4A. Cruz v. Court of Appeals G.R. No.
4A. Cruz v. Court of Appeals G.R. No.
4A. Cruz v. Court of Appeals G.R. No.
THIRD DIVISION
LUTGARDA CRUZ, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and the HEIRS OF ESTANISLAWA C.
REYES, represented by MIGUEL C. REYES, respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court to reverse the Decision
of the Court of Appeals dated March 31, 1995 and its Resolution dated December 1, 1995. The Court
1 2
of Appeals dismissed for being insufficient in substance the Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus,
which sought to nullify two orders of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 53, dated April 18,
1994 and May 6, 1994.
The City Prosecutor of Manila charged petitioner with the crime of "Estafa thru Falsification of Public
Document" before the Manila Regional Trial Court. Petitioner executed before a Notary Public in the
3
City of Manila an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication of a parcel of land stating that she was the sole
surviving heir of the registered owner when in fact she knew there were other surviving heirs. Since
the offended party did not reserve the right to file a separate civil action arising from the criminal
offense, the civil action was deemed instituted in the criminal case.
After trial on the merits, the trial court rendered its decision dated January 17, 1994 acquitting
petitioner on the ground of reasonable doubt. In the same decision, the trial court rendered
judgment on the civil aspect of the case, ordering the return to the surviving heirs of the parcel of
land located in Bulacan.4
On February 10, 1994, petitioner filed by registered mail a motion for reconsideration dated February
7, 1994, assailing the trial court’s ruling on the civil aspect of the criminal case. Petitioner furnished
the City Prosecutor a copy of the motion by registered mail.
On April 18, 1994, the trial court denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration stating:
"Acting on the Motion for Reconsideration dated February 7, 1994, filed by the accused through
counsel and considering that there is nothing to show that the Office of the City Prosecutor was
actually furnished or served with a copy of the said Motion for Reconsideration within the
reglementary period of fifteen (15) days from receipt by the accused on January 28, 1994 of a copy
of the Court’s decision dated January 17, 1994, so that the same is already final and executory, let
the Motion for Reconsideration be Denied for lack of merit." 5
Petitioner moved for a reconsideration of the trial court’s order of April 18, 1994. The trial court
denied the same in an order dated May 6, 1994, to wit:
"Under the Interim Rules, no party shall be allowed a second motion for reconsideration of a final
order or judgment (Sec. 4). The motion of accused dated 22 April 1994 is a violation of this rule.
Left with no recourse, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus with the Court of
Appeals to nullify the two assailed orders of the trial court. Petitioner also asked the Court of Appeals
to compel the trial court to resolve her motion for reconsideration of the decision dated February 7,
1994.
On March 31, 1995, the Court of Appeals denied due course to the petition and dismissed the case
for being insufficient in substance.
The Court of Appeals sustained the trial court’s order of April 18, 1994 denying petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration. The Court of Appeals declared in part:
"SEC. 10. Proof of Service. – Proof of personal service shall consist of a written admission of the
party served, or the affidavit of the party serving, containing a full statement of the date, place and
manner of service. If the service is by ordinary mail, proof thereof shall consist of an affidavit of the
person mailing of facts showing compliance with Section 5 of this rule. If service is made by
registered mail, proof shall be made by such affidavit and the registry receipt issued by the mailing
office. The registry return card shall be filed immediately upon receipt thereof by the sender, or in
lieu thereof the letter unclaimed together with the certified or sworn copy of the notice given by the
postmaster to the addressee."
