Mccrea2006 and Intellectual History Jnanasrimitra

Journal of Indian Philosophy (2006) 34: 303–366 Springer 2006
DOI 10.1007/s10781-005-5739-4
LAWRENCE J. MCCREA AND PARIMAL G. PATIL
TRADITIONALISM AND INNOVATION: PHILOSOPHY,

EXEGESIS, AND INTELLECTUAL HISTORY IN

JÑANAŚRIMITRA’S APOHAPRAKARAN
:A
INTRODUCTION
Among the most salient features of Sanskrit philosophical literature is

its commentarial orientation. This orientation is reflected not only in
texts that comment explicitly on other texts, but also in those inde-
pendent works that do not present themselves as doing so. Even in
such independent works philosophical problems are typically framed
and their solutions are presented with reference to foundational texts
in their respective traditions.1 Due to this commentarial orientation,
Sanskrit philosophers often have two objectives: To demonstrate that
their arguments are philosophically sound and to show that their
conclusions are sanctioned by, and in fact implicit in, these founda-
tional texts.2 This second objective is so important that even radically
innovative philosophers often go to great lengths to portray them-
selves as unoriginal, presenting new ideas and arguments as if they
were merely drawing out the implications of the foundational texts of
their tradition.3 As a result of this, scholars have tended not to view
the broader commentarial tradition as a locus of real innovation.
1
By the term ‘‘foundational texts’’ we mean whatever texts a tradition takes to be
canonical and authoritative e.g., the works of Dign aga and Dharmakrti for the
Buddhist epistemological tradition; the As ayi
: t:adhy for Grammar; the Nyayas utras
for Nyaya; the Brahmas utras for Ved
anta etc.
2
This imperative to conform to established positions within one’s philosophical
tradition is reflected in the generally accepted notion of an apasiddhanta (deviant
conclusion). It is generally accepted in the theory of debate that adopting a position
that is contrary to the established tenets of one’s philosophical tradition is grounds
for losing a debate even if one’s argument is otherwise sound. See, for example, the
anonymous Tarka sastra
(which is sometimes attributed to Asanga _ or Vasubandhu)
in Vidyabh u:sana (1921: 269), Tucci (1929: 13–16), and the NS corpus ad NS 5.2.23.
3
There are, of course, exceptions to this. For example, the commentarial genre of

varttika, in which a commentator both explains and selectively critiques the text
upon which he is commenting. Examples of such varttikas include the Slokavarttika

and Tantravarttika
of Kumarilabhat:t:a, the Praman : avarttika
of Dharmakrti, the
arttika
Nyayav of Uddyotakara etc.
304 LAWRENCE J. MCCREA AND PARIMAL G. PATIL
Commentarial and quasi-commentarial literature4 are generally

overlooked, and often are treated as tools for exegesis rather than as
important works in their own right. This tendency can be seen even in
modern scholarship on the Buddhist epistemological tradition which
has been studied more carefully than most Sanskrit philosophy.
In this paper, we want to examine the dynamic between tradi-
tionalism and innovation as it is reflected in a late work of the
Buddhist epistemological tradition, the Apohaprakaran: a (Monograph
on Exclusion) of Jñ anasrmitra (c. 975), one of the famed
‘‘gate-keepers’’ (dvarapan
: d: ita) at the Buddhist university of Vikra-
masla.5 Jñ
anasrmitra was one of the last great Buddhist philoso-
phers working in India and his Apohaprakaran: a is a work that builds
on centuries of debate about the meaning of words and the formation
of concepts. While a great deal of attention has been paid to the
theory of exclusion (apoha) and its importance to Buddhist episte-
mology, most of it has been directed towards the foundational works
of Dign aga (c. 480–540) and Dharmakrti (c. 600–660).6 When
scholars have attended to later material, they have tended to view it
as merely ‘‘footnotes to Dignaga and Dharmakrti.’’ Consider, for
example, the ground-breaking work of Shoryu Katsura who, in one
of the few papers to focus specifically on Jñanasrmitra’s theory of
exclusion, writes as follows:
After reading through Jñanasrmitra’s Apohaprakaran: a, I had an impression that
there was nothing radically new about his theory of apoha in comparison with
anasrmitra quotes extensively from the works of
Dharmakrti. As a matter of fact, Jñ
Dharmakrti in order to justify his understanding of Dharmakrti. When examined
very closely, most of his arguments stem from Dharmakrti at least in germ.
anasrmitra actually brought a new phase in theory
Therefore, I do not believe that Jñ
4
By ‘‘quasi-commentarial literature’’ we are referring to texts that do not com-
ment on a single text from beginning to end, but that largely consist in the inter-
pretation and elaboration of statements that are drawn from foundational or
canonical texts of a particular tradition. Examples include the Nyayabh u:san: a,
Nais: karmyasiddhi, Tattvabindu, Ratnakirtinibandhavali,
J~ srimitranibandhavali,
nana
etc.
5
Thakur (1987: 1). For an account of his extant work see Thakur (1987), and for
his Vr: ttamalastuti,
which is not included in Thakur (1987), see Hahn (1971, 1989).
See Lasic (2000) and Kyuma (2005) for editions and annotated translations of the

Vyapticarc a and Ks _ adhy
: an: abhang aya
1: Paks
: adharmatadhik For a very useful list
ara.
of philosophers in the Buddhist epistemological tradition, their various works, and
some of the existing secondary scholarship see Steinkellner and Much (1995).
6
See Ganeri (2001), Hattori (1980, 2000), Hayes (1986, 1988), and Katsura (1979)
for a discussion of Dignaga’s theory. For a discussion of Dharmakrti’s theory see
Dunne (2004), Katsura (1991), Pind (1999), and Siderits (1991).
TRADITIONALISM AND INNOVATION 305
anasrmitra merely rearranged and systematized the

of apoha. It seems to me that Jñ
arguments of Dharmakrti ...7
In what follows, we hope to show that the apparent traditionalism

that Katsura correctly notices in Jñanasrmitra’s treatment of
Dharmakrti’s works actually masks substantive and dramatic
innovation in the theory of exclusion. In scholastic traditions,
‘‘rearrangement’’ and ‘‘systematization’’ are often precisely the
mechanisms through which innovation occurs.8 As we intend to
show, in rearranging and systematizing elements of Dharmakrti’s
arguments, Jñ anasrmitra draws conclusions that Dharmakrti
himself did not make and almost certainly would not have endorsed.
Our discussion will begin with a preliminary sketch of the problem of
exclusion and Jñ anasrmitra’s reliance on the pivotal concept of
determination (adhyavasaya) in explaining it. We then provide a
selective history of the development of this concept within in the
Buddhist epistemological tradition in the work of Dharmakrti and his
successor Dharmottara (c.740–800). We then turn to Jñanasrmitra’s
own account of exclusion and determination. We will argue that while
anasrmitra’s work builds upon and extends the theories of
Jñ
Dharmakrti and Dharmottara, it nevertheless subverts some of their
basic principles, by relativizing their central categories through a theory
of ‘‘conditionally adopted positions’’ (vyavastha). Our paper concludes
by briefly considering the implications of this case study for under-
standing the intellectual history of Dharmakrti and his successors.
THE PROBLEM OF EXCLUSION
The theory of exclusion was first explicitly formulated by Dhar-

makrti’s predecessor Dignaga in order to explain how, in a world
7
Katsura (1986: 171). Also see Ogawa (1999: 267–268) n. 2: ‘‘As Katsura (1986:
171) pointed out, Jñanasrmitra makes no original contribution to the theory of
apoha. Rather, he seems to wish to restore, if not Dign aga’s apoha theory, then
Dharmakrti’s theory, which had been modified within the Buddhist logico-episte-
mological tradition itself by Dharmottara and criticized by the non-Buddhist
203 quoted
(Trilocana, Vacaspatimisra). Therefore, I take the present verse [see JNA
below] as faithfully reflecting Dharmakrti’s apoha-theory.’’
8
Katsura is well aware of this possibility. See, for example, his discussion of the
differences between Dignaga and his ‘‘commentator’’ Dharmakrti’s account of
apoha. Katsura (1991: 129–146). Dharmottara’s innovations in his commentaries on
Dharmakrti’s Praman scaya and Nyayabindu
: avini have also been noticed. See, for
example, Dreyfus (1997: Chapter 21). For a general discussion of this issue see
Dunne (2004: 3–12). For a more specific discussion of the complex relationship
between Dharmakrti and Dharmottara’s teacher Śubhagupta see Eltschinger (1999).
without real universals, it is still possible to successfully make infer-

ences and use language.9 Dignaga bases his entire philosophy on a
radical disjunction between perception (pratyaks : a) and inference
(anumana)—for
him, the only possible modes of knowing—and a
corresponding disjunction between their respective objects—particu-
lars (svalaks : an: a), which are exclusively the objects of perception, and
universals (sam anya),
which are exclusively the objects of inferential
reasoning and language.10 According to Dignaga, however, univer-
sals are unreal in that they are conceptually constructed on the basis
of particulars and are not ontologically independent of them.11 It is
through the theory of exclusion that Dignaga explains how, while
functioning in terms of conceptually constructed universals, inferen-
tial reasoning and language enable us to reliably pick out particulars.
A generic concept such as ‘‘cow,’’ for example, is able to refer to
particular cows not because it designates any real property that all
cows share, but rather, because in excluding all non-cows, it nega-
tively defines a domain whose members can be reliably picked out by
the concept ‘‘cow.’’12 Although Dignaga insists that inferential rea-
soning and language only function in terms of these conceptually
constructed universals, he does not provide a clear and satisfying
account of how they can reliably guide us in our dealings with par-
ticulars.13 Specifying precisely how an awareness of conceptually
constructed universals enables us to act successfully towards partic-
ulars thus became a major concern for later Buddhist philosophers.14
anasrmitra, writing nearly 500 years after Dignaga, develops an
Jñ
account of exclusion that addresses this issue. According to
Jñ
anasrmitra, words relate us to both of the kinds of objects
discussed by Dign aga, but do so in two very different ways. They
make universals manifest to us, yet they refer to and enable us to act
reliably with respect to particulars, through a process that
9
For the pre-history of this theory see Bronkhorst (1999), Hattori (1977), and
Raja (1986). For the philosophical context in which this theory was developed see
Dravid (1972), Dunne (1998), Hayes (1988), and Scharf (1996).
10
For an overview of Dign aga’s thought see Frauwallner (1959), Ganeri (2001),
Hattori (1968), and Hayes (1988).
11
Hattori (1968: 79–80). Also see Hayes (1980, 1988) for a discussion of Dign
aga’s
views on inference and exclusion.
12
On the unreality of universals in Dign aga’s thought see Pind (1991: 271–272)
and Hayes (1980: 257ff). For a more general discussion of this issue in Indo-Tibetan
Buddhism see Dreyfus (1997), Dunne (1998), and Mookerjee (1935).
13
For a discussion of this as a ‘‘problem’’ see Dreyfus (1997) and Katsura (1984).
14
For a discussion of Dharmakrti’s views see, for example, Dreyfus (1996),
Dunne (2004), and Hayes (1997). For Ratnakrti’s view see Patil (2003).
anasrmitra calls ‘‘determination’’ (adhyavasaya).

Jñ For Jñanasrmi-
tra, determination is a capacity that conceptual states of awareness,
such as inferential/verbal states of awareness,15 have that enables us
to act with respect to particulars even though those particulars are
not present to our awareness. For example, when a competent user of
language hears the command ‘‘Bring a cow’’ what is brought to mind
is a generalized image (ak ara),
‘‘cow.’’16 Yet, obeying this command
requires that one bring a cow and not an image. Thus, the ‘‘cow’’ that
is brought to mind in understanding the command is not the same as
the cow that we actually bring. Inferential/verbal states of awareness
involve two different sorts of objects, the images that are manifest in
our awareness and the particulars which, though not present to our
awareness, become the objects of our activity through the process of
determination. Thus, it is the process of determination that is the key
anasrmitra’s theory of exclusion since it serves as the link be-
to Jñ
tween the universals that are apparent to us and the particulars that
we act upon. Although it plays a uniquely prominent role in
Jñ
anasrmitra’s theory of exclusion, and in fact in his entire philos-
ophy, the concept of determination is not original to him. In order to
better make sense of how and why Jñanasrmitra uses this concept, it
will therefore be helpful to first reconstruct parts of the history of
‘‘determination.’’
DHARMAKIRTI ON DETERMINATION
As a technical term in Buddhist epistemology, ‘‘determination’’

appears to have been first used by Dharmakrti. 17 For
(adhyavasaya)
Dharmakrti, determination is the process that enables us to act
towards particulars on the basis of the universals that appear in
inferential/verbal states of awareness. For Dharmakrti, as for
Dignaga, there are only two modes of valid awareness, perception
15
For the Buddhist epistemologists, verbal awareness is a subset of inferential
awareness since any valid awareness that we have on the basis of another person’s
utterance can only be inferential. For a general discussion of why this is so see
Kajiyama’s translation of Moks:
akaragupta’s Tarkabhas : a in Kajiyama (1998: 32–35).
16
Here the term image (ak refers to mental content, both conceptual and non-
ara)
conceptual.
17
For references to Dharmakrti’s use of this concept and term, see Katsura (1984,
1993), Dunne (2004), and the passages from Dharmakrti’s works cited in this paper.
and inference.18 Each has its own distinct kind of object: Particulars,
in the case of perception, and universals in the case of inferential/
verbal states of awareness. According to Dharmakrti, the validity of
these states of awareness is linked to their pragmatic effectiveness
19 A state of awareness is ‘‘valid’’ (praman
(arthakriya). : a) in so far as
any activity that we undertake on the basis of it could, in principle,
lead us to results that are consistent with the expectations that we
may form on the basis of it.20 This does not mean that our expec-
tations will be met in every case, but only that the objects towards
which we are prompted to act will function within the parameters
of these expectations.21 For example, suppose that upon seeing a pool
of water in the distance we walk towards it with the expectation of
quenching our thirst. In such a case, it is possible that, due to some
obstacle, we may not succeed in reaching the pool. This lack of
success, however, does not invalidate our awareness of the pool of
water. But, if we reach the place where we saw the pool of water and
discover only sand, our awareness of ‘‘the pool’’ (which we now
conclude to have been a mirage) was actually invalid. Valid states of
awareness must direct us towards objects that are capable of meeting
our expectations, i.e. towards objects that have the capacity to be
pragmatically effective, regardless of whether our expectations are
actually met in any specific case. Since, for Dharmakrti, it is only
18
For an accessible discussion of this see Dreyfus (1997) and Dunne (2004), and
the references contained therein. Also see Franco (1997).
19
For a discussion of this concept in Dharmakrti’s work see Nagatomi (1967),
Mikogami (1979), Katsura (1984), Franco (1997), and Dunne (2004).
20
See PV2.1 on arthakriyasthitih
: . For translations see Nagatomi (1967), Vetter
(1964), Kellner (1984), Van Biljert (1989), Franco (1997), Kellner (2001: 507), and
Dunne (2004). Dharmakrti’s use of the word sthitih: in this much discussed passage is
significant. It does not simply mean the ‘‘existence’’ of pragmatic efficacy, but its
persistence or consistency. Also see PV 3.1–3.3. The test for the validity of awareness
is that its object continues to behave within the expected parameters, as defined by our
interests. This is not limited to cases in which we actually want this object and suc-
cessfully obtain it. It also includes cases in which we wish to avoid a particular object
or, according to some, cases in which we are indifferent. This is recognized by authors
in the tradition who take arthakriya to include avoidance (hana) as well as obtaining
(upad
ana).
An awareness is said to be valid, therefore, if the object that we come to
know on the basis of it behaves in conformity with the expectations that we form on
the basis of that awareness. It is worth noting that others in the tradition such as
Vintadeva, NBT : (Vi) :39.4ff, but not Dharmottara, NBT : : 30.2, add to ‘‘avoidance’’
and ‘‘obtaining/acquisition,’’ ‘‘neglect/indifference’’ (upeks : an: iya). See
: a/upeks

Krasser (1997), and Kellner (2001: 511) n. 32 for a short, but interesting, discussion of
this point.
21
Dunne (2004).
particulars that are capable of being pragmatically effective, it

follows that in order to be valid, states of awareness must direct us
towards particulars.22 This is the case for both perception and
inferential/verbal states of awareness. However, as mentioned
above, inferential/verbal states of awareness can only have uni-
versals as their objects. What Dharmakrti must account for then
is how such states of awareness can lead us to pragmatically
effective particulars: For him, it is determination that provides the
answer.23
Thus, in inferential/verbal states of awareness there is, for Dhar-
makrti, a disjunction between the object that appears to us and the
object that we act upon. For example, when we see smoke rising over
a mountain and infer the presence of fire there, the ‘‘fire’’ that is
presented to us in that state of awareness is not a real, pragmatically
effective particular, but rather a conceptual construct. However, it is
our awareness of this ‘‘fire’’ that prompts us to go to the mountain
and discover a particular fire. Dharmakrti explains this process as
one of systematic misidentification.24 It is only because we errone-
ously take the ‘‘fire’’ that we are aware of through inferential rea-
soning to be pragmatically effective that we act as we do. In
explaining how it is that inferential/verbal states of awareness are
both erroneous and valid, he says,
Even an error can be valid because, in virtue of being connected with the object, it
does not deviate from it. Since, even though its own appearance is not a [real] object,
there is activity through the determination of an object.25
To better explain this, Dharmakrti offers the following analogy:

Someone runs with the thought ‘‘gem’’ [upon seeing ] the [indirect ] light either of a
gem or a lamp. Even though there is no difference, in so far as [in both cases] the
awareness is false, nevertheless, there is a distinction with respect to their pragmatic
22
See HB 2*15–3*16 (discussed below) and the passages cited in Dunne (2004),
Katsura (1993), Kellner (2004).
23
In perception, since the object of our awareness is a particular, this problem
does not arise. This issue is discussed extensively in what follows.
24
For discussions of Dharmakrti’s theory of ‘‘error’’ see Dunne (2004), Katsura
(1984), the very helpful discussion in Kellner (2004), and Tillemans (1999: 209–210).
For a discussion of error-theories more generally see Schmithausen (1965).
25
svapratibhase
’narthe ’rthadhyavas
ayena
pravartan
ad bhrantir
apy arthasambandh-
ena tadavyabhicarat
praman: am. PVin 2.8–10 in Steinkellner (1973), cited in PVV 25.10-
12, NBh u 140.25–26.
effect. In the same way, even though both inference and the false appearance
thereof26 are not in accordance with their object, nevertheless, validity is distributed
between them27 in conformity with their pragmatic effect.28
From a distance, a person sees a glowing light and, taking it to be a

precious stone, runs towards it. Unbeknownst to him, however, what
he sees is not a precious stone but merely the light that is reflected or
refracted from some nearby source such as a precious stone or a
lamp.29 Since in neither case is what he sees a real gemstone, his
awareness ‘‘gem’’ is false. But if the indirect light is coming from a
real gem then as he approaches he will discover a real gem. So his
initial awareness ‘‘gem,’’ though false, indirectly leads him to a
pragmatically effective object that is consistent with his expectations.
Similarly, inferential/verbal states of awareness present us with an
object that is not real, yet they lead us, indirectly, to real pragmati-
cally effective objects that meet our expectations. The process
through which we get from unreal—that is, not pragmatically effec-
tive—objects that appear in inferential/verbal states of awareness to
real pragmatically effective objects is what Dharmakrti calls deter-
mination.
When he refers to determination, Dharmakrti generally highlights
that it is itself a kind of error, as in the following passage from his
auto-commentary to his Praman : avarttika:

