Final ICC 2017
Final ICC 2017
Final ICC 2017
_____________________________________________________________________
Prepared by
The AALCO Secretariat
29 C, Rizal Marg,
Diplomatic Enclave, Chanakyapuri,
New Delhi – 110 021
India
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
CONTENTS
I. Introduction 1-4
A. Background
B. AALCO’s Work Programme on the ICC
C. Issues for focused consideration at the Half-Day Special Meeting during the 56th
Annual Session of AALCO
V. Annex 15
Draft Resolution
THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
I. Introduction
A. Background
1. For decades, international law lacked sufficient mechanisms to hold individuals
accountable for the most serious international crimes. Punishment for grave breaches of the
Geneva Conventions of 19491 or for violations of the Genocide Convention or the customary
international law of war crimes and crimes against humanity depended primarily on national
courts. The problem is that it is precisely when the most serious crimes were committed that
national courts were least willing or able to act because of widespread or systematic violence or
because of involvement of agents of the State in the commission of crimes. If you look at the
past to the best known historical events of that kind-Nazi Germany, Rwanda, the former
Yugoslavia, Cambodia-the governments themselves or their agents were involved in the
commission of those crimes. And so the failures of national courts in these contexts protected
perpetrators with impunity. To prevent impunity in those situations, it is necessary to enforce
international justice when national systems are unwilling or unable to act.
2. The first actions taken by the international community to address this impunity gap were
to create ad hoc tribunals in such situations. The first tribunals were, of course, those of
Nuremberg and Tokyo after World War II. In the 1990’s, the United Nations had set up two
tribunals, namely the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) and the International
Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY). These tribunals were extremely important and were
pioneers. They showed that international justice could work, but they all possessed several
limitations.
3. One limitation is that only a few States participated in their creation. The Nuremberg and
Tokyo tribunals were set up by the victorious Allied powers after World War II, and the Rwanda
1Four Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 relate to the following namely: Convention (I) for the Amelioration
of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field. Convention (II) for the Amelioration of the
Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea. Convention (III) relative to the
Treatment of Prisoners of War, and Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War.
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and Yugoslavia tribunals were created by the Security Council acting under Chapter VII. There
are also other limitations. Ad hoc tribunals are limited to specific geographic locations. They
respond primarily to events in the past. Their establishment involves extensive costs and delays.
Last but not least, their creation depended, every time, on the political will of the international
community at the time. And so in some cases there was action; in some cases there was nothing.
As a result, their ability to punish perpetrators of international crimes and to deter future
perpetrators has been limited. Eventually, a permanent truly international court was necessary to
respond to the most serious international crimes and to overcome the limitations of the ad hoc
tribunals.
4. The attempt to create a permanent mechanism that could try persons committing most
serious crimes got a revival of sorts at the end of the cold war. Particularly, prominent to this
momentum were the creation of ICTY and ICTR. This momentum culminated in the convening
of the Rome Conference which adopted the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court on
17 July 1998, which entered into force on 1 July 2002. As on March 2017, the membership of
the Court stands at 124.2 Out of them 34 are African States, 19 are Asia-Pacific States, 18 are
from Eastern Europe, 28 are from Latin American and Caribbean States, and 25 are
from Western European and other States. This breadth of its membership itself is indicative of
the widespread support it receives across the globe.
5. The adoption of the Rome Statute was a historic event. The treaty has created the first-
ever permanent international criminal court, independent and impartial, and able to hold
individuals personally accountable for the commission of the most serious international crimes.
The ICC will provide redress to victims and survivors of these crimes and may, over time, prove
to be a powerful deterrent to the commission of these crimes. However, it is good to remind
ourselves here that the ICC prosecutes individuals, not groups or States. Any individual who is
alleged to have committed crimes within the jurisdiction of ICC may be brought before ICC.
However, The ICC is not intended to supplant States where States have organized criminal
justice systems that are willing and able to ensure that there is accountability for the crimes
2
https://asp.icccpi.int/en_menus/asp/states%20parties/pages/the%20states%20parties%20to%20the%20rome%20stat
ute.aspx
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concerned. Rather, the purpose of international criminal accountability mechanisms, whether
permanent or ad hoc, is to fill in when there are impunity gaps. They are not substitutes for
national mechanisms.
