiation. (Garcia v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 243735, June 14, 2022)
[Note: In this case, the question as to whether Agustin in fact withdrew his candidacy or
repudiated his nomination as official Partido Reporma candidate for the position of Vice Governor,
Davao de Oro, persists. Ultimately, however, if the COMELEC's denial of Tito's CoC in this case is
sustained, the fact would remain that regardless of whether Agustin withdrew his candidacy or
repudiated the CONA issued to him, Partido Reporma will be left without a candidate from its own
ranks and of its own choosing, for Vice Governor of the Province of Davao de Oro. To this Court's mind,
this is deplorable as it not only operates to defeat Partido Reporma's right (under Section 77 of the OEC)
to field a substitute candidate belonging to its party, it also unduly limits the exercise of the sovereign
will of the electorate to be expressed through the ballot.
On this score, We find apropos Justice Brion's reminder that 'a failsafe method in an election
situation is to give premium consideration not to the candidates or their parties, but to the electorate's
process of choice and the integrity of the elections. In view of the attendant legal or factual equipoise
situation, this Court leans towards the integrity of the electoral process and holds that Tito's CoC, as
substitute Partido Reporma candidate for the position of Vice Governor of Davao de Oro, should have
been given due course. (Tito v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 258459, August 16, 2022)]
Section 33, COMELEC Resolution No. 10420, as amended by COMELEC Resolution No.
10430, provides for the deadline for filing of COCs of substitute candidates, as follows:
Section 33. Substitution of Candidates in Case of Death, Disqualification or

Withdrawal of Another. — An official candidate of a duly registered PP [political party] or
Coalition who dies, withdraws or is disqualified for any cause after the last day for the filing of
COCs may be substituted by a candidate belonging to, and nominated by, the same PP or
Coalition.
xxx xxx xxx
The substitute of a candidate who died, withdrew his candidacy, or was disqualified may
file a COC for the Office affected on or before November 29, 2018 so that the name of the
substitute will be reflected on the official ballots.
No substitution due to withdrawal shall be allowed after November 29, 2018.

xxx xxx xxx
While the aforementioned resolution is silent as to until what time the substitute
candidate may file his/her COC on the last day, it is presumed that the deadline for filing of
COC of substitute candidates shall follow the usual government office hours unless explicitly
stated. Section 5, Rule XVII (on Government Office Hours), Omnibus Rules Implementing Book
V of Executive Order No. 292, provides that the official government office hours shall be from 8
a.m. to 12 p.m. and from 1 p.m. to 5 p.m. on all days except Saturdays, Sundays and
Holidays. The same is reiterated in Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular No. 01, s.
2017. Also, a review of the aforementioned COMELEC resolutions would show that the filing
of COC shall be from 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. only, which is the official government office hours.
(Garcia v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 243735, June 14, 2022)
[Note: The Amended COC shows that it was filed beyond government office hours as it was
stamped by Atty. Manuel on 29 November 2018 at 6:50 p.m. In his petition, petitioner Garcia alleges that
the COMELEC was supposed to render overtime work until 7:00 p.m. on 29 November 2018. However,
no COMELEC resolution or memorandum authorizing the overtime work was shown. Thus, he failed to
prove that the office hours on 29 November 2018 were extended. Accordingly, based on the foregoing,
petitioner Garcia's COC was indeed filed out of time as maintained by the COMELEC. (Garcia v.
Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 243735, June 14, 2022)]
Election Actions
We acknowledge that there are distinctions between the remedies sought by the
petitioners in these consolidated cases. The present petitions stem from two cases before the
COMELEC: (1) SPA Case N o. 21-156 (DC), filed by petitioners Buenafe, et al., which sought to
deny due course to or cancel respondent Marcos, Jr.’s COC; and (2) SPA No. 2 1-212 (DC), filed
by petitioners Ilagan, et al., which sought to disqualify respondent Marcos, Jr. as a candidate for
President. A petition to deny due course to or cancel COC is governed by Section 78 in relation
to Section 74, of the OEC, to wit:
Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. -A verified petition
seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by the person
exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained therein as required under
Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days
from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after due notice
and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election.
Sec. 74. Contents of certificate of candidacy. -The certificate of candidacy shall state that the
person filing it is announcing his candidacy for the office stated therein and that he is eligible
for said office; if for Member of the Batasang Pambansa, the province, including its component
cities, highly urbanized city o district or sector which he seeks to represent; the political party to
which he belongs; civil status; his date of birth; residence; his post office address for all
election purposes; his profession or occupation; that he will support and defend the
Constitution of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; that he will
obey the laws, legal orders, and decrees promulgated by the duly constituted authorities; that
he is not a permanent resident or immigrant to a foreign country; that the obligation imposed
by his oath is assumed voluntarily, without mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that
the facts stated in the certificate of candidacy are true to the best of his knowledge.
On the other hand, a petition for disqualification may be filed pursuant to Sections 12 or
68 of the OEC. The provisions under the OEC state, in relevant part:
Sec. 12. Disqualifications. - Any person who has been declared by competent authority insane or
incompetent, or has been sentenced by final judgment for subversion, insurrection, rebellion or
for any offense for which he has been sentenced to a penalty of more than eighteen months or for
a crime involving moral turpitude, shall be disqualified to be a candidate and to hold any office,
unless he has been given plenary pardon or granted amnesty. These disqualifications to be a
candidate herein provided shall be deemed removed upon the declaration by competent
authority that said insanity or incompetence had been removed or after the expiration of a
period of five years from his service of sentence, unless within the same period he again
becomes disqualified. xxx
Sec. 68. Disqualifications. - Any candidate who, in an action or protest in which he is a party is
declared by final decision of a competent court guilty of, or found by the Commission of having
(a) given money or other material consideration to influence, induce or corrupt the voters or
public officials performing electoral functions; (b) committed acts of terrorism to enhance his
candidacy; ( c) spent in his election campaign an amount in excess of that allowed by this Code;
(d) solicited, received or made any contribution prohibited under Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104;
or (e) violated any of Sections 80, 83, 5 and 261, paragraphs d, e, k, v, and cc, subparagraph 6,
shall be disqualified from continuing as a candidate, or if he has been elected,, from holding the
office. Any person who is a permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign country shall not
be qualified to run for any elective office under this Code, unless said person has waived his
status as permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country in accordance with the residence
requirement provided for in the election laws.
Apart from having the same respondent, these consolidated petitions share further
similarities. For one, they are both pre-election remedies with a similar objective: to prevent a
purportedly ineligible candidate from running for an elective position. In addition, they can be
filed by any registered voter or any duly registered political party, organization, or coalition of
political parties. (Buenafe v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 260374, June 28, 2022)
Ultimately, however, a petition to deny due course to or to cancel COC and a petition for
disqualification are "different remedies, based on different grounds, and resulting in different
eventualities."
First, the two remedies are anchored on distinct grounds: whereas an action under
Section 78 of the OEC is concerned with the false representation by a candidate as to material
information in the COC, a petition for disqualification relates to the declaration of a candidate
as ineligible or lacking in quality or accomplishment fit for the elective position said candidate
is seeking. To prosper, the former requires proof of deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform ,
or hide a fact relating to the candidate's requisite residency, age, citizenship, or any other legal
qualification necessary to run for elective office; the latter, possession of a disqualification as
declared by a final decision of a competent court, or as found by the Commission.
Second, they have different prescriptive periods xxx.
Third, both have markedly distinct effects: a disqualified person is merely prohibited to
continue as a candidate, while the person whose certificate is canceled or denied due course is
not treated as a candidate at all.
Moreover, a disqualified candidate may still be substituted if they (sic) had a valid COC
in the first place. However, one whose C0C was denied due course or canceled cannot be
substituted because the law considers him or her to not have been a candidate at all.
While the grounds for a petition for disqualification are limited to Sections 12 and 68 of
the OEC, and, for local elective officials, Section 40 of the LGC, the same grounds may be
invoked in a petition to deny due course to or cancel COC if these involve the representations
required under Section 78. (Buenafe v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 260374, June 28, 2022)
No petition has been filed before the PET.
Based on current records, no petition for an election contest has been filed before the
PET. An election protest should be filed within thirty days after the proclamation of the winner.
On the other hand, a petition for quo warranto should be filed within ten days after the
proclamation of the winner.
The petitioner in an election protest is limited to the registered candidate for President
or Vice-President of the Philippines who received the second or third highest number of votes.
On the other hand, a quo warranto case may be filed by any registered voter who has voted in
the election concerned.
An election protest is anchored on allegations of electoral frauds, anomalies, or

irregularities in the protested precincts, while a petition for quo warranto attacks the protestee's
ineligibility or specific acts of disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines.
In any case, the proclamation, oath-taking, and assumption of the President result in
removing from the jurisdiction of this Court any pre-proclamation remedy elevated to the Court
from the COMELEC. (Buenafe v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 260374, June 28, 2022)
Petitioners Ilagan, et al. instead argue that respondent Marcos, Jr. has been convicted of a crime involving
moral turpitude and is thus disqualified from being a candidate and holding any government office under Section
12 of the OEC. Notably, Section 68 of the OEC, which provides additional grounds for disqualification, namely,
being found to have committed an election offense, or being a permanent resident of, or an immigrant in, a foreign
country, is not being invoked in the present case. Hence, We limit Our discussion to the alleged disqualification of
respondent Marcos, Jr. under Section 12 of the OEC. xxx.
The CA found respondent Marcos, Jr. guilty of failing to file income tax returns for the
taxable years 1982 to 1985 in Criminal Cases No. Q-91-24391; Q-92-29212, Q-92-29213 and Q-2-
29217. Petitioners Ilagan, et al. argue that this amounts to a conviction of a crime involving
moral turpitude, which has the effect of disqualifying respondent Marcos, Jr. from being a
candidate and from holding any government office. Failure to file income tax returns may or
may not be a crime involving moral turpitude. xxx.
Not every criminal act involves moral turpitude, nor do they (sic) necessarily have to be
heinous. Moral turpitude has been often understood to mean acts that are "contrary to justice,
modesty, or good morals; an act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and social
duties which a man owes his fellowmen, or to society in general." It does not include such acts
as are not of themselves immoral but whose illegality lies in their being positively prohibited.
xxx.
Indeed, in Zari v. Flores, We said that tax evasion is a crime involving moral turpitude.
On whether an act or omission constitutes tax evasion, We certainly agree that it depends on the
totality of circumstances. As such, it must be clarified that failure to file income tax return does
not always amount to tax evasion. Tax evasion connotes fraud through the use of pretenses and
forbidden devices to lessen or defeat taxes. The fraud contemplated by law is actual and not
constructive. It must be intentional fraud, consisting of deception willfully and deliberately
done or resorted to in order to induce another to give up some legal right. Negligence, whether
slight or gross, is not equivalent to the fraud with intent to evade the tax contemplated by law.
It must amount to intentional wrong-doing with the sole object of avoiding the tax.
Furthermore, tax evasion connotes the integration of three factors: (a) the end to be achieved,
i.e., the payment of less than that known by the taxpayer to be legally due, or the non-payment
of tax when it is shown that a tax is due; ) ·an accompanying state of mind, which is described
as being "evil," in "bad faith," "willful," or "deliberate and not accidental"; and (c) a course of
action or failure of action that is unlawful.
On the other hand, failure to file income tax return may be committed by neglect,
without any fraudulent intent and/or willfulness. In fact, under Section 248 of the 1997 NIRC,
the law treats "failure to file any return" differently from "willful neglect to file the return." The
former is meted with a surcharge of 25%, while the latter, 50%. The 50% rate is referred to as the
fraud penalty. (Buenafe v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 260374, June 28, 2022)
The foregoing militates against the notion that non-filing of income tax return by an
individual taxpayer receiving purely compensation income involves moral turpitude, or is
against good morals and accepted rule of conduct. It is not in itself immoral, and neither does it
constitute an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private and social duties which a man
owes his fellowmen, or to society in general. Thus, We sustain the COMELEC's ruling that the
omission of respondent Marcos Jr. to file income tax returns does not involve moral turpitude.
(Buenafe v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 260374, June 28, 2022)
[Note: As We sustain COMELEC's ruling, We, however, address and state Our disagreement
with the argument that the omission to file income tax returns does not involve moral turpitude
because the offense has already been decriminalized by RA 10963, otherwise known as the Tax
Reform for Acceleration and Inclusion (TRAIN) Law.
At this juncture, We clarify that non-filing of income tax returns has not been decriminalized
under the 1997 NIRC and its subsequent amendments. Rather, what our current tax laws introduced
are classifications of taxpayers who are not required to file an income tax return and who may file a
tax return under the substituted filing system. xxx. (Buenafe v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No.
260374, June 28, 2022)]
[Note: Clearly, the CA had the discretion to impose the penalty of a fine or imprisonment or both,
upon respondent Marcos, Jr. The CA's Decision imposing only the penalty of a fine is valid.
Consequently, respondent Marcos, Jr. cannot be disqualified on the ground that he was sentenced by
final judgment to a penalty of more than eighteen months under Section 12 of the OEC. Similarly, as will
be expounded later on, We agree with the COMELEC's finding that respondent Marcos, Jr. was not
imposed with the penalty of perpetual disqualification from running for public office. (Buenafe v.
Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 260374, June 28, 2022)]
[Note: However, a perusal of the dispositive portion of the CA Decision would reveal that the
accessory penalty of perpetual disqualification was not imposed on respondent Marcos, Jr. Evidently,
this CA Decision has long attained finality, and can no longer be touched upon by this Court. To alter
the same would be extremely prejudicial to respondent Marcos, Jr., and would create a precedent
contrary to the basic principle that all doubts should be construed against the State and in favor of the
accused. (Buenafe v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 260374, June 28, 2022)]
The Court has ruled that, as used in Section 74 of the OEC, the word "eligible" means
having "the right to run for elective public office, that is, having all the qualifications and none
of the ineligibilities to run for the public office." Perpetual disqualification is an ineligibility.
Necessarily, therefore, it directly affects one's eligibility to run for office. Equally established is
that the enumeration of qualifications in the 1987 Constitution, as reiterated in Section 63 of
the OEC, is not exclusive. Other pertinent laws lay down requirements for qualification and
eligibility to run for and hold elective office. These considerations are sufficient to meet the
requirement of materiality under Section 78 of the OEC. (Buenafe v. Commission on Elections,
G.R. No. 260374, June 28, 2022)
We agree with petitioners Ilagan, et al., that Section 286 clearly provides for the
imposition of disqualification from public office as a penalty upon public officials or
employees found guilty of violating the provisions of the 1977 NIRC, as amended by PD 1994.
It is, however, not disputed that the fallo of the CA Decision adjudging respondent Marcos, Jr.'s
guilt for non-filing of the required income tax return makes absolutely no mention of said
penalty. (Buenafe v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 260374, June 28, 2022)
Petitioner claims, among others, that: (1) while the COMELEC En Banc may be correct in stating that she is a dual
citizen as evidenced by the CRBA, there is no factual or legal basis to say that she is a dual citizen by naturalization
and not by birth; (2) the mere fact that a natural-born Filipino subsequently acquires foreign citizenship does not
automatically mean he/she falls under the application of R.A. 9225, as the said law contemplates natural-born
Filipinos who became foreign citizens through the process of naturalization; (3) she is not a dual citizen by
naturalization as she was considered a US citizen at birth and did not have to perform any action to acquire her
Philippine and US citizenships; (4) the records are bereft of any evidence showing that she voluntarily performed
any action to acquire US citizenship; (5) naturalization involves a tedious process that is resorted to only if one is
not a US citizen by birth or if the applicant did not acquire or derive US citizenship from his or her parents
automatically after birth; and (6) even if the CRBA expressly states the words "acquired United States Citizenship
at birth as established by documentary evidence presented to the Consular Service of the United States at Manila,
Philippines," the act of presenting the documents as mentioned therein cannot be deemed tantamount to
naturalization, which is a different process altogether.
In its Comment (with Opposition to Petitioner's Application for Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or
Temporary Restraining Order and/or Status Quo Ante Order), the COMELEC insisted that petitioner acquired her
dual citizenship through positive act since she acquired the same upon her application for US citizenship. Being a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines, who after the effectivity of the law in 2003 became a US citizen on 23
August 2004, petitioner is covered by Section 3 of R.A. 9225 and is required not only to take her oath of allegiance
to the Republic of the Philippines, but also to personally renounce her foreign citizenship in order to qualify as a
candidate for public office.
|||
As was made clear in De Guzman v. COMELEC, R.A. 9225 covers two categories of
individuals, thus:
R.A. No. 9225 was enacted to allow re-acquisition and retention of Philippine citizenship
for: 1) natural-born citizens who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their
naturalization as citizens of a foreign country; and 2) natural-born citizens of the Philippines
who, after the effectivity of the law, become citizens of a foreign country. The law provides that
they are deemed to have re-acquired or retained their Philippine citizenship upon taking the oath
of allegiance.
R.A. 9225 particularly applies to natural-born Filipinos who lost their Filipino
citizenship through the process of naturalization. Essentially, both classes of individuals
mentioned in R.A. 9225 refer to those who have undergone the process of naturalization. As
held in Tan v. Crisologo:
R.A. No. 9225 was enacted to allow natural-born Filipino citizens, who lost their
Philippine citizenship through naturalization in a foreign country, to
expeditiously reacquire Philippine citizenship.
Thus, the coverage of R.A. 9225 includes only those natural-born Filipinos who acquired
foreign citizenship through the process of naturalization. Similarly, the provisions of R.A.
9225 on the required oath of allegiance under Section 3, and the personal and sworn
renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship under its Section 5 (2) apply only to dual citizens
by naturalization and not to dual citizens by birth. This is confirmed by the case of Maquiling v.
COMELEC (Maquiling), which states:
Arnado's category of dual citizenship is that by which foreign citizenship is acquired