Language [sruti] produces a false awareness which arises through imposing
[adhyaropya]
a [uniform appearance]30 onto objects that lack a single nature. [This
false awareness] determines [that uniform appearance] to be capable of producing
the effect of those [objects] even though it is not capable of producing that effect
26
By ‘‘false appearance thereof,’’ Dharmakrti means an awareness that appears
to be properly inferential but in fact is not. For example, the inference of ‘‘fire’’ when
one sees steam rising from a mountain and mistakes it for smoke.
27
By ‘‘distributed between them’’ (vyavasthita)—literally, ‘‘differentially estab-
lished’’—Dharmakrti means that one is labeled as valid and the other as invalid
based on whether or not they lead us to a pragmatic effect that is in accordance with
our expectations.
28
man: ipradipaprabhayor man: ibuddhyabhidh
avatoh
: |
mithyaj~
nan
avi
ses
: e ‘pi vi
ses : prati || PVin 2.5 (=PV3.57)
: o ‘rthakriyam
yatha tathayath
arthatve
‘py anumanatad
abhayoh
: |
arthakriyanurodhena
praman : vyavasthitam || PVin 2.6 (=PV3.58)
: atvam
This example is referred to in Katsura (1984: 231).
29
Commentators on this verse, and many recent interpreters, have explained this
example as being about light shining through a key-hole which is then mistaken for a
gem. However, Dharmakrti never mentions a keyhole in either his PVin 2.5–2.6 (in
Steinkellner (1973: 26, 1979: 28)), or in PV 3.57–3.58.
30
See PV1.107, Gnoli (1960: 54–55).
because it is a false appearance. [The false awareness] has as its source just the
separate natures of the real things, [nevertheless] it contains a determination which is
common [to those things]. Even though this is the case, we do not say that [language]
‘‘leads us astray’’ [visam a]
: vadik with respect to the objects that are really distinct
from that [appearance] because it aids [us] in avoiding what is different from those
[objects]31
For Dharmakrti and his followers, particulars are unique—they

do not share anything with one another and therefore there can be
no real similarity between them.32 Yet, a word such as ‘‘cow’’ (or
an inferential reason on the basis of which one could infer the
presence of a cow) produces a single generalized/generic image
(‘‘cow’’) that is superimposed onto a number of absolutely distinct
particulars.33 The only thing that these absolutely distinct partic-
ulars can be properly said to share is a propensity to produce in us
the generalized image ‘‘cow.’’ When we hear the word ‘‘cow,’’ it
produces in us a generalized image ‘‘cow’’ that we mistakenly treat
as a real characteristic present in particular cows. We use the word
‘‘cow’’ as if it picked out one or more members of a naturally
occurring class whose members share a real similarity, even though
there can be no such similarity among absolutely distinct partic-
ulars. For this reason, inferential/verbal states of awareness are
false by their very nature–they necessarily posit a real similarity
between particulars which are in fact absolutely distinct. The
‘‘determination’’ that we make in these cases is precisely a mis-
identification of our internal and generalized image as something
that actually exists in particular cows.
A few lines later, in further developing his argument that words
refer to their objects only through the exclusion of what is other
[anyavyavr
: tti], Dharmakrti offers an account of how a person learns
the use of new words, and again, he relies on the concept of deter-
mination to explain the false ascription of similarity to absolutely
distinct particulars.
31
PVSV ad PV 111–112ab, Gnoli (1960: 58). ekasvabh avarahites
: v arthes: u tam
adhy aropyotpadyaman am
: mithy apratibhasitv
ad akaryak
arin
: am api tatkaryak
arin
: am

ivadhyavasyant im
: vastupr: thagbhavam ijam
atrab : saman
adhyavas
am
ay : mithy abuddhim :
srutir janayanty api tadanyaparihar angabh
_ paramarthatas
avat tadvyatirekis: u pad
arthes:u
na visam : vadikety
ucyate |.
32
For much more on the nature of particulars in Dharmakrti’s thought, see
Dunne (2004) and Keyt (1980).
33
PV1.109 in Gnoli (1960: 56–57). This passage, which Dunne suggests is referring
back to PVSV ad PV1.68–75, is discussed and translated in Dunne (2004: 122–124).
There is continuity among [i.e., a recurring feature in ] those [particular ] things [e.g.,
trees] in so far as they are, by their very nature, [and merely] in virtue of being
perceived, the causes of such a conceptual awareness. Therefore, the cognizer [who
has just been told that the things that he is looking at are ‘‘trees’’], in accordance with
his awareness ‘‘These are trees,’’ takes those things [i.e., trees] which are present to
the awareness of the person who sees them [i.e., the person who just said to him
‘‘These are trees’’] to have the same appearance in his own and the other person’s
conceptual awareness. These things, which are not really so [i.e., do not really have the
same appearance in his own and the other person’s conceptual awareness] are deter-
mined to be so, without regard for the distinction between external and internal. [This
determination is made] in virtue of their being the causes of that conceptual
awareness, and in virtue of the exclusion of what is other than them [i.e., what does
not cause that conceptual awareness]. [The cognizer,] relying upon conceptual
awareness, is able to apprehend the causes of that awareness by means of a differ-
entiation [from things that are not the cause of that conceptual awareness]. Thus, one
employs an utterance to indicate a difference [of the causes of the conceptual
awareness ‘‘these are trees’’] from things that are not a cause of that [conceptual
awareness]. The conceptual awareness which apprehends that [difference] on the basis
of that [utterance] seems to grasp a single thing [i.e., some common element really
present in the individual trees] only because of error. But there is no one thing that is
visible there [in the individual trees], through the observation and non-observation of
which one could distinguish between trees and non-trees even in another instance of
observation.34
Again, Dharmakrti makes clear that determination is a kind of

misidentification. When a person points to certain objects and says
‘‘These are trees,’’ the person who hears this falsely takes the gen-
eralized image that is the content of his own conceptual awareness
(i.e., ‘‘tree’’) as belonging to each individual tree, and also as being
the content of the conceptual awareness of the speaker. In other
words, he falsely identifies his generalized image with the absolutely
distinct tree-particulars and with the equally distinct generalized
image of the other person. In so doing, he ignores the distinction
between what is internal to awareness—the generalized images—and
what is external—the trees. As in the previous passage, determina-
tion is specifically said to consist in the misidentification of one’s
own generalized image with what is not present to one’s awareness
34
PVSV ad PV 120–121, Gnoli (1960: 60.23–61.05). tes prakr: tyaiva pratyay-
: am
ava tathabh
sat utavikalpakaran : an
am
anvayat taddras: t:ur buddhau viparivartaman an

tajj~ nanahetutay
a tadanyavyavr
: ttya catath
abh
utan
api tathadhyavasit
an
avibhak-
tabahy adhy
atmikabhed
an
pratipatta pratipattim anusr: tyaite vr: ks: a iti svaparavikalpes :v
ekapratibhas an
adar
sya vikalpavij~ vyavasthitas tadvij~
nane
nanahet un bhedena prati-
padyetety uktim ataddhetubhyo bhede niyunkte _ | tam
: tasyah : pratipadyaman a buddhir
vikalpika bhrantiva
evaikavastugrahin: iva pratibhati
sad | na punar ekam : vastu tatra
dr: syam asti yasya dar san
adar
san: abhy
am : bhinnadar sane ‘py es : a vr: ks: avr
: ks
: avibhagam
:
kurvita |.
at all—in this case, the generalized images in the awareness of the

other person.35
While this particular feature of determination has not been
clearly recognized in the secondary literature, we contend that it is
a necessary and constitutive feature of determination as it is
understood by Dharmakrti. Dharmakrti does not use the term
‘‘determination’’ to refer to conceptual awareness in general
(vikalpa), but, specifically, to refer to the misidentification of our
own conceptual images with objects that are not perceptually
available to us at all.36 It is for just this reason that determination,
although a form of error, is capable of leading us to real things of
which we have no direct awareness (as in the example of the gem
discussed above). It is precisely because we misidentify the purely
internal contents of our conceptual awareness as something
external that this awareness prompts us to externally directed
activity. And since, for Dharmakrti, states of awareness are valid
only in so far as they direct us toward pragmatically effective
particulars, it is only through determination that conceptual
awareness can be valid. While inferential/verbal states of aware-
ness, like all conceptual states of awareness, are erroneous, they
are (in some cases) nevertheless taken to be valid since, through
determination, they lead us to real things of which we had no
prior awareness.
The distinction between conceptual states of awareness that
direct us to real particulars through determination, and are
therefore valid, and those that do not do so, and are therefore not
valid, is clearly presented in the following passage from
Dharmakrti’s Hetubindu (A Drop of Reason). This passage is a
35
Despite the fact that in this example a person sees trees before him and learns to
apply the label ‘‘trees’’ to them, it is, nevertheless, not a case of what Dharmakrti
calls ‘‘conceptual judgment that follows immediately upon perception’’
(pratyaks: apr::st:alabdhaniscaya), as when one sees a blue object and then applies the
label ‘‘blue’’ to it. What is important to note is that in the ‘‘blue’’ example, the
labeling is epistemically redundant in that the application of the label does not
provide one with any new ‘‘information’’ about what one is seeing. In the ‘‘trees’’
example, however, the conceptual awareness that arises upon hearing the other
person’s statement ‘‘These are trees’’ does provide new information about an object
that is not perceptually available to us, namely, the conceptual awareness (and/or
conceptual image in the awareness of) the speaker. What we learn from his statement
is not a fact about the trees, but a fact about the speaker and how he, and pre-
sumably other users of the language, use the term ‘‘tree.’’ This new information
about how the speaker uses the label ‘‘tree’’ is not perceptual, but is, in fact, arrived
at inferentially.
36
For our argument as to why this is the case see below.
part of Dharmakrti’s account of how one moves from perceptual

to inferential awareness.37 One infers, for example, the presence of
fire on a mountain after seeing smoke rising from it. Dharmakrti
explains that in this inferential process one first sees something
rising from a mountain and through conceptual awareness recog-
nizes it to be ‘‘smoke.’’ One then recalls that wherever there is
smoke there is fire and, on the basis of this, infers that there is fire
on that mountain. Dharmakrti argues that only the first and last
steps in this process—the initial non-conceptual awareness of
smoke and the final inference of fire on that mountain—are valid.
Neither the recognition of what one sees as ‘‘smoke’’ nor the
recollection of the relation between smoke and fire is taken to be
valid, since neither of them presents any new information about a
real thing. He begins his explanation as follows:
For someone who perceives, in its uniqueness [asadh : atman
aran a smoky place that
a],
is separate [vivikta] from other things,38 there arises a recollective awareness of the
inferential reason [‘‘smoke’’] which has as its object the particular [i.e., smoke] as it
was seen.39
The distinction that Dharmakrti is drawing here is between the

non-conceptual and conceptual awareness of a single object. At first,
we perceive the particular, smoke, but do not yet recognize it as
‘‘smoke.’’ It is only in a subsequent moment of awareness that this
recognition takes place. Dharmakrti describes this recognition as
‘‘recollective awareness’’ because it involves remembering previously
perceived instances of smoke and associating the newly perceived
particular with them. This subsequent conceptual awareness thus
apprehends (and is about) the same real thing as the preceding
non-conceptual awareness: It just adds to it the remembered instances
of smoke and the grouping of them all into the class ‘‘smoke.’’
There, [in this process], only the first, visual awareness, which has as its object a
distinct thing [asadh : a—i.e., a particular] is valid. When that thing, of that
aran
[distinct] sort, has been seen, a memory arises due to the power of perception, which
37
HB 2*9ff.
38
In our view, the term ‘‘asadh aran : atman
[it its uniqueness] is adverbial in that it
a’’
describes the manner in which the person is perceiving, whereas the term
‘‘arthantaraviviktar
upam’’ [separate from other things] refers to the uniqueness of
what it is that is being perceived. See HBT : : 24.
39
HB 2*15–2*17. sadh umam : hi prade sam arthantaraviviktar
upam asadh ar-

an: atman
a dr::st:avatah: pratyaks
: en: a yathadr
::st:abhedavis
: ayam
: smartam
: lingavij~
_ nanam

utpadyate. Also translated in Dunne (2004: 412ff).
declares the distinctiveness [of that thing] from one or another [set of things] from
which it is distinct i.e., its difference from that [set], and [therefore] this [memory] has
as its object the exclusion of what is not that. And because this [memory] grasps the
image of [the thing] as it was seen before,40 it is not valid.41
Dharmakrti here elaborates on his account of ‘‘recollective aware-

ness’’ by explaining that it necessarily entails a process of exclusion. It
is precisely through the exclusion of what is dissimilar that the class
‘‘smoke’’ is constructed. Recollective awareness is not considered to
be valid, however, because it does not present to us a real particular
that we have not already apprehended:
[This is so] since, when one has first seen the distinct thing, the [recollective aware-
ness] which proclaims it as [something] distinct does not present a new thing [artha],
because that which accomplishes a pragmatic effect [i.e., the particular smoke] has
already been seen. And furthermore, it [the recollective awareness] does not appre-
hend, conceptually, a thing, as yet unseen, which accomplishes a [pragmatic effect], in
the way that inference does.42
The conceptual awareness that follows upon perception (i.e., the

recognition of smoke as ‘‘smoke’’) is invalid not because it is
misleading, but because it is epistemically redundant. In this
regard, it differs from another form of conceptual awareness,
namely inference.
Inferential (including verbal) states of awareness are similar to the
conceptual states of awareness that follow upon perception in that
they have as their objects class-forming exclusions. They are, how-
ever, not epistemically redundant since they lead us to particulars that
have not been apprehended previously.
40
That is to say, nothing new is presented in the second awareness about that thing
which was perceived non-conceptually in the first awareness. The content of the
second awareness is different from that of the first in that it includes the memory of
previously perceived instances and the grouping of them with the newly perceived
instance as a class. But these newly included elements are not features of the per-
ceived thing. Thus, the second conceptual awareness does not present to us anything
about the real object that we are perceiving that was not already presented in the first
awareness.
41
HB 2*18–2*23. tatra yad adyam asadh
aran
: avis: ayam
: dar sanam: tad eva
praman : am. tasmin tathabh
ute dr::st:e sati sa yena yenas adh
aran
: as tadasadh
aran
: atam
:
tato bhedam abhilapanty atadvyavr : ttivis: aya smr: tir utpanna pratyaks : abalena
yathadr
::st:ak
aragrahan
: an
na praman : am. Also translated in Dunne (2004: 412).
42
HB 2*23–3*1. prag asadh
aran
: am : dr::st:vas
adh
aran
: a ity abhilapato ‘purvarth
adhi-

gamabh av ad arthakriyas adhanasya
darsanad adr::st:asya punas tatsadhanasvabh
avasya

vikalpenapratipatte
s canum
anavat. Also translated in Dunne (2004: 412).
‘‘For, every rational person seeks [to ascertain] what is valid and what is not [in so
far as] he seeks a pragmatic effect. And the universal that is grasped by a con-
ceptual awareness which arises after, and in virtue of, the apprehension of the
particular does not lead to any pragmatic effect. Just as in the awareness ‘‘blue’’
when one has seen blue. For it is just the blue particular that produces the
pragmatic effect that is achieved by a thing of that [blue] sort. And that [particular
thing] has already been seen with that [blue] characteristic through perception. And
the pragmatic effect that is achieved by blue is not produced by the object of the
conceptual awareness ‘‘blue,’’ which arises subsequent to grasping that [blue]
particular. Therefore, even the statement ‘‘a valid awareness has as its object a
thing not already apprehended’’ must be qualified [by the phrase] ‘‘when the thing
not already apprehended is a particular.’’43
In this section, Dharmakrti builds upon his argument that concep-

tual states of awareness which apprehend objects that have already
been apprehended non-conceptually are not valid. Validity, for
Dharmakrti, is indexed to pragmatic efficacy, and it is only partic-
ulars that can be pragmatically effective. What is necessary for a state
of awareness to be valid is that it puts us in touch with a particular
with which we were not already in touch. And, as explained above,
the content of the recollective awareness that arises immediately after
perceiving an object is just that same object as classified through
exclusion. Thus, it does not put us in touch with any new particular
and so cannot be valid.
‘‘But, when the particular has already been apprehended, the conceptual awareness
that arises from and imitates it is just memory because, in being an effect [of it], it has
that [particular] as its object. It is not valid, because it does not apprehend the form
of a thing that has not already been apprehended. For the discrimination of valid
[from invalid] awareness rests upon [real] things, since those who seek [to differen-
tiate them] act, having [in mind] an object which is capable of pragmatic efficacy—for
a thing is defined as that which is capable of pragmatic efficacy. This is so, since, even
when a person acts on the basis of that conceptual awareness [i.e., in inferential/
verbal awareness], [he acts] only with respect to a [real] thing by determining it.
43
HB 3*1–3*9. arthakriyarth i hi sarvah: praman : am apraman : am : ate pre-
: vanves
ks: av
an,
na ca sam anyam
: kamcid
arthakriyam upakalpayati svalaks : an: apratipatter
urdhvam
: tatsamarthyotpannavikalpavij~
nanagr
ahyam : yatha nilam : dr::st:va nilam iti
j~
nane. tad eva hi nilasvalaks : an: am
: tathavidhas arthakriy
adhy ari.
ak tac ca tenatman a
dr::st:am eva pratyaks : en: a. na ca tatsvalaks : an: agrahan: ottarakalabh
ilavikalpasya
avin
vis: ayena nilarthas
adhy
arthakr
iya kriyate. tasmad anadhigatarthavis
: ayam : praman : am
ity apy anadhigate svalaks : an: a iti vi : an: iyam. Dharmakrti seems to be referring here
ses
to a pre-existing definition of valid awareness, but the quotation, if it is a quotation,
has not been identified, and it is not clear whether this definition is one provided by
the Mmam : sa philosopher Kum arilabhat:t:a, as the commentator Arcat:a believes, or
some other source. Also translated in Dunne (2004: 413).
44
Because, with respect to activity, the success [ks
: ema] of application [yoga] of
conceptual awareness is no different from perception.45
Here it is important to keep in mind Dharmakrti’s distinction be-

tween the conceptual awareness that follows immediately upon per-
ception and apprehends the same real object [e.g., the recognition of
smoke as ‘‘smoke’’], and inferential/verbal awareness which ‘‘appre-
hend[s], conceptually, a thing—as yet unseen—that accomplishes a
[pragmatic effect]’.’ In defending his argument that the first of these
types of conceptual awareness is not valid, Dharmakrti makes a
general point about the nature of validity: Valid states of awareness
must put us in touch with real things. The only reason that we care
whether or not a state of awareness is valid is that we seek to act upon
real things, which alone are capable of pragmatic efficacy. And valid
states of awareness are just those states of awareness that put us in
touch with such things. Perception does this directly, by presenting us
with real particulars. Conceptual states of awareness, while not
directly presenting us with real particulars, can, in some cases, put us
in touch with real particulars indirectly through determination. And,
in so far as they do so, they are valid. Such states of conceptual
awareness are classified as inference (which includes verbal states of
awareness). Conceptual states of awareness that do not put us in
touch with real particulars in this way are not valid. Therefore,
Dharmakrti concludes (see above) that the conceptual awareness
that follows immediately upon perception is not valid: Unlike infer-
ence, it does not put us in touch with a real particular, since we have
already been put in touch with it by the immediately preceding per-
ception. Putting us in touch with real particulars, then, is the defining
characteristic of valid awareness. While perception and valid con-
ceptual states of awareness (i.e., inference) function in different ways,
they nevertheless have the same result—they put us in touch with real
44
Against the commentator Arcat:a’s interpretation (HBT : : 36)of ‘‘yoga-ks : ema’’ as
a dvandva [i.e, ‘‘application and success’’], we think that it should be taken as a
tatpurus : a [i.e., ‘‘the success of application’’]. Nearly all of the occurrences of the
compound cited in dictionaries treat the compound as a tatpurus : a, and there is
nothing in Dharmakrti’s usage, here or elsewhere, to suggest that for him
‘‘yoga-ks : ema’’ refers to a pair of characteristics. For a different interpretation and
translation of Arcat:a’s comments see Dunne (2004: 414 n. 7).
45
HB 3*10–3*16. adhigate tu svalaks : an: e tatsamarthyajanm
a vikalpas tadanukari

karyatas tadvis: ayatvat smr: tir eva na praman : am, anadhigatavastur
upanadhigateh:,
vastvadhis
: t:hanatv praman
at : avyavasthay ah: , arthakriyayogyavis
: ayatvat tadarthinam:
pravr: tteh: , arthakriyayogyalaks
: an: am
: hi vastu; tato ‘pi vikalpad vastuny eva tadadhy-
avasayena
pravr: tteh: , pravr: ttau vikalpasya pratyaks : enabhinnayogaks
Also
: ematvat.
translated in Dunne (2004: 413–414).
particulars and thereby make them pragmatically available to us.