7. Apart from this, AALCO has conducted numerous Seminars and Work Shops on specific
thematic concerns relating to the ICC. In 2009, a seminar on “International Criminal Court:
Emerging issues and Challenges” was successfully conducted in collaboration with the
Government of Japan. In 2010, prior to the Kampala Review Conference, a Round Table
Meeting of Legal Experts was organized jointly by the AALCO and the Governments of
Malaysia and Japan with a view to consolidate the position of the Member States. The Reports of
these meetings have thereafter been published and circulated among the Member States.
8. Since review and analysis of the developments at the Kampala Review Conference is an
important part of the work programme of AALCO, a three member delegation, led by Prof. Dr.
Rahmat Mohamad, the then Secretary General participated at the Review Conference.
Addressing the General debate on 1 June 2010, the Secretary General highlighted the specific
concerns of the Member States of AALCO, which emerged at the Putrajaya Round Table
Meeting. He emphasized that expanding on the principles of universality, sustainability and
complementarily were the major challenges that the ICC would have to face and look for
solutions. The need for a clear and broadly accepted definition for ‘aggression’, the relationship
3
between peace and justice, issues on cooperation with the ICC and the principle of
complementarity were the other topics that he reflected on.
9. On 2 June 2010, the Secretary General hosted an informal Networking Meeting of the
AALCO. During the course of this meeting, the “Report of the Round Table Meeting of Legal
Experts on the Review Conference of the Rome Statute of the ICC” was also launched. The
meeting was well attended and several high-level representatives of Members States, non-
Member States and representatives of civil society organizations attended it. In 2011, AALCO
also organized, in collaboration with the Government of Malaysia and the ICC, a two day
meeting of legal experts on the topic “Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: Issues
and Challenges”.
C. Issues for focused consideration at the Half-day Special Meeting during the 56th
Annual Session.
10. At this Fifty-Sixth Annual Session of AALCO Member States are encouraged to
deliberate and make comments on the following issues:
i. “The Legality, under International Law, of the UNSC Authority to Refer Cases
and/or Situations to the ICC Under Article 13 (B) Of The Rome Statute, 1998”. This
is a proposal by the Republic of Sudan4.
ii. The referral and deferral powers of the UN Security Council.
iii. The Principle of complementarity; and
iv. Regional approach to conflict solution.
4This proposal was sent to the AALCO Secretariat vide Note Verbale (SED/6/2/AALCO) dated 24 October
2016.
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II. Recent Developments Relating to the ICC
11. After ten years of its establishment the ICC started to render its judgments since 2012 on
cases before it. In this part of the brief a brief overview is given of some of the judgments
given by ICC in recent years.
12. In this landmark verdict, the ICC found beyond reasonable doubt that Bemba, a former
vice president and commander-in-chief of the Movement for Liberation of Congo (MLC), was
criminally responsible under Article 28(a) of the Rome Statute of the ICC for the crimes against
humanity of murder and rape, and the war crimes of murder, rape, and pillaging committed by
his forces in the course of an non-international armed conflict in the Central African Republic
(CAR) during 2002 and 2003. Bemba is the highest-ranked individual to have been convicted by
the Court to date. At the time of the conflict, Bemba deployed his troops from the DRC to the
neighboring CAR to support the then president Ange-Félix Patassé to beat back a coup attempt
of François Bozizé. Later, in January 2005, the CAR government under Bozizé referred the
situation to the ICC. Throughout the trial, Bemba denied all charges against him claiming that in
fact it was former CAR president Patassé who had actual command and control over MLC
troops.
First, the case against Bemba was the first time in the history of modern international
criminal justice that acts of sexual violence far outnumbered alleged killings. During the
conflict, crimes of sexual violence against women, men and children were used as a
“tool” by Bemba’s troops to terrorize the civilian population in the CAR.
Second, the verdict set another important jurisprudential precedent at the ICC as it was
the first time that the Court addressed the liability of an accused under the command
responsibility doctrine provided for in Article 28 of the Rome Statute.