through a positive act of applying for naturalization. This is distinct from those considered dual
citizens by virtue of birth, who are not required by law to take the oath of renunciation as
the mere filing of the certificate of candidacy already carries with it an implied renunciation of
foreign citizenship. Dual citizens by naturalization, on the other hand, are required to take not
only the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines but also to personally renounce
foreign citizenship in order to qualify as a candidate for public office.
Records show that petitioner was a dual citizen at the time she filed her CoC for the May
2019 NLE, being both a US citizen and a natural born Filipino. The pivotal issue however is
whether petitioner acquired her US citizenship — and therefore her status as a dual citizen —
by birth or through naturalization. If by birth, petitioner need not renounce her US citizenship
or pledge allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines to qualify as a candidate for public office
as required by Sections 3 and 5 (2) of R.A. 9225. Otherwise, if her dual citizenship proceeded
from naturalization, petitioner must perform the twin requirement or renunciation and the
taking of an oath under R.A. 9225.
The COMELEC First Division ruled that petitioner "is not a dual citizen at birth but a
dual citizen by naturalization since there was a positive act that was done in acquiring her US
citizenship" which was the submission of the necessary documents to obtain US citizenship. It
cited Act 322 of the INA, and highlighted the portion of the CRBA which states that petitioner
"acquired United States citizenship at birth as established by documentary evidence presented
to the Consular Service of the United States at Manila, Philippines on August 23, 2004." For
its part, the COMELEC En Banc sustained the finding of the COMELEC First Division that
petitioner is a dual citizen by naturalization and her failure to comply with the requirements
of R.A. 9225 rendered her ineligible to run for elective office.
|||
Petitioner is a dual citizen by birth,

and not by naturalization.
We find that the COMELEC En Banc's conclusion that petitioner is a dual citizen by
naturalization is manifestly erroneous.
First. Philippine courts do not take judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws, and
these must be proven as fact under the rules on evidence. Having cited Act 322 of the United
States INA in its argument that petitioner is not a dual citizen at birth but a dual citizen by
naturalization, respondents Lim and Nuñez should have proven such foreign law pursuant to
the relevant provisions of the Rules of Court. The COMELEC First Division should not have
taken judicial notice of this law, much less made an attempt to analyze and apply the same.
Second. As furthermore pointed out by Justice Caguioa, the cited portions of the INA,
which refers to automatic citizenship of a child upon the application of his or her American
citizen parent, even supports the conclusion that, if, indeed, some positive acts were performed
in the acquisition of petitioner's US citizenship, the same could not have been performed by her
but rather, by her American parent. Notably, the records are bereft of any evidence which
would indicate to the slightest degree that petitioner petitioned to acquire her US citizenship or
that she went through the pertinent naturalization process. Again, respondents Lim and Nuñez
had the burden of proving such allegations before the COMELEC.
Third. As also elucidated by Justice Amy C. Lazaro-Javier (Justice Lazaro-Javier), Black’s

Law Dictionary defines naturalization as "the act of adopting a foreigner and clothing him [or
her] the privileges of a native citizen." In Garcia v. Recio, the Court defined naturalization as a
legal act of adopting an alien and clothing him [or her] with the political and civil rights
belonging to a citizen. It implies the renunciation of a former nationality and the fact of entrance
into a similar relation towards a new body politic. Therefore, naturalization is a process through
which a State confers an outsider, i.e., a non-citizen/alien/foreigner, with rights enjoyed by its
citizens. Based on the definition of naturalization, an insider, i.e., a citizen, is disqualified from
undergoing naturalization proceedings. In this regard, the Court recognizes that naturalization
is superfluous for persons who are already citizens of a particular State and that it is absurd for
a State to issue a certificate of naturalization to its own citizens.
Thus, the Court finds that petitioner, as shown by evidence, never underwent such
process. The CRBA document itself, which was used by the COMELEC En Banc as basis to
declare that petitioner was a naturalized dual citizen, actually proves the opposite.
Interestingly, this CRBA was presented before, and was considered by, the COMELEC, yet the
latter chose to ignore the literal contents of the same. (Gana-Carait v. Commission on Elections,
G.R. No. 257453, August 9, 2022)
[Note: As explained by Justices Caguioa and Lazaro-Javier, the very language of the CRBA shows
that petitioner's US citizenship was acquired at birth, as it literally states: "acquired United States
Citizenship at birth," and that documentary evidence was presented merely to establish such fact. Being a
citizen of the US at birth, it would be absurd to construe petitioner's submission of documents to the
Consular Service of the US to be akin to one's availment of the naturalization process for the purpose of
becoming an American citizen, when she, herself has already been one since her birth.
Our previous ruling in the case of Cordora, which had a similar factual backdrop, is applicable to
the case at hand, thus:
Tambunting does not deny that he is born of a Filipino mother and an American father. Neither
does he deny that he underwent the process involved in INS Form I-130 (Petition for Relative) because of his
father's citizenship. Tambunting claims that because of his parents' differing citizenships, he is both Filipino
and American by birth. Cordora, on the other hand, insists that Tambunting is a naturalized American
citizen.
We agree with Commissioner Sarmiento's observation that Tambunting possesses dual

citizenship. Because of the circumstances of his birth, it was no longer necessary for Tambunting to
undergo the naturalization process to acquire American citizenship. The process involved in INS Form I-
130 only served to confirm the American citizenship which Tambunting acquired at birth. The
certification from the Bureau of Immigration which Cordora presented contained two trips where
Tambunting claimed that he is an American. However, the same certification showed nine other trips
where Tambunting claimed that he is Filipino. Clearly, Tambunting possessed dual citizenship prior to
the filing of his certificate of candidacy before the 2001 elections. The fact that Tambunting had dual
citizenship did not disqualify him from running for public office.
As in the Cordora case, petitioner, because of the circumstances of her birth, need not go through
the process of naturalization to acquire US citizenship, and per the CRBA, the process to obtain the same
was merely to confirm such US citizenship. (Gana-Carait v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 257453,
August 9, 2022)]
As previously discussed, petitioner is not covered by the twin requirements of R.A. 9225,
being that she is not a naturalized US citizen. Thus, her non-compliance with the same does not,
in any way, affect her candidacy, or her declaration in her CoC that she was eligible to run for
the public office.
Even on the assumption that petitioner violated Section 5 of R.A. 9225 for failing to
renounce her American citizenship, the same does not render her ineligible for the office sought
and therefore, cannot be a ground to cancel her CoC.
Specifically, the failure to renounce foreign citizenship as required by Section 5 (2), R.A.
9225 does not affect even a naturalized person's status as a Filipino citizen, which is retained or
reacquired upon the taking of the oath of allegiance under R.A. 9225 — the same oath contained
in the CoC. Such failure merely maintains his status as a dual citizen. The requirement to
renounce foreign citizenship, and therefore have full and sole allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines, is merely a condition imposed upon the exercise by a naturalized dual citizen of his
political right to seek elective public office, but not upon his status as a Filipino citizen. This is
clear from the language of Section 5.
Commonwealth Act No. 63 enumerates the acts by which a Filipino citizen may lose his
citizenship, none of which pertains to failure to renounce foreign citizenship.
Indeed, failure to renounce foreign citizenship under R.A. 9225 and thereby remaining a
dual citizen having dual allegiances does not appear to be an ineligibility, as it presupposes that
the candidate is a Filipino citizen. If at all, the same is a disqualification under Section 40 of
the Local Government Code (LGC), and thus, the proper subject of a petition for
disqualification. On this note, it bears to point out that a petition for disqualification was filed
against petitioner, but the same was dismissed and does not appear to have been appealed.
Hence, even assuming arguendo that petitioner is covered by, and violated Section 5, she
thereby remained in possession of the qualification of being a Filipino citizen under Section 39
of the LGC. Thus, she could not be said to have made a false representation when she declared
in her CoC that she was eligible to run for the subject office. (Gana-Carait v. Commission on
In G.R. No. 250370, this Court considered Villamor not in bad faith, since she never hid
the fact of her naturalization as an American citizen, or the date when she renounced it.
Moreover, in disclosing her residency, she excluded the period of her stay in the US, negating
the existence of bad faith and supporting the view that the statement was a mere error or
mistake on a difficult question of law concerning residency.
This Court also found sufficient proof in G.R. No. 250370 to support Villamor's claim
that she had reestablished residence in the Philippines after her naturalization as a US citizen
in 2009. Apart from her acquisition of properties in Lagangilang and payment of taxes, this
Court also considered her registration and participation as a voter in the May
2018 Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan elections that was not challenged on the ground of
failure to meet the residency requirement. This Court concluded that given Villamor's
compliance with the six months minimum residence requirement for voting purposes during
the May 2018 elections, her period of residency for purposes of being a mayoralty candidate in
the subsequent 2019 elections would satisfy the one year residency requirement.
Giving due course to the present petition would necessarily entail a revisit of this
Court's ruling in G.R. No. 250370 particularly the discussion settling the issue on the
COMELEC's failure to stay Villamor's proclamation despite finding her ineligible. This Court
already declared in G.R. No. 250370, this lapse to be inconsistent with the COMELEC's finding
that Villamor was ineligible for failing to meet the residency requirement as it should not have
allowed her to be proclaimed and assume the position of Mayor if it truly believed that she did
not possess the requisite qualifications for the position. This Court already emphasized that,
given the nature and the public interest involved, election cases must be resolved speedily,
otherwise, the will of the electorate would be frustrated. This Court likewise reminded the
COMELEC of the importance of resolving matters before it, with all deliberate haste, because
time is of the essence in election cases. Therefore, the central issues sought to be addressed in
this petition had been overtaken by events. The supervening Resolution of this Court in G.R.
No. 250370 rendered the present petition, moot and academic. (Viernes v. Commission on
Elections, G.R. No. 257339, June 21, 2022)
Petitioner Garcia further insists that the COMELEC violated Sec. 3, Art. IX-C, the
Constitution, and his right to due process of law for denying his COC through a minute
resolution, and without being heard first by the COMELEC Division.
The argument deserves scant consideration. In Canicosa v. Commission on Elections, the

Court clarified that Sec. 3, Art. IX-C, the Constitution, applies only 'when the COMELEC acts in
the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial functions and not when it merely exercises
purely administrative functions.' The present case originated from a letter dated 3 December
2018 of petitioner Garcia to the Law Department of the COMELEC asking for confirmation of
the timely filing of his COC. Such request, which merely requires checking the timestamp on
the COC, demands only the exercise by the COMELEC of its administrative functions, not
quasi-judicial functions. Section 2 (1), Article IX-C, the Constitution, grants extensive
administrative powers to the COMELEC with regard to the enforcement and administration of
all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of elections. (Garcia v. Commission on Elections,
G.R. No. 243735, June 14, 2022)
The term "residence" is to be understood not in its common acceptation as referring to

"dwelling" or "habitation," but rather to "domicile" or legal residence, that is, "the place where a
party actually or constructively has his permanent home, where he, no matter where he may be
found at any given time, eventually intends to return and remain (animus manendi)." A domicile
of origin is acquired by every person at birth. It is usually the place where the child's parents
reside and continues until the same is abandoned by acquisition of new domicile (domicile of
choice). It consists not only in the intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence
in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention.
The records show that the Resolution dated 08 May 2019 cancelling petitioner's CoC was
based on a proper evaluation of the evidence. The certifications presented by Loquinte
especially that of the punong barangay stating petitioner was not a resident of Brgy. Mahalo,
disputed petitioner's claim of bodily presence and intention to reside in the said place for at
least one (1) year prior to the 2019 elections. Moreover, petitioner does not own any real estate
in Anahawan but had admitted constructing a house in another city where his family lives and
his children go to school. In view of such facts, the COMELEC cannot be said to have acted
with grave abuse of discretion when it cancelled petitioner's CoC. (Luna, Jr. v. Commission on
Elections, G.R. Nos. 247805 & G.R. No. 248376, June 9, 2020)
Appeals
At the outset, the Court notes the COMELEC's issuance of a Certificate of Finality dated
13 December 2021, declaring its En Banc resolution final and executory. An Entry of
Judgment dated 13 December 2021 and a Writ of Execution dated 31 January 2022 were likewise
issued by the COMELEC.
It should be noted, however, that the petition was timely filed within the 30-day period
after notice, as provided under Section 3 of Rule 64 of the Rules of Court, thus:
Section 3. Time to file petition. — The petition shall be filed within thirty (30) days from
notice of the judgment or final order or resolution sought to be reviewed. The filing of a motion
for new trial or reconsideration of said judgment or final order or resolution, if allowed under the
procedural rules of the Commission concerned, shall interrupt the period herein fixed. If the
motion is denied, the aggrieved party may file the petition within the remaining period, but
which shall not be less than five (5) days in any event, reckoned from notice of denial.
The aforequoted 30-day period is a reflection of Section 7, Article IX of the 1987

Constitution, which states that:
SECTION 7. Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its Members, any
case or matter brought before it within sixty days from the date of its submission for decision or
resolution. A case or matter is deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the
last pleading, brief, or memorandum required by the rules of the Commission or by the
Commission itself. Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law, any decision, order,
or ruling of each Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the
aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof.
It is clear from the foregoing that the Constitution and, by extension, Rule 64 of
the Rules of Court, both provide for a remedy by which an aggrieved party may question the
decision or ruling of the COMELEC. Such remedy is in the form of a petition for certiorari which
may be filed within a 30-day period from notice of the decision or ruling being challenged.
(Gana-Carait y Villegas v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 257453, August 9, 2022)
Despite this, the Court is likewise aware that, in contrast to the mandate of
the Constitution and the Rules of Court, Section 1, Rule 37, Part VII of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure (COMELEC Rules) reckons the 30-day period from promulgation, instead of from
notice:
Section 1. Petition for Certiorari; and Time to File. — Unless otherwise provided by
law, or by any specific provisions in these Rules, any decision, order or ruling of the Commission
may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty (30) days
from its promulgation.
More importantly, Section 3 of the same Rule declares that decisions in petitions to
cancel certificates of candidacy, among others, become final and executory after the lapse of five
days from promulgation, unless restrained by the Court:
Sec. 3. Decisions Final After Five Days. — Decisions in pre-proclamation cases and
petitions to deny due course to or cancel certificates of candidacy, to declare a candidate as
nuisance candidate or to disqualify a candidate, and to postpone or suspend elections shall
become final and executory after the lapse of five (5) days from their promulgation, unless
restrained by the Supreme Court.
The said provision appears to be echoed by Section 8 of Rule 23, Part V of the
same COMELEC Rules, as amended by Resolution No. 9523, which states:
Section 8. Effect if Petition Unresolved. — If a Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel

a Certificate of Candidacy is unresolved by final judgment on the day of elections, the petitioner
may file a motion with the Division or Commission En Banc, as may be applicable, to suspend the
proclamation of the candidate concerned, provided that the evidence for the grounds for denial
to or cancel certificate of candidacy is strong. For this purpose, at least three (3) days prior to any
election, the Clerk of the Commission shall prepare a list of pending cases and furnish all
Commissioners copies of the said list.
A Decision or Resolution is deemed final and executory if, in case of a Division ruling, no
motion for reconsideration is filed within the reglementary period, or in cases of rulings of the
Commission En Banc, no restraining order is issued by the Supreme Court within five (5) days
from receipt of the decision or resolution.
Taking all of the above provisions together, We find that there is a need to harmonize
the COMELEC Rules with the Rules of Court and the Constitution. Despite the clear and
express provisions therein, COMELEC Rules are mere procedural, which, as such, must always
yield to substantive law. xxx.
the adverse decision or ruling of the COMELEC. (Gana-Carait y Villegas v. Commission on
In line with the foregoing, and as aptly pointed out by Justice Alfredo Benjamin S.
Caguioa (Justice Caguioa), the proper way of harmonizing Section 8, Rule 23 of the COMELEC
Rules with Article IX of the 1987 Constitution and Rule 64 of the Rules of Court is to understand
it to mean that decisions and resolutions of the COMELEC En Banc, in the absence of a
restraining order from the Court issued within five days from receipt, are rendered only
executory — but not final. Hence, despite COMELEC's issuance of the Certificate of Finality and
Entry of Judgment, We find that the COMELEC En Banc Resolution did not actually attain
finality, and as such, may be the subject of the instant petition, and may be addressed by the
Court. (Gana-Carait y Villegas v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 257453, August 9, 2022)
Election Offenses
As stated in Penera, a review of legislative deliberations in the passage of the Omnibus