But, in so far as conceptual awareness puts us in touch with real
things in this way, it can only do so indirectly through determination.
Thus, this passage also shows that Dharmakrti uses the term
determination specifically to refer to the misidentification of our own
conceptual images with objects that are not perceptually available to
us at all.
DETERMINATION AND ‘‘PERCEPTUAL JUDGMENT’’
In offering this account of determination as it appears in Dhar-

makrti’s work, we are departing in several key respects from what
has been the standard account among modern scholars. Beginning
with the ground-breaking work of Stcherbatsky, modern scholars
have tended to treat as synonymous, and virtually interchangeable, a
broad range of terms that Dharmakrti uses to refer to conceptual
awareness e.g., adhyavasaya (determination), ni scaya (judgment),
ekapratyavamar saj~ (a single reflective awareness [that creates a
nana
grouping of individuals]), pratyaks scaya (judgment
: apr::st:halabdhani
that follows immediately upon perception), samvr : taj~ (‘‘conven-
nana
tional’’ awareness), pratyabhij~na (recognition), smr: ti (recollection),
vikalpa (conceptualiziation).46 Most of these terms are treated by
Stcherbatsky under the single heading of ‘‘perceptual judgment,’’ to
which he devotes an entire chapter.47 Subsequent scholars have
generally followed him in treating these terms as essentially equiva-
lent. While there is considerable overlap in the semantic range of
these terms, more attention needs to be paid to distinguishing the
different ways and contexts in which Dharmakrti himself uses them.
Although all of these terms are used to refer to some sort of con-
ceptual awareness, they seem to mark off specific functional roles in
different mental processes. Conceptual states of awareness can group
an individual with others into a class; call to mind an invariable
association that serves as the basis for an inference; and associate one
or more individuals with a particular word. However, they need not
always do all of these things.
46
Stcherbatsky (1984: Vol 1, 204ff). Also see the discussion of these terms in
Dunne (2004), Katsura (1984, 1991, 1993: 138 n. 40, 144).
47
Stcherbatsky (1984: Vol 1), Part II, Chapter 1 ‘‘Judgement’’ and his summary on
pp. 554–555.
Our survey of Dharmakrti’s use of the term ‘‘determination’’

(adhyavasaya)
suggests that, for him, it is not just a synonym for
conceptual awareness (vikalpa), judgment (niscaya), etc., but is used
specifically to refer to those states of conceptual awareness in which
an internal object—a generalized image—is falsely identified with an
external object that is, in fact, not at all present to our awareness.
Thus, on our reading, determination is, for Dharmakrti, restricted to
inferential/verbal states of awareness. It does not occur in the
conceptual states of awareness that follow immediately upon per-
ception since, in such cases, the external object is already present to
awareness. In taking this position, we differ from both Stcherbatsky
and Katsura, who take determination to be a necessary feature of all
conceptual states of awareness—inferential/verbal states of awareness
as well as those that follow immediately upon perception (which they
label as ‘‘perceptual judgment’’).48
Stcherbatsky, the first modern scholar to discuss the role of
‘‘perceptual judgment’’ in the Buddhist epistemological tradition,
explicitly equates determination (adhyavasaya),
conceptual awareness
(vikalpa), and judgment (niscaya).49 In making this equation he relies
primarily, not on Dharmakrti’s own work, but on that of Dhar-
mottara, whose commentary on Dharmakrti’s Nyayabindu
(Drop of
Rational Methodology) forms the basis of Stcherbatsky’s study of the
tradition. In the most serious and influential study of perceptual
judgment to date, Katsura, recognizing that this equation is too
simplistic, attempts to distinguish between determination and ‘‘per-
ceptual judgment.’’ However, he still takes determination to be a
necessary feature of all conceptual states of awareness—those that
follow immediately upon the perception of an object as well as those
that are inferential and verbal. As Katsura says:
Here50 perceptual judgment is characterized as ‘conceptual knowledge (vikalpa)
produced by perception (pratyaks : abalena utpanna-) which imitates (tadanukarin) the
image of a particular object.’ It takes as its object universal characteristic in the form
of ‘exclusion of others’ (atadvyavr : tti ) and expresses it as ‘differentiation’ (bheda)
from others. Perceptual judgment produces ‘determination’ (adhyavasaya), which
further induces us to an action (pravr: tti) towards a particular real entity (vastu).
Thus, seen from the point of view of a human activity, perceptual judgment, as well
as determination, can be said to share the same object with the preceding perception.
48
Dunne (2004) also seems sympathetic to this. See, for example, Dunne (2004):
Chapter 4, especially p. 287ff.
49
Stcherbatsky (1984 Vol. 1: 554–555).
50
That is, in the same passage of the HB (2*15ff.) that we translated above.
Perceptual judgment is called ‘recollection’ (smr: ti) because it grasps what has been
grasped by perception (yathadr
::st:ak : a). Therefore, it is not praman
aragrahan
: a.
It may be important to note in passing that Dharmakrti seems to distinguish in

Source 6 [the Hetubindu passage translated above] perceptual judgment from
which was identified by Stcherbatsky with the former. Now it is
adhyavasaya
which actually prompts a man to start acting towards an object.
adhyavasaya
Dharmakrti states that without adhyavasaya
(determination) one can neither pro-
ceed nor stop.13 The term comes to play a very important role in post-Dharmakrti
Buddhist epistemology. For instance, Dharmottara declares that perception can be
14.51
: a only when it is followed by adhyavasaya
praman
13
See Dharmakrti 1967(a): 25*: ayam analam : pa
syann apy analo ’yam na salilamity
anadhyavasyan na tis: pratis
t:en napi : t:heteti dustaram
: vyasanam
: pratipannah: syat.
14
See Dharmottara, 1955: 84: adhyavasayam : kurvad eva pratyaks : am
: praman: am
bhavati.
As Katsura recognizes, the term ‘‘perceptual judgment’’ does not

correspond to any single Sanskrit term. Like Stcherbatsky, he uses it
to translate a variety of Sanskrit terms including conceptualization
(vikalpa). While Katsura is well aware that conceptualization is not
limited to what he calls ‘‘perceptual judgment’’—because it also
occurs in inferential/verbal awareness—he nevertheless chooses to
translate the term as ‘‘perceptual judgment’’ when he feels it is con-
textually appropriate, as in this passage. Most of Katsura’s argument
here (beginning with the words ‘‘Perceptual judgment produces
‘determination’’’) hinges on his interpretation of a single phrase:
‘‘tato ’pi vikalpad
vastuny eva tadadhyavasayena
pravr: tteh: ’’ which we
translated above as ‘‘since even when a person acts on the basis of
that conceptual awareness [i.e., inferential/verbal awareness], [he acts]
only with respect to a [real] thing, by determining it.’’ Katsura takes
the term ‘‘vikalpa’’ (conceptualization) in this phrase to refer specif-
ically and exclusively to ‘‘perceptual judgment,’’ as it clearly did
earlier in the same passage.52 As our translation indicates, however,
we believe that in this phrase the term ‘‘vikalpa’’ must refer to con-
ceptualization in general and not specifically to ‘‘perceptual judg-
ment.’’
When quoting this passage (along with Steinkellner’s German
translation), Katsura chooses to omit a large section of it,53 including
the section in which Dharmakrti draws a distinction between the
conceptualization (vikalpa) that occurs in inference—a conceptuali-
51
Katsura (1993: 71).
52
HB 3*4 and 3*10 but not 2*25 where it includes inference.
53
Katsura omits 2*23–3*9 and a portion of 3*10–11.
zation that leads us to a real thing that has not been grasped previ-
ously and is therefore considered to be valid—and the conceptuali-
zation (vikalpa) that occurs immediately following perception—a
conceptualization that does not apprehend a real thing other than
that which was already grasped through perception and so is not
considered to be valid. The phrase under dispute—tato ’pi vikalpad
vastuny eva tadadhyavasayena pravr: tteh: —forms a part of an argu-
ment about the criteria for validity in general: The conceptualization
(vikalpa) that follows from perception is said to be memory (smr: ti),
and is not valid since it does not put us in touch with a new real thing.
The criterion for the validity of awareness is its ability to put us in
touch with a new real thing, since people concerned with validity
always seek some pragmatically effective object and pragmatic effi-
cacy is the defining feature of real things (vastu). The phrase under
dispute is given in support of this general thesis regarding the crite-
rion for validity: Even when one acts on the basis of a conceptual
state of awareness (which does not directly put one in touch with a
new real thing, as perception does), one still acts with some prag-
matically effective object—that is, a real thing—in mind. Given the
context of Dharmakrti’s argument, it is clear that, here, the term
vikalpa refers only to valid conceptual states of awareness—those that
put us in touch with new real things. And, as is well known, and is
clear from the passages discussed above, according to Dharmakrti,
inferential/verbal awareness is the only kind of conceptual awareness
that meets this criterion. Thus, this must be what is referred to here.
In this phrase, therefore, the term ‘‘determination’’ (adhyavasaya) is
used specifically with reference to inferential/verbal states of aware-
ness and not to conceptual states of awareness more generally
(including perceptual judgment).54
Katsura correctly notes that in this passage Dharmakrti distin-
guishes between conceptualization (vikalpa) and determination. In
order to account for this distinction in a manner that is consistent
with his view that it is specifically ‘‘perceptual judgment’’ that is being
discussed, Katsura suggests that conceptualization (vikalpa, which he
here translates as ‘‘perceptual judgment’’), produces determination,
which then serves to ‘‘prompt [one] to start acting towards an ob-
ject.’’ There is, however, nothing in the passage itself to suggest that
determination is specifically linked to motivation. In support of his
54
It is for just this reason that his phrasing here parallels his description of
inference in PVin 2.8 quoted earlier.
position that determination is specifically linked to motivation,

Katsura cites two other passages; one from Dharmakrti’s Hetubindu
and one from Dharmottara’s Nyayabindut
:ika (Commentary on the
Drop of Rational Methodology).
The additional passage from the Hetubindu that Katsura cites, but
does not translate, is as follows: ‘‘This person, although seeing fire,
would neither act nor refrain from acting without determining that
‘This is fire, not water.’ Thus, he would meet with an intractable
dilemma.’’55 Katsura takes this passage to show that determination is
produced by, yet distinct from, perceptual judgment, and that it is a
necessary pre-condition for any activity. In context, however, it is clear
that the passage is not offered as an account of activity-in-general or
even of activity-in-general that follows upon perception, and further-
more that the determination in question is part of an inferential, rather
than a perceptual, process.
The passage referred to by Katsura forms a part of the section of
the Hetubindu that deals with non-apprehension (anupalabdhi)—the
inferential basis for our ability to know absences (abhava) and act
appropriately with respect to them.56 The part of the passage that
Katsura quotes is not about activity-in-general, but is specifically
about activity that is based upon knowledge of absence (abhava).
For, even one who sees fire does not see fire to the exclusion of all other things57 such
that, if he desired water, he would not act [with respect to that object]. If one were to
argue that the absence of water is known [merely] by not perceiving it, then [we
would ask] ‘‘How can an absence [of perception] be an awareness, or a cause for the
awareness, of anything?’’ And furthermore, how can there be the awareness of this
[absence of perception]? If there is the apprehension of the absence [of water] even
without the apprehension of that [non-perception of water] or of anything else, then
why is the absence [of water] not known in states of sleep, intoxication, delirium, or
in conditions where there is something blocking one’s view or one’s back is turned?
This is analyzed further in the Praman scaya. Therefore, this person [i.e., the one
: avi
desirous of water], although seeing fire, would neither act nor refrain from acting
55
HB 25*: ayam analam : pasyann apy analo ’yam na salilam iti anadhyavasyan na
tis t pratis
:en napi
: 56 : t:heteti dustaram: vyasanam
: pratipannah: syat.
For discussions of non-apprehension, with helpful references, see Katsura
(1992), Kellner (1997a, 1999, 2001), and Steinkellner (1991). For a translation of
some of the relevant sections from Dharmakrti’s PV, PVin, and PVSV see Kellner
(2003), Yaita (1985a, b).
57
What this means is that this person sees fire but in doing so does not also see
that the fire is not, e.g., water.
without determining that ‘This is fire, not water.’ Thus, he would meet with an
intractable dilemma.58
What is being discussed here is how we come to know and respond to

the absence of something. If what we want is water, yet we see fire in
front of us, how do we know that there is only fire there and not
water?59 That is, how do we come to know that water is absent there?
Not perceiving water is not itself a sufficient condition for an
awareness of the absence of water. If it were, then we would be aware
of the absence of water whenever and wherever we do not perceive it,
such as when we are in a state of dreamless sleep, or when something
blocks our view. According to Dharmakrti, our failure to perceive
something can serve as a basis for inferring that thing is absent, but
only under such conditions that we would perceive it if it were
present.60 For Dharmakrti, our awareness of the absence of an
object not present before us is necessarily inferential.61 Therefore, the
determination that is referred to in the line quoted by Katsura is part
of an inferential process rather than a perceptual one. The fact that
this passage is about someone who seeks water and not fire is not
incidental to the example, but is essential to it. For someone seeking
water, perceiving fire in a particular place is not itself sufficient for
that person to decide whether or not to approach that place. One
must first conclude that there is only fire there and no water. This
conclusion can only be arrived at inferentially. Thus, because it deals
with inference and not with ‘‘perceptual judgment,’’ this passage does
not support Katsura’s reading of the sentence ‘‘tato ’pi vikalpad

vastuny eva tadadhyavasayena pravr: tteh: ,’’ which we translated above
as ‘‘even when a person acts on the basis of that conceptual awareness
58
HB 25*9–25*19. na hi ayam analam : pasyann api kevalam analam eva pa syati,
i na pravarteta. anupalambhena salilabh
yena salilarth : pratiyata iti cet, ko ‘yam
avah
anupalambho nama. yadi salilopalambhabh ava iti, katham : so ‘bhavah
: kasyacit pra-
tipattih: partipattihetur va; tasyapi
katham
: pratipattih: . tasya tato vanyasya kasyacid
apy apratipattav apy abhavapratipattau
: svapamadam
satyam
urchavyavadh ::st:-
anapr
hibhav adyavasth
asv
apy abhavah : kim : na pratiyate. bh uyo ‘pi vicaritam
: praman : avin-
iscaye. tasmad ayam analam : pasyann apy analo ‘yam na salilam ity anadhyavasyan na
tis
: t59 pratis
:hen napi : t:heteti dustaram : vyasanam : pratipannah: syat.
For a subtle discussion of the implications of this problem see Kellner (1999:
498–503, 507–508).
60
See Kellner (1997a, b, 1999, 2001, 2003)—and the primary sources discussed
therein—on the role of ‘‘non-cognition’’ (anupalabdhi) in the work of Dharmakrti
and Dharmottara.
61
See Kellner (2001: 496–497). For interesting discussions of this issue in the work
of Dharmottara and Jñanasrmitra, see Tani (1984) and Kellner (1997b).
[i.e., in inferential/verbal awareness], [he acts] only with respect to a