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14. Four other members of Bemba's legal team also were sentenced by the Court. They were
found guilty in October 2016 of bribing or persuading by other means 14 defense witnesses to
try to influence the outcome of the first trial, which led to a March 2016 conviction for war
crimes and crimes against humanity. This was the ICC's first case dealing with witness
tampering. The defense lawyer, Aime Kilolo, was given a two-and-a-half-year suspended
sentence as well as a $32,000 fine for his involvement. Bemba remains in detention in the
Hague pending the outcome of his appeals.
15. On 24 March 2017, the International Criminal Court awarded symbolic reparations of
$250 each to 297 people who lost relatives, property or livestock or suffered psychological harm
in a deadly attack by the militia under Congolese warlord Germain Katanga on a Congolese
village in 2003.
16. Awarding both individual and collective damages, the court also found that Katanga,
serving a 12-year term for war crimes, was liable for one million dollars of the total damages
estimated at $3.7 million. The collective reparations are in the form of projects covering
"housing, support for income-generating activities, education and psychological support" for
victims.
17. Katanga was sentenced by the ICC to 12 years in jail in 2014, after being convicted on
five charges of war crimes and crimes against humanity for the February 2003 ethnic attack on
Bogoro village in Ituri province. He was accused of supplying weapons to his militia in the
attack in which some 200 people were shot and hacked to death with machetes. Katanga is now
on trial in the Democratic Republic of Congo on other charges of war crimes and insurrection in
the mineral-rich Ituri region.
18. On 22nd August 2016, Ahmad al-Faqi al-Mahdi, a member of an extremist group named
Ansar Dine, which is linked to Al Qaeda, pleaded guilty at the International Criminal Court
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(ICC) to destroying UNESCO protected shrines and damaging a mosque in the ancient city of
Timbuktu, Mali, in the court’s first prosecution of the destruction of cultural heritage as a war
crime. Also, it is the first time that an alleged offender prosecuted at the ICC has pleaded guilty.
Prosecutors said that he took part in the destruction of a number of venerable centuries-old mud
and stone buildings holding the tombs of holy men and scholars.
19. He faces a maximum sentence of 30 years in prison, but prosecutors will request a
sentence of nine to eleven years as part of a plea agreement. Mr. Mahdi said to be is suspected of
committing other crimes, but the case was narrowly focused to highlight how cultural and
religious buildings are deliberately singled out for destruction to obliterate an enemy’s history
and identity. The judgment is scheduled to be delivered on 27th September 2016.
20. The case comes at a time of heightened international concern about the fate of many
cultural and religious monuments in the Middle East and North Africa. Places of worship,
artworks and archaeological remnants, libraries, museums and other treasured sites have been
destroyed by extremist groups who call them pagan or heretical, including the giant Buddha
statues at Bamiyan, Afghanistan, in 2001, and more recently Nimrud, Palmyra and other pre-
Islamic sites in Iraq and Syria.
(iv) The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Aimé Kilolo Musamba, Jean-Jacques
Mangenda Kabongo, Fidèle Babala Wandu and Narcisse Arido
21. On 21 June 2016, the International Criminal Court sentenced former Congolese Vice-
President Jean-Pierre Bemba to 18 years for murders, rapes and pillaging committed by his troops
in the Central African Republic more than a decade ago. He is the third person to be sentenced by
the ICC since it began work in 2002. His case was the first at the ICC to focus on rape as a
weapon of war and the first to highlight a military commander's responsibility for the conduct of
the troops under his control.
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22. The decision announced focused on the actions of his troops, as Bemba commanded a
private army of 1,500 men who intervened in the neighbouring Central African Republic's civil
war. Judge Sylvia Steiner, the presiding judge in her decision, stated that the former militia leader
had failed to exercise control over his private army sent into the Central African Republic in late
October 2002 where they carried out "sadistic" rapes, murders and pillaging of "particular
cruelty".
23. Bemba was convicted in March 2016 on two counts of crimes against humanity as well
as three counts of war crimes. The case however is likely to drag on for a few more years, as his
defence team has already filed notice that it intends to appeal, and argued that Bemba should be
released immediately as he has been behind bars since his arrest in 2008.