Election Code and R.A. No. 9369, does not lend guidance with respect to the rationale behind
the definition and enumeration of prohibited acts; thus, the Court cannot speculate and is left to
apply the law as stated. Otherwise stated, the limitation with respect to how a candidate may be
held liable for the offense of premature campaigning, irrespective of the motivation is a policy
determination which the Court cannot overturn without offending the Constitution and the
principle of separation of powers. (People v. Ramoy, G.R. No. 212738, March 9, 2022)
[Note: In accordance with the foregoing, the Informations in Criminal Case Nos. Q-11-169068 and
Q-11-169069 insofar as the facts alleged therein refer to the offense of premature campaigning under
Section 80 of the Omnibus Election, which under the state of present law is "impossible" to commit, must
be quashed. Consequently, there is no longer any reason for the Court to make a determination if these
Informations each charge more than one offense. (People v. Ramoy, G.R. No. 212738, March 9, 2022)]
[Note: Foremost, the Court disagrees with the aforementioned disquisition. Under prevailing
laws and jurisprudence, premature campaigning is no longer punishable. It is for this reason that the
Informations in Criminal Case Nos. Q-11-169068 and Q-11-169069 must be quashed on the ground that
the facts charged do not constitute an offense. (People v. Ramoy, G.R. No. 212738, March 9, 2022)]
COMMISSION ON AUDIT
Audit
Jurisdiction
In the present action, PhilHealth invokes repeatedly the concepts of fiscal autonomy, institutional authority to fix
personnel compensation, and good faith in its attempt to have the COA rulings overturned. For one, the contentions
are a reiteration of those raised before and passed upon by the COA Proper. More importantly, it is obvious that the
arguments are not imputations of grave abuse. Assuming that these are proven, the imputations only amount to
errors of judgment, which are beyond the scope of the Court's review under Rule 64. To be clear, PhilHealth's
failure to point out the specific acts of the COA Proper that may constitute grave abuse of discretion in upholding
the subject disallowances is sufficient ground to dismiss the present petition.
The Court observes that PhilHealth does not deny that the subject benefits and
allowances were granted without executive approval or confirmation. Instead, PhilHealth
insists that it belongs to a special class of entities exempted from the requirements in
the SSL and relevant laws/regulations, particularly obtaining prior executive approval in
relation to the grant and payment of salaries and benefits. It continues to rely on its supposed
fiscal autonomy and authority to fix the compensation of its personnel in justifying the grant
and in seeking exemption from the application of the SSL. In other words, PhilHealth believes
that it has a free hand in determining the compensation of its personnel, without the
intervention of the executive, and that the resolutions passed by the Board of Directors are
sufficient legal bases for the grant and payment of the EAA and Birthday Gift.
However, it is already settled that PhilHealth does not have absolute discretion in
determining the compensation of its officials. In the 2016 Decision in Philippine Health Insurance Corp.
v. Commission on Audit, xxx.
That PhilHealth's fiscal autonomy had been purportedly confirmed by the Chief
Executive and the OGCC, as PhilHealth argues, cannot undermine the consistent and
unequivocal Court pronouncements.
At this point, there should no longer be any question that PhilHealth is not exempted
from the application of the SSL. Its power to fix personnel compensation is limited and "must
necessarily yield to the state policy of 'equal pay for equal work.' Thus, any disbursement of
allowances and other forms of employee compensation must conform with prevailing rules and
regulations issued by the President of the Philippines and/or the [DBM]. (Philippine Health
Insurance Corp. v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 250787, September 27, 2022)
Refunds
Quantum Meruit
Quantum meruit literally means "as much as he deserves." This legal principle, a
principle predicated on equity, states that a person may recover a reasonable value of the thing
he delivered or the service he rendered. It is a device to prevent undue enrichment based on the
equitable postulate that it is unjust for a person to retain a benefit without paying for it.
The Court has held in the past that recovery on the basis of quantum meruit is
allowed despite the invalidity or absence of a written contract between a contractor and a
government agency. The absence or invalidity of required documents would not necessarily
preclude the contractor from receiving payment for the services he or she has rendered for
the government.
Thus, in the case at bar, despite the invalidity of Municipal Ordinance No. 2010-02,
which in turn rendered the contract between Corella and Philkonstrak, invalid, the latter is still
entitled to receive payment for the services it rendered for the local government of Corella.
Corella cannot be unjustly enriched and allowed to retain the benefits of the services rendered
by Philkonstrak without properly paying for it.
Philkonstrak sufficiently established its right to be compensated on the basis of quantum

meruit. As gleaned from the records of the case, the Court finds that Philkonstrak entered into
the contract in good faith and for the good interest of Corella, notwithstanding the allegation of
Corella that Philkonstrak "conspired, if not, even was the brains behind all these
irregularities"] with then Mayor Rapal "in an effort to do away with public policy." However,
such allegation was not proven to be true by either the CIAC or the CA.
To deny Philkonstrak compensation for more than 50% of the services it already
rendered, services which clearly benefited Corella, would be the height of injustice, which
cannot be countenanced by this Court. This is especially true since the use of the road grader,
the reconditioned road roller, and the rehabilitation/improvement on the existing waterworks
system benefited the government and people of Corella. It is but just that Philkonstrak be
compensated for the services it rendered. (Municipality of Corella v. Philkonstrak Development
Corporation, G.R. No. 218663. February 28, 2022)
We have consistently sustained the grant of compensation to contractors, who have

entirely or substantially accomplished their obligation under the contract on the basis
of quantum meruit, regardless of any invalidity or irregularity in its procurement. (Metro Laundry
Services, G.R. No. 252411. February 15, 2022)
[Note: This catena of cases clearly shows that the outright denial of Metro Laundry's legitimate
claim for compensation is unjustified. Insofar as Metro Laundry is concerned, it has fulfilled the services
it was contracted for, and in doing so, no evidence of bad faith or collusion with the approving OMMC
officials was presented against it. Needless to say, the government has admittedly benefited from Metro
Laundry's services. Given these circumstances, there is no justification for the COA Proper to impose
upon Metro Laundry the burden of pursuing its claim against the public officials who engaged its
services without compliance with the law. The liability of these erring officers may properly be imposed
in a disallowance case, if bad faith on their part is proven, and/or in an administrative or criminal case, if
warranted. Thus, we find no further obstacle in ruling for the payment of Metro Laundry's services based
on quantum meruit. (Metro Laundry Services, G.R. No. 252411. February 15, 2022)]
Good Faith
In the instant case, it is well to note that petitioners Wilhelmina A. Aquino (Aquino),
Joana D. Carame (Carame), and Joe Allan Baptista (Baptista), as Senior Accountant, Junior
Accountant and Corporate Accounts Analyst, respectively, were not recipients of the
disallowed amounts and merely certified that supporting documents were complete and
proper. We hold that they may be excused from liability considering that their participation in
allowing the disbursement of the disallowed amounts was merely ministerial in nature. Their
participation was merely limited to certifying that supporting documents were complete and
proper, and they could not have refused to certify as such. Furthermore, their certification did
not factor into the illegality of the disbursements for lack of LWUA approval. Verily, it was the
BOD of the BWD which failed to first obtain the LWUA approval before issuing the BWD Board
of Directors' Board Resolution No. 08-2006 and which omission led to the grant of the
disallowed amounts. Hence, good faith shall be appreciated in their favor and Aquino, Carame,
and Baptista should thus be excused from solidary liability. (De Guzman v. Commission on Audit,
G.R. No. 255852, February 15, 2022)
[Note: However, the presumption of good faith fails when an explicit law, rule or regulation has
been violated. The Court has repeatedly enunciated that the deliberate disregard of laws is equivalent to
gross negligence amounting to bad faith. In this case, the approving and certifying officers of the BWD
who authorized the payment of the disallowed amounts and the recipient members of the BWD Board
are guilty of gross negligence when they allowed the P1,200 monthly disbursements without the
approval of the LWUA. These officers cannot feign ignorance of the provisions of PD 198, as amended,
which requires the LWUA approval for the P1,200 monthly allowance for the purchase of cellular cards.
Let this be a reminder to petitioners, as well as other public officers who are custodians of public funds,
to be circumspect in the handling and releasing of funds and to exercise the diligence required in the
performance of their functions. (De Guzman v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 255852, February 15, 2022)]
Good faith is a defense no longer available to payees of disallowed benefits.

Nevertheless, their liability to return may still be excused based on these grounds now
embodied in Rules 2c and 2d of the Madera Rules: (1) when the amount disbursed was
genuinely given in consideration of services rendered; (2) when undue prejudice will result
from requiring payees to return; (3) where social justice or humanitarian considerations are
attendant; and (4) other bona fide exceptions as may be determined on a case to case basis.
In Abellanosa v. Commission on Audit, the Court supplemented Madera and explained that
for the first exception under Rule 2c to apply, certain requisites must be present. Thus:
As a supplement to the Madera Rules on Return, the Court now finds it fitting to clarify that in
order to fall under Rule 2c, i.e., amounts genuinely given in consideration of services rendered,
the following requisites must concur:
(a) the personnel incentive or benefit has proper basis in law but is only disallowed due to
irregularities that are merely procedural in nature; and
(b) the personnel incentive or benefit must have a clear, direct, and reasonable connection to the
actual performance of the payee-recipient's official work and functions for which the benefit or
incentive was intended as further compensation.
Verily, these refined parameters are meant to prevent the indiscriminate and loose
invocation of Rule 2c of Madera Rules on Return which may virtually result in the practical
inability of the government to recover. To stress, Rule 2c as well as Rule 2d should remain true
to their nature as exceptional scenarios; they should not be haphazardly applied as an excuse
for non-return, else they effectively override the general rule which, again, is to return
disallowed public expenditures. (Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office v. Commission on Audit,
G.R. No. 246313. February 15, 2022)
[Note: In Madera v. Commission on Audit, the Court laid down a definitive set of rules
(Madera Rules) to determine the liability of government officers and employees being made to return
employee benefits that were disallowed in audit. Thus:
1. If a Notice of Disallowance is set aside by the Court, no return shall be required from any of the
persons held liable therein.
2. If a Notice of Disallowance is upheld, the rules on return are as follows:
a. Approving and certifying officers who acted in good faith, in regular performance of official
functions, and with the diligence of a good father of the family are not civilly liable to return
consistent with Section 38 of the Administrative Code of 1987.
b. Approving and certifying officers who are clearly shown to have acted in bad faith, malice, or
gross negligence are, pursuant to Section 43 of the Administrative Code of 1987, solidarily liable to
return only the net disallowed amount which, as discussed herein, excludes amounts excused under
the following sections 2c and 2d.
c. Recipients — whether approving or certifying officers or mere passive recipients — are liable to
return the disallowed amounts respectively received by them, unless they are able to show that the
amounts they received were genuinely given in consideration of services rendered.
d. The Court may likewise excuse the return of recipients based on undue prejudice, social justice
considerations, and other bona fide exceptions as it may determine on a case to case basis. (Philippine
Charity Sweepstakes Office v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 246313. February 15, 2022)]
On account of the nature of their liability, payees cannot be exempted therefrom by mere
invocation of the good faith defense. They may be excused from this obligation only when: (1) they
are able to show that the amounts they received were genuinely given in consideration of the
services rendered (Rule 2c of Madera case), or (2) the Court excuses them based on undue
prejudice, social justice considerations, or the bona fide exceptions as will be determined on a
case-to-case basis (Rule 2d of Madera case).
And as later clarified in Abellanosa v. Commission on Audit, a payee may benefit from
exception under Rule 2c of Madera case only when the following conditions concur: (a) if the
personnel incentive or benefit has proper basis in law but is only disallowed due to
irregularities that are merely procedural in nature; and (b) the personnel incentive or benefit
must have a clear, direct, and reasonable connection to the actual performance of the payee
recipient's official work and functions for which the benefit or incentive was intended as further
compensation.
The Court does not find any of the above-mentioned exceptions to be availing in the
present case. First, the payments of EAA and Birthday Gift lack legal basis. As discussed above,
these were granted ultra vires and cannot be classified as valid CNA Incentives (Rule 2c
of Madera case). Second, there are no circumstances in the present case that compel the Court to
excuse herein payees (Rule 2d of Madera case). In these lights, they must refund the
corresponding amounts received in error. (Philippine Health Insurance Corp. v. Commission on
Audit, G.R. No. 250787, September 27, 2022)
Madera also added that these badges of good faith should be considered first before
holding these officers, whose participation in the disallowed transaction was in the performance
of their official duties, liable; and that the presence of any of these factors in a case may tend to
uphold the presumption of good faith in the performance of official functions accorded to the
officers involved.
Badges of good faith could be appreciated in favor of petitioner. No prior disallowance

of the same benefit has been issued against ICAB. Also, there is no precedent disallowing a
similar case in jurisprudence. As a matter of fact, the only other COA disallowance petition
involving ICAB was a case also entitled Abejo v. Commission on Audit, and docketed as G.R. No.
254570. Said case was resolved by the Court on 29 January 2021, and it pertains to an entirely
different incentive. Considering the foregoing, the Court chooses to uphold petitioner's
presumption of good faith. (Abejo v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 251967, June 14, 2022)
Hence, regardless of their good faith, the payee-recipients, including the

certifying/approving officers who also received the meal allowance, are individually liable for
the disallowed amounts they respectively received. This is pursuant to the principle of solutio
indebiti, which imposes an obligation to return what has been received in error.
None of the exceptions in Rules 2 (c) and 2 (d) are present in this case. The grant of the
meal allowance to those not entitled thereto had no legal basis. The defect in payment was not
merely procedural. Hence, refund cannot be excused under Rule 2 (c).
Refund cannot also be excused under Rule 2 (d). Unlike in Madera where the exception
in Rule 2 (d) was applied, the disallowed amounts were not meant to aid the employees amidst
an extraordinary and unique circumstance, similar to the onslaught of Typhoon Yolanda. No
compelling humanitarian considerations exist in this case. Indeed, the exception in Rule 2 (d)
should only be applied in highly exceptional circumstances, lest the Madera Rules be diluted
into insignificance. As there are no grounds to excuse the return of the disallowed amounts, the
payee-recipients should return the amounts they respectively received. (Abrigo v. Commissioner
on Audit (COA)-Commission Proper, G.R. No. 253117, March 29, 2022)
As explained in Madera, Sections 38 and 39 of the Administrative Code state that

government officials who approved or certified the grant of disallowed benefits could only be
civilly liable to return the amount thereof when they acted in evident bad faith, with malice, or
if they were grossly negligent in the performance of their official duties.
Further, this Court accepted the following circumstances as badges of good faith that
may be considered in favor of government officers who, in the performance of their official
functions, approved, or certified the disallowed benefit:
xxx For one to be absolved of liability the following requisites [may be considered]: (1)
Certificates of Availability of Funds pursuant to Section 40 of the Administrative Code, (2) In-
house or Department of Justice legal opinion, (3) that there is no precedent disallowing a similar
case in jurisprudence, (4) that it is traditionally practiced within the agency and no prior
disallowance has been issued, [or] (5) with regard the question of law, that there is a reasonable
textual interpretation on its legality.
Madera also added that these badges of good faith should be considered first before
holding these officers, whose participation in the disallowed transaction was in the performance
of their official duties, liable; and that the presence of any of these factors in a case may tend to
uphold the presumption of good faith in the performance of official functions accorded to the
officers involved.
In this case, there are badges of good faith that may be appreciated in favor of the
approving/certifying officers. In particular, We find that the approving/certifying officers
believed in good faith that the recipients of the allowances are entitled thereto, and that the
grant of such allowances was in accordance with their by-laws, since it has been their practice
for many years, for which they have never been cited for violation by COA until this case.
Finally, it appears that at the time the disallowed benefits were given, there was still no
precedent disallowing a similar case in jurisprudence. Recently, a similar finding of good faith
was made by the Court in Development Bank of the Philippines v. Commission on Audit.
It should be emphasized, however, that good faith on the part of the

approving/certifying officers in granting such allowances does not make it legal or proper as
would justify its continued grant. Neither the corporate by-laws nor the subsequent approval or
confirmation by former President Arroyo (which was done during the prohibited period before
a regular election) exempt DBP officers from the constitutional prohibition on double and
additional compensation. (Development Bank of the Philippines v. Commission on Audit, G.R. Nos.
210965 & 217623, March 22, 2022)
[Note: Nevertheless, despite the deletion of good faith as a defense available to passive-
recipients, their liability to return disallowed benefits may still be excused based on these grounds now
embodied in Rules 2c and 2d of the Madera Rules: (1) when the amount disbursed was genuinely given in
consideration of services rendered; (2) when undue prejudice will result from requiring payees to return;
and (3) where social justice or humanitarian considerations are attendant, or there are other bona
fide exceptions as may be determined on a case to case basis.
None of these exceptions are present here.
In Abellanosa v. Commission on Audit (Abellanosa), the Court ruled that before an incentive is
deemed "genuinely given in consideration of services rendered," the legality of the expenditure should
first be considered. This "legality" includes compliance with all the legal conditions for the disbursement.
Further, the disallowance should have been the result of some procedural error not affecting the
genuineness of the payout. These circumstances would show that the payees would have no issue
receiving the benefit disallowed were it not for that minor mistake. Finally, aside from having proper
basis in law, the disallowed incentive or benefit must have a clear, direct, reasonable connection to the
actual performance of the payee-recipient's official work and functions.
Here, the disallowed benefits clearly lacked legal cover as it violated not only PD 1597 and MO 20
but also the Constitution. That alone disqualifies the subject benefits and allowances from being
considered as genuinely given in consideration of services rendered.
Neither could the payees be exonerated on the grounds of undue prejudice, social justice,
humanitarian considerations, or other bona fide exceptions. Abellanosa instructs Us that to merit the
payees' exoneration, these considerations must be highly exceptional to strongly compel the Court "to
prevent a clear inequity arising from a directive to return." No such extraordinary or highly meritorious
considerations exist here especially considering that the benefits received were deemed additional or
double compensation in favor of the recipients. (Development Bank of the Philippines v. Commission on Audit,
G.R. Nos. 210965 & 217623, March 22, 2022)]
Verily, in Madera v. Commission on Audit, we introduced the concept of "net disallowed