[real] thing, by determining it.’’
Taken in context, this passage, like the previous passage from the
Hetubindu, supports the account of determination that we provided
earlier: That, for Dharmakrti, determination is the misidentification
of the contents of our inferential/verbal states of awareness as objects
that are not perceptually available to us at all. Just as, in the inference
of fire from smoke, the ‘‘fire’’ that we infer is the content of our own
inferential awareness treated as an external object, in the same way,
the ‘‘absence of water’’ that we infer on basis of the non-apprehension
of water is just the content of our own inferential awareness treated as
an external object. In both cases, what we come to know is something
not at all perceptually available to us, namely, fire on that mountain
and the absence of water. And it is just this that distinguishes infer-
ential/verbal states of awareness from perceptual ones. In perception,
the real, pragmatically effective object that we become aware of and
act upon is manifest to us while in inference (including the inference of
absences) the real pragmatically effective object that we become aware
of and act upon is not manifest to us. Thus, as noted above, in
inference there is a gap between that which is manifest to us and that
which we act upon (whereas in perception there is no such gap—the
real pragmatically effective particular is manifest to us and we act
upon it). Determination is the process that bridges this gap.
The second passage that Katsura cites in support of his interpre-
tation of the sentence from the Hetubindu discussed earlier clearly
does support the position that even in perception, determination is
necessary for activity: ‘‘Perception is valid only in so far as it pro-
duces determination’’ (adhyavsayam : kurvad eva pratyaks : am
:
62
praman : am: bhavati). As Katsura himself points out, however, this
passage is not from the work of Dharmakrti himself but from that of
his commentator Dharmottara. This raises the question of how
commentaries should be used in determining the meaning of a pas-
sage. We are committed to the position that a commentator’s state-
ment about the meaning of a passage should not be taken to have
independent probative value for the correct interpretation of the
passage. While a commentary may serve as a useful guide in inter-
preting a work, ultimately one’s interpretation should be grounded in
the work itself. Katsura, of course, realizes this, and does not rely
62
Katsura (1993: 73 n. 14).
solely on the passage from Dharmottara to support his position. But,

if we are correct in our interpretation of the passage ‘‘this person,
although seeing fire...,’’ then Dharmottara’s statement provides the
only remaining support for Katsura’s reading. And, in our view, this
is not sufficient for concluding that Dharmakrti himself took this
position. Katsura is surely right that Dharmottara does take deter-
mination to be a necessary feature of perceptual judgment, but, as we
will argue, this is not simply a clarification of Dharmakrti’s theory,
but an important innovation in the theory of determination.
DHARMOTTARA ON DETERMINATION
While Dharmottara presents himself as a faithful follower and

interpreter of Dharmakrti’s works, his account of the two modes of
valid awareness, and of validity in general, is strikingly different from
that of Dharmakrti.63 As we will argue, the difference in their
accounts turns precisely on the role of determination. Dharmottara’s
understanding of the two modes of valid awareness is succinctly
presented in his commentary on NB 1.12, where Dharmakrti
describes the object of perception as follows: ‘‘Its [i.e., perception’s]
object is a particular (svalaks
: an: a).’’ Dharmottara comments:
The object of this four-fold perception—that is, the thing that is cognized—is a
particular. A particular (sva-laks : an: a) is a property (laks
: an: a)—i.e., a charac-
ter—which is its own (sva) i.e., unique. For a thing has both a unique character and a
general character. And of these, that which is unique is what is grasped by percep-
tion. For the object of valid awareness is two-fold: A grasped object whose image is
produced, and an attainable object that one determines. For the grasped object is one
thing and the determined is something else, since, for perception, what is grasped is a
single moment, but what is determined—through a judgment that arises by the force
of perception—can only be a continuum. And only a continuum can be the attain-
able object of perception because a moment cannot be attained.64
63
For a discussion of Dharmottara’s views on validity see his LPrP, edited and
translated in Krasser (1991). For an excellent summary and analysis of this text see
Krasser (1995). See Steinkellner and Krasser (1989) for Dharmottara’s discussion of
validity in his PVin. Also see Dreyfus (1997) for a general discussion of his views, and
Kellner (1997b, 1999, 2004) for more focused work on specific aspects of
Dharmottara’s thought.
64
It is worth highlighting just how radical Dharmottara’s position is here. Never
before has anyone connected with the Buddhist epistemological tradition even sug-
gested that perception has more than one object. What Dharmakrti himself says is
simply that the object of perception is a particular. By importing the term ‘‘grasped’’
(grahya)
into his gloss on Dharmakrti’s text, without any clear basis in either the
Nyayabindu
or any of Dharmakrti’s other works, Dharmottara has introduced into
his account of perception precisely what Dharmakrti sought to avoid—a bifurcation
So too for inference: It grasps a non-entity, because, even though its own appearance
is not a [real] object, there is activity through the determination of an object.65 But,
since this imposed thing [i.e., the non-entity], which is grasped, is determined to be a
particular, in inference, a determined particular [avasitam svalaks: an: am] is the object
of activity. But what is grasped is a non-entity. So here, showing the grasped object of
this mode of valid awareness, he says that a particular is the object of perception.66
For Dharmottara, an episode of valid awareness, whether perceptual

or inferential, is not a single event, but a process made up of two
stages. In the first stage, an object is grasped—that is, its image is
directly presented to awareness. In the second stage, we determine a
second and distinct object that can be attained—that is, an object
upon which we may act.
(Footnote 64 Continued).
between two different kinds of objects which creates a gap between them that needs to
be bridged by determination. Both of the extant Sanskrit commentaries on Dhar-
mottara’s text try to minimize his break with Dharmakrti by suggesting that he does
not mean to literally claim that perception itself has both a grasped and determined
object. The author of the anonymous T : ippana (NBT :T : : 3) comments as follows:
[Objector:] But how is the continuum an object of perception since it is [in fact] the
object of conceptualization? [Reply] We say that it is due to figurative usage. Because
it is made into an object in such a way that it is determined by that conceptualization
which is the functional output [vyap of perception, it is called the ‘‘object of
ara]
perception’’ on the basis of figurative usage—thus there is no problem. nanu ca
katham : pratyaks : asya santano vis : ayah: , yato vikalpasyasau vis
: ayah: ? ucyate, upacar at
|
pratyaks : avyap
aren
: a vikalpenadhavaseyatay
: ayikr: tatvat
a vis pratyaks : avis
: aya ity ucyate
upacar ad
ity ados : ah: | And Durveka Misra [DhPr (1955: 71.21)], in his commentary,
says: ‘‘Since the judgment that follows perception functions only with respect to what
was grasped in perception, adding nothing to it, therefore, what is determined by that
[judgment] is [said to be] ‘‘determined by perception itself’’—this is the idea. prat-
yaks
: apr::st:habhavino ni
scayasya pratyaks : agr: hita eva pravr: ttatayanati sayadh anena
yat

tenadhyavasitam : tatpratyaks
: en: aivavasitam : |.
iti bhavah
65
Here Dharmottara’s phrasing closely parallels Dharmakrti’s description of
inference in PVin 2.8–10 and HB 3*14–15 (both passages are quoted and discussed
above).
66
NBT : 1955: 70–72. NB 1.12: tasya vis : ayah: svalaks : an: am : . NBT : ad NB 1.12: tasya
caturvidhasya pratyaks : asya vis : ayo boddhavyah: svalaks : an: am | svam asadh aran
: am :
laks: an: am tattvam : svalaks : an: am | vastuno hy asadh aran
: am : ca tattvam asti sam anyam
:
ca| tatra yadasadh aran
: am tatpratyaks : asya grahyam | dvividho hi vis : ayah: praman: asya
s ca yadak
grahya aram
utpadyate, prapan : iya s ca yam adhyavasyati | anyo hi grahyo
‘nya s cadhyavaseyah
: | pratyaks : asya hi ks : an: a eko grahyah : | adhyavaseyas tu prat-
yaks : abalotpannena niscayena santana eva | santana eva ca pratyaks : iyah: |
: asya prapan
ks
: an: asya prapayitum asakyatvat | tathanum

anam api svapratibhase ‘narthe artha-
dhyavasayena pravr: tter anarthagrahi | sa punar aropito ‘rtho gr: hyamanah : svalaks : an: -
iyate yatah: , tatah: svalaks
atvenavas : an: am avasitam : pravr: ttivis : ayo ‘numanasya
|
anarthas tu grahyah : | tad atra praman : asya grahyam : vis : ayam : dar sayata pratyaks : asya
svalaks : an: am
: vis
: aya uktah: |.
It is clear that what Dharmottara says about inference in this

passage is based on Dharmakrti’s account, as outlined above. For
both Dharmakrti and Dharmottara, what is directly presented to
inferential awareness is not a real particular upon which we can act,
but a generalized mental image. Through determination, we treat this
generalized mental image as if it were a real particular. What is most
striking about this passage, however, is that Dharmottara, unlike
Dharmakrti, recognizes a parallel process at work in perception. For
Dharmottara, the gap between the object that is presented to
awareness and the object that we act upon is equally present in both
perception and inference. This is a dramatic departure from both
Dign aga and Dharmakrti, for whom the gap between the presented
object and the object acted upon is just what distinguishes inference
from perception.
In his discussion of perception, Dharmottara raises a problem
arising from Dharmakrti’s theory that all existing things are
momentary. According to Dharmakrti, real, pragmatically effective
objects cannot exist for more than a single moment.67 What appear to
us as temporally extended objects are in fact continua of discrete but
67
The standard Buddhist argument for momentariness is based on a particular
understanding of causality. Briefly: Experience tells us that, after some time, a seed
that has been planted and properly cared for will produce a sprout. Buddhists argue
that the seed, at the moment of producing a sprout, has to be different, in some way,
from the seed in previous moments, since the seed at just that moment produces a
sprout while the seed in previous moments did not. But, if this is the case, one must
also admit that the seed that existed just prior to (and therefore produced) the
sprout-producing seed is itself different, in some way, from the seeds in each of the
moments that preceded it: It produced the sprout-producing seed and they did not. A
similar argument can be made about the seed at the moment prior to that (i.e., the
seed that produced the seed that produced the sprout producing seed), and
the moment before that, etc. Thus, the single observed event—the production of the
sprout from the seed—requires that we accept that each moment in the history of the
seed is different from any other. If the seed were the same at each and every moment,
then it would produce its effect, the sprout, in each and every moment of its exis-
tence. Thus, the continuity of the seed over time is not based on the persistence of a
single entity. The ‘‘continuity’’ is only apparent. And it is this appearance of con-
tinuity over time that Buddhists designated by the term ‘‘continuum’’ (santana).
By
analogy, all pragmatically effective objects must be momentary in this way. For more
on this see Stcherbatsky (1984: Vol 1, 79–118), Steinkellner (1969), von Rospatt
(1995)—for a discussion of the early history of this idea; Yoshimizu (1999), and
Oetke (1993)—for a discussion of Dharmakrti’s famous sattvanum ana—the
infer-
ential proof of momentariness from ‘‘existence’’; Dunne (2004: 91–97); Frauwallner
(1935), for an edition and German translation from the Tibetan of Dharmottara’s
Ks: an: abhangasiddhi
_ (Proof of Momentariness); Tani (1997), for an analysis of this
text; and Mimaki (1976), Woo (1999), and Tani (1999), for a discussion of this theory
in the work of later Buddhist epistemologists.
causally related moments. These continua are not, however,

‘‘ultimately real’’ (paramartha-sat).
Rather, they are conceptually
constructed. It is only the individual moments that are pragmatically
effective and therefore ultimately real. And herein lies the problem for
Dharmottara: What directly appears to us in perception must be a
real particular—that is, a single moment—yet, this is not the object
towards which our activity is directed. For example, suppose that we
see water in front of us. If we are thirsty, we will walk towards it.
Assuming that it is not a mirage, we will eventually be able to take a
drink and satisfy our thirst. Yet, the water that we seek to obtain
cannot be the single moment that initially appeared to us, since our
action presupposes that the water will remain there long enough for
us to reach and drink it. Thus, the object towards which we direct our
activity is not a single moment, but a continuum—the determined
object (adhyavaseya-vis : aya) of perception. While the water that ulti-
mately satisfies our thirst is a pragmatically effective particular, it is
not the same pragmatically effective particular that appeared to us in
our initial moment of perception. According to Dharmottara, then,
there is, in perception, just as in inference, a disjunction between the
object that initially appears to us and the object towards which we
direct our activity (and, similarly, the object that we ultimately
obtain). For him, the process whereby this gap is bridged is exactly
the same as the process that Dharmakrti saw at work only in
inference, namely, determination.
For Dharmottara, then, there is a close parallelism between the
processes of perception and inference. In both cases an object is
‘‘grasped’’—that is, directly presented to our awareness. Yet, in both
cases, this object is not something that we can either act upon or even
intend to act upon. ‘‘Grasping’’ can lead to successful activity (which
is the test of validity) only when, on the basis of it, we construct a
second object towards which we can direct our activity. In perception,
this second object is a continuum, while in inference it is a particular.
According to Dharmottara, it is precisely through determination that
we construct this second object: In both perception and inference, the
object that appears to us is taken to be something other than what it is.
This parallelism between the processes of perception and inference
seems to contradict Dharmakrti’s position as described above, and
Dharmottara is clearly aware of the tension between his own
explanation of these processes and that of Dharmakrti. In
concluding Chapter 1 of his commentary on Dharmakrti’s

Nyayabindu, Dharmottara presents the position of a critic who
suggests that his view contradicts Dharmakrti’s. In his response,

Dharmottara seeks to show that Dharmakrti’s statements about
perception are consistent with his own theory. In the first part of this
passage he says:
[Dharmottara:] Therefore, perception is valid awareness only in so far as it produces
a determination.68 But, if a determination were not made, then [our] awareness
would not be established as being an awareness of [an object, e.g.] blue. And
therefore, the result of valid awareness—the attainment of the object—would not be
achieved. And so, since that awareness would not be the most proximate cause [of
our knowledge of that object], it would not be valid awareness...69
[Objection]: If this were so, then perception would be a mode of valid awareness only
in conjunction with determination, and not by itself.70
Dharmottara’s position is that without determination we could not

take our non-conceptual awareness to be awareness of an object at
all. And so, without determination, there would be no possibility of
successful activity with respect to that object—which, for Dhar-
mottara and Dharmakrti, is the test of validity. Such a position leads
to the following objection: Dharmakrti took great pains to argue
that, in perception, it is only the initial non-conceptual awareness that
is valid, and that any subsequent conceptualization of the object of
that non-conceptual awareness is redundant and hence invalid. Yet,
here, Dharmottara insists that the conceptualization that follows
non-conceptual awareness—which he, unlike Dharmakrti, labels as
‘‘determination’’—is necessary for perception to be valid. This
objection is motivated by exegetical rather than philosophical
considerations: The objection is not that Dharmottara’s position is
philosophically indefensible, but rather that it seems to be incom-
patible with Dharmakrti’s own statements.
In his response, Dharmottara tries to have his cake and eat it too
by insisting, on the one hand, that determination is necessary for
68
This is the same passage quoted by Katsura.
69
The term ‘‘praman : a’’ (valid awareness) is, on the basis of its grammatical der-
ivation, understood to refer to the instrument (karan: a), defined by the Sanskrit
grammarians as the most proximate cause (sadhakatama), of our being aware of
something (Pan: ini As : t:adhy
ay i 1.4.42) . See Hattori (1968: 28, 97–100) n. 55–57 and
Dunne (2004: Chapter 1) for a helpful discussion of this, and related issues.
70
NBT : :84–85. tasmad adhyavasayam : kurvad eva pratyaks : am: praman: am
: bhavati |
nilabodhar
akr: te tv adhyavasaye
upatvenavyavasth
apitam: bhavati vij~ : | tatha ca
nanam
praman : aphalam arthadhigamar
upam anis : pannam
: | atah: sadhakatamatv
abh
av at

pramana : m eva na syaj j~nanam
| … yady evam adhyavasayasahitam
: eva pratyaks: am:
praman : am na kevalam iti cet |.
: syat
perception to be valid and, on the other, that it is still legitimate to

speak of non-conceptual awareness alone as being valid:
[Dharmottara:] This is not so, since the determination produced by the force of
perception determines the object as something seen, and not as something imagined.
And ‘seeing,’ namely, the direct presentation of an object, is the function of per-
ception, while ‘imagining’ is the function of conceptualization. That is to say, when
people conceptualize an object that is beyond the range of their senses, they, on the
basis of their felt experience, determine that this [experience] is the function of
conceptualization, namely, imagining. [They think,] ‘‘we are imagining’’ but not, ‘‘we
are seeing.’’ And therefore, [in cases of conceptualization immediately following
perception] it [conceptualization], setting aside its own function [that is, imagining],
displays the function of perception, [with the thought that] ‘‘When, with respect to a
certain object, there is a determination preceded by perception, there perception
alone is the mode of valid awareness.’’71
71
NBT : 85–86. naitad evam | yasmat pratyaks : abalotpannenadhyavas
ayena
dr: syat

venartho ‘vasiyate notpreks : itatvena | dar saya~
na carthas aks
: atkaran
: akhyam : pratyaks : a-
vyaparah : | utpreks : an: am
: tu vikalpavyap arah
: | tatha hi paroks : am artham : vikalpayanta
utpreks
: amahe
na tu pasyama iti utpreks
: atmakam : vikalpavyap aram
anubhavad adhy-
avasyanti | tasmat svavyap aram
tiraskr: tya pratyaks : avyap
aram
adar
sayati yatrarthe
pratyaks : apurvako ‘dhyavasayas tatra pratyaks : am: kevalam eva praman : am iti | For
another translation see Dreyfus (1996: 216). We take the clause beginning with
‘‘yatrarthe…’’
(‘‘When, with respect to a certain object…’’) predicatively with the
verb ‘‘adar
sayati’’ (shows). Given its context, this seems to be the best way to read
this clause. The only alternative would be to take it as a separate sentence expressing
Dharmottara’s own final position. If this were the case here, however, there should
be a clear indication of the relation of this statement to the earlier argument e.g., by
using the word ‘‘tasmat’’ etc. Furthermore, Dharmottara’s response to the objector
only makes sense if we take him to be describing the way that conceptualization
appears to us rather than the way that it, in fact, is. If Dharmottara were to believe
that conceptualization literally shows, rather than constructs, an object, he would be
directly contradicting what he said earlier in the passage quoted above, namely, that
the determination that follows upon perception constructs an object that is not
present in one’s awareness. This means that despite the subjective difference in the
ways that the two kinds of conceptualization i.e., imagining and ‘‘seeing,’’ feel to us,
they are doing precisely the same thing—they are constructing an object that is not
directly present to our awareness. Nor can Dharmottara’s argument here be
understood as pointing out the redundancy of the conceptualization that follows
upon perception, as Krasser, (1995: 253) appears to believe on the basis of the
parallel passage in Dharmottara’s LPrP (for an edition and translation of this par-
allel passage, see Krasser (1991: 49–50, n. 77)). In both passages, the word ‘‘dr::st:a-
tvena’’ has to be taken predicatively as expressing what the object is determined to be
(i.e., ‘‘as something seen’’) but not as expressing the manner in which it is determined
(i.e., ‘‘as it was seen’’ Krasser, 1995: 253 and ‘‘as it has been seen,’’ Krasser, 1995:
261). This is so regardless of whether one takes the correct reading of the NBT : to be
‘‘dr: syatvena,’’ as printed in DhPr 1955: 85, or accepts the variant reading ‘‘dr::st:at-
vena.’’ This way of taking the term matches the way in which both we and Krasser
take the parallel term ‘‘utpreks
: itatvena/ vicaritatvena’’ (i.e., ‘‘as something imagined,’’
‘‘as having been investigated’’ Krasser, 1995: 253). Dharmottara’s point is not that
the conceptualization that immediately follows upon perception determines its
object as that object was already seen by the preceding non-conceptual awareness
Dharmottara begins his response by drawing a distinction between

our phenomenal experiences of seeing an object that is present before
us, and imagining one that is remote. As Dharmottara has already
explained, when we ‘‘see’’ an object such as a pot there are necessarily
two distinct stages in our awareness, each with its own distinct object.
In the first stage we grasp a real, momentary particular, while in the
second we construct, through determination, an object that is not
directly present to our awareness—i.e., a continuum. This two-stage
process feels to us, however, like a single event—the direct presen-
tation of a single, spatially and temporally extended object to our
awareness. Yet, when we ‘‘imagine’’ an object that is not present to
us, we do not have this feeling of directness. In both cases, however,
conceptualization/determination really serves the same function—it
makes available to us constructed objects which are not directly
presented to our awareness. It is just the phenomenal difference
between ‘‘seeing’’ and ‘‘imagining’’ that allows us to speak as if we
apprehend ordinary objects by perception alone, and not perception
in conjunction with conceptualization. The implication of this is that
for Dharmottara, when a Buddhist epistemologist, including
Dharmakrti, says that perception alone is the mode of valid
awareness through which we come to know objects that are present
before us, he does not, strictly speaking, mean what he says. As
Dharmottara sees it, when one says this, one is reporting a psycho-
logical fact about how the perceptual process feels to us. One is not
providing a philosophically rigorous account of how this process in
fact works. Taking this position allows Dharmottara to maintain
both that determination is a necessary part of all valid awareness and
that Dharmakrti’s insistence that only the first non-conceptual
‘‘seeing’’ is valid is not inconsistent with this stance.
(Footnote 71 Continued).
(and therefore is redundant and hence invalid). Rather, he is saying that the con-
ceptualization that immediately follows upon perception takes its own determined
object to be something ‘‘seen’’ rather than something ‘‘imagined.’’ And since this
statement does not have anything to do with the redundancy of the conceptualiza-
tion that follows upon perception, Dharmottara’s concluding statement that ‘‘when,
with respect to a certain object, there is a determination preceded by perception,
there perception alone is the mode of valid awareness,’’ would not follow from his
argument. Furthermore, taking Dharmottara’s argument to be about the redun-
dancy of conceptual awareness seems to contradict what he said earlier about the two
objects of perception—that in cases of perception we first grasp a single moment and
subsequently conceptually construct a second, different object, a continuum.
DHARMOTTARA ON THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN PERCEPTION AND INFERENCE
Since, as we have seen, Dharmottara’s account of valid awareness