24. In this part of the brief an attempt is made to look at the most important concerns that
Asian-African States have expressed in relation to ICC over the years.
25. The attitude of some of the African States in relation to ICC has navigated from
cooperation to conflict over the years. The relationship has become so unreceptive that, in recent
years, some African states have withdrawn or are thinking of withdrawing from the Rome Statute.
Indeed the “open bureau meeting” on the ‘ICC-Africa Relationship’ that was convened by the
ICC’s Assembly of State Parties (ASP) on 18 November 2016 clearly indicated that some States
in Africa are increasingly disheartened with the ICC. What explains this declining enthusiasm for
the Court in Africa? Any dispassionate and impartial analysis of this situation needs to consider
the following factors into account:
26. First, all situations and cases before the ICC (except Georgia) have come from Africa (to
the exclusion of crimes committed elsewhere). Almost all the cases that are ongoing or that are
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about to begin all concern the African continent.5 All four persons who have thus far been
convicted by the Court are Africans. Almost all who have been indicted are also African.
Although the ICC has the potential to cover all States, whether they are party to the Rome Statute
or not, it has only African States before it even after utilizing all the means by which it may be
seized of jurisdiction. As such, this raises some issues. For example, the ICC (the Office of
Prosecutor) has conducted Preliminary investigations throughout the world including: Iraq,
Venezuela and Colombia (2006); Afghanistan (2007) and Georgia and Gaza, and Honduras
(2010). These investigations have not led to any indictments for various reasons: crimes were
insufficient in number, national justice systems were able to deal with the issue, investigations
are ongoing and/or the ICC cannot legally address some crimes committed in a state non-party to
the ICC Statute. Why the ICC decided not to open investigations in these situations remains
unclear. What is certain though is this: when international prosecutors bring to justice only or
mainly criminals from particular region or particularly weak States, it could potentially lead to
charges of discrimination among human rights abusers on the basis of their citizenship.
27. Second, the ICC needs to bear in mind the cumbersome relationship between the search
for peace and the demands for justice. Peace and justice, on the one hand and accountability and
reconciliation, on the other are not mutually exclusive. To the contrary, they go hand in hand. Put
differently, if we insist at all times on a relentless pursuit of justice a delicate peace may not
survive. If we insist in punishing always and everywhere those responsible for serious violations
of human rights it may be difficult or even impossible to stop the bloodshed and save lives of
innocent civilians. There is some legal basis for this enshrined in Article 53 of the Rome Statute
which allows the Prosecutor to not proceed with an investigation if doing so would serve the
“interests of justice”. The challenge then, is to find the right balance in each specific instance
where this issue arises.
5
However, some cases have been referred to the ICC by the African States themselves. These include: Uganda,
Democratic Republic of Congo; Central African Republic and Mali.
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B. Powers of Referral and Deferral by the UNSC
28. Under the Rome Statute, the UN Security Council has been given a significant role.
However, the relationship between ICC and the United Nations Security Council has been a
matter of great contention since the beginning.6 As in any court system, the ICC is limited to
investigating situations within its jurisdiction. The ICC can investigate a case when a crime is
committed in a state that is party to the ICC or if the person accused of committing the crime is a
national of a state party. Article 13(b) of the court’s Rome Statute, however, also vests the UN
Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, with the authority to refer
situations to the ICC, including those where crimes were committed on the territory of non-states
parties or by nationals thereof. To this date, this is the only way to make ICC jurisdiction
universal- i.e., extended to any state, whether it is an ICC state party or not.
29. The UN Member States who drafted the Rome Statute granted this role to the Security
Council primarily to save it from the need of creating ad hoc tribunals which not only is costly but
also takes several years to bring a tribunal into operation. Meanwhile, evidence and witnesses are
lost. Referral of situations to the ICC through the medium of Security Council enables immediate
investigation to preserve evidence and access witnesses.