amount" to clarify the nature and extent of the approving and/or certifying officers' liability in a
disallowed transaction vis-à-vis that of the payees.' We ruled:
With the liability for unlawful expenditures properly understood, x x x any amounts
allowed to be retained by payees shall reduce the solidary liability of officers found to have
acted in bad faith, malice, and gross negligence. In this regard, [Justice Estela Perlas-Bernabe]
coins the term "net disallowed amount" to refer to the total disallowed amount minus the
amounts excused to be returned by the payees. Likewise, [Justice Marvic Leonen] is of the same
view that the officers held liable [to] have a solidary obligation only to the extent of what
should be refunded and this does not include the amounts received by those absolved of
liability.
In Torreta v. Commission on Audit, we laid down specific guidelines on the return of

disallowed amounts in cases involving irregular or illegal government contracts, viz.:
2. If a Notice of Disallowance is upheld, the rules on return are as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
b. Pursuant to Section 43 of the Administrative Code of 1987, approving and certifying

officers who are clearly shown to have acted in bad faith, malice, or gross negligence,
are solidarily liable together with the recipients for the return of the disallowed amount.
c. The civil liability for the disallowed amount may be reduced by the amounts due to
the recipient based on the application of the principle of quantum meruit on a [case-to-case]
basis.
xxx xxx xxx
Therefore, notwithstanding affirmance of the disallowance, the approving and certifying

officers cannot be made accountable for the refund of the disallowed amount since the COA
Proper had already determined the propriety of allowing the payees to retain all the payments
made to them for their services. To rule otherwise would pave the iniquitous denouement of
enriching the government at the expense of the officers. (Ricalde v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No.
253724, February 15, 2022)
LOCAL GOVERNMENT
Authority
Urrutia invokes the doctrine of implication in relation to Section 456 (a) (2) of the Local Government Code of
1991, stating that the vice-mayor's power to appoint officials and employees of the sangguniang panlungsod carries
with it the power to discipline the same officials and employees, absent any contrary statutory provision. This
doctrine was also used as basis by the CSC and CA for its rulings.
The Local Government Code of 1991 generally applies to the case at bar. However, the
more specific law that applies to the Sexual Harassment violations committed by a government
employee like Urrutia is CSC Resolution No. 01-0940 or the Rules on Sexual harassment Cases.
Section 7, Rule VI of the Rules on Sexual Harassment Cases specifically provides that a
Committee on Decorum and Investigation (CODI) must be constituted in all national or local
agencies of the government, state colleges and universities, including government-owned or
controlled corporations with the original charter. In the absence of a CODI, the head office or
agency shall immediately cause the creation of the CODI in accordance with law and rules.
The Rules on Sexual Harassment Cases is categorical. The head office or agency is the
entity tasked to create the CODI when none is existing or has been constituted. In this case, the
head office or agency responsible for creating a CODI is the office of the city mayor, headed by
the mayor himself, Gatchalian, which he did. Gatchalian issued EO 2012-006 creating the City
Committee on Decorum and Investigation on Sexual Harassment Cases of the City Government
of Valenzuela. The following day, the CODI adopted Resolution No. 2012-001 which, among
others, divided the CODI into two groups: (1) CODI-I, to conduct preliminary investigation;
and (2) CODI-II, to conduct formal hearing. Both CODI-I and CODI-II found Urrutia liable for
sexual harassment classified as a grave offense under the Rules on Sexual Harassment Cases.
They issued a formal charge and preventive suspension order against Urrutia.
In fine, the CA committed reversible error in dismissing Gatchalian's petition on the

basis that the city mayor had no power to discipline Urrutia and that only the vice-mayor has
the sole jurisdiction to discipline Urrutia. There is legal basis for not reinstating Urrutia to his
former position since Gatchalian, through the CODI, had jurisdiction and authority to try the
Sexual Harassment case against Urrutia. (Gatchalian v. Urrutia, G.R. No. 223595, March 16, 2022)
Appropriations
In the case at bar, the Court finds that there is no need for a separate authorization from
the sangguniang bayan as the appropriation ordinance, Municipal Ordinance No. 2010-02,
identified the project or program in sufficient detail, and not just in general or generic terms.
The one-paged appropriation ordinance specifically and expressly set aside an amount of
money, P27,000,000.00, for certain projects, including the purchase of specific heavy equipment
and rehabilitation/improvement of the existing waterworks system of the municipality.
Municipal Ordinance No. 2010-02, having sufficiently covered the project and the cost in detail,
need not be accompanied by a prior sangguniang bayan authorization any longer. (Municipality
of Corella v. Philkonstrak Development Corporation, G.R. No. 218663. February 28, 2022)
[Note: The term "appropriation," as defined under Section 306, Title V of the Local Government
Code "refers to an authorization made by ordinance, directing the payment of goods and services from
local government funds under specified conditions or for specific purposes." (Municipality of Corella v.
Philkonstrak Development Corporation, G.R. No. 218663. February 28, 2022)]
[Note: Juxtaposing this definition with the exception in Article 107(g) of the IRR of the Local
Government Code, that "any ordinance xxx authorizing or directing the payment of money xxx, shall
require the affirmative vote of a majority of all the sanggunian members," it is express and clear that an
"appropriation ordinance" is one such ordinance contemplated in the exception.
The definition of the term "appropriation" in the Local Government Code is clear: [i]t is an
authorization made by an ordinance that directs the payment of money. The exception to the general rule
of the prescribed voting requirement in the IRR of the Local Government Code is clear: an ordinance that
directs or authorizes the payment of money needs a quorum of all the sanggunian members, not only of
those sanggunian members present. (Municipality of Corella v. Philkonstrak Development Corporation, G.R.
No. 218663. February 28, 2022)]
Ordinances
Article 107(g) of the IRR of the Local Government Code provides the general rule that no
ordinance or resolution shall be passed by the sanggunian without prior approval of a majority
of all the members present. The exception to the general rule is that for ordinances or
resolutions authorizing or directing the payment of money or creating a liability, what is
needed is the affirmative vote of a majority of all the sanggunian members, whether present
or not. Simply, the quorum in the general rule depends on the number of
the sanggunian members present while the quorum in the exception depends on the total
number of sanggunian members voted into office. (Municipality of Corella v. Philkonstrak
Development Corporation, G.R. No. 218663. February 28, 2022)
ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS
Liability
Under the "threefold liability rule," the wrongful acts or omissions of public officers may
give rise to civil, criminal and administrative liabilities. Corollarily, public officers could still be
held civilly liable to reimburse the injured party notwithstanding their acquittal. (Matobato, Sr.
v. People, G.R. Nos. 229265 & 229624, February 15, 2022)
In Larin, the administrative case was filed on the basis of the conviction by the
Sandiganbayan of petitioner Aquilino T. Larin, Revenue Specific Tax Officer, then Assistant
Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue and his co-accused of the crimes of violation
of Section 268 (4) of the National Internal Revenue Code and Section 3 (e) of RA 3019. When the
case reached the Court, Larin's conviction in the criminal cases was set-aside.
Here, the administrative and criminal cases were simultaneously filed arising from the
same set of questioned transactions. Settled is the rule that the mere dismissal of the criminal
cases does not ipso facto absolve Esplana from administrative liability considering that the
evidence required in the administrative proceedings is only substantial evidence. (Esplana v.
Field Investigation Bureau, G.R. No. 248150, March 23, 2022)
[Note: However, the Court would not hesitate to recognize the import and weight of the
dismissal of the criminal informations against Esplana considering the clear ruling by the Office of the
Special Prosecutor therein that, after reinvestigation, all SDOs were able to prove that their SCAs were
validly authorized through Special Orders, and covered by their respective fidelity bonds per Bureau of
Treasury Confirmation Letters; and that the SDOs had liquidated their cash accountabilities per
Certification issued by the PCG Chief Accountant. Otherwise stated, there is nothing irregular in the acts
of Esplana in signing the DVs to facilitate the grant of SCAs to the SDOs. These are the same findings of
the Court in this petition. The same evidence was submitted and duly scrutinized by the Court. The same
conclusion was reached by the Court. It can be said, therefore, that the dismissal of the criminal
informations further strengthens the conclusion that Esplana cannot be held administratively liable for
Grave Misconduct, Serious Dishonesty, and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service for lack
of substantial evidence. (Esplana v. Field Investigation Bureau, G.R. No. 248150, March 23, 2022)]
The same principles in Tecson were likewise applied to deny the claim for the dismissal
of administrative case on the basis of the dismissal of a criminal case.
The general rule, however, is not without any exceptions.
In Nicolas v. Sandiganbayan, the Court ruled in favor of the dismissal of the criminal cases
against petitioner therein after having been absolved in a related administrative case. Petitioner
in the said case insisted that the Sandiganbayan should have granted the demurrer to evidence
because of the decision of the Court in the related administrative case where the accused was
absolved from administrative liability. In ruling in favor of the dismissal of the criminal cases,
the Court held:
In the case of Nicolas, he was exonerated of administrative liability in G.R. No. 154668 by
this Court. In said case, the Court noted that while he requested the release of the cargo, he did so
in good faith as he relied on the records before him and the recommendation of Arriola. And it
noted that there was nothing to indicate that he had foreknowledge of any irregularity about the
cargo. Thus Nicolas was absolved of having acted with gross neglect of duty xxx.
This Court is not unmindful of its rulings that the dismissal of an administrative case
does not bar the filing of a criminal prosecution for the same or similar acts subject of the
administrative complaint and that the disposition in one case does not inevitably govern the
resolution of the other case/s and vice versa. The applicability of these rulings, however, must be
distinguished in the present cases.
In Ocampo v. Office of the Ombudsman and the other cases cited by the prosecution in its
Consolidated Comment, it was the dismissal of the criminal cases that was pleaded to abate the
administrative cases filed against the therein petitioners.
More importantly, the quantum of proof required to sustain administrative charges is

significantly lower than that necessary for criminal actions. To this effect was the ruling
in Ocampo:
The dismissal of the criminal case will not foreclose administrative action filed against
petitioner or give him a clean bill of health in all respects. The Regional Trial Court, in dismissing
the criminal complaint, was simply saying that the prosecution was unable to prove the guilt of
petitioner beyond reasonable doubt, a condition sine qua non for conviction. The lack or absence of
proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean an absence of any evidence whatsoever for there
is another class of evidence which, though insufficient to establish guilt beyond reasonable
doubt, is adequate in civil cases; this is preponderance of evidence. Then, too, there is the
"substantial evidence" rule in administrative proceedings which merely requires such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Thus,
considering the difference in the quantum of evidence, as well as the procedure followed and the
sanctions imposed in criminal and administrative proceedings, the findings and conclusion in one
should not necessarily be binding on the other.
Where, as in this case, the administrative complaint was dismissed for failing to satisfy
the degree of proof which is merely substantial evidence, a fortiori the criminal case based on the
same facts and evidence cannot but falter and fall against the highest quantum of proof — proof
beyond reasonable doubt.
Further, in People v. Sandiganbayan the Court also recognized that a dismissal in an

administrative charge may be used to dismiss the criminal case if founded on the same facts,
thus:
Although the dismissal of the criminal case cannot be pleaded to abate the administrative
proceedings primarily on the ground that the quantum of proof required to sustain
administrative charges is significantly lower than that necessary for criminal actions, the same
does not hold true if it were the other way around, that is, the dismissal of the administrative case
is being invoked to abate the criminal case. The reason is that the evidence presented in the
administrative case may not necessarily be the same evidence to be presented in the criminal
case. The prosecution is certainly not precluded from adducing additional evidence to discharge
the burden of proof required in the criminal cases. However, if the criminal case will be
prosecuted based on the same facts and evidence as that in the administrative case, and the
court trying the latter already squarely ruled on the absence of facts and/or circumstances
sufficient to negate the basis of the criminal indictment, then to still burden the accused to
present controverting evidence despite the failure of the prosecution to present sufficient and
competent evidence, will be a futile and useless exercise.
It appears from Nicolas and People that the dismissal of the criminal case was allowed
because of a prior dismissal of the related administrative case based on the following requisites:
(1) the existence of a criminal case and an administrative case against a public officer based on
the same facts; (2) the administrative case has been dismissed with finality; (3) the
administrative case was dismissed on the grounds that the acts complained of did not exist, or
that there is nothing unlawful or irregular in the acts or omissions of the public officer; and (4)
the criminal case is based on the same facts and evidence passed upon in the administrative
case, and no additional evidence was presented by the prosecution.
In this case, this Court rules that the exception, rather than the general rule, applies.
Hence, the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or in
excess of jurisdiction in refusing to apply the exception despite the concurrence of facts and
evidence, and the presence established jurisprudential requisites supporting the same.
First, on the basis of the same allegations against petitioner, administrative and criminal
cases were filed against him.
Second, the administrative case was dismissed with finality by no less than the Court
in Lukban v. Carpio-Morales.
Third, it is undisputed that in dismissing the administrative charges against herein

petitioner, the First Division of this Court found that the latter merely relied on the IAC
Resolution as regards the compliance of the LPOH units with the NAPOLCOM specifications
when he affixed his signature on the Inspection Report Form under the portion of "Noted by." It
was also emphasized therein that it was the IAC who has the responsibility of inspecting the
deliveries to make sure that they conform to the quantity and the approved technical
specifications in the contract, and to accept or reject the same. There is likewise a sheer dearth of
evidence on petitioner's participation in the alleged conspiracy to defraud the government.
Thus, it was also declared that petitioner's acts do not show any disposition to defraud, cheat,
deceive, or betray, nor any intent to violate the truth, and his reliance on the findings of IAC
and the property inspections within his division negates any dishonest intent.
To this Court's mind, this only shows that petitioner acted in good faith and his acts
cannot be considered unlawful or wrongful under the circumstances. Consequently, since the
violation of Sec. 3 (e) of RA 3019 and the crime of falsification of public documents are mala
in se and would thus require criminal intent, the Court's declaration also negates any crime
attributable to petitioner. It will also be highly illogical to allow the criminal case to proceed on
the basis of the same facts and evidence where the Court has already ruled out administrative
liability.
Lastly, it should also be emphasized that the prosecution in the criminal case did not
provide additional compelling evidence to prove petitioner's culpability other than those
presented in the administrative case. In fact, the OSP, in its Comment, did not point to any
additional evidence that has been presented against petitioner before the Sandiganbayan which
could change the conclusions of the Court in Lukban v. Carpio-Morales.
The Sandiganbayan also stated that it is actually entertaining the idea that the defense
will provide evidence as to the duties and functions of the accused which can be used against
petitioner. This only confirms the lack of the required quantum of evidence to support the
conviction of petitioner. In any case, the same cannot be countenanced as it goes against the
settled dictum that the evidence for the prosecution is the yardstick for determining the
sufficiency of proof necessary to convict, and that the prosecution must rely on the strength of
its own evidence and not the weakness of the defense. (Lukban v. Sandiganbayan-Seventh
Division, G.R. Nos. 254312-15, March 2, 2022)
Settled is the rule "that administrative cases are independent from criminal actions for
the same act or omission." The dismissal of a criminal charge does not prohibit the continuation
of the administrative prosecution.
In Paredes v. Court of Appeals:
It is indeed a fundamental principle of administrative law that administrative cases are