takes the processes of perception and inference to be nearly identical,
the question naturally arises as to how they are, nevertheless, to be
differentiated. While, for Dharmakrti, there is a clear difference in
the kinds of mental processes that constitute perception and infer-
ence, for Dharmottara the difference does not have to do with mental
processes (which are the same for both) but with the ontological
status of the objects that they bear upon. Both perception and
inference consist of two stages: One first grasps an object that is
directly present to one’s awareness, and then determines a second
object towards which one acts. In perception, what one grasps is an
ultimately real external particular, and what one determines is a
continuum, which is conceptually constructed and therefore not
ultimately real.72 In inference, however, what is grasped is not a real
particular but a ‘‘non-entity’’ (avastu). The determined object that
one acts upon is what Dharmottara calls a ‘‘determined particular’’
(avasitam svalaks: an: am). At first glance this appears to be a simple
inversion of the two objects of perception: The grasped object of one
becomes the determined object of the other, and vice versa. Yet, the
inversion is not quite as simple as it appears from the passage quoted
above. While Dharmottara does not comment further on the nature
of this ‘‘determined particular’’ in his Nyayabindut
he does
:ika,
72
While there has been some disagreement about whether Dharmottara is a
‘‘Sautrantika,’’ in the sense that he accepts the ultimate reality of external objects
(cf. Hattori, 1968) or a ‘‘Yogac anav
arin/Vijñ adin,’’ in the sense that he does not
accept the ultimate reality of external objects (cf. Matsumoto, 1981), we think that
there are good reasons to believe that Dharmottara believed in the reality of external,
mind-independent objects. Both V acaspatimisra and Moks: akaragupta, for example,
treat Dharmottara as a Sautrantika and quote his texts in support of a Sautr antika
position. See Vacaspatimisra’s remarks in his NKan: 1907: 256–257, translated in
Stcherbatsky (1984, Vol II: 360ff), and Moks: akaragupta’s remarks in his TBh 1944:
66.18f, translated in Kajiyama (1966: 144). Apparently, Dharmottara was the pupil
of Śubhagupta, who seems to have been the classical exponent of a realist position in
post-Dharmakrtian Buddhist philosophy in India. See Frauwallner (1961: 147),
Steinkellner and Much (1995), and Krasser (1991): Introduction n.1, quoting from
PVinT : 3.209b1. Furthermore, Abhinavagupta tells us that Dharmottara was the
author of a text called the ‘‘Bahy
arthasiddhi’’
(Proof of External Objects) in which he
defended a Buddhist realist position. This text is not referred to elsewhere, as far as
we know, and its existence seems to have passed unnoticed in contemporary
secondary literature. See the IPVV: Vol II: 128, 394.
describe it in more detail in his Apohaprakaran: a.73 There, in

describing the objects of verbal (and by implication, inferential)
awareness, Dharmottara remarks as follows: ‘‘That which is grasped
and that which is determined are both exclusions-of-what-is-other
: tti) and not real things (vastu).’’74 Thus, the ‘‘particular’’
(anyavyavr
that we determine in inferential and verbal awareness is not a real
particular at all, but an exclusion, which is nothing other than a
conceptual construct. As Vacaspatimisra says in explaining
Dharmottara’s postition: ‘‘Even the particular that is being deter-
mined is not ultimately real. Instead, it too is conceptually
constructed.’’75 So, for Dharmottara, out of all of the objects of
perception and inference, only the grasped object of perception is
ultimately real. What really differentiates perception from inference is
that perception begins with the appearance of a real particular in
awareness, while inference has no real particular as its object, either
through grasping or determination.
Dharmottara thus introduces a radical change into Dharmakrti’s
system through his four-object model and the parallel role that he
assigns to determination in both perception and inference. This is so
despite the fact that Dharmottara presents himself, and is presented
by his commentators, as if he is merely explaining what Dharmakrti
said. Yet, in spite of its radically innovative character, Dharmottara’s
new picture of valid awareness and its objects quickly became the
standard account for Buddhist epistemologists.

JÑANAŚRIMITRA ON THE OBJECTS OF AWARENESS
Even though Jñanasrmitra is often portrayed as a rival of

Dharmottara, and does criticize him on several key points,76 he fully
endorses Dharmottara’s basic model of the two modes of valid
awareness. Like Dharmottara, he repeatedly makes the claim that
73
For an edition and German translation of the Tibetan text see Frauwallner
(1937: 233–287). For one of the few secondary articles see Steinkellner (1976).
74
yac ca gr: hyate yac cadhyavas
iyate te dve apy anyavyavr : tti na vastuni. Sanskrit
fragment quoted in the NVTT : 444.22 and JNA 332.14–16. Frauwallner (1937: 277).
75
NVTT : 444.18–19: adhyavasiyamanam api svalaks: an: am
: na paramarthasat
| api tu
tad api kalpitam.
76
See, for example, JNA 205, on the issue of implicative negation (paryudasa);
JNA 228, on imposition (aropa);
JNA 332, on causality (karyak : abhava);
aran JNA
332 on supernormal perception (yogipratyaks : a); the references in Woo (2001) to
Jñanasrmitra’s Ks
: an: abhang
_ adhy
aya;
and the references in Kellner (1997b) to his
Anupalabdhirahasya.
each mode of valid awareness must have two objects, one grasped
and one determined. In his Vyapticarc
a (Analysis of Pervasion), in a
debate over the nature of the object of perception, Jñanasrmitra
makes the following remark:
Now, for us, both modes of valid awareness have both objects [a universal and a
particular] because of the division between what is grasped and what is determined.
For that which appears in an episode of awareness is what is grasped, but that
[object] with respect to which this [episode of awareness] operates, is what is deter-
mined. Now, for perception, what is grasped is a particular and what is determined is
a universal. But for inference, it is the reverse.77
Here, Jñ
anasrmitra basically recapitulates Dharmottara’s model and
differs in only one significant respect: He makes it explicit that the
continuum that Dharmottara identified as the determined object of
perception must be regarded as a universal, since it is not a real
particular.78
The most significant difference between Jnanasrmitra and
Dharmottara, however, is their attitude towards the ontological
status of these objects. For Dharmottara, the grasped object of
perception is a real external particular, while in inference there is
77
JNA (VC:166.13–15) and Lasic (2000:13*2–13*6). Note that Lasic (2000: 13*5)
corrects Thakur–adhyavaseya for adhyavasaya. asmakam
: tavad
ubhayam api
praman : am ubhayavis : ayam, grahy adhyavaseyabhedena.
yad dhi yatra j~
nane pra-

tibhasate,
tad grahyam. yatra tu tad pravartate, tad adhyavaseyam. tatra pratyaks : asya
svalaks : an: am: grahyam,
adhyavaseyam : ca sam
anyam.
anumanasya
tu viparyayah: . Also
see JNA (AP: 225.17): dvidha vis : ayavyavaharah
: pratibhas ad
adhyavasay ca. ‘‘There
ac
are two ways of talking about objects: On the basis of appearance and on the basis of
determination.’’
78
Jñanasrmitra, unlike Dharmottara, explicitly identifies the determined object of
perception as a universal (sam anya)
in order to provide a basis for distinguishing
between the two different sorts of universals that can be constructed from the
grasped moment in the perceptual process: In explaining how we come to know that
there is pervasion (vyapti) between an inferential reason and a property to be proved,
Jñanasrmitra points out that when we come to know the pervasion of, e.g., smoke
by fire, we construct, not simply a single smoke-continuum (santana)—as in the
typical cases of perception discussed by Dharmottara (see above)—but the entire
class of smoke-continua, in order to arrive at the determination that ‘‘Wherever there
is smoke there is fire.’’ Thus, while we always construct a universal as the determined
object of perception, we sometimes construct what post-Dharmottaran Buddhist and
Jaina philosophers call a ‘‘vertical universal’’ ( anya)
urdhva-sam i.e., an individual
object-continuum, and other times we construct a ‘‘horizontal universal’’ (tiryak-
sam
anya)
i.e., the class comprising all, e.g., individual smoke-continua. See JNA
(VC: 166.14–166.21) and Lasic (2000: 13*6–14). JNA (VC: 166.16–19) is also dis-
cussed and translated in Balcerowicz (1999: 212). For more on these two kinds of
universals and the explicit use of the terms urdhva and tiryak in Buddhist
philosophical texts see Balcerowicz (1999), Balcerowicz (2001: 180–182) n. 158, and
Patil (2003).
neither the grasping nor determining of such a particular. For

Jnanasrmitra, however, there are no external, mind-independent
particulars. Throughout his work, he consistently maintains that no
mind-independent particulars can exist and that, as he says, ‘‘This
entire triple-world is established to be nothing but consciousness
79
(vij~
naptimatra).’’ Thus, Jñanasrmitra cannot, like Dharmottara,
appeal to the distinction between real and conceptually constructed
objects in order to distinguish perception from inference.
For Dharmottara, the difference between the two modes of valid
awareness hinges on an asymmetrical mapping of two different sets of
paired concepts. In the passages discussed above, Dharmottara
classifies the objects of awareness as those that are grasped (grahya)

and those that are determined, and also as those that are free from
conceptual construction (nirvikalpaka)—and therefore real (vastu/

paramartha)—and those that are conceptually constructed (kalpita/
anyavyavr : tta/aropita)—and
therefore unreal (anartha).80 While all
determined objects are, for him, conceptually constructed, not all
grasped objects are real: The grasped object of inference is a con-
ceptual construct, and unlike the grasped object of perception, it is
not a real thing (it is a non-entity, avastu). Jñanasrimitra, however,
alters this conceptual map by indexing these two pairs of concepts to
each other. For him, all grasped objects are free from conceptual
construction and all determined objects are the products of concep-
tual construction. In fact, Jñanasrmitra takes determination and
conceptual construction to be essentially the same:
…the terms ‘‘conceptualization’’ and ‘‘determination’’ refer to the same thing. It’s
just that [the use of] the word ‘‘conceptualization’’ is occasioned by connection with
words and the like while ‘‘determination’’ is occasioned by suitability for activity
even with respect to [an object] that is not grasped [by awareness].81
Thus, whatever is determined is conceptual and whatever is not

determined is non-conceptual. It follows from this that the grasped
(and, by definition, not determined) object of inference is, contrary to
Dharmottara’s claim, non-conceptual. For Jñanasrmitra, then, the
79
JNA (SSS:367.09): vij~ naptimatram
: sthitam etaj jagattrayam. Also see
akhilam
JNA (SSS:365.16).
80
See NBT : 52.06, (nirvikalpaka); Apohaprakaran: a (in Frauwallner, 1937: 277),
(anyavyavr : tti); PVin (in Steinkellner and Krasser, 1989: 31), (aropita,

paramartha);
NBT : 71–72, (anartha).
81
JNA (AP:226.01–226.03). …satyam ekarthau vikalpadhyavas
ayau
kevalam:
vikalpa sabdah: sabdadiyojan
animittakah
: | adhyavasayas
tv agr: hite ’pi pravarta-

nayogyatanimittah : | This passage is also quoted, in context, below.
objects of awareness fall into two neatly defined and mutually

exclusive categories—those that are grasped, and therefore free from
conceptualization, and those that are determined, and therefore
conceptualized. Dharmottara’s two ways of classifying objects are
thus reduced to one.
RELATIVIZATION OF BASIC CATEGORIES
This position seems to put Jñanasrmitra at odds with his prede-

cessors in the Buddhist epistemological tradition. Beginning with
Dign aga, this tradition relied upon an ontological distinction
between real particulars (svalaks : an: a) and constructed universals
(sam
anya)
which were, respectively, taken to be the objects of per-
ception and inference. Yet, Jñanasrmitra’s re-conceptualization of
the objects of valid awareness effectively obliterates any ontological
distinction between them by relativizing the concepts of ‘particular’
(svalaks: an: a) and ‘universal’ (sam anya).
For Jñanasrmitra, the
objects that appear to us are neither particulars nor universals, in
and of themselves. It is only in relation to subsequent acts of
determination that they can be properly classified as one or the
other.82 In his explanation of the nature of universals, for example,
he says:
From the word ‘‘cow’’ in the sentence ‘‘There are cows grazing on the far bank of the
river,’’ dewlap, horn, tail, etc. appear—accompanied by the form of the letters [which
make up the word ‘cow’]—in effect, ‘lumped together’ because of inattention to
differences between things belonging to the same class. But, that [conglomeration of
dewlap, horn, etc.] is not itself a universal...83
And again, with reference to the ‘‘universal,’’ fire, he says:

For, one and the same bare image—blazing and radiant—although it is utterly
distinct from every particular, when it is being made one with a particular [through
conceptualization, is called a ‘‘universal.’’ But that [image] is not itself a universal
belonging to those particulars because it [the bare image] recurs elsewhere as a
mental image.84
82
See Dunne (2004: 275) for a similar sort of ‘‘relativization’’ in the work of
Dharmakrti.
83
JNA (AP:220.2–220.4) tatha hi uttaratire sarita
s caranti gava
iti vakye
sabdat
gavadi sasn as:rngal
_ ang
_ uladayo
’ks araparikar
: arak ah iyabhedapar
: sajat amar

sat
sam
:84pin: d: itapray
ah: pratibhasante,
na ca tad eva sam anyam
….
JNA (AP: 220.7–220.9) tad eva hi jvaladbhasur akaram
atram
akhilavyaktav
atyantavilaks : an: am api svalaks : an: ena ekikriyaman: am
: sam anyam
ity ucyate | na tu tat
anyam
sam eva tas am,
buddhyak aratven

anyatr
anugam |.
at
For Jñanasrmitra, what we call a ‘‘universal’’ is simply an image that

appears in awareness (just as, for example, the image, ‘‘blue,’’
appears). Our calling it a ‘‘universal’’ is not occasioned by its onto-
logical status, but by the fact that we subsequently relate it to one or
more putative particulars, whether real or unreal. Yet, this sub-
sequent relating of the image to particulars need not occur at all.
When we reflect upon this mental image as a mental image, for
example, we are perceiving it. And relative to this act of perception,
the image is not a universal, but a particular (since it is a grasped
object of perception). When we reflect upon a mental image,
becoming aware of it as a mental image, we do so by assigning it to a
class. For example, when we think, ‘‘The mental image, ‘fire,’ just
appeared in my awareness,’’ we are taking the unique, momentary
image that appeared to us to be a member of the class, ‘‘mental
images of fire.’’ This is exactly like the more familiar example of
perception in which blue appears in awareness and is subsequently
conceptualized as ‘‘blue.’’ From this it follows that the very same
image could become either a particular or a universal depending on
the kind of mental operation that follows it. If we relate the image to
one or more putative particulars, it becomes a universal in relation to
those particulars. But if, by reflecting upon the image as an image, we
relate it to a class of which it is a member, it then becomes a par-
ticular in relation to that class.
Thus, in claiming that ‘‘...for perception, what is grasped is a
particular and what is determined is a universal. But for inference, it
is the reverse,’’85 Jñ
anasrmitra is making a statement that is, for him,
true by definition. The image that appears in the first stage of the
perceptual process is not a ‘‘grasped object of perception’’ because it
is a particular, but rather, it is a ‘‘particular’’ because it is the grasped
object of perception. In the same way, the image that appears in the
first stage of the inferential process is not a ‘‘grasped object of
inference’’ because it is a universal, but rather, it is a ‘‘universal’’
because it is the grasped object of inference. Images are labeled as
‘‘particulars’’ or ‘‘universals’’ only in relation to a subsequent
determination. Thus, for Jñansrmitra, ‘‘particular’’ and ‘‘universal’’
are not really ontological categories at all. Instead, they are defined
contextually. Images are categorized as either one or the other
depending on the role that they are made to play by subsequent acts
of conceptualization.
85
Quoted earlier.
RELATIVIZATION OF INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL
A similar relativization of basic conceptual categories in the Buddhist

epistemological tradition can be seen in Jñanasrmitra’s treatment of
‘‘internal’’ and ‘‘external.’’ For him, ‘‘internal’’ and ‘‘external’’ are
not ontological categories either. Rather, we will argue that they are
defined relative to the activity (pravr: tti) of an agent.
An important element in Jñanasrmitra’s discussion of activity is
the familiar three-fold division into bodily, verbal, and mental.86
According to him, activity is not limited to physical activity involving
putatively extra-mental objects, but also includes verbal and mental
activity that can be directed towards mental images, as well as
towards putatively extra-mental objects. While mental images cannot
be acted upon physically, they can be the objects of verbal and mental
activity, since we do talk and think about them. And, in
Jñ
anasrmitra’s account, in so far as such mental objects become the
objects of activity, they are ‘‘external.’’
That this is Jñ
anasrmitra’s position is evident from his discussion
of semantic value, that is, what it is that we are talking about when
we use language. In his discussion, Jñanasrmitra makes use of the
familiar distinction between what is ‘‘ultimately true’’ (descriptions
that can withstand the most rigorous philosophical analysis) and
what is ‘‘conventionally true’’ (convenient fictions that can help us to
function successfully in the world, but nevertheless cannot withstand
the most rigorous philosophical analysis).87 Jñanasrmitra argues
that, ultimately, given the most rigorous philosophical analysis, our
statements cannot refer to anything at all. He argues further that,
even conventionally, when we make positive or negative statements
what we are affirming or denying the existence of is always some
external thing. As he says:
There is no way of really affirming either the mental image or the external object.
Conventionally [there is affirmation] only of externals, whereas even conventionally
there is no [affirmation] of the mental image.
86 (AP: 226–227): sa cagnir