Patent from the language of the said section is that in case service is made by registered mail, proof
of service shall be made by (a) affidavit of the person mailing and (b) the registry receipt issued by
the mailing office. Both must concur. In the case at bench, there was no such affidavit or registry
receipt when the motion was considered. Thus, respondent Judge cannot be said to have acted with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, in ruling in the manner he did." 7
The Court of Appeals also affirmed the trial court’s order of May 6, 1994 denying the subsequent
motion for reconsideration, as follows:
"xxx, while there is merit in petitioner’s submission that the motion for reconsideration dated April
22, 1994 was not a second motion for reconsideration of a final order or judgment, as contemplated
in the Interim Rules because the motion sought to impugn the order dated 18 April 1994 not on the
basis of the issues raised in the motion for reconsideration dated 07 February 1994 but on the
erroneous legal conclusion of the order dated May 6, 1994, this is already academic. The decision
8
dated January 7, 1994 had long become final when the second motion for reconsideration was filed
on 03 May 1994. Hence, the pairing Judge who issued the order on 06 May 1994 had no more legal
competence to promulgate the same." 9
Finally, the Court of Appeals upheld the assailed decision of the trial court on the civil aspect of the
case, to wit:
"x x x, the institution of a criminal action carries with it the civil action for the recovery of the civil
liability arising from the offense charged. There was neither reservation nor waiver of the right to file
the civil action separately nor has one been instituted to the criminal action. Hence, the civil action
for the civil liability has been impliedly instituted with the filing of the criminal case before respondent
Judge. This is the law on the matter. The proposition submitted by petitioner that the court presided
by respondent Judge had no jurisdiction over the property because it is located in Bulacan - outside
the territorial jurisdiction of said court -does not hold water. Being a civil liability arising from the
offense charged, the governing law is the Rules of Criminal Procedure, not the civil procedure rules
which pertain to civil action arising from the initiatory pleading that gives rise to the suit." 10
In the dispositive portion of its assailed decision, the Court of Appeals declared:
"WHEREFORE, the instant petition not being sufficient in substance is hereby DENIED DUE COURSE
and the case DISMISSED." 11
In a resolution dated December 1, 1995, the Court of Appeals denied petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration. 12
The Issues
1. "WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE PROSECUTION
WAS DULY FURNISHED WITH COPY OF THE PETITIONER’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
WITH RESPECT TO THE DECISION ON THE CIVIL ASPECT OF CRIMINAL CASE NO. 87-54773
(SIC) OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA, BRANCH 53."
2. "WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
OF MANILA HAD JURISDICTION TO RENDER JUDGMENT ON THE CIVIL ASPECT OF CRIMINAL
CASE NO. 87-57743 FOR FALSIFICATION OF PUBLIC DOCUMENT, INVOLVING A PROPERTY
LOCATED IN BULACAN."
3. "WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE PETITIONER WAS
DENIED DUE PROCESS WHEN THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA, BRANCH 53,
RENDERED DECISION ON THE CIVIL ASPECT OF CRIMINAL CASE NO. 87-57743." 13
When the accused is acquitted on reasonable doubt but is adjudged civilly liable, his motion for
reconsideration of the civil aspect must be served not only on the prosecution, also on the offended
party if the latter is not represented by a private counsel. Moreover, if the trial court has jurisdiction
over the subject matter and over the accused, and the crime was committed within its territorial
jurisdiction, it necessarily exercises jurisdiction over all matters that the law requires the court to
resolve. This includes the power to order the restitution to the offended party of real property located
in another province.
The first issue is whether petitioner’s motion for reconsideration dated February 7, 1994 complied
with the mandatory requirements of Section 6, Rule 15 on proof of service. Petitioner submits that
the Court of Appeals erred in sustaining the trial court’s finding that the City Prosecutor was not duly
and timely furnished with petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of February 7, 1994.
Petitioner asserts that both copies of the motion for reconsideration were sent to the trial court and
the City Prosecutor by registered mail on February 10, 1994. Petitioner relies on jurisprudence that
the date of mailing is the date of filing, arguing that the date of mailing of both motions was on
February 10, 1994. Petitioner maintains that the motion was properly filed within the 15-day period,
citing the registry return card which shows actual receipt on February 22, 1994 by the City
Prosecutor of a copy of the motion.
The Court of Appeals, noting that petitioner received a copy of the decision on January 28, 1994,
stated that petitioner had until February 12, 1994 to appeal the decision or file a motion for
reconsideration. The Court of Appeals ruled that petitioner, by filing a motion for reconsideration
without any proof of service, merely filed a scrap of paper and not a motion for reconsideration.