30. In practice, the decisions of the Security Council are often affected less by considerations
of judicial purity and coherence than by factors relating to the conflict at hand. While selectivity
may be a justifiable or inevitable stance from the point of view of the Security Council, this
provision that stands codified in Article 13 of the Rome Statute has serious implications for the
perceptions of legitimacy and the integrity of the ICC. Also important has been the concern
expressed by many States on the use of Article 15 of the Rome Statute that allows the Prosecutor
of the ICC acting proprio motu to refer cases to the ICC.
31. Powers of deferral enshrined in Article 16 of the Rome Statute has also caused a great
deal of discomfort to many States over the years. As is known, Article 16 of the Rome Statute
provides that the UN Security Council may, in a resolution adopted under Chapter VII of the
Charter, request the Court to defer (namely not commence or proceed with) an investigation or
6 Jennifer Trahan, " The Relationship between the International Criminal Court and the U.N. Security
Council:Parameters and Best Practices" (2013) 24 Criminal Law Forum 417-73
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prosecution for a renewable period of twelve months.7 As such it recognizes the ability of the
Security Council to suspend the activities with regard to a specific situation or case, when it is
considered that the suspension is necessary for the maintenance of international peace and
security.
32. Both the powers of referral and deferral present a critical dilemma: they should not be
seen to be governed by political motives, in which case the legitimacy of ICC would be seriously
undermined in the eyes of the international community. In this regard the need to ascertain certain
parameters that could potentially guide the actions of UNSC could hardly be exaggerated. Also
critical is the need to address the claim that how non-party states, especially the permanent
members of the Security Council, can justify their exceptionalism, namely of subjecting to the
Court another state not party while they do not accept the Court’s jurisdiction over themselves.
33. To maintain and preserve national criminal jurisdiction has been a principal concern of
many states over the years. Hence, one of the foundational principles of Rome Statute, namely the
principle of complementarity8 (which means that the Court will supplement but not supersede
national jurisdictions) was a hotly debated issue even at Rome. The basic idea behind the
complementarity is to maintain State sovereignty, under which “it is the duty of every State to
exercise its criminal jurisdiction over those responsible for international crimes”, to enhance the
national jurisdiction over the core crimes prohibited in the Statute, and to perfect a national legal
system so as to meet the needs of investigating and prosecuting persons who committed the
international crimes listed in the Statute.9
34. The Advantages of the Principle of Complementarity (in terms of national judicial
proceedings are as follows):
7
Article 16, Rome Statute provides thus: “no investigation or prosecution may be commenced or proceeded
with under this Statute for a period of 12 months after the Security Council, in a resolution adopted under Chapter
VII of the Charter of the United Nations, has requested the Court to that effect; that request may be renewed by the
Council under the same conditions.”
8
This is embodied in the Preamble and Article 17 of the Rome Statute; See Lijun Yang, "On the Principle of
Complementarity in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court" (2005) 4 Chinese Journal of Internal Law
1, 121-132.
9
Preamble, Rome Statute, supra note 6.
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1. They are closer to the victims and affected communities and enable more easily the
participation of the victims in the proceedings;
2. Evidence gathering is also easier given territorial proximity between the investigative
and prosecutorial offices and the crime scenes;
3. National proceedings tend to be faster and less costly;
4. Enforcement of arrest warrants is easier and less complex.
5. Ending impunity for these powerful individuals can play a significant role in
strengthening a culture of the rule of law and legality without which other phenomena
such as corruption, drug trafficking, political violence and other crimes may continue to
prosper.
6. The most serious crimes not only damage the direct victims, but also cause many indirect
effects with disastrous consequences for the entire population.
35. It is difficult to disagree with the view that the principle of complementarity would be in
keeping with the principle of sovereignty. Indeed States have even deemed the principle of
complementarity as “the most important guiding principle of the Statute”, which should be “fully
reflected in all its substantive provisions and in the work of the Court, which should be able to
exercise jurisdiction only with the consent of the countries concerned.”10
36. However, the difficult aspect of the negotiations at Rome was to develop the criteria
setting out the circumstances when the Court should assume jurisdiction even where national
investigations or prosecutions had occurred. Two broad concepts emerged: Unwillingness and
Inability. As provided in Article 17 of the Rome Statute, where national criminal jurisdictions are
unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out investigations and prosecutions of the most serious
crimes of international concern, the ICC will instead investigate and prosecute those
allegations.11 But this formulation left several questions unanswered (particularly with regard to
the terms “unwilling and unable”) as to the meaning, scope and extent of control to be exercised
10
Rome Conference Vol.II, supra note 8, p. 75; Elizabeth Wilmshurst, “Jurisdiction of the Court”, in Roy S.