JNA atreti vyavasayo im pravr: ttim pras
yatha kayik ute,

tathagnir maya pratita iti vacik
im api pras ar
ute. etadak anuvyavas
upam
ayar im
: manas :
prasavati. ‘‘And just as the determination ‘There is fire here’ produces bodily activity,
in the same way it produces verbal [activity] as well: ‘Fire has been apprehended by
me.’ It also produces mental activity i.e., a reflective awareness having the same form
[as the verbal statement].’’
87
For a general discussion of these concepts see Eckel (1987) and Newland (1999),
and for a specific discussion of these concepts in the Buddhist epistemological
tradition see the references in Dunne (2004) and Dreyfus (1997).
For this mental image, which is indubitable and an object of reflexive awareness,
cannot be what is affirmed or denied by means of words etc., since this would be
useless [in the case of affirmation] and impossible [in the case of denial].88
When one affirms the existence of a tree by saying, ‘‘There is a tree

here’’ or denies it by saying ‘‘There is no tree here,’’ the word ‘‘tree’’
cannot be taken to refer to the mental image ‘tree.’ Since the mental
image ‘tree’ is present whenever one hears and understands the word
‘‘tree,’’ it would be redundant, and therefore useless, to affirm its
existence. On the other hand, it would be contradictory, and therefore
impossible, to meaningfully deny its existence. Jñanasrmitra
continues:
Neither can the external object, which does not appear in conceptual awareness,
[really be affirmed or denied]. Since this object is not cognized, what could be
affirmed or denied?89
Since the external object does not itself appear in awareness (given
that what appears in awareness is only an image), it too cannot really
be affirmed or denied. After all, one cannot affirm or deny what one is
anasrmitra now concludes:
not even aware of. Jñ
Therefore, just as, on the basis of determination, an external tree is conditionally
adopted [vyavasthapita]
as what is denoted by the word ‘‘tree,’’ in the same way, it is
only on the basis of determination that one talks about affirming or denying [any]
external object. Even when, due to certain circumstances, one examines a mental
image, having brought it to mind by means of another conceptualization, then too there
is affirmation and denial of what is external to this conceptualization.’’90
Jñ
anasrmitra’s position is that, even conventionally, one can only
affirm or deny external objects. Yet one can affirm or deny mental
images, as Jñ anasrmitra clearly recognizes. Thus, mental images, in
so far as we affirm or deny them, must be, for Jñanasrmitra, external.
The application of the label ‘‘external,’’ like the labels ‘‘particular’’
and ‘‘universal,’’ does not depend on the ontological status of an
object, but rather on the way that our awareness relates us to it.
Objects are considered to be external if and only if they are
88
JNA (AP: 229.03–06). nak arasya
na bahyasya
tattvato vidhisadhanam|

bahir eva hi sam : vr: ttya sam: vr: tyapi
tu nakr
: teh: || na hy asandehasya vis : ayasya
svasam : vedyasyak arasya
sabdadin
a vidhinis :
edhayogah: vaiyarthy asamarthy
ad ca |.
ac
89
JNA (AP: 229.06–07) napi vikalpapratibh

asino
bahyasya | vis
: ayapratipatter hi
kasya vidhir nis: edho va syat?
90
JNA (AP: 229.07–10) tasmad yatha vr: ks : a
sabdena bahyo vr: ks
: o ‘dhyavasay ad

abhidheyo vyavasthapitah : , tathadhyavas
ay
ad
eva bahyasya vidhir nis : edho va
vyavahriyate | yadapi kuta scit prakaran: ad
buddhyak aram
: ka~ ncid vikalpantaren
: ad
aya

pariks tadapi
: a, tadvikalpad bahya eva vidhinis: edhau |.
determined—that is, not directly presented by the awareness that puts

us in touch with them.
CONDITIONALLY ADOPTED POSITIONS
In the above passage, Jñ anasrmitra makes use of a concept, ‘‘con-

ditionally adopted position’’ (vyavastha), which proves to be central
to his own account of what it is that words do (and do not) refer to
and, as we shall see, to his understanding of traditional Buddhist
claims about exclusion (apoha). What follows is an analysis of
anasrmitra’s use of this concept, specifically in relation to his
Jñ
discussion of exclusion.
anasrmitra begins his Apohaprakaran: a with a powerful attack
Jñ
on the generally accepted view of the Buddhist epistemologists that
words do not refer to real objects but express the exclusion of what is
other (anyapoha).
Speaking in the voice of a hypothetical opponent,
anasrmitra raises two objections against the traditional under-
Jñ
standing of exclusion. The first is phenomenological: The claim that
what we understand from words, or from an inference, is merely the
exclusion of others, namely, a type of negation, is directly con-
tradicted by our experience. In both language and inference we be-
come aware of what seem to us to be positive entities (vidhi) and it is
argued that this would not be possible if the actual content of our
91
awareness were simply a negation (nis : edha). The second objection is
exegetical: Dharmakrti divides inferences into three categories, those
based on identity (svabhava) and effect–cause relations
(karya-k
: a-bhava),
aran which establish the existence of positive enti-
ties, and those based on non-apprehension (anupalabdhi), which
establish the absence of something (abhava). 92 However, if one argues
that what we understand on the basis of inference, and therefore
language, is nothing but a negation—i.e., an absence—then the basis
for this division would collapse, since all inferences would establish
absences.93 In the light of these two objections the opponent asks:
91
See JNA (AP: 201.08–202.04).
92
The secondary literature on the types of inferential reasons is extensive. For a
discussion of inferences based on effect–cause relations see Kajiyama (1989), Gillon
(1991), Steinkellner (1991), Lasic (1999, 2003). For a discussion of inferences based
on identity see Hayes (1987), Steinkellner (1974, 1991, 1996) and Iwata (2003). For
those based on non-apprehension see the references to Kellner, cited earlier. For a
more general discussion see the references in Dunne (2004) and Oetke (1991).
93
See JNA (AP: 202.12–202.23).
‘‘How can you say that ‘exclusion is what is revealed by words and
inferential reasons?’’’94
In answering this question, Jnanasrmitra says the following:
It is for this reason that [in the introductory verse of the Apohaprakaran: a], he [i.e., I,
the author] says ‘‘This is [our] position [sthitih: ].’’ This [claim that exclusion is what is
revealed by words and inferential reasons] is just a conditionally adopted position
[vyavastham atram].
What this means is that it is not really the case [vastutattvam] that
‘‘exclusion is primarily the object of words etc.’’ If you say, ‘‘So then what really is
the case here?,’’ [we say]:
First of all, it is the [external] object that is primarily expressed by words. This being
the case, exclusion is understood as a qualifier of that [external object]. One [of
these—the external object—] is [conditionally] adopted as an object, because of
determination; the other [—the exclusion— is conditionally adopted as an object]
because of appearance [bhasatah : ]. But really, nothing at all is expressed [by words].
This is the summation of the meaning of this text.95
Jnanasrmitra’s response to the objections mentioned above is to

concede that they are substantially correct: It is not convincing to
argue that the content of our inferential and verbal awareness is
simply a negation, and moreover, arguing in this manner would
undermine the threefold division of inferential reasons, just as the
opponent argues. Jn anasrmitra insists, however, that what the
opponent is attacking is not the real Buddhist position, but simply a
‘‘conditionally adopted position.’’ Buddhists do sometimes speak as
if exclusion alone were what is understood from words and inferential
reasons, but this, Jnanasrmitra argues, is not what Buddhists take to
be really the case. The real Buddhist position, as Jnanasrmitra
understands it, is summarized in the above verse: There are two sorts
of things that we might conventionally take to be the semantic value
of a word—the (putative) external object, and the mental image that
appears to us upon hearing the word. The first of these is taken to be
the semantic value on the basis of determination, in that it is an
‘‘actionable’’ object—that is, it is the object towards which our
actions are directed even though it does not appear in our awareness.
94
JNA (AP: 202.20–21), quoting from the introductory verse of the Apohapra-
karan: a: katham apohah: sabdaling _ abhy
am : prakasyate iti.
95
JNA (AP: 202.21–203.05) …ata aha, sthitir iti | vyavastham atram
etat | muk-
hyatayapohah
: sabdader
vis
: aya iti nedam : vastutattvam ity arthah: | kim : punar atra
vastuttvam iti cet? sabdais tavan
mukhyam akhy ayate

‘rthas tatrapohas tadgun: atvena
gamyah: | artha
s caiko ‘dhyasato
bhasato
‘nyah: sthapyo
vacyas tattvato naiva ka scit ||
iti prakaran: arthasam
: grahah: | Instead of the printed ‘‘bhasate,’’
we read ‘‘bhasato’’

following the reading of the verse as cited in Ms. N1, N2, and N3 of Ratnakrti’s
Apohasiddhi, and the printed version in Shastri (1910).
The second is taken to be the semantic value in that it appears in our

awareness even though it is not actionable. Thus one may, under
certain circumstances, conventionally adopt the position that one or
the other of these objects is the meaning of a word. Ultimately
however (for reasons to be discussed below) neither of these can be
properly regarded as the meaning of word, and thus the real position
of the Buddhists is that ‘‘nothing at all is expressed.’’
Despite his ultimate view that nothing at all is expressed,
Jnanasrmitra still provides a ‘‘conditionally adopted position’’ of his
own in order to explain how it is that we are able, even in the absence
of any real object, to engage in pragmatically successful linguistic
(and also inferential and conceptual) activity.96 Jnanasrmitra main-
tains, conventionally, that the content of our verbal (and also infer-
ential and conceptual) awareness must be taken to be a complex
object consisting of both a positive and a negative element. In
accordance with our everyday linguistic experience, a positive object
must be taken to be what is primarily expressed by language. But, an
additional negative element, exclusion, must be taken to be a qualifier
of that positive object. While we can act only towards positive enti-
ties, it is only through exclusion that we can pick out the appropriate
objects for that activity by distinguishing them from those that are
inappropriate.97 This position has often been described as a
‘‘synthesist’’ view of exclusion.98
Yet, this modified version of the theory of exclusion elicits a
further objection:
‘‘Why don’t you just talk in terms of the positive entity alone [when describing the
semantic value of a word]? Or, alternatively, why wouldn’t you be left with the
96
While the verse only mentions what is ‘‘expressed by words,’’ in explaining it,
Jñanasrmitra makes clear that the verse applies equally well to inference and con-
ceptual awareness in general. JNA (AP: 203.08–203.09): sabdair iti copalaks : an: am.
lin: gaih: pratipadyate
vikalpair vis : ikriyata ity api dras
ay : t:avyam. ‘‘And the expression
‘by words’ is a metonym: What is made known by inferential reasons and what is
made into an object by conceptual awarenesses, should also be seen [to be included].’’
For a discussion of this ‘‘complex object’’ in the work of Jñ anasrmitra’s student
Ratnakrti see Patil (2003).
97
JNA (AP: 206.13–206.14). yadi ca sabda srutikale
kalito na parapohah
: katham
anyapariharen : a pravr: ttih: ? tato gam
badhaneti
codito ‘
svad ‘‘And if, at
in api badhniyat.
the time of hearing the word, the exclusion of others was not apparent, how could
one act by avoiding what is other? And therefore, having been told ‘Tie up the cow,’
one would also tie up horses etc.’’
98
For the classification of exclusion theorists as ‘‘negativists,’’ ‘‘positivists,’’ and
‘‘synthesists’’ see Mookerjee (1975: 132). For discussions of this typology see
Katsura (1986), Siderits (1986, 1991), and Patil (2003).
unwanted consequence that one should speak of perception too as having exclusion-
of-what-is-other as its object?99
Here again, the distinction between perceptual and inferential/

verbal awareness is seen to be problematic. We have already noted
that, for Dharmakrti, our non-conceptual awareness of a per-
ceived object is typically followed by a conceptual awareness with
a class-forming exclusion as its object (e.g., the awareness of blue
as ‘‘blue’’). And, at least for Dharmottara and Jñanasrmitra, this
second awareness is a necessary part of the perceptual process in
that it constructs one of the two objects of perception—the second,
determined object. When we act on the basis of perception, the
object towards which we act is understood to be a ‘‘positive en-
tity,’’ differentiated from other objects through conceptualization
(which necessarily takes the form of an exclusion). Here, the
opponent implies that Jñanasrmitra’s theory of exclusion makes
the operation of language/inference and perception essentially
parallel. In each case, the object of awareness consists of a positive
element that is necessarily coupled with an exclusion. In the light
of this, the opponent argues that there is no basis for talking
about the objects of perception and language/inference differently
by asserting that perception deals with positive objects and lan-
guage/inference only with exclusions. If it is correct to say that one
‘‘perceives’’ a real, positive object (vastu), then one could just as
well say that what one refers to or infers is a real, positive object.
Alternatively, if it is correct to say that, because language and
inference can put us in touch with objects only through the
exclusion-of-what-is-other, we should say that they have exclusions
as their objects, then one should also say that perception has an
exclusion as its object.
anasrmitra replies:
Jñ
In response to this, we say: By relying on a little bit of the truth [tattvale sa], a certain
conditionally adopted position is, for a specific purpose, constructed [by us], in one
way, even though the actual state of affairs is different, just as in examples such as the
‘‘self ’’ or the ‘‘arising of a thing.’’ For ‘‘arising’’ can only be a property of an existing
object qualified by a prior absence. By relying on a little bit of the truth, namely, the
prior absence, we conditionally adopt the position that ‘‘[There is arising] of a
non-existent thing,’’ in order to foreclose any worries about the doctrine that effects
pre-exist in their cause. Or, by relying on the conceptual construction of a single
continuum, [we conventionally say]: ‘‘Who else will experience [the result] of an
action done by this very person?,’’ in order to frustrate the deceptive view that there
99
JNA (AP: 204.24–204.25) kevalam: kim
: na vidhinaiva vyapade
sah: prayaks
: asyapi

va parapohavis

: ayatvavyavaharaprasa _ ity ava
nga sis
: yate |.
is the passing away of what has been done and the onset of what has not been
done.100
In this passage, Jñ anasrmitra develops the theory of conditionally

adopted positions. A conditionally adopted position is, as he sees it, a
kind of ‘‘white lie’’—a statement which is not strictly speaking true,
but contains at least an element of truth, and whose use is indexed to
an appropriate purpose. He clarifies this by offering two examples:
While it is not strictly speaking true that non-existent objects can
‘‘arise,’’ it is legitimate to make such a claim as a corrective against
the erroneous S am: khya position that all effects pre-exist in their
causes. ‘‘Arising’’ can only be a property of an existent thing. But the
thing in question must be qualified by a prior absence: E.g., when we
say that a pot ‘‘arises’’ what we mean is that a pot, which did not exist
previously, now exists. The prior absence of the pot is the ‘‘little bit of
the truth’’ that we rely upon in claiming that ‘‘non-existent objects
arise.’’ And this claim, although not really true, may be legitimately
offered to disabuse people of the false notion that nothing can arise
that did not exist previously. In the same way, in explaining the
theory of karma, one may legitimately say that a person will, in the
future, experience the karmic results of actions that he now performs.
Yet, this too is not strictly speaking true, since there is no ‘‘person’’
that endures through time. The statement is based on a ‘‘little bit of
the truth,’’ namely, that we, in fact, conceptually construct a mental
continuum that we take to be an enduring ‘‘self.’’ It is a ‘‘white lie’’ in
that we use it to expose the falsity of the view that our current actions
will not have karmic consequences, and that what we experience in
this life is not at all the result of previous actions.
anasrmitra now applies this theory of ‘‘conventionally adopted
Jñ
positions’’ to the present case:
Here too, [the idea that] linguistic expression takes a positive entity as its object is
just the same [in that it too is a conditionally adopted position]. Here, we condi-
tionally adopt the position that exclusion, even though it is [really just] a necessarily
attendant awareness, is the object of conceptual [including inferential/verbal]
awareness, in order to set aside any suspicion that we accept [the position] pushed by
100
JNA (AP: 204.26–205.03) atra br umah: | iha kacid
vyavastha tattvalesam a
sritya
prayojanavi : ad
ses anyatha sthitav apy anyatha kriyate, yathatmatadutp
ada
iti | utpado

hi pragabh
avavi sis
: t:asya vastunah: sata eva dharmah: | atha ca

pragabh
avalaks : an: atattvale sritya asata iti vyavasthapyate
sam a
satkaryav
ada
sank _ asa
nkoc
_ aya
| yatha vanenaiva
kr: tam
: karma ko ‘nyah:
pratyanubhavis : yatity ekasantanapraj~
naptim a
sritya
sakr
kr: tana : tabhy
agamava~

ncanavimoh
aya….
[our] opponents that it is only the positive entity that is really expressed. And
therefore, we don’t just talk in terms of the positive entity [when describing the
semantic value of a word]. But, when [someone] pushes the position that ‘‘Exclusion
alone is the primary meaning of a word,’’ then we put forth the positive entity as
well. As stated,
‘‘First of all, it is the [external] object that is primarily expressed by words.’’
But, in perception, because there is no disagreement [of this sort], it is proper that
one should not conditionally adopt this position.101
What is generally taken to be the traditional Buddhist position that

‘‘exclusion is what is revealed by words and inferential reasons’’ is not
really the Buddhist position at all. It is just another white lie. The
partial truth on which this white lie is based is the fact that, as dis-
cussed above, language and inference cannot effectively direct us
towards the proper objects of our activities without relying on
exclusion. And the purpose that makes this lie a ‘‘white’’ lie is that it
serves as a corrective to the mistaken view that positive entities alone
are expressed or inferred. Yet, if someone were to mistakenly take
this conditionally adopted position to be really the case, then, one
could adopt a new conditionally adopted position that positive
entities are also expressed and inferred, but only as qualified by
exclusions. This is exactly the position that Jñanasrmitra sets forth in
the first half of the summary verse quoted above. Jñanasrmitra
understands perception to be different from language/inference, not
because the latter takes exclusion as its object and the former does
not, but because, for reasons to be discussed below, there is no
parallel need to put forth the conditionally adopted position that
exclusion alone is the object of perception. Here again, Jñanasrmi-
tra’s response to the opponent’s argument is to concede that it is
substantially correct. Perception and language/inference are alike in
that they both have as their content a positive component and a
negative component, i.e., exclusion. The difference in the way that we
talk about them is based not on a difference in their content, but on a
difference in the kinds of rhetorical contexts that motivate our
discussions of them.
101
JNA (AP: 205.03–205.09). We are emending the text by inserting a sentence
break after the word ‘‘abhidhanam.’’
tathady
api
vidhivis: ayabhidh
anam
: . vastuto vas-

tuna eva pararopitav
acyat ikara
asv sank_ anir
akaran
nantart
: aya iyakapratitir apy apoha
eva vikalpavis
: aya iti vyavasthapyate | ato na vidhinaiva vyavaharah : | yada tv apoha
eva mukhyarthah
: sabdasyety aropah
: , tada vidhir api puraskriyate | yathoktam :,sabdais
tavan
mukhyam akhy ayate
‘rtha iti | pratyaks : e tu vivad
abh
av an
naivam vyavastheti
yuktam |.
This tendency to explain distinctions between basic terms in the