independent from criminal actions for the same act or omission. Thus, an absolution from a
criminal charge is not a bar to an administrative prosecution, or vice versa. One thing is
administrative liability; quite another thing is the criminal liability for the same act.
Verily, the fact that the required quantum of proof was not adduced to hold petitioner
administratively liable for falsification, forgery, malversation, grave dishonesty, and conduct
unbecoming of a public officer in OMB-VIS-ADM-97-0536 does not ipso facto mean that Criminal
Cases Nos. 99-525 to 99-531 filed against petitioner for Estafa through Falsification of a
Commercial Document before the RTC should be dismissed. The failure to adduce substantial
evidence against petitioner in the former is not a ground for the dismissal of the latter. These two
cases are separate and distinct; hence, independent from each other.
First, the quantum of evidence required in an administrative case is less than that
required in a criminal case. Criminal and administrative proceedings may involve similar
operative facts; but each requires a different quantum of evidence. Administrative cases require
only substantial evidence, or such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion. In contrast, in Criminal Case Nos. 99-525 to 99-531,
respondents are required to proffer proof beyond reasonable doubt to secure petitioner'
conviction. Rule 133 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides:
Sec. 2. Proof beyond reasonable doubt. — In a criminal case, the accused is entitled
to an acquittal, unless his guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt. Proof beyond
reasonable doubt does not mean such a degree of proof as, excluding possibility of error,
produces absolute certainty. Moral certainty only is required, or that degree of proof
which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind.
Thus, considering the difference in the quantum of evidence, as well as the procedure
followed and the sanctions imposed in criminal and administrative proceedings, the findings and
conclusions in one should not necessarily be binding on the other. Notably, the evidence
presented in the administrative case may not necessarily be the same evidence to be presented in
the criminal cases. The prosecution is certainly not precluded from adducing additional evidence
to discharge the burden of proof required in the criminal cases. Significantly, the prosecution had
manifested that it would present testimonial evidence which was not presented in the
administrative case.
Second, it is well settled that a single act may offend against two or more distinct and
related provisions of law, or that the same act may give rise to criminal as well as administrative
liability. As such, they may be prosecuted simultaneously or one after another, so long as they do
not place the accused in double jeopardy of being punished for the same offense.
However, Nicolas v. Sandiganbayan clarified that the prior dismissal of an administrative
case involving the same acts subject of the criminal action may be pleaded to abate criminal
liability if there is a finding in the administrative case that the elements of the crime are not
present.
In Nicolas, this Court cited the prior case of Nicolas v. Desierto, where it absolved public
officer Wilfred Nicolas of administrative liability. It found that he was not guilty of bad faith
and gross neglect of duty, which incidentally are elements of a violation of Section 3 (e) of
Republic Act No. 3019. Applying the doctrine of stare decisis, this Court used Desierto and
absolved Nicolas of criminal liability.
In the present case, there was no categorical finding in the administrative case that there
was no bad faith and gross neglect of duty. The Court of Appeals, in ruling on the
administrative liability of petitioner, made no explicit finding on the existence of bad faith.
Instead, it held that there was insufficient evidence to prove "corruption, clear intent to violate
the law, or flagrant disregard of established rule ... to characterize [petitioner's] misconduct as
grave." (Montero v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 239827, July 27, 2022)
Here, while it may be inferred from the ruling of the Court of Appeals that no bad faith
can be imputed against petitioner with respect to the administrative aspect of the case filed
against her, the Office of the Ombudsman explicitly held that she not only acted with evident
bad faith but also with partiality. In the absence of evidence showing that the Office of the
Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion, its findings must be respected.
Accordingly, petitioner cannot use the ruling of the Court of Appeals in the
administrative case as basis to reverse the finding of probable cause against her.
Finally, this Court notes that Informations were already filed against petitioner.
Time and again, we have held that once the criminal action is initiated through the filing
in court of an information or complaint, any proceeding questioning the finding of probable
cause of the prosecutor or the Office of the Ombudsman is rendered moot and academic.
The reason for this rule was explained in Crespo v. Mogul:
The filing of a complaint or information in Court initiates a criminal action. The Court
thereby acquires jurisdiction over the case, which is the authority to hear and determine the case.
When after the filing of the complaint or information a warrant for the arrest of the accused is
issued by the trial court and the accused either voluntarily submitted [themselves] to the Court or
was duly arrested, the Court thereby acquired jurisdiction over the person of the accused.
The preliminary investigation conducted by the fiscal for the purpose of determining
whether a prima facie case exists warranting the prosecution of the accused is terminated upon the
filing of the information in the proper court. In turn, as above stated, the filing of said
information sets in motion the criminal action against the accused in Court. Should the fiscal find
it proper to conduct a reinvestigation of the case, at such stage, the permission of the Court must
be secured. After such reinvestigation the finding and recommendations of the fiscal should be
submitted to the Court for appropriate action. While it is true that the fiscal has the quasi-judicial
discretion to determine whether or not a criminal case should be filed in court or not, once the
case had already been brought to Court whatever disposition the fiscal may feel should be proper
in the case thereafter should be addressed for the consideration of the Court. The only
qualification is that the action of the Court must not impair the substantial rights of the accused[ .
. . ] or the right of the People to due process of law.
xxx xxx xxx
The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or information is filed in
Court any disposition of the case as its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests
in the sound discretion of the Court. Although the fiscal retains the direction and control of the
prosecution of criminal cases even while the case is already in Court [they] cannot impose [their]
opinion on the trial court. The Court is the best and sole judge on what to do with the case before
it. The determination of the case is within its exclusive jurisdiction and competence. A motion to
dismiss the case filed by the fiscal should be addressed to the Court who has the option to grant
or deny the same. It does not matter if this is done before or after the arraignment of the accused
or that the motion was filed after a reinvestigation or upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice
who reviewed the records of the investigation.
Considering that Informations were already filed, jurisdiction over the case is now with
the Sandiganbayan. "[A]ny disposition of the case or dismissal or acquittal or conviction of the
accused rests within . . . [its] exclusive jurisdiction, competence, and discretion[.] (Montero v.
Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 239827, July 27, 2022)
In a last-ditch effort to save his plight, petitioner continues his finger-pointing, but this
time, he tries to pass the blame to his subordinates who allegedly assured him of the validity of
the transactions. Invoking the doctrine laid down in Arias v. Sandiganbayan, petitioner claims
that as a head of office, he can rely in good faith on the acts of his subordinates as he cannot
reasonably be expected to examine every single document relative to government transactions.
Unfortunately for petitioner, the circumstances of this case prevent him from seeking refuge
behind the Arias doctrine.
The Arias doctrine is not some magic cloak that can be used as a shield by a public
officer to conceal himself in the shadows of his subordinates and necessarily escape liability. In
fact, the Court has had numerous occasions to reject this defense in light of circumstances that
should have prompted the government officials to exercise a higher degree of circumspection
and, necessarily, go beyond what their subordinates had prepared.
Such is the case here. As duly observed by the Sandiganbayan, it is unacceptable that
petitioner blindly signed the subject documents despite the fact that the absence of public
bidding was readily ascertainable on their face, being as they were, mere "one-paged
documents." As a high-ranking DILG official, moreover, the first thing he should have
determined was the mode of procurement employed in the transactions. Instead, he testified in
court that his primary act as regional director, on his very first day, was to sign the checks for
the araro procurement, simply because the accountant told him that the transactions were in
order. According to him, he "just relied so much on my [his] staff that I [he] do [did] not even
know persons who entered into these transactions." Had petitioner exerted the necessary
precaution, he would have discovered that, as testified by the president of Revelstone, said
company was never even involved in the production of medicines, araro tools, and drug testing
kits. Regrettably, and with no valid reason, he failed to pay due attention to the glaring
illegality of the subject contracts. (Libunao v. People, G.R. Nos. 214336-37, February 15, 2022)
Petitioner also cannot find solace in Arias v. Sandiganbayan (Arias), which held that
heads of office could rely to a reasonable extent on their subordinates. As we have clarified,
when a matter is irregular on the document's face, so much so that a detailed examination
becomes warranted, the Arias doctrine is unavailing.
Petitioner cannot escape liability by passing the buck to his subordinates. The position
he occupied required him to be more circumspect in his actions and to be in the discharge of his
official duties. He cannot trivialize his role in the disbursement of funds and blindly adhere to
the findings and opinions of his subordinates, lest he be reduced to a mere clerk with no
authority over the personnel and the sections he oversees. (Chen v. Field Investigation Bureau,
G.R. No. 247916, April 19, 2022)
In Joson v. Commission on Audit, this Court again affirmed the wisdom of the foregoing
ruling and extended the protective mantle of the Arias Doctrine to a provincial governor, who
by the nature of his public office and function has to go over numerous paperwork and
documents for signature. To require him to meticulously examine each and every document
would be counterproductive and thus, he may rely to a reasonable extent on the good faith of
his subordinates. (Office of the Ombudsman v. Peñera, G.R. No. 227143, March 23, 2022)
[Note: However, We must clarify that the Arias doctrine is not an absolute rule and cannot be
automatically invoked to exonerate the heads of offices or agencies from criminal, civil or administrative
liability. Thus, if there exists an exceptional or additional circumstance which could have prodded the
public official to exercise a higher degree of circumspection, then the head of office or agency should have
exercised due diligence and go beyond what his subordinates had prepared or recommended.
In the instant case, it cannot be denied that Peñera, then the Municipal Mayor of Sta. Monica,
Surigao del Norte, would be inundated by numerous documents and paper works for her signature, in
addition to her other functions as the local chief executive. To require Peñera to thoroughly examine,
verify and go beyond her subordinate's actions would be counterproductive. Thus, by virtue of her
functions, Peñera may rely to a reasonable extent on the good faith of the evaluation and
recommendation of Camanga as to the determination of the qualified beneficiaries for the educational
assistance.
In addition, the Ombudsman has not shown and proven the existence of any exceptional or
additional circumstance which would prompt Peñera to meticulously review and go beyond the
evaluation and recommendations of Camanga.
It is undisputed that it was Camanga who prepared the report and recommendation, being the
Municipal Welfare and Development Officer tasked with the project. No proof was adduced that Peñera
had any hand or participation in the selection process of who may be considered as a qualified
beneficiary. Absent any other exceptional or additional circumstance Peñera's case falls well within the
ambit of the Arias doctrine.
Accordingly, We affirm the finding of the CA dismissing the administrative complaint against
Peñera. (Office of the Ombudsman v. Peñera, G.R. No. 227143, March 23, 2022)]
Here, in holding that the respondent cannot be held administratively charged for
dishonesty in view of the absence of proof that that she applied for optional retirement to pre-
empt the imminent filing of the administrative complaint against her, the CA applied, albeit
erroneously, the Court's pronouncements in Andutan.
Indeed, in Andutan, the Court dismissed the administrative case against Andutan, which
was filed one year and two months after his resignation. The Court ruled that "the Ombudsman
can no longer institute an administrative case against Andutan because the latter was not a
public servant at the time the case was filed." However this was decided in light of the
circumstances obtaining in Andutan:
The Ombudsman's general assertion that Andutan pre-empted the filing of a case against
him by resigning, since he "knew for certain that the investigative and disciplinary arms of the
State would eventually reach him" is unfounded. First, Andutan's resignation was neither his
choice nor of his own doing; he was forced to resign. Second, Andutan resigned from his DOF
post on July 1, 1998, while the administrative case was filed on September 1, 1999, exactly one (1)
year and two (2) months after his resignation. The Court struggles to find reason in the
Ombudsman's sweeping assertions in light of these facts.
What is clear from the records is that Andutan was forced to resign more than a year
before the Ombudsman filed the administrative case against him. Additionally, even if we were
to accept the Ombudsman's position that Andutan foresaw the filing of the case against him, his
forced resignation negates the claim that he tried to prevent the filing of the administrative case.
To emphasize, Andutan's resignation from the government service was not voluntary, as
he was merely forced to resign. Therefore, whether he knew that a case would be filed against
him or not is immaterial — what is certain is that, he could not have resigned with the purpose
of pre-empting the filing of administrative case against him.
In the present case, it is undisputed that the respondent availed of optional retirement
after Ortiz's counsel sent her letters, which informed her of the possibility of the institution of
legal action against her should she fail to settle her obligation. Verily, a complaint was filed
against her four months after her optional retirement. This is in huge contrast with Andutan,
who was forced to resign from his post. Thus, Andutan cannot be applied to respondent's case.
The respondent's voluntary separation from the government service, in addition to her
knowledge that a complaint would most likely be filed against her at anytime, bolsters the
Ombudsman's position that the respondent attempted to forestall the filing of an administrative
case against her by availing of optional retirement.
The foregoing also finds support in Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas v. Office of the Ombudsman
and Jamorabo, where the Court arrived at a similar conclusion:
Given the suspicious timing and the circumstances surrounding his voluntary retirement
from the service, coupled with his actual departure from the Philippines in April 2010, barely
four months after the loan was finally settled by his wife and sister-in-law, this Court finds that
Jamorabo's voluntary separation from government service was calculated to pre-empt the
charges that will inevitably result from the discovery of the illicit loan he entered into. As it
turned out, RBKSI did report the loan to the BSP in the very next examination period; and the
complaint against Jamorabo was filed shortly thereafter.
Certainly, the respondent's voluntary severance from the government service is not a bar
to the filing of an administrative case against her given that the surrounding circumstances of
her optional retirement reveal that it was availed of to avert impending administrative charges
concerning her unfulfilled obligation. (Office of the Ombudsman v. Hermosura, G.R. No. 207606,
February 16, 2022)
The Court is aware that respondent submitted his resignation letter to the OCA
immediately after the institution of the complaint against him. The records further show that his
resignation remained unacted upon due to the present administrative matter. Despite
submitting his resignation, the Court still deems it proper to impose the penalty of dismissal
against him. It bears emphasis that the precipitate resignation of a government employee shall
not render moot the administrative case against him, and will not preclude the finding of any
administrative liability to which he shall be answerable. In several cases, the Court still meted
the penalty of dismissal from the service against a court employee when the latter's resignation
was filed during a pending administrative complaint, and remained unacted upon. Verily,
resignation "is not a way out for a court personnel who is facing administrative sanction to
evade administrative liability."
Moreover, in the fairly recent case of OCA v. Bravo, the Court agreed with the OCA's
observation that the employee's resignation was made to preserve an opportunity for re-
employment in the Judiciary. However, this scheme, designed to evade the consequences of the
offenses he committed, should not be allowed to prosper. Resignation should not be used as a
device to circumvent administrative liability. (Rivera v. Geroche, A.M. No. P-12-3091 [Formerly
OCA IPI No. 10-3426-P]; January 4, 2022)
[Note: In view of the rules discussed above and with the intention of having a uniform
imposition of penalties against judiciary personnel, the Court holds that dismissal from the service is the
appropriate penalty that should be meted against respondent. The accessory penalties attached to
dismissal especially that of perpetual disqualification from government service, fittingly applies to
respondent, in order to deny him the opportunity to commit any similar misbehavior to the prejudice of
public service.
In line with this pronouncement, the Court resolves to enjoin the heads of offices to withhold any
action on resignations pending the resolution of administrative complaints against their respective
personnel. This includes the period of investigation, i.e., judicial audits, among other similar
administrative proceedings, prior to the filing of the appropriate complaint. More importantly, the OCA
and the JIB, as the case may be, are likewise enjoined to indicate the fact of the involved personnel's
resignation, if there be any, and its status in their reports. This action will facilitate the standardization of
the procedure in disciplining judiciary personnel and the imposition of appropriate penalties. (Rivera v.
Geroche, A.M. No. P-12-3091 [Formerly OCA IPI No. 10-3426-P]; January 4, 2022)]
To clarify, consistent with the findings in the 2016 and 2020 PCSO Cases, the PCSO Board
of Directors members are solidarily liable for the disallowed amount on account of their
participation as the approving officers who passed the resolutions granting illegal benefits (i.e.,
the COLA). However, as pointed out by the COA Proper in the assailed Resolution, the PCSO
Board of Directors members were not impleaded in the present disallowance proceedings.
Consequently, their liability cannot be enforced without and prior to the filing of the
appropriate action against these concerned officials. (Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office v.
Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 260403, July 19, 2022)
The demand for accountability should not be at the expense of well-meaning public
officials who may have erred while performing their duties but have done so without a criminal
mind. Our penal laws against corruption in the government are meant to enhance, rather than
stifle, public service. If every mistake, error, or oversight is met with criminal punishment, then
qualified individuals would be hindered in serving the government. To reiterate, while public
office is a public trust, the constitutionally enshrined right to presumption of innocence
encompasses all persons — private individuals and public servants alike.| (Soriano v. People,
G.R. No. 238282, April 26, 2022)
Administrative Offenses
and Penalties
The Court has regarded the misappropriation of judicial funds not only as a form of
dishonesty, but also of grave misconduct. Dishonesty is defined as: the disposition to lie, cheat,
deceive or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of honesty, probity or integrity in
principle; lack of fairness and straightforwardness; disposition to defraud, deceive or
betray.[21] It is a malevolent conduct that has no place in the judiciary. On the other hand,
misconduct refers to a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more
particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by a public officer. The misconduct is grave
if it is accompanied by the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law, or flagrant
disregard of established rule. (Rivera v. Geroche, A.M. No. P-12-3091 [Formerly OCA IPI No. 10-
3426-P]; January 4, 2022)
As previously discussed, respondent is guilty of two (2) offenses, namely, serious

