183 - Dulay v. Dulay G.R. No. 158857
183 - Dulay v. Dulay G.R. No. 158857
183 - Dulay v. Dulay G.R. No. 158857
RODRIGO S. DULAY
G.R. No. 158857, November 11, 2005
FACTS:
Rodrigo S. Dulay, a naturalized American citizen who petition his brother
Godofredo S. Dulay, Sr. and nephew Pfeger R. Dulay to immigrate to the United
States of America.
The two stayed with him but Godofredo, decided to return to the Philippines
while, Pfeger stayed behind to take care of Rodrigo.
Rodrigo opened a trust account with the Bank of Boston on 27 January 1997 with
a deposit of Two Hundred Thirty Thousand U.S. Dollars ($230,000.00), naming
Pfeger as trustee thereof.
Five months later, Pfeger left Rodrigo’s house allegedly to join his girlfriend in
California but actually went back to the Philippines. Pfeger returned to the United
States but after a brief stay returned again to the Philippines where he went on a
spending binge. Rodrigo found out that Pfeger emptied the account. He found
out that Pfeger used the money from said account to buy several vehicles, loan
money to several people, open bank accounts for his siblings, and buy a house
and lot and jewelry for his wife and whatever was left was allegedly transferred to
Gododfredo.
Rodrigo filed a petition for the issuance of letters rogatory in order to get the
depositions of several witnesses residing abroad.
On 2 February 2000, Rodrigo submitted to the trial court his answers to the
interrogatories and cross interrogatories of petitioners given before a notary
public in the United States.
Pfeger filed an Omnibus Motion, praying that the written interrogatories be
declared inadmissible and reiterating their prayer for the dismissal of the
complaint. But the lower court denied the motion at the same time directing the
archival of the case while waiting for the documents from the United States.
Imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial judge, Pfeger filed
before the Court of Appeals an original action for certiorari but the appellate court
dismissed the petition, finding that the questioned depositions were
accomplished in substantial compliance with the Rules of Court.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred when it refused to dismiss the case at
the trial court level despite respondent’s failure to prosecute his case with
reasonable diligence.
2. Whether or not the documents submitted by respondent were not taken in
substantial compliance with the directive of the trial court itself but in violation of
Sections 11, 12, and 14, Rule 23 of the Rules of Court.
RULING:
While the letters rogatory issued by the trial court specifically directed the Clerk
of Court of Boston to take the depositions needed in the case, it became
impossible to follow the directive since the Clerk of Court of Boston merely
brushed it aside and refused to cooperate. Obviously, it was not within the trial
court’s power, much less the respondent’s to force the Clerk of Court of Boston
to have the deposition taken before it. It would be illogical and unreasonable to
expect respondent to comply with the letters rogatory without the cooperation of
the very institution or personality named in the letters rogatory and requested to
examine the witnesses. This reality was recognized by the trial court when it
ordered respondent to have the questioned depositions authenticated by the
Philippine consulate. Indeed, refusing the allowance of the depositions in issue
would be going directly against the purpose of taking the depositions in the first
place, that is, the disclosure of facts which are relevant to the proceedings in
court.
More importantly, the Court finds that respondent substantially complied with the
requirements for depositions taken in foreign countries. In the instant case, the
authentication made by the consul was a ratification of the authority of the notary
public who took the questioned depositions. The deposition was, in effect,
obtained through a commission, and no longer through letters rogatory.
Besides, the allowance of the deposition cannot be said to have caused any
prejudice to the adverse party. They were given the opportunity to cross-examine
the witnesses through their cross-interrogatories, which were in turn answered by
the deponents. Save for the complaint of delay in the proceedings, petitioners
were unable to point out any injury they suffered as a result of the trial court’s
action.
The ends of justice are reached not only through the speedy disposal of cases,
but more importantly, through a meticulous and comprehensive evaluation of the
merits of the case. The parties’ right to be given full opportunity to ventilate their
cases should not be hindered by a strict adherence to technicalities. After all, as
this Court has so often enunciated, rules of procedure are not inflexible tools
designed to hinder or delay, but to facilitate and promote the administration of
justice. A strict and rigid application of rules, resulting in technicalities that tend to
frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must be avoided.