Buddhist epistemological tradition, not in terms of real differences in
their referents, but in terms of the different discursive contexts in
which they are used, can also be seen in Jñanasrmitra’s treatment of
the terms ‘‘conceptualization’’ (vikalpa) and ‘‘determination’’ (adhy-

avasaya). When an objector points out that while Dharmakrti uses
these terms contrastively,102 Jñanasrmitra does not offer any way to
explain the difference between them, Jñanasrmitra responds:
True, ‘‘conceptualization’’ and ‘‘determination’’ refer to the same thing. It’s just that
the [use of the] word ‘‘conceptualization’’ is occasioned by connection with words
and the like, while ‘‘determination’’ is occasioned by suitability for activity even with
respect to [an object] that is not grasped [by awareness].103
According to Jñ anasrmitra, the word ‘‘conceptualization’’ is

generally used to designate situations in which our mental image of
an object is inextricably bound up with the form of the word that is
used to refer to it: For example, for a competent speaker of English,
thinking of an object as a cow is typically bound up with the recol-
lection of the word ‘‘cow.’’ The word ‘‘determination,’’ however, is
generally applied to cases in which one treats a mental image as if it
were an object that one could act upon. But, as Jñanasrmitra goes on
to explain, since ‘‘thinking of’’ is just a kind of activity, conceptual-
ization is really nothing but determination. He continues:
This being the case, [just] as one concludes that an object has been apprehended
through conceptualization, likewise [one concludes that it has been apprehended]
bound up with the word [that refers to it]. This is because, like the partial image of a
thing,104 the image of the word also appears [in this awareness]. Therefore, the
conditionally adopted differentiation [vyavastha] 105 of conceptualization [from de-
termination] is not based in reality [tattvatah: ], but is only [accepted] in conformity
102
See JNA (AP: 225.19ff) and Katsura (1993).
103
JNA (AP: 226.01–226.03) …satyam ekarthau
vikalpadhyavas
ayau kevalam
:
vikalpasabdah: sabdadiyojan
animittakah
: | adhyavasayas
tv agr: hite ’pi prava-
rtanayogyatanimittah
: |.
104
The conceptual awareness that immediately follows perception classifies the
grasped object by picking out one aspect of it. Thus, in conceptualizing the smoke
that one sees as ‘‘smoke’’ rather than as ‘‘grey’’ or ‘‘wispy,’’ the awareness contains
just an aspect or part of what was grasped by the preceding non-conceptual
awareness (in conjunction with the memory of prior instances of smoke, the word
‘‘smoke,’’ etc.). For a discussion of selectivity in conceptualization see Dunne (2004),
Kellner (2004), and Patil (2003).
105
While we usually translate the term ‘‘vyavastha’’ as ‘‘conditionally
p adopted
position,’’ it could be more literally rendered as ‘‘setting something ( stha) down
(ava) as distinct (vi).’’ In adopting the position that something is a certain way, one
always implicitly adopts the position that it is distinct from what is not that way.
with the [conditional] determination that ‘‘In so far as a person conceives of himself
as apprehending a thing, to that extent, he likewise conceives of himself as appre-
hending it together with its name.’’106
For Jñanasrmitra, the terminological distinction between conceptu-

alization and determination is not based on a real difference in the
mental processes to which they refer, but is a contextually governed
fiction that is indexed to particular purposes. It is because, for people
who have learned a language, the object that one conceptually
apprehends is almost always associated with the word that is used to
refer to it that they mistakenly believe that conceptually appre-
hending an object and associating it with its name are one and the
same thing. And it is as a way of accommodating this widespread but
mistaken belief that Dharmakrti and others in the Buddhist episte-
mological tradition speak as if ‘‘conceptualizing’’ an object (i.e.,
apprehending it in association with a word that may be used to refer
to it) and ‘‘determining’’ it (i.e., apprehending it as an object of
activity in general—bodily, verbal, or mental) are distinct processes,
even though they are one and the same.
anasrmitra now explicitly relates this conditionally adopted
Jñ
position—that conceptualization can be distinguished from determi-
nation in virtue of its being bound up with language—to his earlier
discussion of the distinction between perception and inference.
And it is for the very same reason that, with a view towards the practically oriented
person whose mind has worn itself out due to the conceit [that conceptualizing a
thing and apprehending its name are the same], the qualifier ‘‘free from conceptual
construction’’ is included in the definition of perception [by Dign aga and Dhar-
makrti], and that, in the foundational text [Dharmakrti’s Hetubindu], there is sep-
arate mention [of conceptualization and determination with the words] ‘‘on the basis
of conceptual awareness... by determining.’’107
This passage asserts, rather shockingly, that the claim that perception
is free from conceptual construction—arguably the most fundamen-
tal and characteristic tenet of the Buddhist epistemological
106
JNA (AP: 227.01–227.04) evam : sati yatha vikalpena ayam artho gr: hita iti
ni
scayas tatha sabdena sam : yojyety api, arthak arale
savac chabdak arasy
sphuran: at
api |
tasmad yavad
arthagrahan: abhidh an
anav manavah

: tavad
abhidhanasam: yukta-

grahan: abhim an
anav apity avasay
anurodh
eva vikalpavyavastha na tattvatah: |.
ad
107
JNA (AP: 227.10–227.11). The reference is to HB 3*14–15, quoted in JNA (AP:
225.18–225.19). ata eva ca tadabhimanaml anam
anasam
: vyavah
arikam
: prati prat-
yaks: alaks: an: e kalpanapod
: havises iyate, s
: an: am upad utrato ’pi vikalpad
adhyavasayeneti

bhedanirdesah: |.
tradition—is itself nothing but another white-lie.108 For Jñanasrmi-

tra, it is not really the case that the perceptual process is free from
conceptual construction, since perception and inference each have
both a non-conceptual and a conceptual object. Yet, underlying this–
strictly speaking false—statement is a bit of the truth, namely that
perception does, in fact, have a non-conceptual object that is grasped
in the first moment of the perceptual process. Jñanasrmitra seems to
believe that the reason Dignaga and Dharmakrti state this partial
truth—that perception is free from conceptual construction—is that,
of the four possible objects of awareness (the grasped and determined
objects of both perception and inference), it is only the grasped object
of perception that can be differentiated from the other three objects
without breaking down the false equation of conceptualization and
language. The determined object of perception is conceptual but not
necessarily linguistic; the grasped object of inference/language is, as
discussed above, non-conceptual, but is, at least typically, bound up
with language, while the determined object of inference/language is
necessarily conceptual and (at least typically) also bound up with
language. So, for the practically oriented person, who takes con-
ceptualization and verbalization to be the same, these three objects
cannot be differentiated from one another. Recognizing that it is too
much to expect such a person to give up this deeply engrained
equivalence, Dign aga and Dharmakrti work around it by formu-
lating a definition of perception that takes the first step towards
clearly differentiating the objects of awareness. Accepting even this
‘‘little bit of the truth’’ marks a significant advance in philosophical
understanding for the pragmatically oriented person who is already
‘‘worn out’’ by the effort of accepting even this much.
anasrmitra’s theory of the ‘‘conditionally adopted position’’
Jñ
thus provides a new and powerful tool for satisfying the dual
objectives demanded by the ‘‘commentarial orientation’’ discussed
above—the need to be both philosophically correct and exegetically
faithful to the foundational texts of the tradition. This theory enables
Jñanasrmitra to legitimate Dignaga and Dharmakrti’s statements
while at the same time taking a philosophical position that is at odds
with what they appear, and have been generally taken, to mean.
108
For a brief, but useful, discussion of this tenet see Hattori (1968: 82–85)
n. 1.25–1.27. For more detailed analysis see Funayama (1992) and the discussion in
Franco (1987).
In the concluding passage of his work, Jñanasrmitra more fully

explains how conditionally adopted positions have functioned in the
Buddhist epistemological tradition and, more specifically, how this
theory accounts for the tradition’s differential treatment of percep-
tion and inference in relation to the question of exclusion. He sums
up his conditionally adopted account of the objects of language (and
inference) as follows:
It is established that what is expressed by a word is an external object, by way of
determination, but a mental image, by way of appearance.109
anasrmitra raises another hypothetical objec-

In response to this, Jñ
tion, and again responds to it by appealing to his theory of condi-
tionally adopted positions:
[Objection:] But, if you explain things in this way then you have accepted that the
entire collection of both sorts of objects is expressible. So, how is it that this [theory
of exclusion] has been introduced in order to establish the inexpressibility of all
attributes (dharma)?110
anasrmitra] says, ‘‘This [dual-object position out-
[Response:] To this he [i.e., I, Jñ
lined above] is conditionally adopted.’’111 The idea that things can be expressed
either merely by determination or merely by appearance is just a conditionally
adopted position made with another purpose in mind. And so, in order to rule out112
the mass of conditioning factors [—e.g., a generic property—which might be imag-
ined to occasion the use of particular terms], someone who accepts that there are
external objects merely as a conditionally adopted position on what is ultimately real
says that ‘‘Only the particular that is excluded from others is the object [of language
and inference].’’ Similarly, in order to rule out all external objects, one says that ‘‘The
image that is excluded from what is other—which is what a conceptual awareness
consists of—is the object.’’ But neither of these [is said] for the purpose of finally
settling upon the position that there is objecthood in [either the external object or the
image] itself—Thus, there is no contradiction.
[Objection:] But how is it that even when you say there is objecthood in one or the
other, what is intended is not to settle [upon one or the other as the object], but
rather, the intention [in ascribing objecthood to either one] is only to reject the other?
anasrmitra] says, ‘‘But really, nothing at all is
[Response:] Thus, he [i.e., I, Jñ
expressed [by words].’’113 As far as the practically oriented person is concerned, [in
language and inference] it is the appearance that is excluded [from what is other],
together with determination, that leads us to the belief that a really knowable object
109
JNA (AP: 230.07–230.08) sthitam etad adhyavasayena bahyasya
bud-
arasya
dhyak
tu pratibhasena sabdavacyatvam
ucyate iti.
110
As Jñanasrmitra argues earlier in both the introductory verse and the sum-
mary verse translated above.
111
See JNA (AP: 203.04).
112
We are emending ‘‘nira sana’’ to ‘‘nirasana,’’ as below.
113
JNA (AP: 203.04).
is the object of awareness, just as in the case of perception. For a mere appearance,
which is either devoid of determination, or whose functional role has been interfered
with by a contrary determination, is not capable of establishing for the person
desirous of activity that something is an object—like the touch of grass to one who is
moving through it114 [in the first case], or like the superimposition of water onto the
rays of the sun [in a mirage, in the latter case]. Nor is mere determination detached
from an appearance [capable of establishing, for the person desirous of activity, that
something is an object], again, like the superimposition of water.
Therefore, given that the establishment of an object requires suitability for activity,
it is vitiated by the absence of a requisite factor if either [appearance or determin-
ation] is absent. Since it is necessarily connected with the presence of both, it is
merely conventional to accept it [the establishment of an object] when just one is
singled out.115
114
See Syadv adaratn
akara
1.14–15, Vol 1, p. 146. [S utra] kim ity alocanam atram

anadhyavasaya iti ||14|| [Commentary] kim
: ity alocanam
atram
aspas : t:avisis
: t:avises: aj~
nanam
atram | kim ity aha | anadhyavasayas tr: tiyah:
samaropabhedo
‘dhyavasay ad
vi ses
: ollekhij~ nan
ad anya iti kr: tva | udaharan : am aha

[Sutra] yatha gacchattr: n: asparsaj~ nanam
iti ||15|| [Commentary] gacchato vrajatah:
satah: pramatus tr: n: asparsavis : ayam : j~ : tr: n: aspar
nanam saj~
nanam
anyatrasaktacittatv
ad
evam iyakam evam
: jat
: namakam idam ses
: vastv ity adivi
: anullekhi kimapi maya
spr::st:am ity alocanam
atram
ity arthah: | [S utra] ‘‘Without determination’’ [which is
the third variety of ‘‘superimposition’’ (samaropa), SVR 1.8–1.9 in SVR: 102)] is the
mere sensation ‘‘something.’’ [Commentary] The mere sensation ‘‘something’’ is the
mere awareness of a specific thing which is not clearly specified. ‘‘What is this?’’ He
says: This is ‘‘Without determination,’’ the third type of superimposition. After
taking it to be different from a determination i.e., an awareness which delineates a
specific thing, he gives an example: [S utra] Like the awareness of the touch of grass
for one who is moving through it. [Commentary] For a knower, who is ‘‘moving,’’
i.e., walking, ‘‘the awareness of the touch of grass,’’ i.e., the awareness which has the
touch of grass as its object,—that is to say, the mere sensation that ‘‘I have touched
something,’’ which does not pick out any specific features such as ‘‘this thing is of
this sort and has such a name,’’ because one’s attention is directed elsewhere—is just
sensation [without determination]—this is the meaning [of the s utra].
115
JNA (AP: 230.08–230.24). nanv evam : an
: vyacaks : ena bhavatobhayarthar a
ser
ases
: asya vacyat a svikr: teti katham : sarvadharmanabhil
apyat
asamarthan
artham idam

avataritam sthapyate
ity aha,
iti prayojanantaram uddi sya vyavastham atram
etat
kriyate, adhyavasayam atren
: a pratibhasam atren
: a va vacyatvam
iti | tatha ca
bahirvis : ayikaran: am : tattvavyavasthanam atram
: gr: hn: atah: tavad anyapod : ham :
svalaks : an: am eva vis : aya ity ucyate upadhir sinirasanaparam, evam anyapod
a : hak aro

vikalpasyatm a vis
: aya iti samastabahyanirasanaparam : , na tu svasmin vis : ayatvasya
visram
ayeti
na virodhah: | kutah: punar etat? tatra tatra vis : ayatapratip
adane
‘pi na
vi vivaks
sramo : itah: , kim : tv anyanirasane tatparyam vacyas
ity aha, tattvato naiva
ka scid arthah: | iti adhyavasayasah
apohipratibh : sam
asah : vyavaharik apeks : aya tattvato
j~
neyasya j~ nanavis
: ayatam upanayati pratyaks : avat | na hi pratibhasam atram

avasaya sunyam anyavas ay akr
antavy
ap
aram
: va pravr: ttikamasya
vis: ayavyavastham
arthe ks : amate, gacchattr: n: aspar savat, maricav udakaropavat
avasayam
| napy
atram
apetapratibhasam
udakaropavad eva | tasmat pravr: ttiyogyataya vyaptam :
vis
: ayavyavasthanam ubhayabhave*
vyapak
abh avena
paribh uyamanam
ubhayasam : bhavapratibaddham ekaviveke svikriyaman : am : sam : vr: tam eva | *We are
emending ubhayabh avo to ubhayabh ave.

For Jñanasrmitra, in the case of both perception and inference,

‘‘objecthood,’’ strictly speaking, requires both appearance and
determination. Appearance without determination does not present
us with an object upon which we can successfully act. For example,
when one is walking through a field of grass, but is thinking about
something else, the tactile sensation of the grass, although it is ‘‘felt,’’
does not lead to the determination ‘‘there is grass,’’ on the basis of
which one could undertake an action with ‘‘grass’’ as its object.
Likewise, as in the example of the mirage, when one has a sensation
that leads to a determination that is not appropriate—in the sense that
if one were to undertake an action on the basis of it, that action would
not produce a result that is consistent with one’s expectations—it does
not present us with an object upon which we can successfully act. In
the same way, determination without an appropriate appearance does
not present us with such an object. The example of the mirage illus-
trates this as well. In such a case, there is the appearance of light-rays
reflected off hot sand, but it leads to the determination ‘‘There is
water.’’ Because the appearance and the determination do not prop-
erly correspond to one another, they cannot present us with an object
upon which we can successfully act, as the appearance of light-rays
together with the determination ‘‘There are light-rays,’’ or the
appearance of water together with the determination ‘‘There is water’’
would do.116 Yet, even in these latter two cases, where an ordinary
person would assert that either light-rays or water were the objects of
their awareness, they are, for Jñanasrmitra, as we will see, still not
objects in the strictest sense, although they may be conventionally
described as such.
Jñ
anasrmitra now provides a formal inference to support this
position:
Whatever does not appear in a certain episode of awareness or is not determined by
it is not the object of that awareness, just as a horse [is not the object] of the
awareness ‘‘cow.’’ And a particular does not appear in verbal awareness, and a
mental image is not determined by it. Thus, [in each case] a requisite factor is
missing. Since a necessary relation has been established [between being both manifest
116
When Jñanasrmitra speaks of the ‘‘superimposition of water onto the rays of
the sun’’ he does not mean to imply that this sort of mistake is due to conceptualizing
‘‘water’’ when what is really there are rays of the sun. For Jñ anasrmitra, there is
nothing really there other than a grasped image which is not in the strictest sense an
image of anything. The superimposition of ‘‘water’’ in this case is erroneous only in
the sense that if one were to act on the basis of this conceptualization the results
would not correspond to one’s expectations as they would if one conceptualized the
grasped image as ‘‘rays of the sun.’’
in appearance and determined, and being an object of awareness], [this inferential

reason] is not inconclusive.117
Since, in order for something to be an object, it must both appear in

and be determined by awareness, anything that fails to satisfy either
of these two conditions cannot properly be called an object. Thus, a
horse, which neither appears in nor is determined by the awareness
‘‘cow,’’ cannot be its object. And in inferential/verbal awareness, as
has already been established, what appears is a mental image, but
what is determined is a particular. Because each of these fails to
satisfy one of the two conditions stated above—the mental image is
not determined and the particular does not appear—neither can,
strictly speaking, be an object.
And even if, in the case of completely habitual behavior, things are seen to be objects
of activity merely by appearance [and without any accompanying determination],
nevertheless, that very habituation could not exist without determination. Thus, this
[fact that when we act habitually we do so on the basis of appearance alone] is itself
[due to] the power of [previous] determination. Therefore, this qualification [to the
criterion given above] is required, ‘‘whatever is not determined by it when there is no
habituation [is not the object of an episode of awareness].’’118
Even when we act habitually, our action always depends upon both
appearance and determination. For example, when we act to deflect
something that has been thrown at us, we may do so spontaneously
on the basis of an appearance alone and without any intervening
determination. Yet such behavior is possible, according to
anasrmitra, only because of previous determinations. The habit
Jñ
that governs our actions in such cases must be the product of pre-
vious conditioning in which we were presented with such appearances
and formed appropriate determinations on the basis of them. Thus,
there may be instances of purely habitual action in which we respond
to an appearance without any intervening determination (and thus
the condition for ‘‘objecthood’’ given above must be qualified),
but this habituation itself can only be the product of previous
determinations. Thus, it is still the case that nothing can be an object
without both appearing and being determined.
117
JNA (AP: 230.24–230.27). yatra j~ nane
yan na pratibhasate yena va yan
iyate sa na tasya vis
navas : ayo yatha goj~ nanasy
a
svah: | na pratibhasate
ca sabdaj~
nane

svalaks iyate canena
: an: am, navas ara
buddhyak iti vyapak anupalabdhih
: | pratiban-

dhasadhan nanaik
at
antikah : |.
118
JNA (AP: 230.27–231.02). yady api catyant ase
abhy pratibhasam : api
atren
pravr: ttir vis: ayatvam
: ca dr::st:am, tathapi
sa evabhy
aso navas
ay ad
vinety avasayasyaiva

tat paurus iyate ‘saty abhyasa
: am, tato yena yan navas iti vises : yam | Also
: an: am apeks
see PVA 218.07ff.
At this point, the opponent objects that Jñanasrmitra’s criterion

for objecthood is so restrictive that nothing at all could count as an
object of any mode of awareness:
[Objection] But even in perception there is no determination of the grasped moment
but rather, of the continuum, and there is no appearance of this [continuum].119 So
how can even this [perception] have an object, since there is the absence of the pair
[appearance and determination] in the moment and in the continuum. And this very
investigation [of exclusion] is about inference [as well as about language]. And there
is no other instrument of valid awareness of which there could be any object in virtue
of there being both appearance and determination. Thus, your definition [of being an
object] is impossible (asambhava). Therefore, [awareness] can be established to have a
fixed object only if something can be made [an object] by either one or the other [of
these two, namely, appearance and determination]. And so everything, whether
external or internal, can be expressed.120
Again, the opponent draws attention to the parallelism between

perception and inference that is implied by Jñansrmitra’s argument.
As in linguistic awareness, in perception there is both something that
appears to us—the grasped moment—and something that we deter-
mine—the putatively external object towards which we direct our
activity. But there is nothing that both appears and is determined.
Therefore, the opponent argues that perception too could have no
‘‘object’’ as defined by Jñanasrmitra. Since linguistic awareness is
just a special case of inferential awareness, inference too, on
anasrmitra’s view, could have no ‘‘object.’’ And since perception
Jñ
and inference are the only two modes of valid awareness, the oppo-
nent argues that on Jñ anasrmitra’s definition nothing at all could be
an object of any valid awareness, and hence nothing at all could be
known. In order to avoid this problem, the opponent suggests an
alternative, namely, that anything that either appears or is deter-
mined should be considered to be an ‘‘object.’’ Thus, from the
opponent’s perspective, it is incorrect for Jñanasrmitra to claim that
‘‘nothing at all is really expressed’’: rather, both mental images and
putative external objects are objects of both perception and inference.
anasrmitra, in the first part of my
[Response] About this we say: He [i.e., I, Jñ
summary verse] is stating a conditionally adopted position about the way things
really are [tattvavyavastha].
[In fact] there is objecthood only in virtue of the
119
See Dharmottara NBT : : 71, cited above.
120
JNA (AP: 231.03–231.06). nanu pratyaks : e ‘pi na gr: hitaks ayah
: an: asyavas : , kim
: tu
ah
santateh: na casy : pratibhasa iti kenasy api
savis : ayatvam : , ks : an: e santatau cob-
hayabh
av at
| anumane tu pariks : aiva vartate | na canyat
praman : am asti, yasyobha-
yasam : bhavena vis
: ayah: ka scid ity asam : bhavam etat | tad ekaikena vidheyatve
sthitavis
: ayakasthitir akhilasya bahyasy
antarasya va vacyatvam
iti ||.
existence of both [appearance and determination]. It is just that the convention,