Hence, the reglementary period of petitioner to appeal continued to run and lapsed after the 15-day
period, making the trial court’s decision final and executory.
We agree with the Court of Appeals that petitioner patently failed to comply with the mandatory
requirements on proof of service insofar as the public prosecutor is concerned. The Court has
stressed time and again that non-compliance with Sections 4, 5 and 6 of Rule 15 is a fatal defect.
The well-settled rule is that a motion which fails to comply with Sections 4, 5, and 6 of Rule 15 is a
useless piece of paper. If filed, such motion is not entitled to judicial cognizance and does not stop
the running of the reglementary period for filing the requisite pleading.14
"SEC. 6. - Proof of service to be filed with motions. – No motion shall be acted upon by the
court, without proof of service of the notice thereof." (Emphasis supplied)
15
From the language of the rule, proof of service is mandatory. Without such proof of service to the
adverse party, a motion is nothing but an empty formality deserving no judicial cognizance.
"SEC. 13. Proof of Service. – x x x. If service is made by registered mail, proof shall be made by
such affidavit and the registry receipt issued by the mailing office. The registry return card shall
be filed immediately upon its receipt by the sender, or in lieu thereof the unclaimed letter together
with the certified or sworn copy of the notice given by the postmaster to the addressee." (Emphasis
16
supplied)
If service is by registered mail, proof of service consists of the affidavit of the person mailing and
the registry receipt, both of which must be appended to the motion. Absent one or the other, or
worse both, there is no proof of service.
In the instant case, an examination of the record shows that petitioner received a copy of the trial
court’s decision of January 17, 1994 on January 28, 1994. Within the reglementary period to appeal,
petitioner filed on February 10, 1994, by registered mail, a motion for reconsideration. However,
petitioner failed to attach both the affidavit and the registry receipt to the motion for reconsideration
as required by the Rules.
The defect of the motion is apparent on its face. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was a mere
scrap of paper as it did not contain the required proof of service.
However, petitioner is contesting that part of the decision of the trial court finding him civilly liable
even as he is acquitted from the criminal charge on reasonable doubt. This raises the issue of
whether the public prosecutor is the only proper party to be served with petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration. The present Rules do not require the accused to serve a copy of his motion for
reconsideration on the offended party who may not be represented by a private counsel. The Rules
require service only on the public prosecutor if the offended party is not represented by a private
counsel.
A judgment of acquittal is immediately final and executory and the prosecution cannot appeal the
acquittal because of the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy. However, either the
offended party or the accused may appeal the civil aspect of the judgment despite the acquittal of
the accused. The public prosecutor has generally no interest in appealing the civil aspect of a decision
acquitting the accused.
The acquittal ends the work of the public prosecutor and the case is terminated as far as he is
concerned.
The real parties in interest in the civil aspect of a decision are the offended party and the accused.
Thus, any appeal or motion for reconsideration of the civil aspect of a decision in a criminal case
must be served on the other real party in interest. If the offended party appeals or moves for
reconsideration, the accused is necessarily served a copy of the pleading through his counsel.
If the accused appeals or moves for reconsideration, a lacuna arises if the offended party is not
represented by a private counsel. In such a situation, under the present Rules only the public
prosecutor is served the notice of appeal or a copy of the motion for reconsideration. To fill in this
lacuna in the present Rules, we require that henceforth if the accused appeals or moves for
reconsideration, he should serve a copy of his pleading on the offended party himself if the latter is
not represented by a private counsel. This is in addition to service on the public prosecutor who is the
counsel of record of the State.
In the instant case, the Court notes that petitioner did not serve a copy of her motion for
reconsideration on the offended party who was not represented by a private counsel in the trial
court. In the interest of justice, and considering that the present Rules are silent on the matter, it is
only fair to give petitioner a period of five days from receipt of this decision within which to serve a
copy of her motion for reconsideration on the offended party.