dishonesty and grave misconduct. Under the amended Rule 140, both offenses are classified as
serious charges, with the following penalties: dismissal from the service with forfeiture of
benefits as the Court may determine, and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to
any public office, including government-owned or controlled corporations; suspension from
office without salary and other benefits for more than three (3) but not exceeding six (6) months;
or a fine of more than P100,000.00 but not exceeding P200,000.00.
On the other hand, the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service (URACCS), which is the applicable rule at the time respondent committed the offenses,
classifies dishonesty and grave misconduct as grave offenses punishable by dismissal from the
service at the first instance, with cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of retirement benefits,
disqualification for reinstatement or reemployment, disqualification for promotion, and bar
from taking civil service examinations.
At this juncture, reference shall be made to Flores v. Hipolito, wherein the Court
explained that in case of multiple offenses under the amended Rule 140, separate penalties shall
be imposed against the errant court personnel following the ruling in Boston Finance and
Investment Corp. v. Gonzalez, However, instead of applying Rule 140, the Court referred to the
URACCS in penalizing the errant court employee, because the URACCS only considers the
most serious offense in prescribing the penalty, while the other offenses shall be treated as
aggravating circumstances, viz.:
If the Court applies Rule 140 to the present case, Flores would be charged and penalized
with two separate offenses in line with the ruling in Boston Finance and Investment Corp. v.
Gonzalez, where the Court held that in administrative cases under Rule 140, separate penalties
shall be imposed for every offense. In contrast, only the penalty for the most serious charge shall
be imposed if the URACCS is to be applied, thus:
SECTION 55. Penalty for the Most Serious Offense. – If the respondent is found
guilty of two or more charges or counts, the penalty to be imposed should be that
corresponding to the most serious charge or count and the rest shall be considered as
aggravating circumstances.
Considering that the penalty under the URACCS is more favorable to Flores, the
Court deems it best to apply the said rule and hold Flores guilty of grave misconduct,
which is the more serious offense, aggravated by insubordination. Since this is not Flores'
first administrative infraction – the first being an administrative complaint where she
was found guilty of serious dishonesty and was suspended instead of being dismissed –
the penalty of dismissal in the present case is more than proper.
Similar with Flores, the application of Rule 140 will be more prejudicial to herein
respondent as he will be meted with separate penalties for the two administrative offenses.
Accordingly, for his dishonesty and serious misconduct, respondent shall suffer the penalty of
dismissal with the corresponding accessory penalties under the URACCS. (Rivera v. Geroche,
A.M. No. P-12-3091 [Formerly OCA IPI No. 10-3426-P]; January 4, 2022)
In Republic vs. Gimenez, the Court, xxx re-affirmed the long-established rule that
forfeiture proceedings under RA No. 1379 are civil in nature. The Court further stressed that, as
in all civil cases, the quantum of proof required in forfeiture proceedings is a preponderance of
evidence.
Thus, before the disputable presumption can arise that the properties of a public officer
or employee were unlawfully acquired, it must first be proved by a preponderance of evidence
that the acquisition cost of such properties is beyond his lawful sources of income, or, in the
words of the law, that their acquisition cost is "manifestly out of proportion to his salary." This
is the import of Section 2, RA No. 1379, which reads
Section 2. Filing of petition. — Whenever any public officer or employee has acquired
during his incumbency an amount of property which is manifestly out of proportion to his
salary as such public officer or employee and to his other lawful income and the income from
legitimately acquired property, said property shall be presumed prima facie to have been
unlawfully acquired. xxx.
Accordingly, in order to arrive at the conclusion that the amount of property owned by a
public officer is "manifestly out of proportion to his salary," the Special Prosecutor must first
prove by a preponderance of evidence (1) the existence of properties acquired by the public
officer during his incumbency; (2) the actual acquisition cost of said properties; and to compare
such acquisition cost with (3) the income of respondent public officer from lawful sources. It is
only after it has been proved by a preponderance of evidence that the acquisition cost of the
properties is manifestly out of proportion to the sources of lawful income that the prima
facie presumption will arise.
In the instant case, the bulk of the Special Prosecutor's evidence centered on a listing of
all the properties registered in the name of Mangila, as well as a computation of his salaries
from 1991 to 2004. The Special Prosecutor successfully proved that 6 real properties and 16
motor vehicles were registered in the name of Mangila, thus discharging the first burden. The
Special Prosecutor also presented a computation of his salaries from 1991 and 2004. Thus, the
Special Prosecutor discharged his third burden also. (Mangila v. Republic, G.R. No. 249222,
March 30, 2022)
In Trinidad v. Office of the Ombudsman, this Court clarified what constitutes as dereliction
of duty. Dereliction of duty may be classified as gross or simple neglect of duty or negligence.
Simple negligence is defined as the failure of an employee to give proper attention to a required
task expected of him, or to discharge a duty due to carelessness or indifference. Gross
negligence, on the other hand, is characterized by want of even the slightest care, or by acting or
omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but willfully and
intentionally, with a conscious indifference to the consequences, or by flagrant and palpable
breach of duty. It denotes a flagrant and culpable refusal or unwillingness of a person to
perform a duty. Gross negligence, thus, involves an element of intent, more than mere
carelessness or indifference to do one's duty. To be held liable for gross negligence, a public
official must have intentionally shirked his duty, fully aware that he is duty-bound to
perform. Simply, gross negligence involves consciously avoiding to do one's work. In cases
involving public officials, gross negligence occurs when a breach of duty is flagrant and
palpable.
Primordial in the issue of resolving any liability for dereliction of duty is the
determination of the scope of duties and functions of the government employee — which he has
purportedly breached or violated. In the case of Ragragio, he is accused of awarding the
contract to Nikka despite the alleged irregularities that attended the bidding process. Further,
given such alleged irregularities, he should have been prompted instead to declare a failure of
bidding instead of continuing to award the contract to Nikka.
All of these purported acts of Ragragio cannot properly be attributed to him, so that any
finding for Gross Neglect of Duty against him cannot be supported. As aptly pointed out by
Ragragio, considering his duties and functions as the PNR GM, his participation in the actual
procurement process is extremely limited. As he is neither a member of the BAC nor the HOPE,
he has no discretion to accept or reject the recommendation of the BAC to award the contract,
much less declare a failure of bidding. Thus, the assertion that he committed Gross Neglect of
Duty must necessarily fail, absent any duty or obligation that he flagrantly and culpably refused
to perform. (Ragragio v. Office of the Ombudsman (Field Investigation Office), G.R. No. 245895,
September 14, 2022)
Duty
Issuing tax declarations is not a purely ministerial function. It involves the examination
of documents presented and necessarily requires exercise of discretion. In Mercado v. Valley
Mountain Mines Explorations, Inc., the Court ruled that the writ of mandamus does not lie against
a city assessor to correct a tax declaration of an auctioned property by adding the alleged co-
owners. The documents submitted by those claiming entitlement to a tax declaration must
"indicate the nature of [their] right or claim over the property covered by the tax
declaration." (Bases Conversion and Development Authority v. Callangan, Jr., G.R. No. 241168,
August 22, 2022)
[Note: Thus, the trial court should not have been hasty in rendering the partial summary
judgment as the ownership of land is intertwined with one's entitlement to a tax declaration. It is
apparent from the records that there is a genuine issue raised as regards respondents' ownership. Hence,
before the issuance of a tax declaration, there should have been a full-blown trial to resolve the genuine
issues raised by the parties. (Bases Conversion and Development Authority v. Callangan, Jr., G.R. No. 241168,
August 22, 2022)]
Ombudsman
The Court recognizes the disciplinary authority of the Ombudsman over all elective and
appointive officials of the government and its subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies,
with the exception only of impeachable officers, Members of Congress, and the Judiciary. The
Court likewise appreciates the role of the Ombudsman as agent of the people in ensuring
accountability in public office. (Valderas v. Sulse, G.R. No. 205659, March 9, 2022)
Furthermore, We uphold the authority of the Office of the Ombudsman to issue subpoena
duces tecum notwithstanding the absence of any pending litigation, at that time, against
Estrada, et al. This was the prevailing doctrine at the time the subpoena duces tecum was issued.
While this doctrine had already been abandoned in the Marquez case in that that there must be a
pending case in order for the Ombudsman to validly inspect and compel the presentation of
bank records, it must be stressed that Marquez Case was promulgated four months after the
issuance of the subpoena duces tecum. To reiterate, when a doctrine of this Court is overruled
and a different view is adopted, and more so when there is a reversal thereof, the new doctrine
should be applied prospectively. Accordingly, Marquez Case did not, in any way invalidate the
prevailing doctrine at the time of the issuance of the subpoena. (Allied Banking Corp. v. Office of
the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 174755, March 29, 2022)
It is settled that the orders and decisions of the OMB in criminal cases may be elevated
to this Court via Rule 65 petition, while its orders and decisions in administrative disciplinary
cases may be appealed to the CA under Rule 43 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. (Abad
v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 234696, October 3, 2022)
[Note: The Court explained in Ornales v. Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon that the OMB is
a quasi-judicial agency falling under Rule 43 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. Fabian struck down the
portion of Sec. 27 of R.A. No. 6770, which increased this Court's appellate jurisdiction over decisions of
the OMB in administrative disciplinary cases. Thus, decisions of the OMB in administrative disciplinary
cases may only be appealed to the CA through a Rule 43 petition for review.
R.A. No. 6770 is silent on remedies available to parties aggrieved by the OMB's findings of
probable cause in criminal cases. The right to appeal is merely a statutory privilege and may be exercised
only in the manner prescribed by and in accordance with the provisions of law. Hence, there must be a
law granting such privilege. However, an aggrieved party is not without recourse where the finding of
the OMB as to the existence of probable cause is tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction. An aggrieved party may file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure. (Abad v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 234696, October 3, 2022)]
[Note: The unconstitutionality of Sec. 14 of R.A. No. 6770 did not necessarily have an effect over
the appellate procedure for orders and decisions arising from criminal cases precisely because said
procedure was not prescribed by the aforementioned section. The rule that decisions or orders of the
OMB finding the existence or absence of probable cause should be questioned through a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 filed with this Court was laid down by the Court itself, and not anchored on
Sec. 14 of R.A. No. 6770. Thus, the declaration of unconstitutionality of Sec. 14 is immaterial insofar as the
appellate procedure for orders and decisions by the OMB in criminal cases is concerned.
Having filed a petition for certiorari with the CA instead of this Court, petitioners clearly raised
their case before the wrong forum resulting in the finality of the OMB's June 3, 2014 Review Resolution
approving the DOJ's recommendation. Clearly, petitioners have already lost their right to assail the
OMB's finding of absence of probable cause. The CA, therefore, did not commit any reversible error in
denying their petition for availing of the wrong remedy. (Abad v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No.
234696, October 3, 2022)]
Decisions of the Ombudsman in disciplinary cases are immediately executory and
cannot be stayed by the filing of an appeal or the issuance of an injunctive writ. Thus, Cabañez
is considered to have been out from government from the time the OMB ordered his dismissal
until the pendency of his appeal. That We have now modified the administrative charge and
imposable penalty will not affect the validity of his dismissal or separation from work pending
appeal; the same remained valid and effective until it was, as it is now, modified with the
correction of the designation of the administrative offense he committed and reduction of the
corresponding penalty. This means that while Cabañez may be entitled to reinstatement, he
is not entitled to the payment of back salaries during the period of his "dismissal." The Court's
explanation in Villamor v. Lacson still applies:
It will be noted also that the modified decision did not exonerate the petitioners. And if
we take into account the fact that they did not work during the period for which they are now
claiming salaries, there can be no legal or equitable basis to order the payment of their
salaries. The general proposition is that a public official is not entitled to any compensation if
he has not rendered any service. As you work, so shall you earn. And even if we consider the
punishment as suspension, before a public official or employee is entitled to payment of salaries
withheld, it should be shown that the suspension was unjustified or that the employee was
innocent of the charges proffered against him, which is not the case in the instant proceedings.
Incidentally, the Court takes note of Cabañez's manifestation that he is already a private
citizen. Since it is not clear whether this was a consequence of his dismissal by the OMB or for
some other reason (i.e., resignation), We cannot yet order his reinstatement. In any case, he is
deemed to have served the foregoing period of suspension during the time that his petition for
review was pending before the appellate court and this Court. With the modification of his
penalty from dismissal to suspension, he is likewise restored of all of his rights and benefits
under the law, albeit without payment of back salaries. (Cabañez v. Field Investigation Office, G.R.
No. 249473, July 6, 2022)
On the procedural aspect of this case, the prosecution claims that the petition is infirm
since the denial of a motion to quash/dismiss is not subject to appeal as it is merely
interlocutory. As such, the prosecution maintains that a petition for certiorari or mandamus under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is not proper as there is a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy
available to petitioners.
The prosecution misapprehended the discussion in Cagang v. Sandiganbayan, Fifth

Division (Cagang) which recognized that a party can question the denial of a motion to
quash/dismiss if it can establish that the denial is tainted with grave abuse of discretion xxx.
(Camsol v. Seventh Division of the Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 242892, July 6, 2022)
Furthermore, in Angchangco, Jr. v. Ombudsman, the Court has recognized the propriety
of mandamus to compel the Ombudsman to dismiss a case for violation of the constitutional
right to speedy disposition of cases as it amounts to gross abuse of discretion, manifest injustice,
or palpable excess of authority xxx. (Camsol v. Seventh Division of the Sandiganbayan, G.R. No.
242892, July 6, 2022)
|||
The Province of Bataan is not a "person aggrieved" within the contemplation of
the Rules which can properly avail of the special civil action of certiorari, prohibition,
and mandamus, as it was not a party in the proceedings before the Ombudsman. Consequently,
the petition docketed as G.R. Nos. 197510-11 should be dismissed. (Even if the Province of
Bataan had the standing to file the petitions, it is settled that "as a quasi-judicial agency,
decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases may only be
appealed to the Court of Appeals through a Rule 43 petition" in order to respect the hierarchy of
courts.
Withal, it is only proper that the administrative aspect of the cases be resolved by the
CA, in proper observance of the hierarchy of courts, and in accordance with prevailing rules
and jurisprudence. Similarly, "an administrative agency performs quasi-judicial functions if it
renders awards, determines the rights of opposing parties, or if their decisions have the same
effect as the judgment of a court." When the Ombudsman, in an administrative case, renders a
decision and imposes a penalty, it is performing a quasi-judicial function. Its decision has the
same effect as a court judgment. Thus, as a "decision," the Ombudsman's ruling (in the
performance of its quasi-judicial functions) is appealable to the CA under Rule 43 of the Rules
of Court. Simply put, the procedurally correct way to elevate the administrative aspect of the
case is to file a petition before the CA. (Province of Bataan v. Casimiro, G.R. Nos. 197510-11 &
201347, April 18, 2022)
Established is the rule that the CA has jurisdiction over orders, directives, and decisions
of the OMB in administrative disciplinary cases only. It cannot, therefore, review the orders,
directives or decisions of the OMB in criminal or non-administrative cases.
In the case of Office of the Ombudsman v. Esmeña, We, citing several authorities,
emphasized that:
Pursuant to Fabian v. Desierto, appeals from the decisions of the OMB in administrative
disciplinary cases should be taken to the CA via petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of
Court.
However, in Duyon v. Court of Appeals and Golangco vs. Fung, the Court stressed that the
CA's jurisdiction over appeals from orders, directives and decisions of the OMB extends to
administrative disciplinary cases only. The CA cannot review the orders, directives or decisions
of the Office of the OMB in criminal or non-administrative cases.
Furthermore, while there were instances where the CA acquires jurisdiction even over
petitions for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, this is only possible when the subject
matter of the petition is an order/resolution, considered as an interlocutory order arising from
an administrative case.
In the most recent case of Gaudan v. Degamo, We further clarified that the CA may
entertain an appeal of the OMB's ruling in criminal cases if it is consolidated with an
administrative case. The CA however, should set aside the challenge to the criminal aspect
thereof for lack of jurisdiction and focused its review of the assailed the OMB issuances solely
on administrative liabilities instead.
From the foregoing, it is beyond cavil that the CA has jurisdiction only over orders,
directives, and decisions of the OMB in administrative disciplinary cases only. Otherwise
stated, the CA cannot review the orders, directives or decisions of the Office of the OMB in
criminal or non-administrative cases. (Allied Banking Corp. v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No.
174755, March 29, 2022)
[Note: In the instant case, what petitioner assails are orders of the OMB clarifying its
subpoena duces tecum and directing compliance by petitioner of the subpoena duces tecum in relation to a
pending criminal case against Estrada, et al. These orders are in no way connected to any administrative
complaint and/or liability thrown at Estrada, et al. The observation of the CA on this matter is on point,
thus: "Note that the assailed subpoena duces tecum and Orders are offshoots of the fact-finding
investigation on the possible criminal liabilities of former President Estrada [et al.] Clear as the light of
day, it is not a ruling rendered in an administrative case." With administrative liability being out of the
picture, the CA properly dismissed the petitioner's Petition for Certiorari for lack of jurisdiction. (Allied
Banking Corp. v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 174755, March 29, 2022)]
xxx it has been settled that it is only the Supreme Court, which may review orders,
directives, and decisions of the OMB in criminal or non-administrative matters, petitioner
clearly committed a procedural blunder when it assailed the two Orders of the OMB before the
CA. To reiterate, only the Supreme Court may review the OMB's Orders, being offshoots of the
fact-finding investigation on the possible criminal liabilities of Estrada, et al. (Allied Banking
Corp. v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 174755, March 29, 2022)
Accordingly, Samaniego remains to be the prevailing doctrine. Thus, even if not

impleaded as a party in the proceedings, the Office of the Ombudsman has legal interest to
intervene and defend its ruling in administrative cases before the CA, its interest proceeding, as
it is, from its duty to act as a champion of the people and to preserve the integrity of the public
service.
Therefore, the legal interest of the Ombudsman to file a Motion for Intervention before
the CA is beyond cavil. However, although the Ombudsman has the legal interest to intervene
in appeals from its rulings in administrative cases, the Ombudsman as movant-intervenor must
nevertheless comply with the procedural rules before intervention can be allowed. (Office of the
Ombudsman v. Peñera, G.R. No. 227143, March 23, 2022)
Sequestration
Sequestration is the means to place or cause to be placed under the PCGG's possession
or control properties, building or office, including business enterprises and entities, for the
purpose of preventing the destruction, concealment or dissipation of, and otherwise conserving
and preserving the same until it can be determined through appropriate judicial proceedings,
whether the property was in truth "ill-gotten."
Notably, the PCGG's power to sequester is merely provisional. Section 3 (c) of Executive
Order No. 1 expressly provides:
c) To provisionally take over in the public interest or to prevent its disposal or

dissipation, business enterprises and properties taken over by the government of the Marcos
Administration or by entities or persons close to former President Marcos, until the transactions
leading to such acquisition by the latter can be disposed of by the appropriate authorities.
Sequestration is akin to the provisional remedy of preliminary attachment or