[that there can be objecthood in virtue of either appearance or determination,
separately,] is said to be ‘‘the way things really are,’’ relative to a lower-order
convention [adharasamvr: ti], with a view towards the practically oriented person.
This is because for the practically oriented person things are not destroyed at each
moment, since pragmatic activity breaks down when one gets down to the division
between moments. Even with perception there is really no possibility of both. Thus,
there is no problem.121
Once again, Jñ anasrmitra responds by granting that much of what

the opponent has to say is correct. He agrees that given his definition,
perception, just like language and inference, cannot really have an
object. He does not agree, however, that because of this it would be
better to adopt a less restrictive criterion for objecthood such that
there could really be objects of perception, inference, and language.
In order for a definition to be useful, and therefore appropriate, it is
not necessary that it define something that really exists or even
something that could really exist. Talk of ‘‘real objects’’ can be jus-
anasrmitra, even if one takes the position that ultimately
tified, for Jñ
there are no such objects. When speaking to an ordinary person who
believes that the (momentary) object that appears to him and the
(temporally extended) object that he takes to be the object of his
subsequent activity are one and the same, it may be useful to say that
perception really has two objects, a non-conceptual one (the grasped
moment) and a conceptually constructed one (the determined con-
tinuum), even if one’s ultimate position is that perception does not
have any object at all. The two-object model of perception, while still
‘‘conventional’’ and adopted only conditionally is, nevertheless, for
philosophical reasons, an improvement upon the ‘‘lower-order
convention’’ of the ordinary person.
Now if you say, ‘‘For an ordinary person, there is surely a failure to grasp even the
difference between what is seen and what is conceptualized, such that [for him] the
determined fire is the very same one that appeared,’’ we say, ‘‘No.’’ This is because it
is due to the recollection of other appearances [of fire] that [people] fall into the error
that there is the appearance of that [determined fire]. And since in perception it is
possible to show an appearance of the thing [that is present before one], which
is definitely different from the conceptual appearance, and likewise that this
[conceptual appearance] is different from the perceptual appearance,
therefore—because it is only there [, in perception] that one can settle on the
appearance of a thing—for [modes of awareness that are] different from that
121
JNA (AP: 231.07–231.10). atrocyate | tattvavyavastham aha,
ubhayasam : bha-
venaiva vis : ayatvam : , kevalam : sam : vyavaharik apeks
: aya sam
: vr: ter evadharasam : vr: tim
apeks : ya tattvam iti vyavahriyate, ks : an: abhedavat
are sam: vyavaharavilop
at
vyavah
ar-
ikam : prati pratiks : in: atay
: an: aks a abhav at,
tattvatah: pratyaks
: en: obhayasam : bhavabh
avah
:,
iti na dos: ah: .
[perception—i.e., language and inference], it is better to deny that [anything—either

the grasped or determined object—] is the appearance of a thing (vastupratibhasa).

Therefore, it was rightly said that ‘‘[This is] conditionally adopted. But really,
nothing at all is expressed [by words].’’122
The opponent objects that this ‘‘ordinary person’’ could not even
apprehend the distinction between the grasped and determined
objects of perception and thus could not be brought to accept even
the little bit of truth contained in Jñansrmitra’s supposedly higher-
order convention. While acknowledging that ordinary people do not
usually distinguish between ‘‘grasped’’ and ‘‘determined’’ objects of
perception, Jñ anasrmitra nevertheless argues that it not difficult to
show such a person that there is a clear difference between the visual
image of a perceived object, e.g., the fire that is present before one,
and the conceptual image that appears when one recalls or imagines
fire.123 Furthermore, one can show that many properties that one
takes to belong to the fire that one ‘‘sees,’’ e.g., its capacity to cook
food, are not presented in the visual image, but rather are derived
from our memory of previous experiences of fires. Therefore, it can be
clearly demonstrated that the ‘‘fire’’ that we take ourselves to see is
actually an amalgam of what is visually present to us and what we
conceptually construct on the basis of previous experiences. Thus, in
perception one can point to a clear phenomenal distinction between
the grasped and determined ‘‘objects.’’ And because of this clear
phenomenal distinction, it is relatively easy to speak of one of these
objects as the ‘‘thing’’ (vastu) that we perceive, in contrast to the
conceptually constructed elements of our awareness. In language and
inference, however, there is no such clear phenomenal distinction
between the grasped and determined ‘‘objects’’ of our awareness and
therefore Jñanasrmitra does not see any point in speaking of either
of these objects as being the ‘‘thing’’ that we infer or refer to. So,
while accepting the substance of the opponent’s claim—that what
anasrmitra says about language and inference should, according
Jñ
to his own line of reasoning, also apply to perception—he
122
JNA (AP: 231.10–231.16), quoting JNA (AP: 203.04). atha pr: thagjanasya
dr: syavikalpyayor apy abhedagraho niyata evety avasito vahnih: pratibhasita eveti cet.
na, pratibhas antarasmaran
: ena tatpratibhasabhramabhram
: sasya kr: tatvat
| yatha ca
vikalpapratibhas ad
anya eva vastupratibhaso darsayitum adhyaks : e sakyah: , tatha
*cadhyaks
: apratibhas ad
anyo stiti tatraiva vastupratibhasavi
sram at iyasya
tadvijat
vastupratibhasat avyud
asah
: sreyan
| tasmad yuktam uktam, sthapyo vacyas
tattvato
naiva ka scit | iti | *We are emending ‘‘na’’ to ‘‘ca.’’
123
See Krasser (1995), and our earlier discussion, for parallels in the work of
Dharmottara.
nevertheless provides an account of why it is that Buddhist episte-

mologists have historically spoken of perception as if it had a real
(non-conceptually grasped) object. And since this rationale for
speaking of a ‘‘real object’’ does not apply in the case of language and
inference, it is appropriate for Buddhist epistemologists to say that
language and inference do not have a real object, without necessarily
making a comparable claim for perception. But, despite his defense of
the divergent ways in which Buddhist epistemologists talk about
perception and language/inference, Jñanasrmitra’s argument—as the
opponent rightly claims—is equally applicable to both. At the end of
the day, everything that Jnanasrmitra says about inference and
language in the summary verse of the Apohaprakaran: a is, for him,
also true of perception. The determined object of perception is the
putatively external object towards which we direct our action. But
what is actually present to our awareness is not an external object,
but rather a mental image. Perception, and the actions that we
undertake on the basis of it, presuppose an object that is both
available—that is, present to our awareness—and actionable. And
since only mental images can be available and only putatively
external objects can be actionable, there is really no ‘‘object’’ of
perception just as there is really no ‘‘object’’ of language and
inference.
CONCLUSION
anasrmitra’s theory of conditionally adopted positions (vyavastha)

Jñ
is his primary conceptual resource for resolving the tension between
the dual objectives of exegetical and philosophical correctness dis-
cussed in the Introduction. It allows him to maintain that he is being
faithful to the Dharmakrtian text tradition, and at the same time
arrive at philosophical conclusions that have not been presented in
any of the foundational works of the tradition, and may even seem to
contradict some of its central claims. This theory gives him the
flexibility to reshape and rethink the accepted conclusions of the
Dharmakrtian tradition in a manner that is consistent with his own,
quite innovative, philosophical views. It allows him, in effect, to take
the position that Dharmakrti was right to say everything that he
said, but that not everything that he said was right. But in so doing, it
also problematizes his relationship to the textual tradition which he
ostensibly builds upon in developing his own system. Once the theory
of conditionally adopted positions (vyavastha) is on the table, it

forces upon the interpreter a new set of questions: In interpreting any
particular passage one must determine whether the claims being made
represent what the author ultimately believes, or whether they are just
positions that are conditionally adopted. And if the latter, one must
ask what ‘‘little bit of truth’’ they contain, and to whom they are
addressed, and for what purpose. For Jñanasrmitra, it is not enough
to simply understand what a text literally says or to ask if its argu-
ments are correct. One must also ask why particular arguments and
claims are made use of in specific contexts, and with what interloc-
utors in mind. Jñ anasrmitra’s method, then, requires that one
approach texts of the Buddhist epistemological tradition not merely
as an exegete or as a philosopher, but also as an intellectual historian.
By combining these three ways of approaching texts from the
Buddhist epistemological tradition, Jñanasrmitra is able to
develop a position which is both self-consciously traditionalist and
self-consciously innovative. Thus, he is able to formulate a theory of
exclusion in terms that are derived from Dharmakrti, and to justify it
with abundant citations from his works, while reaching conclusions
that are radically different from, and in some ways contradictory to,
those of Dharmakrti. This means that in assessing the extent
to which Jñ anasrmitra’s theory of exclusion is derivative
from Dharmakrti’s, it is not enough to simply consider his use of
Dharmakrti’s terminology or the frequency with which he quotes
Dharmakrti in support of his own position. Rather, in each case, one
must try to understand Jñanasrmitra’s specific motives and objec-
tives in using Dharamkrti’s words as he does. More generally, it is
essential that in reading Jñanasrmitra we ask, at every step, not
merely what he is saying, but what he is doing. It should be clear,
moreover, that such considerations do not only apply to interpreting
Jñanasrmitra’s work but should be extended to the Buddhist epis-
temological tradition more generally, and to Sanskrit philosophy as a
whole. If we are really to understand how and why Sanskrit philo-
sophical texts were written as they were, it is essential that we not
limit ourselves to a surface analysis. In interpreting any statement, we
must not only attend to what the author is saying but to: why he says
it, why he says it in the way that he does, and why at just this point in
the text; to what audience the statement is addressed; and what he
hopes to achieve in saying it. This approach enables us to engage with
the thought and intellectual practice of individual authors as
individuals. Even when individual authors position themselves as
followers of a well defined textual and philosophical tradition, it

cannot be assumed that they are simply recapitulating or stating more
explicitly what was already implicit in earlier works of the tradition,
even when they claim that this is all that they are doing. An overtly
traditionalist posture may be, and often is, coupled with substantive
and even radical innovation, as we have seen. This has important
methodological implications for our field, particularly for the way in
which we think about and use commentaries. We must move away
from the approach to commentaries and quasi-commentarial litera-
ture that treats them either as exegetically reliable and therefore
philosophically uncreative guides to the real meaning of the root text,
or as exegetically wrong and therefore of limited interest. Authors
such as Dharmottara, Prajñakaragupta, and Jñanasrmitra are,
whatever else they may be, innovative philosophers in their own right
and their work must be read and thought of in this light.124
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ABBREVIATIONS
AP
Apohaprakaran:a (Jñanasrmitra) in JNA.
BKNCT Bulletin of Kochi National College of Technology.
DhPr Dharmottarapradipa (Durvekamisra) in Malvania (1971).
HB Hetubindu (Dharmakrti) in Steinkellner (1967).
HBT: Hetubindut:ika (Arcat:a) in Sanghavi and Jinavijayji
(1949).
HBT
:A Hetubindut:ikaloka
(Durvekamisra) in Sanghavi
(and Jinavijayji) (1949).
IPPV Isvarapratyabhijñavivr: tivimarsini (Abhinavagupta) in

Shastri (1938–1943).
JNA srimitranibandhavali
Jn~ana (Jñanasrmitra) in Thakur
(1987).
LPrP Laghupram an : yapariks : a (Dharmottara) in Krasser (1991).
N1 Apohasiddhi (Ratnakrti), Manuscript # 5–256 from
the National Archives of Nepal.
N2 Apohasiddhi (Ratnakrti), Manuscript # 3–696 from
the National Archives of Nepal.
N3 Apohasiddhi (Ratnakrti), Manuscript # 764d
(running number) from the National Archives of Nepal.
NBT: Nyayabindut
:ika (Dharmottara) in DhPr.
NBT::T Ny
ayabindut :ippan:a in Shastri (1984).
:ikat
NBT: (Vi) Nyayabindut
:ika (Vintadeva) in Shastri (1984).
NBh u Nyayabh
u:san:a (Bhasarvajña) in Yogindrananda (1968).
NKan: Nyayakan
: ika (Vacaspatimisra) in Stern (1988).
NKan: (1907) Nyayakan: ika, in Śastr (1907).
NSu utra (Gautama) in Thakur (1997).
Nyayas
NVTT : Nyayav
arttikat
atparyat :ika (Vacaspatimisra) in Thakur
(1996).
PV 1 Praman : avarttika,
Svarthanumana (Dharmakrti) in
Gnoli (1960).
Praman: asiddhi (Dharmakrti) in
Miyaksaka (1971/2).
Pratyaks: a (Dharmakrti) in
Miyasaka (1971/2), Tosaki (1995).
Pararthanumana (Dharmakrti) in
Miyasaka (1971/2), Tillemans (2004).
PVA Praman : avarttik
nk
ala (Prajñakaragupta) in
_ ara
Sam: krty a yana (1953).
PVin 1 Praman : avini scaya 1 (Dharmakrti) in Vetter (1966).
PVin 2 Praman : avini scaya 2 (Dharmakrti) in Steinkellner (1973).
PVinT: Pram
an: avini scayat:ika (Dharmottara) in Steinkellner
and Krasser (1989).
PVV Praman : avarttikavr
: tti (Manorathanandin) in
Sam: krty ayana (1938–1940).
PVSV Praman : avarttikasvavr
: tti (Dharmakrti) in Gnoli (1960).
SSS Sak arasiddhi

sastra (Jñanasrmitra) in JNA.
SVR Syadv
adaratn

akara (Vadidevas uri) in Motilal
(1926–1930).
VC Vyapticarc

a (Jñanasrmitra) in JNA.
WSTB Wiener Studien zur Tibetologie und Buddhismuskunde.
WZKS Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens.
WZKSO Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Süd- und Ostasiens.
FAS Department of Sanskrit

Harvard University
Room # 313, 1 Bow Street
Cambridge, MA 02138
USA
E-mail: [email protected]

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Journal of Indian Philosophy (2006) 34: 303–366 Springer 2006

LAWRENCE J. MCCREA AND PARIMAL G. PATIL

TRADITIONALISM AND INNOVATION: PHILOSOPHY,

Among the most salient features of Sanskrit philosophical literature is

Commentarial and quasi-commentarial literature4 are generally

anasrmitra merely rearranged and systematized the

In what follows, we hope to show that the apparent traditionalism

THE PROBLEM OF EXCLUSION

The theory of exclusion was ﬁrst explicitly formulated by Dhar-

without real universals, it is still possible to successfully make infer-

anasrmitra calls ‘‘determination’’ (adhyavasaya).

As a technical term in Buddhist epistemology, ‘‘determination’’

particulars that are capable of being pragmatically eﬀective, it

To better explain this, Dharmakrti oﬀers the following analogy:

From a distance, a person sees a glowing light and, taking it to be a

For Dharmakrti and his followers, particulars are unique—they

Again, Dharmakrti makes clear that determination is a kind of

at all—in this case, the generalized images in the awareness of the

part of Dharmakrti’s account of how one moves from perceptual

The distinction that Dharmakrti is drawing here is between the

Dharmakrti here elaborates on his account of ‘‘recollective aware-

The conceptual awareness that follows upon perception (i.e., the

In this section, Dharmakrti builds upon his argument that concep-

Here it is important to keep in mind Dharmakrti’s distinction be-

particulars and thereby make them pragmatically available to us.

DETERMINATION AND ‘‘PERCEPTUAL JUDGMENT’’

In oﬀering this account of determination as it appears in Dhar-

Our survey of Dharmakrti’s use of the term ‘‘determination’’

It may be important to note in passing that Dharmakrti seems to distinguish in

As Katsura recognizes, the term ‘‘perceptual judgment’’ does not

position that determination is speciﬁcally linked to motivation,

What is being discussed here is how we come to know and respond to

[i.e., in inferential/verbal awareness], [he acts] only with respect to a

solely on the passage from Dharmottara to support his position. But,

While Dharmottara presents himself as a faithful follower and

For Dharmottara, an episode of valid awareness, whether perceptual

It is clear that what Dharmottara says about inference in this

causally related moments. These continua are not, however,

suggests that his view contradicts Dharmakrti’s. In his response,

Dharmottara’s position is that without determination we could not

perception to be valid and, on the other, that it is still legitimate to

Dharmottara begins his response by drawing a distinction between

DHARMOTTARA ON THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN PERCEPTION AND INFERENCE

Since, as we have seen, Dharmottara’s account of valid awareness

describe it in more detail in his Apohaprakaran: a.73 There, in

Even though Jñanasrmitra is often portrayed as a rival of

neither the grasping nor determining of such a particular. For

Thus, whatever is determined is conceptual and whatever is not

objects of awareness fall into two neatly deﬁned and mutually

RELATIVIZATION OF BASIC CATEGORIES

This position seems to put Jñanasrmitra at odds with his prede-

And again, with reference to the ‘‘universal,’’ ﬁre, he says:

For Jñanasrmitra, what we call a ‘‘universal’’ is simply an image that

RELATIVIZATION OF INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL

A similar relativization of basic conceptual categories in the Buddhist

86 (AP: 226–227): sa cagnir

When one aﬃrms the existence of a tree by saying, ‘‘There is a tree

determined—that is, not directly presented by the awareness that puts

CONDITIONALLY ADOPTED POSITIONS

In the above passage, Jñ anasrmitra makes use of a concept, ‘‘con-