Petitioner maintains that the Court of Appeals erred in finding that the trial court had jurisdiction to
render judgment on the civil aspect of the criminal case. Petitioner asserts that the Manila trial court
had no jurisdiction over the parcel of land in Bulacan which is outside the trial court’s territorial
jurisdiction.
"Being a civil liability arising from the offense charged, the governing law is the Rules of Criminal
Procedure, not the civil procedure rules which pertain to civil action arising from the initiatory
pleading that gives rise to the suit." 17
We agree with the ruling of the Court of Appeals.
Petitioner asserts that the location of the subject property outside the court’s territorial jurisdiction
deprived the trial court of jurisdiction over the civil aspect of the criminal case. This argument is
contrary to the law and the rules.
There are three important requisites which must be present before a court can acquire criminal
jurisdiction. First, the court must have jurisdiction over the subject matter. Second, the court must
have jurisdiction over the territory where the offense was committed. Third, the court must have
jurisdiction over the person of the accused. In the instant case, the trial court had jurisdiction over
18
the subject matter as the law has conferred on the court the power to hear and decide cases
involving estafa through falsification of a public document. The trial court also had jurisdiction over
the offense charged since the crime was committed within its territorial jurisdiction. The trial court
also acquired jurisdiction over the person of accused-petitioner because she voluntarily submitted to
the court’s authority. 1âwphi1
Where the court has jurisdiction over the subject matter and over the person of the accused, and the
crime was committed within its territorial jurisdiction, the court necessarily exercises jurisdiction over
all issues that the law requires the court to resolve. One of the issues in a criminal case is the civil
liability of the accused arising from the crime. Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code provides that
"[E]very person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable." Article 104 of the same Code states
that "civil liability x x x includes restitution."
The action for recovery of civil liability is deemed instituted in the criminal action unless reserved by
the offended party. In the instant case, the offended party did not reserve the civil action and the
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civil action was deemed instituted in the criminal action. Although the trial court acquitted petitioner
of the crime charged, the acquittal, grounded on reasonable doubt, did not extinguish the civil
liability. Thus, the Manila trial court had jurisdiction to decide the civil aspect of the instant case -
20
Consequently, while we find no reversible error in the decision of the Court of Appeals as to proof of
service and the trial court’s jurisdiction on the civil aspect, we remand this case for further
proceedings in the interest of justice.
WHEREFORE, petitioner is given five (5) days from receipt of this decision within which to serve a
copy of her motion for reconsideration on the offended party. Let this case be remanded to the trial
court for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
Footnotes
2
Rollo, p. 14.
3
Docketed as Criminal Case No. 87-57743 in Branch 53 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila.
The trial court declared that petitioner held the parcel of land merely as trustee of the true
4
surviving heirs of the registered owner. The trial court ordered petitioner not to encumber or
dispose of the said property at the risk of incurring criminal liability. Finally, the trial court
ordered the cancellation of the title in the name of petitioner and the issuance of a new title in
the name of the heirs, upon reimbursement to petitioner of the P2,500.00 she paid to redeem
the property.
5
Rollo, p. 46.
6
Rollo, p. 50.
7
Rollo, p. 11.
8
This should read April 18, 1994.
9
Rollo, p. 12.
10
Ibid.
11
Ibid., p. 13.
12
Supra, see note 2.
13
Rollo, pp. 144-145.
Del Castillo vs. Aguinaldo, 212 SCRA 169 (1992); Cui vs. Madayag, 245 SCRA 1 (1995);
14
15
This is taken from Section 6 of the former Rule, which reads:
16
This is taken from Section 10 of the old Rule.
17
Supra, see note 9.
18
Oscar M. Herrera, Remedial Law, Volume IV, 1992 Edition, p. 3.
Section 1, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure, which was the same rule as the
19
The last paragraph of Section 2, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure provides
20
as follows: "The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil
action. However, the civil action based on delict may be deemed extinguished if there is a
finding in a final judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission from which the civil
liability may arise did not exist." This is substantially the same rule as in the 1985 Rules of
Criminal Procedure.