Lee (ed.), The International Criminal Court: The Making of the Rome Statute, Kluwer Law International, The
Hague, 1999, p. 127.
11 Article 17(1) (a), Rome Statute, supra note 6. Article 17(1) (a) provides “… [a case is inadmissible if it] is
being investigated or prosecuted by a State which has jurisdiction over it, unless the State is unwilling or unable
genuinely to carry out the investigation or prosecution.”
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by the international judges over domestic proceedings. The problems arising out of this principle
were starkly witnessed in certain African situations recently.
37. Another problem that has arisen for African States that are parties to ICC relates to the
principle of competing obligations flowing from the Rome Statute as well as their membership in the
African Union. When a particular course of action is dictated by the ICC it becomes mandatory on
the part of all State Parties to ICC to adhere to that. This is because State parties to ICC are under an
obligation to cooperate with ICC in relation to a number of issues. However, when contrary decisions
are taken by regional organizations, the members of these organizations despite being a member of
them, are faced with a dilemma: whether to give priority to their status as State Parties to ICC or
whether to abide by and implement the decisions taken by the regional institutions of which they are
members. Is this issue amenable to legal interpretation or does it require a political solution. This
remains the crux of the problem.
38. Today it is widely accepted that perpetrators of war crimes, other serious violations of
international humanitarian law, and gross human rights violations must be held accountable and
must be brought to justice in accordance with due process of law.
39. What should also be accepted is that ensuring accountability cannot be the work of one
court, one judicial system, one State, or one region. Ending impunity must, and does, rest upon
the complementary efforts of national and international criminal accountability systems, the
existence of the rule of law within nations and among nations, and the unwavering commitment
of the international community to maintain conditions under which justice and peace prevail. In
other words, Justice is not exclusively dependent on either international or national courts, but on
the vital contribution of each. Indeed, the relations between international and domestic courts and
tribunals are dynamic precisely because they are in a state of constant evolution. This co-
ordination of international and national law increases the resources available to the international
community in achieving the shared goal of ending impunity for the worst crimes against mankind.
In other words, Justice in The Hague cannot be a one-way street- it is a dialogue among
international institutions and jurisdictions, and most of all, a dialogue with domestic jurisdictions.
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40. The biggest challenge for the Court at this juncture, especially in relation to its legitimacy
in Africa, is the “double standard” problem. The idea that everyone is equal before and under the
law underpins domestic legal systems, especially in the area of criminal law. The position under
international law in relations between states is no different, at least in theory. This is enshrined in
the preamble and Article 2(1) of the foundational UN Charter which affirm “equal rights of men
and women and of nations large and small” and the “principle of sovereign equality of all” states.
The exclusive focus on Africa largely reflects current limits on the reach of international justice.
The ICC needs to continue playing an impartial role in the fight against impunity in Africa and
the rest of the world and proactively follow up situations in other jurisdictions where crimes have
been committed. The sooner the better for, the contribution of the ICC to furthering the cause of
justice and peace is undermined by the fact that some States do not yet accept its legitimacy.
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ANNEX
SECRETARIAT’S DRAFT
AALCO/RES/DFT/56/SP2
5 MAY 2017
Taking note of the deliberations in the Assembly of State Parties to the Rome Statute, and
noting the progress in cases before the International Criminal Court (ICC),
Being aware of the importance of the universal acceptance of the Rome Statute of the ICC and in
particular, the principle of complementarity,
Acknowledging the concerns of Member States with regard to and the operation of ICC;
1. Encourages Member States which are not yet party to consider ratifying/acceding
to the Rome Statute and upon ratification/accession consider adopting necessary
implementing legislation;
2. Further encourages Member States that have ratified the Rome Statute to
consider becoming party to the Agreement on the Privileges and Immunities of
the ICC;
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