receivership. Similarly, in attachment, the property of the defendant is seized as a security for
the satisfaction of any judgment that may be obtained, and not disposed of, or dissipated, or
lost intentionally or otherwise, pending litigation. In a receivership, the property is placed in the
possession and control of a receiver appointed by the court, who shall conserve the property
pending final determination of ownership or right of possession of the parties. In sequestration,
the same principles hold true. Sequestration is a conservatory writ, with the purpose of
preserving properties in custodia legis. By no means is it permanent in character. (Trans Middle
East (Phils.) Equities, Inc. v. The Sandiganbayan (Fifth Division), G.R. Nos. 180350, 205186, 222919,
223237, July 6, 2022)
[Note: In this case, the Sandiganbayan already nullified the writ of sequestration through the
Resolution dated 02 January 2003. Moreover, the third amended complaint against TMEE was
subsequently dismissed by the Sandiganbayan in its Decision dated 25 January 2010. Thereafter, this
Court affirmed the dismissal with finality in G.R. Nos. 192651 and 192653.
With the final dismissal of Civil Case No. 0035 against TMEE, the Sandiganbayan can no longer
hold TMEE's property. Since TMEE ceased to be a party in the said civil case, the shares of stock
registered under the name of TMEE cannot be retained in custodia legis. Otherwise stated, by the dismissal
of the case against TMEE, there is ipso facto no more writ of sequestration to speak of. (Trans Middle East
(Phils.) Equities, Inc. v. The Sandiganbayan (Fifth Division), G.R. Nos. 180350, 205186, 222919, 223237, July 6,
2022)]
SALNs
At any rate, the Court finds that petitioner did not violate R.A. No. 6713. In Daplas v.
Department of Finance (Daplas), the Court underscored the importance of filing a SALN:
The requirement of filing a SALN is enshrined in no less than the 1987 Constitution in
order to promote transparency in the civil service, and operates as a deterrent against
government officials bent on enriching themselves through unlawful means. By mandate of
law, i.e., RA 6713, it behooves every government official or employee to accomplish and submit a
sworn statement completely disclosing his or her assets, liabilities, net worth, and financial and
business interests, including those of his/her spouse and unmarried children under eighteen (18)
years of age living in their households, in order to suppress any questionable accumulation of
wealth because the latter usually results from non-disclosure of such matters.
xxxx
Indeed, the failure to file a truthful SALN puts in doubt the integrity of the public officer or
employee, and would normally amount to dishonesty. It should be emphasized, however, that
mere non-declaration of the required data in the SALN does not automatically amount to such an
offense. Dishonesty requires malicious intent to conceal the truth or to make false statements. In
addition, a public officer or employee becomes susceptible to dishonesty only when such non-
declaration results in the accumulated wealth becoming manifestly disproportionate to his/her
income, and income from other sources, and he/she fails to properly account or explain these
sources of income and acquisitions.
In this case, petitioner was indicted for failure to declare her child in the 1997 and 1998
SALNs she submitted. Petitioner contended that her minor daughter had no assets, liabilities, or
business and financial interests, which justified the non-declaration in her SALN.
The rationale behind the requirement of declaring the minor children of the public
officer was explained by the Court in Abid-Babano v. Executive Secretary:
The addition of the threshold age for unmarried children under Republic Act No. 6713 in
relation to the SALN disclosure requirement was rationalized by Senator Rene Saguisag in his
sponsorship speech of the legislative proposal, to wit:
On age, since there is a requirement here – that a public official has to report the
assets, liabilities, net worth, business and financial interest of minors living with the
public official, we decided to lower the cut-off age to 18, and he must be living with the
public official. In one of the bills now before us, it is entirely possible even for an 18-year
old to be an acting mayor. If he lives separately from his parent who is a public official, it
seems pointless to require his parents to include him in the reporting requirement.
The legislative intent to exempt the properties of children who are already 18
years old and older from the SALN disclosure requirement appears to be rooted in the
legal concept of emancipation. Under Article 234 of the Family Code, as amended,
emancipation takes place by the attainment of majority which commences at the age of
eighteen years. The law decrees that the legal consequence of emancipation is the
termination of "parental authority over the person and property of the child who shall
then be qualified and responsible for all acts of civil life, save the exceptions established
by existing laws in special cases."
If the rationale for excluding the properties of the public official's emancipated
child from the SALN is the child's legal capacity to hold property independently and
separately from the parents, that rationale should equally apply to a public official's
spouse, who by law or by ante-nuptial agreement, may unilaterally acquire and dispose
of his or her own properties under a regime of complete separation of property. Indeed,
the evil sought to be prevented by our laws on the SALN, i.e., that a spouse would be
used to conceal from the public the full extent of a government employee's wealth and
financial/proprietary interests, does not exist in the case of a public employee and
his/her spouse whose property regime is complete separation of property considering
that whatever properties are held by each spouse is exclusively his/her own and can
only be counted towards his/her own "wealth."
From the foregoing, the declaration in the SALN of all minor children living with the
public officer or employee proceeds from the likelihood that the public officer or employee may
use his or her child to conceal the full extent of his wealth. Thus, petitioner's explanation, i.e.,
that she did not declare her newborn child in the 1995 to 1997 SALNs because her child had no
assets, liabilities, business or financial interests, is well taken. Significantly, petitioner declared
the existence of her child in the SALN she submitted for 1999, 2000, 2001, and 2002. This further
negates any bad faith or malicious intent on her part to violate the provisions of R.A. No. 6713.
(Perez v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. Nos. 225568-70, February 15, 2022)
[Note: Anent the Ombudsman's finding that petitioner violated R.A. No. 6713 for failure to
disclose the apartment units and the rental income she earned from these, the Court likewise finds no
malicious intent on petitioner's part to conceal the same. In Daplas, the Court found that petitioner therein
had no intent to conceal the truth or to make false statements since she herself admitted in her counter-
affidavit the business interest with KEI. According to the Court, such admission belied any malicious
intent to conceal.
Similarly, it was petitioner herein who disclosed in her counter-affidavit the apartment units in
the Valenzuela property and the rental income she earns from said property. She also explained that the
apartment units were declared in her SALNs as reflected by the increase in the fair market value of the
Valenzuela property. As shown by her 1998 SALN, the fair market value of the property at that time was
merely P672,000.00. In the 1999 SALN and the succeeding SALNs submitted by petitioner, the fair market
value increased to P864,000.00.
Moreover, income or sources of income is not required to be declared or explained in the SALN. R.A. No.
6713 requires only a declaration of the assets, liabilities, net worth, and financial and business interests of
the public officer or employee, including those of their spouses and of unmarried children under 18 years
of age living in their households. The income received by the public officer from other sources must be
declared as part of cash on hand or in bank, which petitioner herein did so in the questioned SALNs.
(Perez v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. Nos. 225568-70, February 15, 2022)]
[Note: All told, the Court finds that the Ombudsman gravely abused its discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed joint resolution and joint order. The complaints against
petitioner should be dismissed in view of the inordinate delay in the termination of the preliminary
investigation, which violated petitioner's rights to speedy disposition of cases and to procedural due
process of law. (Perez v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. Nos. 225568-70, February 15, 2022)]
A SALN is a pro forma document which must be completed and submitted under oath by
the declarant attesting to his/her total assets and liabilities, including businesses and financial
interests that make up his/her net worth. The submission of a SALN by all public officers and
employees is mandated by Section 17, Article XI of the Constitution. Its objective is to promote
transparency in the civil service and to establish a deterrent against government officials bent
on enriching themselves through unlawful means. The requirement for the filing of a SALN is
provided under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019 xxx. (Office of the Ombudsman v. Rodas, G.R. No.
225669, March 23, 2022)
[Note: Respondent admitted that she failed to declare in her SALNs the savings that she earned
from her 19-year-career in the private sector prior to joining MARINA, which savings she used to
purchase two cars and some pieces of jewelry that she declared only in her 2003 SALN. However, We
cannot sustain the Ombudsman's position that such omission alone amounts to a finding of serious
dishonesty as would warrant against respondent the ultimate penalty of dismissal from the service.
(Office of the Ombudsman v. Rodas, G.R. No. 225669, March 23, 2022)]
|||
[Note: A review of the records obtaining in this case reveals that respondent was able to prove
the legitimacy of the source of her undeclared savings which, as of the year 2003, amounted to
P906,000.00. The chronological enumeration of her 19 years of employment in the private sector, along
with the salaries, renumerations, and other benefits that she received, were not even challenged or
refuted by the Ombudsman.| (Office of the Ombudsman v. Rodas, G.R. No. 225669, March 23, 2022)]
||
[Note: Since respondent was able to sufficiently explain the legality of her previously
undisclosed savings, she cannot be held administratively liable for serious dishonesty.
At most, respondent is guilty of simple negligence for having failed to ascertain that her SALN
was accomplished properly, accurately, and in more detail. Alternatively stated, respondent can only be
found administratively liable for simple negligence since there is no proof that her failure to disclose her
savings was impelled by ulterior motive or purpose. Hence, the CA correctly imposed against her the
penalty of suspension without pay for one year. (Office of the Ombudsman v. Rodas, G.R. No. 225669, March
23, 2022)]
Just like a Statement of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth (SALN), the preparation of the
PDS is not a special duty of any particular office, but a general requirement of all public officers.
As such, petitioner's statement of false entries in the PDS he accomplished cannot be said to
have been perpetrated by taking advantage of his official position. (Calderon v. People, G.R. No.
258899, April 25, 2022)
[Note: Nonetheless, the Court is convinced that all the other elements have been proven beyond
any reasonable doubt, which already constitutes falsification under Article 172 (1) of the RPC, an offense
that is necessarily included in Article 171 (4) of the RPC. (Calderon v. People, G.R. No. 258899, April 25,
2022)]
NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY
The second paragraph of Article XII, Section 10 of the Constitution encapsulates the
Filipino First Policy. It ordains:
In the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national economy and
patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos.
As opposed to petitioners' overemphasis and one-sided interpretation of the foregoing

provision, the Charter actually espouses a balanced ideology on Philippine industry relative to
international economic relations. Tañada, et al. v. Angara, et al., instructs:
All told, while the Constitution indeed mandates a bias in favor of Filipino goods,
services, labor and enterprises, at the same time, it recognizes the need for business exchange
with the rest of the world on the bases of equality and reciprocity and limits protection of Filipino
enterprises only against foreign competition and trade practices that are unfair. In other words,
the Constitution did not intend to pursue an isolationist policy. It did not shut out foreign
investments, goods and services in the development of the Philippine economy. While
the Constitution does not encourage the unlimited entry of foreign goods, services and
investments into the country, it does not prohibit them either. In fact, it allows an exchange on
the basis of equality and reciprocity, frowning only on foreign competition that is unfair.
Quite recently, in Philippine Contractors Accreditation Board v. Manila Water Co., Inc., the
Court struck down a competitively-restrictive contractors' licensing scheme, which imposed
more burdensome qualifications on foreign contractors but allowing them narrower industry
participation compared to local firms. According to the Court, striking down the restrictions
would encourage healthy competition among local and foreign contractors, and open
opportunities for development and innovation, so that domestic industries would be globally
competitive.
In any case, these constitutional provisions on the State's national patrimony and
economy highlight that the common good, public interest, public welfare — the people — are of
primary consideration. Despite not being awarded to Filipino contractors, petitioners have not
shown how the award of the projects to foreign firms would defeat the public good, when such
an engagement will only usher in investments, facilitate the influx of skills and technology, and
spur further economic development. It is not far-fetched to consider that the Philippines adopts
a liberal approach in allowing foreign investments to enter the country. What
the Constitution only restricted from foreign investors were enterprises such as public utilities,
mass media, and use of natural resources. These restrictions are necessary to protect the welfare
of Filipino citizens by removing the possibility of exploitation by foreign investors, who are not
fully within the jurisdiction of Philippine laws.
If only on the basis of Section 10, Article XII of the Constitution, the Court cannot
invalidate the Loan Agreements which, while financing infrastructure projects to be undertaken
by foreign contractors, are still consistent with the Constitutional policies expounded in the
above rulings. In other words, while Section 19, Article II of the 1987 Constitution requires the
development of a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by
Filipino entrepreneurs, it does not impose a policy of Filipino monopoly of the economic
environment. The objective is simply to prohibit foreign powers or interests from maneuvering
our economic policies and ensure that Filipinos are given preference in all areas of
development. (Colmenares v. Duterte, G.R. Nos. 245981 & 246594, August 9, 2022)
While the Court cannot rule that the LCB violated the GPRA and its 2016 RIRR, such
procedure apparently contravened the Filipino First Policy. xxx the Court observes the
summary manner by which the DFA and DOF simply acceded to the MOFCOM's proposal to
limit the bidders to three Chinese contractors, to the exclusion of qualified Filipino contractors;
as well as the pertinent IAs' rote implementation thereof. Indeed, qualified Filipinos must be
given preference to bid for infrastructure projects of this scale and significance. Despite these
arrangements being accorded the status of executive agreements, pacta sunt servanda cannot
override Constitutional dictates. In short, bidding rules for these kinds of projects must give
preference, or at least equal opportunity, to qualified Filipinos. (Colmenares v. Duterte, G.R. Nos.
245981 & 246594, August 9, 2022)
While surely lamentable that qualified Filipinos had not participated in the bidding, the
nullification of the LCB procedures and resultant awards would only deny to Filipinos the
expected yields from the CRPIP and NCWS projects. Given the intricacies of diplomatic and
commercial negotiations, the significant transaction costs in delivering such projects, and the
massive resources entailed thereby, it is unlikely that these same projects will again be bid out
(this time including Filipino contractors) if the awards were nullified at this point.
Unfortunately, such move would also diminish the attractiveness of doing business in the
Philippines. It need not be emphasized that stability and predictability are the key pillars on
which our legal system must be founded and run to guarantee a business environment
conducive to the country's sustainable economic growth.
It has also been raised during the deliberations of this case that the LCBs did not violate
the Filipino First Policy. This is because such Constitutional preference is extended only to
"qualified Filipinos" whereas, to begin with, Filipinos were never qualified to bid for the
infrastructure projects as the exchanges of notes limited the bidding to only three Chinese
contractors. However, this only begs the issue.
By the time the LCBs were conducted, Filipino bidders were, indeed, disqualified — but
only following the agreed procedure, and not by lack of merit. All throughout the exchanges of
the Note Verbales and the China MOFCOM's Reply Note, the DFA could have insisted on the
participation of Filipino bidders. That the Republic of the Philippines is the borrower of foreign
funds does not obligate the government to outrightly accept proposed stipulations, especially if
exclusionary to otherwise qualified Filipinos. Economic disparities with other much richer
nations should not relegate the Philippine government to a "take it or leave it" stance.
As such, pertinent government bodies always have the leeway to assert the inclusion of
qualified Filipinos on preferential opportunities in projects of such significance in future
negotiations involving similar transactions. To do otherwise, would lock out qualified Filipinos
of big-ticket projects by diplomatic agreement to exclusionary arrangements. Even if the
negotiation and contract of foreign loans is largely left to Executive policy, the Constitution still
ingrains a policy that serves the general welfare and utilizes all forms and arrangements of
exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity.
In any case, the Loan Agreements cannot be invalidated for giving effect to and
financing the CRPIP and NCWS projects, even if awarded to foreign contractors. (Colmenares v.
Duterte, G.R. Nos. 245981 & 246594, August 9, 2022)
[Note: In view of the foregoing disquisitions, petitioners have failed to present any compelling
issue to warrant the nullification of the CRPIP and NCWS Loan Agreements, or any of its clauses. Save
for the apprehensive language of the Confidentiality Clauses — which issue is nevertheless already moot
— the Loan Agreements have sufficiently complied with the applicable procurement laws and conform
with the pertinent provisions of the Constitution. (Colmenares v. Duterte, G.R. Nos. 245981 & 246594,
August 9, 2022)]
The Regalian doctrine has long been recognized as the foundation of the State's property
regime and has been consistently adopted under the 1935, 1973, and 1987 Constitutions. In
essence, the Regalian doctrine espouses that lands not appearing to be clearly under private
ownership are generally presumed to form part of the public domain belonging to the State.
As explained in the recent case of Federation of Coron, Busuanga, Palawan Farmer's

Association, Inc. v. The Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (Federation), xxx this general rule admits of a single exception: native title to land.
Claims of private ownership pursuant to native title are presumed to have been held even
before the Spanish conquest. Thus, lands subject of native titles are deemed excluded from the
mass of lands forming part of the public domain. (Republic of the Philippines v. Pasig Rizal Co.,
Inc., G.R. No. 213207. February 15, 2022)
At present, Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution classifies lands of the public
domain into five (5) categories — agricultural lands, forest lands, timber lands, mineral lands,
and national parks. (Republic of the Philippines v. Pasig Rizal Co., Inc., G.R. No. 213207. February
15, 2022)
In turn, Section 3 mandates that only lands classified as agricultural may be

declared alienable and susceptible of private ownership. It bears noting, however, that private
ownership contemplates not only ownership by private persons, but also ownership by the
State, provinces, cities, and municipalities in their private capacity. (Republic of the Philippines v.
Pasig Rizal Co., Inc., G.R. No. 213207. February 15, 2022)
There is no doubt that forest lands, timber lands, mineral lands, and national parks
which are lands of the public domain under the Constitution fall under property of public
dominion under Article 420(2) of the Civil Code, as do agricultural lands. It is also clear that
land classified as agricultural and subject to the State's current or intended use remains
property of public dominion. However, these agricultural lands, once declared as alienable and
disposable, become "converted" patrimonial property of the State.
In effect, the classification of agricultural land as alienable and disposable serves as

unequivocal proof of the withdrawal by the State of the said land from the public dominion,
and its "conversion" to patrimonial property. The clear intention of such conversion is to open
the land to private acquisition or ownership. Again, xxx such converted patrimonial property
remains within the broader constitutional concept of public domain precisely as alienable and
disposable land of the public domain.
To recall, property of public dominion is outside the commerce of man. Consequently, it
can neither be appropriated nor be the subject of contracts; hence, they cannot be alienated or
encumbered. Property falling under Article 420 is outside the commerce of man precisely
because it is property of public dominion. Conversely, those falling under Articles 421 and 422
are necessarily within the commerce of man, as they are not property of public dominion.
Clearly, any specific property of the State may either be outside or within the commerce
of man; it cannot be both. Prior to the classification of such property to alienable and disposable,
agricultural lands (being property of public dominion) are beyond the commerce of man. It is
the classification of agricultural lands as alienable and disposable which places them within the
commerce of man, and renders them capable of being the subject matter of contracts (such as a
patent, the latter being a contract between the State and the grantee). In turn, the power to
classify (and re-classify) land is vested solely in the Executive Department. Once a parcel of land
forming part of public dominion is classified as alienable and disposable, they become subject to
private acquisition but only through the prescribed modes of acquisition of ownership. (Republic
of the Philippines v. Pasig Rizal Co., Inc., G.R. No. 213207. February 15, 2022)
Nonetheless, Article 422 of the Civil Code states that "[p]roperty of public dominion,
when no longer intended for public use or for public service, shall form part of the patrimonial
property of the State." It is this provision that controls how public dominion property may be
converted into patrimonial property susceptible to acquisition by prescription. After all, Article
420(2) makes clear that those property "which belong to the State, without being for public use,
and are intended for some public service or for the development of the national wealth" are
public dominion property. For as long as the property belongs to the State, although already
classified as alienable or disposable, it remains property of the public dominion xxx when it is
"intended for some public service or for the development of the national wealth."
Accordingly, there must be an express declaration by the State that the public dominion
property is no longer intended for public service or the development of the national wealth or
that the property has been converted into patrimonial. Without such express declaration, the
property, even if classified as alienable or disposable, remains property of the public dominion,
pursuant to Article 420(2), and thus incapable of acquisition by prescription. It is only when
such alienable and disposable lands are expressly declared by the State to be no longer intended
for public service or for the development of the national wealth that the period of acquisitive
prescription can begin to run. Such declaration shall be in the form of a law duly enacted by
Congress or a Presidential Proclamation in cases where the President is duly authorized by law.
(Republic of the Philippines v. Pasig Rizal Co., Inc., G.R. No. 213207. February 15, 2022)
Once property of public dominion is classified by the State as alienable and disposable
land of the public domain, it immediately becomes open to private acquisition, since "[a]lienable
lands of the public domain xxx [form] part of the patrimonial [property] of the State." The
operative act which converts property of public dominion to patrimonial property is its
classification as alienable and disposable land of the public domain, as this classification
precisely serves as the manifestation of the State's lack of intent to retain the same for some
public use or purpose.
To emphasize, all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership
are generally presumed to be part of the public domain pursuant to the Regalian doctrine.
Consequently, those who seek registration on the basis of title over land forming part of
the public domain must overcome the presumption of State ownership. To do so, the applicant
must establish that the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable and thus
susceptible of acquisition and subsequent registration. However, once the presumption of State
ownership is discharged by the applicant, the burden to refute the applicant's claim that the
land in question is patrimonial in nature necessarily falls on the State. For while the burden to
prove that the land subject of the application is alienable and disposable is placed on the
applicant, the burden to prove that such land is retained for public service or for the
development of the national wealth, notwithstanding its previous classification as alienable and
disposable, rests, as it should, with the State. (Republic of the Philippines v. Pasig Rizal Co., Inc.,
G.R. No. 213207. February 15, 2022)
In cases where land held by the State has not been previously utilized for some public
purpose, the State has no prior use to abandon or withdraw the land from. It would therefore be
unreasonable to require the applicant to present a law or executive proclamation expressing
such abandonment for there never will be one. The imposition of this additional requirement in
cases where the land so possessed had never been utilized by the State has dire consequences
for those who have occupied and cultivated the land in the concept of owners for periods
beyond what is required by law.
However, and to be clear, where the property subject of the application had been
previously utilized by the State for some public purpose, proof of conversion requires the
establishment of a positive fact — the abandonment by the State of its use and the consequent
withdrawal of the property from the public dominion. To establish this positive fact, it becomes
incumbent upon the applicant to present an express government manifestation that the land
subject of his application already constitutes patrimonial property, or is no longer retained for
some public purpose. It is within this context that the second requirement espoused
in Malabanan was crafted. This second requirement covered "converted" patrimonial property
of the State, or those falling within the scope of Article 422 of the Civil Code. (Republic of the
Philippines v. Pasig Rizal Co., Inc., G.R. No. 213207. February 15, 2022)
[Note: In Laurel, the Court held that the Roponggi property assumes the nature of property of
public dominion under Article 420(2) of the Civil Code (i.e., intended for some public service or the
development of national wealth). Noting that the Roponggi property had been subject of prior state-use,
the Court held that its conversion from property of public dominion under Article 420(2) to patrimonial
property under Article 422 must be explicit. The Court ruled:
The Roppongi property is correctly classified under paragraph 2 of Article 420 of the Civil Code as
property belonging to the State and intended for some public service.
Has the intention of the government regarding the use of the property been changed because the
lot has been idle for some years? Has it become patrimonial?
The fact that the Roppongi site has not been used for a long time for actual Embassy service
does not automatically convert it to patrimonial property. Any such conversion happens only if the
property is withdrawn from public use. A property continues to be part of the public [dominion], not
available for private appropriation or ownership "until there is a formal declaration on the part of the
government to withdraw it from being such["] xxx.
The respondents enumerate various pronouncements by concerned public officials insinuating a

change of intention. We emphasize, however, that an abandonment of the intention to use the Roppongi
property for public service and to make it patrimonial property under Article 422 of the Civil Code must be
definite. Abandonment cannot be inferred from the non-use alone specially if the non-use was
attributable not to the government's own deliberate and indubitable will but to a lack of financial
support to repair and improve the property xxx. Abandonment must be a certain and positive act based
on correct legal premises.
From these referenced cases, it becomes clear that the need for an express government
manifestation confirming that the property in question is "no longer retained" by the State for public use,
public service, or the development of national wealth, stems from the principle that abandonment of
property of public dominion under Article 420 cannot be inferred solely from non-use. In turn, the
determination of whether property has in fact been abandoned by the State is necessary only in cases
where there has been prior state-use. To repeat, there is no abandonment to speak of in the absence of
prior state-use. (Republic of the Philippines v. Pasig Rizal Co., Inc., G.R. No. 213207. February 15, 2022)]
[Note: The underlying philosophy of making public land available to Filipino citizens is sewn
into the foundations of the Constitution; it is reflected in the exclusive reservation of land ownership to
Filipinos, and is echoed in the State's mandate to promote agrarian and urban land reform through the
just distribution of all agricultural lands, and the establishment of urban centers and resettlement areas
for the homeless. Through the imposition of retention limits, the provision of incentives for voluntary
land-sharing, and the directive to respect the rights of small land and property owners, the Constitution
further institutionalizes the policy of making land ownership accessible to each individual Filipino.
In line with this, PD 1529 provides for the judicial confirmation of imperfect title to land so as to
bring the latter within the coverage of the Torrens system. The protection afforded by the Torrens system
provides the necessary security to encourage land owners to make the investments needed to make
productive use of their landholdings. Through this process, the law functions to aid land owners in
becoming productive members of society in a manner that is consistent with the principles enshrined in
the Constitution.
With the passage of RA 11573, any doubt which may have plagued the requirements for
confirmation of title under Section 14 of PD 1529 have been clarified, with the expressed view of
removing any ambiguity in its interpretation, and further streamlining the registration process.
To this end, the Court stresses that the issues involved in a land registration proceeding rest
heavily on factual considerations, as they require the determination of land classification status and the
nature of actual physical possession over the property subject of the action. These factual considerations
are, in turn, established not only through written documentation, but also through proof of prior acts
which serve as assertions of ownership, not only of the applicant but also, of the State. Accordingly, the
State's participation in land registration proceedings is imperative, not only at the appeal level, but more
so, at the first instance before the trial courts. Since trial courts are "in a more advantageous position to
examine xxx evidence, [and] observe the demeanor of the witnesses xxx testifying in the case," they play a
unique and essential role in the fact-finding process. The State's participation in the trial court
proceedings enables the parties to thresh out evidentiary issues which would not otherwise be addressed
at the appeal level. Consequently, the State's belated participation at the appeal level hampers prompt
and equitable resolution, and leads to protracted litigation, as in this case. (Republic of the Philippines v.
Pasig Rizal Co., Inc., G.R. No. 213207. February 15, 2022)]
All told, the alienable and disposable character of the land must be proven by clear and
incontrovertible evidence to overcome the presumption of State ownership of the lands of
public domain under the Regalian doctrine and the burden of proof in overcoming such
presumption is upon the person applying for registration. Since the rule is explicit in that the
applicant bears the burden of proving that the land is alienable and disposable, the burden of
proof is not shifted even if the government does not present countervailing evidence. Even on
the assumption that there is some controversy with regard to the exact metes and bounds of
Puguis communal forest, the Court finds its pronouncement in the case of De
Tensuan instructive. In that case, the Court likewise ruled that since the applicant failed to
provide satisfactory proof that the property was alienable and disposable, the burden of
evidence did not even shift to the government to prove that the property fell within the Laguna
Lake bed. Applied to the present case, the burden of evidence to prove that the entire area
covered by the subject properties fell within the Puguis communal forest never shifted to the
respondents. Nevertheless, the Court notes that respondents presented land classification maps
covering the communal forests of La Trinidad, Benguet which show that the subject properties
fall within Puguis communal forest, yet these were dismissed by the trial court on the ground
that these were approved subsequent to the survey plan submitted by Evaristo. To the mind of
this Court, the said land classification maps would constitute the most recent appraisal of the
classification of the subject properties and should not have been cursorily dismissed by the trial
court on such ground. (Heirs of Tiotioen v. Municipality of La Trinidad, G.R. No. 245321, March 16,
2022)
[Note: The fact that the land has been privately surveyed is not sufficient to prove its
classification or alienable character. While the conduct of a survey and the submission of the original
tracing cloth plan are mandatory requirements for applications for original registration of land under PD
1529, they only serve to establish the true identity of the land and to ensure that the property does not
overlap with another one covered by a previous registration. These documents do not, by themselves,
prove alienability and disposability of a property. Moreover, unlike Vega, the approved survey plan in
this case does not even contain an annotation that the subject properties have been classified as alienable
and disposable. Rather, it only bears an annotation that "THIS SURVEY IS OUTSIDE F.R. 20, IT IS ALSO
OUTSIDE ANY CIVIL OR MILITARY RESERVATION xxx" and an attestation that "the survey appears to
have been made in accordance with existing regulations of the Bureau of Lands. . ." To recall, the only
testimony regarding the survey plan came from Engr. Santiago, who prepared the same and his
assurance that the subject properties were outside any civil reservation and forest reservation according
to the Control Base Map. (Heirs of Tiotioen v. Municipality of La Trinidad, G.R. No. 245321, March 16, 2022)]
Here, petitioners failed to show a clear or obvious disregard of the relevant

constitutional provision which requires an immediate action from this Court. In the first place,
monopoly is not prohibited per se but is only regulated or disallowed when public interest so
requires. Further, We have already recognized that securities markets may regulate their own
operations by requiring membership in an SRO under the principle of self-regulation, consistent
with the State policy to "establish a socially conscious, free market that regulates itself," viz.:
From their earliest inception in the United States, stock exchanges and securities markets
have always exercised some form of control over their own regulatory affairs. It has been
generally recognized that due to the large number of market participants and the lack of
resources, full government regulation of securities markets is impractical. As such, stock
exchanges and securities markets are allowed to regulate their own operations, subject to the
control and supervision of the government regulatory authority. This principle is known as self-
regulation; and is embodied in the SRC's declaration of policy, which states inter alia that "the State
shall establish a socially conscious, free market that regulates itself xxx." As explained by a
commentator:
In lieu of direct regulation by the SEC of Exchanges and other securities-related

organizations, the statutory scheme involves, in the first instance, the adoption by SROs of rules
that are subject to SEC review and approval, and the enforcement of such rules by the SROs against
their members. Under this SEC-supervised self-regulation, the SEC will step in only if the SROs are
unable to perform properly their functions. In the process, the SEC is able to conserve its own
resources, since the SROs effectively serve as its instrumentalities in the surveillance of the
markets.
The principle of sell-regulation is enshrined and fleshed out in Sections 39 and 40 of

the SRC. Rule 3 (R) of the 2015 SRC; IRR defines a "Self-Regulatory Organization or SRO" as:
an organized Exchange, registered clearing agency, organization or association registered

as an SRO under Section 39 of the Code, and which has been authorized by the Commission to:
(1) enforce compliance with relevant provisions of the Code and rules and regulations adopted
thereunder; (2) promulgate and enforce its own rules which have been approved by the
Commission, by their members and/or participants; and, (3) enforce fair, ethical and efficient
practices in the securities and commodity futures industries including securities and commodities
exchanges.
Under Section 39.1 of the SRC, the SEC is given the "power to register as a self-regulatory
organization, or otherwise grant licenses, and to regulate, supervise, examine, suspend or
otherwise discontinue, as a condition for the operation of organizations whose operations are
related to or connected with the securities market." In turn, associations of securities market
participants are allowed to apply for registration as SROs. Under the SRC, SROs are empowered:
1) to promulgate, amend, and enforce rules and regulations to govern the trading activities of its
members; 2) to control the admission of brokers, dealers, salespersons, and associated persons
into a securities association; and 3) to impose disciplinary sanctions upon its members.
The regulatory structure under the SRC is therefore a two-tiered scheme, with the SROs
as the first-level regulatory entities, subject to the review, regulation, and supervision of the SEC
as the second-level regulatory entity. The regulatory jurisdiction of SROs is defined in Section
40.2 of the SRC, which mandates SROs to "comply with the provisions of this Code, the rules and
regulations thereunder, and its own rules, and enforce compliance therewith xxx." xxx.
xxx xxx xxx
It is readily apparent from the foregoing that, in enacting the principle of self-regulation
into statute, Congress delegated a modicum of regulatory power to the SROs. These regulatory
powers are exercised "[i]n lieu of direct regulation by the SEC of Exchanges and other securities-
related organizations," and are therefore of the same legal nature as that of the SEC's powers.
Thus, the membership requirement in an SRO does not necessarily violate the
constitutional provision on monopoly. (Villafuerte v. Securities and Exchange Commission, G.R.
No. 208379, March 29, 2022)

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JURISTS BAR REVIEW CENTER™

NOTES ON POLITICAL LAW

"Any ambiguity or vagueness in the delegation must be resolved in favor of

The Administrative Code of 1987 covers the administration, organization, and

Accordingly, Section 31 of the Administrative Code applies in particular to periods

[Note: Section 31 of the Administrative Code, being a specific provision pertaining to

||| Administrative Bodies

Rules Must Not be Ultra Vires

More significantly, no copy of the afore-cited Memoranda can be found through a

The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is grounded on practical reasons,

Corollary to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is the doctrine of

DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES

xxx xxx xxx

The Court rules in favor of respondents. xxx.

Ultimately, in as much as we want to extend the mantle of our country's protection to an

Thus, the case should be remanded to the DOJ-RSPPU in order to re-evaluate

An employer's blanket policy of no-spouse employment is discriminatory. To justify its

The requisites of a writ of kalikasan are as follows:

The writ of kalikasan has been described as follows:

Section 6. Refusal and/or Cancellation of Registration. — The COMELEC may, motu

Section 20, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution provides:

[Note: Contrary to petitioners' rigid interpretation of "prior concurrence," this requirement is

Section 21, Article XII of the Constitution provides:

The subject Confidentiality Clause reads:

[Note: Nevertheless, jurisprudence recognizes limited exceptions extending confidentiality, i.e.,

We elaborately ruled in Opis v. Dimaano that a judge's order of inhibition is not

Article VII, Section 4

Hierarchy of courts is the mechanism that ordains a sequence of recourse to courts

In Gios-Samar, Inc. v. Department of Transportation and Communications, We declared that

The invocation of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts by petitioners is likewise

Preliminarily, the petition should be dismissed outright as petitioner availed himself of

Here, petitioner, a nongovernmental organization which advocates governmental

Here, petitioner's sheer assertion of transcendental importance does not warrant a

To determine whether a matter is of transcendental importance, the Court considers "(1)

Here, petitioners failed to show a clear or obvious disregard of the relevant

Petitioners add, seemingly as an afterthought, that they are investors in government

Otherwise stated, where a judicial interpretation abandons a doctrinal interpretation of

Besides, the doctrine of immutability of judgments is not an iron-clad rule as it is subject

However, when a court overrules a prosecution's objection, which is solely grounded on an

Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo (Amparo Rule) provides:

As defined in the case of Mayor Mamba v. Bueno, viz.:

(a) The personal circumstances of the petitioner;

(f) The relief prayed for.

xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx

[T]he right to security of person is a guarantee of bodily and psychological integrity or

It is recognized that if the acts complained of arose from respondents' performance or

As preliminarily discussed, judicial clemency is granted based on a policy framework

CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

WHEREAS, a review of the jurisprudence involving cases of government officials and

Moreover, the application of the doctrine of de facto officer is misplaced.

During their tenure in the questioned positions, respondents may be considered de

This doctrine presupposes an election or appointment to some office. Here, Masagnay

1) There must be a de jure office;

As to the second element, the color of authority is derived from an election or

Decisions, final orders, or rulings of the Commission on election contests involving

Omnibus Election Code, Section 76:

Section 32. Ministerial Duty of Receiving and Acknowledging Receipt of Certificates of

As astutely observed by Associate Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa (Justice Caguioa)